An F-35 pilot discusses why night flying is necessary, flying more night ops during winter, and surge operations.
11.15.2019
Video by Senior Airman Danielle Charmichael, Airman 1st Class Jazmin Granger and Tech. Sgt. Joseph Orellana
2D Audiovisual Squadron
The occasion of President Jair Bolsonaro’s visit to Miami with President Trump and then to SOUTHCOM provides an opportunity to discuss the challenges facing Brazil in 2020.
Prior to providing that assessment by Kenneth Maxwell, it is important to highlight the historic visit of Brazil’s President to SOUTHCOM.
The video above shows Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s visiting U.S. Southern Command, Mach 8, 2020, to meet with U.S. Navy Adm. Craig Faller, as well as other command and Department of Defense leaders.
Bolsonaro’s historic visit marked the first time a Brazilian president has visited SOUTHCOM. The leaders discussed the growing defense-cooperation partnership between Brazil and the U.S.
While Bolsonaro was at the headquarters in Miami, the U.S. and Brazil signed a bilateral agreement on Research Development, Test and Evaluation Projects that will expand opportunities for both countries to collaborate and share information on the development of new defense capabilities.
The video is credited to U.S. Southern Command and is dated March 8, 2020.
According to Press Reports, President Trump took the opportunity during Bolsonaro’s visit to discuss the evolving situation and opportunities in Venezuela to craft a democratic solution for Venezuela’s future.
In the following article published on January 24, 2020 on Defenes.info, Kenneth Maxwell provided his perspective on the challenges facing Brazil in 2020.
Excerpts from that article follows:
Politics in Brazil are already polarized and will continue to be so in 2020.
The Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, owed his election to this polarization. He will stoke it further. It is in his political interest to do so. It is entirely in his character to do what he does best.
That is stirring up resentments, misogyny, homophobia, nationalism, and rightwing populism.
Confrontation is the new norm in Brazilian politics.
This in a country that once prided itself on conciliation.
Even if conciliation historically covered a multitude of social, racial, and economic inequalities.
Belligerent confrontation is now the name of the game.
Few are seeking consensus.
The economic situation may improve in 2020.
There are indications that the long recession the country has suffered over the last five years may be easing. Employment prospects are beginning to improve. The unemployment rate had been 13.70% in 2017.
But 2019 ended with unemployment falling to 11.20%. This still leaves almost 12 million people out of work within a population of over 210 million.
Some legislative changes have been made in Bolsonaro’s first year in office. Much now depends on implementing radical domestic reform legislation which the multifarious special Interests represented in the Brazilian Congress (there are 17 parties in the Senate and 30 parties in the lower chamber of the Congress) have always been loath to support (or to support in return for special favors.)
An improvement in international trade and business conditions will also help, especially a resolution of the trade dispute between the US and China which could have a major impact on Brazil’s prospects.
Brazilian growth according to the most recent projections, prior to the new crisis in the Middle East, may reach 1.7% which will return Brazil to pre-recession levels.
The World Bank forecasts Brazilian growth at 2%.
Brazilian society remains woefully divided.
The on-going culture wars will intensify.
Brazil will continue to be part of the global struggle over the future of democracy, authoritarianism, populism, internationalized drug trafficking, and especially over the environment. The broad de-facto consensus between center left and the center right which has dominated Brazilian politics since the 1980’s has clearly broken down.
A stable new configuration of political forces has yet to emerge.
The lingering presence on the political scene of the two principal political protagonists of the old political division between center left and center right, former two term presidents Lula da Silva (Lula) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), complicates the situation.
Neither Lula nor FHC shows any willingness to gracefully retire from political protagonism.
Each seems determined to continue fighting old battles. In FHC’s case (he is ever conscious of US precedents) this means promoting the 2022 presidential prospects of the São Paulo TV host and entrepreneur Luciano Grostein Huck. Huck presents “caldeirão do Huck” (Huck’s Cauldron”) on the Rede Globo network, Brazil’s largest.
Lula’s continued political activism stymies the prospects for the emergence of credible alternatives on the left. It did so in his late withdrawn from the last presidential contest which undermined the prospects of Fernando Haddad who belatedly became the Worker’s Party (PT) candidate.)
But Lula’s resilience, wiliness, political ruthlessness, and instinct for self-preservation, should never be underestimated.
The political landscape is being recast by forces well outside the old networks of power (though sometimes these are old forces, like the Bolsonaro clan clothed in and weaponized by new garments.)
