The 0-5 Military: Reshaping Concepts of Operations for Full Spectrum Crisis Management

12/31/2019

By Robbin Laird

Although interesting to speculate about technology and the future of warfare, the core point is the future is now.  The US and its allies have to be ready in the near to mid term to deal with 21stcentury adversaries who will use a variety of crisis management and warfighting tools to advance their interests.

This means leveraging the force we are evolving now to reshape effective concepts of operations to prevail now. For the United States, this means, in significant part, learning how to really leverage fifth generation aircraft and shape what the Aussies referred to as a fifth generation force.

We have written for more than a decade that one piece of key technology – the F-35B – when combined with the Osprey and the new heavy lift helicopter will deliver now and in the next five years, significant distributed warfighting capabilities.

Not in 2030 or in the misty days of the third offset, or not with Dr. Griffin’s space based hypersonic detection force, or with the 6thgeneration aircraft, or the Future Combat System, but right now.

It is clear that an ability to operate basing across a range of mobile basing options is a key to defeating or deflecting adversaries who are stockpiling strike missiles to go up against fixed targets.

Clearly, the Marines are well positioned right now to work through ways to enable the United States to get away from the Middle East basing construct of large fixed bases with aircraft maintained with a wide range of specialized maintenance skill sets.

It is clear as well that in the Pacific, the ability to leverage islands from which to operate an offensive-defensive enterprise is a crisis dominance capability which the Chinese would not want to contend with.

Five years ago, Ed Timperlake highlighted the strategic opportunity, which mobile ADA could provide when leveraging an island deployment strategy.

WW II was Island hopping for offensive air power-but first the enemy air threat had to be beaten back, or there would be big holes in runways and destroyed aircraft on the ground.

One could imagine the PLAAF and 2nd Arty surprise if a lot of “rocks” off shore around PRC became fortified shooters linked into Aegis Carrier Battle Groups, the USN/USMC “Gator Forces” and 7th AF air mobility and Pacific strike capability mutually cross linked and reinforced with allied capability into a solid honeycomb of Pacific defense only activated when needed.

 And in a future is now approach, the premier crisis management force for the United States, the USMC. is moving out on leveraging its current technology to reshape significantly the options available to the combatant commander.

In so doing, they are highlighting why the new heavy lift helicopter, the CH-53K needs to be available to the force now and not in some distant time when the testers and Chinook advocates are satisfied.

An article by Megan Eckstein published on April 23, 2019 highlighted that the Marines are folding their F-35Bs into a new Pacific island-hopping concept.

The Marine Corps is learning how to incorporate its new F-35B Joint Strike Fighter jets into its island-hopping concept of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations, with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit rehearsing this concept recently in the Pacific.

The Japan-based MEU was the first to operate with the new F-35B, though its experience with the jet has been quite different than that of the 13th MEU and Essex Amphibious Ready Group, which were the first to deploy with the F-35B from the United States and the first to conduct an operational air strike with the Joint Strike Fighter.

The 31st MEU, unique in being the only forward-deployed amphibious group, has been focused on integrating the new jet into its crisis-response and self-defense missions and showing off the new plane to Pacific allies and partners, MEU Commanding Officer Col. Robert Brodie said today at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. If a conflict were to emerge in the Pacific, 31st MEU would likely be among the first on the scene and would likely use its island-seizing EABO concept – so, figuring out how to conduct this mission with the new airplane was the focus of a recent exercise on a small Japanese island, Brodie said.

On Ie Shima, off Okinawa, 31st MEU conducted a standard raid and seizure: a recon team jumped in to pave the way for a raid force being flown in to seize the island.

Once the island was secured, CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters flew in fuel bladders and ordnance to conduct a forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operation with the F-35Bs.

“We were actually able to set up a refueling point, and our 53s were taking the gas from a bladder and filling up F-35s, and then the F-35s were going and flying missions,” Brodie said.

“That’s kind of the concept we rehearsed there. And the key to this is speed: we did not rush through it because we wanted to be very deliberate and we’re in a learning phase, but I think you could do these types of things relatively quickly if you had the right ground.”

Brodie said the Marines could do this type of operation with either the CH-53E or the MV-22B Osprey, but the MEU has found the helicopter works best.

“We find the 53 works out really well with the F-35, it does a great job pumping gas into it. And I think the 53K will be a tremendous asset when we incorporate it in the future,” he said of the replacement heavy-lift helicopter still under development.

“We utilized our CH-53 with aviation ordnancemen; they just rolled [the munitions] right off, put it right in while the 53 was gassing up the aircraft….”

And for those who simply wish to ignore the weapons load out which the F-35 can carry when not operating in a LO mode (something which the F-15 for example can NEVER do), there is this reminder from the good Colonel.

