The Next Phase of Development for Osprey Nation: From Reach to Working Effectively in an Integrated Distributed Force

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10/31/2019

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I had a chance to visit Naval Air Station Patuxent River and to meet with Col Matthew Kelly, who is in charge of the V-22 Joint Program Office (PMA-275).

I first met “Squirt” when he was an F-35B test pilot and indeed was selected as test pilot of the year in 2011.

Having come from the F-35 world, where the entire command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure is being reworked, is a perfect community for the new head of the V-22 Program to come as that aircraft is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

It is often overlooked that the US Air Force Special Forces Command (AFSOC) and Marine Corps are still the only tiltrotor forces in the world.

And the Osprey from the outset has demonstrated a speed and reach capability which traditional rotorcraft simply have not replicated.

I first saw Ospreys on the tarmac in 2007 at Marine Corps Air Station New River and have followed their evolution ever since.

As Col. Kelly noted in our conversation: “I first flew on an Osprey in Iraq in 2008.

“It was the only assault asset which could cover the entire combat theater in one flight.

“And senior officers, whether from the Army, Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps, soon demanded an Osprey to fly on when touring the battlespace.

“They could move much more rapidly and to see the battlespace in a much shorter period of time.”

The physicality of the Osprey has had a major impact on the Marine Corps and its approach to its assault forces.

The reach of the aircraft in terms of speed and distance which it can cover has revolutionized how the Marines conduct assault operations.

But Col. Kelly has come to the program with a major shift underway for the Marines. 

That shift requires the aircraft not simply to be a robust distance runner but to become smart in the digital battlespace.

This requires major modifications to the aircraft in terms of its ability to work with data, generate data and to work in the evolving C2 and ISR infrastructure which the Marine Corps is building for its approach to building an integrated distributed force.

Coming from the F-35 program provides Kelly with a leg up in terms of understanding what that aircraft can contribute to the Osprey and how, in turn, the V-22 aircraft needs to be modified to a more useful member of the integrated distributed force.

“With the Marine in the back of the Osprey working with his MAG-Tab (tablet), he or she is able to gain access to information flowing in from other platforms in the battlespace.

“And that is one key aspect of what we are focused on as we rework the program.

“Indeed, we have already done exercises at MAWTS-1 and VMX-1 where the Marine in the back of a V-22 can be looking on his MAG-TAB at a video generated from an H-1 or an F-35 operating in the same battlespace.”

And the V-22 working with the F-35 is a key element of being able for the Marine Corps/Navy team to work a Lightening carrier approach whereby an LHD like the USS America can operate a significant number of F-35s with accompanying Ospreys.

And this approach clearly is about changing dramatically the nature of what a Marine Corps assault force looks like as well as the combat effect it can achieve.

Col. Kelly, in language reminiscent of how the ADF describes the impact of the F-35 on its combat transformation, refers to what he calls a fifth-generation assault force.

And that process this means changes need to and are being made to the Osprey itself.

With the coming of the CH-53K, the assault group will be further transformed in terms of the mass and combat force which can be delivered by the evolving capabilities of the assault force.

And the K is taking advantage of the re-crafting of the Osprey to build in from the outset the kind of digital capabilities which the Osprey did not have at birth, but are now being added within the scope of the kind of C2 and ISR infrastructure which can be built into the upgraded Osprey.

Another key aspect of the change facing the V-22 community: the Navy becoming an operator of the Osprey for the carrier resupply mission and the Japanese becoming the first FMS customer for the aircraft.

This means that the original plank holders of the program, AFSOC and the Marine Corps, are being jointed by an expanded set of users.

This places a demand on the program to do a better job with regard to global sustainment but also provides the opportunity to leverage the budgets of additional stakeholders to expand the sustainment infrastructure as well.

“There is no other air platform that has the breadth of aircraft laydown across the world than does the V-22.

“And now that breadth is expanding with the inclusion of the carrier fleet and the Japanese. We currently have a sustainment system which works but we need to make it better in terms of supporting global operations.

“With the US Navy onboard to operate the Osprey as well, we will see greater momentum to improve the supply chain.”

We then discussed the impact of Additive Manufacturing (AM) on the V-22 program.

