Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part Three

01/19/2020

By Kenneth Maxwell

Social and Racial Divisions

The social and racial divisions have not improved over the past 15 years since Tuca Vieira took his iconic photograph. It was in Paraisopolos, now the second largest favela in São Paulo, where 100,000 people live, that nine young people, attending the weekend “baile funk” on the first Sunday of December were shot dead (according to the military police), though they were more likely killed by suffocation caused in the panic as the military police intervened and blocked all exits, according to residents and the families of those killed.

Eduardo Bolsonaro (35) a congressman representing São Paulo, and the president’s third son (he received the largest vote in Brazilian history) took to Twitter to ironize the Paraisopolis victims. Eduardo Bolsonaro is the chair of the foreign affairs and defence committee in the lower house. His father wanted him to be the Brazilian ambassador to Washington. He is an acolyte of Olavo de Carvalho and more recently of Steve Bannon, and he has been the South American link in Bannon’s right-wing international populist organisation.

Last October in response to the widespread street protests in Chile and Bolivia, he suggested Brazil needed “a new AI-5” which was the Brazilian military regimes institutional Act 5 which gave it the power to override the constitution and inaugurated the most repressive period of military rule. His father has for many years praised the military regime. Eduardo Bolsonaro is a former federal police officer and lawyer.

The deaths in Paraisopolos at the hands of the São Paulo military police are far from being isolated cases. Up until October of 2019 the military police in São Paulo killed 697 people. In 2018 they killed 686. (The civil police in São Paulo over the same period killed 28 and 18 respectively). In Rio de Janeiro the police killings rose by 17% in 2019.  Here the favelas and the high rises coexist in close proximity, often defined as the contrast between the “morro and the ashfelt” the contrast between the city street and the hill side self-made settlements that lack road paving and most city services. These hill side favelas narrow steps, irregular surfaces, overhanging buildings, channels of rubbish and sewerage, protected by and subject to extrajudicial punishments and protection rackets by drug gangs and the informal milícias of former police officers, are the most iconic favelas, but in reality in Rio de Janeiro the favelas also stretch much further inland to the north and far west of the city’s limits.

Here the disparity between locally available jobs and the resident population is enormous so residents must travel two hours a day each way to work in the inner city. The favelas of Rio have increased exponentially over the last half century, from 337,000 out of a total population in Rio de Janeiro of 3.3 million in 1960 (10.20%) to 1.313 million in a population of 6.2 million in 2010 (22.16%).

The same is true on the periphery of São Paulo as well as in occupied abandoned high-rise buildings close to the São Paulo city center. The consequences of these social and racial disparities show up in the Brazilian crime statistics which are the sixth highest index in the world in terms of homicides for 19 to 24-year olds: 7000 in Rio de Janeiro, 26 per 100,000 of the population. For young black men this means 400 per 100,000. The absence of the state and brute force is the norm for many.

Environmental Crisis

It is the crisis of the environment where Brazil is at the center of the global challenge and where what happens in Brazil has broad and inescapable international ramifications. Bolsonaro, like Trump, is a climate change denier. The US and China are the world’s largest contributors to carbon emissions.

But the threat to the Amazon rainforest has long attracted global concern and has created networks of powerful connected Brazilian and international activists, many of them high profile international figures, like the assassinated Chico Mendes in the past and the indigenous leader cacique Roani today, the British singer Sting in the 1980s, and American film star Leonardo DiCaprio more recently.  Bolsonaro claimed that DiCaprio was bankrolling the deliberate incineration of the Amazon rainforest.

The “criminalization” of NGOs in Brazil by Bolsonaro’s government comes against the background of the global mobilization of young people against global warming who are demanding concrete responses to the pledges made at the Paris global climate change summit in Paris and the subsequent failed climate change meeting late in 2019 in Madrid where China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Australia, blocked meaningful resolutions.  Bolsonaro not surprisingly attacked Greta Thunberg as “pirralha” (literally a little ”brat”or “pest”).

Donald Trump, another climate change denier, and also the master of insulting tweeted acronyms, agreed with Bolsonaro about the merits (or in their view the lack of merit) of Thunberg’s declarations.

The figures for 2019 for the burnings in Brazil are dramatic. The highest loss in rain forest in a decade, a 30% rise over the same period the year before. The attacks on Leonardo DiCaprio accused by Bolsonaro of bankrolling NGO’s to deliberately incinerate the Amazon rainforest and of Greenpeace for creating oil slicks along the Brazilian coast, are met with contempt outside Brazil. As was Bolsonaro spat in 2019 with Emanuel Macron, the French President.

Over the past year 3,700 square miles of Amazon rainforest has been razed. The cattle, soybean frontiers have been advancing all across the Amazon rain forest and along the Amazonian periphery in the Cerrado. Small prospectors, for gold, iron ore, and land grabbers and property speculators clearing forest land, are at the forefront of this violent, lawless, illegal cutting edge. Big agribusinesses are the beneficiaries. As is China which imports Brazilian agricultural products.

Bolsonaro in his first live press comments of 2020 promoting tourism in the Amazonian region returned to his attacks on Macron and Greta Thunberg who he again called a “pirralha.” Bolsonaro added: “Now that Australia is on fire l would like to hear if Macron has anything to say. He said he had asked his minister of defence and his foreign minister “to offer the little that we have to combat the fires in Australia.” He also praised Paul Guedes and his economic team.

The Culture Wars

It is not surprising that these conflicts find expression in acute culture wars in Brazil and they bring strange alliances and counter alliances. The military agrees with the notion that foreigners are envious and covetous of Brazil’s Amazon riches. The Vice President, General Mourão, certainly thinks so. Bolsonaro has long blamed the indigenous population for controlling large segments of the forest and preventing development there.

Bolsonaro’s guru, Olavo Carvalho, says that the “the greatest and most perfidious enemy of human intelligence is the academic community.” Bolsonaro agrees. ”Experts” are the enemy, and the Brazilian Universities (especially the federal universities which opened their doors to poorer students under the Lula government and introduced a system of quotas to encourage the participation of non-whites in the student body) are hot beds of “cultural Marxism” in Bolsonaro’s (and Olavo de Carvalho’s) world view.

Bolsonaro has placed his education minister. Abraham Weintraub, his minister for women, family and human rights, the Evangelical preacher, Damares Alves, and the disciple of Olavo de Carvalho, the Foreign Minister, Ernesto Araújo, at forefront of this cultural campaign. The nomination (since withdrawn) of Sergio Camargo to president of the Palmares foundation, a black Brazilian, who claimed that “slavery was terrible but was beneficial to the descendants of negroes brought to Brazil, where they lived better than the negroes in Africa” and who is a critic of “the day of black conscience.”

The Palmares Foundation was established in 1988 to promote Afro Brazilian art and culture and is named after the fugitive slave community which flourished in the interior Alagoas between 1605 and 1694 made up of communities of former slaves gathered in quilombos.

Bolsonaro appointed Letícia Dornelles a television telenovela producer to be president of the Casa Rui Barbosa in Rio de Janeiro. Located in Botafogo in the home where the eminent writer, politician and jurist and his family lived between 1895 and 1923, the Casa Rui Barbosa was the first museum established in Brazil in 1930 and houses his personal archive and library in a beautiful neo-classical building and garden and has been a beacon of cultural life for many decades and has been directed by many distinguished Brazilian scholars.

Letícia Dornelles first act was to dismiss the director of research and four researchers, all eminent scholars. She was indicated for the position by the neo-Pentecostal pastor of the “cathedral of avivament” and congressman from São Paulo, Marco Feliciano, an outspoken conservative and friend of Jair Bolsonaro. Feliciano was ordained in the US and is the head of 14 churches in Brazil. He plans to run for Vice President in 2022. He is notorious, like Bolsonaro, for his attacks on Africans, LGBTQ individuals, women and catholics. Africans he said are descended from “ancestors cursed by Noah.” He abhors the” promiscuous practices” of homosexuals. Giving women more rights would “undermine relationships and marriage as well as increasing the likelihood their children would be gay.”

Another front in this cultural war is Bolsonaro refusal to sign off the renowned Brazilian singer and novelist Chico Buarque de Hollanda’s award of the prestigious Camões Prize, which will nevertheless be awarded anyway in Lisbon in April 2020.  In this Bolsonaro is facing many of his favorite enemies that he has spent 27 years in the Brazilian Congress railing against.

