10th Mountain Division and Multi-domain Operations

03/14/2025

The 10th Mountain Division (LI) hosted Summit Strike 2024, Nov. 19-21, with the intent to seamlessly integrate fires; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); and multi-domain operations (MDO) assets by partnering with other countries, military branches, and multiple industry partners to defeat adversaries, while showcasing Fort Drum as the premier training and force development hub in the Northeast.

“It is our sacred obligation to fight and win our nation’s wars,” said Maj. Gen. Scott Naumann, the 10th Mountain Division (LI) and Fort Drum commander. “Summit Strike provides the 10th Mountain Division the opportunity to hone the skills our warfighters need to accomplish this. Through this multi-domain training exercise, we are able to learn, refine requirements, and develop innovative solutions to fight a near-peer enemy with successive iterations of live, multi-domain training.”

Summit Strike ’24 validated the division’s ability to integrate surface-to-surface, rotary-wing, and fixed-wing weapon systems, enhancing its lethality. The exercise solidified Fort Drum’s position as a premier training and force development hub, showcasing its ability to integrate emerging technology and systems into range operations.

FORT DRUM, NEW YORK

11.21.2024

Video by Spc. Mason Nichols 

27th Public Affairs Detachment

10th Mountain Division hosts Summit Strike 2024

03/12/2025

The 10th Mountain Division (LI) hosted Summit Strike 2024, Nov. 19-21, with the intent to seamlessly integrate fires; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); and multi-domain operations (MDO) assets by partnering with other countries, military branches, and multiple industry partners to defeat adversaries, while showcasing Fort Drum as the premier training and force development hub in the Northeast.

FORT DRUM, NEW YORK

11.20.2024

Video by Spc. Mason Nichols 

27th Public Affairs Detachment

Perspectives on European Defense Industry: A March 2025 Update

03/11/2025

By Pierre Tran

Saint Cloud, France – Thales and Dassault Aviation reported respectively March 4 and 5 buoyant 2024 financial results, as European political leaders sought to raise €800 billion ($869 billion) to rearm in response to what they saw as the U.S. turning away from Europe, with Washington leaning on Kyiv to yield ground to Moscow.

The share price of those two French companies were among those of arms manufacturers, including BAE Systems, Leonardo, and Rheinmetall, which soared March 3, in response to European pledges of boosting military spending.

A tense climate between the U.S. president, Donald Trump, and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, could be seen with the former suspending arms shipments to Kyiv, to put pressure on the latter to reach a settlement with Russia.

Dassault Aviation, a builder of fighters and business jets, reported 2024 adjusted net profit of €1.1 billion, up 19.2 percent from a year ago. That was a net profit margin of 17 percent.

Asked about U.S. suspension of military aid to Ukraine, the Dassault executive chairman said the matter was in the hands of European governments.

“I have no reply to that,” said Eric Trappier. “This is a matter for the state.

“The reply is really from the European nations, and French policy. The scale of support needed to substitute for American aid is high, and the decision is to be taken by the European nations.”

Trappier was speaking at a news conference on the 2024 results. The company held the news conference on its barge, The Talisman, moored on the banks of the river Seine, at Saint Cloud, the smart suburbs of the capital.

Time to Buy European

On the sidelines of the news conference, Trappier said it was time for European nations to switch procurement to European weapons away from the U.S.

“What I would like to see is the European governments favor European industry, in the present context,” he said. “I have said that for 30 years – I am not happy to say we were perhaps right – it is another context. Remember what General de Gaulle said at the time – we are in the alliance, we are allied to the United States, but be careful not to put all your eggs in the one basket.”

France had followed that Gaullist approach and built a domestic defense industry which had developed and supplied aircraft, submarines, and onboard electronics, he said. That had allowed  development of French kit, and not to depend exclusively on the United States for defense.

“Which is not to say we are outside the alliance,” he said.

Trappier welcomed the Berlin announcement of a large increase in defense spending, in response to the chill in transatlantic relations ushered in by the Trump administration.

“Germany realized that they have to invest in defence,” he said.