Kelly noted that the V-22 program was very forward leaning one with regard to finding ways for AM to provide supply chain complementarity on the fly, something very important for ship-based operations for sure.

“Our Marines, including MAWTS-1, have been aggressively pushing ways to use AM to support the aircraft.

“For example, last year at New River, Marines invented a tool in the tire shop to remove interior nuts and bolts off of the wheel hub.

“They designed and produced the tool with AM and after a short turn around this tool is now being used fleet wide.”

“We are doing a test today of a 3-D printed hub strap for a V-22 which is a part which has been a degrader for us in our supply system. We are working on an AM replacement for the strap and we are currently in the process of testing the part to ensure that it is a viable one.”

Col. Kelly noted that with the maturation of the fleet, the program has quite accurate fleet metrics and are using these metrics to shape their Performance Based Logistics contracts going forward.

Rather than tying incentives to piecemeal elements of the aircraft, the shift in focus has been upon decreasing the non-mission capable rates in the fleet.

“If fleet non-mission capable rates go down, Bell and Boeing receive more money.”

He also argued that as manufacturing experience has improved and the quality of the initially produced aircraft are better, providing a boon to fleet performance.

“The aircraft that is coming off of the line today as part of the multi-year three contract is much different than the ones produced in multi-year one or two,” he said.

“You are seeing a much more reliable airplane from the outset which requires much lower maintenance man hours per flight hour as well.”

In short, the V-22 team is making the aircraft smarter to go along with its range and speed physical capabilities.

And the maturing of the manufacturing processes is delivering a reliable aircraft.

But as the Navy becomes a direct user of the aircraft along with the Japanese, there are new challenges facing the program, most notably, how to provide better global sustainment to the global fleet of aircraft.

Put broadly, the aircraft which replaced the CH-46 became a physically wondrous asset that changed how the Marines could operate in the Middle East land wars to now becoming part of the fifth-generation revolution.

For an archive of Osprey articles which we have published over the years, see the following:

https://defense.info/system-type/rotor-and-tiltrotor-systems/the-osprey/

For a recent briefing which I gave to BIDEC 19 in Bahrain on October 30, 2019, see the following:

Or for a recent interview which I did at the Chief of Navy’s Seapower Conference held in Sydney, Australia from October 8-10 2019, and which focused on the building and operating of the integrated distributed force see the following:

And for the impact which the addition of new remotes to the Osprey-F-35-CH 53K enabled amphibious task force, see the following:

The Role of Unmanned Aerial Systems in the Remaking of the Amphibious Task Force: The Perspective of Lt. General (Retired) Trautman

The featured photo shows a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B and a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) V-22 Osprey conducting aerial maneuvers at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, July 9, 2019.

Marines assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron 204 and JGSDF soldiers conducted a confined area landing exercise as part of their integrated training, strengthening relations and interoperability between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elias E. Pimentel III)

Reflections on Recent Syrian War Developments

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Reflections on Recent Syrian War Developments
10/29/2019

By Richard Weitz

With the death of terrorist leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi at the hands of U.S. Special Forces, the so-called Islamic State has lost critical finances, territory, and now leadership.

These blows have removed several sources of the Islamic State’s attractiveness, both regionally and globally.

Al-Baghdadi had uniquely sinister leadership, recruitment, and combat skills due to his strong jihadist and Islamist credentials, at least in the eyes of his followers, as well as his connections with former Saddam Hussein regime elements and ruthless immorality.

Depriving the Islamic State of its self-proclaimed Caliph and Caliphate should weaken it substantially, at least in the short-term.

There could be some revenge attacks by individual adherents, though these did not occur after Osama bin Laden’s death.

The Islamic State still has substantial assets, but without its senior leader, the group could fractionalize into a regional groupings, especially in Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa and Southeast Asia like the Philippines.

The U.S. raid found Al-Baghdadi in the northern Syrian province of Idlib, an area under predominately al-Qaeda control.

He may have been striving to forge tactical partnerships with other terrorist groups.

Conversely, these groups could act on this opportunity of a decapitated Islamic State to gain its followers and revenue streams.