But the collateral victims of this cultural war are the young people killed in Paraisopolos, all them 14 to 23-year olds, all from the periphery, all of them devotees not of “bossa nova” but of baile funk. All of them “marginals” in terms of race and social class as far as the Military Police of São Paulo were concerned. The image of this “new” Bolsonaro Brazil is not that of the “Girl from Ipanema” on the beach in Rio de Janeiro, but of the 14-year-old Gustavo Cruz Xavier killed at a “baile funk” in the narrow alleyways of Paraisopolis in São Paulo.

The Greenwald Factor

The hyper involvement of the use and misuse of the internet and the international dimensions of these political conflicts is also at the heart of the activities of Glenn Greenwald in Brazil. Greenwald was responsible for the revelation of the hacked archive messages between the judge and prosecutors in the “car wash” investigation which had led to the unprecedented conviction of many leading businessmen and politicians, including former President Lula, conducted by former judge Sergio Moro. Jair Bolsonaro appointed Moro to be minister of justice in his administration and also promised him a freehand in reforming the criminal justice system and in combating corruption.

Greenwald is no ingenue. He is a New York born constitutional attorney whose law firm represented clients, many on a pro-bono basis, which included a white supremacy advocate and a neo-Nazi organization.  In 2013 working with the British newspapers “The Guardian” he detailed the US and British global surveillance program based on information provided by Edward Snowdon. In 2014 funded by the founder of eBay, Pierre Omidyar, he established with two colleagues Intercept Brasil. There were claims that information on Hillary Clinton purveyed during his blogging days came originally from Russian intelligence sources. Greenwald has also been highly critical of US Democratic Politicians for what he considers their “anti-Russian” hysteria.

The most significant information revealed by Intercept Brasil was the release of private messages exchanged between the investigate judge Moro and the main prosecutor, Deltan Daliagnol, during the ”car wash” investigation, the ongoing criminal investigations by the Brazilian Federal Police, Curitiba branch, which began in 2014. These private messages were hacked apparently by Walter Delgatti Neto. The consequence of these revelations was to seriously undermine Sérgio Moro’s stellar international reputation and to severely embarrass many (both within Brazil and internationally) who had praised his anti-corruption campaign, as well as to jeopardize many of the successful corruption convictions. Which were indeed spectacularly successful.

Using plea bargains the “car wash“ investigations interrogated 429 individuals, in 18 companies, in corruption case involving more than 11 countries, and convinced 159 major political and business figures. All of which was unprecedented. But Greenwald’s “Intercept” revelations do not seem to have seriously damaged Moro’s reputation in Brazil. Moro was in a DataFolha opinion survey in the January 2020 the Brazilian in which the population has “most confidence” (33%) followed by Lula (30%) Bolsonaro (22%) and Huck (21%). Though it should be noted that all also have low confidence rates (Moro 42%) (Lula 53%) (Bolsonaro 55%) (Huck 55%). But a real consequence has been a weakening of the anti-corruption momentum in Brazil.

Greenwald is also at the heart of the cultural wars Bolsonaro is waging. While in holiday in Rio Janeiro he met on the beach at Ipanema a handsome young Brazilian. It was a case of “the boy from Ipanema“ twenty-first century style. Greenwald fell in love. David Miranda and Greenwald are married and have two adopted children. Miranda is now a Congressman from Rio de Janeiro. Miranda and Greenwald both have a very high profiles In Brazil, and Greenwald as a major interpreter of Brazilian events to the outside world.

David Miranda and Glenn Greenwald have both received death threats in Brazil, which should not be underestimated. A good friend of theirs, the Rio de Janeiro council women, Marielle Franco, who had taken on the militias, was assassinated, and Miranda himself took up the seat in Congress of an openly gay Rio congressman who is now living in exile after death threats. Greenwald and Miranda both epitomize everything about the alternative Brazil that the homophobic Bolsonaro and his family and their sour “guru” in Virginia most hate. It is for them all a very personal and individual cultural war.

Shift in Brazil’s International Policies

The arrival Jair Bolsonaro in office also marked a major shift in Brazilian international policy. In 2020 Brazil has become very much part of the Trump (and American) camp. The days of Lula’s skepticism about the United States, and his opening to Africa, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Islamic world is long gone. But navigating these international shoals will not be uncomplicated for Bolsonaro in 2020.

Trump is an unpredictable friend and Trump is above all a transactional and not an ideological president and he faces an election campaign in 2020. In Brazil’s neighborhood in Latin America tensions will continue in 2020. Social unrest and street protests have already sent shock waves across the region from Chile to Colombia.

Venezuela is in permanent and unresolved crisis and millions of Venezuelans have fled the country including into Brazil. Brazil will strive to avoid contagion. Jair Bolsonaro will face the need to conciliate the ideological driven and pragmatists within his own government.

He will need to bring economic growth.

None of these easy tasks within an angry and divided society he has done so much to instigate and on which his political fortunes depend.

Coda: Goebbels Pops Into the Brazilian Discussion on Culture

An article published by Journalists Livres highlighted the appearance of the infamous Goebbels into the Brazilian context:

The Special Secretariat of Culture of Brazil has just released a video in which the Secretary of Culture Roberto Alvim announced a funding program for the arts. In a well centred frame and with a piece from Richard Wagner’s Lohengrin on the background – the same used in Charlie Chaplin’s The Great Dictator -, a well groomed and brilliantine haired Roberto Alvim, with a picture of president Bolsonaro above him, a Cross of Lorraine on his left and the brazilian flag on his right, describes the Bolsonaro’s government guidelines for the arts: patriotic, linked to family values, connected to god and virtues of faith.

A few minutes into his speech, he delivers a pearl: an almost identical quote from the infamous Nazi Germany Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels:

“The Brazilian art of the next decade will be heroic and it will be national, it’ll be endowed with great capacity for emotional involvement and deeply committed to the urgent aspirations of our people, or it will be nothing.”

The Goebbels quote, probably taken from his biography by Peter Longerich, which was published in Brazil in 2014, reads as follows:

“The German art of the next decade will be heroic, it will be steely-romantic, it will be factual and completely free of sentimentality, it will be national with great Pathos and committed, or it will be nothing.”

The resemblance is too clear to be an accident, or even a mere inspiration. It’s an explicit reference. What Mr. Roberto Alvim means by it, if it’s a tip on the path Brazilian government wants our culture to follow, or just a provocation meant to unsettle the left, it’s unclear. It is, though, undoubtedly, very unsettling.

Watch the full video here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YiO23U59CdU

And the follow on to this story: Bolsonaro fires hist cultural minister.

President Jair Bolsonaro’s top culture official was dismissed on Friday over an address in which he used phrases and ideas from an infamous Nazi propaganda speech while playing an opera that Adolf Hitler regarded as a favorite.

The address by Roberto Alvim, the culture secretary, set off an outcry across the political spectrum as Brazilians reacted with exasperation and incredulity.

It was the latest flash point in a broader debate over freedom of speech and culture in the Bolsonaro era. The president campaigned on a promised course correction after an era of rule by leftist leaders, whom he accused of trying to impose “cultural Marxism.”

Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part One

Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part Two

 

Shaping High End Integrated Training: The Australian Case

By Andrew McLaughlin

The RAAF graduates a growing number of Air Warfare Instructors across multiple skillsets

They are among the RAAF best of the best – the latest batch of Air Warfare Instructor (AWI) capability subject matter experts showing they have what it takes to emerge as graduates of the biennial 2019 Air Warfare Instructor Course (AWIC).

The course concluded with the now familiar Exercise Dawn Strike, an event where about 20 combat aircraft fought their way through a defensive force to conduct a simulated strike on RAAF Base Williamtown.

While flying en route from RAAF Amberley, the course candidates and their airborne instructors flying F/A-18 classic and Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers were intercepted by other classic Hornets from Williamtown off the NSW mid-north coast, with the melee being ‘supervised’ by an E-7A Wedgetail.

All attacking and defending aircraft then conducted a spectacular high-speed low-level ‘beat-up’ of Williamtown in waves of up to four aircraft, before recovering at the base for the graduates’ informal patch presentation at the Williamtown mess.

A couple of nights later, your writer was privileged to attend the formal graduation where the newly minted AWIs were presented with their qualifications and various awards of excellence in front of senior RAAF leadership, past and present FCI and AWI patch wearers, their peers, and family and friends.

FROM FCI TO AWI

AWI course candidates are drawn from an increasing number of RAAF air combat specialties.

