French Defense Industrial Re-Set as France Prepares to Re-Emerge from the Coronavirus Crisis

04/15/2020

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Dassault Aviation has resumed training flights for Indian pilots on the Rafale fighter jet, as the aircraft builder seeks to meet contract requirements despite the deadly spread of coronavirus.

“At Merignac, the (conversion training center) activities started on Monday with a daily mission for two Indian Rafales, in order to meet our contractual obligations for delivery,” executive chairman Eric Trappier said April 8 in a note to staff on the company website.

Merignac is the main Dassault factory, a suburb of Bordeaux, southwest France.

Flights have also restarted with the ATL2 maritime patrol aircraft and Falcon 900 light jet, both flying from Istres, southern France, he said.

The national quarantine will be extended a further four weeks to May 11, president Emmanuel Macron said in an April 13 broadcast to the nation, as he called for continued strict observation of the lock down.

On the training flights, the Merignac authorities had posted a schedule to address local noise concerns, with Indian pilots due to fly from October 2019 to March 2021, with take-off and landing from Bordeaux airport, Monday to Friday between 8.30 am and 6 pm (local time).

Qatari pilots had flown their Rafale training missions from April 8 to June 7 2019, with three to four flights per week, the Merignac website said.

France was due to deliver the next Rafale to India in May and it remained to be seen whether that hand over will go ahead as scheduled, in view of uncertainty sparked by the pandemic, an industry source said.

That government-to-government Rafale deal led to the Oct. 8 formal delivery of the first aircraft in the Indian order for 36 units, worth some €7.9 billion ($8.7 billion).

Clients normally pay the last instalment on a deal when delivery has taken place. That payment will be welcome in view of strain stemming from a shut down of production.

Industrial re-set

Dassault’s industrial re-set follows requirements of the defense ministry and Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office, Trappier said in a video to staff.

The return to production reflected priorities agreed with clients, he said. The top priority was to support the French forces, flying Rafale and Mirage 2000 fighter jets, and ATL2 aircraft. Development for certain programs would also be pursued.

Export clients are also important, particularly India, which is seeing serious effects of the pandemic, he said.

The company has adopted SMS texts to keep personnel up to date.

Dassault has gradually re-opened its nine factories and offices around the country.

The ATL2 flights relate to a program to upgrade the combat system to standard 6. That modernization covers 18 units, with Dassault upgrading the first seven, and the SIAé aircraft maintenance center working on the remaining 11 units.

The upgrade included Thales Search Master radar with active antenna, acoustic subsystem for sonar buoys for anti-submarine warfare, and a Dassault navigation console. There are also new consoles developed by SIAé and software for information processing from Naval Group.

The first two upgraded ATL2s were delivered last October, with the last upgrade due in 2023.

Conserve cash

In the financial disruption, Thales said April 7 it was cancelling a planned final 2019 dividend of €430 million to conserve cash, and signed a €2 billion bank loan to boost access to funds. That bank credit was available for 12 months, with an option to extend for six months.

Those funds were in addition to €2.9 billion in cash and cash equivalent, and a €1.5 billion credit facility.

In France, there were 14,967 deaths due to Covid-19, with 137,779 confirmed cases, according to John Hopkins university.

Of those fatalities, 5,379 were in rest homes, and 9,588 in hospitals, afternoon daily Le Monde reported April 14. The health ministry said April 13 there had been 335 deaths over the last 24 hours, compared to 310 on Sunday.

Among the measures Macron announced in his broadcast were distribution of face masks to the general public, and schools and colleges to re-open from May 11. Museums, restaurants and cinemas will remain closed under the lock down.

Macron sought to inspire hope in his speech and his delivery was seen as an attempt to show a gentler, more human face than his previous broadcast, which invoked a martial spirit with six references to war.

“The results are there,” he said. “Several regions have been spared. In the last few days, the number under intensive care has fallen.

“Hope is reborn.”

Featured Photo: GUILLAUME HORCAJUELO/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock

In an article by Eszter Zalan published in the EUObserver on April 15, 2020, the general challenge of the Europeans returning to some form of normalcy in terms of work was highlighted.

The EU commission on Wednesday (April 15, 2020) is set to roll out a set of recommendations for EU countries to better coordinate easing lockdown measures to avoid spillovers between member states. 

While the EU executive cannot force member states to act in unison, it wants to make sure counties take into account the situations of neighbouring countries, according to a spokesperson. 

The recommendations call for member states to notify each other and the commission before measures are loosened. 

