Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Evolution of Osprey Nation: Next Steps

Posted on May 18, 2019 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

05/18/2019

By Robbin Laird

During a recent visit to New River Marine Corps Air Station, I had a chance to meet with the CO of MAG-26, Colonel Boniface and members of his team.

I first met him at the standup of the Osprey and viewed its first impacts on Marine Corps operations.

The early days of Osprey Nation required establishing a significant learning curve with regard to the aircraft and leveraging the Osprey in terms of changing USMC and USN concepts of operations.

The Osprey has spearheaded significant change with regard to the Amphibious Ready Group, in which the ships in the ARG-MEU would operate at much greater distance from one another, and migrated into what I have referred to as an amphibious task force rather than thinking of it as the traditional ARG-MEU and its three-ship operation within a 200 square mile box.

The inclusion now of the F-35B into the task force has added significant new capabilities which when added to the Osprey allow for a very capable force able to operate from the seabase.

But the Osprey as it has matured faces new challenges and obstacles to overcome as the Osprey Nation evolves and as the new heavy lift helicopter– the CH-53K — is added to the fleet as well as other new capabilities for the force.

A major challenge, which the USN-USMC team faces, is simply the shortage of amphibious ships from which to operate.

As the capabilities of the force have gone up, the number of amphibious ships has gone down.

Clearly, this is a challenge, which can be met, but only if there is a ramp up of amphibious ship construction.

There is also the very significant challenge to the amphibious fleet provided by the increasingly integrated digital force operating off of the ships in the fleet, namely, the IT and C2 systems are much more limited than what a digitally integrated force of Ospreys, F-35Bs and CH-53Ks can deliver to the ARG-MEU commander.

During our meeting in April 2019, Col. Boniface focused on two major challenges, which he sees with regard to the way ahead for Osprey nation.

The Training Challenge

There is a significant challenge and opportunity, which he sees with regard to training.

Prior to the US Navy and the Japanese acquiring the Osprey, the main focus has been upon training Marines or the Air Force, with the latter taking their training into the Special Ops forces, which operate the CV-22.

Now with the growth in Osprey Nation comes the challenge to provide adequate training opportunities to the new partners and allies within a single integrated training squadron operating within MAG-26.

The first aspect of the challenge is to ensure that the Navy pilots and maintainers do not repeat the sins of the past by following the same path which the Marines followed in its earlier days of learning how to operate the aircraft.

According to Col. Boniface: “Learning has definitively occurred over the last 15 years and we must incorporate those lessons learned and attempt to speed up the maturation phase by accelerating the process much like, “Sixth graders skipping middle school and going directly into high school” vice following a traditional model which takes them through the rest of elementary school into junior high school.”

“We know where the past mistakes were made and we have done a good job revising the entire syllabus. More to the point, we know what is critically important to operate successfully and safely this aircraft.”

A key way to do this is to have Navy pilots and maintainers serve on amphibious ships and to learn their skill sets in operational conditions—operating in the conditions that will replicate future missions.

According to Col. Boniface: “On the next MEU we’re actually integrating more Navy maintainers, more pilots and crew chiefs into a composite MEU ACE Squadron.

“This approach shows a lot of potential.

“These Sailors are not rookies; they have a tremendous amount of experience and while they learn how to maintain and fly an Osprey from ARG shipping they also provide vital aviation maintenance experience to our younger Marines.

“It is an absolute win for both services.”

Deployment decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, but clearly accelerate US Navy learning.

Cold Weather Training for VMM-266 Osprey Squadron from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

The majority of the Navy pilots come from the Carrier Onboard Deliver or COD community in the US Navy, although there are SH-60 pilots as well.

But what the Navy has seen as the Osprey has flown to the Carrier is that the Osprey can land directly on the deck as a helicopter and does not need to trap. This means that the Osprey can fly into the carrier saving landing time and space as well.

Col. Boniface commented: “Some of our Navy partners recently flew out to a “big deck” carrier and performed a proof of concept flying the MV-22 in a COD mission scenario while integrating into the F-18 flight pattern.

“They were able to do maintain an integrated five-minute flight pattern around the ship without having to trap.”

“Bottom line, instead of having to take a trap, unhook, taxi etc., you just come in land like a traditional helicopter.

“You unload, load and your off again.

“No current COD approach has that capability built into it.”

New Users and the Expanded Global Fleet

A second major challenge is to ensure that the USMC’s new partners and allies operate safe and successfully for the Osprey has come to become a central player in the evolution of USMC capabilities. There is very little interest in having enhanced use by the US Navy or the Japanese lead in any way to negative performance, up to and including accidents of various sorts.

With regard to the training of the Japanese, the pilots and maintainers have to conduct all operations in English. This has been a challenge for the Japanese, but they have been showing a tremendous amount of success in this realm.

The growing numbers of Ospreys has some challenges of its own.

These largely revolve around parts shortages.

According to Col. Boniface: “The focus of the past couple of years has been upon getting more parts into the wholesale system while moving retail parts as close the aircraft as possible.

“The real challenge is how do we do this in a somewhat resource deficient enterprise.

