By Ed Timperlake

A game changer in weapon effectiveness and a way ahead to deal with a most “wicked problem” facing the US Navy today is how to effectively counter Putin’s threat of using HSCMs, notably aboard submarines.  

My preliminary  analysis on how to engage with evolving HSCM and to develop counter measures originates from a comment made by the  previous CNO Admiral Greenert.

Admiral Greenert graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1975 with a Bachelor of Science degree in ocean engineering and completed studies in nuclear power for service as a submarine officer ¹

As a very smart Navy Captain noted in discussing con-ops-“we have no problem using the word attack we are Naval Officers.”

Consequently just like the famous Carrier Pilot mantra “kill the archer not the arrows” in the Navy Air Fight against strike bombers — Sinking the sub at all costs is critical.

But if that isn’t achieved then the Navy then fighting HSCMs in flight is everything. 

Thankfully the Navy now has now declared the F-35C carrier version operational. The best way I could hope for in looking at  the problem of destroying a  HSCM in flight was to identify the coming global “S-Cubed” revolution of Sensors, Stealth and Speed.

“You know that stealth may be over-rated,” Admiral Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, noted during a speech at the Office of Naval Research Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo, Washington D.C. (2015)

“I don’t want to necessarily say that it’s over but let’s face it, if something moves fast through the air and disrupts molecules in the air and puts out heat – I don’t care how cool the engine can be – it’s going to be detectable.”

The CNO was exactly right. 

Admiral Jonathan Greenert, a nuclear trained Navy submarine officer, and General Mike Hostage the recently retired Commander of the USAF Air Combat Command and an F-22 pilot are in agreement on the dynamic nature of “stealth.”

From General Hostage’s last interview before retirement and one which he did with us:

People focus on stealth as the determining factor or delineator of the fifth generation. It isn’t; it’s fusion.

Fusion is what makes that platform so fundamentally different than anything else.

And that’s why if anybody tries to tell you hey, I got a 4.5 airplane, a 4.8 airplane, don’t believe them.

All that they’re talking about is RCS (Radar Cross Section).

Fusion is the fundamental delineator. And you’re not going to put fusion into a fourth gen airplane because their avionic suites are not set up to be a fused platform.

And fusion changes how you use the platform.²

Just like in Admiral Greenert’s initial warfighting community, the U.S. Navy’s submarines “silent service,” airpower commanders have the same type of relative technology dynamic against a reactive enemy but in a different medium.

Both communities have to be ready to fight in a very dangerous three-dimensional maneuvering environment where active and passive sensing and weapons and countermeasures to those weapons mean the difference between life and death.

In our discussions with Dr. Mark Lewis, former Chief Scientist of the USAF and currently head of the Institute for Defense Analysis Science and Technology Policy Institute, we focused on the threat posed by the hypersonic cruise missile.

We interviewed Dr. Lewis, a leading expert on hypersonics,  in the context of rolling out an F-35 fleet with the rapidly approaching Hyper-Sonic Cruise Missile (HSCM) as a new weapon of war.³

HSCMs are part of what one might call an S Cubed formula for thinking about military critical technologies for 21^st-century targeted R&D.

S-cubed=sensors-stealth-speed of weapons can provide a new paradigm for shaping a combat force necessary for the US Military to fight and win in 21^st century engagements.

Stealth or no stealth the F-35 fits perfectly into the S3 revolution in modern war.

No matter which path is taken, the F-35 as a single platform with all three attributes combined or as a non-stealth sensor platform, employing speed of weapons carried organically or trading off with other platforms at the speed of light by giving incoming target vectors to their weapons.

Airframe design characteristics are all blended together in tradeoffs and have been focused on constantly improving, payload (improved by systems/and weapons carried), maneuverability (measured by P Sub s), speed, and range (modified by VSTOL–a basing mobility plus factor).

Stealth was a clean sheet design for F-22 and F-35 and is embedded in the total airframe and it is a very sensitive multiplicative factor; one does not add stealth. 