It warns that “any level of gradual relaxation” of measures will “unavoidably” mean increase in new coronavirus cases. 

It argues for a gradual easing, starting small and local, with opening schools and universities, while restaurants and mass events should only allowed at a later stage. The EU’s internal borders should open first before its external borders are accessible again.

The EU executive argues that three conditions should be met to ease restrictions: “the spread of the disease has significantly decreased for a sustained period of time”, the health care system has sufficient capacity and there is effective monitoring including large-scale testing. 

The commission also recommends contact tracing by the use of mobile apps, which should respect data privacy and should be voluntary. 

German foreign minister Heiko Maas on Tuesday called for a single smartphone app to be used across the EU.

Countries should also be ready to revise their approach if more data comes in, or there is a risk of another wave in the spread of the virus, the comission says. 

“We will have to live with the virus until a vaccine or treatment is found,” the commission’s document warns. 

 

USS Bataan at Sea

Bataan, with embarked 26th MEU, is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Gary Jayne III)

Reshaping China Strategy: Reconsidering the Role and Place of the Military Dimension

04/14/2020

By Robbin Laird

The Coronavirus crisis and its management by the liberal democracies is clearly and inflection point. Moving forward choices will be made shaping the decade ahead in terms of basic national strategies as well as with allies.

A key aspect of shaping a way ahead clearly will be how to deal with the 21st century authoritarian powers. There is little doubt that the crisis has highlighted what was in plain sight prior to the crisis, namely, the challenge of supply chain security. This is notable in a number of areas, but probably nowhere more so than in dependence on China with regard to medical production and supplies.

A key part of the reshaping of strategy towards China going forward will clearly revolve around the question of supply chain security, and how to reshape how the liberal democracies deal with this challenge.

It is within this context of shaping a new strategy towards China that any U.S. or allied military strategy towards China will need to be placed. The last thing we need is a cacophonic single service set of strategies to warfighting in the Pacific which do not fit into a national strategy towards China overall.

For example, we learn that the U.S. Army is developing a very long-range canon.

The U.S. Army is pushing ahead with plans to field a cannon with an astounding 1,000-mile+ range. The cannon, along with hypersonic weapons, will allow the service to attack long range, strategic-level targets far beyond the reach of existing Army systems. 

According to Defense News, the Army’s program manager for long range fires, Col. John Rafferty, the service expects the gun to have a range of 1,000 nautical miles—or 1,150 statute miles. The technology behind the cannon is described as “cutting edge” that’s so advanced that the service is not sure if the gun would be affordable. 

This may or may not be a good idea, but where does this fit into a warfighting joint and coalition strategy in the Pacific?

To get a sense of how, we might shape a military strategy that fits into the evolving strategic context I talked with nuclear arms expert Paul Bracken of Yale University.

For one aspect which seems often to be neglected is that China is a nuclear power and like all nuclear powers, adversarial warfighting strategies which highlight operations deep within the close in periphery of a counter tend not to be considered in conventional military terms alone.

Question: How would you characterize the Chinese situation?

Paul Bracken: A number of leading scholars on China underscored that China was facing a real economic crisis prior to any U.S. backlash against it. Their point was that China could not continue to grow from 2015 onward, simply by doing more of what it was doing.

The global economy was becoming much too complex for Chinese economic mass mobilization manufacturing strategies to work going forward.

In other words, China was facing a branch point.

What would they do?

Then with the U.S. backlash against China, the branch point changed as well. The branch point, plus the U.S. and broader allied reactions to China are going to force Beijing to rethink what they’re doing.

They can’t simply do more of the same.

This is the reason China faces complex new challenges which are unprecedented.

Question: With regard to the military side of the equation, where might we start?

Paul Bracken: China is a major nuclear power.

And they are one which has missiles of various ranges within the Pacific region.

What they have done far exceeds what the Soviet Union had against NATO Europe during the Cold War.

With the end of the INF treaty, an end driven in part by Chinese missiles which would have been excluded by an INF treaty if they had been party to it, Beijing’s long-range missile threat needs to become a focus of attention, and not just by counter military responses.

This raises the question of the possibility of having at least three power nuclear talks (US, Russia, China) to provide both public diplomacy and cross-government considerations of how to manage the missile challenge. Obviously, such an approach is challenging but certainly has its advantages of finding a place to discuss ways to crisis manage as well.

Moreover, China would like to constrain U.S. nuclear modernization, and for this they simply cannot ignore arms control.

