The Finns are in the process of acquiring four new corvettes equipped to contribute to their national air defense capabilities.

They are in the process of acquiring and equipping four new corvettes in this role.

The Pohjanmaa-class corvette is a class of general-purpose surface combatants currently under development for the Finnish Navy as part of the Squadron 2020 (Finnish: Laivue 2020) project. Together with the existing four Hamina-class missile boats, the four new corvettes will form the backbone of the Finnish Navy from the mid-2020s onwards. They will replace seven older vessels that have been or are due to be decommissioned: the minelayer Pohjanmaa, two Hämeenmaa-class minelayers and four Rauma-class missile boats.

And recently an article on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website indicated a way ahead with regard to missiles arming the corvettes in an air defense role.

Minister of Defence Jussi Niinistö authorised, on 21 February 2019, the Finnish Defence Forces Logistics Command to procure a surface-to-air missile system (ITO20) for the Pohjanmaa-class corvettes of the Squadron 2020 project. The ITO20 system will consist of Evolved SeaSparrow Missiles (ESSM), launcher units, spare parts, required supplementary parts, and the related software package.

The ITO20 system will be installed in all four Pohjanmaa-class vessels. The number of missiles to be procured is not public information. The entire system will cost EUR 83 million, without value added tax, and it will be procured from the United States defence administration through a government-to-government agreement.

The ITO20 system is an integral part of the combat system in the corvettes; surface-to-air missiles protect the vessels’ own operations and make it possible to protect other sites or operation of troops. The ITO20 system improves the Navy’s capability to participate more effectively in national air defence and protect important sites. A Gabriel surface-to-surface missile system and a torpedo weapon system have already been procured for the corvettes.  

Squadron 2020 project contract

The four modern corvettes designed for Finland’s conditions will replace the seven surface combatants that will be decommissioned. The Pohjanmaa-class corvettes will be constructed in Finland for reasons of security of supply. The combat system, in other words the weapons and sensors, will be procured from overseas through a separate tendering process. 

There are on-going negotiations on contracts for the Pohjanmaa-class shipbuilding and combat systems. The process of completing an extensive contract with a number of parties has required special diligence and has therefore also taken more time than expected. 

Recently, the Norwegian government reminded us of the anniversary of the new phase of European development.

Five years have passed since Russia illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol on 18 March 2014. This act was a serious violation of international law and a challenge to the established international order. Norway therefore reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territory, which it urges Russia to reverse. Norway considers it essential that relations between states are guided by international law,’ said State Secretary Audun Halvorsen.

Russia committed several other violations of international law prior to the annexation. Under the false pretext of restoring law and order in Crimea, Russian forces entered Ukrainian territory and took control of important institutions and key societal functions. In the course of a few weeks, a part of Ukraine was forcibly placed under Russian administration.

The illegal referendum on 16 March 2014 was used to legitimise Russia’s use of force. In the absence of any form of international recognition, the referendum was presented as justification for the illegal incorporation of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation two days later.

‘We are concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in Crimea and Sevastopol. Norway urges Russia to fulfil its human rights obligations and to grant organisations such as the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe access to the peninsula without delay,’ said Mr Halvorsen.

The featured photo shows Russian tanks and soldiers storming a Ukrainian air force base in Belbek near the Crimean city of Sevastopol on March 22, 2014. (Viktor Drachev / AFP/Getty Images).

 

It is not just about getting better intelligence through space-based systems to have an historical record of what killed you.

It is about the kill web executing the kill function.

This report focuses on the way ahead now and for the five year period ahead.

The future is now; the threat is not just about the hypothetical world of 2030.

This report by Ed Timperlake looks at shaping a realistic way ahead now which can be built upon for the mid and long term as well.

It is not about wasting resources on legacy thinking or abstract long term concepts.

With the immediacy of challenges facing the US and its allies, it is about what the military can do now and in the next five years which are the basis for shaping realistic crisis management approaches.

