By Richard Weitz

“This is a great New Year’s present for the country,” President Putin told senior Russian military and political leaders when he oversaw Russia’s successful test of its new Yu-71 Avangard Hypersonic Glider from the country’s National Defense Control Center at the end of December.

According to the Kremlin, Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces successfully launched the weapon from a silo in the Dombarovskiy missile base in the Ural Mountains of southwestern Russia at a target more than 6,000km distant in the Kura range on Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula.

Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov claimed that the Avangard reached a speed of Mach 27 (approximately 33,000 kilometers per hour) in the test.

Putin said that the Yu-71 Avangard system can maneuver horizontally and vertically thousands of kilometers and withstand temperatures of up to 2,000 degrees centigrade.

Russia’s Federal Space Agency oversaw the research-and-development work of this project, which was performed by the Reutov-based Research and Production Association of Machine-Building enterprise, the Motor and the Special Machine-Building design bureaus, and the Nauka Research and Production Association, which developed the craft’s thermoregulation system and composite materials.

There were unsurprisingly many failed tests of the previous Yu-70/102E prototype given the technical complexities and limited defense resources.

However, after what Putin termed “a major, long-lasting and complex effort that required groundbreaking solutions,” Moscow has apparently succeeded in developing an operational system.

So far, the Russian government has primarily brandished hypersonic systems for national prestige. Putin and other Russian leaders, echoed by their national media, have characterized the country first possession of some of these weapons as demonstrating Russian military prowess and even superiority over the West, at least to domestic audiences.

As The Washington Post noted, “The fanfare surrounding the [December 2018 Avangard] test — it led the TV news, and state media reported that Putin gave the launch order — underscores how central nuclear saber-rattling has become to the Kremlin’s effort to depict Russia as a global superpower for audiences at home and abroad.”

Over the next decade, however, Russia plans to deploy perhaps two dozen strategic HGVs, beginning with two “Avangard” 15Yu71 nuclear-armed gliders assigned to a regiment of the Strategic Missile Forces in 2019.

The current Russian state armament has made equipping the Russian armed forces with hypersonic technologies—weapons capable of traveling in excess of five times the speed of sound—a priority.

The Russian Air Force has been testing a hypersonic air-to-surface ballistic missile, the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (Dagger). Its solid-propellant engine can accelerate the missile to reportedly Mach 10 speed.

In March 2018, the Ministry of Defense released a video showing a Mig-31BM supersonic fighter, based in Russia’s Southern Military District, launching a Khinzal at a ground target. The system can supposedly undertake evasive maneuvers to overcome traditional U.S. ground and naval air defense systems.

According to Putin, the Khinzal air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) can carry a nuclear or conventional warhead for a range of over 2,000km. This figure may include the combat radius of the plane carrying the missile, since Tass reports a source describing how the Kinzhal’s range will reach more than 3,000km when launched from a Tu-22M3 bomber, which can carry several of these missiles, due to the longer-range of the bomber compared to a fighter plane.

Russian sources describe the Kh-47M2 as a variant of the land-based Iskander-M ballistic missile, which has a stated range of only 500km. By this reckoning, the missile might be able to reach intercontinental range with refueling of the carrier or if the plane does not return to its home base.

Although the Mig-31 will be the main carrier of the missile, the Russian defense industry plans to equip Russia’s new fifth-generation Su-57 Stealth fighter with a similar ALBM, though of smaller size to fit inside the plane’s internal weapons bay, as well as hypersonic air-to-air 300km missiles.

Meanwhile, the Russian Navy is equipping its submarines, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and other warships with the 3C14 universal vertical launch platform, which can potentially fire multiple subsonic, supersonic, or hypersonic anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.

Through the BrahMos Aerospace joint venture, formed by Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya rocket design bureau and India’s DRDO, the two countries have been developing supersonic cruise missiles for use by both their armed forces against land and naval targets as well as for possible export to other countries.

The Russian-Indian joint venture has also planned to develop the BrahMos-II, a hypersonic variant of the missile.

The Research and Production Association of Machine-Building has been developing the Zircon 3M-22 (3K-22), a hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile that has a stated range of 400km and a speed of from Mach 4 to March 6. It falls in the same technological family as the Russian-Indian supersonic version of the BrahMos, though the exact relationship between the two missiles is unclear.

Following years of development and testing by the Russian Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC, the Zircon will enter serial production in the next few years as a core anti-ship, and potentially land-attack, missile on the Pyotr Veliky and Admiral Nakhimov nuclear missile cruisers as well as the Steregushchy-class Project 20380 corvettes, the Admiral Gorshkov-class Project 22350 frigates, and the Project 885 Yasen-class attack submarines.