The European Commission should bolster the defence industry with the use of European funds, he said, with the money spent equitably across the European defence industry.

“I was pleading for the cause of European defence back in 2000,” he said.

Previously, leaders in the European Union kept their distance from a constant call from French president Emmanuel Macron for a European strategic autonomy, but there now appeared to be wider support for a military capability on the Continent, separate from Washington.

The European Commission has proposed a €150 billion fund to lend to member nations as part of an €800 billion package for rearming their services.

Faster Build

Dassault was now building three Rafale a month, Trappier said, and was looking at increasing to four, and perhaps five, but only if that production rate could be maintained over a period of time, not for just a year or two.

An Indian order for 26 Rafales for the navy was “programmed,” he said, and “discussions,” have begun with Saudi Arabia for sale of the twin-engined fighter.

The 80 Rafale ordered by the United Arab Emirates will be delivered in the F4 version, he said, “and they envisage the F5” at a later date.

There was an operational autonomy for client nations in the use of French-built fighters, he said. Since the 1950s, there has been a “good track record,” he said, as France has not imposed a “geopolitical framework” for use of those fighters by nations such as India and the Middle East client nations.

They are allies which will have signed defense or strategic agreements, but they enjoy autonomy, he said.

There were difficulties in the French supply chain, and companies were capable of responding, but not with immediate response, he said. Companies were on a long cycle.

Previously, industry had been told to structure itself to build one fighter a month, he said. As there lacked sales in the export market, fewer than one fighter a month was built, as was the case back in 2020, he said.

Production has changed with export wins, and industry has increased fighter production, he said, but it took time to recruit qualified staff and re-train them, and build hangers. The supply chain had to do the same, he said.

“It takes time,” he said, maybe two or three years.

Volatile Share Markets

Asked about the rise in share price of arms companies he said stock price movements were “very circumstantial” – things can change in very little time. Stock prices were sensitive to factors as such trade tariff increases, commercial instability,  and worries on the stock market.

On the other hand, there was opportunity for companies with defense capabilities, he said. In France, Dassault and Thales were two companies with fairly autonomous capability. That was effectively the Dassault group, as Thales is part of the “logic” of the Dassault group, he said.

Trappier in January succeeded Charles Edelstenne as chair of the supervisory board of Groupe Industriel Marcel Dassault (GIMD), the family-held holding company which oversees Dassault Aviation. Edelstenne was previously executive chair of the fighter company. He launched Dassault Systèmes, which builds computer-aided design and manufacturing computer systems.

Edelstenne was appointed honorary chair of the holding company.

Dassault holds 26.6 percent of Thales, which contributed €507 million net profit, up from €453 million. That delivered an adjusted consolidated net margin of 17 percent, down from 18.5 percent, due to the lower weight of net financial income and a contribution from Thales.

Dassault’s capacity to lift the production rate of the Rafale caught the attention of Agency Partners, an equity research firm.

“We were particularly interested that Dassault is not only now apparently comfortable moving to building 4 aircraft per month, but could, especially in the event of another significant order from France, envisage 5pm in the early 2030s. And, on top of that, an Indian assembly line could add another 2-3 aircraft to the rate,” the research note on Dassault said.

There was another striking factor, with Dassault’s “offer” of the Rafale as a “nuclear-capable aircraft in the event that the US withdraws its own nuclear bombs and/or reduces support for European F-35s,” the note said. Such an offer could only be made with the approval of the French government, the note said.

There was also rising awareness of a need for European air forces to diversify fighter fleets, dependent on the F-35, with a second, European-sourced fighter, the note said.

Such military procurement could be easier as European military budgets were due to rise to three percent of GDP, and beyond that for some nations, the note said.

Thales Eyes Long Program Times

The British prime minister, Keir Starma, said March 2 the U.K. would support a £1.66 billion ($2.1 billion) deal to supply a further 5,000 lightweight multirole missiles (LMM) to Ukraine. The Thales U.K. unit builds the LMM weapon in Belfast, Northern Ireland.

Ukraine was of little “consequence” for orders for Thales in 2025 and 2026, Thales executive chairman Patrice Caine told a news conference, when asked how he saw the suspension of American military kit for Ukraine.