Question: This does raise the question of how to craft an effective and realistic military strategy towards China, with recognition of the nuclear reality of any confrontation in the Pacific.

You and I both entered our professional lives and worked with military and political leaders who understood that large scale conventional operations always contained within them the possibility and in some cases the probably of the triggering of nuclear use.

I simply do not see this with the generation of leaders who have lived through the land wars as their existential reality.

Do you?

Paul Bracken: Nuclear war as a subject has been put into a small, separate box from conventional war.

It is treated as a problem of two missile farms attacking each other.

This perspective overlooks most of the important nuclear issues of our day, and how nuclear arms were really used in the Cold War.

It should be remembered that China is the only major power born in a nuclear context. The coming to power of the Communists in China was AFTER the dawn of the nuclear age. And Beijing learned early on the hard realities of a nuclear world.  Soviet treatment of Beijing in the Taiwan Straits crises and in the Korean War with regard to nuclear weapons, taught China the bitter lesson that they were on their own.

This led directly to China’s bomb program.

China is also the only major power surrounded by five nuclear states.  It’s true that two of these states are, technically speaking, allies (Pakistan and North Korea).

But there can be little doubt that both target China with atomic weapons.

More, at senior levels of the Chinese government they understand that their “allies” are a lot more dangerous than China’s enemies.

When discussing defense strategies, it is crucial to understand the nature of escalation. One of the fundamental distinctions long since forgotten by today’s military leaders and in academic studies is the zone of the interior, or ZI.

As soon as you hit a target inside the sovereign territory of another country, you are in a different world.

From an escalation point of view striking the ZI of an adversary who is a nuclear, crosses a major escalation threshold.

And there is the broader question of how we are going to manage escalation in a world in which we are pushing forward a greater role for autonomous systems with AI, deeply learning, etc.

Will clashes among platforms being driven by autonomous systems lead to crises which can get out of control?

We need a military strategy that includes thinking through how to go on alert safely in the various danger zones.

Question: This raises a major question for strategy: How to manage military engagements or interactions in the Pacific without spinning crises out of control.

How does the nuclear factor weigh in?

Paul Bracken: The first thing is to realize it is woven into the entire fabric of a Pacific strategy. You don’t have to fire a nuclear weapon to use it.

The existence of nuclear weapons, by itself, profoundly shapes conventional options.

The nuclear dimension changes the definition of what a reasonable war plan is for the U.S. military.

And a reasonable war plan can be defined as follows:  when you brief it to the president, he doesn’t throw you out of the office, because you’re triggering World War III.

Also, see the following:

A Look at Strategic Geography for Pacific Defense: Putting the Chinese Military Challenge Into Strategic Context

 

 

Platforms, Innovation and Integratability: The Case of the Osprey

By Robbin Laird

In my series focusing on USMC and digital interoperability, the first piece focused on the interaction between platform innovation and integratability.

With the evolution of the capabilities of the new combat platforms generated through Marine Corps aviation, the ability of the Marines to operate in an integrated, air, ground, and sea environment have been enhanced.

To take the next step requires investments in the core platforms to enhance their integratability. 

The Marines refer to this as building out digital interoperability and have a plan in place to shape an effective way ahead.

And this way ahead entails both shaping core capabilities to manage networks and the data they can provide as well as to build into existing assets greater capability to participate in the networks most relevant to the operational envelope of particular platforms.

The challenge is a highly interactive one. New platforms shape new opportunities to define new concepts of operations and to shape new combat capabilities. Driving such innovation is crucial which means that new platform introduction will often be disruptive of the existing concepts of operations. New platforms can provide a forcing function dynamic for change.

At the same time, new platforms need to operate with other elements of the combat force, and that tension between platform innovations and inherited concepts of operations is an ongoing dynamic driving change.

What digital interoperability provides is an opportunity to both enhance the capabilities of the existing platforms as well as to share the benefits of what new platforms bring to the combat force.

A key question is posed:  How do new platforms interact with and shape integratability challenges, and how digital connectivity can enhance what these new platforms bring to the combat force as well as how can the “legacy” platforms make greater contributions to a combat force being driven by change from new platform introduction?

A clear case in point has been the introduction of the Osprey.

If integration with the legacy force was the key mantra for the USMC, the Osprey would never been introduced. But it was and it introduced range and speed considerations to the insert of the Ground Combat Element which have been historically unprecedented.