Additionally like all modern fighters stealth aircraft are also designed with inherent other survivability factors, such as system redundancy and hardening.

Stealth is simply a survivability term that impacts the entire airframe and will eventually decline as better sensors are developed.

This is also why passive sensing is also a real revolution. Passive sensing can attenuate the problem of generating active “signals in space” which often can give away a platform’s position either maneuvering or an absolute fixed location for a counter- attack.

Stealth dynamically over time will become more vulnerable as enemies sensors improve.

How long and against what enemy, and where in world will the ant-stealth sensors and successful weapons be employed is unknown, but it will occur.

Modern air combat, just like submarine warfare is essentially an evolving contest of “blind man’s bluff.”

Even if and when stealth survivability deteriorates–ENTER the F-35 fusion cockpit with passive sensing and a significant payload of hard points.

External weapon hard-points on the F-35 are a brilliant design aspect, which is often overlooked in most discussions.

The non-stealth F-35 can sling more ordinance than F/A-18 and F-16.

So even in a non-stealth world, advantage goes to F-35, with its 360 active and passive horizontally linked cockpit decision-making ability.

As the former CNO says “payloads over performance.”

An F-35 as a non-stealth fleet still has a 360-degree sensor platform with “reach not range” as a fundamental fleet enabler.

It is an information dominance fusion platform that can be favorably compared to the equivalent of being a 21st Century version of USN Destroyers standing very dangerous and heroic radar picket duty protecting the amphibious invasion force and Carrier Fleet against kamikazes off Okinawa.

As the former CNO pointed out “something moves fast through the air and disrupts molecules in the air and puts out heat – I don’t care how cool the engine can be – it’s going to be detectable.”

Only this time against the HSCM and also a lesser-included problem of killing slower cruise missiles if F-35 did not exist it would have to be invented.

In other words, an additional benefit of R&D and con-ops efforts to kill HSCMs makes taking down conventional cruise missiles much easier.

Bluntly put, an overemphasis on sensing of hypersonic missiles from space really misses the point — it is not about being alert to what is about to kill you — it is about killing the archer and the arrow.

And we have in our hands the means to do so as we knit together key platforms which are delivering the S cubed revolution.

The future is now and working enhanced integrative capabilities moving forward with the new platforms and the relevant legacy ones is a core priority; not preparing for a new space world in 2035.

This is the eighth piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missiles.

We have focused for some time on the importance of the modernization efforts of the Nordics in dealing with the return of the direct defense challenge in Europe.

A key state in the effort has clearly been Norway.

Recently, the Norwegian government released their defence plan for the next seven years with regard to projected defense acquisitions.

According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence website:

The long term planning process outlines the continuous development of the Norwegian Defence Sector with respect to organisation, infrastructure (garrisons and bases), personnel (numbers, composition and qualifications) and materiel (existing equipment and new acquisitions).

This process is carried out under the direction of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Long Term Plan – Materiel forms the basis for all materiel procurements in the short term (4 years), the medium term (8 years) and the long-term perspectives (20 years). Annually, the plan is updated to reflect updates based on changing requirements, available resources and progress in on-going acquisitions.

The Government recognises the vital role the defence industry plays in support of the Armed Forces’ capabilities. This role ranges from the provision and maintenance of military equipment to the delivery of a wide range of support services.

The Government’s national strategy for the defence industry was recently revised, and presented as a new White Paper to Parliament (Meld. St. 9 (2015–2016) Nasjonal forsvarsindustriell strategi) and covers the relationship between the Defence Sector and the defence industry.

The main reasons for presenting an updated White Paper are the developments in the security sphere over the recent years, changes in the defence market both nationally and internationally, changes in terms and conditions, the introduction of the EU’s defence and security procurement directive, in addition to an increased focus on preparedness and security of supply.

The new White Paper focuses on national security interests and security of supply as basis for the new policy and strategy. The policy will continue to maintain and develop an internationally competitive Norwegian defence industry in areas of relevance for the Norwegian Defence Sector.