Caine was speaking on the 2024 results at offices just a short walk from the Arc de Triomphe,  a Napoleonic tribute to the French military, and the resting place of the unknown soldier.

The Thales order book was “very large,” he said, and orders for Ukraine were “not material” for the group. The company had limited exposure to Ukraine, with orders for Kyiv accounting for less than one percent of the group’s orders, he said.

Australia, France, and the U.K. were the core markets, with the company not dependent on just one nation in the world market, he said.

The company seeks to maintain its book-to-bill ratio above 1, stacking up orders to sales.

Thales’ business cycle ran five, six, or 10 years, he said, with the long cycles tied to multi-year military budget laws, which offered decades of “strong growth.”

There has been little growth in markets in Europe for the company, apart from Britain and France, he said. Growth came from the Middle East, Asia, and Southeast Asia, with some nations keeping up a steady development path. Client nations such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, India, and Indonesia were investing, he said.

“Europe has rediscovered a certain reality,” he said.

France and the U.K. are leading efforts to form a “coalition of the willing” to back Ukraine, with formation of a European peacekeeping force if Kyiv and Moscow agree a ceasefire.

If French and British troops were deployed to Ukraine as peacekeepers, “it would be hard for Merz to stay out,” a researcher from the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank, said March 3 at an informal discussion of the German election results.

That was a reference to Friedrich Merz, leader of the CDU conservative party,  expected to be the next chancellor of Germany.

There were political announcements, and there was converting announcement into orders, which gave “long-term visibility,” Caine said. There was a “translation” of increasing defense spending to two percent – or three or 3.5 pct – of gross domestic product.

That would have medium and long-term effect, but it would not change 2025 company results, he said. Growth came from execution of orders. A valuation was not just for 10 years, but for “a generation,” and it did not just come from Ukraine.

A company could invest in plant, and speed up production, once an order was signed and the equipment developed, he said. Development took time for kit such as radar and sonar.

Higher Output

One of the priorities for 2025 was boosting production, he said, which included tripling onboard systems for the Rafale fighter, notably the radars; tripling output of the Ground Master radar; quadrupling missiles and rockets, dubbed “effectors”; and also tripling satellite communications and kit for cockpits.

The company’s shareholder base was around two thirds in North America and the U.K., with a third in France, Caine said. That trend was likely to continue.

The U.S market for inflight entertainment, military kit, cybersecurity, and ID products  generated some 500 million, he said, which meant the company was “below the radar” in the expected transatlantic tariff war.

Thales reported 2024 adjusted operating profit of €2.4 billion, up 5.7 pct on a like-for-like basis, on sales of €20.6 billion, up 8.3 pct.

The electronics company reported a six percent rise in orders to €25 billion, with a five percent gain in orders for its defense sector to €14.7 billion, which was a record for that segment, the company said in a statement with results. Those orders took the defense order book to a record €39 billion, up 12 pct, the equivalent of 3.6 years of sales, Thales said.

Thales reported 9.6 pct growth in orders from emerging markets, worth €4.3 billion. Orders rose 7.9 pct from mature markets to €16.3 billion.

“The record order book provides unprecedented visibility for all our activities,” Caine said, forecasting “accelerated, profitable and sustainable growth over the coming years, starting in 2025.”

On the U.K. ’s £1.66 billion deal for LMM for Ukraine, that was “the largest contract ever received by Thales in Belfast and the second largest MoD has placed with Thales,” the U.K. ministry of defense said in a March 2 statement.

That large deal followed a £162 million contract signed September 2024 for 650 LMM, the ministry said, with the first batch of that September order shipped before last Christmas.

“This new contract will continue deliveries,” the ministry said March 2. That LLM order will create 200 new jobs, while supporting 700 current positions.  Thales Northern Ireland will deliver on the contract, worth an initial £1.16 billion, with a prospective further £500 million order, the MoD said. The Thales U.K. unit will work with a Ukrainian industry partner, which will build launchers, and command and control vehicles for the missiles in Ukraine.