If a CH-46 replacement had truly been that disruption would not have occurred, and significant innovation in concepts of operations driven by the disruptive force which the Osprey has provided would not have as well.

The US Army is the lead on a new Future Vertical Lift helicopter which is being designed to have similar reach and range to the Osprey. How this will impact the entire approach to shaping the future US Army is a key strategic question.

But the Marines have already been living in the world of FVL for a decade and a half.

Thinking outside of the helo defined operational box has been a key game changer in thinking about the concepts of operations for the USMC for some time, and adjustments to their concepts of operations have been driven by its operational capabilities.

In order to get full benefit from the Osprey forcing function, the Osprey needed to become a more integratable capability within the MAGTF. Digital interoperability provides a key bridge to do so.

In the next piece I will return to my discussions with Major Salvador Jauregui and Mr. Lowell Schweickart from the USMC Aviation Headquarters who are working on the digital interoperability effort.

And in that piece will focus directly on the question of what DI brings to various platforms in the MAGTF, and how what that brings to those specific platforms can lead to further capability enhancements or changes in concepts of operations.

But here, I want to return to a number of pieces we published in 2014 which highlight how the digital interoperability piece became highlighted as a significant opportunity for Osprey nation.

The speed and range of the Osprey has meant that it can outrun the embarked Marines capability to have the situational awareness they needed when disembarking in the objective area.

How then to solve that problem?

In the following piece published on January 18, 2014, we identified why C2 innovation when coupled with the capabilities of the Osprey created new options for the MAGTF.


With a new system, as innovative as the Osprey, it takes time to shape the course of change. 

With its successful use in combat, its ability to work effectively with other elements of the MAGTF, and its core role in shaping innovations such as Special Purpose MAGTF-Crisis Response, the Osprey is becoming a key change agent throughout the MAGTF.

Although the Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft, its heart and sole is in supporting the Ground Combat Element (GCE) differently than any airborne capability seen before.

The Marines work the relationship between the GCE and the Air Combat Element (ACE) to shape a capability, which is expeditionary, flexible, and with the Osprey more rapid with greater range for force insertion than before.

But to get to the next phase requires further innovation, this time in terms of how the MAGTF (GCE and ACE) can better use the new emerging capabilities, specifically C3I and fires, to execute its mission more effectively.

The Osprey and KC130J pairing provides an ability to operate at distance and to rethink various missions such as force insertion, extraction of embassy personnel, TRAP and others, to include limited objective MAGTF strike operations.

By not being a relatively slow-moving helicopter that typically requires forward operating bases to conduct long-range operations, the Osprey allows the USMC (and the USAF) to think about how to use the speed and range of the Osprey when paired with organic tanking capabilities to operate fundamentally different from past approaches.

Over the past year, during three separate, long-range, Marine Air-Ground exercises, the Marine Infantry Officer Course (IOC) has worked closely with multiple aviation units to attack this required culture change. 

During these experiments, the combined air-ground team has sought different approaches to achieve more effective outcomes, and have used these exercises as means to shape future technological adaptations.

A recent example of this approach was seen in a long-range Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) that IOC, serving as a simulated Company Landing  Team(CLT), executed into a semi-permissive environment from  29Palms to Fort Hood Texas.

The exercise was called TALON REACH and was the culminating event for IOC Class 1-14.  This event was conducted under one period of darkness between 29 Palms California and Ft Hood Texas.

This exercise was made possible by the teaming of the USMC MV-22s and KC-130Js.

During this experiment and those previous, the long-range insertion method proved interesting, but the innovation to drive enhanced capabilities is even more so.

To get a sense of how this innovation process is unfolding, I talked with a participant in the exercise, Lt. Col. Bill Hendricks. 

Hendricks is a Cobra driver, and currently is assigned to USMC Aviation Headquarters as the air-ground weapons requirements officer.

A key element of the discussion focused on how mission planning can change significantly with the new configuration of insertion forces and how that approach can, in turn, significantly shorten the time from launch to operating in the objective area. Rather than several hours on the ground planning the mission and then launching the force mission, now the time associated with the Rapid Response Planning Process can be significantly reduced.  A new process is being developed.

The insertion force takes off and then does the planning in route (given the range and time in transit) and provides real time information to the GCE and ACE commanders aboard the Osprey prior to going into the objective area.

And this most recent experiment is really only the tip of the iceberg so to speak.  Given that the Ospreys are paired with KC-130Js there is no inherent reason that the bigger planes cannot carry mission planning and management support systems.