Though the F-35B is known for its fifth-generation stealth capability, the jet can also be loaded up with weapons to serve as a fourth-generation bomb truck, and 31st MEU got to practice with that configuration for the first time outside of a test environment. Brodie said he loaded the jets up with six bombs and two heat-seeking missiles on the external pylons, and the jets dropped 30 precision-guided munitions over three weeks of training in the fourth-gen mode.

And with regard to its island operations, it could then as well provide protection for the sea base, and this could be for any of the various sea based key assets, whether carriers, destroyers or amphibious ships.

Defending the amphibious task force has been a recent push within 31st MEU, and Brodie said the F-35B could play a role in that mission that its predecessor, the AV-8B Harrier, never could. 13th MEU leadership told the Potomac Institute earlier this monthat a similar event that they used the F-35B for blue-water missions the Navy assigned the ARG/MEU team.

While the 31st MEU hasn’t gone quite that far yet, Brodie said the JSF would be able to spot and follow surface targets, pass information, conduct armed reconnaissance missions and more to increase the combat capability of the ARG/MEU.

Brodie brought six F-35Bs to sea, supplemented by 10 V-22 Ospreys and four CH-53Es. He said the F-35s maintained an overall readiness rate of 90.5 percent and averaged five of six jets being up and fully mission capable on any given day.

The importance of the FARP to such an approach is crucial.

Which is why in turn the need to get the K into the fleet rapidly is also crucial.

There is simply no comparison between what the legacy CH-53 can do and what the new CH-53 can do in terms of lift, C2, situational awareness, and an ability to deliver supplies over a much wider area of delivery and more rapidly.

If base mobility is important, a FARP is a key enabler.

Then why is the K not being accelerated into the fleet to support the B and its distributed force capability?

 For the rest of the article, see the following:

Marines Folding F-35B into New Pacific Island-Hopping Concept

Featured photo: An F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121 refuels at an established Forward Arming and Refueling Point during simulated Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations at Ie Shima Training Facility, March 14, 2019.

Marines with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit are conducting simulated EABO in a series of dynamic training events to refine their ability to plan, rehearse and complete a variety of missions. US Marine Corps photo.

And not to be subtle about it, we wrote about this as well in our book on Pacific strategy finished in 2012, and published in 2013.

And what follows is the 2014 article by Ed Timperlake focused on an island hopping strategy.

The Role of ADA in the Attack and Defense Enterprise: Reinforcing Forward Deployed Defensive Capabilities in the 21st Century

2014-01-07

By Ed Timperlake

In our recent book on the rebuilding of American military power in the context of shaping a new Pacific strategy, we highlighted the significance of shaping a new template for the synergy between defense and offense.

With the new multi-mission systems – 5th generation aircraft and Aegis for example – the key is presence and integration able to support strike or defense in a single operational presence capability.  Now the adversary cannot be certain that you are simply putting down a marker.

This is what former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne calls the attack and defense enterprise.

The strategic thrust of integrating modern systems is to create an a grid that can operate in an area as a seamless whole, able to strike or defend simultaneously.  This is enabled by the evolution of C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and it is why Wynne has underscored for more than a decade that fifth generation aircraft are not merely replacements for existing tactical systems but a whole new approach to integrating defense and offense…..

By shaping a C5ISR system inextricably intertwined with platforms and assets, which can honeycomb an area of operation, an attack and defense enterprise can operate to deter aggressors and adversaries or to conduct successful military operations. 

https://sldinfo.com/crafting-an-attack-and-defense-enterprise-for-the-pacific/

Our interview with PACAF Commander, General Hawk Carlisle, highlighted a key way ahead is forging various paths towards cross-domain synergy among the joint and coalition forces.

One of the key examples he provided was the role of the first THAAD deployment to the Pacific.

THAAD being fired as part of exercise. Credit: Lockheed Martin
THAAD being fired as part of exercise. Credit: Lockheed Martin

Thanks to a demonstrated rapid THAAD deployment to Guam, the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) branch of the US Army has demonstrated their significant role in US and Allied Air Sea Battle planning.

We followed up on Carlisle’s illustration to interview the Guam commander of the THAAD battery.

And this interview made it clear that ADA capability far transcends moving infantry around the Pacific tying up precious Air Force resources. Army Pacific battle planning was reported as being called “Pacific Pathways.”

In a recent Washington Post article the Senior Army Pacific Commander, General Brooks, a command based in Hawaii, was recently elevated to four stars, and makes a significant point:

“We can no longer afford to build [combat] units and put them on a shelf to be used only in the event of war,” the Senior Army Pacific Commander’s command wrote in an internal planning document.

He is exactly correct and the best answer to General Brooks thinking is very simple: just don’t do it.

There is no need for a large standing army to be built. America has shown the ability to very successful in mobilizing what is often called “trigger pullers.”

In fact The Washington Free Beacon has given a wonderful tribute to the men and women in today’s US Army.  “2013 Man of the Year: The American Soldier.”