“Prioritizing correctly while developing a suitable forecasting and reliability tool is the key to distributing supply material to the right user quickly and efficiently not just in the U.S., but throughout the world.”

There still is no global sourcing approach in terms of ensuring that parts are closer to the operational forces operating worldwide as opposed to ensuring parts are closer to the depots.

This would mean that the advantages which a global fleet of Ospreys could provide in a crisis would be reduced significantly as parts shortages, choke points and shortfalls would undercut the ability to leverage what the Osprey Nation could bring to the fight.

In past discussions with Col. Boniface, he has repeatedly underscored the importance of getting a solid global support system in place.

But clearly, we are not yet there.

This is how Col. Boniface put the challenge: “By right sizing, or more to the point balancing our community, we can more easily distribute supply material availability to the operator because we are better prepared to manage operational tempo.

“A global mindset allows for a refined flow of parts throughout the world because while we might not know exactly where the next fight will be, we have an accurate model for forecasting and reliability. ”

With regard to the supply chain, clearly the Osprey is facing major challenges.

Colonel Boniface put it this way:“ Our operational fleet is approaching 20 years old.

“We are now looking at mid-life upgrades which always ramps up maintenance costs and time.

“We have new partners and allies flying this aircraft and more possibly on the way, but we have not significantly refined or in some cases reinforced our supply material availability.

“PMA-275 at Pax River has been outstanding by ramping up Performance Based Logistics Contracts to ensure more effective delivery of parts on a timely basis.

“However, the growth in the community has not been fully accounted for in terms of the supply chain demand side.”

I added that from my work in Australia, the question of sustainability through a crisis simply augments the challenge, which he described.

If the Pentagon believes we’re dealing with high-end warfare demands, we have to have a supply chain that can deal with high-end crises.

That means however efficient the supply chain is currently, we have to actually relook at it from the standpoint of how do we maintain a global fleet for a significant period of time.

Moscow Conference on International Security, 2019

Posted on May 16, 2019 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

05/16/2019

By Richard Weitz

Last month, Second Line of Defense attended the eighht annual Moscow Conference on International Security (MCIS-2019), which met from April 24-26.

The Russian capital was surprisingly warm, with the temperature higher than in Washington, but the frigidity of the Russian-U.S. relationship was pervasive at the conference.

The Russian speakers, which included the country’s senior national security leadership, said that they wanted greater cooperation with the West, but there was no expectation that this might occur soon given the wide gap in the two sides’ positions and perceptions.

Excluding some favorable comments about Russian-Western (and Chinese) collaboration regarding Afghanistan and the Korean Peninsula., the Russian speakers mostly criticized various Western policies.

Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev depictedWestern governments as resisting necessary reforms in established international laws and norms to accord with the new realities of a multipolar world order. Instead, Patrushev accused the West of trying to impose alien values and political systems on foreign countries.

In his keynote address, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu charged the West with creating new global dividing lines and the United States with reviving the Monroe Doctrine in punishing Venezuela.

Shoigu warned that, in response to NATO’s strengthening its military power near Russia’s borders, including the Baltic and Black Sea regions, Moscow would pursue countermeasures.

The one novelty of Shoigu’s presentation was his denunciation of the supposedly horrendous conditions in the U.S.-controlled refugee camps in Syria, including forced underage homosexuality and a paucity of food and medicine.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrovdelivered one of his standard template speeches. He said that Western governments were repeating the same policies of “geopolitical engineering” in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua that they had earlier pursued in the Middle East and the former Soviet bloc. He interpreted these efforts at regime change as having contributed to terrorism, transnational crime, and illegal trafficking in arms and people.

Additionally, Lavrov charged Washington and its allies with constantly rewriting international laws and manipulating international organizations—violating the principles of sovereign equality and international equality—to advance their specific national interests.

Lavrov castigated supposed Western obstructionism in blocking realization of Moscow’s proposals for a global coalition against terrorism under UN auspices, a Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, and the Russian-Chinese draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space.

The only novel element of Lavrov’s speech was his accusation that the United States had pressured European governments not to attend the conference. In my assessment, however, at least some decided for their own reasons to continue their post-2014 boycott.

In any case. the Western governments had their lowest presence ever. Although NATO governments participated in the first two of these eight conferences, which began in 2012, they started boycotting them in 2014, following NATO’s suspension of most military exchanges with Russia due to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine. Since 2014, some U.S. military personnel attended in civilian dress, but not on this occasion.

Whereas Western governments have continued to avoid the conference, the annual meetings have attracted a large number of defense officials from developing countries.

This year there were many speakers and delegates from Asian, African, South American, and Middle East nations. They were particularly in evidence in the foyer examining the models and brochures of Russian-made weaponry exhibited by various Russian defense companies.

Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Russia’s General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, warned that technological proliferation has empowered individual states and terrorist groups to weld unprecedented tools of violence previously only available to nation states.

Yet, Gerasimovsaw the most serious threat to global stability as allegedly aggressive U.S. policies to control global resources and transportations routes,

Washington’s employment of information technologies to depict governments the United States opposes in a bad light, its use of economic and military coercion as well as other non-kinetic means against foreign targets, and Washington’s alleged violation of international law and exempting itself from international treaties.

