An Update on UK Defence: The MoD’s Report on the Modernising Defence Programme

01/22/2019

Late last year, the UK Ministry of Defence provided an update on its 2015 report on defense modernization.

As one commentator put it with regard to the report:

A combination of strained alliances and ever-expanding political demands explains the MOD’s determination to secure funds to rebuild UK military capability.

After 20 years of preoccupation with counter-terrorism and humanitarian intervention, the current Defence Equipment Programme is now more focused on the heavier “state-on-state” capabilities required to deter a hostile major power in the North Atlantic region (warships, combat aircraft, mechanised ground forces, and so forth).

And all of this must take place while still having enough left over to do a bit of all the other things that are asked of the armed forces.

The report can be downloaded later in this article if so desired.

Here is one excerpt of the report which highlights the focus of UK defense modernization.

The character of warfare is fundamentally changing.  Advances in information and communications technology have drastically increased the speed at which attacks can unfold.  The newer domains of warfare – cyberspace and space – continue to grow in significance and provide our competitors greater scope for hostile action.  

Areas such as artificial  intelligence, autonomy, directed energy weapons (such as lasers) and warheads that can manoeuvre at hypersonic speeds provide new challenges and opportunities.

We expect this troubled period to endure.  States will continue to engage in aggressive competition unless deterred from doing so.  Technologies – established and novel – will continue to evolve at great speed.  We must act to maintain our competitive advantage in the immediate term and for the decades to come…..

More generally, we will focus on gaining ‘Information Advantage’ as the character of warfare changes.  The effective collection, analysis and dissemination of vast quantities  of data will enable us to understand how our adversaries are thinking, how they may choose to act against us, and how we can act quickly to deter or defeat them.  

We are pursuing modernisation in areas like artificial intelligence, machine-learning, man-machine teaming and automation to deliver the disruptive effects we need in this regard.

ModernisingDefenceProgramme_report_2018_FINAL

The F-35 Global Enterprise: Working Global Logistics: The Case of Japan

The F-35 has come at the time of the strategic shift for the liberal democracies from dealing primarily with the land wars to preparing for crisis management with peer competitors.

We referred a decade ago to the coming of the F-35 as the renorming of airpower which was a clear indication from our point of view that it is not a replacement aircraft but a key catalyst for reshaping air combat operations, indeed combat operations.

We also paired this with what we called the three dimensional warriors and referred specifically to the dynamics of change we saw coming more than a decade ago as the Marines would add the F-35B to their force mix.

The arrival of the F-35 and the standup of the aircraft on a global basis is clearly underway.

The challenge now will not simply be for national forces to leverage what the aircraft can bring for the transformation of their own forces, but for the emergence of the F-35 as a global fleet to be supported by a global logistics system.

The F-35 is a 21stcentury weapon system with a core sustainability approach built in with an inherent strategic capability to reshape US and allied air combat operations.

The challenge is to find ways to leverage the inherent advantages of a global system, which the F-35 as an air system provides.

But culture change in the approaches being taken by the services and nations is crucial in order to draw full advantage of the emergence of a globally operating aircraft, with inherent commonality built in.

For example, both Australia and Japan are going to be key players in the Asian support system for the F-35.

How will these centers be set up not just to support their national fleet but for those of their allies?

How will the United States shape an approach for sustained engagement where US F-35s can fly to the crisis and be maintained by the Japanese and Australians or other F-35 partners in the region?

The recent decision by Japan to become the largest operator after the Untied States of F-35s opens the aperature for change in the sustainment approach for a global fleet.

Indeed, the Japanese have recognized the opportunity and are closing down their local assembly facility in favor of ramping up their MRO capabilities for the aircraft, clearly with an eye on regional support and collaboration with Australia and the United States.