In the next few years, the Islamic State movement will likely face succession disputes, fractionalization into loosely networked affiliations, and merging with other existing and new terrorist groups, including those associated with al-Qaeda.

The main differences between Islamic State and al-Qaeda has been the former’s possession of physical territory (an “Islamic State”) and a uniquely malevolent leader. These divergences have now largely expired.

The regional groupings could emerge in many locations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, such as the Sahel region, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Libya, and Yemen.

The United States and its partners will need to redouble their efforts, which have been something of an unheralded success, to weaken the attractiveness of Islamist propaganda in these and other regions.

Al-Baghdadi also appears to have been plotting to exploit the disruptive impact of the Turkish military intervention to advance his group’s interests, perhaps even by moving his base of operations into Turkey.

In this regard, Washington and others need to wean the Turks off their practice of using jihadists to fight Kurds in neighboring countries.

Ankara should be alarmed by how close Al-Baghdadi was found to the Turkish border.

The Trump administration has made understandable efforts to strengthen Turkish-U.S. ties by removing Syria as a source of bilateral irritation.

But Moscow has now offered Ankara a better deal by giving Turkey substantially more Syrian territory than Washington did the previous week.

This Putin-Erdogan deal at Sochi includes unprecedented joint patrols by Turkish and Russian troops (replacing the now defunct Turkish-U.S. joint patrols).

This pact builds on earlier moves by Ankara toward Moscow, notably its purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air defense system despite hearing years of counterarguments by NATO leaders and experts.

This act justifiably led the Pentagon to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program and NATO to curtail various joint activities.

In the short-term, the Putin-Erdogan deal clearly benefits the two signatories most.

Through the arrangement, Turkey consolidates its military position in northern Syria while Russia consolidates its preeminent position in the rest of the country.

The agreement also averts a possible near-term military confrontation between the Turkish army and Syrian regime forces, backed by Iran and Russia.

Yet, in the longer-term, there are still challenges for Russian-Turkish relations regarding Syria.

In particular, Russia does not want Turkey to establish a permanent buffer zone in northern Syria, either through military occupation or the relocation of large numbers of Syrian Arab refugees along the Turkish-Syrian border so as to change the area’s ethnic composition.

Regarding U.S. influence in the Middle East, the successful U.S. operation should help restore regional confidence in U.S. military prowess.

Questions concerning U.S. will and capacity likely have arisen due to the faltering U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the effective Russian military intervention in Syria, and the U.S. restraint from kinetic action against Iran.

The blow against the Islamic State could have a positive impact on Syria’s future security.

For example, it would help reassure Syrian refugees in exile that they can return to their home territories without less angst of feared Islamic State territorial resurgence.

Nonetheless, one should not be too optimistic about the Geneva or Astana peace processes, led respectively by the UN and Moscow, given the wide gaps between the Syrian actors and their foreign backers.

Furthermore, the weakening of their common Islamic State adversary could remove a force binding some of these Syrian and foreign actors together.

The U.S. military drawdown could force other actors to accept more of the burden for promoting security and counterterrorism in Syria.

But preventing an Islamic State resurgence in Syria likely will require the United States to continue employing manned and unmanned aircraft as well as Special Forces against select terrorist targets of opportunity.

As in the past, the United States may need to partner, tacitly and temporarily, with other foreign and local Syrian actors to counter threats from terrorists operating there.

To shape the behavior of both nation states like Turkey and the Syrian regime, as well as terrorist groups in Syria, the United States can employ diplomacy, sanctions, and military power.

Without many boots on the ground, besides select Special Forces missions, the Pentagon will need to rely on air and missile strikes, possibly throughout Syrian territory to prevent further mass atrocities, WMD use, or the reconstitution of terrorist camps.

This is a good task for the F-15, which has shown its value in less contested air environments in deterring asymmetrical threats from both nation states, such as Turkey, and non-state actors, like terrorist groups.

For instance, on October 16, U.S. Special Forces were targeted by Turkish-backed militias as they departed from Kurdish-controlled territory in northern Syria.

The appearance of two F-15 fighter aircraft, along with diplomatic communications and an Apache attack helicopter, coerced those Turkish-backed militias into ceasing their firing on U.S. troops.