Gerasimov correctly noted that U.S. military doctrine has shifted from focusing on counterterrorism to concentrating on great power threats, especially from Russia. He claimed this transformation aimed to justify U.S. military spending buildup.

Although Gerasimov claimed that Russia had displayed maximum military restraint in its countermeasures, and had been forced to redeploy forces to Russia’s western and southern fronts from other military regions, he warned that Russian military planners would have to proceed on the basis of worst-case planning regarding NATO’s moves.

Interestingly, Gerasimov confirmed the assessment of Western analysts that the unexpected Russian military intervention that began in September 2015 had saved a Syrian regime that would, according to Moscow’s calculations, have collapsed in only 1-2 months.

At variance with Western assessments, however, was Gerasimov’s avowal that Russian operations had strived to minimize civilian casualties and other collateral damage.

In his remarks, Sergey Naryshkin, the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, addressed the supposed misperceptions of Euro-Atlantic elites, who he claimed refused to recognize the reality of a multipolar world and therefore resisted it by force, generating global instability.

Naryshkin saw other Western policies, such as the push for multi-culturalism, as sparking populism and additional forms of resistance.

Naryshkin argued that Western governments no longer believed in the world order that they had created and now arbitrarily interpreted international rules.

Unless the West changed its behavior, he warned, other countries will need to build a new world order on their own based on sovereign equality right to develop in their own way.

Beyond substantive arguments, the Russian organizers refined the format of the conference as well as their messaging. This year, they expanded the practice of holding concurrent sessions, at times running a roundtable discussion along with a pair of panel discussions as well as the usual plenary sessions.

These sessions addressed such topics as:

preventing armed conflicts and military incidents,
strengthening military peacekeeping,
the militarization of space,
“hybrid” warfare and “color” revolutions,
the destabilizing implications of missile defense, and
comprehensively addressing terrorist threats (e.g., the spread of extremist ideologies, return of terrorist fighters, post-conflict reconstruction, refugee resettlement).

There was more focus on South American conflicts than in past conferences, which tended to focus on Ukraine and more recently the Middle East.

Another difference was that the Russian speakers did not spare President Trump from criticism, a recognition of the continuities of his policies from those of past U.S. administrations.

In terms of messaging, the Russian organizers adopted the tactic of having prominent officials lay out several tenets in the plenary sessions that other Russian speakers reiterated in the various panels and roundtables.

Still, this year’s session attracted much less attention in the media, even from Russian news agencies, than in previous years.

Unfortunately, the large number of speakers at all the panels and workshops meant that there was no opportunity for audience questions or comments.

Almost all the sessions were broadcast live and then posted on YouTube, expect for several specially sensitive foreign speakers, such as the Chinese and North Korean defense ministers, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces General No Kwang-chol (though I have audio recordings of these presentations available for those interested).

The Decade Ahead for Europe: An EU Perspective

Posted on May 15, 2019 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

05/15/2019

By Robbin Laird

Clearly, Europe is in crisis. In my own view, it faces a double constitutional crisis.

Brexit is an internal constitutional crisis in the “United” Kingdom and poses a constitutional crisis within the European “Union” which is itself undergoing significant regional devolution.

The continental European economies are facing as well significant challenges economically with average growth rates of around 1.5%.

While these internal dynamics are going on, Europe is challenged by the rise of 21st century authoritarian states.

In addition, the United States remains the strongest Western economy and, in spite of mainstream European views of President Trump., continues as the significant backbone for military defense for Europe as well.

There is a growing impact of Australia and Asia upon Europe both in terms of trade, but also in terms of internal engagement.

That in a nutshell would be my cryptic view.

Now let us look at the analyses proffered by a recently released “Inter-Institutional EU Project,” entitled Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe.

Whatever the global challenges. we are advised at the outset of the importance of Europe globally and, by its de facto importance, that Europe as an integrated entity will have a persisting positive strategic impact.

With these profound changes underway, it may seem easy to dismiss Europe, as too small and too insignificant to really make a difference, but that would be a grave mistake.

Not only does Europe need Europe, but the world needs Europe as well – as an inspiration for a better future; a sound balance between economic, social and environmental objectives; a beacon of democracy, diversity and freedom; and a true champion of multilateral solutions and collaborative approaches in a world increasingly dominated by nationalism and zero-sum politics.

Europe is still a normative superpower, the place that sets the global gold standard when it comes to human-centric technology and digital rights, to regulation and consumer welfare, to social protection and inclusive societies.

We learn as well that we are entering a new historical epoch — the poly-nodal one.

Multilateralism is a key dynamic, and the ability of states to belong to international organizations and alliances will “constitute capital.”

“Soft power and the ability to inspire others will also increase in importance. This means that values will not go out of style, and states with shared ones will continue to gravitate towards each other.”

We learn that Europe will be the second major economic power by 2030 with strong growth continuing.

We learn that globalization and trade will increase, and that the European Union because of its acceptance of multiculturalism, climate change, globalization and the other positive forces will be central to the world’s evolution as seen in the projected 2030 world.

Terrorism and conflict will remain as threats of course.