What is new is that these clusters of special interests have emerged in an environment which is already internationalized with the rise of cyber influence campaigns and sophisticated clandestine political interference and manipulation.
In this Brazil is well ahead of the game which marries the old surveillance mechanisms inherited from the military dictatorship to the new techniques developed in the age of the Internet.
One of the Harvard University students who co-founded Facebook in 2004 it should be remembered was the Brazilian Eduardo Saverin. He fell out with Mark Zuckerberg. His worth was estimated at US$10.1 billion in June 2019 and he is now living in tax exile in Singapore.
Jair Bolsonaro with an eye on the next presidential election in 2022 is forming a new political party, an “Aliança pelo Brasil” with himself as the President of the party and his son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro of Rio de Janeiro, as the Vice-President. Its objectives match his government’s slogan of “Brazil above all, God above all everyone.”
Like so much with (reserve) army captain Jair Bolsonaro and his outspoken nostalgia for the days of the military dictatorship, his new “Aliança pelo Brasil” is reminiscent of the National Renewal Party (ARENA), the pro-government conservative political party (or agglomeration) which between 1966 and 1979 was the” official” party of the military regime.
The Aliança pelo Brasil is mobilizing the support of leading Evangelicals to obtain the 491.000 signatures needed to make the new party a viable electoral alternative.
The Evangelicals are an important force in Brazil.
Recent analysis in one Rio de Janeiro favela found that 40% of the residents considered themselves to be evangelical and only 17% considered themselves to be Catholic’s. in São Paulo a vast 10,000 seat “Temple of Solomon” was built as the cost of US$300 million by the “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.” Its minister is the son-in-law of the founder of the church, Edir Macedo, whose worth is thought to be US$ 1.3 billion and is the owner of Rede Record, the second largest broadcaster in Brazil. The “Universal Church” is said to have 1.8 million followers in Brazil.
The old battle between “Liberalism” (or “neo-liberalism”) and “Statism” (that is the dominant role of the state in business enterprises) is also back with a vengeance.
This is a conflict that rests in part on the struggle between the power of the “official” economy, where the statisticians, the bankers, the corporate managers, and the international investors live, and the “informal” economy where most non-rich (and non-white) Brazilians survive their daily challenges, and where emotional support for national enterprises remains very strong.
The “markets” know what it is they would like to see: A successful implementation of the plans of Paulo Guedes, the minister of the economy, and the creation of a slimmed down, more agile state, with more privatizations, a simplification of the tax system, much greater openness of the economy to the world, more flexible labour rules, and the overhaul of the pension system.
Paulo Guedes is certainly trying…..
The arrival Jair Bolsonaro in office also marked a major shift in Brazilian international policy. In 2020 Brazil has become very much part of the Trump (and American) camp. The days of Lula’s skepticism about the United States, and his opening to Africa, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Islamic world is long gone. But navigating these international shoals will not be uncomplicated for Bolsonaro in 2020.
Trump is an unpredictable friend and Trump is above all a transactional and not an ideological president and he faces an election campaign in 2020. In Brazil’s neighborhood in Latin America tensions will continue in 2020. Social unrest and street protests have already sent shock waves across the region from Chile to Colombia.
Venezuela is in permanent and unresolved crisis and millions of Venezuelans have fled the country including into Brazil. Brazil will strive to avoid contagion. Jair Bolsonaro will face the need to conciliate the ideological driven and pragmatists within his own government.
He will need to bring economic growth.
None of these easy tasks within an angry and divided society he has done so much to instigate and on which his political fortunes depend.
For the complete article by Kenneth Maxwell, see the following:
By Robbin Laird
At the upcoming Williams Foundation Seminar to be held on March 26, 2020, the role of autonomous systems in the evolution of the combat force is the focus of attention.
Clearly, a key aspect of this evolution will be the role of maritime remotes within the maritime force, and notably, how these systems will interact with and extend the reach of the surface fleet.
A recent CSBA study entitled Taking Back the Seas by Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton provides a good launch point for addressing the question of the projected role and impact of maritime remotes
The study provides a look into how the US Navy should reshape its entire shipbuilding and development strategy to build its core future capability around a surface fleet which encompasses the coming revolution in autonomous systems.
There is much to recommend this study, but what is missing is the question of how the surface fleet itself plays out its role within the overall kill web of the air-maritime-land force?