At the operational level, these systems would reinforce Russia’s anti-access/area denial strategy, since they could more effectively attack U.S. carriers and other warships than existing conventional missiles.

The proliferation of hypersonic technologies to other countries could present additional anti-access/area denial challenges to the U.S. military.

The best means of presently countering these hypersonic missiles is through destroying their launchers before they can be used.

The United States and its allies will need additional means of defense as these weapons proliferate.

The featured photo is taken from the following source:

https://sputniknews.com/russia/201701211049856785-russia-army-hypersonic-vehicles-technology/

Editor’s Note:

Of course, the US has been a leader for some time in hypersonic research and will see fruition of this technology sooner rather than later.

The question becomes how this technology becomes integrated into US and allied concepts of operations both for the offensive-defensive enterprise being generated around the new generation of airborne technologies and reset of 360 strike and defense operations.

In the US and allied case, hypersonics can be joined with a significant redesign of the air-sea combat enterprise as well.

See for example:

Shaping an S-Cubed Combat Revolution: Preparing for the Coming Hypersonic Cruise Missile Threat

By Robbin Laird

Peter FitzSimmons has written a trilogy of books focused on Australia and the First World War.

His latest book focuses specifically on an aspect of the First World War that is little known outside of experts or World War I buffs.

But it is a story which deserves to be widely told and FitzSimmons book provides an outstanding opportunity for our readers to become either familiar with or gain more detailed knowledge of the role of the Australian general who pioneered a combined arms approach to offensive operations and broke the mold on how World War I operations were conducted up to that time.

The book is entitled: “Monash’s Masterpiece: The Battle of Le Hamel and the 93 Minutes that Changed the World.”

The book is written in the present tense and draws heavily on diaries and histories of the period and allows the reader to go back in time to gain an understanding of the context and in the preparation for what would turn out to be a breakthrough battle, the battle of Le Hamel.

The battle was fought and won in less time than it takes to read the book.

It was fought on July 4 1918 and was the first engagement which involved Americans who fought under Australian command and also was a founding moment for what would become the very solid American-Aussie relationship.

The Americans were involved in the battle against the wishes of General Pershing who had insisted that Americans be held out of the war until 1919 when he felt they would be ready.

Nonetheless, the Americans were integrated into the Aussie forces and were key participants in the battle despite General Pershing.

And it was clear from the conduct of the Americans that the troops were more than eager to go into battle and in fact attacked the Germans with the cry: “Remember the Lusitania!”

In a classic moment after the victory, the French Prime Minister hosted Generals Haig and Pershing to thank them for the victory.  Pershing did not say anything during the ceremony but afterwards was keen for this to not happen again and he made it clear that the Americans participated against his direct orders.

But the Aussies and Americans simply had too much in common for even Pershing to block the way.

“For their part, most of the American soldiers are impressed (with the Aussies), with private Charles D. Ebersole, of Chicago, recording his impression that the Australians are ‘very good,’ and ‘very democratic,’ although ‘somewhat undisciplined.”

“In short, exactly their kind of blokes.” ¹

Monash was an engineer rather than a professional soldier; and he was resented by some fellow officers because of this fact.

But as an engineer, he focused on ways to leverage the engines of war to reshape how an offense could be conducted, rather than simply using human combat mass to win the day.

His original plan was to take the German positions at the village of Le Hamel by a combined air, tank and infantry operation. But his style was to plan an offensively carefully, brief the plan and get the key experts involved in the plan.

As a result, he changed the plan to make key use of various artillery capabilities integrated with a phased air and tank-infantry operation.

He insisted on getting high grade intelligence with regard to the disposition of the German forces and to work carefully on crafting an offensive in which each element of the combined force would then be used with particular effect in a coordinated offensive assault.

The Aussies had been used first in World War I in the disaster of Gallipoli; but they would end the war becoming the tip of the spear of the allied forces in shaping offensive operations.

Following, Le Hamel, similar tactics would be used at Amiens with similar results.

“In no small part due to the exertions of Sir John Monash and his men, and the example they set at Hamel – which was then replicated many times over – the war was won within weeks.” ²

“In short, courtesy of Monash (Allied) GHQ made it official: the days of just sending waves of men at enemy trenches and hoping to overwhelm them by sheer force of numbers are mercifully gone. From now on, the key is to is to use ‘fighting machinery,’ the tanks, the planes and guns to do much of the heavy lifting as, through rapid, coordinated attack against a surprised enemy, you overwhelm their resistance and use your soldiers to mop up and consolidate the ground won.” ³

The ability to leverage technology and to combine technology with well-planned combat operations for an integrated force was important then; it is even more important now.