The Norwegian defence industry contributes substantially to our national economic growth, technological and industrial development, export related income and high-tech related employment.

The aim of the strategy is to secure good cooperation between the defence sector and the defence industry based on our sector’s need for cost-efficient deliveries of defence equipment and services.

The strategy implies that Norway increasingly should cooperate with other nations on defence procurement. The strategy will also contribute to necessary predictability for Norwegian export companies. The Government upholds the governmental support programme for marketing and industrial cooperation.

A central feature in the annual updating of the Long Term Plan – Materiel is the preparation and publication of an unclassified overview of long-term materiel requirements. This publication does not examine each planned project in detail but creates opportunities for in-depth discussions between the Defence Sector and industry. In this way, industry can get an early insight into potential materiel investments.

The aim is to maintain highly skilled companies that individually or in cooperation with others, are able to support the needs of the Defence Sector. Having a proven and highly skilled industry is also fundamental for being able to compete in the international defence market that in many ways remains a closed one.

The materiel investment projects are subject to decisions and approval by the MoD and the Parliament.

The projects listed in this publication are not approved for implementation. It is emphasized that any project not yet formally approved may subsequently be terminated or changed without any further explanation or liability.

Clearly, a key area of focus needs to be on C2 and IT systems, which is underscored in the report:

The Information Infrastructure Programme is by nature a complex programme consisting of different kind of ICT-services, -solutions and –systems. 

The Information Infrastructure Programme emphasizes the investment profile on tactical plattforms, data center solutions and to increase the ability of information sharing and interoperability. 

In more detail the programme consists of: 

• Modernization of quantum resistant ecryption solutions. 
• Providing ICT-infrastructure for new defence base structure. 
• Augmentation and modernization of mobile and static communication infrastructure. 
• Modernization of C4ISR and JISRSystems for Information Security and Computer Network Defence. 

faf-2019-2026-english---final

See also the following:

The Nordics and the Strategic Shift

By Ed Timperlake

It is now time to accept that a war-changing weapon, HSCM is in the late stages of R&D and it must be accounted for in any battle plan.  

Unlike distant “hyper-sonic” R&D efforts such a Global Strategic Strike aircraft, a hypersonic cruise missile is a rapidly evolving technology, which sooner than later will be demonstrating the art of the possible up close and personal.  

Such a revolutionary CM in the US arsenal is a very good thing. In the hands of Russian forces it is a very real “wolf at the door.”

Consequently when, not if, a hypersonic-Cruise Missile is battle ready the Air/Sea Battle staff will have to figure out both offensive and defensive con-ops.

In sufficient numbers a hypersonic cruise missile can be a war-tipping asset. 

Employed by US and Allied forces the capability will greatly enable a deadly combat punch.

If it is in the hands of an enemy a hypersonic cruise missile is a ship killer and now a direct strategic threat to the US. 

The Cold War USN Carrier Battle Group protection mantra against Russian Bombers with anti-ship cruise missiles was to try and first kill the archer not the arrows.

Top Gun in the late eighties briefed “Chainsaw” tactics, and the F-14 was very well designed for long-range interception of threats against the Fleet.

“Chainsaw” was a focus on reaching out as far a possible against any threats.⁴

Now if Russian and/or PLAAF successfully air launch HSCMs or their missiles are launched from ground batteries or surface ships or subs (USN fast attack subs are of utmost importance in that battle) they will be engaging in their version of the S-3 formula. 

Just like the USN and USAF they first need sensors to make it all work. 

The order of the “S” words in the priority of formula is very important.

If they develop a HSCM to empower their fighting force the F-35 does not have to fight in the stealth mode against HSCMs. 

Even if HSCMs move at Mach 10 an F-35 sensor platform moves “trons” at the speed of light and this can make all the difference.

It is very evident that all fighting forces need both reach and range. 

The F-35 today can play both stealth and non-stealth and is a generation better than any other aircraft in the world. 