That March 2 announcement of missiles draws down on the U.K.’s £3 billion a year financial package for Ukraine. The September 2024 order was mainly funded from that £3 billion package, with contributions from Norway through the International Fund for Ukraine, the MoD said.

Thales supplies the active electronically scanned array (AESA) RBE2 radar for the Rafale, which is being upgraded to the Mk 4.1 standard.

Ukraine said March 7 the Ukrainian air force flew Mirage 2000 and F-16 fighters to hit Russian cruise missiles, marking the first announcement of use in combat of the French-built fighter.

France announced March 6 the launch of its Composante Spatiale Optique-3 (CSO-3) military spy satellite on the new Ariane 6 rocket, from the Kourou space center, French Guiana. That was the third and last satellite in the MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging System) program.

“It illustrates the ambition of the (military budget law) to maintain and strengthen the national capability on the mastery of space,” the armed forces ministry said in a statement.

Berlin and the European Way

Meanwhile in Berlin, Friedrich Merz, a former lawyer, has called for talks with London and Paris to explore putting Europe under a European nuclear umbrella, in case the Trump administration pulls out of the Nato alliance.

Merz has also called for increased German spending on military and infrastructure, funded by an easing of the “debt brake” written into the German constitution to avoid over-borrowing by the state.

The Green party has resisted Merz’s bid to boost the nation’s debt, but was ready to support moves to strengthen the military and stimulate economic growth, Reuters reported March 10.

A detailed think tank report on the European call to arms sets out the delicate task at hand.

“The European defense industry finds itself at the center of forces both centrifugal and centripetal, a perilous situation which makes it all the more urgent for the agreement of European states on common aims on equipment and industrial ambitions, under the threat of future consolidation moves pursued purely out of national pressure or influenced by factors outside Europe,” said a report titled European Re-armament: Defense Industry on the Precipice, from the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS).

Credit graphic: ID 157491362 | European © Ahmet Yamak | Dreamstime.com

A Tiltrotor Enterprise: From Iraq to the Future

03/10/2025

We have published a new book in our airpower and naval modernization series. This book focuses on the Osprey and its evolution since 2007.

As the United States faces a global overload of strategic challenges and the concomitant challenge of shaping an effective and capable force to deal with these challenges but having serious budget stringencies, leveraging the unique capabilities which the United States already possesses is crucial.

Whether it be the Aegis global enterprise, or the F-35 global enterprise or the tiltrotor enterprise, the United States has shaped unique warfighting capabilities which it can leverage as it shapes effective forces moving forward for todays and tomorrow’s challenges.

This is a story of a unique capability which has reshaped the USMC in ways that are unimaginable without it. It has given the USAF special operational capabilities and now the U.S. Navy will experience a very different capability and approach to sustaining its distributed fleet.

As the U.S. Army focuses on how to distribute its force, the new tiltrotor capability will become a backbone for an effort to leverage speed and range which no rotorcraft possesses.

And has LtGen (Retired) Karsten Heckl concluded in his forward to the book:

“Over the years, as I’ve conducted interviews and had discussions with Dr. Laird, it occurred to me, how did an aircraft with the ability to carry our nation’s sons and daughters into and out of harm’s way, farther, faster, and at lower risk, somehow become maligned as an example of government waste and come under unprecedented, if not absolute irrational scrutiny, despite a safety record that previous rotor craft could only dream of?

“Dr. Laird has been interested in my perspective, is because I had a front row seat to this constant mismatch between rhetoric and reality that has taken place over the last two decades.

“Dr. Laird has done an incredible job capturing the reality, the true story of the MV-22 Osprey…an assault support aircraft without comparison, and I highly commend this book.”

The timeline of operational development since the introduction of the MV-22 in 2007 in Iraq has seen the expansion of the concept of operations of the USMC as the aircraft numbers and use multiplied over the past decade and a half.

The learning curve of the USMC and the evolution of industrial support and engineering capabilities for the platform have shaped new ways to use the aircraft for distributed operations across the spectrum of warfare.