Simply ignoring the fifth generation revolution is not a strategy but myopia.

Leveraging the revolution and shaping an ever more effective distributed kill web clearly provides both for immediate and long term benefits for warfighting as well as providing a solid foundation for force transformation.

Kill Web and HSCMs

For an ebook version of the report, see below:

 

 

By Ed Timperlake

President Putin has just given all in America a wakeup call, but  to the Russian Military everlasting regret if combat ever breaks out  the US Navy is always ready-NOW. 

Over fifty years ago, 1965, in Bancroft Hall at the United States Naval Academy, Plebes (freshmen) were required when making a very loud announcement to a gathering of fellow Midshipman to begin with the alert-“attention world, attention world.”

It was a time at Annapolis  when some of those who had fought WWII in the great “Big Blue Blanket” war winning con-ops were still in uniform, several of the Navy Pilots who were featured in the great work “the Bridges of Toko-Ri” were still in uniform, and Vietnam Yankee and Dixie station Carriers were beginning to fight that war.

From Plebe to Four Star Admirals, all in the United States Navy and Marine Corps were constantly engaged and challenged in understanding and mastering the dynamic nature of war at sea and the role of Navy/Marine power projection from across the beach. 

In those days sailors still in uniform wearing the Dolphins of the “silent service,” the Navy Submarine Community, would proudly point out that with the loss of 52 subs “still on patrol” that their community sunk over 50% of the tonnage of the Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII.

All Navy commanders have to practice over and over to evolve a much broader scope of understanding and direction in this 21^st Century information world. 

It is a 21st Century challenge to understand the dynamic learning from a computer-human interface while also recognizing it is the goal of a reactive enemy to attempt to destroy not only individual platforms, sink ships and subs and shoot down aircraft, but wreck the very synapses of all things command and control.

Information assurance with redundancy and reliability is critical but also the ability to act independently as systems are degraded to fight and win cannot be forgotten in all training exercises. 

The enemy always gets a vote but so does the United States Navy.

The decade ahead is not a repeat of the past 15 years; it is not about a continuation of the land-centric and counter-insurgency slow motion war.

ASW platforms which can operate in an interconnected manner are the crucial ones to build, deploy and sustain in the period ahead, versus those which are very limited in their capability to provide synergy to joint or coalition forces in the battle space.

This means as well that force packages need to be examined, less in and of themselves terms, than in terms of their synergy and capabilities in shaping dominant combat power in the interconnected battle space.

In a lasting reminder to anyone who threatens America from the sea there is a monument at the sea wall at the  US Naval Academy, of those “Still on Patrol,” the names of lost Submarines from a fading war that are ever within the ethos of the fighting courage of sailors in today’s Silent Service.  

Courage does run deep.

Bluntly put, an overemphasis on sensing of hypersonic missiles from space really misses the point — it is not about being alert to what is about to kill you — it is about killing the archer and the arrow.

And we have in our hands the means to do so as we knit together key platforms which are delivering the S cubed revolution.

The future is now and working enhanced integrative capabilities moving forward with the new platforms and the relevant legacy ones is a core priority; not preparing for a new space world in 2035.

This is the tenth and final piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missiles.

The featured photo shows  Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives to deliver his annual state of the nation address in Moscow on February 20, 2019.

By Ed Timperlake

My initial 2011 paper “winning Air/Sea Battle” only looked at F-35 as early warning platform ¹

Essentially, I focused in that paper on the F-35s as providing a “heads up” to fleet surface ships about “incoming” missiles threats but in the non-stealth mode the F-35 can carry more ordinance than F/A-18 or F-16.

So instead of just a “heads-up” to the NORTHCOM/NORAD Commander or an Admiral commanding a  Carrier Strike Group to make ready American shore defenses or a fleet for close in defensive measures, why can’t an F-35 carry anti-HSCM designed ordinance to kill HSCMs in flight?

Design a missile that can link to the fusion cockpit for an immediate fire control solution and launch a missile with an appropriate warhead to take down an incoming HSCM.