With the Afghan transition comes the opportunity to shift from a land heavy mobilization force. Indeed in our forthcoming piece in the Joint Forces Quarterly, we argue that the decade ahead has little in common with the decade behind and that “the force being remade by new technologies ripening in the decade ahead, there are significant possibilities for innovation and re-shaping of the force structure.”

In the decade ahead, it is clearly the time for Big Army demobilization.

The current Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Odierno, West Point 1976, has an appreciation for the combat legacy of the Long Gray Line. As a strong advocate for the US Army, he told Congress and hence the American people that to win a war send in the Army. He was exactly right for the Civil War, WWI and WWII.

Unfortunately, unless he wants to argue to support, equip and train a standing “Big Army” to capture Beijing or Tehran, his vision for Army resources has to be modified to recognize the realities of the potential combat facing America in this half of the 21st Century.

Hussein assumed that Kuwait was his.  Neither Iran nor China should believe that they can make such an assumption about any of their neighbors.

It is American power projection backed by mobilization if necessary which adds a key deterrent quality to Iranian or Chinese thinking. 

America, can mobilize an Army, but the need for ready now survivable aircraft, and air bases and Navy ships with a 9/11 force of US Marines afloat to shape an attack and defense enterprise is the key challenge.

And not funding these forces along innovative lines while maintaining an Army built for Iraq and Afghanistan makes little sense in the decade ahead. 

Our role is to shape global reach and bring power to bear for our allies, which makes any adversary like Iran or the PRC lack certainty that a perimeter attack on one of their neighbors is just that.

https://sldinfo.com/echoes-from-history-in-a-veterans-cemetery-the-way-ahead-for-a-21st-century-american-military-force/

Also involved is the challenge of shaping a key understanding of the appropriate tactical and strategic role of the US Army in the Pacific. One just has to look at the geography of the Pacific and ask why just Guam and does a THAAD Battery always have to be moved by truck?

The answer to this question is part of a larger question: how does Army missile defense play in the attack and defense enterprise within the strategic quadrangle?

US Navy and Japanese Aegis ships, THAAD on islands, and “Rapid Raptor” which are a parts of an evolving con-ops that can be proof of concept for F-35 and tankers can make tactical and strategic moves to many PacRim airfields.

The problem is the US Army is not a lift command.  It borrows USAF lift to move around the vast Pacific. And the Afghan war has weighed heavily on the lift and tanking resources of the USAF and its ability to support the joint force.

What is needed is to rethink how to support ADA in the Pacific without overtaxing lift assets.

During exercise Stellar Avenger, the Aegis-class destroyer USS Hopper launches a standard missile 3 Blk IA, successfully intercepting a sub-scale short range ballistic missile, launched from the Kauai Test Facility, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sans, Kauai. (Credit: USN Visual Service, 7/31/09)
During exercise Stellar Avenger, the Aegis-class destroyer USS Hopper launches a standard missile 3 Blk IA, successfully intercepting a sub-scale short range ballistic missile, launched from the Kauai Test Facility, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sans, Kauai. (Credit: USN Visual Service, 7/31/09)

An alternative way to think about the ADA approach is to build the support facilities throughout the Pacific whereby THAAD and air defense can be supported. THAAD–globally transportable, rapidly deployable capability to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere during their final, or terminal, phase of flight. THAAD Weight launch vehicle, fully loaded 40,000kg=88, 184 lbs or 44 short tons.

http://oshkoshdefense.com/variants/m985a4-guided-missile-transporter-gmt/

The Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of missile battery truck alone is 66,000 lbs.

Now let us rethink how it might be deployed to remote islands as part of a flexible grid.

The CH-53 can take 30,000 lbs internal or sling 36,000 external-range unrefueled is 621 nm. The MV-22 human capacity is 24 combat-loaded Marines-range app 700 miles.

The actual missile battery is 26,000 lbs and well inside the lift capacity of a CH-53.

The problem is the mechanics to raise and lower the battery and rearm. A battery lowered from the air sans truck on reinforced concrete pads with calibrated launch points may make sense. A separate modular lift device could be put in place to load and reload.

Consequently, taking apart modules doesn’t appear to be a showstopper, and Marine MV-22s flying in Army ADA troops into any reasonable terrain is absolutely no problem.

The weight of TOC and Radar maybe of concern, and it appears that in todays world there may have been little appreciation by Big Army on using MV-22 and CH-53Ks.

To be very fair the US Vietnam War Army did get it brilliantly by setting up firebases in remote areas with helo lift of very heavy guns.

A THAAD island maneuverability concept is the same in principle but with different technology.

Combine ADA Batteries with the ability to move a floating airfield as needed inside the potential sanctuary of a 200+ KM protection umbrella of disbursed island bases with ADA batteries and power projection of the sort needed in Pacific defense is enhanced.

The targeting and thus war fighting capability of a projected threat from any PLAA2AD becomes incredibility complicated. A distributed offensive defensive grid is an additional factor in the US current PLA or North Korean IRBM kill chain R&D efforts.