And the example of Monash as engineer rather than a traditional General might also be important was we work the skill levels for a 21^stcentury combat force to succeed.

The Monash story also reminds us that to invent an innovative approach is important; but when your enemy learns how to do it better than you and you tend to forget what you did, it may not turn out so well.

As we would learn when the Germans migrated this approach into the Blitzkrieg of 1939. It is not enough to innovate and forget; it is important to build from your innovations and keep on innovating.

In his entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography, Geoffrey Serle provided an overview on Sir John Monash’s life and in that overview provided the following comments with regard to Monash and his role in World War I:

On the outbreak of war Monash acted as chief censor for four weeks before he was appointed to command the 4th Infantry Brigade, Australian Imperial Force.

It was an Australia-wide brigade which had to be organized and gathered at Broadmeadows, Victoria, and given elementary training before sailing with the second contingent on 22 December 1914.

Monash chose as his brigade major Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. McGlinn; they were soon intimate friends. Monash commanded the convoy of seventeen ships which reached Egypt at the end of January 1915.

The 4th Brigade went into camp near Heliopolis as part of Major General Sir Alexander Godley’s New Zealand and Australian Division. Godley and the corps commander Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood were well satisfied with Monash’s training of the brigade.

At the Gallipoli landing it was in reserve: Monash did not land until the morning of 26 April, and was given the left-centre sector including Pope’s Hill and Quinn’s Post to organize while the Turks counter-attacked. His brigade was still not fully gathered by the 30th but Monash had an orderly conference of his battalion commanders that day.

The night offensive on Baby 700 of 2 May, which Monash had opposed, was disastrous; according to Charles Bean it left him ‘unstrung, as well it might’.

The brigade played its part in withstanding the Turkish offensive of 19 May and the break-in to Quinn’s on the 29th, and was relieved from the line at the end of the month.

In July Monash learned of his tardy promotion to brigadier general at a time when wild rumours were circulating in Cairo, London and Melbourne that he had been shot as a German spy and traitor; there had been a similar vicious whispering campaign in Melbourne the previous October.

The brigade now prepared for the battle of Sari Bair and its part in the left hook on Hill 971. Their night-march of 6 August was delayed and a vital wrong turning made. Monash forced himself to the front, punched his battalions into position and made good progress against moderate resistance.

But the maps were faulty, the men were lost and exhausted, and next morning could only dig in. On the 8th, after attacking, they had to withdraw. Most of the men were sick, many had paratyphoid. The remnants then took part in the unsuccessful attacks on Hill 60, before being withdrawn to Lemnos.

Monash had three weeks leave in Egypt where he learned of his appointment as C.B. The brigade returned to a quiet sector on Gallipoli. On the final night of the evacuation Monash was not one of the last to leave, but rashly sent home an illegal diary-letter implying that he had been. Gallipoli had given him a devastating education.

Bean, Birdwood and others left an impression that his performance had been mediocre; but his brigade had performed at least as well as any of the other three and he had little or no part in the battle-plans he had to attempt to carry out. His performance on 7-8 August is open to criticism, but it came to be recognized that the attack on Hill 971 was totally impossible of achievement. Bean reported the saying that Monash ‘would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better than a division’.

In Egypt in January 1916 he wearily began retraining his reconstituted brigade, distressed by the news of his wife’s operation for cancer. The brigade, after dismemberment to form daughter units, joined 4th Division and spent two months in the local defences east of Suez Canal.

In June they moved to France, to the Armentières sector, and were immediately tagged for a substantial diversionary and unsuccessful night-raid on 2 July.

That month Monash was promoted major general in command of the new 3rd Division arriving on Salisbury Plain, England. He was given two first-rate British professionals to watch over him, Lieutenant-Colonels G. H. N. Jackson and H. M. Farmar, who soon became his admiring devotees.

Training proceeded vigorously. Monash had a flattering triumph when King George V himself inspected the division. In November they moved into the Armentières sector as part of Godley’s II Anzac Corps and General Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second British Army. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig inspected on 22 December. Monash had established and retained a remarkably low crime-rate in the division.

