Rapid Forge Refueling At Ämari Air Base, Estonia

09/18/2019

U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Operators assess, secure, open and secure airspace for a forward arming and refueling point mission from an MC-130J Commando II to two F-35A Lightening IIs and two F-15E Strike Eagles during Operation Rapid Forge at Ämari Air Base, Estonia, July 25, 2019.

Special Tactics is a U.S. Special Operation Command’s tactical air and ground integration force, and the Air Force’s special operations ground force, leading Global Access, Precision Strike, Personnel Recovery and Battlefield Surgery operations on the battlefield. The MC-130J Commando II, and aircrew, are able to execute refueling missions in austere, sensitive or hostile territories.

The Air Force’s newest operational 5th -generation fighter, the F-35A Lightening II, provides unmatched lethality, survivability and adaptability to the warfighter.

Operation Rapid Forge involves NATO territories in order to enhance readiness and improve interoperability between U.S. allies and partners in Europe.

ÄMARI AIR BASE, ESTONIA

07.25.2019

Video by Staff Sgt. Rose Gudex

24th Special Operations Wing Public Affairs

The Coming of Triton to the Allied Global Maritime Domain Awareness Enterprise: The RAAF Case

09/17/2019

The Triton unmanned system is a key building block for 21st century maritime operations.

In effect, the Triton provides capabilities similar to a low-earth orbiting system which can serve directly the maritime task force commander.

Indeed, a key dimension of the coming of Triton is to ensure that intelligence communities not consider this their asset, but ensure that it is considered an operational asset for the fleet, and as part of the maritime domain awareness 360 degree capabilities for the fleet operating as three dimensional warriors.

After our visit to Jax Navy in 2016, we highlighted the importance of this aspect of the coming of Triton, or more accurately, of the coming of the P-8/Triton dyad to the maritime services.

Another key advantage is shaping domain knowledge of the key geographical areas where the dyad will operate.

“The Poseidon operates from 15-30,000 feet normally; the Triton will operate at 50,000 feet and take a broader view.”

The world looks differently at each altitude but by rotating crews, a unique perspective is gained by operating at the different altitudes and with different operational approaches to gain knowledge dominance.”

This is an approach for a new generation which “wants choice in their careers, rather than being locked in to a single platform.”

This is about crew resource management as well. It is abut shaping, developing and deploying the right skill to the task.

But the capabilities of the dyad are so good in terms of richness and fidelity of information there is already a tug of war between the intelligence community and the operators.

In an era of distributed lethality or distributed operations in the extended battlespace, the decision makers in the fleet, need the information to inform time-constrained decisions.

The fleet commanders need to make timely decisions; the intelligence community wishes to collect information, first, and inform decision makers later. This structural division will simply not work in the era of distributed decision-making and distributed lethality.

The information-decision cycle has to change to adapt to the technology.

“We need an effective cross-domain solution.

The huge divide between intelligence and operations has to be closed.”

Their experience is suggestive that there is a broader need for a very robust discussion on real time actionable intelligence information.

US National Command Authority enforcement of Rules of Engagement (ROE) has had a “good and other” progression over time. The “good” is thoughtful ROEs can save lives from fratricide and friendly fire while still allowing direct and indirect fires to destroy the enemy.

The “other” is what we have quipped is the new  OODA loop, an OO-L-DA loop in which  L stands lag time in combat tempo for Legal review. But after Navy Jax we came away with concern for what yet again is a roles and mission discussion on the flow of strategic and tactical “Intelligence ROE”

If not addressed and debated early, a template of actionable intelligence information going directly into IC NRO/NSA/NGO and upper echelon  commands to be analyzed and disseminated may inhibit combat effectiveness and the decisiveness need to prevail in the contested and extended battlespace.

Time sensitive intel is critical  at lower level direct action combat commanders from  the Squadron pilots,  CAG and Strike Group Commanders. The ROE in the traditional IC formula of “up and out” may not be in harmony with ever evolving speed of light sensor shooter  technological advances.

Triton is part of the reshaping of the allied maritime domain awareness enterprise as well, with the Aussies operating the aircraft along with the US Navy in the Pacific region and with the prospects for European allies already scheduled to operate P-8s to either operate the aircraft or benefit from the US Navy’s operations of the Triton in their theater of operations as well.

In a recent article by Andrew McLaughlin published on August 28, 2019, the evolution of the US Navy-RAAF partnership was underscored.

The co-operative development program between the RAAF and the US Navy to develop capabilities for the Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton unmanned maritime surveillance system is ramping up, with the placement of eight RAAF personnel with the program in the US.