And with regard to the future of warfare:

There are a few things we can say with certainty about future conflicts: for instance, extrapolating from past trends, we can assert that while interstate wars have become less prevalent, we will still witness one per decade at the global level.

This can take place in many different forms: at sea, in the air, on land, in space – and in the cyber domain. But it can also take on hybrid forms and come without a formal declaration or open acts of war: propaganda and political agitation, too, will be part of the offensive portfolio of others.

In addition, the current unravelling of the non- proliferation regime re-opens the possibility of stand-offs between nuclear powers.

The number of intrastate (or civil) wars will either remain the same, or increase in the coming years – that is, to over 40 ongoing conflicts per year. We can assume this because all the indicators for the drivers of conflict are projected to grow: climate change, inequality, youth bulges, repression, the unchecked spread of small arms and the connectivity of non-state actors all mean that states that are already facing numerous internal challenges will probably face even more difficulties in the coming years….

Different types of warfare will require very different skillsets from our armed forces: whereas conflict stabilisation is normally less sophisticated and more manpower intensive, it also lasts longer and requires long-term political commitment.

Conflicts that we are the victim of can happen at any time, in any place, in any way: a 360° type of conflict for which we are currently not ready – but others are. It might include modern technology in the shape of unmanned aircraft and ‘killer robots’

But there are other more pressing threats. The real danger emanates from all those types of attack which we do not immediately recognise as such, be it infiltration, media and political manipulation or cyber-attacks.

This is a problem area because “Europe needs to ready itself for all the aspects of war likely to unfold — while also engaging in conflict prevention and resolution.”

But we are warned that “the majority of conflicts that break out in the coming years will take place within a state, rather than between states.”

There are a number of projections:

Trade will increase;
Food and water will have to be watched;
Warfare will change;
Terrorism will remain;
Technology will spring ahead;
People will move;
Populists will try (and we learn that the American case shows that populism is less about past performance and more about future expectation);

The report then addresses what it considers to be the game changers:

How do we save the planet?
How do we improve aging?
How doe we manage new technologies?
How do we position Europe in the world?
How do we manage conflict?
How do we protect democracy at home?
How do we reach equality?

Each of these sections have some amazing judgments inserted.

“As Europeans, we reject violence, but we will have to be ready for those who do not.”

Or this one: “In both types of conflict, at home or abroad, defence will not be the only tool, but will be the main tool.”

Or this one: “The more equal our societies are, the better prepared we are to face the challenges of the future.”

I think this comment best captures the tone of the report:

Many aspects of the poly-nodal system we are entering are familiar to Europeans: we have built our foundations on relations and communication between powers of different sizes, and the plural nature of the world will mirror the plural nature of Europe. That said, this does not mean that finding our distinct place (and ability to influence) in this context will be an easy task.

But we do not have to wait for a place to be assigned to us. Indeed, the EU Global Strategy already contains the vision that we have for ourselves as a global player – now is the time to implement it with even more determination.

We can do this proactively by continuing to be a strong leader in the fight against climate change, a stout defender of democracy and human rights, a continuous supporter of the global trade system, a reliable contributor to multilateral organisations, and an agenda-setter for the development of human-centric technology and ethical uses of AI.

But to be defined as distinctly European in future geopolitics will require more than this: it will also require a change in mindset (and perhaps also institutions and procedures) as it will mean being more active in areas we did not sufficiently address before (for instance, in defence and conflict abroad). We will have to acknowledge the fact that the peaceful world we dreamt of is not yet within reach, adjust the way we communicate with the world and present ourselves, and act with conviction.

If we do so, and continue to build on the EU’s achievements of the past decades, we have the potential to be one of the shapers and innovators of this century – and continue to serve as an inspiration for others despite its flaws.

In this case, a united Unity in foreign policy will also help us forge a closer bond with our citizens again: overwhelmingly and regularly, two-thirds to three quarters of Europeans are in favour of common action in defence and foreign policy. We have a mandate to achieve this goal.

Perhaps this is inspirational, but my problem with the report and it is a key one — this is more about how to keep the German vision of the post unification period alive than it is realistic analysis of the world we live in and which is being battled over in the period ahead.

The report reflects a clear denial that there is any constitutional crises going on in Europe, or a realistic view of the continued central importance of the United States to the viability of Europe itself, or a realistic understanding of what an authoritarian China, an oligarchic Russia or new Sultan in Turkey is able to influence events within Europe let alone its global role.

These states clearly are playing on Europe a la carte even if the Commission works to avoid dealing with a reality in which the nation state has returned in significance, even if it is not a version of 19th century nationalism

We are in a different historical epoch from the post-unification period; it is about time we had some realistic assessment of how to navigate this new period of history so that it does not look like older ones.

espas_report2019

Competitive Cross-Learning: The 21st Century Authoritarian Powers and the Liberal Democracies

Posted on May 12, 2019 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

05/12/2019

By Robbin Laird

The Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy underscored the return of great power competition. By so doing, they did focus much more on the world as it is, rather than the last Administration which focused more on the world one might wish existed.

But neither really capture the core strategic reality of the period we are in.

