The Return of Direct Defense in Europe

08/25/2019

We are publishing a book next year with Praeger which focuses on the return of direct defense in Europe.

What follows is our introduction to the book. 

The title of our book is the easy part: The Return of Direct Defense in Europe.  The subtitle: Meeting the Russian Challengeis more difficult, for the challenge is occurring in a very different strategic context than when WESTERN Europe was dealing with the Soviet Union.

It is clear that the challenges posed by the Russians share both commonalities but significant differences to those posed by the Soviet Union.

This is one theme of the book.

But the scope of our book is designed to deal with the question of the direct defense in Europe today, which is broader than that of the Russian challenge alone.

The Russians are clearly playing off of the dynamics of change within Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationships, and those dynamics are not generated by the Russians themselves but provide a rich environment in which to shape enhanced influence and capabilities to provide both direct and indirect threats to individual states as well as to deepen fissures within NATO and the European Union, the two collaborative organizations most central to direct defense.

The Cold War is over; but the Russians are back.

Russia clearly is not the Soviet Union; and Western Europe has been replaced by a new geo-strategic reality – the European Union and NATO have moved eastward.

The strategic shock of Russian actions in 2014 in Crimea, which logically followed from their actions against Georgia in 2008 sent shock waves throughout Europe.  But those shock waves were impacting on an evolving West and the global rise of 21stcentury authoritarian states.

This combination has meant that reshaping rethinking and reframing European defense is not a repeat of the period prior to the fall of the Wall; but is something quite different. And crafting a strategic response to the Russian challenges in Europe will itself need to be quite different; even different from what was done before the coming of President Trump and the various European crises of the past few years.

The return of Russia has occurred in the context of a very different geography than the Soviet Union governed with the Warsaw Pact.

In those days, there was a clear Central Front and the flanks served the battle anticipated if war came to the Central Front. The Soviet leadership planned an air ground assault against Germany, combined with an amphibious assault along the lines of what the Germans did against the Northern Flank in World War II along with holding actions in the Southern Flank, the weakest part of any anticipated Soviet assault.

And large numbers of nuclear weapons with fairly clear distinctions between long and short range were woven into the coming battle; with significant uncertainties with regular to nuclear use within the context of any projected European battle.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians faced a new geography. But even with this change in Euro-geography, the Russians remained an immense geographic landmass from Europe to Asia.  Remember the last U.S. Administration’s strategic mistake of referring to them as a regional power? Which region were they referring to?

But now Russia had its famous Window to the West, now again St. Petersburg, directly facing newly independent states, and Moscow now facing an independent Poland, with the Ukraine and Belarus as buffer states. 

If you think in classic geopolitical terms, and that is both the strength and weakness of the approach of the current President of Russia, any further movements West of the European Union (EU) and NATO would put a dagger at the heart of Moscow.

From the West’s point of view, the kind of EU and NATO expansion is to be understood in terms of a greater inclusion of states within the two drivers eastward, the German led European Union and the American led European alliance.

Striking into Crimea clearly made sense to Putin in terms of halting any move eastward. But Russian actions came at a time when both the American and German systems of alliances were in the process of fundamental change and significant pressures which were changing both the EU and NATO.

The coming of Brexit and of Trump represents clear visible signs of change.

But intellectually, if you were to combine the analyses done with regard to U.S. strategy done by John Mearsheimer with that done by Sir Paul Lever with regard to Germany and the EU you would get a realistic understanding of two strategic thrusts coming to a halt.

Or put another way, the return of Russia and how they are shaping their efforts to navigate the shoals of Western policies to their benefit are coming at a time of fundamental change in the West itself.

John Mearsheimer in his book published in 2018 entitledThe Great Delusion describes in considerable detail the thrust of U.S. strategic policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S. has pursued a policy of what he refers to as “liberal hegemony,” and one not even in the interest of the U.S. seen from a more realistic geopolitical perspective. The invasion of Iraq and the endless war in Afghanistan fit no concept within a realist understanding of the world. Indeed, the U.S. engaging in an open ended liberal hegemonic effort has undercut American strategic interests.