And as the Harvest Hawk configured C-130s return from Afghanistan, these planes could be used as the lead element in the insertion of a long-range insertion package as well.

Lt. Col. Hendricks started by explaining the role of the CLT  within the insertion force.

The CLT is based around highly trained, educated, and equipped infantry Marines, basically pulled out of the regular battalion and they tend to be your more qualified individuals.

The CLT can do raids of duration that are a little bit longer than a standard company could do; but shorter in duration than a battalion could support.

And they could do that because they have the best equipment and they have the best or most highly trained individuals.

The CLT is somewhere on the spectrum between a standard Marine rifle company and a MARSOC unit, as far as the skills that they bring.

It is clear that the CLT requires good ability to have systems for C2, ISR and an ability to work effectively as they move off of the air asset.

The CLT, combined with the MAGTF’s 21st century ACE, provides the nation a unique capability that already is (South Sudan) and will increasingly be in great demand.

To make this happen, the CLT’s current legacy equipment needs to change. The concern is that a lot of their equipment is legacy at best, and very heavy and bulky and not very effective.

And the red force, that they were up against, were outpacing them, as far as their ability to command and control with their own personal IPhones, chat, text messaging, and widely commercially available systems.

These opportunities and concerns bring us back to the focus of Talon Reach. A key focus of the exercise was upon how to close the gap and to give the GCE, in this case the CLT, more effective tools to support force insertion.  And to exercise also allows USMC Aviation to better understand the technology, which is most desired and effective for the GCE in their missions operating off of aircraft.

A key shift is from the GCE being primarily voice directed to a combination of voice-directed AND image enabled, combined with a data capability.  In the past few years, the GCE receives via voice communication from intelligence officers conclusions about the situation in the objective area determined by data obtained from systems like UAVs.

The approach used in the exercise was significantly different.

Lt. Col. Hendricks :

We had a command center set up in Miramar and via satcom we were sending information updates, via chat messaging that was then received in the back of the airplane on hand-held tablets. 

These were all scripted (for it was an exercise) but they would see things like:

“At 1350 zulu time, a crowd is seen gathering in front of the embassy.”

This comes across the net and the four V-22’s that were carrying the infantrymen en route could all see that on the tablet.

We could do the same with regard to imagery as well. We had Harriers out in front of the package that with their lighting pods were taking photos of the objective area where we were doing this insertion and these images were now being sent to the back of the airplanes and distributed as well.

And we had on the airplane full motion video as well. The video was coming from the lightning pod of the Harrier into the back of the lead  V-22 with a subsequent re-transmission to the other V-22s.

This allowed as well what one might call the John Madden capability. Referring to John Madden used to call the football games so he had that magic pen that he could circle on the screen. We had the same capability where we could turn it into a still image, circle a certain part of it and then distribute that image amongst the CLT on these hand-held tablets.

You could literally just draw an arrow on the screen, hit send. Just like you would a text message and now everyone has a visual image.

Clearly, this is a work in progress and sorting out the value of still versus full image video is part of the challenge and to get the systems working fully.

Nonetheless, this was the first time that we were able to demonstrate this capability to close to 75 infantry officers to get their feedback.

It is clear that these new capabilities present a great potential for the MAGTF. 

This change in equipment will force a re-examination of the current mindset and culture of warfighters accustomed to relying largely on voice-to-voice communications.  The addition of imaged enabled communication and data capability will force operators to re-think how current mission profiles are planned and executed.

In the future, infantry squads will be able to plan in flight with regard to what they see and what they think the first approach should be.

Additionally, decision-making will likely be significantly improved as these same units work through what to do while in route to the objective rather than simply receiving intelligence inputs prior to departure.

Lt. Col. Hendricks highlighted the significant impact on time to departure to time on mission.

It is four hours to get there but you are not leaving until you have done up to six hours of planning. 

This means that your real response time is ten hours from the time you receive something to actually being on station.

Based on mindset and culture shift, largely based on information and imagery and an enhanced ability to communicate, the future MAGTF could conduct planning en route to the objective area and thus cut response time in support of combatant commander’s requirements in half.

The package, which deployed on this experiment, reflects that the effort is one in progress, moving forward at a rapid rate.

Lt. Col. Hendricks indicated that the six MV-22s included 4 to carry the troops and 2 from VMX-22 to facilitate the innovation in communication and information exchange.

The VMX-22 Ospreys were used to empower the network for the insertion force.