The visibility of the F-15s are good for intimidating, and therefore deterring, non-state actors and their state sponsors.

In this regard, there have been proposals for U.S. forces to occupy and exploit Syria’s oil fields.

Besides smelling of 19th century imperialism, these ideas do not make practical sense.

Militarily occupying these oil fields would cost more in terms of money and human resources than they are worth.

The fields do not produce much oil and any occupation is bound to rouse costly Syrian resistance.

The U.S. forces confined to guarding oil fields would be difficult to defend since they would be a stationary target amidst an alienated local population.

Suggestions that U.S. companies like Exxon could develop the oil and sell it are not credible since U.S. private companies will not invest in a warzone when larger fields and better investment climates exist in other countries.

Keeping the oil out of terrorists’ hands can be done best by air strikes to destroy any oil stocks they seize.

Attack helicopters and strike drones would work best for urban operations, where discrimination is needed to limit civilian casualties and other collateral damage.

Meanwhile, the F-35, unmatched in air-to-air combat but limited in numbers due to perennial underfunding of the U.S. defense budget, can focus on deterring great powers like China and Russia as well as preparing for major regional contingencies with Iran and North Korea.

These countries’ growing air power threats, from both other airplanes and air defense systems like the S400, have been evident in recent parades, exercises, and other manifestations.

The F-35s are critical for defeating Chinese and Russian fifth-generation fighters, penetrating their integrated multilayered air defense networks, as well as reassuring U.S. allies and partners facing high-end threats.

If the United States plans to fight wars without a large ground footprint, we will need to adequately resource our air power capabilities.

 

French Naval Group and the Greek Navy: Building out the FDI Frigate

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on French Naval Group and the Greek Navy: Building out the FDI Frigate
10/27/2019

By Pierre Tran

LORIENT, France – The Greek navy chief of staff was foreign guest of honor at the Oct. 24 ceremony of first cutting of steel for the frigate for defense and intervention (FDI), signaling Naval Group’s aim to help close a sale of the new French warship.

Admiral Nikolaos Tsounis sat in the front row, along with his French counterpart Admiral Christophe Prazuck and armed forces minister Florence Parly, as executive chairman Hervé Guillou welcomed guests at the company shipyard in northwest France.

The Greek defense minister, Nikos Panagiotopoulos, and Parly signed a non-binding letter of intention for procurement of two FDI warships, the French minister tweeted Oct. 10.

France launched the FDI program, worth €3.8 billion ($4.2 billion), in April 2017, consisting of five frigates for the French navy. That warship, under the brandname of Belharra, will be vital to French efforts to win export sales.

A determination to help the government-to-government negotiations could be seen in Guillou’s ending his speech in Greek, and Naval Group flying the Greek flag along with flags for France, the European Union and the company.

Naval Group provided transport and accommodation for the press trip, which included four Greek reporters, of which three were for television and one for a weekly magazine.

Guillou welcomed the foreign guests, which included the New Zealand ambassador, and the Polish defense attaché and deputy defense attaché, pointing up the priority set on export deals  in a tough world market.

There are potential sales of at least 40 intermediate frigates around the world, a senior Naval Group executive said in 2016.

Guillou was in New Zealand Oct. 10 and 11 as chairman of the France-Australia business council, part of the international office of Medef, the French business lobby group. Guillou was co-leader with Thierry Mallet, CEO of Transdev on that trip, which included Australia.

Transdev is a transport company,

The international department of the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) procurement office is leading the negotiations, which include a Greek request for arming the 4,500-ton warship with 16 cruise missiles.

DGA chief Joel Barre was at the ceremony, in which Parly started the automated cutting equipment, which produced the outline of FDI. Parly and Guillou went on to sign the cut out.

The DGA program director for FDI, Gregory, declined Oct. 23 to comment on whether the contract for the first FDI was worth €2 billion, as reported by business website La Tribune.

The Greek navy’s requirements are expected to lead to a unit price of €750-€800 million, depending on the choice of arms and equipment.

Athens would mark a step up in the international arms arena if the deal were sealed.