In an email exchange with Dr. Lewis, he raised a significant challenge which needs to be addressed in R and D and the shaping of effective con-ops.

“The biggest threat I see is actually a swarm attack of high-speed incoming, that might overwhelm any solution. The Chinese have been rather open about this tactic.” 

“It is very fair to say it is truly a wicked problem, but he also adds; “the good news is there are indeed solutions that will stop them.”

“The one point in favor of the HSCM intercept to a kill shot is the need to just get in front of the missile with something that abruptly and directly disrupts its forward motion. 

“The key to defeating it is to make it beat itself to death– the old joke about you only have to be close in horseshoes and hand grenades applies.”

Again quoting Dr. Mark Lewis from that email exchange:

“One method of stopping them simple kinetic will be effective, with the challenge that a high-speed maneuvering missile will be rather hard to catch with dumb ordnance. 

“And with a rapid closing speed, the window for that kill chain is of course small.

“There are other very promising options as well.

“Stability and control of a hypersonic craft is a key element. The DARPA HTV-2 failed twice due to control losses, something that the Air Force warned DARPA about ahead of time. 

“In the case of HTV-2 flight 1, the loss occurred due to yaw-roll coupling; essentially, the vehicle developed a small asymmetry, began to yaw, and corrective control action caused it to roll out of limit. 

“That was a case of bad design, but also an example of how easy it is to mess with these craft. 

“HTV-2’s second flight was lost because an important protection system failed again making it uncontrollable.

“I can’t help drawing an analogy to the old German V-1’s, that could be disabled by flying alongside in a fighter and hitting their wing tips. The resulting roll made them unstable!

“The third flight of X-51, where a fin broke off the cruise vehicle during solid rocket boost, and when it separated from the solid motor (at Mach 4.8) it almost immediately lost control. So when you are flying at hypersonic (or even supersonic speeds) and take even minor damage, survival is unlikely. 

“Coincidentally, and as a funny historical quirk, there is a pretty long list of hypersonic programs that have been lost due to fin failures completely unrelated to the hypersonic portion of the flight: X-43 first flight, the Australian HyShot first flight, and now most recently, AHW’s second flight. 

“That last one is especially painful; the booster lost a fin a few inches above the launch pad due to an entangled thermal blanket.

A hypersonic missile must travel between Mach 5 and Mach 10, or 3,840–7,680 miles per hour in order to be considered hypersonic. 

One should think a mile a second.

By comparison, a current missile AA missile, the AIM-120 has the characteristics seen in the graphic to the left (credit Wiki).

Thus, there is a speed differential of between 1 and 6 Mach and also the HSCMs are also in flight, the intercept missiles are at a standing start.

The first look at intercepting a HSCM inbound against the fleet is one of the first verbal math problem we all had in Algebra 1-“A train leaves a station going 50 mph… Another train leaves it’s station going 80 mph.. etc etc.”

The logic of that example is that both HSCM and intercept missile are on the “same track” and a parallel track for a perfect “face-shot.”

However, the crossing angle to intercept may be much more significant, say for example an F-35 flying on a heading of 090 and the pilot’s cockpit’s fusion display picks up a HSCM coming at the Fleet heading 180 and the closes point of approach for the physical passing of the F-35 on station and HSCM for intercept is offset by say 30 miles and at a different altitude.

The F-35 sensor shooter for an example could be 90 degrees off the nose for an intercept vector and also off set by some miles and altitude from the physical closes point of approach, this is a very hard shot.

The F-35 at best can try to point and shoot with the missile arming and independently maneuvering but having been initially launched many degrees off the aircraft’s initial route of flight.

The challenge is that at some point in space and time, the kill missile must get in front of the HSCM. 

It is not necessary to hit a bullet with a bullet. 

With the current significant Mach differential shown above a conventional missile cannot run down a HSCM. 