And the creation of a core industrial capability to shape the drive forward in tiltrotor evolution coupled with the innovations of the Marines, the Air Force and the Navy in using the aircraft have created a unique tiltrotor enterprise.

How did we get here?

And what is the path forward?

And how might the U.S. military leverage this unique capability moving forward to deal with strategic challenges they face in global operations?

And how has the payload revolution which has enabled a kill web transformed the Osprey into a multi-domain warfighting capability as well?

This book tells the story of the evolution of the tiltrotor aircraft from the time of its introduction into combat in Iraq in 2007 and begin the story of the development of the new variant of the aircraft being designed by Bell and the U.S. Army.

In addition to this volume, a second companion volume will be published 15 September 2025 to provide additional interviews with warfighters and industry which enhance the argument made in this book. In addition, there are insightful essays for analysts and practitioners of the tiltrotor art.

The two volumes together form a more complete sense of the experience generated by the tiltrotor enterprise.

 

General Support Aviation Battalion FARP Training

U.S. Army 3-82 General Support Aviation Battalion, 82nd Combat Aviation Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division conducted an aerial gunnery table in conjunction with a forward-arming refuel point exercise at Marine Corps Outlying Field Atlantic, North Carolina, Nov. 15, 2024.

MCOLF Atlantic is an active outlying landing field operated by Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point to assist operational training in urban environments. With operating units ranging from local law enforcement to sister service branches across the Department of Defense, Cherry Point’s outlying fields serve a vital role in ensuring its users are prepared to meet and defeat a wide array of threats.

NORTH CAROLINA

11.15.2024

Video by Lance Cpl. Casey Ornelas 

Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point

Building Blocks for the USMC Force Distribution Approach

03/09/2025

By Robbin Laird

The Marines like the other services in the U.S. military have been focusing on how to distribute their forces for both their core missions and in support of joint and coalition operations.

Force distribution has been necessitated by the growth of precision strike available to both peer competitors and non-state groups or small states which can act by leveraging elements of such capability when the Marines carry out a core mission as a 911 force.

What the Houthi’s demonstrated in the Red Sea affects the use of force by the United States in acting in a crisis affects force building calculations as well as operating against a peer competitor.

And never forget that war in Vietnam: a non-peer competitor can access with the add of a peer competitor their weapons. So don’t just focus on core capabilities of the peer competitor without forgetting the reality of weapons transfer.

As the nation’s 911 force, the Marines need to be ready to deliver an integrated force to a crisis point to be able to insert force. This is after all, why the Marines have a unique integrated air capability to work with its Ground Combat Element and able to operate without a capital ship. This is why they have modern fast jets as a key element of how they insert force. The U.S. Army does not have fast jets; the USMC does. This means that the Marines can respond to a crisis rapidly with a coherent integrated force capability.

But to do so in evolving combat conditions means that they have to build in some of the skill sets essential for force distribution, such as having effective local area C2 and ISR baked into the force, and to lower signature management.

This 911 capability inherently requires a mobile agile force capability whether coming from land or sea. Often a 911 intervention in fact relies on mobile basing skills.

In other words, force distribution skill sets are drawn upon even when delivering a larger integrated USMC force or a MAGTF to a crisis management event.

Under Commandant Berger, the Marines began to emphasize the need to build skill sets which allowed the Marines to work in a certain way with the joint force, prioritizing their maritime role, and doing so in terms of being able to project power into the weapons engagement zone of the enemy and to operate as an inside force.

But of course, one could operate as an inside force in terms of Marines or working with the joint force or the coalition force.

For example, when looking at how the Marines can operate in the Nordics, the Marines can work on how to embed themselves in the Nordic region whereby the Nordics are the “inside force” to use the language of the USMC force design effort.

What the Marines are doing, in effect, is taking their long history of working mobile basing, and developing new tools and new approaches to shaping a way ahead to build more agile, and dispersed elements of delivering a mobile basing capability. And to do so, they are evolving the ecosystem to leverage their operation from sea bases and using their integrated air capability to do so.

But such a tool set needs to operate for a tactical purpose within an overall strategic scheme. It is a means to an end; it is not an end in itself.

