As the Western Alliance looks to deal with the evolving Russian challenge, the question of how fragmentation in the EU or NATO can be overcome in a crisis.

With the Russians playing Europe a la carte, it will be about being able to enhance capabilities at the point of stress in a crisis, not simply the question of words on a treaty paper.

And with the expansion of the EU and NATO eastward, there clearly is a question of what key European states would do during such a crisis.  The Baltics have received most attention but Poland in many ways is the key state.

When one looks at the defense efforts of the former states in the Warsaw Pact, Poland is among those most series about defense and the need to have a robust response to Russian blandishments.

For example, in James W. Peterson and Jacek Lubecki’s first rate book entitled Defense Policies of East-Central European Countries after 1989: Creating Stability in a Time of Uncertainty, the authors underscore security and defense divergences as well as political and economic convergences in the region.

Poland is the anomaly in the region in being focused on the need for “Old” and “New” Europe to take the military challenge seriously from Russia, up to and including the new forms through which the Russians are exercising their power.

Underneath the appearance of convergence, though, signs of divergence abounded, only to burst into the open with dramatically different policy responses to the Russian takeover of Crimea and the Ukrainian Crisis of 2014.

Poland’s uniquely robust, focused and militarized response to the heightened perception of the Russian threat after 2014 could not contrast more with the other V4 members’ lukewarm/borderline pro-Russian policy responses (albeit still “loyal” in practice) and, essentially, continuation of the same defense policies that focus on “minimum” loyalty functions in NATO.

This difference has suddenly highlighted the fact that Poland and the other V4 countries had really been following different paths ever since 1989: the former with its continuous emphasis and relatively high spending on the military, the latter with pretty much systematically falling military spending and a commitment to a minimal defense posture.¹

A new building block which Poland is laying down as part of its national defense can facilitate reinforcement in times of crisis by allies. 

Poland has purchased the new system to integrate their Patriots with their own shorter-range air defense systems.  By building an integrated approach not only can they enhance their national capabilities, but provide better protection for their bases which would be used also by allies in times of crisis.

By shaping an integrated system of C2, the Poles are putting in place a way for a country like Germany to be able to reinforce Poland in times of crisis.

Germany could move their Patriot units in to reinforce the front lines (it is no longer the inner German border, although sometimes this gets forgotten) and can work integration with their MEADS system which would only add further capabilities as part of a crisis response capability.

What the Poles are doing is an important step forward in enhancing their own defense, but allowing allies to show up and contribute relevant and meaningful force in a crisis.

Poland orders Northrop Grumman IBCS for national air & missile defence

By Andrew McLaughlin March 22, 2019

The US Army has awarded Northrop Grumman a US$713m (A$1bn) contract on behalf of the Government of Poland for the production of the company’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) for Poland’s WISŁA air and missile defense program.

Under the foreign military sales (FMS) contract, Northrop Grumman will manufacture IBCS engagement operations centres and integrated fire control network relays, and will deliver IBCS net-enabled command and control for four firing units. The IBCS engagement operations centres will be integrated with IBCS battle management software that maximises the combat potential of sensors and weapon systems. IBCS engagement operations centres and network relays will be transported by Polish Jelcz vehicles.

“Poland is taking a leadership role in today’s complex threat environment by selecting IBCS over legacy stove-piped systems that were designed decades ago for a much different threat profile,” Northrop Grumman’s vice president and general manager missile defense and protective systems, Dan Verwiel said in a statement. 

“IBCS is the future of multidomain operations and with it, Poland will have a state-of-the-art system to modernize its integrated air and missile defense capabilities. Through the acquisition of IBCS, Poland will be in line with the U.S. Army’s future direction. Poland will have the flexibility to consider any radar and any interceptor, optimize sensor and effector integration and keep pace with an evolving threat.”

Poland signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance with the U.S. government to purchase IBCS in March 2018, becoming the first international partner country to acquire the system.

Northrop Grumman’s IBCS is expected to form the basis of the company’s for the ADF’s AIR 6500 Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) capability requirement.

The featured photo shows Cpt. Grzegorz Piskiewcz, the air defense officer, 12th Mechanized Division Headquarters, and Sgt. 1st Class Paige Shelton from the 5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, discussing some of the capabilities of the new U.S. Army patriot missile system in the Drawsko Pomorskie area of Poland, June 4, 2018.

DRAWSKO POMORSKIE, POLAND

06.04.2018

Photo by Spc. Aaron Good

126th Public Affairs Operations Center

 

By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Australia working with the Williams Foundation, I had a chance to meet with the former head of the Aussie Navy, Vice Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett, and to discuss the Australian approach going forward with maritime power.

I have had the privilege of meeting with him when he was in office, but this was the first chance I had to continue that conversation after he had retired from the Navy.

I think the best place to start in understanding his perspective with the book he published when he was Chief of Navy.

The title of the book The Navy and the Nation.

What clearly emerges from this book is a much broader perspective about the RAN than simply adding new hulls or capabilities; it is about a national security strategy in which Australia as a nation embraces what is necessary to defend the nation in the challenging times of the 21^stcentury.

It is an enterprise not simply a force structure approach; it is about Australia as a society and political system embracing the importance of building an infrastructure which can sustain the defense of Australia in an alliance context.