The eight cooperative project personnel (CCP) have joined the program over the past 12 months following the signing of the agreement in 2018, and the Commonwealth’s commitment to acquire up to six Tritons and associated mission control stations under the Triton development, production and sustainment cooperative program.

“This cooperative program aligns with [the US DoD’s] objective to strengthen alliances that are crucial to our National Defense Strategy,” US Navy Triton program manager, Capt Dan Mackin said in a statement. “We are working together with our Australian counterparts to jointly define new capabilities that benefit both countries.”

RAAF flight test team member, SQNLDR Neale Thompson added, “It is an absolute privilege to fulfil this role, working with my US Navy colleagues to develop and test this new, unmanned platform. The dedication and ingenuity displayed by the system administrator team in this example epitomized the US Navy’s genuine commitment to integrate their cooperative partners within the Triton program.”

SQNLDR Thompson is a former AP-3C tactical coordinator (TACCO) and is a graduate of US Naval Test Pilot School, and is the first international partner to operate the Triton. His responsibilities include managing mission systems during flight, and to perform the mission systems team-lead role at the integrated test team (ITT) where he manages specialised flight test engineers and project officers.

“This is the latest important milestone for our cooperative program, which allows our test team member to be fully involved in all facets of testing,” Australian National Deputy for the Triton program, WGCDR Troy Denley said. “The cooperative program continues to mature with all CPP embedded in key roles that will help ensure the success of the program for both nations. This is due in no small part to the dedication of Triton’s international team.”

To date, two MQ-4Cs have been ordered for the RAAF, with the first system due to be delivered in 2023.

The featured photo shows former RAAF AP-3C TACCO SQNLDR Neale Thompson. Thompson is the first international partner to operate the MQ-4C Triton. (US NAVY)

Also, see the following:

Allies And The Maritime Domain Strike Enterprise

Standing up the P-8/Triton Maritime Domain Strike Enterprise in Australia: Visiting RAAF Edinburgh

The Arrival of a Maritime-Domain Awareness Strike Capability: The Impact of the P-8/Triton Dyad

Japanese Add F-35Bs to their Evolving Capabilities for Perimeter Defense

The Japanese are working to enhance their capabilities for perimeter defense.

To do so, they are adding Ospreys and F-35Bs to their force mix which will allow them to operate from sea or island bases or both in a rotational island strategy approach to defense.

In an article by Andrew McLaughlin published on August 20, 2019, the formal approval by the Japanese government was highlighted.

The Japanese Defence Ministry has announced it has received formal approval to buy 42 Lockheed martin F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variants of the JSF for operations aboard its Izumo class helicopter destroyers (DDH).

The formal announcement follows last December’s announcement of Japan’s intention to buy additional F-35As, the F-35Bs, and to convert the two Japanese maritime Self-Defense Force 27,000t Izumo DDHs to operate the STOVL aircraft. A formal proposal from the US Government was reportedly received in June.

Japanese media says an initial budget allocation for 18 F-35Bs will be made by 2023, with the additional 24 jets to follow in a subsequent budget.

The featured photo shows an F-35B Flying at Beaufort Air Show, April 2019. Credit. Second Line of Defense.

The USMC, the RAF/Royal Navy, and Singapore plus Japan are the initial operators of F-35Bs but we expect other F-35 partners to buy into the flexibility of the B.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26049/singapore-moves-closer-to-joining-what-china-calls-the-u-s-f-35-friends-circle

 

China Working on Fielding Electromagnetic Weapons: An Indian Perspective

By Debalina Ghoshal

There is no doubt that China is working on sophisticated weapon systems.

While China is modernising its nuclear forces, it is also not neglecting its conventional firepower.

For example, China is working on electromagnetic technologies with the objective of fielding electromagnetic weapons for its ground, naval forces as the initial services to do so with the Air Force to follow later as the technology evolves.

In August 2018, there were reports that China is developing an electromagnetic surface-to-surface rocket with long firing range capability. The gun when fielded would provide China greater capability in high-altitude regions like Tibet and Himalayas. Their range though not specified, is believed to be greater than the range of China’s 150kms range rocket systems providing Beijing the leverage to fire the rocket away from the plateau region.

According to reports, China’s Navy has already tested sea launched versions of the gun in 2018 and the warship mounted gun is expected to enter service in 2025. The naval gun has a range of 200kms approximately. If reports are true, China had already successfully mounted the gun on a warship in 2017 itself.