The FCI course was founded in 1954 by WGCDR Dick Creswell to develop specialist Fighter Combat Instructors from air combat lessons he had learned as Commanding Officer of 77SQN in the Korean War, and his previous air combat experience in WWII. In 1954 the RAAF was flying Gloster Meteor fighters, and through the following four decades course candidates operated the CA-27 Sabre, Dassault Mirage IIIO, and the classic Hornet.

In 1992 the FCI course was expanded for the first time to include ground-based Fighter Intelligence Instructors (FII) and Fighter Combat Controllers (FCC), while later that decade the first F-111C strike crews were also invited to undertake the course and graduate as FCI ‘patch-wearers’.

FCIs are considered subject matter experts in the fields of air combat, strike, RAAF weapons systems, and adversary capabilities and tactics. But to be considered to participate in the course, candidates must have completed a number of professional milestones.

Following operational conversion (OPCON) to their aircraft type, candidate pilots and air combat officers (ACO) will have completed at least one three-year squadron tour and a large force employment exercise such as Red Flag, Cope North or Pitch Black. These major exercises are often where pilots are upgraded to a B Category (B-Cat) rating which qualifies them to lead four-ship formations in combat. Course candidates are also invited to participate based on their above-average competency and leadership qualities.

Up until 2017, the FCI Course was conducted wholly within Air Combat Group (ACG) and using ACG resources. Due to the limited resources of the operationally-focused force element group (FEG) – and despite the high-quality output of the course – the course’s scope was understandably limited.

“It was still a very fighter-centric course,” Air Warfare Centre Commander, AIRCDRE Phil Gordon told ADBR. “But with the advent of Plan Jericho and the Air Warfare Centre in 2016, the die was cast to fundamentally re-think how we execute that advanced integrated training, and we leant very heavily on the US Fighter Weapons School model when it broadened its scope to become the USAF Weapons School.

“The first AWIC we ran was in 2017, and that was the first one that was not entirely based around fighters with other supporting capabilities, but became a whole-of-community integrated effort,” he added.

With its own dedicated budget and instructional resources to draw upon, the AWIC was brought under the Tactics and Training Directorate (TTD), an element of the Air Warfare Centre.

“The Air Warfare Centre I would say was born of Plan Jericho and the need to drive the Air Force to make the most of all the new capabilities that are being introduced,” AIRCDRE Gordon said. “When it was formed in January 2016 with the motto to ‘Ready the Warfighter’, it really was focused on driving innovation and integration across all of air force to get us to that 5th generation future.

“One of the newly created directorates within the AWC at that time was the TTD which has 88 Squadron within it,” he added. “I think the TTD is one of the real crown jewels in our drive for high-end integration. It has some really high-calibre subject matter experts from each of the platforms and systems that we use operationally, and we put them all together and make them work out how to get all the systems to work together and how to fight as a system-of-systems, not as a series of individual platforms.

“Having developed these tactics, 88SQN really shapes the training and the tactics and the development of the rest of Air Command, so that everyone is heading in the right direction to deliver on that integrated future.”

While the AWC is headquartered at RAAF Edinburgh near Adelaide, the “critical mass” of TTD and 88SQN is based at RAAF Williamtown in order to be co-located with key RAAF elements such as ACG, 81WG, Headquarters Surveillance & Response Group (HQSRG), 41WG, 42WG, the E-7As Wedgetails of 2SQN, and most of the fighter squadrons’ headquarters.

The TTD is currently headed by GPCAPT Matt McCormack and 88SQN is commanded by WGCDR Tim Main. GPCAPT McCormack is a classic Hornet pilot and a former CO of 2OCU, while WGCDR Main is an air combat officer and a qualified Fighter Combat Controller (FCC).

With the change from FCI course to AWIC, the 2017 course was vastly expanded to include AEW&C Combat Instructors (ACI) from the E-7A Wedgetail, and Mobility Tactics Instructors (MTI) from the C-130J. Also in 2017 the FII qualification was “re-branded” as ICI, or Intelligence Combat Instructor.

“So we broadened the community away from just fighters to include Wedgetail and C-130s,” AIRCDRE Gordon said. “Then in 2019 we created a Growler Tactics Instructor (GTI).”

Prior to 2017, FCI courses usually graduated between six and 10 fast-jet crew members plus a few FIIs and FCCs. But AWIC19 graduated a total of 27 AWIs across six specialist domains, comprising eight FCIs (five classic Hornet pilots, two Super Hornet pilots, and one Super Hornet ‘back-seater’ weapons systems operator), four FCCs, three ICIs, five ACIs, three MTIs, and four GTIs.

COURSE ELEMENTS

Exercise Dawn Strike at the end of May was just the last of several major exercise elements conducted over the five months of the course.

The first of these was Exercise Diamond Sage conducted in Canberra in January which comprised planning meetings and briefings in conjunction with Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) and other participating ADF capability managers. Following that was an initial instructional phase in February, before the course rolled into Exercise Diamond Shield in March.

Previously called Aces South, Diamond Shield is an air defence exercise conducted at Williamtown and Amberley and the airspace in between and, this year, was supported by visiting USAF F-16C/D fighters from the 18th Aggressor Squadron based at Eielson AFB in Alaska.

Following an additional instructional phase, the course rolled into Exercise Diamond Spear which is a dedicated air-to-ground phase using live and simulated ordnance on the ranges around Williamtown and Amberley. Exercise Diamond Spear was previously called Aces Strike.

In between all the flying activities of the course, the AWIs are required to complete intensive academics to provide theoretical grounding for what they will later be required to put into practice.

The major exercise element of the AWI course was the massive three-week long Exercise Diamond Storm which was conducted primarily in the Northern Territory ranges around Darwin and RAAF Tindal near Katherine.

Formerly called Aces North, Diamond Storm this year included visiting USAF F-15C Eagles of the 144th Fighter Wing (144FW) California Air National Guard based in Fresno, and B-52Hs from the 23rd Expeditionary Bomber Squadron (23EBS) on a rotational deployment at Anderson AFB on Guam that were working with the ADF on the regular Enhanced Air Cooperation (EAC) program.

“There are multiple levels why it is important for USAF to support exercises like Diamond Storm, the major one being interoperability between the United States and Australia,” the 23EBS Assistant Director of Operations, Maj Bryson Ayers said in a statement during the exercise. “We train together because it gives us a better understanding of the people we are likely to work with in the future.

“It’s sometimes the small things that build the strongest relationships, we don’t just fly together – we eat together and attend briefs together,” Maj Byers added. “We are learning about how life is different in the two countries and yet essentially the same. It has been an enriching couple of weeks for the crew on the ground here.”

In addition to the USAF assets, there were also US Marine Corps AH-1Z Vipers, UH-1Y Venoms and MV-22B Ospreys, and Alpha Jets and Learjets operated by Air Affairs and Raytheon to provide additional electronic warfare, adversary force, and a force multiplication capability.

The Raytheon Electronic Warfare Training Systems (EWTS) Learjet 35A provides a simulated contested electromagnetic environment which course candidates need to manage and ‘fight’ through. An ADF statement says the EWTS inclusion in the adversary force’s order of battle introduced radar jamming, communications denial, and deception through accurate threat simulation.

“When we experience jamming from the Learjet it makes it more difficult for us to be able to target that aircraft,” F/A-18A pilot FLGOFF ‘Georgi’ said in a statement during the exercise. “We have to use our radar in a more deliberate manner to achieve an affect. It increases the complexity of the task and is a fantastic simulation of what would happen in the real world.”

Raytheon also deployed its Mobile Threat Training Emitter System (MTTES) system from Oakey in QLD to the NT for Diamond Storm. The MTTES is a new capability designed to provide an operationally representative ground-based threat, the effects of which can be coordinated with other air and ground elements to create a layered defence posture that requires advanced integrated planning and execution to overcome.

“The threat emitters give us another layer of targeting complexity when we are focused on delivering weapons on our adversary’s doorstep,” said FLGOFF Georgi. “We must defend against surface-to-air threat systems that can pop-up without notice anywhere in the area of operation. It’s been great to see our aircraft threat warning indicators react in real time to surface-to-air threats. It really makes a difference when you see an indicator light up as opposed to having to pretend.”