21st century authoritarian powers have clearly emerged, able to be significantly engaged within the liberal democracies, and at the same time, able to contest them regionally and globally, These powers both play off of each other’s actions as well as work together on a case by case basis where useful to shaping their specific interests.

We saw something like this in the 1930s into the 1940s whereby authoritarian states — while differing fundamentally on many issues — saw common cause to weaken the liberal democracies and to make the world safe for authoritarianism.

In a recent article by Lyle J. Goldstein entitled “China is Learning from Russian Military Interactions with the United States,” highlights an aspect of this cross-learning.

Part of this Chinese article examines the U.S. Navy response to the Russian challenge. A “recent revival in Russian comprehensive power [最近年俄罗斯综合国力的复苏] is described, including reasonably “successful” military interventions in both Ukraine and also Syria.

“The Russian Navy has significantly strengthened its presence in both the Black Sea and also the Mediterranean, but the activities of Russian warships in the North Atlantic, Baltic, as well as the Arctic Ocean has obviously increased, as well,” according to this Chinese analysis.

It is stated that heavier U.S. Navy forces (e.g. USS Trumanaircraft carrier battle group) are tied down in the Mediterranean and unable to confront the Russian Navy in the North Atlantic.

Meanwhile, the article contends that Russia’s Yasen-class nuclear attack submarine can attack any cities or targets along America’s east coast.

“Russian Navy submarines could even adopt the German Navy’s ‘wolf-pack’ tactics [狼群战术] from World War Two and cut the supply lines between the US and Europe.” As a result, NATO is said to be “weighed down by anxieties [忧心仲仲]” regarding Russian naval activities.

The author includes a very interesting observation from the cited Chinese article about the impact of the “endless wars” in the Middle East on the USMC.

With respect to the U.S. Marine Corps, this Chinese assessment also pulls no punches. It is asserted that counter-insurgency has resulted in a “serious corrosion [严重侵蚀]” of the Marines’ high-intensity warfare core competence.

Moreover, there are reported to “exist major gaps in the force [存在较大的兵力缺口],” including the numbers of F-35B fighters, CH-53K helicopters and KC-130J air refueling aircraft.

One does not have to agree with everything the author writes to note that he has focused on a neglected but key subject — the cross learning among the authoritarian states.

And, of course, the conclusions drawn, can be very wrong, but that is less important than understanding the perceptions of our adversaries when they have fundamentally misunderstood what a liberal democracy which works very differently from an authoritarian state might do in a crisis.

But one also must remember that in spite of differences among the liberal democracies both in terms of domestic and foreign policies, there is significant collaboration and cross-learning going on as well.

The importance of such cross-learning and collaboration is enhanced precisely because of conflicts among the positions of liberal democratic powers and the need to better position those states when confronting an authoritarian power in a regional crisis.

With regard to the strategic shift from the land wars to high end crisis management, probably the most important cross learning collaboration program is that of the F-35, which I have referred as building the F-35 global enterprise, and have done so since working with Secretary Wynne in the middle of the last decade.

It is not the only one of course, as other collaborative efforts often built around common platforms whether Eurofighters, tankers, air lifters, missile defense systems, and maritime patrol systems provide significant collaborative and crass-learning opportunities as well,

But what makes the F-35 effort distinctive is that it is a high end combat asset arriving exactly when the U.S. and its allies need to transform their forces from being optimized for the land wars in the Middle East to one capable of competing with the world-wide 21st century authoritarian powers.

The featured photo shows three F-35A Lightning IIs assigned to the 62nd Fighter Squadron at Luke Air Force Base, Ariz., lined up and ready to takeoff on a mission as part of Red Flag, exercise 19-2, March 14, 2019, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

Italian and Norwegian F-35 instructor pilots participated in the exercise for the first time and the integration and cohesion of the 62nd FS was displayed to other coalition partners.

(U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Bryan Guthrie)

Shaping an Integrated at Sea Force: The Case of the New Build Australian Off-Shore Patrol Vessels

Posted on May 12, 2019 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Robbin Laird

Two broad findings can be drawn from my five years of visiting Australia and working with the Australian Defence Force.

The first is that they are very focused on building out as integrated a force as they are capable of doing, and that means not only leveraging an advanced asset like the F-35 but shaping common combat systems throughout the force. This is why they refer to their effort as building a fifth-generation force; it is not just about interoperability but about building out an integrated force across the spectrum of crisis management and warfare.

The second is that they are keen to enhance their ability to build a more sustainable force, which in shipbuilding terms means to put in place what they refer to as “continuous shipbuilding.”

What this means is working ways to have an ongoing ship build, modernization and sustainment process.

The new Offshore Patrol Vessel illustrates very well the new approach.

First, of all the OPV is part of an overall crisis management approach. During my last visit to Australia, I had time to meet with the head of the Maritime Border Command, Rear Admiral Lee Goddard. And as he talked me through the map of Northern Australian waters and the challenges facing his command, it was clear that the command’s capability had to be integrated with the overall ADF.

The new OPVs are to be operated both by his command and the Royal Australian Navy, and will share common combat systems, integratable with the RAAF and the RAN, and the OPV program itself is seen as a launch point for a key part of Australian shipbuilding, namely, the patrol vessel global market.