With focused R&D perhaps a future hypersonic-interceptor missile is possible but in this example I am using the current art of the possible and assuming a +6 Mach advantage given to the HSCM and it is already in flight while interceptor missile is on the rail at the start.

Therefore, detection and reaction time for launch and missile light-off the intercept angle for the missile altitude differential make time and distance of flight against HSCM everything. 

At around 88 miles per minute incoming, depending on altitude it is a very hard problem.

The first issue is simply just getting a missile off an F-35 in the time of calculation for sensing something approaching at a high rate of speed.

Using the CNO’s formula heat=sensing, an F-35 can see something moving very fast at a distance.

How far away is one key BUT not a showstopper.

Because if the F-35 can sense at a whatever distance it is reacting electronically at the speed of light and there is the possibility of doing something about it.

Slaving an immediate launch fire-control solution from the F-35 fusion cockpit sensed HSCM route of flight vector to an interceptor missile loaded on the aircraft hardpoints is one way.

But just as significant the F-35 sensor can off load the kill shot to another F-35 with a better chance.

To have any chance of success the launching F-35 has to have a certain head on aspect – if the HSCM is beyond the wing-line the engagement is lost at first detection. 

The kill-shot game for that one F-35 in launching a counter-missile is already be over.

But now think of a 21st Century “chainsaw” as a solution set and a way ahead.

The USN strike commander is currently using F/A-18s to refuel F/A-18s. Since stealth in not an issue against an HSCM swarming missile attack, a mix of F-35s with F/A-18 tanking assets can put as many F-35s on a combat air patrol station as far away from the surface fleet as possible for early detection. That effort can then feed-back for defense in depth combat engagements.

Against even a Mach 10 threat the F-35 data linked information dominance sensor can off load at the speed of light the incoming track of swarming inbound HSCM threats to other F-35s standing CAP right over the Fleet.

Additionally, all USN combat platforms can also light up; AEGIS ships, Growlers, E-2 Hawkeyes and other close in defensive combat weapon systems.

Additionally, the Ford CVN-78 has been specifically designed with an area on the flight deck to configure the air wing aircraft quickly and efficiently with the appropriate ordinance for the appropriate mission.

In alternating between offensive strikes, using active or passive stealth with weapons in a weapons bay or non-stealth with a significant weapons load, the combat ordinance on an F-35 can be configured quickly.

As the combat situation dictates the defensive requirements of loading anti-HSCM missiles as stated above can also be done quickly. USN ship design teams working on the CVN-78 figured this all out; switching ordinance and/or reloading. 

It is no small issue; the Japanese carriers were sunk at the battle of Midway because they were caught in an arming, de-arming, arming cycle. From that moment forward they were going to lose the war.

The challenge for the R&D community is to immediately give a lot of thought and research on what type of ordinance, missiles and warheads are best to defeat a HSCM. 

The challenge for strategic planning is to consider a return “back to the future” and establishing an East Coast Air Defense string of bases for the F-35A/B/C.

F-35 wide area sensing targeting and mapping capability against, air -breathing HSCM, enemy aircraft and  surface ships is beyond excellent. 

They can fulfill the target acquisition requirement  of a Payload Utility function.

“The difference between a good and great officer is about ten seconds”. Admiral Burke. 

The US Navy now has many great officers moving in the air at sea and under the ocean surface at light speed sensing  acting and if necessary killing.  

If F-35s are stationed to stand air defense alert in a  21^st Century “Cold War basing” con-ops  from Otis ANG Base to NAS Pax River, (or Quantico air field)  Langley field, NAS Oceana, MCAS Beaufort  and NAS Key West (Bocha Chica) then appropriately networked to other “kill shot” platforms both at sea and Army ADA we might survive an attempted first strike. 

If Putin and the Russian military saw this type of preparedness they might always hesitate. 

Even if a Russian cruise missile sub gets off a shot it is dead dead dead because the F-35, P-8 and Triton will know exactly where it is on launch and can deliver an effective payload for its defeat and provide other options as well. 

This is the ninth piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missiles.