Diamond Storm also saw the final employment of the Dornier Alpha Jets as adversaries prior to their return to Canada. Operated by Discovery Air Defence Services under Air Affairs Australia’s existing Jet Air Support contract, the three former Luftwaffe Alpha Jets have been based at Williamtown since August 2017 on a two-year trial contract to provide adversary ‘Red Air’, Joint Terminal Attach Controller (JTAC) training, and RAN fleet support work.

Another simulated threat employed for Diamond Storm was a Royal Air Force Skyguard radar and inflatable simulated weapons system – or ‘jumping castle’ – which was set up in the Bradshaw Range southwest of Darwin. The RAF says that when the Skyguard radar and inflatable weapons system are paired together, they create a layered defence.

“The Skyguard radar can track aircraft up to 16 kilometres away and has twin 35mm cannons with a range of four kilometres,” RAF Aerospace Systems Manager, SGT Nick said in a statement during the exercise. “In a real world scenario it would be used to protect high value assets like a hospital or base headquarters.

“Skyguard sends out an electronic signal to the aircraft, giving the aircraft a realistic target on the ground,” he added. “From the air, a pilot will see an inflatable tank and react to the threat from the Skyguard. Our equipment is simulating an adversary force that the AWIC candidates have to identify, engage or manoeuvre around.”

Following Diamond Storm, the Skyguard radar and inflatable weapons systems was deployed to Queensland and used in Exercise Talisman Sabre 2019.

Apart from the fast jets, other ADF Diamond Storm assets included Hawk 127, AP-3C (EW) Orion, P-8A Poseidon, C-17A, KC-30A MRTT, E-7A Wedgetail and C-130J Hercules, as well as 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit (114MCRU) and 3CRU operating AN/TPS-77 Tactical Air Defence Radar Systems (TADRS), Army SASR special forces and Tiger ARHs, and 4SQN combat controllers.

Near Timber Creek at the southern end of the vast Bradshaw Range, 3CRU set up its TPS-77 unit, while 114MCRU set up its radar and communications systems at Pine Creek between Darwin and Katherine.

“Our TADRS has a range of up to 250 nautical miles, and our role here is to help provide a three dimensional air picture in exercise scenarios,” 3CRU communication electronics Technician CPL Steve Maley said in a statement during the exercise. “We are trained to deploy our radar capability to the most remote locations.

“3CRU are emulating an enemy force during Diamond Storm,” he added. “We are playing the ‘baddies’ to provide complex training for the course. We have to keep the radar spinning to keep the exercise going. If a jet breaks it can potentially sit out of a mission, but if our radar goes down there is a crucial missing link.”

Also supporting the exercise was the newly upgraded Delamere Air Weapons Range (DELAWR), a half-million acre area southwest of Katherine that the ADF describes as ‘Australia’s premier weapons ranges for practice gunnery and both inert and high explosive bombing.

The range has recently received new accommodation, recreation and messing facilities to better support permanent staff and those deployed for major exercises and training events.

“The new facilities have more work-stations and work areas meaning that we can more easily accommodate exercise personnel,” Officer in Charge Range Operations, WGCDR Lynette Horne said in a statement during the exercise. “We now have a dedicated and permanent facility for Raytheon, an operations centre and briefing room, a dedicated medical room with trauma bed and purpose built explosive ordnance storage areas.

“The new facilities have enhanced our ability to provide a high-quality support base for operations in the field. All the permanent staff here look forward to the future growth of the range.”

Further upgrades are scheduled for DELAWR, including the all-important electronic warfare training range capability that will be required to provide high-fidelity threat training for the RAAF’s F-35A, EA-18G Growler, and the forthcoming Gulfstream G550-based MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare system.

FUTURE AWIC

While AWIC19 saw the course’s continued expansion into new skillsets and categories, it was also a somewhat poignant one for the RAAF. With the F/A-18A/B classic Hornet due to retire from RAAF service in 2021/22 after 37 years of service, this will likely have been the final AWI-FCI course led by 2OCU flying classic Hornets.

In July, the RAAF commenced the final operational conversion course (OPCON) to the classic Hornet. Once that course is complete later this year, 2OCU will divest itself of its Hornets before elements of the squadron relocate to Luke AFB in Arizona in early 2020 to begin their conversion to the F-35A, before returning to Williamtown in late 2020.

“Having worked in ACG for a large part of my career, I have seen the evolution from where we started with the Hornet to where we have ended up, and the progression has been remarkable,” Commanding Officer of 2OCU, WGCDR Woodland said. “It is sad to see the Hornet retire, but it’s also an exciting time as we transition to the F-35A and beyond, evolving into that next generation fighting force.”

In the meantime, 77SQN at Williamtown and 75SQN at Tindal will continue to operate the Hornet as operational squadrons and, while they will conduct upgrades and refreshers ‘in-house’ through their own training flight elements, from next year all formal RAAF fast-jet pilot training will be conducted on the BAE Hawk, F/A-18F, EA-18G and F-35A.

By the next AWIC in 2021, one RAAF squadron of F-35As will have achieved an initial operational capability (IOC) and another will be well advanced, and local operational conversion will be well underway. But the rapidly increasing tempo of F-35 training and operational workups mean it is unlikely the RAAF will be ready to send any F-35 pilots to the 2021 course.

But the F-35A community will still play a major role in AWIC21 by providing air combat, strike, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), joint-force integration, and other support roles to the exercise.

Meanwhile a high priority for AWIC21 for the RAAF is to develop an AWI category for the P-8A Poseidon maritime ISR aircraft.

“We had planned this year to have our first students on the course flying the P-8 Poseidon, but the operational tempo of that aircraft during its transition into service meant we held back on that,” AIRCDRE Gordon told us in closing. “The P-8 community still participated in the exercises and integrated at various points, but they didn’t have any of their crews as candidates on the course.

“In 2019 we also had some other warfighter communities supporting the course and as observers. For example, we had C-17 folks, KC-30, we had combat controllers from 4SQN, and we had some cyber folks from the Information Warfare Directorate in the AWC. The priority community in 2021 is to add the P-8, but we’re also looking at how we bring these additional new communities into the course in a measurable way that doesn’t dilute the product.”

This article was published by ADBR on January 16, 2020.

 

Defeating “Weapons That Wait” With Unmanned Systems

01/16/2020

By George Galorisi

The November 15, 2019, a Latvian Public Broadcasting System article headline was as stark as it was disturbing: “NATO ships clear more than 50 mines from Baltic Sea.”

The subtext was more explanatory: “November 14 saw the conclusion of the Joint Hod ops (Historical Ordnance Disposal Operation) exercise organized by NATO’s 1st Standing Anti-Mine Squad and the Baltic Minesweeper Squadron (BALTRON) which began November 4.”

As the article noted: “During the Hod ops exercise, approximately 20 square nautical miles were cleared, finding 56 explosive items at the bottom of the sea, including various different types of mines.  Currently, 43 mines have been destroyed, and the Navy will continue its work on neutralizing the remaining 13 mines.”

The fact that these mines, some of which were WW II German-made mines weighing almost 1000 kilograms each were discovered, is a vivid example that the mine threat that exists in 2020 is real.

Few would disagree with the statement that mines represent one of the most vexing military challenges. Sea mines are perhaps the most lethal form of these weapons, as they are hard to find, difficult to neutralize, and can present a deadly hazard to any vessel—even those ships specifically designed to hunt them.

These “weapons that wait” provide almost any adversary with an effective means to thwart even a major naval power.

Even the threat of mines can stop any naval operation dead in its tracks. The use of sea mines adjacent to maritime choke points presents a threat that is at once ubiquitous and deadly. Further afield, sea mines have broader repercussions for global maritime trade routes as well. Sadly, western nations have given insufficient attention to dealing with the threat sea mines pose to naval and merchant activities worldwide.

While the United States and many of its NATO and other allies are laying up and “sun-setting” their mine-countermeasures (MCM) capabilities, peer competitors are enhancing their MCM inventory.  In late 2019, Russia christened a new Alexander-Obukhov-class minesweeper, adding to their already substantial fleet of Aleksandrit-class and Natya-class minesweepers. China added new Wozang-class mine-countermeasures vessels in 2016 (Rongcheng and Donggang types) and in 2017 (Rudong type).

Mine Countermeasures Is an Ongoing Challenge

In the past several decades, rogue states have employed a wide variety of sea mines.  Libya used mines to disrupt commerce in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb.  Iran laid mines to hazard military and commercial traffic in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.  During Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991, the threat of mines hazarded coalition forces operating in the Arabian Gulf.