But that alliance is changing fundamentally with the rise of China, and Australia clearly is playing and needs to play an anchor role for core allies like the US and Japan, and not simply contribute to Alliance defense

He starts his book this way:

MOST PEOPLE THINK that Navy is something else. They know it exists, they may even have a rough idea of what it is for, but they don’t think it’s got much to do with them. They’re wrong.

The Navy is a national enterprise in which everyone is involved and which delivers peace and security to everyone in the country.

This enterprise is a two-way street, and must be a two-way street.

Going one way, the Navy offers peace and security. Going the other, the people offer support and contribution. Only when the street is a properly mutual two-way exchange between the Navy and the citizens can this bargain, this contract, deliver what it needs to.

Barrett then added a comment with regard to how industry and Navy needed to work together to get the kind of enterprise approach in place which would provide for national security.

In the wider community of interest for which this essay is also intended, the manufacturing, industrial, technological and investment sectors are at front of mind.

Not only should the leaders of these sectors read and understand how the Navy might position itself for these new opportunities, but they should also begin to join the conversation that is a necessary part of realising these opportunities.

Industry leaders should embark upon a conversation with the leaders of the Navy in the same way that naval leaders should talk to them.

Barrett then highlighted the key point that a force like the Australian Navy will draw upon the broader changing skill sets in Australia and both energize them and draw from them, which is another key point when considering an enterprise approach.

Most of the leaders of our key national institutions are acutely aware that our society is changing as it learns to adjust to demographic pressures, the evolving expectations of our fellow citizens, the fluidity and variability in the career choices available to young people, the pressures of managing family and professional demands, the remarkable and timely expansion in the role that women play in our national enterprise—to name just a few factors driving change.

Just as the Navy will be affected by the pace of change, so it needs to participate in managing change and benefiting from it. Inevitably, the naval career of the twenty-first century will differ significantly from that of the twentieth century. We need to prepare for change, in order to make the most of it.¹

Working from this perspective it is obvious that for Tim Barrett, the modernization of the Navy is both part of a broader force transformation, a redesign of alliance structures, and a shift in how the Navy needs to work with the broader society in order for Navy to contribute to the strengthening of Australia’s defenses in the broader region and the bigger world.

We discussed the approach to Naval force structure modernization and he emphasized two key points.

The Navy was being recapitalized in terms of hulls, but the larger picture was how those hulls would work together with the larger ADF and beyond that with core allies and partners.

Here the former Chief of the Navy provided further details on the core point he made at a Williams Seminar in 2016:

“We are not building an interoperable navy; we are building an integrated force for the Australian Defence Force.”

The kill web approach was clearly what he is working from when he discusses force modernization for the Navy.

Barret provided a particularly compelling example of the approach and what it means in terms of acquisition.  He described a recent visit to Spain where his wife was privileged to launch a new tanker to support the maritime force.

That tanker has on it a combat system which allows it to operate in a joint manner with the wider maritime force and to be integrated into the wider ADF.

This was a good illustration of what we have argued for, namely “no planform fights alone” if linked with platforms and assets in a broader kill web.

Barrett argued that a key consideration for naval procurement was the nature of the combat systems being placed on the hulls as well as their potential for continuous modernization which is part of what he meant when he argued for a continuous shipbuilding strategy.

The operational advantage that can go to a 21^stcentury combat force can come as much for the clean room where software is developed as from the armaments onboard any particular vessel.

And in part this is because if one can shape a kill web force one can get this sort of outcome:

“An Air Warfare Destroyer is as important to the RAAF as is an F-35 to the RAN.”

He underscored that: “We have deliberately separated the procurement strategy for the hull from that of the combat management system.

“For example, with regard to Aegis, the hull is there to take Aegis to sea.

“The hull configuration will change only gradually over its lifetime.

“The Aegis combat system however will evolve and adapt constantly, informed by operational experiences and from the broader Aegis community as well.

“And Aegis is what provides the combat advantage, not just for the Navy but for the wider ADF.”

We discussed at some length the new submarine decision to go with French Naval Group and what the wider ramifications of doing so might be.

It is clear that this is NOT a simple tech transfer contract; it is a co-development contract and as such challenges BOTH the French and Aussies sides to engage in significant cross-learning.

For the French, the Aussies are going to build a digital shipyard, which is not what the French currently have.

The two societies operate with very different work forces and if the French desire they can learn from how the Aussies trade-based system operates and to generate change in France itself.

What we discussed were the changes on the Australian side.

Because this is not simply a build in France or import the design or the technology from an existing submarine in France, at the heart of the challenge if the program is to succeed would be to build the kind of workforce which Australia will need to have to engage in a continuous shipbuilding approach for the new class of submarines.

And associated with this as well will be the combat systems side of this, where Australian software engineers and designers become full participants in its ongoing development.

He emphasized the importance of a whole of government approach to the new build submarine. He noted that providing visas to the French participating in the program, needed to be combined with the education and training part of the Australian government to ensure that French participation in the program was as well about the development of an Australian work force capable of evolving the entire French-Australian submarine enterprise.

“We need to ensure that we have the right personnel to build the 6^thsubmarine on; not just capability in place to stand up the program.”

Ultimately, this is about Australian sovereignty and the ability to sustain force in a crisis.

This also means that Australia is enhancing its role in terms of anchoring an alliance of the liberal democracies, and not just in the Pacific.

Interestingly, for this French partner, most French analysts would consider sovereignty to be about an ability of the nation to build its military systems on its own.