One just has to look at Russian and PLAAF attempts to develop a real F-35 capability and their stealth airframe is lacking the sensor systems comparable to F-35. 

It is a pure marketing assertion that they have fusion parity and DAS.

The F-35 “360 Degree Fusion Cockpit” is good for a decade or more as the never ending action/reaction cycle of our enemies attempt to make their technology and training moves to catch up to the United States.

The US and its Allies are the only airpower thinkers and practitioners that can learn TTPs when F-35, F-22 and legacy aircraft mix it all up at a Red Flag. Russian and PLAAF cannot do that training within a decade. 

They might claim that they are building fusion cockpits in stealth jets-but currently just by looking at their airframes with no nose sensors or wing sensors, they are simply fusing linear improvements to radar systems. They do not have the complete 360-active/passive reach that the F-35 brings to AA, AG and EW fight.

There is one other significant factor of HSCMs.

A ship has an advantage in that it can maneuver at sea; it also has a distinct disadvantage if a mortal blow is landed it sinks.

In contrast, an airfield or strategic target like the White House or Camp David has a disadvantage in that it they are a very well-known fixed point on land. 

Training for the Kill Web

Both the US Navy and US Air Force have the vision and resources to develop the most modern training ranges in the world and a dedicated unified approach to collecting operational intelligence against HSCM airborne “signatures.”

During a visit to Nellis AFB Major General Jay Silveria, then the Commander of the USAF Warfare Center, pointed out that one of the missions of his command is to create a mission file for the F-35 fleet.

“The mission file includes all of the data about every threat, aircraft, surface-to-air missile, blue aircraft, and airliner, whatever that airplane may see during its flights.

“That intel mission data will fill the mission data file that will build is what the airplane then goes in and looks to see when it fuses that target.

The mission data file that we’re building right now in the 513th at the 53rd wing which are part of the Warfare Center were initially building are for the Marines.”⁵

The value is that USAF, USMC, USN and Allis have the possibility of working off that same mission data library.

The very practical application and perhaps battle tipping aspect of a fleet wide mission data file is that if just one F-35 anywhere anytime gets hit on a HSCM, the entire fleet can have the data.

This is unique capability to be able to prevail in modern war.

Concurrently, the Navy at Fallon is also building a significant training complex for practicing current con-ops and looking forward to studying how to defeat future threats.

Rear Admiral Scott Conn was Commander of Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center during our visit in 2014. He is now head of Naval Aviation at N-98.

According to Admiral Conn, “We are working at Fallon at expanding the capability for Naval aviation to operate in an expanded battlespace.” ⁶

And the Admiral made it clear that this was being done with adding capabilities like the F-35, and leveraging joint and coalition capabilities into what we are calling an attack and defense enterprise.

He and his team are spearheading a broad based effort to expand the envelope of training to combine live and virtual training by building a Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) training range as well, an approach well under progress at Fallon.

Rear Admiral Michael Manazir, when he was Director of Naval Air Warfare identified the Navy way ahead that will allow tactical innovation and practices for the best way to attack and destroy incoming HSCMs.

The threat baseline that we’re looking to fight in the mid-2020s and beyond is so much more advanced that we cannot replicate it using live assets.  And those advances are in the aircraft capability, the weapon capability, and in the electronic warfare capability of the threat systems.  

That drives us to thinking about a different way to train.

Live, virtual, constructive (LVC) training is a way to put together a representation of the threat baseline where you can train to the very high end using your fifth generation capability.  

Some of it is live with a kid in the cockpit, some of it is virtual in a simulator, and so “virtual” is actually the simulator environment.  

And then constructive is a way to use computers to generate a scenario displayed on either or both of the live or simulated cockpit.

You can also combine them to be live-constructive, or virtual-constructive, and by that I mean there are systems out there right now that you can install in the airplane that will give you a constructive radar picture air-to-air and surface-to-air along with the electronics effects right onto your scope.