The kind of innovation needed for the next phase is clearly based on continued and effective collaboration between the GCE and the ACE.

According to Lt. Col. Hendricks:

As we go forward with developing these new capabilities we need a collaborative effort between Aviation and the GCE.

They tell us what they need, and we work to provide that to them.

The GCE is going to be a key driver for innovation within the MAGTF being reshaped under the influence of the Osprey and the F-35.


The above article and several accompanying articles which we published in 2014 highlighted the opportunity of combing the forcing function of the Osprey with new approaches to C2 reach to shape a more integratable force which would then have its own tactical and strategic impact.

In my view, this is really the opportunity being opened by the digital interoperability effort.

On the one hand, recognizing that new platforms provide forcing function opportunities.

But on the other hand, working more directly integratability in the C2/ISR domain to both take advantage of the forcing function drivers of change but also providing enhanced capabilities for the new platform by enhanced C2/ISR reach.

Note: In an interview we did with the Major Cuomo, the head of the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) at the time of the 2014 interview, we generated a graphic which highlighted the learning path to doing the Talon Reach effort, an approach which the leaders of the DI effort highlighted as an important on with regard to combat learning and the evolution of specific technologies being woven into the DI thread.

Exercising ways to enhance the GCE insertion capability. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense, 2014

See also, the following:

Talon Reach: Shaping a Combat Cloud to Enable an Insertion Force

The GCE Drives USMC Aviation Innovation: Major Cuomo of the Infantry Officer Course Discusses the IOC’s Team Perspective

Re-shaping Ground Force Insertion: The USMC Leverages Tilt-rotor Technology To Continue to Innovate

 

USMC Long Range Raid: Shaping an Insertion Force for the 21st Century

 

UH-1Y Venom Helicopters Operate from the Sea During Cobra Gold 20

UH-1Y Venom helicopters assigned to 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 265 (REIN), operating from the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock USS Green Bay (LPD 20) in support of Exercise Cobra Gold 2020, March 5, 2020.

America Expeditionary Strike Group-31st Marine Expeditionary Unit team are seen participating in Cobra Gold 20, the largest theater security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and an integral part of the U.S. commitment to strengthen engagement in the region.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Vincent E. Zline)

Crises Learning: The Australian Case

04/13/2020

By Michael Shoebridge

Australian governments at all levels have learned a lot between the onset of the bushfire season and the first stages of the novel coronavirus pandemic.

There’s a clear understanding that national crises require coherent national responses. And that the seams between and among the Commonwealth and the states and territories that are tolerable during normal circumstances become unacceptable when the situation isn’t normal. Australians look to their prime minister to lead and to other leaders—including state premiers—to work coherently, positively and constructively together, if only for the period the crisis lasts.

Such crises empower prime ministers well beyond the letter of the constitution and beyond any political conventions.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison has recognised this and clearly knows that we need more than periodic Council of Australian Governments meetings to make our way through the coronavirus crisis, so he has formed a national cabinet with premiers and chief ministers that will meet as often as needed.

But there’s more to managing crises nationally than creating greater coherence and coordination at the political level. Below the waterline, ministers expect public-sector leaders and agencies to work across portfolio boundaries and, like the public in their expectations of state–federal relations, have no patience for jurisdictional or portfolio-based boundary claims. That’s a good thing.

As important as national leadership and improved inter- and intra-government operation is the return of the experts. In an era of dismissal of expertise and subject-matter knowledge, during crises governments and publics look to experts for guidance. We saw this with the rural fire service and emergency services chiefs during the bushfires and we are seeing it now with chief medical officers. These experts also become key to trusted communication with the public.

The good news is that the new national cabinet has support from respected experts and senior officials. Australia’s chief medical officer, Brendan Murphy, and the governor of the Reserve Bank, Philip Lowe, both participated in Friday’s emergency COAG meeting. And the new cabinet will receive continual expert advice from the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee, meaning this expert body will be a primary driver of national policy and action throughout the pandemic—which is all to the good.

This new national machinery will provide consistency of advice and decision-making. Once it gets into stride, we’ll have less of the discordant actions and advice we were starting to see—like some political figures recommending particular measures such as school closures or avoiding handshaking, while others still promoted large public events like Melbourne’s Formula 1 Grand Prix.

That’s a big step forward, and will help meet Australians’ need for clear and consistent messages from our leaders during this time of anxiety and uncertainty. National decisions are complex, so we should expect the national cabinet to expand or to at least have sub-groupings that bring in key private-sector leaders—from the food and logistics sectors, for example.