By an extraordinary feat of will-power he had reduced his weight drastically to 12½ stone (79 kg), which considerably added to his authority. His good fortune was, unlike the other Australian divisions, to serve under Plumer and Major General Harington, and that his first major battle, Messines in June 1917, was Plumer’s masterpiece.

According to Bean, Monash ‘concentrated upon the plans an amount of thought and care far beyond that ever devoted to any other [A.I.F. operation]’.

‘Wonderful detail but not his job’, Harington commented. In the autumn, during 3rd Ypres, at Broodseinde Monash brought off the greatest A.I.F. victory yet. But the weather had broken and in the following week Monash and his 3rd Division suffered the misery of Passchendaele.

3rd Division, which Monash was sure was ‘one of the Crack Divisions of the British Army’, spent most of the winter quietly in the Ploegsteert sector.

In November it had at last joined the other divisions in I Anzac Corps. Monash dined privately with Haig who let it be known that he wanted him as a corps commander; at the New Year he was appointed K.C.B., not a mere knighthood.

In March 1918, in the face of the great German offensive, he brilliantly deployed his division to plug the gap in front of Amiens.

They were, however, in the eye of the storm, and saw little serious action. But in late April and May they were heavily involved in aggressive ‘peaceful penetration’.

Then, to the general satisfaction of the A.I.F., Monash was appointed corps commander from 1 June and promoted lieutenant-general; Birdwood remained general officer commanding the A.I.F. Bean and the journalist (Sir) Keith Murdoch, however, carried on a relentless campaign for more than two months to replace Monash with Major General (Sir) Brudenell White and Birdwood with Monash. He stood to win both ways, but was determined to test himself in the field at corps level.

The battle of Hamel of 4 July—’all over in ninety-three minutes…the perfection of teamwork’, Monash wrote—proved his point.

The Americans participated, and Monash had to withstand, by extraordinary force of personality, a last-minute attempt by General Pershing to withdraw them.

Military historians have acclaimed it as ‘the first modern battle’, ‘the perfect battle’. ‘A war-winning combination had been found: a corps commander of genius, the Australian infantry, the Tank Corps, the Royal Artillery and the RAF’.

Recently UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson provided a final update on the Modernising Defence Program to the House of Commons on December 18, 2018.

What follows is his oral statement made to Commons:

In July, I made a statement setting out headline conclusions from six months of work on the Modernising Defence Programme (MDP). Since then, work has continued apace. Firstly, I would like to welcome the extra £1.8 billion of funding for Defence, including the additional £1 billion that was in last month’s Budget.

Today, I want to provide an update on the MDP, and set out the work that will be ongoing. I have placed a full report on the MDP in the library of the House.

First, I should put the MDP into context.

The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review was the right plan for Defence at that time. The Government put the Defence budget on a firmer footing, increasing throughout the life of the Parliament. Defence is much stronger as a result of that. NATO is growing in strength and the UK is a leader.

More allies are meeting the 2 per cent spending guideline, or have developed plans to do so. We are the second largest defence spender in NATO, one of only a small number of allies to spend 2 per cent of our GDP on defence, and invest 20 per cent of that in upgrading equipment.

We can be proud of what we have achieved since 2015. But we have to also be vigilant. National security challenges have become more complex, intertwined and dangerous since 2015 and these threats are moving much faster than anticipated.

Persistent, aggressive state competition now characterises the international security context. In response to the growing threats the MDP was launched in January.

And, in the last year, our Armed Forces have demonstrated their growing capability, engaged globally, and supported the prosperity of the UK. The Royal Navy has increased its mass and points of presence around the world. We have taken steps to forward base the Army, enhancing our global posture.

The Royal Air Force has continued to innovate, and has celebrated a proud past its RAF100 years since its creation. Progress has also made in cyber and space, as the changing character of warfare makes both domains increasingly important.

We have reinforced the UK’s position as a leading voice in NATO and on European security. And, our Armed Forces have led the way for Global Britain, tackling our adversaries abroad to protect our security at home and nurturing enduring relationships with our allies and partners.

Through the work over the past year the MDP has identified three broad priorities, supported by the additional £1.8 billion invested in Defence.

Firstly, we will mobilise, making more of what we already have to make our current force more lethal and better able to protect our security.

The UK already has a world-leading array of capabilities. We will make the most effective use of them.

We will improve the readiness and availability of a range of key Defence platforms: major warships, attack submarines, helicopters and a range of ISTAR platforms. We are adjusting our overseas training and deployments to increase our global points of presence, better to support allies and influence adversaries.