The proposed surface fleet transformation which is designed to deliver a distributed combat capability within an integrated force actually intersects with the significant transformation already being realized by aviation, including naval aviation.
Indeed as one senior Admiral put it to me recently when we were discussing the role of software upgradeability in changing the approach to force modernization, ” aviation has been living through this software transformation for a much longer period than the surface fleet.” He then argued for a cross-cutting transformation to accelerate change within the surface fleet itself.
At its heart, the fifth-generation transformation being effected by the F-35 sensor fusion-CNI C2/ISR capability to open up the aperture of C2 decision making at the tactical edge is shaping a significant set of opportunities for the surface and subsurface fleet to deliver strike throughout a distributed battlespace.
The authors of the surface fleet study have provided a thoughtful look at how maritime autonomous systems can change how the surface fleet would be configured.
But I would argue that this will be most significant, at least in its first phases, in terms of delivering proactive ISR to the fleet.
The challenge will to translate that proactive ISR into the distributed strike and defensive capabilities which can empower the entire combat force, not simply the surface fleet.
This opportunity and challenge ultimately rests on the capability to deliver C2 to the tactical edge as well as the ability to then be able to provide for decision making which can find ways to leverage a crisis management force postured for distributed operations.
In their study, they highlight the role of C2 as follows:
U.S. surface forces will likely operate in a contested and congested EMS during future conflicts. To overcome this challenge, DoD is investing significant resources in the development of resilient and adaptable communications architectures, including new low earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, UAV relays, and jam-resistant radios.
Despite these investments, U.S. forces may be unable to sustain high or moderate bandwidth communications over wide areas due to their proximity to adversary jammers and the long distances between U.S. units and theater commanders. Rather than expend scarce resources to build a new communications architecture to support desired C2 structures, communications requirements could be reduced through an alternative approach to C3 that adapts existing C2 structures to accommodate communications availability. This concept, which could be described as context-centric C3, relies on decision-support tools to help junior commanders develop and execute plans even when communications are lost with senior leaders.
Under context-centric C3, junior commanders would employ automated decision aids to support operational planning and execution. Several of these tools are under development today and could be fielded by 2030. When they are unable to receive orders from senior leaders, decision aids would help junior commanders develop courses of action to pursue objectives using the units in communication at that time. In a degraded or denied communications environment, planning tools would help coordinate a commander’s plan with those of friendly forces that are out of radio contact by predicting the actions of other forces given the guidance of senior leaders and sensor data on friendly and adversary units. (Page 26)
The C2/ISR challenge is really at the heart of what maritime autonomous systems can or cannot deliver to the maritime force.
Without considering the key role which fifth generation air systems are delivering as well as the reset which the Navy-Marine Corps team is working through in terms of the integratable air wing or the evolving amphibious task force, one can overstate what maritime autonomous systems can really deliver to the force.
It is clear that the network is a weapon.
But one of the key challenges facing maritime remotes is their potential “capture” by an adversary and the turning them into “inside” the network weapons against the blue force itself; that is certainly something which the blue side is working on with regard to adversaries.
From my perspective, the importance of the CSBA study is challenging force planners to think in terms of the coming of maritime remotes not simply as additive elements but as core elements of a redesigned force in which the manned element is dispersed as well throughout the deployment of autonomous systems.
And that manned element is clearly what I would call C3 but in a bit differently from the authors of the study.
The third C to me is confidence in information and that is at the heart of how decisions will be taken at the tactical edge, namely, deployed at the tactical edge, warriors WILL take decisions based on the information they have the most confidence in, not simply, what is potentially available from a waterfall of information from edge of the battlespace.
What the study highlights is the importance of simply not having a 30 year shipbuilding plan which ignores what shifting to the concepts of operations of a distributed integrated force requires, and one which is clearly joint.
It is not simply about ships: it is about sea bases within a distributed integrated force which reaches out to air and land basing as well of various sorts.
For example, a key contributor to providing crisis management dominance to a surface fleet with mixed UUVs, USVs and manned surface combatants, would almost certainly be the US or allied fifth generation tactical fighters or P-8s or Tritons, along with either long range strike or proximate strike platforms.
And certainly, one of those platforms in the period projected in the CSBA study when remotes become a key element of the surface navy will be the B-21 bomber.
This bomber can get to the crisis management area more rapidly than any ship at distance.