Today, especially given the tensions between the United States and Iran, U.S. and allied military professionals are evaluating the ways that Iran could threaten the west. Many think that the most serious threat is that Iran could mine the Strait of Hormuz. The mines themselves would not only take an extended period to clear, but the minesweepers could only do their work once the Iranian navy was sunk and its anti-ship missile sites destroyed.

Beyond the Iranian threat, the challenge posed by potential adversary mining capabilities is real and growing.  The number of countries with mines, mining assets, mine manufacturing capabilities, and the intention to export mines has grown dramatically over the past several decades.  More than fifty countries possess mines and mining capability.  In addition, the types, sophistication, and lethality of the mines available on the world market are increasing.

This threat is not lost on Navy and Marine Corps leadership.

During the November 2019 NDIA Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Vice Admiral John Miller, former commander of Naval Forces Central Command, noted that developing MCM capability is critical as the Navy faces increased mining threats from adversaries worldwide.  During this event, Major General David Coffman, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade noted, “The threat of mines is growing globally.  It is an asymmetric advantage that our enemy is trying to leverage and directly affects our maneuverability and our assets.”

It falls squarely on the U.S. Navy to provide the MCM capability to enable the Joint Force to operate forward in support of United States’ interests, as well as those of our allies and friends.

Indeed, the U.S. Navy’s strategic document A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 (Design 2.0) articulates the profoundly challenging strategic environment where peer competitors such as China and Russia and lesser (but more unstable) powers such as North Korea and Iran, have impressive inventories of naval mines.

Design 2.0 notes that, “It has been decades since we last competed for sea control, sea lines of communication and access to world markets.”  One doesn’t have to be a Sun Tzu or Clausewitz to understand that the threat of naval mines is one of the key challenges that drives our emerging need to once again compete for freedom of movement on the world’s oceans, as well as in the littorals.

Mine Countermeasures (MCM) is one of the most difficult and time-consuming missions for navies to successfully execute.

That is likely why, through the entirety of my U.S. Navy experience (which began in 1970), I have witnessed the Navy “admire the problem” of MCM.  For example, in the late 1990s, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, and Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Jones, signed out the fourth edition of the unclassified and widely distributed Naval Mine Warfare Plan.  Shortly thereafter came the 21st Century Warfighting Concept: Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection.  Several years later, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Robert Natter, and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Thomas Fargo, jointly published an unclassified Carrier Battle Group/Amphibious Ready Group Mine Warfare Concept of Operations (CVBG/ARG MIW CONOPS).

The U.S. Navy’s MCM capabilities are little-changed today, even after decades of “aspirational” intentions to enhance the Navy’s MCM posture. While the U.S. Navy has made some important strides, such as the MCM package aboard the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the significance of the MCM mission provides both the impetus and opportunity to do much more. And the time to do so is now.

The platforms that embody the U.S. Navy’s primary MCM capability—the MH-53E AMCM aircraft and the Avenger-class minesweeper – are scheduled to sunset by 2025.

As Captain Chris Merwin of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) pointed out at a military-industry event in October 2019, the Navy’s follow-on MCM capability, embodied the MCM package aboard the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), is not coming on line as rapidly as anticipated, and initial operating capability is not scheduled until 2023 – a date Captain Merwin described as “optimistic.”

Based on my U.S. Navy experience—spanning half a century, first as a naval officer and now as a Navy civilian—this is not a new issue for the U.S. Navy, but one it has struggled with for decades. 

The entirety of my professional involvement with the operational Navy strongly suggests that it is not a lack of “want,” or even a lack of money (although MCM funding has lagged other procurement priorities), but rather, not having adequately mature technology to address the challenge.

Evaluating Unmanned Vehicle Technologies

Today, one of the most rapidly growing areas of innovative technology adoption by military forces worldwide involves unmanned systems. In the past several decades, the expanding use of military unmanned systems (UxS) is already creating strategic, operational, and tactical possibilities that did not exist a decade ago.

While unmanned systems show great promise, most military professionals are keenly aware of the importance of not embracing every tool a technologist thinks might be of value to those in the fight. Employing unmanned systems in an ongoing series of exercises, experiments and demonstrations is a proven way of separating promising, but immature, technologies from those that will actually wind up in the hands of a warfighter as a proven capability.

Given today’s compelling mine threat, as well as the age of current MCM force, to say nothing of the rapidity with which current MCM systems are sun-setting, it may be time for naval professionals to shift to a new technology paradigm and focus on technologies—often commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies—will likely deliver an MCM capability faster than traditional acquisition processes.

For all navies, there is only one way to completely, “Take the sailor out of the minefield,” and that is to leverage unmanned technologies to hunt and destroy mines from a distance. As naval analyst Norman Friedman pointed out in a piece for Defense Media Network, “Gulf War 20th: Naval Lessons of the Gulf War,” the severe damage done to U.S. Navy ships, USS Samuel B. Roberts, USS Tripoli and USS Princeton by simple sea mines is something that can be avoided in the future. In the past, unmanned vehicle technologies were not mature enough to be considered to take on the complex mine-hunting and mine-clearing task. They are today.

The U.S. Navy is accelerating the testing and fielding of unmanned systems.

Headlines such as, “Navy, Marines Moving Ahead with Unmanned Vessel Programs,” appear in the defense media. Concurrently, other articles, such as “When Will the U.S. Navy be Able to Autonomously Seek and Destroy Mines?” emphasize the U.S. Navy’s strong desire to take sailors out of the minefield.  Similar efforts are likely going on in other navies, especially NATO naval forces.

As just one indication of NATO’s concern in this area, and the reason that MCM efforts are gaining traction, the alliance has a long history of mine-countermeasures exercises, and has stepped up their periodicity and complexity. An article in Second Line of Defense in August 2018, “NATO Mine Counter Measures Group One Works in Norwegian Waters: August 2018,” presented the challenge in compelling terms.  Other articles, such as Ryan Hilger’s “The Navy Needs Agile Mine Warfare,” in the October 2019 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings addressed the challenge this way: “The United States lacks the capabilities and operational concepts to deploy large-scale mine countermeasures against a peer competitor.” Lieutenant Commander Hilger went further, noting;”

The U.S. Navy is not prepared to confront that level of mine threat, nor does it have a robust strategy for offensive mine warfare.

The current operational concept relies on manned surface platforms and sailors in or near the minefield for detection and clearance operations. The systems rely on a slow, methodical pace to complete the end-to-end countermine kill chain. The Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships and Freedom- and Independence-class littoral combat ships (LCSs) lack the survivability to conduct mine clearance operations in a denied environment—assuming the mine countermeasures module for the LCS ever reaches the fleet.

Other navies can capitalize on the work that the U.S. Navy has already conducted as it has explored ways to use emergent COTS unmanned technologies for the MCM mission.  Given the severity of the mine threat, all navies would be well-served to leverage and build upon mature technologies that have been examined by commercial and other government agencies in the United States, and tested extensively in exercises, experiments, and demonstrations to field a near-term MCM capability.

Building on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Experience

Earlier in this article I quoted both a U.S. Navy admiral and a U.S. Marine Corps general, both of who spoke of the severity of the mine threat as well as the challenges of fielding an effective and affordable MCM capability. This was not a set of random quotes, but rather an indication that the Navy and Marine Corps are united in their mutual efforts to deal with the worldwide mine threat to naval expeditionary forces.

The reason for this unity of effort is clear: Navy-Marine Corps expeditionary strike groups operate in the littorals close to shore, often on a coastline that the adversary defends with mines. That is one of the reasons why,  over the past several years, in a series of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps events as diverse as the Ship-to-Shore Maneuver Exploration and Experimentation and Advanced Naval Technology Exercise, the Battlespace Preparation in a Contested Environment, the Surface Warfare Distributed Lethality in the Littoral demonstration, Dawn Blitz, Steel Knight, the Bold Alligator exercise series, and Valiant Shield, operators have field-tested wide range of emerging technologies, many of them adaptable to the MCM mission.

One of the technologies that performed well was the MANTAS unmanned surface vehicle (USV).

Over the course of the events described above, the MANTAS was scaled-up from a six-foot, to eight-foot, to twelve-foot version. During Exercise Valiant Shield, MANTAS was tasked with re-supply mission, carrying cargo to the troops ashore. As a result of that mission success, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officials have asked MANTAS’ manufacturer, MARTAC Inc., to scale-up the MANTAS further and design a thirty-eight-foot version.