To improve the combat effectiveness of our Force, we will re-prioritise the current Defence programme to increase weapon stockpiles. And we are accelerating work to assure the resilience of our Defence systems and capabilities.

We can mobilise a full spectrum of military, economic and soft power capabilities. And, where necessary and appropriate we will make sure we are able to act independently.

We will also enhance efforts with our allies and partners, aligning our plans more closely with them, acting as part of combined formations, developing combined capabilities, and burden-sharing. And we continue to invest in, and grow, our global network of Defence personnel and the education and training we offer in the UK and overseas.

Secondly, we will modernise, embracing new technologies to assure our competitive edge

Our adversaries and competitors are accelerating the development of new capabilities and strategies. We must keep pace, and conceive of our joint force as consisting of five domains, air, land, sea, cyber and space, rather than the traditional three.

We must modernise, targeting priority areas. A major new step will involve improved Joint Forces Command that will be in a better position so that defence can play a major role in preventing conflict in the future and improve our cyber operations and capabilities across the armed forces but also across government as well.

This year Defence’s Innovation Fund put £20 million towards projects in areas including unmanned air systems, virtual reality training, and enhanced digital communications for the Future Commando Force. The fund will grow to £50 million next financial year, increasing the scope, ambition and value of the projects it can support.

We will launch new ‘Spearhead’ innovation programmes that will apply cutting-edge technologies to areas including sub-surface threats to our submarines, our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability, and command and control in the Land Environment as well.

And to drive innovation and change through the Department I am launching a Transformation Fund. Next year, I will ring-fence £160 million of MOD’s budget to create this fund available for innovative new military capabilities.

I will look to make a further £340 million available as part of the Spending Review. This fund will be available for new innovative military capabilities which allows us to stay one step ahead of our adversaries.

Together these and other steps will enable the acceleration of our modernisation plans.

Thirdly, we will transform, radically changing the way we do business in Defence.

We need to improve markedly the way we run Defence. To sustain strategic advantage in a fast-changing world, we must be able and capable of continuous and timely adaptation. We will embrace modern business practices and establish a culture that nurtures transformation and innovation.

We also need to create financial headroom for modernisation. Based on our work to date, we expect to achieve over the next decade the very demanding efficiency targets we were set in 2015, including through investment in a programme of digital transformation.

We will develop a comprehensive strategy to improve recruitment and retention of talent, better reflecting the expectations of the modern workforce. We will access more effectively the talents of our ‘Whole Force’ across all three Services, Regulars, Reserves, Civil Service and industrial partners.

Looking ahead, dealing effectively with persistent conflict and competition will increasingly hinge on smarter, better informed long-range strategy.

To help achieve these goals we will establish a permanent Net Assessment Unit, as well as a Defence Policy Board of external experts, to bring challenge to Defence policy and to Defence strategy.

Our achievements under the MDP have made Defence stronger. The capability investments and policy approaches set out, with the £1.8 billion worth of Defence funding, will help us keep on track to deliver the right UK Defence for the challenging decade ahead.

Without a shadow of a doubt, there is more work to be done as we move towards next year’s Spending Review.

We must sustain this momentum if we are to realise our long-term goals of increasing the lethality, reach and mass of our Armed Forces.

I will do everything within my power to make sure that the UK remains a Tier-One military power in the decade ahead, and that we continue to deliver the strong defence and security that has been the hallmark of the government.

The Modernising Defence Programme

The featured photo shows Secretary of State for Defence Gavin Williamson CBE (Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire) sits in the cockpit of an F-35 Lightning II during a visit to the Royal Air Force’s 17 Squadron Dec. 2. The squadron is part of the F-35 Joint Operational Test Team at Edwards Air Force Base. (U.S. Air Force photo by Kyle Larson)

EDWARDS, CA, UNITED STATES

12.02.2018

412th Test Wing Public Affairs

We missed this presentation in the House but we are in the House of Commons the next day December 19, 2018 for meetings to discuss Brexit and related issues.

By Richard Weitz

Turkish President Erdoğan’s warning that he would soon send his military forces into the region of Syria where U.S. forces are operating was apparently the immediate factor prompting President Donald Trump’s decision to announce the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers from Syria.

These Special Forces have been in the country since late 2015, aiding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to combat the local elements of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Both the U.S. and EU officials had warned Ankara earlier in the week before the U.S. withdrawal announcement that the Turkish armed forces should not enter the region of Syria occupied by U.S. troops.

However, the prospect of a military clash between Turkish and U.S. forces compelled President Trump to assess the stark reality of imminent combat with a NATO ally over Syria.