And with the fifth-generation combat systems onboard with the very flexible payloads which it could carry, can be customized to the presence force engaged in crisis management and provide it with tailorable assets to provide for scalable dominance.
In short, maritime remotes are clearly a key part of the redesign of the surface fleet but understood in the broader redesign of the distributed Integratable joint and coalition force.
Also, see the following:
Shaping an Australian Navy Approach to Maritime Remotes, Artificial Intelligence and Combat Grids
Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force.
Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which the integrated force will prepare and operate.
Moreover, they have highlighted the challenges of acting independently at an accelerated tempo and in sustained, high intensity Joint operations involving peer competitors.
Within this narrative, the 2020 seminars will further develop the ideas associated with an increasingly sophisticated approach to Joint warfighting and power projection as we face increasing pressure to maintain influence and a capability edge in the region.
Following on from the October 2019 seminar titled ‘The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre’, the 2020 series of seminars and lunches will examine:
In doing so, they will each address how the Australian Defence Force must equip, organise, connect, and prepare for multi-domain operations. As ever, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation has identified pre-eminent speakers from across the Australian and international defence communities, as well as invited industry representatives to reflect the integral role they will play in the national framework of future operational capability.
Building upon the existing foundations of Australian Defence Force capability, the aim of the March seminar is to explore the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with unmanned systems. From its origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of increased autonomy across the enterprise are now expected to fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations.
The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance.
Often described as the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions, unmanned systems have now provided the commander with a far broader range of options for the application of force against even the most challenging target sets. However, ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as the game changer.
The narrative is now forming across defence which has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than hitherto. The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’.
Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to generate the desired overwhelming firepower.
This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system. Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting.
The aim of the March 2020 seminar, therefore, will be to promote discussion about the near and far future implications of autonomous systems, and to build an understanding of the potential and the issues which must be considered in the context of the next Defence White Paper and Force Structure Review.
It will investigate potential roles for autonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain, providing Service Chiefs with an opportunity to present their personal perspective on the effect it will have on their Service.
The seminar will also explore the operational aspects of autonomous systems, including command and control and the legal and social implications that affect their employment.
And finally the seminar will examine the current research agenda and allow industry an opportunity to provide their perspective on recent developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants.
Each of which are opening new ways of warfighting and creating opportunities to reconceptualise Joint operations and move away from the platform-on-platform engagements which have traditionally characterised the battlespace.
WF_NGAS_26Mar2020_SynopsisandProgramThe featured image highlights the future loyal wingman aircraft being developed in Australia by Boeing.
A February 10, 2020 press release by Boeing Australia highlighted progress on the program:
BRISBANE, Australia, February 10, 2020 – The Boeing [NYSE:BA] Australia team recently completed major fuselage structural assembly for the first Loyal Wingman. The aircraft is one of three prototypes that will be developed as a part of the Loyal Wingman – Advanced Development Program in partnership with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
“This is an exciting milestone for the development program, and the Australian aerospace industry, as we progress with production of the first military aircraft to be developed in Australia in more than 50 years,” said Dr. Shane Arnott, program director, Boeing Airpower Teaming System (ATS).
The Australian team has applied digital engineering and advanced composite materials to achieve cost and agility goals for the 38-foot (11.7-metre) aircraft, which is designed to use artificial intelligence in teaming with other manned and unmanned platforms.
“The partnership with Boeing is key to building our understanding of not just the operational implications for these sorts of vehicles, but also making us a smart customer as we consider options for manned-unmanned teaming in the coming decade,” said Air Commodore Darren Goldie, RAAF Director-General of Air Combat Capability. “Boeing is progressing very well with its development and we look forward to seeing the final product in the coming months.”
Arnott said Australian Industry participation had been critical to the program’s rapid development, with a 16-strong Australian industry team making key deliveries to date including:
This first Loyal Wingman prototype will provide key lessons toward production of the ATS, which Boeing Australia is developing for the global defence market. Customers will be able to tailor ATS sensors and systems based on their own defence and industrial objectives.
The next major milestone will be weight on wheels, when the fuselage structure moves from the assembly jig to the aircraft’s own landing gear to continue systems installation and functional testing. The aircraft is expected to complete its first flight this year.