You’re literally flying your airplane, and through a data link, you can share that information between airplanes, you can share it between dissimilar airplanes.⁷

Thus a key way ahead for R&D and con-ops to deal with the coming HSCM threat is clear.

The F-35 does not have to be in a stealth mode to sense and engage against HSCM racing at a CSG–it can go out and loiter as a 360-sensor picket platform and can empower the kill web with its detection capabilities. 

This is the seventh piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missiles.

The featured photo shows an F-35C Lightning II assigned to the Rough Raiders of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 125 launching from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72).

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Aug. 26, 2018)

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeff Sherman/Released)

By Ed Timperlake

The US Navy and the surface fleet is very much engaged in our strategic and tactical thinking about how to defend against the emerging Hyper-Sonic Cruise Missile threat. 

Of course, the best way to stop a HSCM is to sink the enemy sub before it has a chance to fire.  

A new player which could play a key role in a kill web approach could be the new Zumwalt class destroyer.  There are three ships in this class, but rethinking the key role it could play in a kill web approach to the HSCM and other threats might lead to a rethink. 

I have had a lifelong experience with the US Navy first as a “Navy Junior” because my father was career subs and an early participant in the Nuc Sub Navy serving on the USS Triton (SRN-586).

After graduating from Annapolis, I entered the Marines and became a Carrier qualified Naval Aviator so have had a lifetime of experience with the learning cycle for the sea services. 

My key take away is that the Navy has proven to be absolutely ruthless in dealing with technology. 

The Navy leadership in my personal experience  has always been unrelenting on making the very hard choices on giving the best platforms and weapons to their sailors, after having the most open mind of any military in the world on pushing R&D efforts. 

Of course, ugly politics often intrude beyond their control in the form of Congressional and OSD meddling. As always in our Constitutional process, one has to respect that civilian control. 

But left to their own devices the Navy most often gets it right. 

In an article which I published in The Washington Times a decade ago, I addressed how the Zumwalt can address the ASW challenge effectively.

On March 8, five Chinese ships converged on the USNS Impeccable, which was operating in international waters in the South China Sea. The dramatic confrontation was diffused but could have easily turned ugly.

At the time of the incident, the Impeccable was gathering intelligence about 70 miles south of Hainan Island, home to China’s newest and most sophisticated submarine base. China is in the process of creating its most lethal and stealthy fleet of submarines. Through an accelerated construction program and by purchasing ultra-quiet Russian subs, the Chinese are working toward a massive naval expansion, which is expected to top 200 attack and ballistic missile subs.

When China went after the Impeccable last month, the Chinese navy (or more accurately their Coast Guard), sent a powerful and very public signal from the waters off Hainan Island that they are worried about the U.S. Navy’s antisubmarine capabilities.

Chinese subs leaving port to hide in deep water must be identified and followed as they sortie out from the shallow waters. Now a significant capability of the Zumwalt-class destroyer becomes essential – the ability to defend itself with a significant punch while locating, tracking and identifying Chinese submarines in the cluttered littoral waters off Hainan Island and elsewhere.

Official Navy testimony delivered July 31 pointed out that the Zumwalt-class destroyer is “superior in littoral ASW” to the Burke-class, which has better “blue water” ASW. It the equivalent of a football coach saying the linebacker is superior at the line of scrimmage but the safety is better for deep coverage; both ship classes on the same team are hugely complementary.

Both the Burkes and Zumwalts will have the range and endurance well beyond the capability of the smaller Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). If both are combined in an ASW task force or going together in harm’s way as part of a carrier battle group, they will be mutually supporting and deadly.

Should a Chinese ballistic submarine make a run for open water in times of a building crisis, a future Zumwalt destroyer can tag it in shallow water, follow it to blue water and pass that intelligence along to a Burke destroyer and American attack submarines. This not only keeps America safer, it also keeps American sailors safer.