But for Barrett this approach would be too narrow, particularly in today’s world of rapidly changing technologies and capabilities.

For Barrett, “sovereignty is the ability to act in a crisis, when government requires it, where it requires it and to be able to do so for as long as is needed, to the level you need, with the resources that are readily available to you.”

“We can and indeed will buy other nation’s equipment, but we will operate it in a sovereign manner and we will integrate into our ADF approach.”

From his perspective, Australia was not building a Barracuda, for it is a new design submarine.

“We are designing the Barramundi ( – which is a well known Australian fish).”

But the new build submarine program really is about a two-way street working with France.

“The whole point of this exercise is that we leverage their each other’s skills: they learn from us as much as we learn from them as they develop their business and manufacturing processes as well.”

This is clearly part of a potential French strategic opening in the region as well.

“They are clearly re-establishing their presence in the region, as recent French naval activity demonstrates as well as the public policy statements made by President Macron as well.”

Barrett then went on to describe a presentation which he made at a UK conference three years ago.

“I put a map of Australia over the map of Europe which showed the relative sizes of each geographic area and got the usual laughs.

“But then I pointed out that on the European map the significant trade routes within the graphic simply stopped at the Suez canal.  It did not account for, or recognize the more than seven trillion dollars that emanates from Asia and our region – from India, China, Japan and the Pacific trade routes as far as the US, that flows into the European economy.

“I opined that the Asia Pacific region was as critical to Europe as it is to Australia”

“I also argued that you need to consider the broader picture, especially when you consider that the influences acting upon European markets – for example, the Chinese acquisition of  container ports in Greece and other European maritime infrastructure.

“They are clearly focused on European ports and are looking at the wider picture. It is important for Europeans to do so as well.

“Perhaps our working relationship with France on submarines might be part of shift in Europe as well on the broader defense and security posture and situation.”

Editorial Note:

The first of a new class of Royal Australian Navy’s auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) ships, the future HMAS Supply, was launched by Spanish shipbuilder Navantia at its Ferrol shipyard on November 23, 2018.

HMAS Supply (II) was launched following a keel laying ceremony in November 2017.

Supply and sister ship Stalwart (III) will replace HMAS Success and Sirius with delivery of the first ship scheduled for 2021.

The new Australian AORs are built under a contract signed in May 2016 and are based on the Spanish Navy’s Cantabria-class AORs. They will be delivered at an estimated cost of AU$640 million.

The ships are intended to carry fuel, dry cargo, water, food, ammunition, equipment and spare parts to provide operational support for the deployed naval or combat forces operating far from the port on the high seas for longer periods.

In addition to replenishment, the vessels can be used to combat against environmental pollution at sea, provide logistics support for the armed forces, and to support humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) operations following a natural disaster.

The AORs will displace 19,500 tons and measure 173.9 meters in length.

https://navaltoday.com/2018/11/23/first-australian-supply-class-aor-launched-in-spain/

In our book on Pacific defense, we highlighted the importance of what we called the “conveyer belt” and its relationship to SLOC defense.

This clearly requires a broader coordination of efforts among the liberal democracies as referred to by Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett.

Shipping is at the heart of global trade. Most international trade—about 80 percent of the total by volume—is carried by sea.

About half of the world’s trade by value and 90 percent of the general cargo is now transported in containers. The containerization of cargos and the growth in the size of the cargo ships are important forces for change as well. Containerization has been both cause and consequence of a shift in the nature of the global supply chain. Logistic supply chains that feed components and finished products to users on a just-in-time and just-enough basis have become critical to modern manufacturing and service industries.

Seaborne trade and its land connections in the global supply chain have become increasingly efficient, large-scale, and thus open.

Also, part of the containerization phenomenon has been the rise of the megaports. The top container terminals such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and four other East Asian ports accounted for nearly 60 percent of world sea container throughput. Globalization has put in motion many changes on the manufacturing side in which just-in-time manufacturing has been built around the capability to disperse the elements of the production process and then transport those core elements to a final assembly or production area.

The role of maritime commerce is essential to such just-in-time manufacturing practices. It has been enhanced as well by the container revolution within which containers of standard sizes become the coin of the realm in terms of transiting goods by sea then capable of being rapidly transitioned to land forms of transportation for their final destination.

This maritime system is the “highway” and “factory floor” for 21st-century globalization. It reaches from deep within countries to their ports and over the maritime transit routes to other countries’ ports and then deep inside those countries’ delivery systems. With the Arctic opening, the vectors of operation of the conveyer belt will change as well with northern routes complementing the great circle routes and the royal routes.

The major Pacific routes currently operating between the United States and Asia can be seen in Figure 7.1.

What is not widely realized is that the paths from Asia to North America primarily pass through Unimak Pass and the Aleutian Islands.

So the northward trajectory of the conveyer belt will simply be taken farther north by the Arctic opening.

Securing the conveyer belt is a major task facing the Pacific states, notably in terms of the growth and development of the economies in the region.

Much of the physical movement of goods from and to Asia is by sea, even as the currencies move digitally.²

The featured photo shows Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN during his farewell tour.

Vice Admiral Barrett spoke to personnel of all ranks at HMAS Kuttabul and toured HMAS Hobart alongside in Fleet Base East. Vice Admiral Barrett commissioned HMAS Hobart -the Royal Australian Navy’s first Hobart-class guided missile destroyer- during his tenure as Service Chief.