“This is a political decision, as a naval cruise missile is a strategic weapon with deep strike capability,” said Etienne Daum, manager for aeronautics, defense and security at think-tank CEIS. Sailing an FDI would also boost the Greek capability within Nato, he added.

A naval cruise missile would add to the Greek air force Scalp cruise missile flown on its Mirage 2000-5 fighter jet.

The first FDI is due to be delivered to the French navy in 2023, with the last by 2030. If Athens and Paris were to reach agreement, Greece would receive the second ship, while the French navy would receive the third, and the second Greek ship would be the fourth built. Two FDI ships are due to be delivered by 2025.

Greece has long sought a heavily armed French frigate, with the Greek navy previously seeking the Fremm multimission frigate with cruise missiles before 2008. But the financial crisis in that year forced Athens to put a hold on a purchase as deep spending cuts were imposed on the frail Greek economy.

For Poland, there is the Swordfish program, with requirement for a highly capable frigate armed with a cruise missile, the Poland In website reported

“The French navy also needs the FDI, which is a more capable ship than the Lafayette frigate, as there is rising threat and proliferation of weapons,” Daum said.

The ship is designed for anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-ship operations, capable to make up a third of the 15-strong French fleet of first-rank warships. That fleet includes eight 6,000-ton Fremm multimission frigates, of which two are air defense versions, and two Horizon air defense frigates.

The contract for the first ship – to be christened Amiral Ronarc’h – includes research and development as well as construction. That ship, effectively the prototype, will include a digital open architecture, two data centers, and Thales Sea Fire 500, a fixed-panel radar.

There will be an expanded version of the Setis combat management system to weave together the various onboard subsystems, a workstation for cybersecurity, and capacity to fight off asymmetric attacks by fast small vessels.

There has been work on an onboard workstation to give a more complete tactical picture and share that with other vessels. The naval cooperative surveillance system, which has been tested on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, Horizon and Fremm frigates, will be fitted on the first FDI.

For the French navy, the main weapons will be MBDA Aster 15 and 30 anti-air missiles, Exocet anti-ship missile, Leonardo 76 mm canon, MU90 light  torpedoes, and two remote control Narwhale 20 mm canons. Light weapons such as 12.7 mm and 7.62 mm machine guns could be used for attacks from small vessels.

MBDA is working on a new launch system to accommodate both A-50 Aster and A-70 naval cruise missile. There is no cruise missile for the French navy FDI.

There is deck space for an 11-ton helicopter such as NH90 and a 700-ton helicopter drone. For 360° low-light visual coverage, there will be banks of Bertin cameras on the single mast, and two Safran Paseo electro-optical infrared sights.

Other equipment includes a Thales hull-mounted KingKlip Mk2 sonar and Captas 4 towed sonar array. MTU will supply the diesel engine, expected to deliver speed of 27 knots.

There will a 125-strong crew, comprising 111 sailors and 14 for the aircraft.

The DGA, navy and Naval Group, the prime contractor and systems integrator, are working on collaborative design of the FDI on an enhanced version of the Catia computer system.

The FDI frigate has grown in weight. When France unveiled a reduced scale model  at the 2016 Euronaval trade show, the ship had been expected to weigh 4,250 tons rather than the present 4,500 ton.

Naval Group has invested €27 million in the Lorient shipyard, Guillou said.

The shipyard is working on the Alsace, the first of the two Fremm air defense versions, and has capacity for building four warships at the same time. The yard is working to cut the build time, with the Fremm now taking 42 months after 72 months for the first vessel.

The first FDI is scheduled to take 38 months, and a target of 30 months has been set for later units.

“It is close to €12 billion which will be invested in naval combat, anti-submarine warfare and attack submarines,” Parly said at the steel cutting ceremony.

“This military budget law effectively prepares the future for our navy.”

Parly was referring to the funds set aside for the navy in the 2019-2025 military budget law, which requires annual confirmation by the finance ministry.

The graphic shows an artist impression of a Belharra, the FDI frigate (Picture source: Naval Group)

100th Air Refueling Wing

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A KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, RAF Mildenhall, England, flew in formation with a B-2 from the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman AFB, Missouri, Sept. 16, 2019.