People can have honest disagreements over which of these two ships to support. But as China expands its submarine capabilities, there’s no doubt which American destroyer Chinese sub commanders would rather see scrapped. With superior littoral ASW capabilities designed to detect the quietest electric-powered stealth subs, the Zumwalt-class destroyer is a far greater threat to China’s growing submarine fleet.

If one goes back to my article of 10 years ago and if you simply substitute the Russian sub threat for the Peoples Liberation Army Navy sub threat highlighted in my analysis, the potential role of the Zumwalt is quite clear. 

Now with the Russian “gremlin” again on our doorstep, the shallow water ASW capabilities of the Zumwalts  might be of considerable value providing a key element in the Atlantic Sea Frontier. 

This is the sixth piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missile

 

By Murielle Delaporte

NATO’s Allied Transformation Command will celebrate’s its fifteenth year this year as NATO celebrates its seventieth.

Earlier this month, in an interview with the new Supreme Commander, General André Lanata, we had a chance to discuss his approach to ACT and its transformation mission.

When asked about the challenge posed by the resurgence of high intensity conflict as demonstrated in the last big scale NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2018 (TRJE 18), SACT highlighted the importance of building upon the past performance of the Alliance.

“Whenever there was a threat at its borders, NATO coalitions always responded, whether in terms of Inherent Resolve against ISIS or Resolute Support in Afghanistan …

“Our role is to ensure that we accurately assess the threat and our capability gaps.

“We do this through prospective studies and through various review processes.”

That kind of anticipation has been part of General Lanata’s approach throughout his career.

He is a former Chief of Staff of the French Air Force and a former fighter pilot like his predecessors (ever since France rejoined the integrated command in 2008).

He has fought alongside the allies during the Gulf, the Bosnian and Kosovo wars.

He also has served in the office of plans and policy for air and joint staff, as well as as being the Deputy Director for International and Strategic Affairs at the Secretariat for National Defense and Security.

Then as Deputy Chief of Operations at the Joint Staff,  he has worked on establishing the Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF).

His goal is to “move forward together.”

He highlighted that as a key goal in his speech during the command change ceremony at Allied Command Transformation (ACT) held on September 11th, 2018 as Hurricane Florence was threatening to hit the Virginia Coast hard.

As he has done throughout his career, he has focused on taking very concrete steps to achieve a broader strategic objective.

“We have built a very efficient innovation hub here at Norfolk, that we can now leverage to establish an Innovation Lab.”

Another key focus for the head of ACT is to complete the reform of the NATO Command Structure (NCS).

One of the major changes affecting ACT is the regrouping by NATO of exercises planning within Allied Command Operations (ACO). (Allied Command Operations is responsible for the planning and execution of all Alliance operations. It consists of a small number of permanently established headquarters, each with a specific role. Supreme Allied Commander Europe – or SACEUR – assumes the overall command of operations at the strategic level and exercises his responsibilities from the headquarters in Mons, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, more commonly known as SHAPE.)

General Lanata explained that ACT will continue to lead on all ‘transformation’ aspects involving exercises.

ACE will remain in command of JFCT (Joint Forces Training Command) and JWC (Joint Warfare Center) as well.

General Lanata highlighted that he believed that new tools involved in modelling and simulation will allow the Alliance to provide for creative preparation for a wide range of scenarios.

Suggestive of the approach was his first visit as SACT to Europe in October 2018.

He visited Bydgoszcz, Poland, where the Poles host the JFTC and the yearly experiment CWIX (Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise).⁸

“At ACT, we produce norms.

“But this goes far beyond equipment compatibility.”

He underscored that interoperability through the development of standards and certifications involves con-ops and joint training as much as working equipment compatibility.

Such an effort enhances common processes and norms and to operate effectively in times of crisis.

An exercise such as Trident Juncture 2018 (TRJE18), which took place last Fall in Norway, was an opportunity to test innovations in equipment (e.g. 3D-printed spares delivered by drone to the warfighter.⁹

It was as well an important opportunity to test out new operational concepts such as the Modular Combined Petroleum Units or MCPU.