It is this USV—one that closely approximates the size of an eleven-meter RHIB used by many navies—that can be combined with surface and subsurface mine-hunting and neutralizing equipment to provide an over-the-horizon “single sortie detect-to-engage” MCM capability that takes the sailor out of the minefield and provides a potential solution for this vexing mission. While there are any number of USVs and UUVs that the U.S. Navy is testing, leveraging one that has been thoroughly wrung out for hundreds of hours during years of Navy exercises, experiments, and demonstrations provides the most important building block for a comprehensive MCM capability.

Achieving a Near-Term MCM Capability with COTS Technologies

The essential building block for a commercial-off-the-shelf technology MCM solution is a scaled-up version of the twelve-foot MANTAS high-speed catamaran proven in the events listed earlier.  This USV—nicknamed the T38—is virtually identical in size to an eleven-meter RHIB carried by many naval ships.  The T38 can operate in up to sea state five, has a cruise speed significantly greater than that of an eleven-meter RHIB and a range four times greater than the RHIB.

One of the most important attributes of this building block is the fact that the T38 has an aft-mounted twin tow station which houses both a mine-hunting sonar system and a mine neutralization remotely-operated vehicle (ROV).  These towed subsystems are installed on two rails aft.  The catamaran hull enables the MANTAS to conduct an angled submergence of the stern tow station. This unique configuration results in a flooded well-deck that facilitates a straightforward launch and recovery of the tows.

The first key component of a commercial-off-the-shelf technology MCM solution is a towed-body-mounted sonar.  A sonar for this mission must have a resolution sufficient to search for mine-like objects (MLOs).  Such a sonar is also programmable for obstacle avoidance, bottom following and terrain referencing.  Another important feature is automatic target recognition to identify likely MLO anomalies.  At this stage, an operator can verify the MLO designated as such by the MANTAS sonar.  Verified MLOs are then added as a waypoint for validation.

The second component of a commercial-off-the-shelf technology MCM solution is a Mine Neutralization System (MNS) Remotely Operated Vehicle.  Mine-like objects that have been verified will be continuously updated.  Once this is complete, the system will recommend a route for the MNS ROV.  This route can be changed as needed as priorities shift or the tactical situation evolves.  Once the area search is complete, the T38 transitions from hunting to neutralizing by conducting a well-deck recovery of the towed-body.  This is followed immediately by the launch of the tethered MNS ROV.

The Mine Neutralization System Remotely Operated Vehicle then performs the work previously conducted by various classes of ships as it provides real-time video validation of mine-like objects.   The MNS ROV autonomously executes the MLO route for final classification and man-on-the-loop validation of each MLO.  As this is taking place, the T38 shadows and supports it as an over-the-horizon communications link.  This process is repeated until the field is cleared.

If the technical and operational solution presented above sounds simple and achievable it is just that—a capability that exists today in the commercial subsystems that can be delivered far more rapidly than anything the traditional acquisition system can provide.

MARTAC is already completing the design and fabrication of the T38 MCM variant prototype for potential demonstration to the Navy as early as this summer.

The time is right to embrace an unmanned COTS solution to deal with deadly mines.

An MCM Challenge Demanding Action Today

During my decades of service in the operational Navy, I deployed to the Arabian Gulf a number of times—the same body of water where my shipmates on USS Samuel B. Roberts, USS Tripoli and USS Princeton were seriously injured by mines.  Because ships and sailors operate daily in harm’s way, The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps—and by extension other allied navies—need to accelerate their efforts to deal with deadly mines. The essential components for such a system exist today, and a robust COTS MCM solution can reach fruition in the near-term.

It is time to put a near-term solution in the hands of the U.S. Navy’s sailors.  While programs of record are developing next-generation technology, the Navy should invest in parallel-path solutions that leverage mature subsystems ready to provide speed-to-capability today.  Once the Fleet sees the COTS solution that can be delivered with the system described above, the U.S. Navy—as well as other navies with the foresight to embrace such a system—will have an effective way to defeat today’s deadly mine threat.

George Galdorisi is a career naval aviator whose thirty years of active duty culminated in fourteen years of consecutive service as executive officer, commanding officer, commodore, and chief of staff. His last operational assignment spanned five years as a carrier strike group chief of staff embarked in the USS Carl Vinson and USS Abraham Lincoln.

The featured photo is of a MANTAS unmanned surface vehicle (USV).

In 2015, Murielle Delaporte deployed with a NATO Mine Counter Measures Group and reported on the challenges facing the de-miners.

The “Standing NATO Mine Counter Measures Group One Change of Command

Dealing with the Challenge of Mine Warfare: An Interview with Commander Peter Bergen Henegouwen, SNMCMG1 Commander

Enhancing Joint Seamanship: The CO of the Donau Talks About NATO Missions

Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part Two

By Kenneth Maxwell

Brazilian Society

Brazil is now overwhelmingly an urban society.

Yet the countryside matters, and is now dominated by agribusiness, which is a major source of president Jair Bolsonaro’s political support. He appointed a major friend of agribusiness, Tereza Cristina, as head of the agriculture ministry.

Agribusiness likes to export, and China which has for 10 years been Brazil’s principal commercial partner. China is the largest market for Brazilian soya beans, soya bean meal, beef, and pork. In 2019 Chinese purchases of Brazilian produce reached US$ 65.4 billion. (The United States was in second place in 2019 with US$ 29.6 billion.) The Arab states are major importers from Brazil. Countries with majority Islamic populations import 70% of Brazilian sugar, 37% of Brazilian chicken, and 27% of Brazilian beef.

Jair Bolsonaro is an evangelical Pentecostal. Like US president Donald Trump he is ideologically wedded to Israel. He was baptized in the River Jordan. He wanted to move the Brazilian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. He has claimed that “China was buying up Brazil.”

But Bolsonaro has already been obliged to reconcile Brazil’s material concerns with his ideological (and Pentecostal) preferences. He visited China on his way back to Brazil from the enthronement of the Japanese emperor (Brazil has a large and influential Japanese origin population, especially in São Paulo state). He was lavishly feted in Beijing by Chinese President Chinese Xi Jinping.  Bolsonaro also visited Saudi Arabia on his way back from Japan and China though he spent much of his time there railing in an unhinged televised transmission against Globo, the big Brazilian media empire.

The Brazilian mainstream press (like Trump and his attacks on what he calls the ”fake news” of the mainstream US media) is another of Bolsonaro’s favorite targets. He declared recently that the press was ”a species facing extinction.”

Chinese investment has been rising in Brazil.

Massively into Brazil’s electricity distribution system as well as into Brazilian off shore oil production.

China is at the center of the ideological split within Bolsonaro’s government between the “pragmatists” represented by the economic team under Guedes, the military ministers in the government led by Vice President army General Hamilton Mourão, and the ideologists led by the President and his sons, supported by the foreign minister, Ernest Araújo, and Felipe Martins, the president’s foreign policy adviser in the presidential palace (palácio do planalto), the environmental minister, Ricardo Salles, who is like Bolsonaro a climate change denier, the education minister, the economist Abraham Weintraub (he is greatest user of twitter in Bolsonaro’s government), Damares Alves, the Evangelical pastor, the minister of women and family and human rights, all of them backed from Virginia in the US by Olavo de Carvalho, the self-exiled verbally incontinente, foul mouthed, internet ”philosopher” and gun totting “mentor” and “guru” to Bolsonaro and his sons.

Brazilian society is profoundly unequal and the concentration of wealth at the top remains obscene, even by international standards.

The top one percent of Brazilians control 28.3% of the national wealth. 10% of the richest control 41.9% of the wealth. Only Qatar has a worse distribution of wealth at 29%.

Yet Jair Bolsonaro’s most fervent political support base is among Pentecostalists, many of them drawn from the urban aspiring lower middle class and Favala residents.

The intersection between the urban upper middle class ensconced behind their well protected high rises and heavily gated compounds, and the aspiring poor is intense, interconnected, and interdependent.

Often these connections are through household service and through what the Brazilian historian Jaime Reis calls the world of “motor boys, bike boys, Uber, the slaves of neo-liberalism.”

This is the “Gig” economy Brazilian style. These unequal segments of society are linked through the large informal economy of the drug trade especially in cocaine. This is where the middle class meets the traffickers. These connections are also international.