F-15s from the 48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath, England, and Royal Air Force F-35s from RAF Marham, England joined the formation.

UNITED KINGDOM

09.16.2019

Video by Senior Airman Kelly OConnor

100th Air Refueling Wing Public Affairs

Defending Australia: The Role of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre Capabilities

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Defending Australia: The Role of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre Capabilities
10/26/2019

By Robbin Laird

At the recently concluded Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra, Australia on October 24, 2019, the series launched in 2013 to discuss the nature and impact of fifth generation force capabilities in the defense of Australia and its capabilities to work with core allies continued.

At this session, the focus was upon the changing nature of the regional context for Australia and how the fifth generation force needed to evolve to operate effectively in the dynamically changing region and how best to provide for the continuous change which an evolving integrated distributed force clearly needs to gain the decisive advantage needed in a contested region.

The session built from the two most recent sessions where the focus on shaping an integrated distributed force was the assumption based upon which further development of the Australian Defence Force would be built.

The first session last year posed the question of how to extend the reach of the ADF within the region through shaping longer range strike capabilities.

The second session then broadened the consideration to how to enhance the sustainability of the force by shaping a more resilient Australia and enhanced capability for Australian industry and the infrastructure renewal in Australia could be built.

This seminar proceeded from the operative assumptions on how for the ADF to be able to enhance its capability for a decisive advantage when needed within the region and beyond, when necessary to operate alone, or in a leadership role within coalitions, or when contributing to a coalition led by partners or allies.

There were several key themes developed throughout the three sessions during the day, and the upcoming articles on those sessions and the final report of the seminar will provide more detail on the various sessions themselves.

A major theme throughout the day was the nature of the challenging region and the threat calculus facing the ADF. The notion of manoeuvre was taken in a wider sense than simply military tactical advantage and was considered in the wider context of information war and gaining a strategic advantage through political warfare, supply chain dominance or defeating the enemy without firing a shot.

Gaining an information advantage and C2 dominance featured throughout the day as a key part of 21st century manoeuvre warfare, with warfare understood in the wider context in the region where dealing with 21st century authoritarian powers as well as the threats and anomalies associated with 21st century terrorism and analogous challenges needed to be dealt with.

Fifth generation manoeuvre was highlighted in terms of enhancing the ways the ADF in terms of its evolving C2 and ISR operational infrastructure could provide the force with the ability to bring decisive effect to the threat or the challenge.

The head of the Australian Air Warfare Centre, AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, provided the following definition of fifth generation manoeuvre: “The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.”

Throughout the day, various speakers provided their perspectives on how to build out the capability identified by AIRCDRE Gordon.

A key contribution came from industry where the evolving relationship between industry and government was the focus of attention. The core point was the need for both industry to work more effectively with one another and with government able to provide a more cohesive engagement with industry to shape the kind of integration which is prioritized by the build out of the integrated distributed force.

One point highlighted was that by linking industry labs more effectively the capability of industry to support the evaluating capabilities for the integrated force would be enhanced.

A case study of how the kind of integration being built might be accelerated was provided by Rear Admiral Goddard, the head of the Maritime Border Command.

Here the level of integration among key agencies in the Australian government are being enhanced with a core focus on dealing with the threats and challenges facing Australian border security, and by being able to deal with threat or challenge at its source.

This requires Australia to bring integrated capability to the effort but doing so with close cooperation with allies and partners.

As Rear Admiral Goddard put it:

Through our capacity as a convening authority, at any point in time I can rely on ADF, AFP, AFMA, intelligence agency, AFP and others unified together for effect; a true Multi-Agency.

The advantages of this unity of effort must be leveraged ultimately at the tactical level, through what I would term Command and not control – Robbin Laird has termed control the ‘legacy approach to hierarchical approval’ and I would tend to agree with his assertion that any advantage on the battlefield we currently have would be negated by a hierarchical approach.

MBC must take advantage of the opportunities afforded from a distributed force to achieve mission success through technological advantages – our future will be through allowing sound decision making at the tactical level through sound connectedness.