“Liberal hegemony is an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions. In essence, the liberal state seeks to spread its own values far and wide.”1

The U.S. does not have the resources, or capability to remake the countries into which it has inserted itself and in trying to do so has undercut its own geopolitical interests. Or put another way, American diplomatic and military approaches have reshaped U.S. tools to do things like stability operations rather than investing in relevant air and naval systems to defend the U.S. directly and to be able to more effectively compete with a rising China or a resurgent Russia.

As Mearsheimer put it: “Liberals tend to think of every area of the world as a potential battlefield, because they are committed to protecting human rights everywhere and spreading liberal democracy far and wide. They would naturally prefer to achieve these goals peacefully, but they are usually willing to countenance using military force if necessary. In short, while realists place strict limits on where they are willing to employ force, liberals have no such limits. For them, vital interests are everywhere.”2

Even though this quote highlights liberals, the liberal hegemonic approach he is discussing has been at the heart of the last three Administration’s policies, whether driven by neo-cons or liberals. With the Soviet Union gone, and the working assumption that the Chinese were being assimilated into the global order, the U.S. was free to work with its allies to reshape the troublesome Middle East and to deal with “Islamic terrorism” as the key strategic threat.

But with the election of Donald Trump, there has been a clear recognition that this strategic direction is not one which the U.S. can resource, or should pursue.  His Pentagon released a new national security strategy, which focused on the return of Great Power rivalry and the need to reshape U.S. policies and capabilities to make such a strategic shift.

It is an open question of whether the Administration has really been reorganized to do this or whether the U.S. can easily shift course. What is not in question is that the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia have put in play 21stcentury authoritarian powers directly challenging the United States and the liberal democratic allies whose challenges need to be met.

The other key strand of a strategic shift is clearly the disaggregation of the German-led European Union. 

Sir Paul Lever in his brilliant book Berlin Ruleshas analyzed the other element of the twin dynamic of the West confronting a strategic environment different from the past thirty years.  In the German-led European Union, the expansion of liberal Europe East has been crafted with the clear image that the new states will act like the older ones and shape a collaborative political-economic enterprise capable of growing into a leading global power for the new age of globalization.

The resurgence of Russia has called this into question along with the flood of Muslim refugees into Europe and the inability with a European Union magic wand to erase 50 years of history in which Eastern Europe was dominated by Russia.  The oft-noted comment by German politicians and analysts that a number of East Europeans are not pursuing “European values,” is less about whether or not these states are acting normally, but more about the fact that there is little prospect for a single European culture dominating life on the continent.

Lever provides his assessment of Germany’s role within Europe and how it has evolved from the war through to the eve of Brexit. His argument is straightforward – the European Union reflects the values and interests of Germany and weaves seamlessly into the German approach to economic policy.

The founding of the Euro created a key venue for Germany to enforce its core economic approach upon those who entered the Euro zone. And although the gap between Eurozone and non-Eurozone members is an important one within the European Union, the EU has provided the framework for Germany to find its national identity after having it shattered in the flames of defeat in World War II.

He argues that the tensions over migration have introduced a fundamental tension in the European Union, which could trigger more fundamental change, but argues that the German political class simply does not contemplate fundamental change in the European Union even with the departure of the United Kingdom.

The Germans have been able to dominate the European Union because of their economic weight and after unification their size relative to other members. The German political leadership has clearly used the EU to protect German national interests and, indeed, as Lever argues they believe that there is no fundamental disconnect between how Europe should behave economically and what Germany wants.

He focuses as well upon the forces driving change within Europe and relates those forces of change to what might become the evolving German approach. He raises three key questions with regard to how Germans may rethink their approach to Europe and their nation.

“How robust is the German consensus on Europe?

“Will Germany’s politicians continue indefinitely to argue for more integration without having to spell out what exactly this would mean?

“Will its electorate always be willing, even if unenthusiastic to go along with whatever next step is proposed along the road of ever-closer union?”3

The title of the book is a clever one as it highlights to core of German policy – EU rules should reflect German approaches and one rules through a European process heavily influenced by Germany.

But the tensions facing Europe may well disrupt this approach and force German leaders to consider alternative approaches to the way ahead for both Germany and Europe.

“The failure to address the issue of compatibility between different identities, national and European, has been a feature of the way in which all German politicians discuss Europe.