Electromagnetic catapult systems could enable the rocket to reach greater range with an increased velocity thereby further making it difficult to intercept the rocket system. Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (RAMs) are most difficult to be intercepted and high velocity would only make the task of defending against these rocket systems further difficult.

In addition, rockets can be fired in several numbers in salvos that would make interception further difficult. These guns are also cheaper than guided missiles. This is reported to enable the gun to attack targets over much broader area and can launch projectiles at hypersonic speeds. The projectile is placed on an armature between two conductive rails following which an electric charge is driven into the rails resulting in two magnetic fields form to create ‘Lorentz force’ blast.

One of the advantages of electromagnetic rocket systems is that conventional firepower uses powder and fails to sometimes perform according to expectations at high altitudes due to the lack oxygen.

Electromagnetic artillery rockets negate this disadvantage by using electromagnetic force making them suitable weapon system for mountain and plateau regions where oxygen content in the atmosphere is less. The use of electromagnetic force enables the rocket to fly smoother and hit targets more accurately.

Such a system has an advantage for airborne platforms as airborne platforms may also find it difficult to cater to enough oxygen.

Increased range of these rockets would enable aircraft carriers to remain farther from enemy targets thereby increasing their chances of survivability.

These electromagnetic rockets are also reported to be more precise and stable during launch with increased maneuverability in comparison to conventional rockets at lesser cost than conventional rockets. The electromagnetic guns can help perform missile and air defence roles, anti-invasion missions and also can attack anti-aircraft missile systems thus increasing both China’s offensive and defensive capabilities.

Also, electromagnetic catapult would allow more number of fighter jets to take off in a shorter interval of time boosting the jets’ combat capabilities. The catapult would be capable of launching heavier fixed wing planes that include airborne early warning and control aircraft that would help them gather more real time battlefield information.

Deploying the land-based version in reportedly Qinghai-Tibet plateau region would strengthen China’s conventional deterrence vis-à-vis India.

China is reported to have large areas of mountains and plateaus that could be invaded by adversaries and hence, rocket artillery would allow destruction of these forces from a considerable range with lesser involvement Chinese soldiers.

In the plateaus, temperatures are extremely low during winters and the atmosphere is thin with much low air pressure than at the sea-level. This means tail-fins could find it difficult to generate adequate force to control a conventional rocket’s position during flight affecting its precision.

India and China have had stand-offs especially as seen in the Dokhlam issue and such cases, such weapon systems would prove fruitful for China to deter India’s conventional capabilities.

Naval guns especially would be a useful conventional capability in the South China Sea as well as in the East China Sea. Such guns would also limit China’s need to forward deploy large quantities of heavy explosive tipped shells that would increase the safety of the naval vessels and reduce logistic costs.

This would allow the ships to remain at sea for longer time with lesser need for resupply and reduced burden of sea replenishment operations.

Development of electromagnetic weapon systems is challenging. China has been experiencing several failures and conducted ongoing  tests to check the credibility of the weapon system.

There is a signifiant challenge associated with electromagnetic guns, and rockets.

China would need adequate electricity and this could be a challenge for China especially when ships is on sail.

Perhaps one technology source for the electromagnetic technologies comes from a foreign acquisition.

China’s railway firm ZhouZhou CRRC Times Electric acquired the British semiconductor company Dynex Semiconductor in 2008.

The British company produced insulated-gate bipolar transistors, a component critical in railguns and catapult type technologies.

Debalina Ghoshal is Non Resident Fellow, Council on International Policy and an AsiaPacific Fellow, EastWest Institute

For the featured photo, see the following:

https://www.newsweek.com/china-secretly-building-superweapon-leaked-photos-first-hypersonic-railgun-798565

See also the following:

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-warships-to-be-equipped-with-electromagnetic-railguns-report

https://www.popsci.com/an-electromagnetic-arms-race-has-begun-china-is-making-railguns-too/

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/18119/is-this-chinese-navy-ship-equipped-with-an-experimental-electromagnetic-railgun

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-chinas-mad-scientists-plan-shock-americas-military-super-19737

2nd Brigade Combat Team Air Drop

09/16/2019

Paratroopers assigned to 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division conducted an airborne operation on Sicily Drop Zone at Fort Bragg, N.C., Aug. 7, 2019.

The 82nd Airborne Division is America’s Global Response Force and is capable of deploying forces within 18 hours of notification to conduct the full range of military operations anywhere in the world.