The local assembly of the F-35 has reportedly added a premium of more than 30% to the cost of each aircraft.  The Japanese have announced that instead they will focus on providing maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade (MRO&U) services for the aircraft.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ (MHI’s) Nagoya Aerospace Systems Works in Aichi will provide MRO&U for the F-35 airframe, while the IHI Corporation’s Mizuho plant in Tokyo will provide MRO&U support for the aircraft’s Pratt & Whitney F135 engine.

Our sources in Japan have indicated that while the primary focus will be upon support for Japanese F-35s, there is a clear interest in broadening that to support for US and allied aircraft as well.

This is a strategic opportunity for the F-35 global enterprise.  In later pieces, we will address the challenges to doing so as well as the  opportunities.

For two articles which address the Japanese decision, see the following:

Japan to discontinue local F-35 assembly

https://www.janes.com/article/85838/japan-steps-back-from-f-35-assembly

The featured photo shows a Japanese Air Self-Defense Force F-35A flies flying overhead at Misawa Air Base, Japan, Nov. 2, 2017.

This is the first Japanese-built F-35A, which was assembled at the Final Assembly and Check Out facility at Komaki-Minami Factory of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry.

Credit photo: USAF

 

“The Sky Is The Limit”: Renewing France’s Space Capabilities

01/21/2019

By Murielle Delaporte

When the French minister of the armed forces, Florence Parly, visited the heart of space technology in Toulouse last September, she stressed how much space has become over the past years a key domain for national security.

She noted that the Russian satellite Luch-Olymp had recently been engaged in not such a friendly action against Italian satellite Athena-Fidus, upon which French war against terrorism in Sub Saharan Africa relies in part.

“Yes, we are at risk.

Our communications, our military manoeuvers as well as our daily life are jeopardized if we do not react,” she said.

She also confirmed  that a working group had been tasked to prepare a new space strategy for France with a clear mandate : “ne vous interdisez rien!” which can be translated as “The sky is the limit.”

September is the month when the first of three third generation very high resolution optical observation satellites was delivered.

After six weeks of preparation in Kourou European Spaceport in French Guyana, it was successfully launched on a Soyuz launcher on December 19th.

This marks the beginning of a renewal of capabilities for France, and Europe as a whole, initiated in 2010, but which had been delayed by lack of investments and lack of a sense of urgency.

Indeed the military Earth observation “CSO ” satellites (CSO stands for  “Composante spatiale optique : are part of the MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging System) program and are meant to replace Helios satellites.

As a reminder, Helios I was a product of a cooperation between France, Italy and Spain with a 2007 agreement granting access to imagery to the European Union (EU).

The second generation Helios II was enlarged to Belgium and Greece, while a similar agreement was signed in 2008 with the EU.

In addition, bilateral exchange  access agreements were signed between France and Italy – Helios II vs the Italian radar satellite Cosmo-Skymed (CSK) – and between France and Germany – Helios II vs the German radar satellite SAR-Lupe.

As far as CSO satellites are concerned, bilateral agreements have been signed in 2015 with Germany (SARha is to succeed to SAR-Lupe) and Sweden, as well as with Belgium and soon with Italy (CSG is to succeed CSK).

New European commitments and investments in 2015 – especially from Germany – allowed the planning for more than one CSO satellite. The goal is of course to boost a “Defense Space Europe” (“Europe spatiale de la defense”) and not only European space capabilities, the same way a true Defense of Europe is currently being revived in part as a response to President Trump’s push for a better burden-sharing in NATO.

A renewed sense of the need for sovereignty, autonomy and a resilient industrial base not seen in Europe since the end of the Cold War is indeed acting as a catalyzer so that the “best of Europe working together”, as Nicolas Chamussy, Executive vice-president of Space Systems of Airbus Defence & Space, refers to it, can thrive.

In the case of CSO, the French procurement agency DGA (Direction générale de l’armement) runs the program along with CNES, while Airbus Defence & Space, Thales Alenia Space, Thales Services, OHB (Orbitale Hochtechnologie Bremen), Capgemini and Arianespace are involved on the industrial side of things.