The most fundamental point is US technology is already tested. Some weapons already in combat others on ranges. The US does do rigorous testing and has many important ways to share technology with all allies.

In contrast, the PLA has not tested any of their asserted A2AD capability, which is much quoted in US-search, acquisition, launch, guide, and end-game maneuver. So far they have poked a few holes in their land target outlined like a Navy Carrier. This is 1960s stuff.

The involvement of THAAD in an Aegis engagement grid may actually give” Big Army” employing ADA capability both a realistic and important way ahead to for them to make a contribution to the Air Sea Battle within resources available.

Currently it looks like the Army is assuming they can utilize AF lift as their announced right to move 700 troops around the Pacific every three months, which is an incredibly waste of resources and taxing on a lift fleet already stretched to the limit. The Afghan tax on Air Force lift has to be paid back.

The Marines know how to maneuver forces at sea and in the air to protect islands–and also deny the PLA any opportunity for them to go “feet wet” to grab Islands for their strategic use.

The USAF could stage an Army THAAD battery on a runway anywhere around Pacific. The USAF would have no problem doing just that and it sure beats the resource drain on AF heavy lift of moving 700 Army troops around every three months as proposed in their Pacific Pathways emerging doctrine.

The THAAD package could go from the runway to an Amphip, Deck  or directly to  MV-22s and Heavy lift helos to move this capability to a couple of rocks jutting out of Pacific.

The Island Geography around the Pacific Rim is a critical physical reality which such a deployment approach can play to:

Japan is an archipelago of 6,852 islands;

The Philippine archipelago comprises 7,107 islands, of which only about 2,000 are inhabited;

Korea has more than 3,300 islands;

Vietnam has 20 Islands-including their claim on Sprats and Parcels cluster;

And finally, Republic of China islands provide additional deployment options.

The geography of islands inside the Pacific strategic quadrangle can favor moving a THAAD Battery to various pre-planned island launch pads to protect vital runways and harbors.

The Pacific Strategic Quadrangle. Credit: SLD
The Pacific Strategic Quadrangle. Credit: SLD

When combined with Aegis ships and 7th AF maneuverability, cross-domain synergy is enhanced which can then greatly complicate PLA and NK targeting and thereby enhance deterrence.

So much for the  “run-away” A2AD bogy man-especially with F-35 arrival in the region, which will extend significantly the forward reach of the sensor package to work with defensive systems!

Now if the US National Command Authority and Secretary of Defense could just convince the Army to consider accepting a strategic view that cross-domain 21st Century technology (not just boots on the ground for their own sake) can move war wining capability ADA into a strategic battle position inside our Strategic Quadrangle by Air instead of “the caissons go rolling along ”

The biggest show stopper could be fighting a tradition from 1908 (date of song)-that has very little appreciation for an Air/Sea Battle–over the expanse of the Pacific OCEAN.

WW II was Island hopping for offensive air power-but first the enemy air threat had to be beaten back, or there would be big holes in runways and destroyed aircraft on the ground.

One could imagine the PLAAF and 2nd Arty surprise if a lot of “rocks” off shore around PRC became fortified shooters linked into Aegis Carrier Battle Groups, the USN/USMC “Gator Forces” and 7th AF air mobility and Pacific strike capability mutually cross linked and reinforced with allied capability into a solid honeycomb of Pacific defense only activated when needed.

Updating European Defense for the 2020s: Establishing a European Defence and Security Council

12/30/2019

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France seeks to maintain close ties with Britain after Brexit on a bilateral and multilateral basis, with the Macron administration proposing a European council for security and defense as an institutional link, a government official said.

The Dec. 12th election resulted in the UK seeing the Conservative party returned with a comfortable 80-seat parliamentary majority, allowing prime minister Boris Johnson formally to take the UK out of the European Union at the end of January.

“A page will turn,” the French official told Dec. 17 the Anglo-American Press Association.

France sees the UK as a valuable partner and is promoting creation of a European security and defense council, which would work with the European Council, a high-level EU political institution.

“The European defense and security council is not necessarily an instrument solely of the 27 (EU members),” the official said. The council would serve as a “means of structured exchange between the European partners and the United Kingdom.”

“We need to reach agreement on the council’s mission,” the official said.

The idea of such a council has been accepted and there are talks on procedure.

There are already European institutions covering foreign affairs, defense and security but no such high-level political institution dedicated to defense.

The European Council is the political forum for heads of state and heads of government of the EU, which Britain will leave on Jan. 31. The European Council sets the political agenda, while the European Commission acts as the executive arm.

France and Germany have floated the idea of a security and defense council, which has been considered by think tanks, a European source in Brussels said. There is not a formal proposal and it remains to be seen how such an organization would fit into the institutional landscape.