A March 7, 2019 article by Malcolm Davis on the loyal wingman program highlighted its importance for Australia:
One of the hottest debates among airpower analysts is the role of unmanned systems in future air combat. Australia may have just staked a lead in capability development of unmanned systems with the unveiling of the locally designed and built ‘Loyal Wingman’ unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) that is at the core of the Boeing Air Teaming System. The Loyal Wingman was unveiled in front of Defence Minister Christopher Pyne at the 2019 Avalon Airshow and Defence Expo last week.
Although it’s a Boeing platform, it will be designed and built entirely in Australia. That has some pretty significant implications for the future of Australia’s defence industry. It drives home the point that there’s more to this realm than just naval shipbuilding. It’s also a capability that is being planned with an export market in mind, to Five Eyes partners, and beyond. Australia will be able to position itself as a leading defence exporter of this type of capability as a result of the Loyal Wingman project.
And with its first flight slated for 2020, this is a capability that is not way off in the future with decades-long acquisition cycles. With Loyal Wingman, the aim is to produce an operational capability quickly—within the next few years.
Let’s start with what the platform is and why it’s important. The Loyal Wingman is designed to act as a force multiplier for manned fighters like the F-35A, F/A-18F Super Hornet and E/A-18G Growler, and larger manned aircraft like the E-7A Wedgetail or KC-30A refueller. Its primary role is projecting power forward, while keeping manned platforms out of harm’s way. It also seeks to protect ‘combat enablers’ like the Wedgetail from an adversary’s long-range offensive counter-air capability.
Although the planned aircraft is relatively small, according to Boeing it will have a range of more than 3,700 kilometres. That’s sufficient to operate over the South China Sea flying from RAAF Tindal near Darwin. It will carry integrated sensor packages to support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions and electronic warfare (EW), and has an internal weapons bay that eventually could be armed with standoff weapons and precision bombs.
It will be able to fly autonomously, rather than being remotely piloted, which is vital. Exploiting trusted autonomy with the human ‘on the loop’ in an oversight role, rather than directly controlling the UCAV in every aspect of its mission ‘in the loop’, is a much more sensible approach to this sort of capability.
The Loyal Wingman can extend Australia’s air defence envelope much further north than would be possible using the F-35 alone. Imagine a swarm of Loyal Wingman UCAVs controlled by a four-ship formation of F-35s undertaking defensive counter-air tasks over the sea–air gap. The less stealthy UCAVs would be geographically located well away from the stealthy F-35s to avoid betraying their location, but close by in terms of being part of a resilient network. The F-35s in turn are networked to a Wedgetail to the rear. The UCAVs are the forward sensor in the ‘sensor to shooter’ link, but can also be a forward shooter, against an adversary equipped with long-range airpower, while the F-35s and Wedgetail can stay out of harm’s way.
Alternatively, in a role to support strike missions, the UCAVs could use their long-range ISR sensors and EW capabilities, and potentially precision-attack munitions, to identify and supress enemy integrated air defences. That would open up a path for the F-35s and fourth-generation aircraft like the Super Hornet and Growler to strike at high-value targets.
In both cases, long-range power projection and protection are of key importance. The Loyal Wingman could restore a significant amount of the long-range strike power the RAAF lost with the retirement of the F-111C in 2010. Although the Wingman is much smaller than the F-111C and carries a smaller payload, the emphasis on low-cost development means more UCAVs can be acquired. Local production will make it easier to keep on acquiring them as and when we need more. This will allow us to exploit combat mass and boost the potential of the RAAF’s future strike and air combat capability through swarming networks of autonomous shooters and sensors.
That’s a good move. One of the major challenges facing the RAAF is that by investing in very high-tech exquisite platforms like the F-35, which exploit technological overmatch against an opponent, the size of the air combat arm is constrained. It becomes a boutique force. In a future crisis against a major-power adversary, that would be a disadvantage—we can’t afford to lose any because we have too few fast jets in the sky. A larger force is better able to exploit Lanchester’s square law to the RAAF’s benefit. The Loyal Wingman begins that process of building a larger, more powerful RAAF, and that’s precisely the path Australia needs to take in preparing for the next war.
The Loyal Wingman will allow Australia to effectively exploit future air combat technology developments coming out of US programs like the US Air Force’s penetrating counter-airand the US Navy’s ‘F/A-XX’ (formerly known as ‘sixth-generation fighter’ projects), which will be based heavily on manned–unmanned teaming technologies. We are taking our first steps towards the types of platforms that could one day replace the F-35, and we are getting there faster than originally planned.