“Because their own country takes no pride in its past, they assume that an EU can be developed which equally has no collective past to be proud of. They even make a virtue of it…

“The underlying assumption is that the nation states of Europe failed in the past to prevent wars and that therefore the nation state is itself inadequate as an instrument of governance.”4

In other words, the twin shocks – Trump and Brexit – are not speed bumps along the path of the ever-expanding liberal order supported by a German-American dynamic; we are facing a strategic turn the outcome of which is not clear.

Brexit and Trump are not speed bumps, but they are not clarion calls for a well-defined and clear new strategic approach or order either.

The resurgence of Russia comes as well accompanied by the rise of new broader authoritarian challenges. Rather than some inexplicable return to the 19thCentury suggested by the former Secretary of State, John Kerry, we are seeing the rise of a fundamental set of challenges posed by authoritarian states, which are combing a diverse set of tools to challenge the viability and strategic direction of the liberal democracies. There are viable 21stcentury authoritarian alternatives, rather than the “end of history.”

The Russians are economically weak but playing a high-risk game of chess with the West. In this game they are inventing new approaches for the use of military power with leveraging new tools of the digital age. The term “hybrid war” has been coined to highlight the approach, but this really is a statement that the liberal democracies are facing a new strategic calculus; and new strategic contest 5

The Russians are allied with the Chinese who have growing global presence and are buying their way into liberal democratic societies, finding new ways to use military power in what analysts call the “gray zone” and are clearly reshaping the nature of Western infrastructure necessary for the security and defense of the liberal democracies.

But the gray zone is an ambiguous term itself. The goal is to reshape the external environment in ways favorable without the need to engage in kinetic operations. In the hybrid war concept, lethal operations are the supporting not the tip of the spear element to achieve what the state actor is hoping to achieve tactically or strategically.

Both gray zone ops and hybrid war ops are part of a broader strategic reality, namely, the challenge of mastering crisis management where the liberal democracies need to deal with the authoritarian states in a ongoing peer-to-peer competition.

And then we have the Turkey of President Erdogan.  Here we have a formerly secular state now becoming aggressively Islamic and directly intervening in the internal politics of Europe and importing Russian equipment in a defiant gesture to all of NATO.

This is the context within which the West or the liberal democracies must reshape their capabilities to provide for their direct defense; and to do so will not look like a legacy NATO approach, but will require significant innovation.

How can we recast the direct defense of Europe in ways that would not simply be a badly resourced replay of the Cold War?

How will the U.S. and the very different sets of allies within Europe address the strategic challenges?

And how will the inevitable inability to have a coherent consensus on what to do be managed?

What tools are available now and how can they be worked in an interactive interoperable way to credibly deter Russia?

And how do we handle the inevitable clash of approaches and differences within Europe in which neither the German nor American approach will determine what states do in a crisis?

What might a more realistic approach to the direct defense look like and one which allows the U.S. and its allies to deal with the global challenge of a China which is clearly seeking to reshape the global order in ways which are not in any way liberal democratic?

Reaper in Northern Strike 19

08/23/2019

An MQ-9 Reaper assigned to the 214th Attack Group, Arizona Air National Guard, joined the skies over Alpena, Mich., flying training sorties in support of Northern Strike 19 at the Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, July 24, 2019. 2019 marked the remotely piloted aircraft’s historical debut at the joint force, multinational combat exercise.

Northern Strike 19 is a National Guard Bureau-sponsored exercise uniting service members from more than 20 states, multiple service branches and numerous coalition countries during the last two weeks of July 2019 at the Camp Grayling Joint Maneuver Training Center and the Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, both located in northern Michigan and operated by the Michigan National Guard.

The accredited Joint National Training Capability exercise demonstrates the Michigan National Guard’s ability to provide accessible, readiness-building opportunities for military units from all service branches to achieve and sustain proficiency in conducting mission command, air, sea and ground maneuver integration, together with the synchronization of fires in a joint, multinational, decisive action environment.