By virtue of the nature of the command, MBC is answerable to both the Home Affairs Portfolio and the Australian Defence Force through the Chief of Joint Operations. This in itself has the opportunity to create advantage for the civil maritime security mission; the advantage of operating in the so-called ‘Grey Zone.’

While MBC operations are civil in nature, it has a high end mission – security of our maritime borders – and uses high-end assets to do so; an ideal future would to see the entire spectrum of both civilian and military assets put to the task.

Operating within this grey zone allows MBC to play a large role supporting and engaging a large remit of stakeholders. With regular contact with all facets of government from State/territory up to Commonwealth as well as industry in a supportive role, MBC’s force elements encompass land, sea and air – a unique arrangement in regards civil maritime security, however Australia’s Borders are unique which necessitate this approach.

Reflecting a Fifth Generation approach, the force is scalable dependent on the threat or response that is required and the structure at Maritime Border Command allows this force to fully integrate providing both situational awareness and effect.

With the Maritime Border Command living the transition so to speak, the ADF is working a broader scale transformation of its own which can interact with this real-world experience as well.

And the need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October:

“It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.”

The need for such capabilities was highlighted by the significant presentation by Brendan Sargeant at the seminar where he addressed the major strategic shift facing Australia and why the kind of force transformation which the Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted are so crucial for Australia facing its future.

In the future there will be times when we need to act alone, or where we will need to exercise leadership. We have not often had to do this in the past – The INTERFET operation in Timor, and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands are examples.

We are far more comfortable operating as part of a coalition led by others. It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth, but that has been a consistent feature of our strategic culture.

So I think our biggest challenge is not a technical or resource or even capability challenge – it is the enormous psychological step of recognising that in the world that we are entering we cannot assume that we have the support of others or that there will be others willing to lead when there is a crisis. We will need to exercise the leadership, and I think that is what we need to prepare for now.

To return to the title of this talk: if we want assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific, then we need to work towards a world that ensures that that access is useful and relevant to the sorts of crises that are likely to emerge.

I will leave one last proposition with you. Our assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific will be determined by our capacity to contribute to regional crisis management. That contribution will on some occasions require that we lead.

The task now is to understand what this means and build that capacity. 

 

Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan

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10/22/2019

Dr Buchanan is a Research Fellow at the ANU Centre for European Studies where her areas of expertise are Russian foreign energy strategy and Russian polar geopolitics.

Dr Elizabeth Buchanan is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Modern War Institute at The U.S Military Academy WestPoint.

Dr Elizabeth Buchanan is co-Managing Editor of the Institute for Regional Security’s Security Challenges journal – Australia’s sole academic journal for the study of future security issues.

Dr Buchanan was recently the Visiting Maritime Fellow at the NATO Defense College, working on Alliance capabilities in the High North.

She has published widely on polar geopolitics most recently with the NATO Defence College, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, The Australian and the Lowy Institute.

Dr Buchanan is a Non-Resident Fellow of the Institute of the North, Alaska, and is a Polar Analyst for The Moscow Times.

Elizabeth has been a Visiting Scholar with The Brookings Institution and has work experience in the global oil sector.

In 2018, she was an Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) Early Career Research Awardee and in 2019 Dr Buchanan was listed as a ‘Young Woman to Watch in International Affairs’.

Dr Elizabeth Buchanan | Australian Strategic Policy Institute | ASPI

And for a recent interview with Dr. Buchanan with regard to Antarctic security,  please see the following:

 https://podcasts.google.com/?feed=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5wb2xhcmdlb3BvbGl0aWNzLmNvbS9mZWVkLnhtbA&episode=cG9sYXJnZW9wb2xpdGljcy5wb2RiZWFuLmNvbS9hdHMtdW5kZXItcHJlc3N1cmUtZG9tZS1hLWF1c3RyYWxpYS1hbmQtZ3JlYXQtcG93ZXItZ2VvcG9saXRpY3MtaW4tYW50YXJjdGljYS02NDc2YjI1MTYzMWFjOTYzNjNmMDYzYzgwMmQ3ZGQxNQ&hl=en-AU&ved=2ahUKEwiuw4exga_lAhVj73MBHRKCCFcQieUEegQIABAE&ep=6&at=1571717885465