As part of his farewell tour, Vice Admiral Barrett also visited other naval establishments and ships at sea around Australia to say farewell and thank you.

Vice Admiral Barrett handed over command to Rear Admiral Michael Noonan, AM, RAN on Friday 06 July 2018.

 

As the strategic shift from the land wars gains momentum the investments and training in an appropriate 21^stcentury crisis management and high intensity combat force will not be modelled on the Cold War European based force. It is not about a German-US Army brotherhood with significant presence.  It is not about re-establishing air-land battle

It is about leveraging core force integration capabilities, such as F-35 with the Aegis, which can provide a pull function moving the US and the allies towards a more flexible and scalable force which can operate over the spectrum of operations.

As Vice Admiral Barrett, the former Chief of the Australian Navy highlighted with regard to how he saw the build out of the Australian Navy: “We are not building an interoperable Navy; we are contributing to an integrated Australian Defence Force able to exercise sovereign options and work closely with core allies.”

Because the adversaries are building to mass and are emphasizing expansion of strike capabilities controlled by a very hierarchical command structure, the kind of force which will best fit Western interests and capabilities is clearly a. distributed one. Fortunately, the technology is already here to build effectively down this path, a path which allows engagement at the low end and provides building blocks to higher end capabilities.

The force we need to build will have five key interactives capabilities:

1. Enough platforms with allied and US forces in mind to provide significant presence;
2. A capability to maximize economy of force with that presence;
3. Scalability whereby the presence force can reach back if necessary at the speed of light and receive combat reinforcements;
4. Be able to tap into variable lethality capabilities appropriate to the mission or the threat in order to exercise dominance.
5. And to have the situational awareness relevant to proactive crisis management at the point of interest and an ability to link the fluidity of local knowledge to appropriate tactical and strategic decisions.

To be blunt about the last point – a cutting edge new system, the Triton UAV, is part of the new maritime SA force for the US and slelected allies. The SA on this aircraft needs to be used by the presence forces and not be part of the “intelligence collection” team back in the United States.  Or put in other words, the new challenges require a significant challenge in terms of how the very un-agile US intelligence process tries to “own” information.

The new approach is one which can be expressed in terms of a kill web, that is a US and allied force so scalable that if an ally goes on a presence mission and is threatened by a ramp up of force from a Russia or China, that that presence force can reach back to relevant allies as well as their own force structure.

The inherent advantage for the US and its allies is the capability to shape a more integrated force which can leverage one another in a crisis.

A good example has been the evolution of the Aegis fleet in the Pacific.

The enhanced capability of the US and allied navies is coming not just from platforms but from kill web integration.

There is no greater case in point than how the US Navy and the allies are integrating their Aegis destroyers.

Earlier, this year, the Australian Navy demonstrated its ability to integrate with the US Navy with regard to the CEC system.

According to Andrew McLaughlin in an article published on January 7, 2019:

The tests were conducted in conjunction with the US Navy at the vast Pacific test ranges near Hawaii and off the coast of California, and saw the vessel’s systems and crew challenged in realistic tests and demonstrations. This included testing the vessel’s ability to integrate with US Navy assets via the Co-Operative Engagement Capability (CEC), a US high-end naval networking capability so far made only available to Australia.

“We were presented with some of the world’s toughest and most challenging threats; modern anti-ship missiles, maritime strike aircraft, fighters and high-speed attack craft,” Commanding Officer of HMAS Hobart, CAPT John Stavridis told Navy Today. “On every occasion we successfully defended all threats.”

Part of HMAS Hobart’s systems validation included a series of at sea tests known as Combat System Ship Qualification Trials (CSSQT) which aim to achieve a sustainable level of combat and weapon system readiness.

“This ship represents the future of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatants: capable, competent and lethal,” Fleet Commander, RADM Jonathan Mead said upon HMAS Hobart’s return to Sydney. “With her recently commissioned sister ship, HMAS Brisbane, and soon to be delivered NUSHIP Sydney they will be able to defend our Fleet against any threat.”

As part of the increasingly integrated maritime threesome — the US, Australian and Japanese Navies — the Japanese recently added a new platform to the mix.

According to Naval Today:

Japan’s second Asahi-class destroyer, the JS Shiranui, entered Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) service in a ceremony at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Nagasaki Shipyard on February 27.

The lead ship in the class was commissioned a year before, on March 8, 2018.

The 5,100-ton general-purpose escort destroyers were previously designated as 25DD and are designed on the basis of Akizuki-class destroyers but with a focus on anti-submarine instead of anti-air warfare.

JS Shiranui (DD-120) was launched in October 2017 and was commissioned without delays.

Asahi-class destroyers are lauded as fuel-efficient ships featuring COGLAG, a combined gas turbine engine and electric propulsion system. They measure 151 meters in length and reach speeds of 30 knots, according to the Japan defense ministry. Armament includes Mark 41 vertical launch systems for self protection, 62-caliber naval guns, close-in weapon systems and two Mark 32 surface vessel torpedo tubes.

The destroyers will have a complement of around 230 and embark one Mitsubishi-built SH-60J/K are anti-submarine patrol helicopter.

Asahi-class destroyers are the first JMSDF ships to deploy with periscope detection radars in addition to being equipped with new towed array sonars.

Earlier, when the first of the new destroyers was launched from its shipyard last year, the integration piece was highlighted.