In other words, the Marine Corps effort to be able to operate in terms of an EABO or Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations needs to be part of a larger tactical whole in terms of either a USMC force insertion or of a joint force or of a coalition force. And to do so, the Marines are shaping their ecosystem for force distribution to be able to do so.

EABOs are extensively exercised by the Marines. For example at MAWTS-1, the premier training center for the Marines, EABOs are a central piece of the capability being developed by the Marines in shaping their force development.

For example, in an interview I did at MAWTS-1 with the then CO of MAWTS-1, Col Purcell, he highlighted the focus on EABOs but cautioned that this was a tool within an approach not an end in itself.

Col Purcell talked about the changes that have occurred since taking command. He underscored that one major change has been working in maritime strike packages into the force as well as enabling the ability to do EABOs or Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.

But he made it clear that EABOs are not an end of themselves: what combat purpose do they meet and how do they make for a more effective force in particular missions?

This is how he put it: “The ability to conduct expeditionary advanced bases, that’s a capability that’s going to enable something else. It is not a mission of itself. EABOs are what we do in an operational area to project lethality and to project our power and delivering capability to deter an enemy. It has to be about the ability to integrate all six functions of marine aviation in support of a larger mission.”

The Marines have worked Forward Arming Refueling Points for some time and are now transitioning those skills into EABO capabilities. In other words. the Marines have been working new ways to do FARPs as a way to do EABOs, but there are key limitations to what one can do in the real world.

  • And ultimately, the key combat question can be put simply: What combat effect can you create with an EABO?
  • How does the joint force use an EABO in creating a joint effect?
  • And what is the relationship of the creation of EABOs to what the Marines do when the National Command Authority calls on them to deploy?

This can be put another way as well. In 2022, I published a report on the Marines and mobile basing and in that report I highlighted an interview with an especially insightful Marine Corps leader which focused on the key question: what is the mobile base for and for how long is it need to play the designated tactical role within a strategic context?

In a 2020 interview with then Maj Steve Bancroft, Aviation Ground Support (AGS) Department Head, MAWTS-1, he highlighted a key aspect of force distribution:

In this discussion it was very clear that the rethinking of how to do FARPs was part of a much broader shift in in combat architecture designed to enable the USMC to contribute more effectively to blue water expeditionary operations.

The focus is not just on establishing FARPs, but to do them more rapidly, and to move them around the chess board of a blue water expeditionary space more rapidly. FARPs become not simply mobile assets, but chess pieces on a dynamic air-sea-ground expeditionary battlespace in the maritime environment.

Given this shift, Major Bancroft made the case that the AGS capability should become the seventh key function of USMC Aviation.

Currently, the six key functions of USMC Aviation are: offensive air support, anti-air warfare, assault support, air reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. Bancroft argued that the Marine Corps capability to provide for expeditionary basing was a core competence which the Marines brought to the joint force and that its value was going up as the other services recognized the importance of basing flexibility,

But even though a key contribution, AGS was still too much of a pick-up effort.  AGS consists of 78 MOSs or Military Operational Specialties which means that when these Marines come to MAWTS-1 for a WTI, that they come together to work how to deliver the FARP capability.

As Major Bancroft highlighted: The Marine Wing Support Squadron is the broadest unit in the Marine Corps. When the students come to WTI, they will know a portion of aviation ground support, so the vast majority are coming and learning brand new skill sets, which they did not know that the Marine Corps has. They come to learn new functions and new skill sets.

His point was rather clear: if the Marines are going to emphasize mobile and expeditionary basing, and to do so in new ways, it would be important to change this approach. Major Bancroft added: I think aviation ground support, specifically FARP-ing, is one of the most unique functions the Marine Corps can provide to the broader military.

He underscored how he thought this skill set was becoming more important as well. With regard to expeditionary basing, we need to have speed, accuracy and professionalism to deliver the kind of basing in support for the Naval task force afloat or ashore.