Learning to operate manned and unmanned systems as a network—a ‘system of systems’—is crucial. The key is not just resilient data links that maintain networks, but also the development of trusted autonomy so that platforms like Loyal Wingman don’t have to depend on human control.
That aspect may generate controversy. Advocates of a ban on lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) are sure to challenge this project. Australia must resist calls for projects like Loyal Wingman to be cancelled on ethical or legal grounds. The platforms will depend on trusted autonomy, with humans ‘on the loop’, and any use of force will be made with human oversight. Unlike our adversaries who don’t need to adhere to legal and ethical constraints on LAWs, Western liberal democracies will always need to operate systems like Loyal Wingman with the laws of armed conflict in mind.
Finally, there are the defence industry and export benefits. Boeing Australia is designing and building the Loyal Wingman locally, establishing a sophisticated aerospace design and production capability. This could see Australia energise a new sector of its defence industry, complementing shipbuilding and other high-technology sectors. It would add to our defence export portfolio to key allies, including the Five Eyes countries. It would establish Australia as the leader in a global supply and support chain for Loyal Wingman operators around the world.
Loyal Wingman was the biggest story coming out of Avalon, and it may even surpass the F-35’s blazing performance in the skies as the cutting edge of future Australian airpower.
Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI.
By Robbin Laird
For the past few years, I have been visiting Australia to participate in and to write the reports for the bi-annual seminars held by the Williams Foundation which focus on defense transformation by the ADF in a changing strategic environment.
In the course of this work, it has become clear to me that the fundamental strategic shift facing Australian and allied forces is from the land wars being fought in uncontested air and maritime space to full spectrum crisis managing in very much contested air and maritime space.
And the key focus of trying to prevail in a full spectrum crisis management environment is building out to operate a distributed force which is integratable through evolving C2/ISR capabilities.
In my view, as the liberal democracies build new platforms there is a clear need to build these platforms in such a way that they are designed from the ground up to be able to operate as an asset for a distributed force which can be scalable, integratable and tailorable to a crisis.
I view such an effort as the new Offshore Patrol Vessel in Australia.
According to an article published on Naval Technology:
The Arafura class offshore patrol vessels (OPV) are being built for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The new OPVs are intended to replace the existing Armidale class and Cape class patrol boats, Huon class coastal minehunters, and Leeuwin class survey ships in service with the RAN.
The program is building a single class of ships to perform the functions of four legacy ships. This has its challenges, notably in terms of ensuring that the ships can be configured for the different missions, but the advantages of a common build of a class of ships in terms of manufacturing, sustainability and possibilities for export are obvious.
The OPVs in the class will be able to perform maritime patrol, response duties, and constabulary missions. The vessels can be customized to perform mine hunting, hydrographic survey, fisheries patrol, disaster relief, and unmanned aerial system (UAS) missions.
The Arafura class vessels will be interoperable with the fleet of Australian Border Force, Australian Defence Force units, and other regional partners to perform a range of missions.
Following the build of the first two vessels in South Australia, the next 10 vessels will be built at the new $80-million shipbuilding facility in Henderson, WA.
The OPV project is the first of the new shipbuilding projects to be built under the framework of a “continuous shipbuilding approach.”
In its evolution, it has gone from being a replacement ship to becoming a presence asset which can leverage the entire ADF and work with allied and partner nations.
In the CIVMEC description of the OPV the following is highlighted:
The primary role of the OPV will be to undertake constabulary missions, maritime patrol and response duties.
State of the art sensors as well as command and communication systems will allow the OPVs to operate alongside Australian Border Force vessels, other Australian Defence Force units and other regional partners.
This one of the rare references to this key aspect which in my view makes this the first ship in the unfolding shipbuilding series of new build in Australia ships which is being built from the group up to benefit from building out of a distributed Integratable force.
With regard to the Maritime Border Patrol, one focus clearly could be upon how one takes the C2 post in Canberra and replicates, mimics or downsizes its capabilities onboard the vessel.
I will focus in the next few weeks on the OPV program and how the Australians are addressing it as a new build Australian vessel but also one which is contributing to and leveraging the approach of the ADF to its transformation.
It is logical that the USMC which is focused on enhanced capability to perform distributed operations but to do so in an integratable approach are keenly interested in both digital interoperability across the force and the ability to command that force with agile C2.
One of the elements in that tool kit is the new MUOS system.