French president Emmanuel Macron stirred heated debate by evoking the “brain death” of Nato, in an Nov. 7 interview with British weekly, The Economist, with that critical state stemming from a lack of reliable support from the US.

US president Donald Trump said Macron’s comment was “very, very nasty,” when  a few weeks later the political leaders gathered for the Nato summit, held at Grove hotel on a golf course at Watford, north of London. That meeting marked the 70th anniversary of the Atlantic alliance.

How the council would be set up raises questions as the UK will have left the EU if and when the institution were set up. 

If Britain were on the council, which other nations would have a place at the table, said Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of think tank Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégique.

One way round the structural problem raised by Brexit might be an informal group, he said.There are informal groups such Britain, France and Germany speaking as a three-strong European group on Iran.

“Perhaps it will be an informal solution, but an institutional one,” he said.

“It’s a great idea in principle,” said Nick Witney, senior research fellow at European Council for Foreign Relations, a think tank.

Such a council might yield a strategic overview seen as needed in Europe.

“The need to re-engage in serious, collective strategic thinking, as opposed to waiting to be told what to do by the Americans, may be the single most important step towards a Europe that is significantly more capable of defending itself, ” Witney said in a June 25 ECFR report.

“Such a Europe is more likely to survive the twenty-first century as a protagonist rather than prey. ” 

The ECFR report was titled Building Europeans’ Capacity to Build Themselves.

Macron in a March 4 speech called for a “European security council with the United Kingdom on board to prepare our collective decisions ”

In that discourse, titled For European Renewal, Macron sought a Europe backed by a defense and security treaty “to define our fundamental obligations in association with NATO and our European allies.”

Macron also called for more defense spending.

On the bilateral front, there will be celebration in November of the 10th anniversary of the Lancaster House treaty, the French official said.

A French senate report on arms procurement on Nov. 27 called for France to put fresh energy in the Lancaster House accord.

That Anglo-French treaty is a bilateral agreement for operational and industrial cooperation, including research in nuclear weapons, a joint combined expeditionary force, and sharing technology for a combat UAV.

There are also plans to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the call by the late French president, Charles de Gaulle, for France to fight back against the Nazis. The BBC broadcast that call to arms from London on June 18 1940.

On the operational front, the British help in a  “very significant way ”, in the sub-Saharan Sahel region, flying Chinook heavy transport helicopters supporting French forces. Those Chinooks are “of high value,” the official said.

There is much scope for industrial cooperation, the official said.

“We are confident we can deepen the cooperation in defense and security. ”

Asked on whether Britain could join the Franco-German project for a Future Combat Air System, the official said, “It’s clearly a Franco-German project, with a “prime partner ” and “junior partner ” in each significant part of the aircraft.

These partners have French, German, and French-German-British links, the official said, adding that there was no knowledge of a British request for direct partnership on FCAS.

On the industrial front, “obviously MBDA is an Anglo-French success,” the official said.

MBDA is a missile maker, with joint ownership in Britain, France and Germany.

There is also close French cooperation with Germany, with two flagship industrial projects, namely a New Generation Fighter in FCAS and a new tank in the Main Ground Combat System, and an agreement for arms exports.

“We are working, and Germany works with us,” the official said.

The new tank is a key element in a planned MGCS, designed as a system of systems composed of several land vehicles, both manned and unmanned.

The French vehicles will work in the Army’s Scorpion modernization program, while the German vehicles will plug into the equivalent national system.

On the institutional front, the European Commission is gearing up for a stronger presence in defense, with the appointment of Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for internal markets, and creation of a directorate general for defense.

Breton is former CEO of Atos, a French technology company, and former finance minister.

The EU is setting up the European Defense Fund with a 2021-2027 budget of €13 billion to co-fund research projects with industry. That fund is part of a bid to boost European strategic autonomy and sovereignty.

Macron pursues a strong Europe, which includes European defense. In the pursuit of the latter, the projects for FCAS and the MGCS tank system were launched. There is also a planned medium-altitude long-endurance UAV.

See also, the following:

President Macron’s Economist Interview: Reactions and Implications

 

Osprey Resupply

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 161, attached to Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Crisis Response – Central Command 19.2, perform MV-22 landing qualifications and logistics runs with the expeditionary landing base (ESB-3) USS Lewis B. Puller in an undisclosed location, Oct. 29, 2019.

The SPMAGTF-CR-CC is a quick reaction force, prepared to deploy a variety of capabilities across their area of operation.

(UNDISCLOSED LOCATION)

10.29.2019

Video by Sgt. Kyle Talbot

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response – Central Command

Pacific Scan Eagle

12/27/2019

Mike McCord, Scan Eagle site lead, and his team conduct Small Unmanned Aerial System or drone aboard USCGC Stratton (WMSL 752), in the Pacific, Oct. 31, 2019.

The cutter’s crew spent half of 2019 underway in support of joint operations in the Pacific.