Japan launches first 27DDG-class AEGIS destroyer from a shipyard in Yokohama today (July 31). She has named “Maya” after mountain in Japan and WWII heavy cruiser.

The US$1.5 billion vessel is the seventh Aegis destroyer acquired by Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, but the first to be fitted with the advanced Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system. With a displacement of 8,200 tons and a length of 170 meters, it is scheduled to enter service by 2020.

Supplied by the US, the CEC system enables real-time sharing of intelligence on battlefield situations and hostile targets between ships in allied navies, while information and parameters are synced across all platforms linked to a sensory network. Sharing of radar and fire-controlling data will also be possible with the US Navy.

Warships equipped with this system can intercept incoming ballistic missiles in steep, lofted trajectories, and track dozens of targets simultaneously while firing clusters of defensive missiles, according to Japan Times. One such missile is the SM-3 Block IIA.

Japan will have eight Aegis destroyers with a ballistic missile defense capability by 2021. At their core will be a computer-based command-and-decision element capable of mounting simultaneous operations against a range of threats.

Because all three of these navies are part of the F-35 global enterprise as well, integration of F-35s with Aegis is part of the combat capability facing adversaries in the Pacific.

A shift to a kill web approach to force building, training and operations is a foundation from which the US and its allies can best leverage the force we have and the upgrade paths to follow.  A kill web linked force allows a modest force package – economy of force – to reach back to other combat assets to provide for enhanced options in a crisis or to ramp up the level of conflict if that is being dictated by the situation.

The evolution of 21st century weapon technology is breaking down the barriers between offensive and defensive systems.  Is missile defense about providing defense or is it about enabling global reach, for offense or defense?  Likewise, the new 5th generation aircraft have been largely not understood because they are inherently multi-domain systems, which can be used for forward defense or forward offensive operations.

Indeed, an inherent characteristic of many new systems is that they are really about presence and putting a grid over an operational area, and therefore they can be used to support strike or defense within an integrated approach.

In the 20th Century, surge was built upon the notion of signaling.  One would put in a particular combat capability – a Carrier Battle Group, Amphibious Ready Group, or Air Expeditionary Wing – to put down your marker and to warn a potential adversary that you were there and ready to be taken seriously.  If one needed to, additional forces would be sent in to escalate and build up force.

With the new multi-domain systems – 5th generation aircraft and Aegis for example – the key is presence and integration able to support strike or defense in a single operational presence capability.  Now the adversary cannot be certain that you are simply putting down a marker.

This is what former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne calls the attack and defense enterprise.

The strategic thrust of integrating modern systems is to create a grid that can operate in an area as a seamless whole, able to strike or defend simultaneously.  This is why Wynne has underscored since at least 2005 that fifth generation aircraft are not merely replacements for existing tactical systems but a whole new approach to integrating defense and offense.

When one can add the strike and defensive systems of other players, notably missiles and sensors aboard surface ships like Aegis, then one can create the reality of what Ed Timperlake, a former fighter pilot, has described as the F-35 being able to consider Aegis as his wingman.

By shaping a tron warfare system inextricably intertwined with platforms and assets, which can honeycomb an area of operation, an attack and defense enterprise can operate to deter aggressors and adversaries or to conduct successful military operations.

The US Navy leadership has coined their version of this approach, the “kill web.” In an interview we did with Rear Admiral Admiral Manazir, then head of N-98, Naval Aviation.

If you architect the joint force together, you achieve a great effect.

It is clear that C2 (command and control) is changing and along with it the CAOC (Combined Air and Space Operations Center).

The hierarchical CAOC is an artifact of nearly 16 years of ground war where we had complete air superiority; however, as we build the kill web, we need to be able to make decisions much more rapidly.

As such, C2 is ubiquitous across the kill web.

Where is information being processed?

Where is knowledge being gained?

Where is the human in the loop?

Where can core C2 decisions best be made and what will they look like in the fluid battlespace?

The key task is to create decision superiority.

But what is the best way to achieve that in the fluid battlespace we will continue to operate in? 

What equipment and what systems allow me to ensure decision superiority?

We are creating a force for distributed fleet operations.

When we say distributed, we mean a fleet that is widely separated geographically capable of extended reach.

Importantly, if we have a network that shares vast amounts of information and creates decision superiority in various places, but then gets severed, we still need to be able to fight independently without those networks.

This requires significant and persistent training with new technologies but also informs us about the types of technologies we need to develop and acquire in the future.

Additionally, we need to have mission orders in place so that our fleet can operate effectively even when networks are disrupted during combat; able to operate in a modular-force approach with decisions being made at the right level of operations for combat success.

Inherent in such an enterprise is scalability and reach-back.

By deploying the tron warfare grid or a C2/Information superiority “honeycomb”, the shooters in the enterprise can reach back to each other to enable the entire grid of operation, for either defense or offense.

By being able to plug into the F-35 and Aegis enabled honeycomb, the United States providees force augmentation and surge capability to those allies and at the same time those allies enable forward deployments which the United States would not own or operate.

Put in other terms, presence is augmented at the same time as scalability is as well. This provides a significant force multiplier across the crisis management spectrum.

In effect, what could be established from the United States perspective is a plug-in approach rather than a push approach to projecting power.  The allies are always forward deployed; the United States does not to attempt to replicate what those allies need to do in their own defense.