ALPENA, MI, UNITED STATES

07.25.2019

Video by Tech. Sgt. Lealan Buehrer

182nd Airlift Wing

Reworking the Australian-American Alliance

08/19/2019

It is clear that for Australians, the United States is the key military partner for their own defense efforts. But it is also clear, that reworking the relationship in light of the dynamics of the current and last Administration have put a spotlight on what Australia needs to do to enhance its own flexibility in dealing with threats in the Pacific and to rework the Alliance in part along these lines.

The last Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted some of the key aspects of change required as perceived by Australian strategists and national security officials.

But it is less about whether the United States is reliable enough but much more about shaping Australian benchmarks with regard to what they perceive to be legitimate policy goals which Australia needs to pursue and to encourage their great power ally to consider following as well.

It is a dialogue to be based on enhanced Australian capabilities and Australian actions, to shape a way ahead.

Recently, the new Australian Ambassador to the United States provide an overview on how he viewed the way ahead.

If read carefully, a number of Australian objectives with regard to the United States and its dealings with China are identified as well.

Brendan Nicholson, defence editor of The Strategist has written a very helpful overview on the Ambassador’s recent speech.

Washington’s ambassador to Australia, Arthur Culvahouse, has used a speech to ASPI to stress the strength of the alliance with the United States and to reject suggestions that China and America are involved in a new cold war.

Ambassador Culvahouse said the view of Americans he’d spoken to, including the president, vice president, secretary of state and defense secretary, was that the US commitment to Australia was incredibly strong.

‘Let me assure you that the United States is a Pacific nation that is here to stay, and that our Alliance with Australia is indeed unbreakable,’ he said in an address to an ASPI seminar on Wednesday.

‘We’re Pacific nations. We care deeply about what happens here and we’re here to stay. We’re both continental democracies and champions for the rule of law and human rights. And we’re both nations of strivers and innovators. We believe that everyone deserves a fair go, and that by working hard and playing by the rules, everyone should have a fair shot at prosperity.

‘These are the values that make the US–Australia alliance unbreakable and will carry it into our next century of partnership.’

Culvahouse said Australia could always rely on the US, and so could the rest of the Indo-Pacific region. The pivot to the Pacific was a reality.

He rejected suggestions that the US and China were involved in a new cold war and recalled serving in the Reagan White House and taking part in evacuation drills where he had five minutes to get onto a helicopter in the event of a nuclear attack. That was a ‘long, tough slog, an expensive and dangerous situation’ and anyone who lived through it was not looking for a new cold war at all, the ambassador said.

The US preference was to engage with China but it also had to call out malign conduct where it appeared.

Culvahouse said regional nations were not being asked to choose between the US and China. ‘That’s not how we operate. As the president has made clear, we seek a constructive relationship with China where our prosperity and security grow together, not apart. Indeed, we would welcome China to get onside and join the US, Australia and the other nations in efforts to create the conditions for rules-based growth in the region.’

But the US, Australia and other Pacific nations also agreed it was important to shine a spotlight on bad behaviour, however and wherever it occurred.

‘That includes speaking out in defence of democracy in Hong Kong and calling out the Chinese government’s human rights abuses against its own citizens, including detaining hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs in Xinjiang province.’

It also meant standing up for freedom of navigation and overflight and condemning China’s militarisation and disruptive activities in the South China Sea, including poaching fisheries belonging to others and disrupting longstanding oil and gas projects.

‘And that includes supporting the pressure campaign against North Korea’s nuclear program,’ the ambassador said. ‘The challenges we face call for strong leadership on behalf of the principles we hold dear.’

Australian Defence Force chief Angus Campbell gave a similar response to the cold war question, saying the fact that China was America’s largest trading partner made the situation profoundly different from the post–World War II decades of tense strategic rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West. ‘I think there are a lot of options and a lot of space to see better paths emerge,’ General Campbell told the seminar.

The ambassador said the US welcomed Australia’s expanding leadership role in the region.  ‘That’s not only a good thing for the region, but for the world.’

He said the time was right for the US and Australia to do much more together in the region and beyond. ‘Our Indo-Pacific visions are closely entwined, and we support Prime Minister Morrison’s Pacific Step Up program to help Pacific peoples lift living standards, increase their independence and sovereignty over their economic futures, and improve the wellbeing and stability of the region overall.