PACIFIC OCEAN

10.31.2019

Video by Chief Petty Officer Sara Muir

U.S. Coast Guard District 14 Hawaii Pacific

Securing the Black Sea

12/23/2019

The Black Sea is a crossroads between Europe and Asia and an important waterway for trade and commerce.

Its security is vital for the countries that border it, including NATO Allies Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey and partners Georgia and Ukraine, and for the wider European community.

Ever since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its subsequent military build-up in the Black Sea, the security situation has deteriorated. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO Allies announced an increased presence in the region.

Today, NATO’s presence is a visible reminder that the Alliance is ready and able to work with Allies and partner nations to keep the Black Sea secure.

Footage includes various shots of NATO ships exercising in the Black Sea and interviews with a range of Allied officers who explain why NATO’s presence is necessary.

11.19.2019

Courtesy Video

Natochannel

Shaping a 21st Century C2/ISR Infrastructure: The Emergence of C3

12/22/2019

By Robbin Laird

At the recent International Fighter Conference 2019, there was much discussion of the growing salience of the combat cloud to the “next” generation of air combat power.

This discussion was subsumed within a growing emphasis on multi-domain operations, and the need for the kind of C2 which can leverage the right information at the right time to make the right decisions within a multi-domain environment with the right package of combat force.

In effect, this capability is what precedes any discussion of what a 6th generation fighter aircraft might be.

What clearly the F-35 has generated is the “renorming of airpower” which we predicted some years ago.

But what it is also generating is a significant rethink of how to fight at the speed of light in terms of high confidence data to deliver capabilities to for decisive decision making at the tactical edge.

In effect, C3 is emerging as a key driver of change Command, Control and Confidence in the most relevant ISR data is required at the tactical edge to make the decisions necessary to prevail in the evolving battlespace.

At the International Fighter Conference 2019, Lt. General David Nahom, Director of Strategic Plans and Programs, for the USAF, underscored that a core focus in shaping the evolution of USAF airpower was upon joint all-domain command and control.

He argued that “we are building the high-speed highway on which to put the trucks.”

The focus in his perspective needs to be upon building the C2/ISR infrastructure where “we can all work together.”

The approach to shaping an advanced battle “manger” is no longer focused on a specific air platform, AWACS, Joint Starts or the like.

It is now focused on crafting, leveraging and evolving a distributed system which draw upon the “high-speed data highway.”

Obviously, in such an approach, machine-to-machine interactions and artificial intelligence enabled decision making are foundational elements. And with a “high speed data highway” focus enabled by the fifth-generation transition; the next generation fighter is not likely to be a single “truck” but a family of systems.

Clearly, a key component of the new high build out is already here and key element of the F-35 global fleet, namely, the CNI.

The significant impact of an INTEGRATED CNI solution simply is not part of the strategic discourse about the evolution of the U.S. and allied combat forces in a way that gets out of a fifth-generation marketing pitch, qua fifth gen.

It is not about fifth generation, it is about shaping the “high speed data highway” which the F-35 global enterprise can provide support to task forces engaged in an area of interest and enabling a key aspect of a targeted “combat cloud.”

By DoD putting in motion the effort to build the F-35, the program has forced DoD to integrate its core combat fighter in ways that would not otherwise have occurred.

The CNI is to combat air as the smartphone is to the original Nokia mobile phone.

And it would NOT have happened without the F-35 program driving the need and the requirement.

Sensor fusion enabled by machine to machine operations and expanded by integratability across an F-35 fleet is a significant driver of air superiority now and lays down the way to the future being hypothesized at conferences like IFC 2019.

As the cards within the CNI are updated, modernized or transformed, along with the capabilities contained on those cards, and any accompanying hardware changes made, not only can an F-35 as a combat asset itself improve.

But the technology upgraded on that aircraft can reshape the combat elements on the air, sea or land which can benefit directly to F-35 connectivity and those demonstrated capabilities can inform decisions with regard to modernization or transformation of other combat assets which can employ similar variants of the new systems contained within the CNI.

Put in blunt terms, the integrated capability delivered by the CNI within the F-35 fleet is a key driver of change for the C2/ISR “highway” able to empower the integrated distributed force and deliver C3.

After the IFC 2019, I had a chance to discuss with Scott Rosebush of Cubic Mission Solutions, a company focused on enhancing capabilities for C2 and ISR at the tactical edge, including with regard to the F-35 and CNI.

We discussed how such a highway might be built out leveraging where we are today, and how emergent capabilities today can provide a way ahead with regard to this C2/ISR “highway” building effort.

Rosebush started the discussion by describing the vision of a High Capacity Backbone or HCB.

“The idea is to equip a select set of nodes with high throughput data links that could encapsulate data and pass it amongst themselves in a reliable way.

“Any node on the network to which the HCB nodes subscribes would then be able to access the date on the HCB.”

He argued that this would bring the power of the cloud into multi-domain operations.