But what the United States can offer is strategic depth to those allies. At the same time if interoperability and interactive sustainability are recognized as a strategic objective of the first order, then the United States can shape a more realistic approach than one which now rests on trying to proliferate power projection platforms, when neither the money nor the numbers are there.

Put bluntly, if you do not get, you do not get it.  The fifth generation enabled force is here; and the challenge is clearly to leverage it as one builds out new elements of the kill web to enhance the scope and lethality of the US and allied force structure in either the Pacific or Europe.

The featured photo shows the strategic quadrangle within which the US, Japan and Australia are shaping a kill web approach.

For our recently published Special Report which looks at these issues, please see the following:

the-strategic-shift-the-role-and-impact-of-the-f-35-global-enterprise

By Robbin Laird

China has expanded its maritime reach as it modernizes its navy and air force.  And has done so through a “buy in strategy” but one that is challenged as well with its approach to “gray zone operations” in the region as well.

In a recent article by Leland Lazarus andJohn Brunetti, the “buy in” approach is discussed.

China continues to roil Asian neighbors over claims in the East and South China Seas. However, China has also been cooperating with neighbors to establish codes of conduct to reduce conflict in the maritime arena. For years, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) negotiated maritime codes of conduct.

More recently, China hosted the signing of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in 2014. In February 2018, China and ASEAN held a two day tabletop exercise in Singapore, where defense ministers from eleven countries planned responses to potential oil tanker fires, search and rescue evacuations, and naval assistance to merchant vessels and civilian ships. And in October last year China and ASEAN organized an inaugural five-day maritime field training exercise.

More than one thousand personnel—deployed on eight ships from Brunei, China, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—conducted exercise drills in the Ma Xie naval base in Zhanjiang, China.  

According to exercise co-director Colonel Lim Yu Chuan of Singapore, the exercise drills “enabled us to strengthen interoperability and more importantly, build trust and confidence for our navies to work with one another in responding to maritime incidents at sea.”  Despite the maritime claim tensions, regional powers are beginning to buy into a cooperative relationship with China.

A second element of the “buy in strategy,” according to the authors is the Chinese maritime reach into the Middle East and Africa, where the Chinese Navy has assisted in counter-piracy operations

PLAN has escorted more than 6,400 Chinese and foreign ships, and prevented about 3,000 suspected pirate boats from launching attacks in the Gulf of Aden. China’s maritime initiative is also evident in the South Pacific. The Peace Ark, China’s ten-thousand-ton medical ship, provided free medical treatment to twenty thousand patients in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, and Tonga. Such exercises show China’s transition into a blue water navy, and dovetails nicely with China’s narrative of being a peaceful, cooperative neighbor, and not a competitor to be feared.

The third element of the “buy in strategy” is in the area of expanding port ownership as part of its global silk road strategy.

Over the past decade, China has helped finance at least thirty-five ports around the world. One flagship project is the Gwadar port in Pakistan. Part of the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative, China is helping Pakistan update the Gwadar port

A final element of what the author’s call a “buy-in strategy” is the Chinese shipbuilding industry.

Today, China’s ship construction dominates the world market. CSSC’s Jiangnan Shipyard and Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding recently began building the world’s largest container ships. These ships are a marvel of size and technology using liquid natural gas to deliver goods the world over. China is also willing to sell existing ships to allies; for instance, China just agreed to sell its aircraft carrier Liaoning to Pakistan. For allies, seeing such transactions certainly sweetens the deal of working with China.

We could put this differently and see what the author’s are calling a “buy in strategy” as key elements of an overall maritime influence strategy designed to expand the power of the authoritarian state at the expense of the liberal democratic order.

This is clearly a global influence strategy in which the “soft power” approach is underwritten by the willingness to use force to support its impact and influence.

The “gray zone” approach being followed by China is a constant reminder to states that China has presence and is willing it to reshape the maritime order to its preferences.

A recent book edited by Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson on Chinese maritime operations looks at “gray zone” operations being conducted by the Chinese.

The book identifies and discusses in detail “gray zone” operations, namely, operations short of the use of lethal force but empowered by a well worked out chain of maritime power elements up to and including the presence of combat forces.

The goal is to reshape the external environment in ways favorable without the need to engage in kinetic operations. In the hybrid war concept, lethal operations are the supporting not the tip of the spear element to achieve what the state actor is hoping to achieve tactically or strategically.

The book argues that this is a phase short of what the Russians have done which has been labelled hybrid warfare.

But from my point of view both gray zone ops and hybrid war ops are part of a broader strategic reality, namely, the nature of crisis management facing the liberal democracies competing with the authoritarian states in a peer-to-peer competition.

And I would subsume the “buy-in strategy” as part of the broader capabilities which can indeed shape how crosses can be avoided, influenced or dominated by the Chinese. In the US, the kind of activity which the Merchant Marine or the Coast Guard does has NEVER been incorporated into the broader influence strategy. For the Chinese, these capabilities, including economic activities have been.

The separation of activities so important to the success of capitalism, is ignored by the Chinese as an authoritarian state and instead works to integrate the spectrum of activities from peace to war in a quite different manner.

The challenge can be put bluntly — deterrence has been designed on the Western side with large scale engagement of enemy forces in mind.

What if deterrence in this sense is the necessary but not sufficient capability to constrain the actions of the authoritarians?

What if you can deter from full scale war, but by so doing not be able to control what your adversary is doing in terms of expanding his global reach and reshaping the strategic environment to his benefit?