As Chief of Staff for the French Air Force he set in motion the Franco-German Future Combat Air System.

This is an approach which highlights the importance of interconnections among platforms and connectivity to deliver a combat effect.

As SACT, he is clearly focused on the importance of a paradigm shift from platform-centric to a data-centric con-ops architecture.

He views the move from a platform-centric to a “data-centric capability architecture “as paving the way to what to shaping a “collaborative connected warfare” approach.

Notably, he highlighted this shift during last November’s NATO Industry Forum in Berlin.

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But to achieve the full effect of such a shift,  he underscored a key cultural change which needs to occur within the Alliance and clearly one which is focused on trying to facilitate.

“If the 29 members are rather efficient in sharing data about common adversaries, there is more reluctance about sharing data about themselves. We all know that without that kind of sharing, there cannot be progress in fields such as artificial intelligence and the management of Big Data.”

A new SACT is in town.

The featured photo shows French Air Force General Andre Lanata delivering his first address as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation during the Allied Command Transformation change of command ceremony at the command’s headquarters.

Allied Command Transformation’s mission is to contribute to preserving the peace, security and territorial integrity of Alliance member states by leading the transformation of military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines.

The mission must enable NATO to meet its level of ambition and core missions.

(Photo by Sarah Schulte)

September 11, 2018.

Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise

The Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise (CWIX) is the largest annual NATO interoperability event held at the Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland. 

CWIX gathers different stakeholders from NATO and participating nations, providing a federated multi-functional environment in which:

Scientists eXplore emerging interoperability standards and solutions through collaborative innovation activities

Engineers eXperiment with new interoperability solutions and assess suitability for near term implementation

Testers eXamine technical interoperability among fielded and soon be fielded capabilities and generate scorecards

Operational users eXercise interoperability capabilities using a relevant scenario

Designed to support the continuous improvement of interoperability for the Federation, CWIX is a North Atlantic Council (NAC) endorsed, Military Committee directed, and Consultation, Command and Control Board (C3B) guided Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) annual programme.

NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) provides direction and management of the CWIX programme, while NATO and member nations sponsor interoperability capabilities. As a result, most of the funding comes from participating nations which is a clear indicator that nations value the testing opportunities CWIX provides.

CWIX addresses a wide spectrum of technical Communication and Information System (CIS) interoperability topics for current fielded, near-term, future and experimental CIS capabilities throughout NATO nations. The aim of CWIX is to improve technical interoperability in a timely and cost effective manner by testing systems, finding solutions for interoperability shortfalls, experimenting with alternative approaches, and exploring emerging technologies. In a highly federated multi-national environment, it is important to improve communication and collaboration between all stakeholders in order to meet mutual goals and objectives. CWIX is a key tool in helping the Federation meet the interoperability challenges of tomorrow by allowing NATO nations to address technical CIS shortfalls well before operational deployment reducing risk, resource requirements, and system failures in theatre.

As one of NATO’s foundation venues for achieving and demonstrating interoperability, CWIX is fully in line with the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and ACT’s Smart Defence concept.

The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) is one element of NATO’s future posture. It will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains strong, ready, robust, and a responsive Federation capable of meeting current and future challenges and threats. The key supporting initiatives, such as SMART Defence, continue to make progress.

CWIX supports NATO’s SMART Defence concept by enabling federated multi-national pooling and sharing.

CWIX continuously improves CIS interoperability well before deployment.

CWIX validates and verifies CIS for achieving combat readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF), Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), followed by the STEADFAST COBALT and culminating in the TRIDENT JUNCTURE/ JOUST exercise.

For some of the earlier articles on ACT published by Murielle Delaporte on Second Line of Defense, see the following:

SACT Commander General Paloméros : “Strategic Awareness is the Key to the Future of NATO”

The Allied Transformation Command: Shaping A Common Technological Awareness Within NATO

NATO’s Allied Transformation Command: The Challenge of Shaping a Way Ahead