‘Australia’s $2 billion infrastructure financing initiative for the Pacific is a great, tangible step forward. The US and Australia want our friends to achieve prosperity through responsible economic development, as well as through fair and reciprocal trade and investment.  We’re committed to creating the conditions for that to happen.’

Cooperation with the US and Australia brought mutual benefits, not zero-sum deals and not ‘payday loan diplomacy’ where one side would win big and the others risked losing big.

The ambassador said that along with what he described as the ‘well-established triad’ of Japan, Australia and the United States, there’d been significant, tangible steps towards the Quad with India and the start of positive conversations with other countries in the region.

During consultations in Washington before coming out, he’d heard a lot about the Quad and other partnerships, only to find that what sounded good in concept had yet to take place in reality.

‘Five months later, as our discussions with our Australian counterparts at AUSMIN made clear, now we find that a network of like-minded countries that share our values, principles and vision for the Indo-Pacific region is taking shape.’

Australia did not get enough credit for its leadership in areas where it was out in front of the US and other countries, the ambassador said. ‘And we all need to follow Australia’s lead in safeguarding our 5G networks and taking a hard look at state-sponsored election interference and what Confucius Institutes are really up to on university campuses.’

Gnarly challenges immediately ahead included working out how to stop foreign fighters returning from Syria and setting up camp in Southeast Asia.

Asked how the United States would react if Australia decided it could no longer rely on the American nuclear umbrella and opted to develop its own nuclear weapons, Culvahouse said that was a matter for Australia.

‘But let me also say that our alliance is unbreakable, our commitments to Australia are solid and profound, and I would not be out here unless I believed that. I would not be giving the speeches I’ve been giving unless I believed that.’

Also, see the following:

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/4610-us-studies-centre-study-calls-for-greater-australian-indo-pacific-pivot

Cobra Gold 2019

Adm. Phil Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, visited Thailand to help our allies and partners close out multi-lateral training.

Cobra Gold, in its 38th iteration, is designed to advance regional security and ensure effective responses to regional crises by bringing together a robust multinational force to address shared goals and security commitments in the Indo-Pacific.

02.22.2019

Video by Sgt. Dahnyce Baucom and Petty Officer 2nd Class Kayla Cosby

Defense Media Activity Forward Center – Pacific

Quick Reaction Alert Royal Air Force Operations

08/18/2019

The Royal Air Force is deployed on Operation AZOTIZE in Estonia in support of Baltic Air Policing.

And earlier this month engaged in its “seventeenth QRA scramble resulting in an intercept since the RAF took over enhanced Air Policing (eAP) from the German Air Force on 3 May 2019 as part of Baltic Air Policing. The UK operates in support of NATO to reassure our allies and is a further demonstration of the UK’s commitment to the security of the region.

“Elsewhere around the world RAF Typhoon jets are also deployed in the Falklands Islands on QRA missions, as well as operating in the Middle East on Operation SHADER.”

The UK Ministry of Defence article published on August 8, 2019 described the process as follows:

RAF Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) Typhoon fighter aircraft scrambled from RAF Lossiemouth, with an RAF Voyager from RAF Brize Norton, to monitor two Russian Bear maritime patrol aircraft approaching UK airspace.

Meanwhile Typhoons deployed on NATO Baltic Air Policing also scrambled from Amari airbase to intercept a Russian Bear bomber and two Flanker fighter aircraft flying close to Estonian airspace.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:

“Every day certain states are determined to push international norms and to test the UK’s resolve. The threats to the international rules based system are on many fronts.

“The RAF is well equipped to stand sentry alongside our allies on the UK’s and Europe’s borders. I am grateful they are there 24/7 to uphold the UK’s commitment to our security.”

UK QRA launch

The QRA launch from RAF Lossiemouth took place after the two Russian patrol aircraft flew close to the international airspace of the UK’s fellow NATO Allies. A co-ordinated response allowed Allies to monitor the aircraft until the RAF intercepted them.

Our fighters escorted them from the UK’s area of interest and ensured that they did not enter either UK sovereign airspace. The intercept and monitoring was completed in international airspace throughout and conducted in a safe and professional manner.

The RAF routinely identify, intercept and escort Russian aircraft that transit international airspace. Russian aircraft frequently attempt to test NATO’s level of readiness, as well as conduct intelligence-gathering missions. The rapid reaction of the RAF and by NATO allies serves as a reminder of NATO’s cohesion and its ability to react.

