A U.S. Air Force C-130J Super Hercules offloads cargo in support of exercise Resolute Force Pacific 2025 at Misawa Air Base, Japan, July 10, 2025.
By linking bases across the Indo-Pacific, the exercise validates expeditionary operations and the seamless movement of aircraft, cargo and personnel.
MISAWA AB, AOMORI, JAPAN
07.09.2025
35th Fighter Wing
By Robbin Laird
In 2021, my book entitled Training for the High-End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s was published.
I am starting a series of article re-engaging on this critical issue in the run up to my visit this Fall to the Italian International Flight Training School where there will be a great opportunity to look at one of the leading Western air forces addressing this challenge.
In this article, I want to revisit the argument presented in that book as my base line, so let me begin:
The fighter pilot climbing into an F-35C today faces a fundamentally different challenge than their predecessor from the Iraq War. Instead of operating as part of a traditional strike package with clearly defined roles, they must think and fight as a node in a vast, interconnected web of sensors, shooters, and decision-makers spanning multiple domains and services.
This shift from platform-centric warfare to network-enabled operations represents one of the most significant transformations in military thinking since the advent of combined arms warfare and it’s forcing a complete reimagining of how America trains its warriors.
The end of the “land wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan has coincided with the rise of peer competitors possessing sophisticated anti-access capabilities and advanced military technologies. This strategic shift demands “full spectrum crisis management” or the ability to seamlessly scale from peacetime presence operations to high-intensity conflict while maintaining precise control over escalation dynamics.
“We only win if we fight as an interoperable, networked, and distributed force,” explains Captain McCoy, Chief of Staff for the Navy Air Boss, reflecting on the challenge facing naval aviation. “We must embrace what is new and redefine what is basic warfighting capability.”
This transformation centers on the evolution from “kill chains” to “kill webs.” Traditional kill chains follow a linear progression: find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess.
But in contested environments against capable adversaries, this sequential approach proves too rigid and vulnerable. Kill webs, by contrast, create multiple pathways to achieve effects, with any sensor potentially informing any shooter across the joint force.
The introduction of fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 has accelerated this transformation. These aircraft aren’t just more capable platforms, they’re information nodes that fundamentally change how air power operates. As Rear Admiral Brophy of the Naval Air Warfare Development Center (NAWDC) notes, “A distributed fleet without integratability delivered by interactive kill webs would weaken the force.”
This reality is driving comprehensive changes to training syllabi across all services. At NAWDC, the traditional TOPGUN curriculum is being supplemented with new Maritime ISR (MISR) officer training, creating what some call “sixth generation officers” focused on the command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2/ISR) capabilities that enable distributed operations.
“Training can no longer focus solely on platform capabilities,” emphasizes Captain McCoy. “Training has to develop young aviators who appreciate their role within a larger maneuver/combat element.” Fighter pilots must now understand how their F-35C complements fourth-generation aircraft within the carrier air wing and how that air wing integrates with distributed surface combatants across the entire carrier strike group.
Perhaps nowhere is this transformation more evident than in the renewed emphasis on what military professionals call “the left side of the kill chain” — the find, fix, and track functions that precede targeting and engagement.
“For the US Navy and the USAF, the weight of effort has been upon target and engage,” explains one senior officer. “But if you cannot find, fix or track something, you never get to target.” This shift requires training mission commanders to think through how various Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets could be used in complex strike packages, from P-8 maritime patrol aircraft sensors to satellite communications networks.
The challenge extends beyond simply accessing more information. In contested environments, operators must learn to synthesize data from multiple, often non-organic sources while making rapid decisions under pressure. This represents a fundamental cognitive shift from the deliberate targeting processes developed during the counterinsurgency era.
The transformation is perhaps most dramatic within the U.S. Marine Corps, which is undergoing its most significant reorganization since World War II. The service is shifting from an amphibious assault force designed for major combat operations to a distributed maritime force focused on sea control and sea denial in the Indo-Pacific.
Colonel Gillette, commanding officer of the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 (MAWTS-1), frames the challenge: “How do you bring forces afloat inside the red rings in a responsible way so that you can bring those pieces to the chess board or have them contribute to the overall crisis management objectives?”
This shift requires Marines to master entirely new skill sets. Fire support Marines, traditionally trained in deliberate targeting for ground operations, must now learn dynamic targeting for maritime battles. The service is experimenting with blended training environments that combine live flying events with sophisticated simulators to create contested environments impossible to replicate safely in the real world.
Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) training is emerging as a critical enabler of this transformation. By blending real platforms with synthetic threats and environments, LVC allows training for scenarios that would be prohibitively expensive or dangerous to execute with live forces alone.
“We will shape a blended training environment,” explains Colonel Gillette, “which, from the operator’s perspective, will be no different than a completely live environment.” This technology enables realistic training against peer-level threats while allowing for repeated iterations that would be impossible with purely live exercises.
The integration extends beyond individual services. The U.S. Air Force is working closely with naval forces to develop truly joint training scenarios. As one Air Force leader notes, “There is a clear recognition that the maritime forces and USAF integratability is the key to unlock the U.S. capabilities in the Pacific and the North Atlantic to prevail in the high end fight.”
The transformation isn’t limited to U.S. forces. Key allies are simultaneously restructuring their own forces and training approaches. Australia is developing a fifth-generation enabled fleet focused on the Indo-Pacific, while Britain is implementing its Integrated Operating Concept. The challenge lies in ensuring these parallel transformations remain interoperable.
“Doing so in interaction with allies and partners is a key part of the training environment,” notes one senior officer. “If in combat such sharing will be more widespread than allowed in most training environments, the joint enterprise will suffer significantly from combat preparation.”
This points to one of the most complex aspects of the transformation: balancing operational security requirements with the need for realistic training. Information sharing protocols that work during peacetime exercises may prove inadequate for the rapid decision-making required in actual crises.
The transformation of military training for great power competition is still in its early stages, but the direction is clear. Success will require abandoning comfortable assumptions about how military forces organize, train, and fight. Platform-centric thinking must give way to network-enabled operations. Sequential kill chains must evolve into adaptive kill webs. Most importantly, individual expertise must be balanced with collaborative capability across services, domains, and allies.
As Admiral Nimitz observed in the Pacific War, “Having confronted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s skill, energy, persistence, and courage, Nimitz identified the key to victory: ‘training, TRAINING and M-O-R-E T-R-A-I-N-I-N-G.'” The same principle applies today, but the training itself must be fundamentally reimagined for the challenges of 21st century warfare.
The stakes couldn’t be higher.
As I concluded my book, “These systems will have the proper effect only in the hands of skilled warriors, who, today, have to face a radical disjuncture from traditional training approaches and thinking in order to address these new types of threats.”
For a podcast which discuses this article, go to the following:
For a short briefing overview on the strategic shift, see the following
A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey with Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 prepares to land during landing drills aboard the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), during 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Composite Training Unit Exercise while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, June 28, 2025.
During COMPTUEX, the IWO ARG and 22nd MEU(SOC), refine tactics, techniques, and procedures to execute warfighting functions that enhance operational readiness and lethality as a unified IWOARG/22 MEU(SOC) team.
06.28.2025
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
Australia’s ambitious leap into nuclear submarine warfare through the AUKUS partnership represents one of the most significant strategic pivots in the nation’s defense history.
But a seemingly unrelated infrastructure project in Western Australia may be inadvertently creating a massive security vulnerability at the very heart of this cornerstone defense initiative.
In September 2021, Australia announced its historic commitment to the AUKUS deal. This is a landmark collaboration with the United Kingdom and United States that would see Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. The decision marked a dramatic strategic shift, requiring billions in investment and decades of planning to build the infrastructure needed for these cutting-edge vessels.
Simultaneously, the Western Australian government has been pursuing its own ambitious project: Westport, a $7.2 billion initiative to relocate container operations from Fremantle to a new facility in Kwinana. While economically beneficial for the state, this development has created an unexpected and potentially catastrophic security challenge.
The problem lies in geography. Kwinana sits just 20 kilometers from HMAS Stirling on Garden Island which is the Royal Australian Navy’s largest base and the planned home for Australia’s future nuclear submarine fleet, as well as rotational visits from US and UK nuclear submarines.
The Westport project will funnel both high-value nuclear submarine traffic and a rapidly expanding volume of commercial shipping through the same narrow channel in Cockburn Sound. Once fully operational, shipping movements through this critical waterway are expected to more than double, with some commercial docks positioned as close as six kilometers from the naval base.
According to a comprehensive report from the Institute for Integrated Economic Research Australia, co-authored by distinguished military figures Air Vice Marshal John Blackburn and Commodore Vince DiPietro, this configuration creates multiple layers of security risk that appear to have been inadequately addressed.
The security concerns extend far beyond simple traffic congestion. In an era of asymmetric warfare, seemingly benign commercial vessels can become sophisticated weapon platforms. The report points to recent conflicts in Ukraine and Israel, where weapons were successfully deployed from shipping containers.
Ukraine’s “Operation Spider Web” exemplifies this new reality. Drones were smuggled into Russia inside standard shipping containers to attack military airfields. Such tactics transform ordinary commercial vessels into potential covert launch platforms, particularly dangerous when positioned near critical military assets like nuclear submarine bases.
The statistics are sobering: Australia currently operates only 15 commercial vessels over 2,000 tons flying its own flag. This means virtually all increased shipping traffic through Cockburn Sound would involve foreign vessels with varying levels of oversight and scrutiny. This creates what the report describes as a significant “blind spot” in national security.
Beyond direct attacks, the concentration of traffic creates another critical vulnerability: the risk of channel blockage. A single maritime incident, whether accidental or deliberate, could create cascading crises affecting both military operations and civilian infrastructure.
The report cites the 2011 MV Rena incident off New Zealand, where a grounded container ship required six to seven weeks just to remove cargo, with environmental recovery extending for months afterward. A similar blockage in Cockburn Sound wouldn’t merely trap submarines; it would halt all refined fuel deliveries to Perth, which is 100% dependent on fuel imports through the sound.
Such a scenario could cripple everything from military readiness to essential civilian services, ambulances, food transport, and power generation, creating a strategic chokepoint with devastating potential.
Perhaps most troubling is the apparent disconnect between levels of government on these security concerns. Local Western Australian MP Mr. McGinn felt compelled to bypass normal channels and directly brief Washington DC officials about the risks, supported by documentation from the Maritime Union of Australia.
Meanwhile, WA Premier Roger Cook has categorically dismissed these concerns as “wrong.” The report’s authors characterize this response as “opportunistic ignorance.”
Or a tendency to prioritize economically beneficial projects while hoping security concerns simply fade away, rather than conducting comprehensive threat assessments.
The Institute for Integrated Economic Research Australia report poses more than a dozen critical questions that apparently remain unanswered at the highest levels of government:
The failure to systematically address these fundamental security questions represents what the authors term a significant gap in strategic foresight.
This situation appears symptomatic of a broader challenge facing modern nations: the failure to integrate national security considerations into infrastructure planning from the outset. The report suggests similar vulnerabilities likely exist at other Australian ports near major defense installations, including Darwin, Newcastle, and Sydney.
Australia’s AUKUS commitment represents a multi-billion dollar, multi-decade strategic investment positioned as the cornerstone of the nation’s future defense capabilities. Yet this grand strategic vision risks being undermined by what appears to be inadequate coordination between state economic development goals and federal defense requirements.
The implications extend beyond Australia’s borders. AUKUS is fundamentally about strengthening allied capabilities and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. Security vulnerabilities that compromise the program could affect allied confidence and regional deterrence strategies.
The situation in Western Australia serves as a stark reminder that national security in the 21st century requires unprecedented integration across all levels of government and infrastructure planning. Traditional threats are evolving rapidly, with asymmetric capabilities emerging that can turn civilian infrastructure into strategic vulnerabilities.
As one of the report’s authors noted, this raises fundamental questions about how nations ensure their grand strategic visions aren’t accidentally undermined by failures to “connect the dots” between seemingly local decisions and overarching national security postures.
For Australia, addressing these concerns may require difficult conversations about balancing economic development with security imperatives and ensuring that the nation’s most significant defense investment in generations isn’t compromised by avoidable vulnerabilities created in its own backyard.
The question remains: in our complex, interconnected world, how many other nations are facing similar blind spots where strategic ambitions could be subtly or not so subtly undermined by a failure to connect these critical dots?
For a podcast discussing this report, see the following:
https://defense.info/podcast/how-australias-port-development-threatens-its-nuclear-submarine-future/
A change of command ceremony for VRM-40, the “Mighty Bison” squadron, took place on July 31, 2025 at Naval Station Norfolk, where Cmdr. Brett H. Learner relieved Cmdr. Mason B. Fox as commanding officer.
The ceremony marked the official transfer of leadership for the squadron, which provides carrier onboard delivery (COD) support using the CMV-22B Osprey.The event was held to publicize the change in command to the squadron’s personnel, and it was a formal, impressive, and brief ceremony.
For our interview with Cmdr. Mason B. Fox, see the following:
Visiting the First East Coast CMV-22B Squadron: October 2024
By Robbin Laird
In an interview I did in Norfolk last year with Commander Mason Fox and his team. Fox is the Commander of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 40, the “Mighty Bison.”
In that interview he underscored a key point which is rarely noted in discussions about the way ahead for the capabilities of the “fight tonight” force.
“Our version of the Osprey has a little bit more gas that we can carry, and we have a primary mission that is different than the Marine Corps and Air Force Ospreys. But I think that if we’re looking at a joint fight, we’re looking at the 450 plus Ospreys that are part of the program record. They will all be contributing to distributed maritime ops, because that’s the fight we are in.”
The “fight tonight” philosophy represents military readiness doctrine emphasizing immediate operational capability. This concept prioritizes having forces that can deploy and engage effectively without extensive preparation time, which is crucial in today’s rapidly evolving threat environment where conflicts can escalate quickly.
Fox’s emphasis on distributed maritime ops reflects a fundamental shift in naval strategy. Rather than concentrating forces in large, potentially vulnerable formations, this approach spreads capabilities across multiple smaller platforms operating semi-independently. The Osprey’s unique capabilities make it ideal for this concept because it can:
The reference to “450 plus Ospreys” in the program record underscores how modern military thinking prioritizes joint capabilities over service-specific solutions. This suggests that in future conflicts, the distinction between Marine, Navy, and Air Force Ospreys may be less important than their collective contribution to overall mission success.
This integrated approach represents a significant evolution from historical military planning, where services often developed parallel capabilities independently.
An article by Douglas Thumm published on May 19, 2025, provided an important insight into the thinking of a “fight tonight” force. While the Pengaton was conducting program reviews of the Osprey, the Marines were getting on with it.
Douglas Thumm is a retired U.S. Marine Corps lt. colonel. He flew nearly 1,600 hours in the MV-22 Osprey and continues instructing new Air Force and Marine Corps Osprey pilots in the MV-22 simulators at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina.
In his article he discussed how the U.S. Marine Corps is maintaining strong commitment to the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft despite two upcoming government reviews that may generate criticism. The reviews — one by the Navy (a “comprehensive review”) and another by the Government Accountability Office — were initiated following a tragic November 2023 crash of an Air Force CV-22 Osprey off Japan that killed eight airmen.
The Marine Corps leadership, particularly Lt. Gen. Bradford Gering, has emphasized that the Osprey remains central to their aviation strategy, calling it “the core of the aviation combat element” and comparing its importance to the Navy’s Super Hornet. The service’s new aviation plan reaffirms the MV-22B Osprey as the “backbone of Marine Corps combat assault transport capability.”
Key developments include:
The author argues that while the upcoming reviews may generate negative headlines, the real story is the military’s continued investment in improving an aircraft that provides unique capabilities essential for operations, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. The article advocates for continued support from the Pentagon and Congress for the Osprey program’s modernization efforts.
I am publishing my next book I have written on the USMC which focuses on 2nd Marine Air Wing. The title of the book is “2nd Marine Air Wing: Transitioning the Fight Tonight Force.” And that is really the point and being able to deploy successfully for the Marines their ability to engage a broader tiltorotor enterprise as a key element of their operating eco-system.
They are not “cubical commandos.” They are ready to deploy warfighters. That does create a difference in attitude about the importance of leveraging and expanding the capabilities which they have right now and can be enhanced in the near to mid-term.
Featured photo:
U.S. Marines Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 242 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, conduct pre-flight procedures during flight operations aboard the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6), in the Coral Sea, June 26, 2025. The 31st MEU executed integrated operations to enhance lethality, readiness, and interoperability by conducting multiple mission sets simultaneously. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt. Devin Nichols).
Also, see the following:
In an era of intensifying major power competition, China’s diplomatic engagement with commodity-rich nations has emerged as a cornerstone of its global strategy.
The contrasting yet complementary approaches Beijing has adopted toward Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Australia under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reveal a sophisticated framework for securing access to critical raw materials while building resilient political relationships.
Both countries represent major suppliers of essential commodities to China’s economy, and both are led by center-left governments that have maintained critical stances toward certain U.S. policies while embracing China’s economic partnership model.
China’s relationship with Brazil represents perhaps the clearest example of its commodity-rich country strategy. The economic dimensions of this partnership are staggering: China has been Brazil’s top trading partner since 2009, with bilateral trade reaching $152.8 billion in 2022 and growing to approximately $160 billion by 2024. This represents a 37-fold increase since President Lula’s first term began in 2003, demonstrating the sustained momentum of the relationship across different political cycles.
The relationship’s institutional foundation runs deep. China designated Brazil as its first official “strategic partner” in 1993, later elevating this to a “global strategic partner” in 2012. This progression reflects China’s recognition of Brazil’s significance not merely as a commodity supplier, but as a key player in shaping its increasing dominance of the BRICS organization.
The relationship reached new heights in November 2024, when China and Brazil decided to elevate their ties to a “community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet.” This designation, typically reserved for China’s most important partnerships, signals Beijing’s view of Brazil as central to its vision of a multipolar world order guided by Global China.
The economic structure of this partnership reveals China’s strategic priorities. Brazil exports $91.26 billion to China, primarily soybeans and mineral products, while importing $61.5 billion in manufactured goods. This trade pattern, raw materials flowing to China in exchange for value-added products, reflects a broader pattern in China’s commodity diplomacy, though Chinese and Brazilian officials have explicitly discussed moving toward higher value-added exchanges.
China’s engagement with Brazil operates through multiple multilateral platforms including BRICS, G20, and various South-South cooperation mechanisms. This multilateral dimension serves China’s broader strategy of positioning itself as a champion of the Global South while providing Brazil with platforms to assert its own leadership ambitions. This is a key part of the Global China strategy.
Lula’s foreign policy philosophy of “active nonalignment” aligns well with China’s preference for partners who maintain strategic autonomy from U.S.-led alliances. This convergence allows China to present itself as respecting Brazil’s sovereignty while building a Global China-led world order.
China’s relationship with Australia under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese presents a more complex case study in commodity diplomacy. The relationship had reached its nadir during the period from 2020-2022, when diplomatic communications were frozen and trade restrictions affected AUD 20 billion in Australian exports. However, since Albanese’s election in 2022, both countries have pursued a deliberate stabilization strategy.
The year 2024 marked a turning point, with the lifting of the final trade restrictions that formed part of Beijing’s campaign of economic coercion against Australia. Live rock lobster exports, the last commodity subject to punitive trade actions, resumed in mid-December. This gradual removal of trade barriers signals China’s willingness to compartmentalize economic and political issues when dealing with strategically important commodity suppliers.
Despite ongoing tensions over AUKUS, the Quad partnership, and Australia’s military exercises in the South China Sea, Chinese President Xi Jinping acknowledged that China-Australia ties had “risen from the setbacks” during Albanese’s July 2025 visit to Beijing. This language suggests a deliberate Chinese strategy to focus on economic cooperation while managing rather than eliminating security disagreements.
China’s renewed engagement with Australia occurs in a broader context of U.S.-China trade tensions. Chinese officials have expressed interest in expanding the decade-old Australia-China Free Trade Agreement and pursuing cooperation in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence. China is seeking to capitalize on uncertainties in U.S. trade policy by positioning itself as a stable and reliable partner for key commodity suppliers.
The approaches to both Brazil and Australia must be understood within China’s comprehensive strategy for securing access to critical raw materials. China initiated raw materials diplomacy at the end of the 1990s, encouraging state and private companies to go global in selected targeted sectors. This strategy is based on the Belt and Road Initiative and revolves around acquisitions, stakes in mines, or the provision of infrastructure in exchange for exploitation of raw materials.¹¹
China’s success in this area is remarkable. Today, it refines 68% of the world’s nickel, 40% of copper, 59% of lithium, and 73% of cobalt. This control over processing capabilities creates dependencies that extend far beyond simple bilateral trade relationships, as many resource-rich countries lack the capacity to refine their own raw materials.
Both the Brazil and Australia cases demonstrate China’s strategic patience and adaptability. The approach allows Beijing to weather political changes in partner countries while maintaining long-term economic relationships.
This patience proved crucial during the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil and the Morrison government in Australia, both of which adopted more confrontational approaches toward China.
Both relationships feature robust institutional dialogue mechanisms designed to provide stability during periods of tension. These range from high-level strategic dialogues to sector-specific cooperation mechanisms. The institutionalization of these relationships creates predictability and continuity that survives changes in government.
China leverages multilateral platforms to strengthen bilateral relationships while advancing its broader strategic objectives. With Brazil, this occurs through BRICS, G20, and various South-South cooperation mechanisms. With Australia, China has sought to use platforms like the G20 and ASEAN-related forums to maintain engagement even during periods of bilateral tension.
The Australia case highlights the limitations of China’s commodity diplomacy when it encounters fundamental security concerns. Australia’s AUKUS commitments and alliance with the United States create ongoing friction that pure economic incentives cannot fully overcome. The Darwin Port lease controversy, where Australia is reviewing a Chinese company’s 99-year lease of a strategic port, exemplifies these tensions.
Both relationships face domestic political constraints that limit their scope. In Australia, public opinion toward China remains generally negative despite improved government-to-government relations. In Brazil, while the relationship enjoys broader support, there are concerns about over-dependence on Chinese markets and the need for greater economic diversification.
The intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition creates pressures on both Brazil and Australia to make difficult choices about their international alignments. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency adds another layer of uncertainty, as both countries must navigate between their economic interests with China and their broader strategic relationships.
China’s success in building these relationships has significant implications for global commodity markets. The combination of China’s processing capabilities and its strong relationships with key suppliers creates a form of market power that extends beyond traditional measures of economic influence.
The concentration of critical mineral processing in China, combined with its strong relationships with major suppliers like Australia and Brazil, creates potential vulnerabilities for other countries seeking to develop their own supply chains. This has prompted responses from the United States and European Union to develop alternative supply chains and reduce dependencies on Chinese processing capabilities.
China’s engagement with Brazil and Australia reveals a key element of the Global China strategy for reshaping the “rules based” order.
The Brazil relationship provides China with a comprehensive partnership that spans economic, political, and strategic dimensions. The Australia relationship demonstrates the approach’s resilience and adaptability, showing how China can rebuild relationships even after significant crises.
But as Global China meets the rethinking by the United States and Europe of their relationship with China, China’s commodity diplomacy will face increasing challenges from countries seeking to reduce their dependencies and develop alternative supply chains.
Featured image produced by an AI program and highlights the challenge from Brazil’s perspective of protecting its sovereignty against Global China, something which President Lula does not seem to be concerned with.
Middle Powers in a Changing World: How Australia and Brazil Navigate the China Dynamic
U.S. Marines with Marine Wing Support Squadron 471, Marine Aircraft Group 41, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, provide maintenance and fuel to an MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 764, during Atlantic Alliance 2025 at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, July 5, 2025.
AA25 is a premier naval integration exercise designed to enhance interoperability among U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and allied forces.
CAPE COD, MASSACHUSETTS
07.05.2025
Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES)