With the USMC developing the combat architecture for expeditionary base operations, distributed maritime operations, littoral operations in a contested environment and distributed takeoff-vertical landing operations, reworking how to execute FARP operations is a key aspect. FARPs in the evolving combat architecture need to be rapidly deployable, highly mobile, maintain a small footprint and emit at a low signature.

While being able to operate independently they need to be capable of responding to dynamic tasking within a naval campaign. They need to be configured and operate within an integrated distributed force which means that the C2 side of all of this is a major challenge to ensure it can operate in a low signature environment but reach back to capabilities which the FARP can support and be enabled by.

This means that one is shaping a spectrum of FARP capability as well, ranging from light to medium to heavy in terms of capability to support and be supported. At the low end or light end of the scale one would create an air point, which is an expeditionary base expected to operate for up to 72 hours at that air point. If the decision is made to keep that FARP there longer, an augmentation force would be provided and that would then become an air site.

Underlying the entire capability to provide for a FARP clearly is airlift, which means that the Ospreys, the Venoms, the CH-53s and the KC130Js provide a key thread through delivering FARPs to enable expeditionary basing.

This is why the question of airlift becomes a key one for the new combat architecture as well. And as well, reimagining how to use the amphibious fleet as lilly pads in blue water operations is a key part of this effort as well.

Then during my 2023 visit to MAWTS-1, I discussed the evolution of the USMC approach with Col Purcell as follows:

As the Marines operate Ospreys. F-35s and now CH-53Ks, the Marines are bringing significantly capability to the evolving mobile basing function.

Mobile basing is playing a central role in the current phase of USMC transformation.

Col Purcell put it succinctly: “We are taking capability which we have had for some time, but focused on how we can move more rapidly from mobile base to mobile base. We have to find ways to make mobile bases, smaller, more distributed and persist for shorter periods of time”.

Another key aspect is that what has been a core competence of the USMC now is becoming a key capability for the wider joint and coalition force.

Col Purcell put it this way:”I think the challenge for all the forces, whether it’s the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the coalition forces is that the sustainment of distributed forces is challenging. How do we adapt our maintenance, logistical and sustainment systems that have been used to operating from austere bases, but now enhance the mobility of those austere bases?”

The type model and series of USMC aircraft are embedded in the USMC thinking about mobile basing.

But as Purcell put it: “We have to find ways to make mobile bases, smaller, more distributed and persist for shorter periods of time”.

What is necessary to be able do so, and how to do it, is a key focus of the way ahead.

This means adapting effectively to the payload revolution and the ability to deliver maritime effects via use of autonomous systems working with the manned force.  Rather than thinking in terms of manned-unmanned teaming, the reality is creating a capability to deliver combined arms effects or alternatively combined effects. Or it might be put this way: With the integrated distributed force, the Marines are leveraging their core assets configured differently with the addition of new technology — including autonomous systems — enabling further evolution of the desired concept of operations approach,

In short, as I argued in a discussion with LtGen (Retired) Heckl in an interview with him earlier this year:

“Clearly Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) understood in terms of distributing capital ships is very important in shaping an effective way ahead, but DMO understood in terms of delivering distributed maritime effects is clearly of growing importance given technological developments and given the shortfall in legacy shipbuilding approaches.

“DMO in terms of delivering distributed maritime effects is where EABO is best understood. In shaping a way ahead for EABO the air platforms available to the USMC coupled with innovations in autonomous or manned maritime platforms create a clear path to shift from the legacy ship building approach.

“In a DMO effects approach one is focused on combat clusters whereby each asset is interactive with other members of the combat cluster and will NOT have the full gamut of capabilities which a maritime task force member would have in terms of organic defensive and offensive capabilities.”

In my view, what the Marines are shaping are capabilities that can contribute both to empowering DMO but shaping a wide range of innovative ways to deliver distributed maritime effects as well — with the same technology but configured to specific mission sets.

A local area commander will need to master both in shaping an effective combat approach dealing with an adversary, whether peer or local group tapping peer competitor capability.

And the Marines uniquely are shaping their force going forward in both approaches.

Note: All quotes are taken from our recent MAWTS-1 book.