In the UK, the RAF Typhoon and Voyager aircraft are held at a state of readiness every day, supported by engineering and airspace management personnel.

The lead RAF pilot of the Typhoons that intercepted the Russian aircraft said:

“Protecting NATO and UK airspace is what the RAF is here for, so today’s mission gave us the opportunity to demonstrate that we will always police our area of interest and also how well trained the Typhoon force is for dealing with events like this.”

Estonia QRA launch

The RAF Typhoons deployed on NATO Baltic Air Policing in Estonia intercepted a Russian TU-142 ‘Bear’ Bomber, heading west close to Estonian airspace. The Typhoons then handed the escort over to Finish and Swedish QRA aircraft, before being tasked to re-intercept to maintain the escort of the TU-142 as its transited close to NATO airspace. The “Bear” had since been accompanied by two Russian SU-30 ‘Flanker’ fighters.

This is a routine NATO mission for the Typhoons which provides reassurance that the UK is here to work in partnership with Estonia.

A Typhoon pilot from XI(Fighter) Squadron, attached to 121 Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW), was conducting Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) duty when the scramble was called. He said:

“We were scrambled to intercept a Russian TU-142 aircraft, routing west close to Estonian airspace. We then handed over the escort to our Finish and Swedish partners, as the aircraft continued West. We were then tasked to re-intercept and escort the TU-142 ‘Bear’ which has since been joined by two SU-30 ‘Flanker’’. These Russian aircraft transiting the Baltic region were not on a recognised flight plan or communicating with Air Traffic Control. The intercept was uneventful and conducted in a professional manner throughout.”

For our overview look at Quick Reaction Alert Operations, see the following:

Japan in Tailsman Sabre 2019: Opening the Aperture on Perimeter Defense

We argued in our 2103 book on Pacific strategy, that Japan would work to enhance its perimeter defense and move eventually towards what we called a two anchor appraoch.

We argued that expanded perimeter defense is a key part of what we referred to as the “dynamic defense” phase in Japanese policy. We argued that “this meant greater reach of Japanese systems., better integration of those systems within the Japanese forces themselves, more investments in C2 and ISR, and a long-term strategy of reworking the U.S.-Japanese military relationship to have much greater reach and presence.

“The dynamic defense phase carries with it the seeds for the next phase — the shaping of a twin-anchor policy of having reach in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean.

“Obviously, such reach is beyond the capabilities of the Japanese themselves and requires close integration with the United States and other allies.  And such reach requires much greater C2, ISR and weapons integration across the Japanese and allied force structure.”

One of the key features of our appraoch was and continues to be how to leverage the new systems we are already bringing on line which allows us to expand our deterrence in depth capabilities.

There is way too much emphasis Inside the Beltway on potential and hypethetical future systems and significant denigration of how the newly being introduced systems when much more effectively integrated with robust C2 rather than some hegemonic Amazon cloud like system can deliver the capabilities we need in the evolving five year period in front of our forces.

It too often seems that the approach is shaping dense briefings of the world in 2030 as a deterrent to our adversaries rather than building out the capabilities which are within reach as new systems enter the force.

If we were to write this book now we would expand significantly the Australian role in what is becoming a Japanese-Australian-United States creative process in reshaping full spectrum crisis management forces.

A good example of how the future is being shaped now has been the work done in Tailsman Sabre 2019..

The Japanese fully participated in the exercise and brought some of their perimeter defense capabilities to the exercise effort.

According to the Japanese Ministry of Defence:

From June 3rd to August 21st, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) are participating in the Talisman Sabre 2019 with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in Australia. It is the first time the JMSDF participates in this exercise.

This exercise aims to improve the tactical capabilities of the JGSDF and JMSDF in amphibious operation and land battle as well as interoperability between Japan and the U.S., and to contribute to maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Approx. 330 personnel from the JGSDF’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and 1st Helicopter Brigade as well as approx. 500 JMSDF personnel from the JS Ise and JS Kunisaki are participating in the exercise.