As was noted in a 2018 article by Matthew Beinart:
The U.S. Marine Corps is set to become the first service to widely deploy the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellite communication capability for the battlefield as it looks to install the system across its radios by this fall. MUOS capabilities will be fielded to the Marines’ AN/PRC-117G radios through the fourth quarter of FY ’18 with initial operational capability planned for the beginning of FY ‘19, as officials look to boost the force’s line of sight capabilities. The new satcom system adapts commercial cell phone technology connected to Lockheed Martin-built ultra high frequency satellites to improve mobility and operational survivability of battlefield communications on the Marines’ manpack radios.
“MUOS provides several advantages over legacy satcom,” Capt. Shawn Avery, a MUOS project officer for Marine Corps Systems Command, said in a statement. “The most obvious to the operating forces will be the increased accessibility. This will allow us to explore new operating concepts by pushing on-the-move voice and data connectivity to the squad level.”
Marine Corps officials have already fielded many of Harris’ MUOS-ready AN/PRC-117G manpack radios, and will now turn to updating the firmware to best utilize the new waveform. Future software-defined Marine radios will also be fitted to connect with MUOS.
“Previously, infantry companies had limited access to satcom, but now company commanders can employ their Marines beyond line of sight with a higher degree of confidence in maintaining those critical [command and control] links,” Avery said.
The narrowband MUOS waveform makes use of the satellites, first launched in 2012, to focus on a smaller geographic footprint. The stronger connection will give Marines more reliable mobile access with radios and improve communication in satcom-challenged environments.
Now the USMC are engaged in an exercise where MUOS is being leveraged as a key tool in delivering distributed operational capabilities.
In an article by Gidget Fuentes published by USNI News on March 4, 2020, the exercise was highlighted:
When a division of Marines deployed across a wide swath of the Southwest during a recent live-fire field exercise, the Navy’s new satellite communication system helped close a command and control gap that’s often-vexed commanders and their subordinate units.
The long-awaited Mobile User Objective System, or MUOS, promises secure, worldwide data and voice communications on the move with speeds equivalent to a smartphone. It’s an upgrade to the legacy 1990s Ultra High-Frequency Follow-On (UFO) satellite communication system.
“This thing has been a game-changer for us, especially with direction to the division two years ago to be lighter, more lethal, more mobile and more survivable,” Maj. Gen. Robert F. Castellvi told an audience at the WEST 2020 conference cohosted by the U.S. Naval Institute and AFCEA on Monday.
“It has bridged the digital divide gap we have between our higher headquarters that require high bandwidth systems and the battalion and below command posts that are dependent on very narrowband systems.”
Marines put MUOS to the test on the battlefield during the division-level exercise Steel Knight 2020, held in late 2019 in Southern California, Arizona and on ships at sea. The exercise pitted 13,000 Marines and sailors, against a near-peer opposing force to challenge 1st Marine Division units.
The Marine Corps has begun fielding MUOS to operational units, including the 1st Marine Division, based at Camp Pendleton, Calif.
The featured graphic is an undated Lockheed Martin artist representation of a MUOS satellite. Lockheed Martin Photo
RF and THC Comm Test Devices_Moore
An F-35 pilot discusses F-35 flight patterns, flying over houses, flight altitudes, and afterburner use.
11.15.2019
Video by Senior Airman Danielle Charmichael, Airman 1st Class Jazmin Granger and Tech. Sgt. Joseph Orellana
2D Audiovisual Squadron
The Republic of Singapore has contributed as well to support of ADF efforts in assisting to fight the Bushfires.
The Singapore Armed Forces has concluded its operations in support of the Australian Government’s bushfire relief efforts in south-eastern Australia on Feb. 6.
Two Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) CH-47 Chinook helicopters from the RSAF’s detachment in Oakey, Australia, were deployed to the Royal Australian Air Force Base East Sale in Victoria, Australia, and commenced relief operations on 9 January 2020 alongside the Australian Defence Force.
The RSAF helicopters contributed to relief efforts by delivering firefighting equipment and relief supplies, and transporting emergency service personnel. In total, the RSAF helicopters flew over 30 sorties, transported more than 260 persons and ferried close to 73 tons of supplies.
A total of 71 RSAF personnel from the Oakey detachment, comprising pilots, aircrew and engineers, were deployed for this mission. The two Chinook helicopters and RSAF personnel will arrive back in Oakey on Feb. 7.
Credit: Australian Department of Defence
February 20, 2020