Drones Calling for Artillery Fire

03/07/2025

The capabilities of the 166th Regiment – Regional Training Institute’s 1st and 2nd Battalions melded during a unique artillery live-fire training exercise at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. Nov. 15, 2024.

During the exercise, several models of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS), more commonly known as drones, were used to acquire data of targets to be engaged with artillery fire. This data was used to submit a call for fire to instructors and students with 2nd Battalion, who engaged identified targets with artillery fire using M119, M777, and M109A6 howitzers.

FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PENNSYLVANIA

11.22.2024

Video by Sgt. 1st Class Shane Smith 

166th Regiment – Regional Training Institute

Defense of Europe: “Tomorrow’s Solutions are No Longer Yesterday’s Habits.”

03/06/2025

By Murielle Delaporte

President Macron’s address to the French on March 5, 2025[1] echoes the speeches of his predecessors, who tirelessly fought for an autonomous and sovereign defense, or at least the most sovereign defense possible in view of global economic constraints and realities.

General de Gaulle’s vision of a strong defense industrial base and nuclear deterrence enabling us to hold our head high in the post-war decades is an opportunity today, even if the dividends of peace have somewhat weakened it.

But the legacy and the spirit have always prevailed, whether in the pursuit of our comprehensive army model enabling us to be present in external theatres and be respected there, or in being pioneers in Europe in the development of a cyber strategy or a space defence strategy, new battlefield fields unfortunately confirmed for the 21st century.

The post-war reshuffle, which is currently underway and has been going on for a number of years now, is also in line with NATO’s enlargement from 12 to 32 members between 1949 and 2024[2], on the one hand, and the rise of China, whose rearmament is a cause for concern in Washington[3], on the other.

Rather than talking about a transatlantic rift, such as the “excessive warmongers” and “excessive defeatists” – to use the expression of President Macron in his speech – tends to depict the current situation, it seems more realistic to talk about a readjustment of the sharing of burdens and responsibilities within an Atlantic Alliance that still has its say.

This is what has been desired on both sides of the Atlantic for decades – in any case in France constantly and in the United States more sporadically depending on the different presidents from Kennedy to Trump today.

The overall objectives are therefore now aligned so that the American contribution to NATO, currently estimated at around 64% of the total budget, can be partly redirected to face other threats – just as real – on its western front[4] and a true European defense can emerge.

As for the nature of Washington’s support for Ukraine, it is still too early to know what will happen – in one direction or another – at the end of the peace negotiations with Moscow and depending on how they progress, if they are confirmed.

What we must remember, however, are the ups and downs that have regularly punctuated the history of NATO and especially Franco-American relations since the post-war period: the current disagreements over Ukraine are in many ways similar to the Suez crisis, the reaction of the Americans during our wars of decolonization (Indochina and Algeria), or more recently the Euromissiles crisis under the Reagan administration (a de facto president as hated and booed by the media of the time as Donald Trump is today)[5], or even the differences between the two nations over the war in Iraq.

Americans and Europeans are different and have the right to disagree on everything, but that does not mean an all-or-nothing policy. Only their common enemies have an interest in a decoupling between Allies who were celebrating their 75th anniversary a few months ago and who have gone through many similar crises year in and year out since the end of the Second World War.

Let’s keep our fingers crossed that the same will be true today and that this transition towards a rebalancing of NATO will take place in a harmonious and natural way.

Notes and references:

[1] https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-24161-fr.pdf

[2] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm

[3] See for example on this subject: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/05/asian-defence-spending-grows-chinas-grows-more/; or the Pentagon analysis >>> https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF

[4] https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-fr.pdf ; see also: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-fr.pdf

[5] See: Murielle Delaporte, La politique étrangère depuis 1945 : l’Amérique à la croisée de l’Histoire, pages 67 to 79 in particular >>> https://www.fnac. com/a147470/Murielle-Delaporte-La-politique-etrangere-americaine-depuis-1945-l-Amerique-a-la-croisee-de-l-histoire – or the PDF extract >>> Extract pages 67 to 71 La politique etrangere americaine depuis 1945 DELAPORTE

This was published on 6 March 2025 in French on Operationnels.