And in an article by Seth Robson published by Stars and Stripes on July 24, 2019, the Japanese engagement in the exercise was highlighted:

Members of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force began observing and participating in amphibious training with U.S. Marines on Okinawa in 2012.

The training, which was off limits to media, was part of a multiyear effort to develop amphibious capability that included new helicopter carriers and landing craft.

The buildup has taken place amid tensions in the East China Sea, where China has challenged Japan’s claim to the Senkaku Islands (known as Daioyu by the Chinese) and the nearby oil and gas resources.

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Capt. Hiroshi Watanabe, who was on the ground at Bowen, said 300 out of the now 2,000-strong amphibious brigade are participating in Talisman Sabre.

The force transited north from Brisbane in a pair of warships, the JS Ise and JS Kunasaki before conducting an amphibious landing, he said.

“It’s a very good exercise to improve our skill level,” he added.

“We think interoperability between Japan and the U.S. will improve through this exercise,” Watanabe said, using a military buzzword describing the ability of one nation’s armed forces to use another country’s training methods and equipment. “Also, there is relationship building between Japan and Australia.”

Conor was on Okinawa from 2014 to 2017 and watched the Japanese amphibious capability grow in strength.

Troops from the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade trained at Camp Pendleton earlier this year, said Conor, whose unit is part of Marine Rotational Force – Darwin in Australia’s Northern Territory this summer.

“It gives [the Japanese] the ability to respond within Japan’s island chain in a very rapid manner,” he said of the new force.

Marine Col. Matthew Sieber, an exchange officer who is helping the Australian army grow its own amphibious capability, said Talisman Sabre had put the Japanese troops a long way from their homeland.

“They are getting some great training in new training areas that they can’t get in Japan,” he said. “The number of repetitions they can get here in Australia is far more than they can do in Japan.”

 

SDB1 Arrives for the RAAF’s F-35s

By Sergeant Max Bree and Corporal Mark Carter

Bombing capacity of F-35As has quadrupled with the arrival of small diameter bombs introduced to No. 3 Squadron in June.

The GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb, Increment 1 (SDB1), packs about 16kg of modern high explosive, guided by GPS-aided inertial navigation.

Wing Commander Simon Bird, Chief Engineer at Aerospace Explosive Ordnance Systems Program Office (AEOSPO) – Explosive Materiel Branch, said it was Air Force’s most advanced bomb and made best use of the F-35A’s internal weapon bay.

“We’ve got a next-generation bomb to go with our fifth-generation fighter,” Wing Commander Bird said.

“Where you used to carry one JDAM [joint direct attack munition] in a position on the aircraft, SDB1 allows you to carry four bombs that each achieve very similar effects. Although at 285lbs the SDB1 is lighter than a 500lb JDAM, it’s highly accurate and packs a more powerful, modern explosive.

“SDB1 is also designed to penetrate harder targets, or can fuse above ground to create area effects.”

The bombs make use of ‘Diamondback’ wings, which deploy after release to provide greater stand-off range.

“With JDAMs you’ve got to be very close to the target to engage it, but because of the wings on SDB1, a single F-35A can engage up to eight separate targets from outside the range they can defend against,” Wing Commander Bird said.

“What’s more, because an SDB1 is carried internally, the F-35A can remain low observable and will not be affected by any extra drag from carrying eight bombs.”

Four bombs are fitted to new bomb release unit racks before loading on the aircraft.

“With an old JDAM, you had to take all the components and build it up, but that takes time, equipment and people,” Wing Commander Bird said.

“You can test the SDB1 without opening the box; you can test them before they’re even shipped to the base you’re going to operate from.

“This weapon comes fully assembled; you basically take it out of the box and load it.”

About 15 armament technicians from No. 3 Squadron received familiarisation training on the bombs before planned test firings in coming months.

AEOSPO’s engineering, logistic and technical staff ensured introduction of the weapons and their delivery was a milestone towards the F-35A’s initial operational capability in 2020.

This article was published by the Australian Department of Defence on August 16, 2019.

Flying Officer Matthew Walker, left, delivers bomb familiarisation training to armament technicians from No. 3 Squadron, from left, Corporal Christopher Sorrensen, Leading Aircraftman Adam Fulmizi and Corporal Simon McMillan. Photo: Sergeant Guy Young