That country has been of lower priority in Trump’s foreign-policy agenda compared with Iran, Korea, Russia, China, and international economics.

Withdrawing the U.S. troops could create problems.

The SDF will likely decrease its anti-ISIL operations in order to reinforce defenses against the Turks. There are reports of the SDF releasing ISIL prisoners and seeking new ties with Russia and Iran.

The various groups will compete to fill the vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal, generating an upsurge of fighting.

If the Turks do consolidate control over the border regions, however, they could close this vacuum, which could allow many refugees to return.

In the short-term, the withdrawal of U.S troops would reduce Turkish-U.S. tensions over Kurdish separatism and unleash a major Turkish offensive into Syrian territory that, whatever its contribution to fighting local terrorists, could exacerbate tensions between Turkey and the Russian-Syrian-Iranian bloc.

Damascus fears Turkish territorial ambitions in Syria, and Turkey could more directly challenge the other members of the Astana peace process, from which the West is excluded, if Ankara does not need their support against Washington.

However, it could have the opposite effect if the Turks think they now no longer need a deal with Washington over Syria and can instead reach a deal with the Syrian-Russia-Iranian bloc at the Kurds’ expense.

The 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria were never powerful enough to consolidate control beyond the Euphrates region. Their presence did deter others from acting there, but at the risk of triggering an inadvertent conflict between the United State and other countries.

For example, the withdrawal reduces the risk of an inadvertent Russian-U.S. military clash.

Until now, Syria has been the most prominent location where Russian and U.S. forces have operated in immediate proximity on the same battlefields.

Despite a de-confliction agreement, there have been many instances of near Russian-U.S. clashes, including a major U.S. air strike against Russian mercenaries that inflicted many casualties.

In the aftermath of Trump’s election, Syria seemed prepped to become an arena for closer Russian-U.S. cooperation, in this case through joint operations against the terrorists operating there.

This clearly failed to occur, and in recent years, Syria has become yet another source of tension between Moscow and Washington.

With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria, that risk of a direct Russian-U.S. military clash there will be substantially lowered.

However, the Trump administration is unlikely to help finance a Russian-Assad led reconstruction effort in any part of Syria.

Most likely, Syria will become a less important issue in bilateral relations, compared with Ukraine and other questions.

The United States should intensify its external airborne surveillance operations and missile strikes from bases in other countries and from ships sailing in the eastern Mediterranean.

Not only would these operations kill terrorists, or at least hinder them from grouping into concentrated targets, but it would also increase U.S. leverage regarding Syrian developments, such as deterring Syrian government use of chemical weapons.

The decision to halve the number of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan is more militarily problematic, since unlike in Syria, these soldiers are directly combating terrorists as well as training the Afghan Security Forces.

The U.S. decision may encourage other NATO allies, who now contribute some 8,000 troops, to cut back their forces as well.

The impact of the decision may be amplified if the U.S. and other countries cut their financial support for the Afghan government and armed forces.

As in Syria, however, the United States has faced a challenging situation in Afghanistan due to the lack of strong local allies.

The troop cut will lead some Taliban leaders to question the durability of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, which could make it harder to achieve peace since they will not negotiate in good faith as long as they believe they can win the war on the battlefield.

Yet, this step could also make U.S. professions of interest in a peace agreement more credible, since a Taliban condition has been the eventual removal of all foreign forces (including ISIL fighters) from Afghanistan.

The Taliban intentions should become clearer now—hopefully they will begin engaging with the Afghan government and other Afghan parties interested in peace.

These decisions, compounded by Secretary Mattis’ departure, have exacerbated concerns about the Trump administration’s commitments to U.S. friends and allies as well as general U.S. foreign-policy credibility.

No one notified the SDF or other U.S. allies in advance of the presidents’ tweets. The U.S. network of global allies, as the president’s National Security Strategy notes, is a unique asset of international power available to the United States but no its major competitors.

However, President Trump’s decisions and decision-making process reflect his long-standing aversion to having U.S. ground forces engage in protracted conflicts as well as his desire to rebalance U.S. global commitments and make other countries assume more of the burden where possible (which he now believes is possible in Syria and Afghanistan).

He has argued that he can restore U.S. respect and influence by ending the U.S. role as a world policeman but increasing U.S. military strength to deter threats without the use of U.S. military force.

In terms of process, Trump cultivates unpredictability as enhancing his negotiating position and U.S. diplomatic flexibility—which can help deter some opponents but makes reassuring partners harder.