But there are differences between what we saw during the bushfires and what we are already seeing with coronavirus, so there are new lessons to be learned.

The bushfires generated a great surge of community spirit, with neighbours helping neighbours evacuate, strangers opening their homes to and feeding people in need, and a whole set of small businesses from motels to restaurants offering accommodation and free food.

The recovery phase, now interrupted by the coronavirus, has been bringing out similar qualities—from the Business Council of Australia’s BizReBuild initiative that has the top end of town helping small businesses in regional communities, to the huge public donations to charities, like the $180 million donated to the Red Cross for bushfire recovery.

Unfortunately, the coronavirus has already brought out some of the opposite behaviours: fights over toilet paper and panic hoarding show a tendency for this crisis to drive our community apart rather than be a source of unity. Disease outbreaks in history show that fear and anxiety drive people to narrowly selfish behaviours, even within families. And the unfortunate fact that social isolation is a primary public health response to the virus means that what we’ll all need to do in coming days and weeks will make it harder to reach out and help those around us.

Toilet paper skirmishes may seem trivial, but there’s real work for leaders at all levels of government and society to do to tend to the sense of community and cohesion that we’ll need during and in the recovery from this global pandemic.

As we saw with our firefighting volunteers, we know that Australian medical professionals—community nurses, GPs, staff and specialists in our hospitals and aged care facilities—will provide countless examples of service and compassion to their fellow Australians. Similarly, the behind-the-scenes work of people across essential supply systems—from fuel to food, and from health supplies to waste removal, will be invaluable.

The work these Australians do matters on a very practical level, but it will also matter as glue to hold our communities together. To encourage what Abraham Lincoln called the ‘better angels of our nature’, perhaps the communications campaign the federal government is putting together needs to portray their work. Healthcare workers and essential service providers must not be taken for granted; they need to be made visible to us as we live out weeks of social isolation.

And for all our public cynicism, the visible presence of our national leaders and their words and behaviour will be a source of comfort and reassurance.

In the middle of this national health, societal, financial and economic crisis, it’s hard to look ahead. But we need to.

One thing we need to learn and keep from both crises is that events now routinely cross our fixed organisational boundaries. The national cabinet machinery will need to be kept and improved and probably exercised more often than we expect. This has redesign implications for the machinery of government at the federal, state and territory levels and is probably best thought through with the lessons from this crisis fresh, but outside the crucible of the crisis itself.

A challenge we have yet to comprehend or deal with is the likely future where different crises overlap, with effects that compound and interact. My colleague Robert Glasser’s report Preparing for the Era of Disasters shows how regional disasters will likely not be isolated but will cascade and escalate. An example we are experiencing now is that communities damaged by the bushfires are simply in a worse position to cope with coronavirus than those left unaffected by the fires. They will need particular attention in broader plans.

And one other major challenge will be how we tune our national systems to spot indicators of potential crises earlier and empower ourselves to act rapidly and decisively at the earliest stage.

A last element will be revitalising our international engagement. That means more investment in our diplomats and diplomacy as well as currently derided international organisations like the UN, NGOs and more prosaic ones like international standards and regulatory agencies. This is a necessary reinvestment in experts, including in our public service.

It is also part of a recognition that, no matter how elegant Australia’s national crisis machinery becomes, our interconnected world requires a sense of global community and a structured system for this community of nations to act together.

Michael Shoebridge is director of the defence, strategy and national security program at ASPI.

Credit Image: Brook Mitchell/Getty Images.

This article was published by ASPI on March 16, 2020.

 

 

The Charles De Gaulle Returns Home Early: Managing the Coronavirus Impact

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and its frigate escort were due to arrive at Toulon on April 12, a return to base earlier than expected due to the coronavirus hitting 50 sailors on the capital warship.

“The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and its escort will arrive at their home base in the afternoon of Sunday April 12, at the end of almost three months tour of operations in the eastern Mediterranean and the North Sea,” the ministry said in an April 11 statement.

“The first concern of the ministry and the navy is the health of the sailors, their families and our citizens,” the ministry said.

The Charles de Gaulle had been due back at Toulon April 23, before the break out of coronavirus on board the flagship of task force 473.

An April 8 emergency medical test of 66 sailors on the carrier showed 50 had fallen ill with Covid-19, the ministry said April 10. The test led three sailors with the virus being flown April 9 on an NH90 Caïman naval helicopter to Lisbon airport, where they were transferred to a Falcon 900 jet for flight to Toulon military hospital.