In 2017, the Australian Navy announced the selection of the design for an initial program of 12 OPVs to replace the 13 active Armidale class patrol boats. These ships will be owned and maintained by the Royal Australian Navy, although a certain number will be assigned to the Maritime Border Command. And additional ships could be procured to meet other capability needs, such as the MCM or mine counter-measure mission.

According to an article by Stephen W. Miller:

Lürssen’s design is based on its OPV80 which is also in service with the Brunei Navy.

The design is noteworthy for its spacious layout for additional equipment, with the stern ramp RHIB launch and recovery system, and large helicopter flight deck. The vessel will have a displacement of around 1700 tonnes and a length of 80 meters. Their speed is around 20 knots while they have greater range and endurance than the current Armidale Class Patrol Boats they are replacing.

The vessel will have a 40mm Bofors gun and modular mission packs including unmanned aerial systems. It has a crew of 40 but can accommodate up to 60. The vessels will utilize a modular mission payload system similar to that used by the Danish Navy and the United States Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships.

Mission equipment will be fit into 20-foot containers and placed onto the ship as needed for assigned tasks.

A MoD spokesperson suggested that “The new OPVs will operate alongside Australian Border Force vessels, other Australian Defence Force units and its regional partners.”

But at the heart of the program is its common combat systems and C2 systems which will allow the ship to be part of an integrated “kill web force” which will allow it to become a scalable presence asset by reaching back to Australian or allied connected combat assets.

As one analyst put it: “To compare the ACPBs to the OPVs is somewhat like comparing a Cessna to an F-35 in regards technology and system performance. In a nutshell, each OPVs will act as a coherent ‘Node” within a wider shared picture compilation and information dissemination environment.

“Not only will the OPV offer greatly improved sea-keeping and endurance over the ACPBs, but it will also be able to actively contribute with other ADF and Allied force elements within a Joint Force combat environment.

“In additional to nominal Boarder Protection Patrol functions (Patrol/Deterrence/VBSS etc.), the increased Electromagnetic environmental awareness and data connectivity intrinsic to the OPV will enable it to either act as a forward deployed sensor (with wider Common Data Link connectivity to both Tactical and Strategic assets), or as a mothership for its own ‘Constellation” of Unmanned Systems (UAVs/UUVs/USVs), or as an interactive communications relay node in Denied, Degraded, Intermittent, Low-bandwidth (DDIL) SATCOM environments.

“Succinctly, the new OPVs will be better able to actively contribute to and assure a wider Battle Group information environment that do the present tranche of Australian Navy Frigates and Destroyers.”

When at the last Williams Foundation Seminar held on April 11, 2019, I had a chance to discuss the OPV approach with the recently retired head of the Australian Navy, Vice Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett.

Barrett highlighted how the OPV fitted into the larger shipbuilding picture and evolution of the integrated air-maritime force.

“It is clearly not just about the platform, or buying a replacement platform. With the contract, we are kick starting an entire industry in Australia. We will be training those who will build the launch platforms, but those individuals will be part of a continuous build process and will be part of the design, modernization and sustainment process. It is part of establishing a sovereign industrial capability.”

But it is not just that.

It is about putting in place a key approach to ensure commonality across the fleet with regard combat and C2 systems, and a commonality that reaches deep into allied fleets as well.

“We are building the ship around a mothership concept, which means that its ability to link and work with not just systems operating from the OPV but within the ADF more broadly is a critical one. With this platform as with our other new ships, we have separated the decisions on making the hulls from the decisions about the onboard systems. The latter is really the key part of ensuring we have an integrated not interoperable force.”

He drove home the point about viewing these assets as nodes within the kill web.

“We have to start treating these platforms as nodes, which can both leverage other ADF or allied capabilities, and contribute as well to the capabilities of a seamlessly stood up task force.”

The mother ship concept is at the heart of what a kill web OPV can do. It is anticipated that both UAVs and UUVs could be operated from the ship. That data will go to the ship but can be distributed into the operational space. And given that it is data, how that is managed, handled and distributed will be determined not just by technological capabilities, but also with regard to the evolution of processing technologies and decision making algorithms.

Put in other terms, the OPV can host capabilities, which are reaching deep into the future, but capability of delivering capabilities for today’s operating force.

It was very clear from my discussions with Rear Admiral Goddard, that given the geographical expanse, which the ADF and the Maritime Border Command has to deal with, only an integrated force can combine presence with scalability to get the kind of result Australia will need for its sovereign borders policy. And in his view the new OPVs will be an important contributor to his command and to the integrated force.

It can not be overemphasized the priority on the integrated aspect; the Aussies are clearly rejecting what is often seen in the United States as Balkanized logistical support and tower of Babylon C2 and combat systems approaches.

They seek to gain a strategic advantage from being a smaller more agile force operating in a dangerous and busy neighborhood.

The Venezuelan Crisis: The Humanitarian Engagement

Posted on May 10, 2019 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

05/10/2019

By Ed Timperlake

As the Guaidó forces on the streets of Venezuela were losing the tactical battle, a strategic defeat was rapidly approaching, that is until the president made an historic phone call to President Putin. That call accomplished a most important objective: President Trump personally built new strategic maneuvering space, and President Putin agreed:

“He (Putin) is not looking at all to get involved in Venezuela other than he’d like to see something positive happen for Venezuela,” Trump said in the Oval Office. “And I feel the same way.”