He is content making decisions based on his commercial experience, intuition, gut instincts, and faith in his negotiating skills—with minimal consultation with advisers but strongly influenced by his most recent discussions with foreign leaders like Erdogan.

These recent decisions remind us that President Trump is comfortable resisting international and domestic opinion on controversial issues such as the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate agreement, and tariffs.

More than any recent U.S. President, Trump has been willing to accept high risks for high potential gains.

The featured photo shows a U.S. Soldier surveils the area during a combined joint patrol with Turkey in Manbij, Syria Nov. 1, 2018. This operation ensures they can safely work with partner forces to maintain the safety and security of the region and protect the civilians of Manbij in their common pursuit of defeating ISIS. Maintaining security and stability in Manbij is also important to sustaining momentum for ongoing operations to defeat Daesh in eastern Syria. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Zoe Garbarino)

By Vice Adm S Sinha (Retd)

Thus far the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has been law abiding and stable maritime region permitting smooth flow of world trade.

Sea Lanes of communication criss-cross the Indian Ocean after negotiating restricted passages, i.e., Straits of Hormuz, Gulf of Aden and Straits of Malacca.

One look at the map of vast expanse of Indian Ocean would reveal the strategic importance of India. It provides port facilities to transiting vessels as well as vessels carrying trade to and from India’s ports. The Sri Lankan port of Colombo is another port which is used by international shipping.

After the British colonisation ended in Asia, most of the countries were in extreme poverty and began their economic development.

Also, soon after World War II, the world arranged itself in bipolar Cold War paradigm.

However, India and number of other countries foresaw the pitfalls of this paradigm and chose non-alignment as their state policy. India had to recover from the scars of partition.

Security and territorial integrity of the country became paramount with the creation of permanent adversary Pakistan which claimed parts of Indian territory as its own.

Indian planners also saw through the security challenges in the Indian Ocean, mainly from two halves of Pakistan viz. East and West. Indian Navy’s capabilities were being developed for maritime security in two large sections of Indian Ocean – Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

122337 fade 1.0 5.0

Pakistan joined the US in CENTO coalition mainly to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining access to warm water ports in the Arabian Sea. Pakistan was using its alliance with the US to develop its Armed Forces to keep J&K issue on the boil and protect its eastern state East Pakistan which did not have terrestrial connectivity.

India’s major naval combatants were of British origin whereas Pakistan benefited from technologically advanced platforms from America. India had acquired a light Aircraft Carrier Vikrant and built its Naval Aviation Capabilities. Witnessing the improvement in Pakistan Navy’s armada, India added to its capabilities by inducting Soviet origin ships and platforms for the Army and Air Force.

India fought two wars, 1962 against China and 1965 against Pakistan which exposed the weaknesses of our Armed Forces. Capability enhancements then began in earnest.

As a result, the war in 1971 was fought with much superiority.

Efficacy of Navy’s carrier borne aircraft was proven where repeated attacks by the fighter aircraft from sea not only destroyed ships in erstwhile East Pakistan harbours but also blockaded the ports, precluding logistics support to Pakistan troops as also their escape route.

This hastened the surrender process of over 90,000 Pakistan troops.

However, loss of INS Khukri and some of IAF aircraft, led to India’s increased weapon acquisition from the Soviet Union. Strategic Partnership agreements were signed. It had become essential for national security to make India more capable given its vast land borders and EEZ.

While China Pakistan nexus was just about emerging, Indian Navy focused on strengthening its surface, air and sub-surface capabilities to protect India’s larger interests in the wider Indian Ocean which linked Pacific with the Mediterranean Sea.

Indian Navy inducted Rajput Class destroyers, Minesweepers, more submarines etc and also speeded up indigenous shipbuilding.

Since then the Naval capabilities have come a long way.

Navy exercises great degree of regional supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

Induction of Delhi Class destroyers, G and B Class Frigates, Kilo and Shishumar Class submarines, second aircraft carrier Viraat, modern fighters Sea Harrier STOVL aircraft, state-of-the-art Anti Submarine Helicopters Sea Kings, Maritime Patrol Aircraft IL-38 and Tu-142 provided Maritime Domain Awareness in much larger swath which reflected India’s and the Navy’s desire to exercise sea control over much larger areas in the IOR.

Our planners had the foresight of emerging geopolitics in the IOR and need to continue strengthening its Maritime power.

India remained the unchallenged leader in the Indian Ocean’s strategic maneuvering space and was so acknowledged by much advanced navies of the US and France.