Clandestine Commerce

Some idea of the scale of this clandestine commerce can been seen in the extent of drug seizures. Cocaine seizures between January and October 2019 comprised 47.1 tons in the port of Santos (SP), 18.9 tons in Paranaguá (PR) which is the second largest port in Brazil in terms of tonnage and the third in container shipping and is the main port for Brazil’s agricultural products, 13.5 tons of cocaine was seized in Natal (RN), and 4.4 tons in Itajaí (SC).

These cocaine shipments were destined for Holland, France, and Belgium. The cocaine routes link the inland frontiers of Colombia and Venezuela through Bolivia and Paraguay to the Brazilian (and Uruguayan) Atlantic ports. The trade also passes from Natal to Europe through the former Portuguese colony of Guiné Bissau (virtually a narco-state).

The trade in cocaine and the routes of cocaine trafficking into and out of Brazil are a major unacknowledged contributor to Brazil economy.

It also stokes Brazil’s high rate of crime, urban gang warfare over urban territory, and the interconnections between the informal armed “milícias” which since 2000 under the guise of combatting narcotraffickers have extorted the population of the favelas and low income communities for the clandestine use of gas, cable television link ups and other services, and in the sale of property. Formed of police, firemen, security guards and retired military officers, they often live in the communities and are linked to politicians and community leaders.

According to research in 2010 the milícias dominated 41.5% of the 1006 favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The other 55.9% were controlled by narco traffickers. The corruption of the police and local politicians, and the high rates of homicides, especially among Brazil’s “afro descendent” population is a direct consequence. In Rio de Janeiro the milícia “escritório do crime” which is active in the western area of the city exploits the illegal construction and the sale of real estate.

The role of the military police along these sharp domestic boundaries is particularly shocking.

The context was captured by the iconic photograph, taken in 2004 by Tuca Vieira of the favela of Paraisopolos abutting the upper-class district of Morumbi in São Paulo, where the division between wealth and poverty was most grotesque, between the favela and the luxurious apartment bloc.

It also mirrors the division between whites and non-whites with deep roots in Brazilian history and the legacy of almost 400 years of slavery.

Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part One

The featured photo shows Brazilian police seizing hundreds of kilos of cocaine in a drug raid in Sao Paulo on September 23, 2016, in which an Israeli man was arrested. (screen capture: Ynet)

The photo was taken from the following source:

israeli-arrested-in-brazil-with-300kg-of-cocaine-report

 

 

Shaping a Next Gen Workforce for Airpower: The Australian Case

By Andrew McLaughlin

The equipment is here or on the way, but what is the RAAF doing to develop a next gen workforce?

The Royal Australian Air Force is undergoing arguably the biggest transformation in its 98-year history. Not only has almost every platform in its inventory been recapitalised in the past decade and a half, the service is also having to re-skill and upskill much of its workforce to adapt to a whole new generation of capabilities.

Air Commodore Geoff Harland joined the Royal Australian Air Force in 1985. During his career, he has flown as an Air Combat Officer on P-3C Orion, F-111C and F/A-18F Super Hornet.

He has commanded 1SQN, 82WG, and Air Force Training Group as well as deploying as an Air Planner for INTERFET (East Timor), Director Air Operations Centre and Air Component Commander for Operation Sumatra Assist, and Director of the US Central Command’s 609th Combined Air Operations Centre in the Middle East.

Outside Air Force, AIRCDRE Harland spent 18 months working for the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) in aviation safety culminating in roles including Australian Safety Oversight Branch Manager. He was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross in 2001, appointed as a Member of the Order of Australia and awarded the Distinguished Service Medal in 2017. He is currently the Director General Personnel – Air Force.

AIRCDRE Harland is clearly an experienced operator with a clear focus on human resource management, and his role as Director General Personnel – Air Force is to oversee the transformation of the RAAF’s workforce to be able to safely and effectively operate the next generation of systems entering service.

“We’re in a phase now where we are really reconsidering what works for Air Force in terms of workforce,” AIRCDRE Harland told ADBR. “Looking forward, we’re trying to understand and anticipate the future nature of work and emerging demographics to determine how we might better prepare ourselves and continue to generate good workforce outcomes now and into the future and in doing so stay ahead of the game.”

Two of the key challenges of building a next gen workforce are the changing demographics of and demands for different skill-sets in Air Force and society in general.

“The question we asked ourselves was, ‘what would a 5th generation air force mean from a workforce point of view?’,” he said. “We asked that question against the backdrop of the changing nature of work in the wider community, given that Air Force is drawn from the wider community. We are importantly an all-volunteer force, so the way we work and the way we operate needs to make sense to the wider community, we also need to ensure we remain viable and perform as an Air Force.”

One of the opportunities Air Force has used to begin to re-shape was provided by Project Suakin which formalised the notion of a total workforce model. Launched in November 2013 by then VCDF AIRMSHL Mark Binskin, Project Suakin’s aim was to “improve the ADF’s ability to respond to future workforce challenges and changes in the security environment and the economy by giving it a more flexible workforce structure.”

By using the Total Workforce Model (TWM) the Project Suakin aimed to “provide flexible career pathways, matching remuneration and benefits with capability delivered, enhanced workforce flexibility, simplified processes and helping to build an organisational culture that is more accepting of flexibility”.

“What we’re looking at in the Air Force’s adoption of the TWM is the creation of a total workforce system which takes into account uniformed Air Force people who engage in a career in more flexible modes than in the past and may work in a casual, part-time or full-time way rather than the previous binary permanent or reserve Air Force construct,” AIRCDRE Harland explained.

“We are now realising opportunities with casual workforce, readiness part-time work force, and standard part-time workforce which allow us to leverage off previous education, training and experience,” he added. “Add Public Service, industry and contractors and we have a more flexible Air Force total workforce system”.

“We’re also exploring ways that we can consider the use of automation and artificial intelligence to deliver traditional workforce outcomes for Air Force. What we’re trying to do is basically move away from the management of a permanent workforce which has a little bit of reserve helping out, to the idea of a workforce system that has more flexibility for the people who we engage with, considers emerging technology and allows us to adapt as we look forward.”

AIRCDRE Harland says he envisions the RAAF’s workforce model operating across three key time frames. “The first frame is what we call the ‘force-in-being’, which is operating the current force in that zero to three years frame and delivering the ‘now’,” he explained.

“The second time frame is what is known as the ‘objective force’ in which the period nominally three to 10 years from now and drives the future workforce structure and development of our people to allow Air Force to realise the new capabilities that are generated through the capability life cycle.

“The third time frame is beyond 10 years from now as we look at the aspirational future force which is really very difficult to define in the current context because the environment is rapidly changing, what we’re doing is looking and saying, ‘here are the things that we might need to anticipate’.”

The RAAF has also increased its engagement and outreach to educational institutions to develop that future workforce. “In the cyber domain in particular we’re looking at generating a cyber workforce – cyber warfare officers and cyber warfare specialists as well as looking at electronics engineers who are network specialists, and also network technicians who will maintain our infrastructure.

Another consideration is personnel retention and recruitment rates. Whereas Air Force has, in the past, struggled to retain key personnel such as pilots when civilian organisations are in an expansion phase and are hiring. Air Force maintains a close watch on external markets and has recently introduced a strategy to manage aircrew in a way to improve return on investment and increase resilience.

“So right now, the macro level Air Force level doesn’t have a retention problem,” AIRCDRE Harland said. “We’re at around about seven per cent separation which is healthy, because we do need to refresh and regenerate.

“There are pockets of Air Force which we’re seeing competition for talent outside,” he added. “And in those areas I think it’s really about what we can offer as a force, and how we can differentiate ourselves from an experience that an individual might get in industry.

“We’re now allowing people to flow in and out of Air Force more than previously and in doing so we are able to access intellect and capacity of Air Force people as they’re moving in and out of uniform. So acknowledging the experience that they get outside in wider industry is actually really important to us, and it can bring some different perspectives back to Air Force which can really improve our performance.”

AIRCDRE Harland added that Air Force doesn’t currently have any trouble with recruitment. “Right now, it’s exceptionally positive,” he said. “We don’t typically have trouble getting talent in the door, but we acknowledge that as we look forward into STEM related industry there’s going to be increasing competition for talent. So we need to be very clear on what the offer is for Air Force, have a system that makes sense to people, and also have some flexibility in the way that we engage with people.

“While also considering workforce structure and policy, we’re also looking at the kind of behaviours that we would see successful people exhibiting in the future Air Force,” he added. “We’re exploring that area because, you can change structures and you can change policies, but until you actually really tap into cultural change and behavioural change, you can really end up returning to where you are now. So we’re doing work in terms of trying to understand and influence culture and behaviours.”