There are two important takeaways from this current Moscow Times article, which is a public stalking horse for President Putin:

Putin Is Ready to Give Up Venezuela for the Right Price

Sergei Lavrov and Mike Pompeo will soon meet in Helsinki to discuss Venezuela’s future.

But, as common in his personal interactions with Putin, Trump quickly lost the initiative, allowing the discussion on Venezuela to drift towards the softer subject of humanitarian aid.

Moscow is ready to sell its stake in Maduro, but it is still unclear whether Washington is ready to offer the right price.

Taking the latter point first, it is simply the Russian version of “The Art of the Deal” in the opening round of “what can we get.”

However, the first point about President Trump losing the initiative with the “softer subject of humanitarian aid” actually means that President Trump has won the terms of the engagement.

It is simple: both President Trump and President Putin know that Juan Guaidó is the current president of Venezuela because his legitimacy was not in question during the phone call.

The proof of that reality is that President Putin allowed this quote in his hometown paper to appear in print:

Putin expressed Russia’s displeasure with U.S interference in Venezuela while convincing Trump that he “was not looking at all to get involved in Venezuela”.

In “diplo-speak,” that means that Maduro’s days are numbered simply because both the U.S. and Russia have agreed that humanitarian aid is approved.

Focusing on humanitarian aid is actually the key point for a nation literally starving with arguably the richest oil reserves in the world.

The Maduro administration bungled the great wealth of Venezuela while also disarming the population.

It actually took President Trump to not only build strategic maneuvering space, but also keep the focus on solving the human suffering side of the engagement, and this is now the publicly agreed upon (by Putin!) agenda of the way ahead.

But the need to focus on the humanitarian disaster which Venezuela has become is in and of itself crucial.

We recently received photos from Venezuela which bring home the reality of this disaster.

In these photos, elderly Venezuelans are seen leaving Venezuela to return to their natives countries from where they left over 50 years ago when Venezuela offered a better life.

Now, they are returning to their natives countries, fleeing leaving behind deteriorating economic conditions, lack of food and medical care, electricity and water and physical insecurity.

A version of this article was first published on May 7, 2019 by American Thinker.

Also see the following pieces by Ed Timperlake regarding Venezuela:

https://defense.info/featured-story/2019/05/president-juan-guiedo-is-a-man-of-courage-the-perspective-of-the-government-of-spain/

Reconsidering Venezuelan Options: Focused US Efforts

The F-35 and the Warlords: A Look Back and a Look Ahead

Posted on May 10, 2019 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

We recently visited the Warlords at Beaufort MCAS.

We had a chance to meet with the CO of the squadron and to watch flight demos at this year’s airshow hosted by Beaufort MCAS.

This gave us a chance to reflect back at the more than a decade of dealing with the Warlords as they have brought the F-35 to life as a combat capability.

We have had the opportunity earlier to observe the standup of the Osprey Nation and its contributions in launching what one Marine leader called a “tsunami of change.”

Clearly, the F-35 has continued that tsunami and we will be observing and shaping a broader strategic narrative of the next key USMC air system generating signifiant change, namely the CH-53K.

In this report, we have begun with the most recent visit and then went back to the exit interview with the “godfather” of the F-35B, namely, Col. “Turbo” Tomassetti.

We visited “Turbo” many times at Eglin AFB as the F-35 was first being stood up.

We included the final interview which we did with him, namely his exit interview from Eglin in 2013.

We then navigate through a decade of interviews which highlight the evolution of the Warlords standing up and operating the new aircraft.

The Warloards and the F-35

For an ebook version of the report, see the following

The featured photo shows Capt. Frank Zastoupil with Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 (VMFAT-501) flying the F-35B Lightning II during the 2019 Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort Air Show, April 27.

MCAS Beaufort hosts the air show in order to bring the community together and demonstrate U.S. Marine Corps Aviation Combat Element and Marine Air-Ground Task Force capabilities. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Brittney Vella)

Shaping Direct European Defense Capabilities: Exercise Formidable Shield 2019

Posted on May 10, 2019 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

The return of the Russians to a position of directly threatening Europe is not a return to the Cold War.

Not only is Russia, not the Soviet Union with the Warsaw Pact, but the threat being posed is considerably different.

Analysts have focused on the hybrid threat whereby Russia uses a variety of means to pressure European states.

The 2014 seizure of Crimea started a significant process of change in how key European states looked at the willingness of Russia to reverse the post-Cold War order.

Even though there are constitutional crises in Britain and in the European Union, the reach of modern European institutions remains significant and impacts on Russian thinking.

Putin certainly has played his nuclear card to ramp up from time to time diplomatic pressure on key European states as well.

And the Russian nuclear modernization process has put in play an expanded threat of the potential use of low yield nuclear weapons early in any significant conflict on the continent as well.

But rather than being on the inner-German border, the Russians face Poland and an independent Eastern Europe as challenges as well.