The Falcon was adapted for medical flight, with two doctors and a nurse on board.

Three specialist doctors flown out to the carrier attempted to track the infection and limit the spread of the disease.

The carrier sailed from Toulon January 21 on its three-month operation Foch and had stopped over March 13-15 at Brest naval base, northwestern France.

A sailor on a Belgian frigate, Leopard 1, was confirmed March 24 to have contracted Covid-19, while the warship was sailing with the Charles de Gaulle task force, reported B2, a Brussels defense blog. The Belgian vessel, which also docked at Brest at the same time, left the task force and sailed home to arrive March 27. The Belgian crew went into quarantine.

The crew and fleet air arm unit on the French flagship carrier, and the crew of the Chevalier Paul frigate will go into a two week quarantine in military bases, the ministry said. Health and logistics specialists will take steps to deliver the “best conditions for health and accommodations.”

Further tests will be made during the quarantine and before the sailors return home.

A 1,200-strong crew sailed the Charles de Gaulle, with a further 560 personnel to command the task force, and fly and support the 18 Rafale fighter jets, two Hawkeye spy planes and three helicopters.

Some 195 sailors sailed the Chevalier Paul, a Horizon class air defense frigate.

Other ships in the naval task force – the Somme fleet auxiliary tanker and La Motte-Picquet anti-submarine frigate – will sail to Brest after a health check on board.

The fleet air arm will send the aircraft and their crew to their bases, with helicopters to Hyères, southern France, Hawkeyes to Lann Bihoué and Rafales to Landivisiau. The latter two airbases are in northwestern France.

In response to Covid-19, the troops deployed in February to the Barkhane operation in sub-Saharan Africa will continue their tour for a further one or two months, the defense and foreign affairs committee of the French senate said April 10, following  appearance of armed forces minister Florence Parly by video.

There are an estimated 3,800 “probable or possible” virus cases among the services, with 369 confirmed by health tests, the senate committee said.

The deadly pandemic has claimed the lives of at least 13,832 in France, of which 4,889 were in retirement homes, afternoon daily Le Monde reported April 12. There were fewer deaths on a daily basis, with 353 deaths on Saturday compared to 554 on Friday.

The number of patients in intensive care was declining for the third day in a row, with 6,883 patients, 121 fewer than the previous day.

President Emmanuelle Macron was due to give a nationwide address on April 13 on the pandemic.

The lock down, which started March 17, is expected to be extended beyond April 15. The question is only how long, with debate on how the tight restrictions will eventually be dismantled.

Featured Photo: French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle cruises at the coast of Frederikshavn in Denmark on March 29. The carrier is returning to home port after suspected cases of COVID-19 were found aboard.

Henning Bagger/Ritzau Scanpix/AFP via Getty Images

Editor’s Note: Here is how some French citizens are viewing the French government approach to managing the crisis:

Algeria Modernizes its Air Force: Upgrading its SU-24s

by defenceWeb

The Algerian Air Force is overhauling and upgrading its Su-24 strike aircraft fleet, with the first six at the 514 Aviation Repair Plant in Russia.

Photographs show six Algerian Air Force Su-24MK/MK2 Fencer aircraft being overhauled at the 514 Aviation Repair Plant near Rzhev in Russia, Scramble Magazine reports.

Algeria’s Air Force is understood to have some 35 Su-24s in its inventory, with the whole fleet to undergo modernisation and upgrade at the Rzhev facility. They will be upgraded to Su-24M2 standard – the same as Russian Air Force aircraft.

The upgrade includes the addition of the SVP-24 Gefest navigation and attack system incorporating new sensors, GLONASS global positioning system and other modifications (trajectory computer, atmospheric and inertia sensors, encrypted data link and head-up display) for greater weapons delivery accuracy.

The system allows the Su-24 to use older unguided munitions but with far greater accuracy, thus keeping costs to a minimum. It calculates the aircraft’s position while monitoring weather, speed, angle of attack etc. for optimum weapons delivery from up to 5 000 metres altitude. No laser markers or modifications to the bombs are required, allowing old stock weapons to be used.

The SVP-24 system has been used by Russian in Syria and apparently its success there prompted Algeria to upgrade its aircraft. The SVP-24 system has apparently been fitted to Russian Su-24, Su-25, Tu-22M3, Ka-50 and Ka-52 aircraft.

This article was published by defenceWeb on April 3, 2020.