What if you have organized yourself for deterrence but not effective crisis management?

The gray zone concept in my view is subsumed in this broader strategic shift and challenge.

There is also a key question whether gray zone operations is the strategic focus or really a phase on the way to engaging in kinetic operations as part of the way ahead.

What if the US and its key allies are not willing or able to respond and the Chinese expand their appraoch over time?

We can not assume that as Chinese look at the world or read RAND studies that they will not believe that actually striking a US or allied warship might not be a useful part of their evolving appraoch to crisis management.

From this point of view the discussions of the book could be seen as a historic look at a phase of Chinese maritime power and the evolving approach to strategic engagement in the region and beyond.

I would note that the focus in the book is on the US Navy and its responses.

Having worked with the USCG for years, I found the resource neglect of the service and the strategic decision to stick them into the Department of Homeland security as significant strategic failures on the part of the US.

First, the engagement in the Middle East has stolen resources from many security and non-security accounts, among them the USCG.

And then the focus on the return of Great Power politics, although admirable must focus on the nature of who these competitors actually are and how they operate.

How do we constrain Chine, and not just deter it?

Many years ago when I started a series on Pacific defense for the then AOL Defense, now Breaking Defense, I actually started with the significance of the USCG and why they were a foundational element for the kind of “constrainment” as well as deterrent strategy we needed to shape.

That series led eventually to our co-authored book on Pacific strategy which again started with the “constrainment” challenge not just the deterrence one.

What I had not realized was that it is the broader challenge which the authoritarian states were generating for crisis management against the liberal democracies  which was in play.

And that this was the core strategic shift from the land wars.

This book simply validates how important the missing USCG National Security and Offshore Patrol vessel hulls and trained personnel are.

Instead, the US focused on Littoral Combat Ships which made no sense.

The white hulls are crucial to a “constrainment strategy”, and the expansion of the Chinese Coast Guard in the region has been central to the gray zone operations discussed in the book.

Or let me be blunt: What the Chinese have done should not be a strategic surprise or a black swan.

It is simply something for which we did not prepare nor resource.

In effect, the “buy in strategy” when combined with the Chinese approach to “gray zone operations” and its expanded capability to fight at the high end really work together to underscore that China is not a liberal power wishing to reinforce current rules of the maritime order.

Rather, they a modern authoritarian power seeking to work with its allies to reshape the global order in a more favorable manner to themselves.

In the second edition of their highly regarded book on Chinese maritime power, Toshi Yoshihira and James R. Holems, what one Chinese analyst has called the “cabbage strategy.”

Zhang Zhaozhong—a retired rear admiral, NDU professor, well-known television personality, and prolific author of nationalistic navalist books for popular consumption—explain(s) how a cabbage strategy works. The strategy, Zhang says, can be encapsulated in “just one word, which is squeezing.”

His explanation is worth quoting at length: “For every measure there is a countermeasure.…If you send fishing vessels to resupply, then we will use fishing vessels to keep them out; if your coast guard sends supplies, then we will send marine surveillance to keep them out. If your Philippine Navy ships hurry over, we will use naval vessels to keep them out. There is nothing to be afraid of, and we must stick it out to the end. The cabbage strategy of which I have spoken many times is to surround them layer by layer, and make them unable to enter [Second Thomas Shoal].48 (Our emphasis).”¹

A key disconnect between Western navies and the Chinese over the past few years has been a clear focus by Western navies on maritime missions to support the global trade order whereas the Chinese have been focused on conflict at sea as well as global trade order missions.

China’s approach poses problems from a cultural standpoint as well. In the sense that “Mahanian” connotes girding for fleet battles and “post-Mahanian” means policing the sea or projecting power ashore, China is comfortable using post-Mahanian means for Mahanian ends.

A fishing trawler or coast guard cutter represents an implement of power politics as surely as a warplane or a hulking destroyer.

For their part, U.S. naval officers find it hard to deal with white-hulled China Coast Guard cutters or maritime enforcement vessels trying to cement command of Chinese-claimed waters. Countermeasures for maritime militia embedded within the fishing fleet and working in conjunction with law enforcement ships are still harder to come by.²

The authors note that this is changing as the US Navy begins to refocus on conflict at sea as a core mission and is modifying its combat assets to be more capable of so doing.

The authors conclude their book by looking at ways the US might more effectively counter the Chinese approach and to enhance core combat capabilities.

And it is China’s mounting resistance to the U.S.-led system of trade and commerce, which has nourished the regional order for more than seven decades, that makes the rise of Chinese sea power so worrisome.

Policy makers, then, must resist the temptation to focus narrowly on the material or operational dimensions of Chinese anti-access.

These are important beyond a doubt. But statesmen must recognize that China’s ascent and its accompanying dream pose an all-encompassing challenge to the United States and the long peace over which it has presided in Asia.³

I would add that a major aspect of working mid-term and long-term responses to the Chinese and to shape ways to constrain them is clearly how the US works with core Asian allies.

The military-technical aspects of so doing are important but so are the political-military as well as diplomatic.

But bluntly, how Japan, Australia, the South Koreans and others work together with the US in shaping the next phase of the liberal order is a crucial concomitant of the refocus on what the authors refer to as the “Mahanian” focus which connotes girding for fleet battles and “post-Mahanian or policing the sea or projecting power ashore.

The authors deal with the allied dimension in the context of how the Chinese see the general challenge facing them with regard to their core security challenges.