Here Putin is working relationships among some East European states to work to undermine the EU and NATO as these institutions remain bulwarks to Russian intervention.

The Russian Army is not a new version of the very large Soviet Army organized along lines postured for invasion of a more traditional European sort.

This poses the question for the United States with regard to what kind of force posture makes the most sense to support Europe in its direct defense role?

With Germany without a series defense force, and with the questionable defense infrastructure situation facing the Germany of today, the role of the US Army played in the time of the Cold War in Germany makes little sense.

It would make more sense to strengthen the air-maritime forces which the US provides for European defense, and significantly alter the role envisaged for any US Army role.

Clearly, a primary mission for the US Army is to enhance significantly its ADA or missile defense roles, as well as providing Special Forces and infantry support to these missions.

And linking in a comprehensive manner, land based ADA with sea-based defenses are clearly a key contributor to a 21st century approach to direct defense in Europe.

A current exercise highlights the way ahead.

“Formidable Shield shows how Allies are working together to protect NATO forces and populations from the real threat of ballistic missiles”, said NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu.

“This is one of the world’s most sophisticated and complex air and missile defence exercises and a great example of how Allies are continuing to adapt to meet current and future security challenges.”

According to a U.S. 6th Fleet Public Affairs release on May 7, 2019:

Exercise Formidable Shield 2019, a live-fire integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) exercise conducted by Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO on behalf of U.S. 6th Fleet, started May 7, 2019 at the U.K. Ministry of Defense’s Hebrides Range in the vicinity of the Western Isles of Scotland.

The purpose of Formidable Shield is to improve allied interoperability in a live-fire integrated air and missile (IAMD) environment, using NATO command and control reporting structures.

Nine nations – including Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States – are contributing 13 ships, more than 10 aircraft, and approximately 3,300 personnel to the exercise. Belgium and Germany will support the exercise with staff officers embarked with Task Group IAMD.

“Exercise Formidable Shield demonstrates the United States and our allied maritime partners high end war fighting capability in integrated air and missile defense. This significant investment of resources, time, and personnel ensures we are ready to deploy and operate anywhere, anytime, to defend the alliance and deter aggression,” said Vice Adm. Lisa M. Franchetti, Commander, U.S. 6th Fleet and Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO. “These maritime operations provide a tremendous opportunity to enhance our interoperability and test our capabilities as we collectively work to maintain a safe, secure, and prosperous European region.”

Participating nations will practice, demonstrate, and assess their ability to share common tactical pictures, share situational awareness, conduct NATO-level mission planning and engagement coordination, and exercise force-level, pre-planned responses with capabilities and limitations.

“Exercise Formidable Shield 2019 will once again help us refine our air and missile defense capabilities with our partners and allies by training together and demonstrating our ability to ensure the cooperative security and collective defense of the NATO Alliance,” said Capt. Shanti Sethi, commander, Task Group IAMD for Formidable Shield, and commander, U.S. 6th Fleet’s Task Force 64.

U.S. ships participating include the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG 64) and USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) and the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ship, USNS Medgar Evers (T-AKE 13).

“The Roosevelt crew is so excited about participating in Exercise Formidable Shield 2019,” said the ship’s Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Matthew Molmer. “It will allow us to showcase the training we’ve had to date and work closely with our NATO partners.”

Formidable Shield is scheduled to conclude May 19, 2019. This exercise is planned to be a recurring, biennial event, which is designed to assure allies, deter adversaries, and demonstrate our commitment to collective defense of the alliance.

Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO, based in Lisbon, Portugal, is a rapidly deployable, maritime headquarters that provides scalable command and control across the full spectrum of warfare areas.

U.S. 6th Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with joint, allied and interagency partners, to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.

A NATO press release dated May 8, 2019, added:

The exercise will see Allied ships detecting, tracking and defending against an array of anti-ship and ballistic missiles using NATO command and control procedures. Drills will include sharing real time tactical information, conducting joint mission planning, and engagement coordination.

Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States will participate by sending ships and aircraft. Belgium and Germany will support the exercise with staff officers.

A total of 13 ships, 10 aircraft, and about 3,300 personnel are involved. Maritime patrol aircraft and NATO AWACS surveillance aircraft will provide aerial over-watch and ensure that the airspace is clear. Formidable Shield will cover a huge area in the North Atlantic – from more than 1,000 km west of the Scottish Hebrides, and from the south of Ireland to the southern end of Iceland.

The exercise follows NATO’s decision in 2010 to step up the defence of European Allies from ballistic missile threats. NATO missile defence links Allied sensors and weapons together in a single system. Major components of NATO missile defence currently include U.S. Navy destroyers fitted with the ‘Aegis’ missile defence system based in Rota, Spain; and a U.S.-operated land-based system in Romania known as Aegis Ashore. Other major components include an early warning radar in Turkey. NATO’s air command in Ramstein, Germany is the responsible command.

See the following:

the-us-and-european-direct-defense-what-role-for-the-us-army

Poles Enhance Integrated Defense: Laying Foundation for Enhanced Allied Crisis Support

Poland, Article III and Missile Defense: Shaping a Way Ahead in Alliance Capabilities

Missile Defense, Innovation and Multi-Domain Warfare