2BCT, 82nd Abn. Div. White Falcons Conduct Airborne Operation

NC, UNITED STATES

08.07.2019

Video by Staff Sgt. anthony johnson

2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division Public Affairs

Brazilian Foreign Minister in Washington DC, September 2019

09/14/2019

The Brazilian foreign minister recently was in Washington DC and was very visible in providing an update on what the new Brazil was seeking in its relationships with the United States, notably with the Trump impact on U.S. policies.

As Lauren Meir of The Washington Times wrote in an article published on September 11, 2019:

President Trump and Brazil’s conservative populist President Jair Bolsonaro have an opportunity to forge a new “universal insurgency,” an anti-globalist movement that stands up for those whose voices and views are not respected by traditional political forces, Brazilian Foreign Minister Ernesto Araujo said Wednesday on a visit to Washington.

Like Mr. Trump, Mr. Bolsonaro — dubbed the “Trump of the Tropics” — is given to politically incorrect statements and maximalist demands that infuriate his liberal opponents but energize his socially conservative, political base.

“Trump and Bolsonaro are a part of the same insurgency, what I would call universal insurgency against [BS],” Mr. Araujo said in an address to the Heritage Foundation.

In a speech dubbed “Brazil is Back,” the foreign minister applauded Brazilians and Americans who are “no longer buying the traditional lies of the system.” He said Brazilian voters and Mr. Trump’s “MAGA voters” have created a “revolt against ideology,” and touted Mr. Bolsonaro for being “the only political leader capable to bring the people to power.”

And in a joint press conference at the U.S. State Department, the Minister highlighted the coming of the new Brazil.

The Minister expanded on his remarks at a presentation at the Heritage Foundation during his visit as well.

The Brazilian Foreign Minister Visits Washington

For articles by Dr. Kenneth Maxwell, on the new Brazil, see the following:

Professor Kenneth Maxwell: Perspectives on Brazil and the World

Challenges for the Australian Submarine Enterprise

09/13/2019

By Marcus Hellyer

The word on the street is that the government intends to make a decision by Christmas on whether to relocate full-cycle dockings of the Collins-class submarines from Osborne in South Australia to Henderson in Western Australia.

Full-cycle dockings are the two-year-long deep overhauls that ASC conducts to prepare the boats for their next 10 years of service. They will also be the foundation of the life-of-type extension that’s intended to keep the Collins a relevant capability until its eventual retirement sometime in the 2040s.

Some in South Australia speculate that this is the result of the West Australian government working with the federal ministers for defence and defence industry—both West Australians—to ‘pinch’ work from Adelaide.

But consideration of a move predates the recent changes on the coalition government’s front bench. In March 2018, the minister for defence industry—the very South Australian Christopher Pyne—acknowledged that Defence was ‘contingency planning’ to move full-cycle dockings. And ASC’s CEO Stuart Whiley informed Senate estimates that Defence had asked ASC in December 2017 to study a potential move to Henderson. A redacted draft of the study was released under freedom of information disclosure in August last year.

The South Australian response has been fairly restrained. Like the dog that caught the car it chased, South Australia is probably wondering how it’s going to digest all of the shipbuilding work it has landed; full-cycle dockings may not be worth fighting for, particularly if moving them frees up workers in Adelaide for the building of the Attack-class submarines and the Hunter-class frigates.

Western Australia appears to have learned that bids for defence work should be couched in terms of the national interest, arguing that moving full-cycle dockings west would lead to better capability outcomes. It didn’t help its case by simultaneously releasing a reporttrumpeting the economic benefits to the state of a move. Overall, however, there’s a level of maturity across the board that accepts the decision must be based on capability.

So would moving full-cycle dockings deliver better submarine capability? There are good cases to be made both for and against moving, which I outlined last year in an ASPI special report. Overall, the core arguments come down to which location allows for best mitigation of the workforce risks associated with sustaining and upgrading the Collins at the same time as three major shipbuilding programs are ramping up (the submarines and frigates, plus the offshore patrol vessels).

But are we missing the forest for the trees? There are two bigger issues here than full-cycle dockings per se. The first is, what does Australia’s submarine enterprise look like in an era of two submarine classes? The second is, what is ASC’s role in that enterprise?

The key to the success of the get-well program for Collins sustainment that followed the Coles review was the establishment of a single Collins enterprise. All participants signed up to the required targets, and all participants’ accountabilities were clear. After a lot of hard work, the result has been that Collins availability now meets or exceeds world benchmarks.