Many countries engaged India in bilateral exercises and other training courses for their Armed Forces, more so the Navy.

In the meanwhile, the contours of geopolitical space were undergoing profound changes.

The US, having been involved in Iran-Iraq war, Global War on terror post 9/11 and Syrian crisis of ISIS, decided to wean away from West Asia and reduce its presence in Afghanistan. The US realised that Pakistan had betrayed them in GWOT by protecting fugitive Osama Bin Laden (OBL) while the world was looking for him.

Once OBL was killed President Obama declared US policy of pivot to Asia.

This was triggered by asserting rise of China in the maritime space while US was engaged in chasing terrorist organisations and individuals.

China had utilised this vacuum in Indo-Pacific to build its military and economic capabilities.

Economically it was beginning to challenge the US for world leadership; militarily it was threatening the regional countries. It occupied few structures in Spratly and Paracel group of islands. It made historical claims of vast EEZ nearly in all of South China Sea. It threw to winds the ICJ judgement on Scarborough shoals which was clearly Philippine territory.

China heavily militarised these structures in order to widen its control on larger expanse in the SCS. US was aghast with these developments. Except for freedom of Navigation operations it could not reprimand China any further.

China was increasing its economic influence on the IOR littorals. This rang alarm bells in South Block.

Hambantota port in Sri Lanka was developed by China, Maldives had leased out number of islands to China for port and airport development, Myanmar had leased Kyapku port for development by China.

The Indian Navy was stretching out in wider Indian Ocean to increase its surveillance bubble. The ships, submarines and aircraft were deployed for longer durations.

China’s building of naval base in Djibouti and taking Gwadar on operational lease was clear indication that China has arrived at all choke points through which not only their trade travels but the entire world’s trade moved.

India’s concerns were twofold.

Firstly, the security of trade at choke points and SLOCs and secondly, the nexus between China and Pakistan under which eight submarines were to be supplied to Pakistan as also some frigates. It would embolden Pakistan in the Arabian Sea and could harass Indian Navy in its operational space. Clearly the strategic space of India is shrinking.

While China’s economic debt trap diplomacy in IOR littorals is constantly enhancing its influence, its arming of Pakistan reflects her desire to keep India engaged in matters military.

India has sensed the geopolitical alterations in the region and given its Navy free hand to operationally ensure freedom of navigation for global commons in areas of Indian interests.

Navy’s present capabilities and the ongoing ship/submarine induction programme provides the needed operational edge.

However, China’s rapid military rise and its impending basing of Naval combatants in the Indian Ocean littorals, Djibouti, Gwadar and possible replenishment facility at ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Maldives leaves little choice but to strengthen the present combat ability of Indian Navy.

Should China’s aircraft carrier and nuclear submarines become a regular feature in India’s backyard, Navy would not only have to sustain the existing assets but enhance its combat power for deterrence.

The US has presence in the IOR in the form of Fifth Fleet HQ in Bahrain. NAVCENT serves as the hub of maritime domain awareness network. The US has been alarmed by the ‘Access Denial’ ability of China.

In response, the US’s new formative security architecture in East and South East Asia will complement Washington’s designs for an Air-Sea Battle doctrine (later renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Manoeuvre in the global commons) as a counter to China’s rising techno-military power in the region.

According to this doctrine, US Forces would have to penetrate China’s airspace, take out Chinese air defences and offensive missile capabilities, and then move US aircraft carrier battle groups closer to China’s shores.

As China has marched on technologically faster than expected, some American strategists have urged much closer security cooperation with leading military powers in the Indo-Pacific.

In fact Chinese strategist Yan Xue Tong at Tsinghua University, has foreseen the US effort for a new institutionalised net of alliance (mainly read Quad), argues that China should pre-eminently abandon its non-alignment principle and provide credible security assurances to regional partners, “Wallet Diplomacy” alone cannot build a coalition countering US containment.

Though President Xi Jinping has officially declined that call, China’s selling arms and platforms to countries where it has already laid economic trap, is nothing but enlargement of interoperability envelope of its own ships/submarines and aircraft with those countries which can surreptitiously support Chinese war waging effort.

Arming of Pakistan and few other countries in the littorals of Indian Ocean needs to be seen in the overall context of larger geopolitical landscape.

While Indian Navy has factored this aspect in its mission based deployments, but rising Chinese military power will call for additional asset induction to maintain power balance in the IOR.

The author is a former FOC-in-C, Western Naval Command and Chief of Integrated Defence Staff. Views are personal.

This article was published by or partner India Strategic in December 2018.