We discussed the combat cloud at length comparing the viability of network architectures that feature an enterprise network like a commercial WAN as compared a numerous set of smaller networks optimized for a particular task force that could potential be connected by a backbone.

The HCB could be built to facilitate this approach.

According to Rosebush: “By connecting multiple combat clouds, fusion applications could be generated to empower the combat force.”

Rather than simply networking data, information and domain knowledge would be available to the tailored combat force through fusion applications including those empowered by artificial intelligence.

He underscored that the underlying HCB technology needed to realize the 21st century vision is ready for fielding now. 

Advancements in phased array antennas paired with sophisticated digital beam forming technology enables the ability to produce and maintain numerous simultaneous high bandwidth directional communications links.

These solutions facilitate opportunities for data relays, networking bridging, and data format conversions leading to resilient and robust multi-domain networks.

The HCB highway can also be used to pass data that would traditionally be sent over congested time division multiple access networks like Link 16 freeing up capacity on those legacy networks.

Cybersecurity is a necessary focus area for the future of networked C2 and ISR objectives as well. 

“The flip side to connectivity and interoperability is vulnerability to cyber-attack” said Rosebush.

He believes there isn’t a silver bullet to ensure cybersecurity for the combat cloud, but instead thinks that “a mindful application of defense-in-depth principles and solutions while taking advantage of factors like the use of cryptography and directionality of the links can lead to an ultimately agreeable resultant security posture for the warfighter.”

Rosebush argued that HCB technology is ready to field – with mass adoption feasible in the one to three year timeframe.

He then focused on the next round of capability – the three to six-year time horizon — which he argued was in the domain of free space optical communications (aka laser-comm).

“Historically, the challenges associated with the precise pointing and tracking required to acquire and maintain FSOC links between dynamic platforms have been too problematic to overcome for mature solutions.

But with recent technology advances in these fields as well, the ability to point, acquire, and hold FSOC links on moving platforms is increasingly feasible.

A realistic long-term goal is to combine the laser communication options with a smart RF node to provide for hybrid data links.”

In short, creating and enabling a cluster of data transportation solution sets or the data highway system is the “next” platform.

And in the course of doing so the redesign of platforms and what is expected from new platforms will be a work in progress.

The featured graphic is from the briefing of Lt. General David Nahom given at the International Fighter Conference 2019.

 

HMAS Hobart Task Force Returns from Initial Deployment in North Asia

By Andrew McLaughlin

This was the first operational deployment of a Hobart class DDG.

“This deployment has been a real test of our preparation for and readiness to deliver Destroyer capability and is the culmination of two years of hard work,” Hobart’s CO, CMDR Ryan Gaskin said in a statement.

“The success of Hobart’s mission is a credit to the ship’s company, embarked staff and those working in support of the ship from ashore. They’ve all worked superbly together as an integrated team.

“We’ve proven the Hobart Class Destroyer is not only ready to perform on the multinational stage in a high-end warfare exercise context but has also proven a highly effective command platform for Task Groups at sea.”

Task group commander CAPT Andrew Quinn added, “HMAS Hobart served as the host ship for the embarked Maritime Task Group Command team at sea, demonstrating the new RAN destroyers capability to fulfil this role.

“Over the past several months our Navy people have generated presence in the East Asian region and conducted complex exercises with our partners,” he added. “This has built on our respective operational skillsets and furthered our ability to work together to help keep the region secure.”

This article was published on December 12, 2019 by ADBR.

The featured photo shows Royal Australian Navy ship, HMAS Hobart, sailing in formation with participants of exercise Annualex.

Eleven vessels, four maritime combat helicopters and more than 1,000 personnel across two groups visited regional partner in the Northern and Southern Asia for multinational exercises and regional engagement activities.

This is the Royal Australian Navy’s second multiple task group activity in the region this year and comprises HMA Ships Sirius, Hobart, Stuart, Parramatta, Arunta, Leeuwin, Ararat, Gascoyne and Diamantina as well as two submarines.

Task group ships visited Guam, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Ships in the different task group elements participated in Exercises Nichi Gou Trident, Haedoli Wallaby, Annualex, Pacific Vanguard, Bersama Lima, MASTEX, New Horizon, Multinational Mine Warfare and Hyuga Nada.

They also took part in a Mine Counter Measure Symposium and the South Korean International Maritime Defence Industry Exposition as the ADF participated in Commemorations to mark the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the Battle of Surigao Strait.

Projecting Power with the F-35: The Case of the F-35B

By Marcus Hellyer

In my series looking at the future of Australian power projection and the role of the F-35, I looked at how deploying from offshore airbases would allow the F-35A to operate relatively far away from Australia in areas that are strategically important to us.

However, this is not a straightforward exercise. Even putting aside the issue of finding an amenable host country, the F-35A needs substantial infrastructure to operate. It’s not just the 8,000-foot runway, but fuel, munitions, maintenance facilities, apron space and so on. There aren’t a lot of candidates for bases that could quickly be put into service, particularly in the South Pacific.

This leads to another problem: it would be obvious to adversaries where our air force was operating from, which would dramatically simplify their early warning challenge. It would also simplify their targeting problem, and modern long-range missiles are sufficiently precise to target runways and even aircraft on the ground.

Addressing these challenges is part of the evolving concept of distributed long-range fires, which seeks to complicate an adversary’s targeting problem by moving away from a small number of fixed bases and increasing the options for striking the adversary. One element of this is deployable land-based missiles (more on those in future posts).

It has also been argued that the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the joint strike fighter, the F-35B, could contribute to this operating concept. Since the F-35B can take off from much shorter runways, it potentially opens up a greater number of airfields. Long, straight stretches of highway could possibly also serve as runways.

The US Marine Corps has been experimenting with operating its F-35B from ‘pop-up’ bases in the Pacific. Essentially, it would use the mobility provided by its amphibious forces to seize islands, establish improvised airfields, operate them for a short period, and then relocate before the adversary can respond.

The F-35B has a smaller range and carries fewer munitions than the conventional F-35A, but if this approach offers a way to get the F-35 and its fifth-generation suite of sensors into the fight, it should at least be considered. However, there are significant obstacles to implementing it, particularly for a force the size of Australia’s.

The key problem is that the F-35B still needs all the other inputs I’ve mentioned, in particular fuel. Depending on the kind and number of sorties flown, the requirement for fuel quickly becomes hundreds of tonnes per day. Flying that fuel into a pop-up base would require a huge logistics train. A US study that analysed this issue concluded that flying in the fuel for even one base would involve most of the Marine Corps’ 60 C-130s (the Australian Defence Force has 12). The larger C-17As could deliver more fuel but would quickly render an improvised airstrip unusable.

Alternatively, the fuel could be put into bladders and flown directly from amphibious ships to the improvised base. But that would require large numbers of heavy-lift helicopters—many more than the ADF’s 10 CH-47F Chinooks (assuming there was space for them on the ships). It would be very difficult to sustain high-tempo operations.

Another approach would be to relocate frequently between improvised airbases on a larger land mass. The same study argued that around 60 vehicles would be needed to move the operation, and there’s still the problem of sustaining fuel supplies that may still need to be flown in. Whichever way you look at it, there’s a big logistics tail.

So the bill for all the enablers necessary to support distributed STOVL operations could be much more than the cost of the F-35Bs themselves, which already have a higher unit cost than the F-35A.

Since ships are designed to carry bulk fuel and stores, it would be much simpler to operate the F-35Bs directly from a ship which can be resupplied with fuel and stores from other ships. ASPI and others have looked at this issue (here and here, for example). The benefit is that it gets the F-35 into a fight that it potentially couldn’t reach otherwise, so it can contribute its sensors and weapons to both enhance and protect other ADF systems around it.

Even with its reduced weapons carriage, the F-35B would provide a potent strike or close air support option in a range of scenarios. And a moving airbase certainly complicates the adversary’s targeting picture.

The disadvantages have also been enumerated. If the ADF didn’t want to reduce its current amphibious lift capability, a third or even fourth landing helicopter dock or a similar large, flat-topped vessel would be required (noting that the first two cost over $3 billion), preferably optimised to support air combat operations. It’s unlikely that a vessel of that size could maintain a sortie rate that could sustain a continuous combat air patrol, if that was the effect sought.

To get the F-35Bs up in time to provide air defence, their host ship would likely also need an airborne early warning capability (though perhaps this could be provided by an innovative drone). And much of the navy would need to be devoted to protecting the ships, reducing its ability to perform other tasks. Even then, their survival would not be assured in highly contested environments. Nevertheless, an amphibious taskforce with the F-35B would be more survivable than one without it.

It’s certainly possible to make a case for the utility of the capability. The benefits seem to outweigh the disadvantages for the USJapan and (potentially) South Korea, which are putting F-35Bs on ships of a similar size to our LHDs—and operating in highly contested environments. But the question must always be, is it a more cost-effective way to deliver the effects sought than other options?

The assumption underlying this series is that in an age of strategic uncertainty, Australia’s defence organisation should enhance its options to project military power. We’ve seen that any option relying on the F-35 would require a huge investment in enabling capabilities to break through the aircraft’s inherent 1,000-kilometre range limitation.

All of those options must be subjected to the cost-effectiveness test, particularly when there are other possible solutions that don’t rely on the F-35. In coming pieces, I’ll examine some of those alternatives.

Marcus Hellyer is ASPI’s senior analyst for defence economics and capability.

This article was first published by ASPI on October 30, 2019.

The featured photo shows Capt. Frank Zastoupil with Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 (VMFAT-501) flying the F-35B Lightning II during the Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort Air Show, April 27, 2019.(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Brittney Vella)