Geography colors how Chinese strategists appraise threats. The Korean half-island and the Japanese archipelago converge on key bodies of water while forming straits near China’s political and economic centers.

Whether the U.S.–Japan–South Korea alignment can ever become a coherent strategic unit is dubious at best in light of the two Asian allies’ turbulent past.

Nevertheless, Chinese observers find it unsettling that two U.S. allies boasting advanced economies and modern armed forces stand athwart sealanes essential to China’s security and economic health.

Sowing disunion among the allies would partly ameliorate this dilemma—and thus represents a strategic imperative for Beijing.⁴

Indeed, from my perspective working the technology and working the US and allied concepts of operations along with reshaping how the alliance will work in the presence of persistent Chinese efforts to change that Alliance is at the heart of the challenge.

For US policy makers, rebuilding the US Navy is a necessary but not sufficient condition; working more effective allied relationships to constrain and channel the Chinese is crucial as well.

In short, at the heart of the Chinese transition with regard to seapower is the shift from benefiting from and leveraging the global liberal system which has been underwritten by the US Navy to shaping their own capabilities to defend their interests, operate globally and to provided extended defense of their crucial port regions, where significant population and economic capabilities are located.

And it is not just about the numbers and capability of their gray hulls; it is about the sweep from a “buy in strategy” to “gray zone operations” to “economic presence” in the global maritime system and shaping higher-end capabilities which could come into play as crises occur and need to be managed.

Note: This is what I wrote in my piece on AOL Defense in the second piece in my Pacific series and published on August 14, 2012:

As Vice Admiral Manson Brown, the recently departed Coat Guard Pacific commander, underscored in an interview last year:

“Many people believe that we need to be a coastal coast guard, focused on the ports, waterways, and coastal environment.

“But the reality is that because our national interests extend well beyond our shore, whether it’s our vessels, or our mariners, or our possessions and our territories, we need to have presence well beyond our shores to influence good outcomes.

“As the Pacific Area Commander, I’m also the USCG Pacific Fleet Commander. That’s a powerful synergy. I’m responsible for the close-in game, and I’m responsible for the away game. Now the away game has some tangible authorities and capabilities, such as fisheries enforcement and search and rescue presence,” he said.

At the heart of a strategic rethink in building a U.S. Pacific maritime security strategy is coming to terms with the differences between these two domains, the security and military. The security domain is based on multiple-sum actions; military activity is by its very nature rooted in unilateral action. If one starts with the military side of the equation and then defines the characteristics of a maritime security equation the formula is skewed towards unilateral action against multiple-sum activity.

But there is another aspect of change as well. Increasingly, the United States is rethinking its overall defense policy. A shift is underway toward preparing its forces for global operations for conventional engagement in flexible conditions.

Conventional engagement is built on a sliding scale from insertion of forces to achieve political effect to the use of high intensity sledgehammer capabilities. Policymakers and specialists alike increasingly question the utility of high-tech, high-intensity warfare capabilities for most conventional engagement missions.

In parallel to the relationship between those two domains is the relationship between the Coast Guard and the Navy, rooted in a sliding scale on levels of violence. This needs to be replaced by a new look, which emphasizes the intersection between security operations and conventional engagement, with high-intensity capabilities as an escalatory tool.

To protect the littorals of the United States is a foundational element for Pacific defense, and allows the U.S. to focus on multiple sum outcomes to enhance defense and security, but at the same time it lays a solid foundation for moving deeper into the Pacific for military or extended security operations when needed.

A reflection of such an approach is the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. Again one must remember the central place the Great Circle Route plays in trans-Pacific shipping and the immensity of the Pacific. Given these conditions, the Coast Guard has participated in a collaborative security effort in the North Pacific designed to enhance littoral protection of the United States.

Among the key participants are the Canadians, Russians, the Japanese, the South Koreans and the Chinese.

Admiral Day, an active participant in the forum during his tenure, notes that members have participated in numerous exercises and several joint operations.

But for the United States to play a more effective role in defending its own littorals and to be more effective in the kind of multi-national collaboration which building Pacific security and providing a solid foundation for littoral defense, a key element are presence assets.

“And it’s presence, in a competitive sense, because if we are not there, someone else will be there, whether it’s the illegal fishers or whether it’s Chinese influence in the region,” said Vice Adm. Manson Brown. “We need to be very concerned about the balance of power in the neighborhood.

If you look at some of the other players that are operating in the neighborhood there is clearly an active power game going on. To keep the US presence relevant, the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutters are a core asset.

The inability to fund these and the putting in limbo of the smaller cutters, the so-called OPCs, or Offshore Patrol Cutters, underscores a central question: without effective littoral presence (for U.S. shores) how does one do security and defense in the Pacific?

The size and immensity of the Pacific means you operate with what you have; you do not have shore infrastructure easily at hand to support a ship. Ships need to be big enough to have onboard provisions and fuel, as well as aviation assets to operate over time and distance.

In short, providing for littoral defense and security on the shores of the United States requires a reaffirmation of the Coast Guard’s Title X role and ending the logjam of funding support for the cutter fleet and the service’s aviation assets which enable that fleet to have range and reach.

The featured photo shows the Chinese Navy guided-missile destroyer Xi’an (153) participates in a maritime interdiction event with the guided missile destroyer USS Stockdale (DDG 106), during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2016. Credit US Navy: July 21, 2016.