He said recruiters were generally looking for candidates who have good communication skills, are critical thinkers, and who are good at collaborating. “With those three things as a baseline, they will be good contributors to their joint force. Provided they have the baseline technical skills and qualifications, we can teach the skills the Air Force needs, it’s much harder to influence soft skills and attitude.”

I asked AIRCDRE Harland if, by looking for more flexibility in its workforce, was Air Force in danger of losing or degrading its technical mastery in specific trades and skill-sets.

“Air Force by its nature has always been a technical force,” he said. “The way we describe professional mastery in Air Force is that it’s comprised of three elements: technical mastery, combat mastery and social mastery. In the early part of an individual’s career, they typically concentrate on getting good technical skills and generating technical mastery, whether it be in aviation, cyber, engineering et cetera.

“Then as they move through their career they will work on their combat mastery, which is how they will apply their specialisation to generate air power effects,” he added. “And foundational to that is increasing social mastery, which is really about the ability to be able to communicate and influence in a really positive way across the ADF.

“So to answer your question, the way that we structure an individual’s career will typically build them on a big pillar of technical mastery, and then we’ll broaden their skills in combat and social so they become more broadly adaptable across the force.

“An important bottom line to our plans is that, as we look forward to increased flexibility to enable Air Force to continue to remain relevant in the future and access the talent and workforce capacity it requires, we must equally ensure that we remain fully viable as a military force. So as ever, it’s a careful balancing act.” AIRCDRE Harland stated.

“The Chief (of Air Force) and Air Force’s senior leadership are very focused on the Air Force workforce, and I think we have an opportunity to further challenge ourselves with the difficult questions and improve and prevail in the future.”

This article was published by ADBR on January 7, 2020.

 

Pacific Reach

01/15/2020

The Australian Department of Defence is contributing to a whole-of-Government initiative to further deepen Australia’s engagement in the Pacific region.

Since the announcement of the Pacific Step-up in November 2018, Defence has enhanced existing engagement across the region.

Working with her partners, Australia is increasing Defence’s presence, conducting training and activities with Pacific security agencies, strengthening their resilience.

Australian Department of Defence

December 2, 2019.

Prospects for Brazil in 2020: Part One

01/14/2020

By Kenneth Maxwell

Politics in Brazil are already polarized and will continue to be so in 2020.

The Brazilian President, Jair Bolsonaro, owed his election to this polarization. He will stoke it further. It is in his political interest to do so. It is entirely in his character to do what he does best.

That is stirring up resentments, misogyny, homophobia, nationalism, and rightwing populism.

Confrontation is the new norm in Brazilian politics.

This in a country that once prided itself on conciliation.

Even if conciliation historically covered a multitude of social, racial, and economic inequalities.

Belligerent confrontation is now the name of the game.

Few are seeking consensus.

Overview

The economic situation may improve in 2020.

There are indications that the long recession the country has suffered over the last five years may be easing. Employment prospects are beginning to improve. The unemployment rate had been 13.70% in 2017.

But 2019 ended with unemployment falling to 11.20%.  This still leaves almost 12 million people out of work within a population of over 210 million.

Some legislative changes have been made in Bolsonaro’s first year in office. Much now depends on implementing radical domestic reform legislation which the multifarious special Interests represented in the Brazilian Congress (there are 17 parties in the Senate and 30 parties in the lower chamber of the Congress) have always been loath to support (or to support in return for special favors.)

An improvement in international trade and business conditions will also help, especially a resolution of the trade dispute between the US and China which could have a major impact on Brazil’s prospects.

Brazilian growth according to the most recent projections, prior to the new crisis in the Middle East, may reach 1.7% which will return Brazil to pre-recession levels.

The World Bank forecasts Brazilian growth at 2%.

Brazilian society remains woefully divided.

The on-going culture wars will intensify.

Brazil will continue to be part of the global struggle over the future of democracy, authoritarianism, populism, internationalized drug trafficking, and especially over the environment. The broad de-facto consensus between center left and the center right which has dominated Brazilian politics since the 1980’s has clearly broken down.

A stable new configuration of political forces has yet to emerge.

The lingering presence on the political scene of the two principal political protagonists of the old political division between center left and center right, former two term presidents Lula da Silva (Lula) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), complicates the situation.

Neither Lula nor FHC shows any willingness to gracefully retire from political protagonism.

Each seems determined to continue fighting old battles. In FHC’s case (he is ever conscious of US precedents) this means promoting the 2022 presidential prospects of the São Paulo TV host and entrepreneur Luciano Grostein Huck. Huck presents “caldeirão do Huck” (Huck’s Cauldron”) on the Rede Globo network, Brazil’s largest.

Lula’s continued political activism stymies the prospects for the emergence of credible alternatives on the left. It did so in his late withdrawn from the last presidential contest which undermined the prospects of Fernando Haddad who belatedly became the Worker’s Party (PT) candidate.)

But Lula’s resilience, wiliness, political ruthlessness, and instinct for self-preservation, should never be underestimated.

The Political Landscape

The political landscape is being recast by forces well outside the old networks of power (though sometimes these are old forces, like the Bolsonaro clan clothed in and weaponized by new garments.)

What is new is that these clusters of special interests have emerged in an environment which is already internationalized with the rise of cyber influence campaigns and sophisticated clandestine political interference and manipulation.

In this Brazil is well ahead of the game which marries the old surveillance mechanisms inherited from the military dictatorship to the new techniques developed in the age of the Internet.

One of the Harvard University students who co-founded Facebook in 2004 it should be remembered was the Brazilian Eduardo Saverin. He fell out with Mark Zuckerberg. His worth was estimated at US$10.1 billion in June 2019 and he is now living in tax exile in Singapore.

Jair Bolsonaro with an eye on the next presidential election in 2022 is forming a new political party, an “Aliança pelo Brasil” with himself as the President of the party and his son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro of Rio de Janeiro, as the Vice-President. Its objectives match his government’s slogan of “Brazil above all, God above all everyone.”

Like so much with (reserve) army captain Jair Bolsonaro and his outspoken nostalgia for the days of the military dictatorship, his new “Aliança pelo Brasil” is reminiscent of the National Renewal Party (ARENA), the pro-government conservative political party (or agglomeration) which between 1966 and 1979 was the” official” party of the military regime.

The Aliança pelo Brasil is mobilizing the support of leading Evangelicals to obtain the 491.000 signatures needed to make the new party a viable electoral alternative.

The Evangelicals are an important force in Brazil.

Recent analysis in one Rio de Janeiro favela found that 40% of the residents considered themselves to be evangelical and only 17% considered themselves to be Catholic’s. in São Paulo a vast 10,000 seat “Temple of Solomon” was built as the cost of US$300 million by the “Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.” Its minister is the son-in-law of the founder of the church, Edir Macedo, whose worth is thought to be US$ 1.3 billion and is the owner of Rede Record, the second largest broadcaster in Brazil. The “Universal Church” is said to have 1.8 million followers in Brazil.

The old battle between “Liberalism” (or “neo-liberalism”) and “Statism” (that is the dominant role of the state in business enterprises) is also back with a vengeance.

This is a conflict that rests in part on the struggle between the power of the “official” economy, where the statisticians, the bankers, the corporate managers, and the international investors live, and the “informal” economy where most non-rich (and non-white) Brazilians survive their daily challenges, and where emotional support for national enterprises remains very strong.

The “markets” know what it is they would like to see: A successful implementation of the plans of Paulo Guedes, the minister of the economy, and the creation of a slimmed down, more agile state, with more privatizations, a simplification of the tax system, much greater openness of the economy to the world, more flexible labour rules, and the overhaul of the pension system.

Paulo Guedes is certainly trying.

He has incorporated into his super-ministry the former ministries of planning and industry and commerce and established departments of “de-bureaucratization” and “de-Stateization.”

Guedes also has under his wing the national development bank (BNDES), the Banco do Brasil, the Central Bank, Petrobras, and the applied research institute (lpea). Guedes was promised a free hand by Bolsonaro.

Not surprisingly he is most popular among rich Brazilians (58% approval according to the December 5/6 DataFolha opinion survey) than among poorer Brazilians (where his rating is 31%).

The featured photo is of President Bolsonaro and is credited to Mauro Piemtel/AFP and the original source can be found here:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-presidential-candidate-181007020716337.html