With the establishment of the future submarine program and the selection of Naval Group as the Commonwealth’s design and build partner, the single enterprise has been blown apart. It’s not clear if there are now two separate enterprises delivering two parallel submarine capabilities, or one with multiple bedfellows thrust uncomfortably together. Either way, it’s not seamless. If anything, suggestions that the Collins’ full-cycle dockings should be moved west are a tacit admission that one part of the submarine enterprise, ASC, needs physical quarantining for its own protection.

But moving full-cycle dockings west won’t help the long-term viability of the Collins if ASC doesn’t have a clear role in the long-term submarine enterprise. For a successful capability transition, the Collins has to operate for another 25 years (table 2, page 18), and for the next 20 the navy will likely have more Collins than Attack-class boats.

But if the best ASC’s workforce can hope for is to manage the Collins’ graceful degradation as it sails slowly into the sunset, they will walk well before then. If you were a young engineer, what would you do? Join ASC to manage an ageing submarine into oblivion? Or join Naval Group to design, build and potentially sustain the navy’s future capability? Our submarine capability could evaporate through loss of Collins engineering expertise well before any meaningful quantity of Attack submarines are delivered.

Rather than the current laissez-faire approach, the government could decide that the long-term sustainment, including full-cycle dockings and upgrades, of all of Australia’s submarines will be conducted by ASC, an Australian-government-owned entity that has shown itself capable of world’s best practice in submarine sustainment. That would necessarily include the Attack class.

The decision would give ASC’s workforce (both existing and yet to be recruited) certainty about their future and allow the enterprise to manage a planned workforce transition.

For ASC to sustain the Attack class successfully, it would need to understand its design philosophy. That means ASC would need to be meaningfully incorporated into Naval Group’s design and build processes. But ASC would give at least as much as it gets.

It’s often stated that a key lesson from the Collins program is that submarines need to be designed for sovereign sustainment. Injecting ASC’s hard-won knowledge in sustaining Australian submarines in Australian operating conditions into the design of the Attack class seems essential. Yet three and a half years after the selection of Naval Group, the one entity that understands the sustainment of Australian submarines still has no formal role in the design and build of the Attack class.

The government has repeatedly emphasised its requirement for a sovereign submarine capability. ASC now sources around 90% of Collins components locally. That approach should be incorporated into the Attack-class program, to maximise both sovereign capability and Australian industry capability.

Planning for the Collins life-of-type extension, or LOTE, has started. Incorporating Attack-class components such as diesel engines or photonic periscopes into the Collins as part of the LOTE offers the potential to de-risk the build of the future submarine, enhance Collins’ capability, and provide commonality of systems across the enterprise to ease the transition. It’s hard to see how this can work effectively without a formal partnership of some kind between ASC and Naval Group.

Going purely by the Collins schedule (table 2, page 18), one could argue that if full-cycle dockings are going to move west, a decision is needed now—the first Collins full-cycle docking incorporating a LOTE is due to start in 2026. Ideally, you wouldn’t want the first full-cycle docking in the west to be something that complex, so the last ‘regular’ full-cycle docking, starting in 2024, would be the one to aim for. Four years isn’t that much time in light of the need to build a new workforce if the work does move west.

But a decision purely on full-cycle dockings without addressing the broader issue of the future of ASC potentially creates more risk than it retires. Australian workers generally don’t move. So ASC’s existing workforce is unlikely to move to Western Australia. While the blue-collar workforce could potentially be rebuilt in the west on the foundation of the team already performing mid-cycle dockings there, ASC’s engineering workforce couldn’t be rebuilt there from scratch. Faced with the prospect of somehow working on the Collins submarine more than 2,000 kilometres away and an uncertain long-term future, ASC’s experienced engineers may simply elect to walk across to the other side of Osborne shipyard to work on the Attack class. That would put the viability of a further 25 years of Collins service in a dire position.

At the core of the government’s defence industry policy is the concept of industry as a fundamental input into capability. This is a powerful tool that allows, and indeed requires, Defence to shape the industrial landscape to ensure Australia has the industrial capability the defence force needs. The alternative is to simply hope that when the time comes, industry will somehow deliver. But hope is not a strategy.

Marcus Hellyer is ASPI’s senior analyst for defence economics and capability.

This was published by ASPI on September 5, 2019.

The featured photo shows the Royal Australian Navy Collins Class Submarine HMAS Sheean at sunset during a routine transit and training exercise off Christmas Island.

VMM-163 in the Gulf

U.S. Marines with  Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 163 (Reinforced), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), conduct aircraft maintenance aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4). The Boxer Amphibious Ready Group and the 11th MEU are deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and the Pacific through the western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points.

ARABIAN SEA

11.06.2018

Video by Lance Cpl. Dalton Swanbeck

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit