Global Supply Chain Support: The Osprey Case Study

05/25/2019

Although the Osprey has become a globally deployed aircraft, the supply chain has not.

This is crucial as we move forward into an era of regionally specific crises involving peer competitors.

It will not just a race to get that Fed Ex delivery from the US through foreign customs, it will be about adversaries deliberately focusing on disrupting our supply chains.

And having the parts needed to maintain operational. aircraft through a crisis, will be a core requirement, not just a nice to have capability.

The recent interview with Major Paul M. Herrle,  head of MALS-26 which is part of MAG-26, argued that is increasingly crucial to have an integrated sustainment system and one, which could flow parts to a globally deployed force as well.

A recent masters thesis by Jacob P. Jones published in December 2018 and done within the Naval Postgraduate School program provided an overview on the challenges facing the Osprey supply chain system. He did so from the standpoint of taking modern notions of supply chain management and comparing the theory against the practice as seen from data which he analyzed with regard to Osprey deployments.

He highlighted the challenge as follows: “Due to the distributed nature of current naval forces, challenges supporting individual elements has increased. Logistics structures centered on supporting the carrier strike group are becoming antiquated as forces operate in a more dispersed fashion, growing the number of elements needing logistical support….”

After his analysis of data from a corps USMC Osprey squadron he reached the following conclusion:

Overwhelmingly, the supply chain did not behave as an agile network, adjusting and adapting to the needs of VMM-264.

After analyzing a 92-day period, the supply documents reported on the AMSRR conveyed a supply network that was reliant on supply nodes located within the continental United States.

Highlighting “BA” Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) parts the research showed that 71.3% of the requisitions were sourced from the continental United States, while DLA Europe Germersheim, Germany (SDQ), sourced only 0.19% of the requests.

Furthermore, those parts with higher quantities, between 5 and 22 items, were sourced from DLA Fort Belvoir, Virginia (SMS), NAS Oceana, Virginia (PNZ), and U.S. Navy Mayport, Florida (P29). “BA” Partial Mission Capable Supply (PMCS) displayed similar sourcing rates from the United States, accounting for 73.6% of the components.

None of the PMCS parts were sourced from DLA Europe or other European distribution centers. “AS” coded parts shared comparable results. “AS” NMCS and PMCS sourcing activities accounted for 83.4% and 72% of the components forwarded from the United States.

None of the parts initially given a status code of “AS” were sourced within the European theater of operation.

If this approach is taken with the F-35B or the new CH-53K, the inability to support the 21st century ACE will be enhanced.

It is time to deal with the global sourcing problem head on.

It is a basing, sourcing and structural issue; not an act of nature.

Rather than GAO writing continuous reports on parts shortages, it would be much more useful if the Department put together a structure that is congruent with how the 21st century force operates, rather than one that feeds the US based depots.

The featured photo shows a V-22 Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 268 refueling before departure from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Okinawa, on Japan, March 26, 2019.

VMM-268’s stop on the island was part of a 9,816-kilometer flight across the Pacific to train with U.S. allies in the region. (United States Marine Corps photo by Pfc. Ethan LeBlanc)

The thesis can be read below:

18Dec_Jones_Jacob

US Working With India on Enhanced ASW Capability

05/24/2019

Clearly, as the challenge from the Chinese Navy grows, the US needs to work with core allies and partners to shape more effective defenses in the years ahead.

India is clearly a partner in this effort.

According to an article published in April 2019by our partner India Strategic, the US State Department has approved sale of MH-60R ASW helicopters to India.

New Delhi. The US State Department has approved the sale of 24 Lockheed Martin MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters to India, paving the way for final negotiations to set the price and what onboard equipment and weapons will be required by the Indian Navy.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) of the State Department announced approval on April 2, under the Foreign Military Sale (FMS) programme “for an estimated $2.6 billion” for the multi-mission helicopters. Procedurally, DSCA has to notify the US Congress, which it did, saying the proposed sale will strengthen the US-Indian strategic relationship and “improve the security of a major defensive partner which continues to be an important force for political stability, peace, and economic progress in the Indo-Pacific and South Asia region.”

This is the first time that the Indian Navy will get one of the most advanced Anti-submarine helicopters, equipped with Raytheon’s MK-54 torpedoes, Lockheed Martin’s Hellfire missiles, Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) and its Rockets, Night Fighting systems, sophisticated radars and secure communication devices. Just about the same that the US Navy uses.

The Indian Navy had decided about five years ago to go in for this helicopter, then Made and Sold by Sikorsky, and as usual there were procedural hiccups in India. Later, Lockheed Martin acquired Sikorsky, and the deal was closed.

Air Vice Marshal AJS Walia (Retd) and later Dr Vivek Lall, Lockheed Martin’s Vice President for Strategy and Business Development, coordinated the negotiations with Indian authorities. The Ministry of Defence will now set up a Price Negotiations Committee (PNC) to finalise the deal, and the supply of helicopters will commence around three years after the first payment is made.

Indian Navy sources said the helicopters are needed at the earliest possible, and the US company may be asked to expedite the delivery on As Soon As Possible basis.

As for the Weapons and Systems on board, DSCA said:

The Government of India has requested to buy twenty-four (24) MH-60R Multi-Mission helicopters, equipped with the following: 

Thirty (30) APS-153(V) Multi-Mode radars (24 installed, 6 spares); sixty (60) T700-GE-401C engines (48 installed and 12 spares); twenty-four (24) Airborne Low Frequency System (ALFS) (20 installed, 4 spares); thirty (30) AN/AAS-44C(V) Multi-Spectral Targeting System (24 installed, 6 spares); fifty-four (54) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation Systems (EGI) with Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) (48 installed, 6 spares); one thousand (1,000) AN/SSQ-36/53/62 sonobuoys; ten (10) AGM-114 Hellfire missiles; five (5) AGM-114 M36-E9 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); four (4) AGM-114Q Hellfire Training missiles; thirty-eight (38) Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS) rockets; thirty (30) MK-54 torpedoes; twelve (12) M-240D Crew Served guns; twelve (12) GAU-21 Crew Served guns; two (2) Naval Strike Missile Emulators; four (4) Naval Strike Missile Captive Inert Training missiles; one (1) MH-60B/R Excess Defense Article (EDA) USN legacy aircraft. 

Also included are seventy (70) AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Devices; fifty-four (54) AN/ARC-210 RT-1990A(C) radios with COMSEC (48 installed, 6 spares); thirty (30) AN/ARC-220 High Frequency radios (24 installed, 6 spares); thirty (30) AN/APX-123 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders (24 installed, 6 spares); spare engine containers; facilities study, design, and construction; spare and repair parts; support and test equipment; communication equipment; ferry support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; US Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

The total estimated cost is $2.6 billion.

Finland Works Its Fighter Replacement Program

At the beginning of the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland established a stance of enhanced independence when it purchased Hornets from the United States and began a process of working with Western allied airpower.

In an article published on February 16, 2018, we looked forward and backwards to the Finnish fighter capability.

The Finnish government is set to acquire 64 new fighter jets for its air force.

This is occurring as Nordic defense is being reworked, and the Northern European states are sorting out how to deal with what the Finnish Defense Minister Jussi Niinistö has referred to as the “new normal” in Russian behavior.

“It’s important that our armed forces have the equipment that they need to fulfill all of their fundamental roles,” said Niinistö.

Niinistö has described Russia’s more unpredictable behavior in the greater Baltic Sea region, particularly in the areas of political influencing methods and security policies, as the “new normal”.

“Changes in the security environment and the multi-purpose use or threat of power have become a new normal. Russia has shown in Ukraine and Syria that it possesses both the capacity and the will to use military power to push its goals,”

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/01/26/global-vendors-size-up-finland-s-multibillion-dollar-defense-upgrades/

The new combat aircraft will be part of an integrated Finnish defense force in the evolving strategic environment of the 2020’s.

It is important to remember that the last major acquisition also occurred in a significant period of change for Finland in its strategic neighborhood.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the dynamics of change in the new Russian republic, Finland was able to negotiate its way out of the Cold War agreement with Russia in which Finland was committed to cooperate with Russia militarily in the case that an aggressor was threatening to use Finnish territory to attack the Soviet Union.

The agreement required mutual affirmation of the threat and the engagement but nonetheless was a major curb on Finnish military independence.

With the end of this agreement, and then the unification of Germany, and the opening of a new chapter in the development the European Union, Finland positioned itself for membership in the European Union in 1995.

The EU treaty contains a mutual security agreement for all of the members as well.

It was in this period of dynamic change, that Finland acquired new fighters for its air force, F-18 Hornet aircraft.

The fighter replacement program is being conducted under the auspices of the Strategic Projects Program.

According to the Finnish Ministry of Defence:

A sector called Strategic Projects Programme operates directly under the Director General of the Resource Policy Department. This programme is led by Project Coordinator Lauri Puranen.

Strategic projects include the replacement of the capabilities of the Hornet fleet (HX project) and the replacement of the Navy’s vessels which are scheduled to be decommissioned (Squadron 2020).

The Strategic Projects Programme is responsible for steering and coordinating strategic projects in the Ministry of Defence so that national defence policy objectives and timely replacement of ageing military capabilities are ensured while taking into account the security policy environment. 

The Strategic Projects Programme plans and manages external quality assurance, prepares funding models for projects and formulates the decision-making criteria for security and defence policy areas when procurement decisions are dealt with. The Programme is also responsible for a project-based coordination of cooperation, communications and travels to gather information. 

Furthermore, it maintains project-based situational awareness and prepares meetings as part of the steering process. The unit cooperates closely with other units in the Ministry of Defence as well as with organisations responsible for the Defence Forces’ strategic projects.

And earlier this month, Lauri Puranen provided an English translation of articles which he had published earlier in Finnish about the fighter replacement program.

Review of the blogs on the HX programme during the past 12 months

Lauri Puranen

I write a blog in Finnish about the background of and current matters related to the HX programme. If it was translated into other languages, my blog would probably have more readers; but so far it has been only in Finnish.

This rather long review published exceptionally in English is a compilation of the HX blog posts over the past year. My aim has been to put together the most relevant points about the background and developments of the programme.

In March 2018 I wrote this about the HX system and the goal of the HX fighter programme:

With the available resources, our task in the HX programme is to ensure that the best possible capability be procured for Finland’s defence system. Therefore, it is not a matter of a particular fighter plane’s features or its performance in air combat but what is desired for the Air Force’s entire combat capability in the future.

Its capabilities will be based on multi-role fighters: integrated sensors, aircraft self-protection systems, data exchange systems and other systems.  In addition to effective missiles, bombs and cannons, the capability of multi-role fighters to engage targets in the air, on land and at sea is based on electronic warfare systems, which all have been integrated into multi-role fighters and their systems.

The information from the aircraft’s own systems is not enough; the effectiveness of modern weapons and electronic systems requires also data acquired outside and input in advance about, for example, the location of targets and the parameters of systems used by the enemy. When all these elements work seamlessly together, the result is a combat-ready multi-role fighter.

A single multi-role fighter can be compared to a single ice-hockey player. More points will be scored only when the team consists of top-level individuals who play seamlessly together. In air warfare, a team corresponds to a section formed of four multi-role fighters and an air combat leader.

The effectiveness of this section is dependent on the capabilities of the fighters, the networking between fighters and the air combat leader and networking with other actors in the defence system. Here networking means immediate sharing of information on targets, target indication and aircraft position with the section’s other aircraft and air combat leader.

This is how all aircraft of the section can have a real time and comprehensive situation awareness that is notably more comprehensive than that of a single fighter.

Finland must be able to use the capabilities discussed above for thirty years. In April 2018, I wrote on the decision-making model of the HX fighter programme:

The procurement decision will have a substantial effect on the defence system’s capabilities and credibility. The Air Force’s high preparedness and high-performing multi-role fighter systems will play a significant role in securing a preventive threshold.

The replacement of the Hornet fleet will define the Air Force’s entire combat capability into the beginning of the 2060s. It is therefore vital that development prospects of each candidate aircraft will be critically evaluated for all areas of key importance when making a procurement decision. High performance, security of supply and appropriate operating costs are Finland’s key requirements for the coming decades.

Since the capabilities in Finland’s environment that challenge our defence evolve all the time, multi-role fighters must bring added value to the defence solution for their entire 30-year life cycle. It must be possible to develop the systems and features of the multi-role fighters over time, thus maintaining the defence capability also in the future. Avionics, radar, weapon and electronic warfare systems are software-defined but the “hardware”, computers and weapons, requires upgrading as well.

When considering the procurement decision, it is similarly essential to evaluate the candidates for the number of aircraft in use and the extent of the user community over the projected life cycle into the 2060s. Other user nations will share the costs with us.

Selecting a multi-role fighter is based on five decision making areas: the multi-role fighter’s military capability, security of supply, industrial cooperation, procurement and life cycle costs, and security and defence policy implications. (Editorial remark: Military capability is the only decision-making area where the candidates will be compared. The other areas are assessed as pass or fail. Defence and security policy will be assessed separately).

Since the procurement will have an impact on the Defence Forces’ operational capability and define the Air Force’s entire combat capability into the 2060s, a system with the greatest capabilities, including supporting elements, should be selected.

The quotations will be placed in an order of priority, based solely on military capabilities; as to the other decision making areas, the quotation shall meet the strict requirements laid down in the Request for Quotation.

Towards the end of 2018, public discussion on the number of aircraft became more heated.  I took up the needs of and justifications for defence:

As to the number of fighters, claims have been made that full capabilities could be achieved with fewer, more effective modern fighters.  Some comments have even proposed reducing capabilities.

Since full replacement of capabilities requires a procurement of the same size as that of the Hornet fleet, Finland invited tenders for 64 multi-role fighters. There are three key factors that impact this number: Finland’s military operating environment, tasks set for the Defence Forces and resources allocated to defence.

Changes in the security environment

Since the 1992 decision to procure Hornets, Finland’s security environment has changed and has become more challenging. The situation in Europe is also more strained. These changes do not support the idea to decrease the number of fighters, quite the contrary. Although the significance of the procurement contract extends beyond the current security political situation and defence planning cannot depend on the political climate, the impact of the HX Fighter Programme is monumental in creating a credible defence capability.

Tasks of the Defence Forces

The Defence Forces have clearly set tasks to maintain a credible and preventive defence capability and the capacity for defending Finland’s entire territory. These tasks have not changed since the procurement of the Hornet fleet.  Finland as a militarily non-allied country is responsible for its own defence, despite the increased international cooperation.

The foundation of the Defence Forces’ deterrence capacity is a proven, flexible and proactive preparedness control, with a credible capacity for repelling an attack, based on a sufficient amount of equipment fit for combat, competent personnel and the will to defend the country.

Defending Finland’s airspace and supporting the other services engaged in combat require that a sufficient number of fighters must be available in all situations; only fighters in the air increase the defence capability.  The operational range of a fighter is about 500 km, which means that in Finland it is necessary to be able to operate simultaneously in two directions. In one operational direction, several four-fighter sections are needed, and when necessary, they will have to be fuelled and armed on the ground. Some of the fleet are always out of use because of servicing.

Undisputedly the new fighters will be more effective than the Hornet fleet, but so are the adversaries in the air who also employ new aircraft; military technology evolves everywhere. It is a fact that the new multi-role fighters have capabilities not exceeding those of the Hornets’ with similar operating speed, radius and time. Moreover, the arming and fuelling time on the ground for a new sortie needs to be roughly the same.

In view of the Defence Forces’ tasks, the full replacement of the Hornet fleet requires that the current number of fighters will be kept.

Allocated defence resources

Resources in the defence system consist of funding, defence materiel, personnel, competences and infrastructure. These must be able to produce the Defence Forces’ peacetime activities and results. Simply put, we currently have resources for just over 60 fighters to be maintained and operated by the Air Force. The existing infrastructure, personnel, training system, flight hour adjustment, and the command and control system can be exploited when new multi-role fighters are introduced.

It has been stated that while the new multi-role fighters will be financed from outside the regular defence budget, their operating and maintenance will have to be financed from the regular defence budget.

Even if it was to some extent justified to procure more fighters than what the current number is, the size and resources of the Air Force influence what can be done. In this respect, sixty-four is the right number of new multi-role fighters for our defence system.

In January 2019, before tenders were received, I published a blog where I reflected on coming events in 2019:

The received tenders will be analysed during this spring and, based on them, negotiations will be conducted with the tenderers. As to reaching a procurement decision, 2019 is too early for drawing conclusions. Instead of making comparisons, the aim this spring is to analyse and fully understand the concept and the whole package offered by the tenderers, and to continue the negotiations to reach the best possible solution for Finland. After the spring negotiations and possible steering by the new government, a more specified Request for Quotation (RfQ) will be issued. The goal is to send the RfQ in early autumn 2019.

To evaluate the tenders, an HX Evaluation Handbook was written to ensure an accurate implementation of the evaluation.  By means of the Handbook it is possible to ensure impartiality and to enable making comparisons in all areas of the decision model.

The responses to the preliminary RFQ build around the package of 64 aircraft. It is assumed that the system packages of the five tenderers are very different from one another because of different sensors, weapons, data, and training and servicing solutions. Each tenderer has, of course, a different flying platform.  All tenders are very likely to fall within the price range of EUR 7 to 10 billion as defined in the government’s Defence Policy Report.

Tough competition is in the buyer’s advantage. Keeping in mind the requirements for full replacement of capabilities, the aim is to procure best possible capability for Finland and as advantageously as possible. The final procurement costs will become more accurate after analysing the tenders, based on the new government’s steering.  Preventive and defence capabilities as part of the defence system are to be the key criterion for the system to be procured.

The ultimate capabilities and components, including the number of fighters, will become clear in the course of the tendering process and evaluations.

All tenders are confidential and their contents cannot be published as they contain both secret information on required capabilities and commercially confidential information.  The defence administration will inform of the progress and stages of the project.

To conclude, here is a blog I published some weeks ago on the start of the negotiations:

Negotiations started in March and they are being conducted in Finland, with a similar time frame reserved for each candidate. All areas of the decision model will be addressed: evaluation of capabilities, security of supply, contract terms, cost information and industrial cooperation.

The first round of negotiations will be concluded in May. The second round will be conducted in the course of summer, with the aim to discuss complementary information requested and received from tenderers, and to address any other business that may rise. The third round of negotiations will be conducted in early autumn, preparing the candidates for receiving a more specific RfQ

After the first stage or the three rounds of negotiations, a more specific RfQ will be sent in autumn 2019.

The second stage will start after answers have been received.

The final tenders will be requested in 2020 and the procurement decision will be made in 2021.

Lauri Puranen

Program Director, MoD

Major General, ret.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Re-shaping C-2: Decision Making at the Tactical Edge

05/22/2019

By Robbin Laird

With the introduction of new communications and video technologies, military decision making has changed over the past twenty years.

A significant point of change was the introduction of Rover which created what Secretary Wynne, under whose mandate Rover was introduced, referred to as the democratization of the battlefield.

In a 2012 interview with one of the key shapers of the Rover technology, the impact of Rover on C2 was highlighted.

Rover has been a key element of democratizing the battlefield. 

The General has the generally same picture as the guy in the field does. 

And this rover essentially creates a horizontal command structure where any Special Forces Team or Captain or a Lieutenant on the ground or a Battalion Commander or a theater committee can call in the air strike commensurate with the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

It’s really the story about the JTACS and how they into very effective fighting tools that we have used in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This democratization of the battlefield has unfolded in the context of the land wars in the Middle East and has been an essential part of a significant reshaping of what air support means to the ground forces.

With the strategic shift from the land wars to higher intensity operations, how then to replicate the Rover experience but to do so for the distributed force operating in much higher tempo operations?

As noted in the last piece in this series on distributed C2, the coming of the F-35 and its sensor fusion provides a significant foundation for rethinking how C2 at the tactical edge could occur.

In some ways this is just the beginning of a significant shift in the capability which can be unleashed by new technologies and new approaches to command and control.

A key technology which could drive such change is the delivery of ubiquitous full motion video, embedded with overlays which can provide dynamical contextual awareness to the warfighter at the tactical edge.

With a proliferation of decision-making technology, risk can be reduced and decisions made more rapidly and with better outcomes.

But for a full motion video enabled force with embedded overlays to lead to the kind of change, which inherently it could, two related capabilities need to occur.

First, senior commanders have to avoid detail management through C2 intrusiveness and to focus on appropriate mission command.

The practices of the past twenty years where video technologies have often been used for intrusive controls at the tactical edge by senior commanders simply will not work in a high tempo operational environment and will take away the advantages which could accrue to a distributed force.

And, secondly, operators at the tactical edge need to learn how to make decisions using the context provided via overlays to the full motion video.  

They need to understand how to implement mission command in a high tempo environment with enhanced decision-making tools made available to them.

In effect, the challenge facing today’s F-35 pilots to shift from performing as an AWACs-like commander, to becoming a decision maker at the point of interest with the full motion video and overlays available to them, is a harbinger of a broader transformation of the C2 environment.

But this will not happen unless both aspects of change interactively occurs – namely, Generals lead but do not provide detailed intrusion; and distributed force commanders, operate on the SA which can be constructed with the tools available at the tactical edge.

And another challenge involves how the US has operated its intelligence processes.

In high tempo operations, it is not about collecting data, and culling it at some command post in the rear. It is about the intelligence function being embedded into a tactical edge rapid decision-making process.

Much of this information is fleeting, and it is a question of making better rather than worse decisions more rapidly; it is not about slowing down decision-making to the speed which hierarchical review requires.

Recently, I had a chance to talk with Bradford Powell, Vice President and General Manager of Cubic Corporation’s C2ISR Solutions business, about the nature of change in the C2 sector.

We discussed both the general dynamics of change as well as some solutions being worked by Cubic as well.

In this piece, I am focusing our discussion of the dynamics of change and in the next one I will address some specific Cubic solutions.

According to Powell, the clear trend line is to expand significantly access to imagery and to full motion video (FMV), while improving integration between the two.

While today, access to FMV within the military is targeted and to some extent limited, a decade out, full motion video will be ubiquitous.

He noted that his group at Cubic has primarily focused on handling the movement of video from Airborne ISR platforms.

For example, they have provided means for getting MQ-9 video from point A to  point B.

With the growing flood of video, the challenge will be not simply to manage it, but to turn the video stream into an effective decision-making tool at the tactical edge.

“We are working to provide context within the full motion video feeds, which will enable the operational user to make tactical decisions more effectively.”

He described C2 as moving from a focus on maps, to command and control operating from within full motion video.

And to do so will require tools that provide context easily used by the tactical decision maker.

As a relatively simple example he referred to the television networks placing yellow first down markers over the video of a football game.  If one then imagines the various data clusters which could be laid down over the full motion video available to the tactical decision maker, in his area of interest or the area where he is operating, then the coming future of video driven context for C2 at the tactical edge can be envisaged.

The task is to insert relevant tactical data into the full motion video.

“The full motion video focused C2 environment would then evolve to make a broader set of intelligence products discoverable in the video.”

The overall focus is to provide the local decision maker with much greater context for what he is looking at in the full motion video.

Obviously, as this capability is introduced, refined and developed, artificial intelligence can be shaped to provide effective tools to help shape the data coming into the contextual shaping function for the full motion video.

In short, “what is the impact of full motion video in terms of making faster decisions and communicating those decisions in a more effective way and enabling decision making at the lower level?”

In other words, the template for decision making is changing.

A shift to a distributed force will be effective only if a new template for decision making is put in place, one that allows for 21stcentury mission command and decision making at the tactical edge operating in high tempo operations.

For the first piece in this series, see the following:

Strategy, Concepts of Operations and Technology: The Challenge and Opportunity of Shaping a Distributed C2 Enabled Force

 

 

 

 

 

 

Manufacturing the CH-53K: Adding a Key Crisis Management Capability to the Force

The CH-53K provides a truly unique heavy lift capability.

Not only is it fully designed to operate in a wide variety of support missions from the sea base, but it is built as a digital aircraft from the ground up.

Given its digital systems, it can work with a variety of multi-mission assets to expand the range of support over a greater operating area compared to either the CH-53E or the Chinook.

It is designed from the ground up to carry heavier loads, three times that of the E with external lift.

It has automated flight controls which allow the flight crew to be part fully of any air combat insertion team, rather than having to be primarily be engaged with the challenges of flying a heavy lift helicopter.

The flight crew are part of the combat team throughout the mission, rather than having to focus largely on operating the aircraft.

The USMC clearly needs this aircraft now, and work its integration into the fleet.

And unlike the experience of Osprey Nation, the CH-53K nation have the advantage of a significant jump on the way ahead with the sustainability of the aircraft.

The Marines have learned from the earlier Osprey experience.

They have set up a logistics team in New River working through from a practical point of view, how to implement and improve the maintainability of the aircraft from the ground up.

In the context of a strategic shift from the land wars of the Middle East to higher tempo crisis management operations which can involve conflict with peer competitors, it is hard to understand how any serious defense analyst would want to compare this aircraft with that of the Chinook.

If the Pentagon is serious about the National Security Strategy, it is time to take seriously the shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management.

Unfortunately, when acquisition debates occur, considerations of the nature of the strategic shift is not being taken seriously enough and comparisons are sought with new combat systems built for the new strategic environment with older systems which have operated for the past 20 years in the counter-insurgency wars.

If the need to equip the force for the new strategic situation, it is difficult to understand why the CH-53K would not be considered a key stakeholder in the new force critical to operate in full spectrum crisis management.

It is good news then that the US Navy has just awarded a contract to Sikorsky to build additional Ch-53ks.

In a recent press release by Naval Air Systems Command dated May 17, 2019:

WASHINGTON (NNS) — The Naval Air Systems Command awarded on May 17 a $1.3 billion Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lots 2 and 3 contract for 12 aircraft to Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin company, Stratford, Conn. for the U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion.

“The Marine Corps is very appreciative of the efforts by the Navy and our industry partners to be able to award the LRIP 2/3 contract,” said Lt. Gen. Steven Rudder, Deputy Commandant for Aviation. This is a win for the Marine Corps and will secure the heavy-lift capability we need to meet future operational requirements and support the National Defense Strategy.  I’m very confident in the success of the CH-53K program and look forward to fielding this critical capability.”

The most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense, the CH-53K King Stallion is a new-build helicopter that will expand the fleet’s ability to move more material, more rapidly throughout the area of responsibility using proven and mature technologies. The CH-53K is the only aircraft able to provide the Marine Corps with the heavy-lift capability it needs to meet future operational requirements for the vertical lift mission.

 “This contract award reflects close cooperation and risk sharing between the Government and industry teams to deliver critical capabilities to the Marine Corps,” said James Geurts, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition.  “Working with our industry partners, the team ensured that solutions for technical challenges are incorporated into these production aircraft. This reflects the urgency to ensure we deliver capabilities necessary to support the Marine Corps and the Department of Navy’s mission, while continuing to drive affordability and accountability into the program.”

Designed and demonstrated the lift capability of nearly 14 tons (27,000lbs/12,247 kg) at a mission radius of 110 nautical miles (203 km), in Navy high/hot environments, the CH-53K lifts triple the baseline CH-53E lift capability. The CH-53K has proven the ability to lift up to 36,000lbs via the external cargo hook. The CH-53K will have an equivalent logistics shipboard footprint, lower operating costs per aircraft, and less direct maintenance man hours per flight hour. The combination of unmatched heavy-lift and range, fly-by-wire flight controls, with an advanced, integrated communications suite will provide the Marine Corps with the operational flexibility necessary to gain and, more importantly, sustain a tactical edge on the battlefield.

And an article by Megan Eckstein of USNI News published as well on May 17, 2019 provided further insight with regard too the decision.

In a Friday news release, Navy and Marine Corps leadership expressed confidence in the program despite the challenges it has faced over the past year or so.

“The Marine Corps is very appreciative of the efforts by the Navy and our industry partners to be able to award the LRIP 2/3 contract,” Lt. Gen. Steven Rudder, the deputy commandant for aviation, said in a news release.

“This is a win for the Marine Corps and will secure the heavy-lift capability we need to meet future operational requirements and support the National Defense Strategy. I’m very confident in the success of the CH-53K program and look forward to fielding this critical capability.”

“This contract award reflects close cooperation and risk sharing between the Government and industry teams to deliver critical capabilities to the Marine Corps,” James Geurts, assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development and acquisition, said in the release.

“Working with our industry partners, the team ensured that solutions for technical challenges are incorporated into these production aircraft. This reflects the urgency to ensure we deliver capabilities necessary to support the Marine Corps and the Department of Navy’s mission, while continuing to drive affordability and accountability into the program.”

In a House Armed Services Committee hearing earlier this spring, Daniel Nega, the deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for air programs, told lawmakers on the tactical air and land forces subcommittee that the upcoming contract would put the onus on Sikorsky to address remaining design flaws and fix any other problems that come up during the remainder of testing.

“The flight envelope’s been tested to the corners; Gen. Rudder talked about how we’ve sort of wrung it out,” he said at the hearing.  “There’s a relatively low risk that anything major will be found. However, if nuisance issues come along, we are not going to give those nuisance issues to the Marines, and the Navy and Marine Corps team is not going to accept the full risk of that. So the risk concurrency between the development and the production, that overlap is going to be taken care of.”

Asked how the contract awarded today would do that, Hernandez told USNI News that “the production contract is structured to ensure a deployable configuration is delivered for fleet use. All known issues are included in the contract, additionally the contract provides provisions for any new issues discovered during flight testing. This will ensure appropriate shared risk between the government and industry.”

The article also discussed upcoming sea trials for the CH-53K which will take the lessons learned at New River with regard to maintainability to sea.

Initial operational test and evaluation is set to begin in early 2021, which would allow the Marine Corps to declare initial operational capability in time for the first deployment in 2023 or 2024.

Though work still remains to be done, Paul Fortunato, director of Marine Corps business development at Sikorsky, and John Rucci, the company’s senior experimental test pilot for the CH-53K, said the new helicopter has already proven it is easier to operate and maintain than its predecessor and that its warfighting capability surpasses the requirements for the aircraft.

Rucci said pilots have total trust in the fly-by-wire cockpit, which essentially lands the helicopter on its own – meaning the pilots can focus on the mission at hand or evading a threat, or can safely land in a sandstorm or other degraded conditions.

And Fortunato said the helo was built with easy maintenance in mind: fewer tools are required, the all-electronic maintenance documents include graphics that maintainers can zoom in on and rotate to help them maintain or repair parts, the logistics footprint is smaller and easier for deployments aboard amphibious ships. The design even includes putting electronic components in “backwards,” meaning the connections are facing outwards and easily accessible when maintainers take off a panel, instead of the wiring being in the back like usual and requiring a Marine to use a mirror to see what is going on behind the component.

At Marine Corps Air Station New River in North Carolina, Falk said, Marines are using one of the system demonstration test article (SDTA) helicopters to work out any remaining issues in the maintenance manuals and to start learning more about how to fix and sustain the new helo.

“There’s Marines crawling around that aircraft, taking it apart, putting it back together again, running the maintenance procedures, and basically using what we developed in order for them to be able to maintain the aircraft,” Falk said.  “So the opportunity for us before we start delivering production aircraft, we can learn from that, we can feed all that back, we can improve our maintenance procedures and basically when the aircraft is deployed deliver a much higher-quality, more efficient set of maintenance instructions. Plus, you’ve got Marines that have already used it, done it, learned.”

For the complete article, see the following:

Navy Awards Sikorsky $1.13B for Next 12 CH-53K Heavy-Lift Helicopters

Reshaping the Osprey Fleet: The Logistics Challenge

05/21/2019

By Robbin Laird

I have had the opportunity to follow the standup of the Osprey from the outset of its first deployments.

Clearly, one highlight of shaping that narrative was the first time it was used in combat in Afghanistan.

That interview was done by phone with Lt Col. Bianca, the squadron commander, and the sound of the Ospreys come back from its first combat mission in Afghanistan could be heard in the background.

On February 9th, 2010, “Second Line of Defense”‘ followed up its earlier interview with the Osprey squadron just before its deployment to Afghanistan last November with a new one, this time directly from Afghanistan, with Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca, the Osprey Squadron Commander. 

The most compelling point underscored by the squadron commander is how, in effect, the Osprey has inverted infrastructure and platform. 

Normally, the infrastructure shapes what the platform can do. Indeed, a rotorcraft or a fixed wing aircraft can operate under specific circumstances.

With the range and speed of the Osprey aircraft, the plane shapes an overarching infrastructure allowing the ground forces to range over all of Afghanistan, or to be supported where there are no airfields, or where distributed forces need support. 

The envelopment role of the Osprey is evident in Afghanistan as well, whereby the Osprey can provide the other end of the operational blow for the ground or rotorcrafts in hot pursuit of Taliban. The Osprey can move seamlessly in front of rotorcraft and land forces, allowing the pursuit of different lines of attack. 

Now more than a decade later, the initial Ospreys have grown into a large fleet operated by the USMC, the USAF, and now the US Navy and with the acquisition by Japan of Ospreys, the first foreign customer of the aircraft.

And the aircraft operates world wide on the aircraft, and in the words of MAG-26 Commander, Col. Boniface, and “soon the sun will never set on the Osprey as a globally deployed aircraft.”

But unfortunately, the sustainment side of the creation of the globally deployed aircraft has not been matched by shaping a global sustainment enterprise.

It is clear that to get full value from a globally deployed platform like the Osprey, it is crucial to have a logistical system in place which can allow for sustainable global operations at the point of interest or attack, rather than simply waiting for parts to show up from the next Fed Ex shipment to a remote location from a depot based in the United States.

This is especially important as the US and its allies face 21stcentury authoritarian powers who will also focus on the disruption of an already Balkanized logistical operation.

During my visit to 2ndMarine Air Wing in April 2019, I had a chance to discuss the challenge with a very experienced Marine Corps logistics officer, Major Paul M. Herrle. He is currently is head of MALS-26 which is part of MAG-26.

Throughout the discussion, Major Herrle underscored that with the growth of the Osprey numbers, there now was in place a large fleet.  But that it was not managed as such.  A core point is that even though parts are common throughout the fleet, the USAF has one sustainment system, the Marines another, and with new members of Osprey nation, yet other sustainment systems in play.

He argued that it was increasingly crucial to have an integrated sustainment system and one, which could flow parts to a globally deployed force as well.

He put the challenge this way.

“The USAF supports its ospreys from England; but we can not tap into that support structure to support our SP-MAGTF force in Europe, for example.

“Right now I cannot use USAF parts if I need them.

“I cannot touch the parts on the ship as well.

“I cannot do lateral support from the amphibious ships parts as well for SP-MAGTF.”

He noted that a great deal of his work was leveraging his networks to find ways to fill the gaps, but from his point of view, this is clearly not the way to do business, especially with a mature global fleet of operational aircraft.

The USMC is working to take the multiple configurations of the Osprey and building a common configuration, something being worked at the Boeing plant in Philadelphia.

But alongside this effort, it would make sense to have a common sustainment system, and one which has global hubs from which parts can flow to the fleet, both in normal operations and in crisis situations.

As the USMC is the nations crisis response force, there is a clear need for a sustainment system which could actually function as a core element of the strategic capability to prevail in a crisis.

But as it stands right now, and this is my perspective, and not one I am attributing to Major Herrle, we have created a significant strategic vulnerability, which clearly our peer adversaries will seek to exploit.

Rather than being able to leverage a globally sustained fleet of global aircraft, we have a Balkanized logistical system which is designed from the outset to sub-optimize performance.

Perhaps we can do that in slo-mo war but certainly not in full spectrum crisis management, where we can assume high tempo operations will be required.

First to the fight, but without a durability to continue the fight, is not a strategic motto, I would choose to embrace.

The photos in the slideshow were provided by Lt. Col. Bianca and highlight the Osprey in Afghanistan in early 2010.

For articles highlighting the evolution of Osprey Nation, see the following:

https://defense.info/system-type/rotor-and-tiltrotor-systems/the-osprey/

With regard to the background of Major Herrle, his experience speaks for itself.

The featured photo shows two MV-22 Ospreys, assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 268, flying past the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) during flight operations in support of Exercise Balikatan 2019.

Exercise Balikatan, in its 35th iteration, is an annual U.S., Philippine military training exercise focused on a variety of missions, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-terrorism, and other combined military operations.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Daniel Barker)

See also:

The Evolution of Osprey Nation: Next Steps

An Update on SP-MAGTF: From the Logistical Point of View

Strategy, Concepts of Operations and Technology: The Challenge and Opportunity of Shaping a Distributed C2 Enabled Force

05/20/2019

By Robbin Laird

I would argue that the US and its allies are not so much facing a great power competition. I would refer to it as a global contest between 21st century authoritarian powers and the liberal democracies.

And on each side of the competition there is significant cross learning going on. With regard to the authoritarian powers, Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, just to mention the most prominent they are clearly playing off of each other’s policies challenging the democracies and, in some cases, actively collaborating,

With regard to challenging the democracies, these authoritarian states are using what some in the West refer to a “whole of government policies” or in other words, using a very wide range of tool sets to try to disrupt an dominate

It is clear that the democratic powers need to find ways to expand their own tool sets to respond, including capabilities such as offensive cyber operations.

One clear line of difference is the reliance of the authoritarian militaries on hierarchical decision making versus the potential for Western militaries to shape a much more flexible, distributed force.

But for the Western forces to do so will requires a significant change beyond the legacies of the land wars. 

In the land wars, which have been intensive from time to time but are largely slow mo war from a strategic point of view. The West has shaped rules of engagement which create a very hierarchical C2 system.

The new video technologies and new communications systems have been shackled by a centralized command structure.

And if this template continues, the West will lose a significant advantage which new technologies will allow. 

This is why analysis of military technologies can never stop with an analysis of technologies, but must look to concepts of operations, training and the system of authority which militaries are built around.

An interview which I did some time ago with Robert Evans, formerly of Northrop Grumman and now with Cubic Corporation highlighted what the technology built into the F-35 could unleash in terms of C2.

Formations of F-35s can work and share together so that they can “audible” the play.

They can work togethe, sensing all that they can sense, fusing information, and overwhelming whatever defense is presented to them in a way that the legacy command and control simply cannot keep up with, nor should keep up with.

That’s what F-35 brings.

If warfighters were to apply the same C2 approach used for traditional airpower to the F-35 they would really be missing the point of what the F-35 fleet can bring to the future fight.

In the future, they might task the F-35 fleet to operate in the battlespace and affect targets that they believe are important to support the commander’s strategy, but while those advanced fighters are out there, they can collaborate with other forces in the battlespace to support broader objectives.

The F-35 pilot could be given much broader authorities and wields much greater capabilities, so the tasks could be less specific and more broadly defined by mission type orders, based on the commander’s intent.

He will have the ability to influence the battlespace not just within his specific package, but working with others in the battlespace against broader objectives.

Collaboration is greatly enhanced, and mutual support is driven to entirely new heights.

The F-35 pilot in the future becomes in some ways, an air battle manager who is really participating in a much more advanced offense, if you will, than did the aircrews of the legacy generation.

What Evans identified was a potential inherent within the F-35 which can be delivered by the integrated combat systems on the aircraft which can not only create data fusion but a very different decision-making system, one able to operate very effectively and comprehensively at the tactical edge.

But this advantage built into the aircraft will simply not be realized if the older templates of decision making are pursued; and this will be doubly a challenge if this happens as the authoritarian states are building strike in mass directed by hierarchical decision making as a key way ahead.

This will not happen by itself and requires a very different approach to C2 and building out from this approach to capturing the technologies which will accelerate this potential strategic advantage as well.

The F-35 with its DAS systems and its integrated approach for a man-machine system to managing data and to establish a very different approach to reversing the relationship between C2 and SA, whereby decision making at the speed of light gets enhanced by man-machine capabilities on board the aircraft informed by data coming into the network is laying the foundation for a broader revolution.

But this revolution can be enabled by the technology but will not happen unless the services and the allies embrace it and shape new distributed decision-making templates.

The global fleet of F-35s lays a solid foundation for engaging a broad coalition of liberal democratic military powers to contribute to shaping s new template of decision making and distributed concepts of operations.

In the next piece, I will address a key technological dynamic which is broadening the military sectors which can participation in this C2 revolution and which will dramatically increase the pressure to shape new C2 templates which the liberal democracies can leverage to remain competitive with the growing global impact of the 21stcentury authoritarian powers.

Also, see the following:

Fighting at The Speed of Light: Making it All Work

 

Fighting at The Speed of Light: Making it All Work

By Ed Timperlake

Honoring, and empowering human’s engaged in the deadly serious occupation of defending their fellow citizens as combat warriors in putting their life on the line  is everything in a military analysis before any future technology discussions can begin.

It is no good to talk about future technologies without starting from the nature of warfare and of human engagement in that warfare.

Often looking at ground battles from the earliest recorded days, the forces engaged had a simple guiding rule — kill the enemy in greater numbers.

There is no hard and fast rule from history of what tips a battle one way or another except one core principle: with the will and means to continue to degrade ones opponent winning is enhanced.

The great quip often credited to Grantland Rice who gives full credit to a fellow sports writer  comes to mind;

As Hugh Keough used to say: “The race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; but that is the way to bet.

Such insights actually are biblical from The King James Bible (such poetic writing):

“I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happened to them all.”

At the most basic Payload Utility function, the key to combat success since the dawn of warfare is captured in a  ery simple example — the  great command of  learning the very basic art of accurate marksmanship.

“Ready on the Left Ready on The Right-Already on the firing line” and with that every Marine is trained in the use of their rifle.

Once trained and retrained and retrained until actual combat because  heir skills are never allowed to atrophy the individual Marine has a direct engagement using a very simple payload utility function in shooting the weapon.

The combat utility of the basic rifle is  acquire the target and then accurately engage to kill the enemy.

That type of engagement at the basic infantry level is no different than the senior Generals and Admirals having their fighting forces acquire and engage targets using many different mixed and matched payloads.

This universal way of war is often correctly referred to as combined arms, as layer after layer of direct and indirect fires, kinetic and non-kinetic, weapons are engaged to defeat the enemy.

I created a short hand phrase “Tron” war for that spectrum of non-kinetic offensive and defense  weapons integrated together.

In fighting against a reactive enemy in a larger battle, the aggregation and disaggregation of sensor and shooter platforms with no platform fighting alone is the commanders goal.

Making it all come together effectively is the challenge.

The infantry squad leader directs his combat force by pre-briefing, briefing and then direct voice commands to maneuver his fire team elements during  the very confusing  heat of combat, often accurately called the fog of war.

Using voice commands since biblical days is fighting at the speed of sound it is up close and personal.

However, with early electronic devices, for example the Civil War telegraph, the platoon leader concurrently reached electronically up and down the chain-of-command to be part of a greater focused unity of purpose combat  force.

Commanders at the highest level have to keep both cohesion of the combat engagement mission by effective communications, while concurrently relying on all to engage intelligently relying on their individual initiative to fight to the best of their ability.

Communicated information is essential.

But central as well is empowerment of the force.

The key is to ensure a maximum of capability for combat operations to be able to operate independently with accurate real time dynamic intelligence at the right level at the right time to make their combat function superior to the enemy.

Very little is different from the deck of Navy Strike force or Air Battle or Ground  Commander  from a Marine Platoon commander except the complexity of all the “moving parts” to be managed and employed to fight that are also spread out over very great distance.

Fighting at the Speed of Light

But after two decades of the land wars, we need to learn to fight again in higher intensity operations.

We need to Fight at the Speed of Light.

This requires that a fighting force at all levels must take advantages of ever increasing technological advances to make decisions using the speed of light.

In other words, symbolically as the laws of theoretical physics are evolving, the test is the application phase or the success of the applied physics phase, so to speak. Nothing illustrates this more than E-MC squared to the atomic bombs that ended WWII.

With advances in all forms of “tron” war from Directed Energy, to Cloud Computing to Artificial Intelligence to robust encryption, many building block mathematical algorithms are now assisting the process of generating accurate and timely information in making the step from being  theoretical to applied.

At the moment battle begins, command and control is essential and has to have several attributes.

First and foremost, accurate information has to flow through robust redundant systems at the speed of light in making everything come together to fight and win.

The infantry platoon commander trusts the training and combat effectiveness of each Marine to do the right thing using initiative in following orders in the heat of battle while also trusting higher commands to provide supporting arms, including air, to get it right and at the right time.

The communication and intelligence capability in this  21stCentury evolution/revolution of global coms is the connective tissue for human decisions with how to  conduct successful operations and to use payloads effectively at the speed of light.

This where the capabilities begin to come together.

The future is now because from today “zero day” to five years out, there is sufficient insight to merge the human combat brain functioning  with existing and near term technology to fight and win in any combat theater.

We have highlighted the importance of the 0-5 military and the central significance of how technology is integrated into evolving concepts of operations rather than focusing on an abstract long term future.

Recently, a senior British commander when discussing our approach referred to this as the rolling FYDP which in his view is crucial to engaging in combat operations successfully going forward, rather than abstracting waiting for the best hi tech solution some think tank could come up with.

America is blessed that many in the defense industrial base in responding to combat requirements have answered the challenge to build systems of systems inside the emerging Kill Web way of fighting, vice obsolete Hub Spoke and linear Kill Chain thinking.

First existing command and control is always against a reactive enemy a time dependent factor that is critical to force level combat.

If a commander can count having the initiative combat ops tempo over the enemy then his forces can be dynamically optimized as a coherent combat directed fighting force.

This is the challenge of effective command and control, of course ultimately the commander has to always have the wisdom and judgment to fight to win effectively.

If victory in battle could have been simple engineered it would have already been done so.

The Challenge

Given competent and skilled commanders there are two qualities of a fighting force that are needed for the force to derive the full capabilities of its weapons systems.

The first is motivation or dedication, or call it; will, heart, ambition or competitiveness. It is the quality that makes  fighting personnel appear enthusiastic rather than lackadaisical or dispirited.

The second is a forces technological capability which is the ability at the appropriate level to have the capacity to understand and operate the rather sophisticated equipment associated with modern war.

Marrying force motivation with technological capability allows a superior force to achieve combat performance over the enemy. It is a combination of appropriate combat equipment at all levels of any engagement operated by trained individuals .\ Inventory of weapons systems and platforms, including sufficient munitions at the start of a war can make all the difference.

The time factor of both battle damage repair with any possible industrial surge and sufficient logistical supply/resupply  while ensuring a pipeline of well-trained individuals from  E-1, basic initial enlisted rank  to 0-10, Admiral or General is simple to identify  but a huge challenge to get it so right at the time of initial conflict.  Trained humans matched up to technology is an obvious statement and makes all the difference as a combat campaign progresses.

The biggest challenge in the rapidly exploding human/information dynamic in this 21stCentury challenge of modern war is the ability to have all make accurate decisions using light speed technology.

The Big Three

The emerging “Big Three” of 21stCentury Tron war are: Cloud Computing, Artificial Intelligence and ever advancing encryption technology.

There are many appropriate technological stovepiped research applications which can be drawn upon to shape a dynamic integrated capability.

Cloud computing, Artificial Intelligence and secure encryption are very appropriate research areas unto themselves. There is also the need to be ever technology and con-op vigilant for a counterpunch combat challenge of a reactive enemy always working to deny their enemy’s (US) successful employment of our Big Three while protecting the development and employment of  their own.

Remember it is not just about the money but it always about the money.

Cloud Computing

Cloud Computing R&E with the recent sole source DOD contract of Ten Billion awarded to Amazon comes at just the right time. Such a massive influx of R&D money if managed smartly will make a significant difference to advance US military cloud computing capabilities.

American military test and exercise planners can easily horizontally intellectually work inside emerging Cloud, Kill Webs, with the template of the payload utility function of multi-domain, multi platforms sensors and shooters with no platform fighting alone.

Combat Cloud research and engineering can be tied together as a global enabler to fight at the speed of light.

Success in building testing and using cloud computing emerging capabilities can become a significant component of a combat force engaged in stopping a strategic nuclear attack delivered by hypersonic weapons at all levels of threat-from space and atmospheric maneuvering glide to sub launched HSCM.

The potential of ready secure data being interactive at all levels of command is an intriguing concept. The theory and execution of “Kill Webs” by the U.S. Sea Services shows great promise.

The US Navy has pioneered the Kill Web concept versus the kill chain, with the latter reflecting linear thinking.

A global Combat Cloud  built as  a secure, robust, and redundant go to source of data based decision making at light speed can provide useful warfighing networking and intelligence sharing concurrently in and out of each combat theater.

This potential real time combat dynamic learning at all levels of command and when needed capability is central to the way ahead.

This will allow directed combat action sensor/shooters delegated down to all and will be very significant at all levels of force engagements.

In other words,  successful cloud research is tailor made to have scalable forces operating around the globe using the same data base.

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly approaching fleet wide empowerment to make truly actual speed of light decisions. It is not necessary to try and integrate AI into diverse military utility functions because it will most definitely find it’s own way in.

The Defense Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) is championing AI research.

For more than five decades, DARPA has been a leader in generating groundbreaking research and development (R&D) that facilitated the advancement and application of rule-based and statistical-learning based AI technologies.

Today, DARPA continues to lead innovation in AI research as it funds a broad portfolio of R&D programs, ranging from basic research to advanced technology development.

DARPA announced in September 2018 a multi-year investment of more than $2 billion in new and existing programs called the “AI Next” campaign.

What should not be overlooked by DOD and, specifically DARPA, is the fact that Medicine has been pioneering many dimensions of AI, with significant research investments. Although HIPAA privacy rules and DOD Classification protocols are different, they both have a very similar issue to deal with: to guard the sanctity of data and there are significant penalties in each system.. Violate HIPAA  and there can be significant private sector law suits. Violate the sacred trust of one’s security clearance and it can be a career ending mistake at a minimum.

So far the differential in research money between Military AI research and medical AI research greatly favors medicine

“Healthcare Artificial Intelligence Market to Top $34B by 2025”

This would suggest that learning from what currently exists in medical AI should most definitely be part of any important DARPA  research way ahead.

The global market will rise to the challenge of synthesizing massive volumes of big data though machine learning techniques, including deep learning, semantic computing, and neural networks, according to the report.

Key clinical and operational areas will include medical imaging analytics, drug discovery and clinical trials, clinical decision support, natural language processing, biomarker discovery, and patient management.

Software developers seeking to address these use cases are likely to see $8.6 billion in annual revenue by 2025, contributing to the $34 billion total in software sales, hardware installations, and consulting opportunities within the AI market.

(Note Medicine is already integrating AI and Cloud Computing)

Cloud-based solutions accounted for the largest segment of the software and service market in 2017, and are likely to continue to grow in popularity as organizations seek speedy, low-cost options for deploying and maintaining health IT systems.

Two examples of AI in a health care applications touch on just two of  countless lessons from a community spending billions  of dollars already.

First, a paper on deep learning and a computer vision in which deep learning can outperform humans highlights research in the health field of relevance to defense.

Examining the use of AI for Imaging in Clinical Care

Aalpen A. Patel, MD, Chair, Department of Radiology, Geisinger Health

In recent years, deep learning has revolutionized the field of computer vision. In ImageNet competition, deep learning models are now outperforming humans in object detection and classification. In medical imaging, deep learning has been used in variety of image processing tasks such as segmentation and in recent years, for diagnostic purposes such as diabetic retinopathy and skin cancer detection using large medical datasets. 

More recently, we have published a paper describing DL based identification of intracranial hemorrhage on CT scans of the head and using it to prioritize the list for interpretation. 

We believe that using large clinical grade, heterogenous data set is extremely valuable in generalizing and translating to clinical tools.  This is just the beginning – combining all the -ologies, -omics with imaging will lead to insights we have not had before.

AND this is a universal dynamic as DOD research moves forward:

Avoiding Hype and False Conclusions About AI in Medicine: Key Concepts and Examples

Mike Zalis, MD, Associate Professor of Radiology, Harvard Medical School

With advances of machine intelligence in healthcare, key stakeholders risk suffering from an inflation of expectations and misunderstanding of capabilities. This talk will summarize key conceptual underpinnings of machine learning methods and discuss academic and industry implementation examples of AI in healthcare. The goal of this talk is support participants in adroit critical thinking as they face potential applications, initiatives, and products involving AI in healthcare.

Encryption

Ever improving encryption technology can take many different research paths and often can create as much confusion as enlightenment.

Just one example of interesting research paths this is  building a “Security Token”-

One example of dynamic possibilities in this field can be ways t leverage encryption technologies from the Bitcoin world.

This is but one example of many was to encrypt data based information. I am not engaging in the Bitcoin money fight-just the proof of concept of using block chain math  potential for national security information secure  transmittal research.

One should always be mindful of a word of warning from a man owning 10% of all bitcoins in the world of the damage of a very early  bad start; never make a Security Token-as brutally said by the owner of 10% of all bitcoins isn the world  a  “Shit token”  inside  a corrupted ecosystem. The key is always “trust of information” in any ecosystem.

A “value” of bitcoins is obvious, when thought about, is that in the actual creation process it is not just “value” but it is also a standalone unique “nugget” of information.

The mathematical protected uniqueness of each bitcoin now may highlight a way of transferring classified information flow in 21st Century war fighting enterprise.

Instead of focusing on “bitcoin” as a unit of value which is a very real attribute, think of creating  mathematically unique  “nuggets” that when ‘spent”  are  used to “buy” or  actually access classified information..

Thanks to a Cornell Professor’s research using a unit of Block-chain math in perhaps securely fighting at the speed of light has had a brilliant proof of concept.

Intel’s core idea allows users to run their code unmolested in a secure enclave. That means both ends of a transaction have the same constraints.

“Normally you don’t know what the computer on the other end of the relationship is going to do,” Sirer says.

“You have no idea what code they’re running or what kind of adversarial behavior they could engage in, so you have to write your protocols in the most conservative manner possible.

“But with this technology, you know exactly what code the other side has, and you’re assured the person cannot change or violate the integrity of that code.

“This allows us to build mechanisms on top that are much more efficient.”

In a test, Sirer and his colleagues set up a Teechan channel between Imperial College in London and Cornell University and sent transactions across the Atlantic at the blistering fast speed of one-one-hundred-thousandth of a second

Shaping a Way Ahead

The senior leadership challenge in defense is to foster and accept innovations generated within “stovepipe” fielding processes from vertical IR&D to R&D to requirements and to engage in cross-learning, It is not enough to introduce innovation in the individual sectors,

The challenge and the opportunity to empower decision making at the speed of light by shaping integrated C2 drawing upon these technologies in the big three areas of innovation,

Rather than chase individual emerging technologies such as the Cloud, AI or encryption  it is much more productive to immediately begin the “applied physics” phase of crafting experiments for dynamic iterative solutions that  allow all to constantly learn how to fight at the speed of light.

Each of the “Big Three” has it’s own R&D dynamic so having an open dynamic testing process can accommodate each technology’s current practical demonstrated capability — all constantly  integrated together in an open loop learning but operational cycle.

Accurate, timely, target acquisition and target engagement leading to payload utility success from the heavens to under water is the goal.

Shaping success is ongoing con-ops learning process success is found in the Nike saying of just do it.

It is not about simply discussing technology in isolation.

As the cloud comes on line, we can embrace it as a dynamic way to share information.

As AI improves in many situations, the human factor can be successfully taken out of the loop. One huge caution in that there is both promise and danger in getting AI correct to consider never having  a totally closed loop AI engagement process.

Encryption is a wondrous field of research and mathematical advance are being made every day.

For the most advanced military forces in the world, the most practical way to learn to fight at the speed of light begins just like the first command a private hears  “Ready on the Right Ready on the Left,  with the  boundaries of being ready on right and left incorporate global engagements with all weapons.

The command “Ready”  can begin on instrumented training  ranges. Not only is training for training sake essential, but just like the individual Marine sees exactly where his rounds have hit the target.

The real time data collected on instrumented ranges is everything for enragement improvements at all levels.

Feeding back the captured range data results in trying to make accurate payload decisions at light speed can accelerate all aspects of future combat success.

Hard data from instrumented ranges is the most essential building block of marrying human capacity with their ever improving force technological adeptness.

For all who want to successfully fight at the speed of light, they are only limited by their imagination on how to mix and match offensive and defense engagement exercises on instrumented ranges.

One simple example, one could deploy staggered F-35s on station hundreds miles apart integrated with advanced Hawkeyes, UAVs  and active AEGIS ships and then run very fast low level bogies with a minimum RCR signature at them from hundreds of miles away.

Then clock the ability to safely pass target acquisition and then weapon engagement data  against such a threat.

Finally, begin to include Space Assets after testing integrated “air-breathing” systems. I suspect Space is nice but might not be the panacea all believe it can be in the year 2030.

After such a series of engagements break the problem down to simple questions with the focus being only technology available specifically in a  0-to 5 years out year time horizon with a rolling FYDP being created.

Conclusion

The future of combat is very high right now and it is essential to deal interactively with these various dynamics:

Will Combat Cloud research help?

Will AI make a difference?

Is encryption of data essential?

How can various platforms mix and match weapon payloads?

What is the current and five year out use  of space based systems.

Do all types of UAVs help?

What difference does ever improving Directed Energy make?

If the threat comes from below the surface, on the sea or land or screaming from space, where does existing technology come together and where are deadly seams for an adversary to exploit?

If a very fast set of bogies, one R&D team suggests several F-104s as adversary, what is similar with low flying Mach 1+ targets to being different from hypersonic incoming warheads going a mile a second .

With that initial lower Mach data collected than asked the above questions again and again and again, so successful ways ahead will be discovered by integrating in considerations of  HSCM and advanced BMD (including hypersonic maneuvering glide warheads) .

Eventually the research and testing is for both Live Virtual Ranges and computer simulations.

But nothing should take the place of first learning by doing in building from limited in geography operations to the very large global combat.

With respect to U.S. test ranges, the East Coast military Warning Areas are perfect, eventually Allies can be part of learning by doing.

Four distinct possible combat global areas could be considered to eventually  test proof of concepts between US and Allies while building stronger integrated combat Kill Webs;

The round two of suggested research, after limited test range experiments is to acknowledge the global  geography of threats being  both similar and different all with the common  threat of escalation into a potential nuclear weapon exchange.

Looking at potential flash points of global threat areas that the American Military  has  can be seen in four  “wicked” combat theaters anyone of which can  escalate to major  tactical  and strategic use of  of Nuclear Weapons.

  1. South China Sea
  2. North Pacific
  3. Nordics
  4. Battle of the Atlantic.

My personal opinion is research will  demand  better quicker longer reach payloads as the most pressing challenge.

America might have to go back to the future in looking a very low yield Nuc warheads.

But that is a national debate, including all Allies,  fraught with much political danger but it still may be considered as the most productive way ahead to save a Navy Carrier strike force.

A Nuc is one heck of a Payload Utility function.