As Helios II was used for the needs of  “EUROFOR Chad” and as coordinated satellite-based targeting capabilities were at the heart of last April’s joint operation between the United States, the United Kingdom and France against Syria over its suspected chemical weapons attack, the need to bring European space capabilities up to date to be able to keep conducting military operations has been highlighted.

Increased accuracy and reduced revisiting time are enhanced with the recent CSO’s launching.

The fear of being left out from an ongoing space rivalries involving Russia, China and the United States as well as the necessity to protect what has become a key to today’s way of life – connecting to a phone, a computer, or running a GPS require the helps of 10 to 40 satellites per person every day in France alone! – have therefore lead the Macron government to accelerate the funding of a true XXIthcentury space policy.

Already doubled between 2008 and 2014 with 600 million Euros, the procurement budget for space is to reach 3.6 billion Euros in the next 2019-2025 Program Law.

Three more intelligence satellites are planned for 2020 and two more telecommunication satellites should be launched between 2020 and 2022.

The new French space strategy is focused on ways to enhance the resilience of French and European space assets and play in the same domain as the big powers, since any military strategy, and any future asset (whether Scorpion for the French Army or SCAF for the French Air Force) is fully dependable on space-based connectivity.

For the French Chief of staff of the Air Force, who took office last summer, that strategy is threefold:

  • Reinforce the French space detection capacity
  • Being able to identify and characterize a potential threat (i.e. improve SSA or Space Situational Awareness capabilities in particular through a space-based direct monitoring of space)
  • Propose solutions to avoid or respond to such threats.

In the opening speech of the 12th RACAM conference – a yearly meeting between French civilian and military aviation authorities – last October, General Philippe Lavigne referred to British Field Marshal Montgomery’s famous quote “if we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it quickly” to stress the importance of reinforcing the resilience of European space capabilities.

Enhancing the resilience of European space capabilities is indeed essential at two levels:
– first, in terms of sovereignty of the « Old Continent »;
– and second, as a crucial contribution to NATO’s future ability to resist increasing aggressive behaviors from adversaries in space and to monitor the growing activity of an ever larger number of players both public and private.

The featured photo shows a French CSO-1 reconnaissance satellite launching on a Russian-built Soyuz rocket on December 19, 2018.

*** A version of this article was first published by Breaking Defense on January 3, 2019.

Soyuz at the Guiana Space Centre is described by Wikipedia as follows:

Soyuz at the Guiana Space Centre (also known as Soyuz at CSG or Arianespace Soyuz) is an ongoing ESAprogramme for operating Soyuz-ST launch vehicles from Guiana Space Centre (CSG), providing medium-size launch capability for Arianespace to accompany the light Vega and heavy-lift Ariane 5

The Soyuz vehicle is supplied by the Russian Federal Space Agency with TsSKB-Progress and NPO Lavochkin, while additional components are supplied by Airbus,  Thales Group and RUAG.

The Arianespace Soyuz project was announced by the ESA in 2002. Cooperation with Russia began in two areas: construction of a launch site for Soyuz in CSG and development of the Soyuz launch vehicle modified for the Guiana Space Centre. A Programme Declaration was signed in 2003 and funding along with final approval was granted on 4 February 2005.

Initial excavation for the Ensemble de Lancement Soyouz (ELS; Soyuz Launch Complex) began in 2005, construction started in 2007, and the launch complex was completed in early 2011, allowing Arianespace to offer launch services on the modified Soyuz ST-B to its clients.

Two early flights, VS02 and VS04, and a recent flight, VS17, used the Soyuz ST-A variant.

Since 2011, Arianespace has ordered a total of 23 Soyuz rockets, enough to cover its needs until 2019 at a pace of three to four launches per year.

Soyuz-Flyer-Oct2015

 

Algerian Kilo Class Submarines

By defenceWeb

The Algerian Navy has commissioned into service two new Kilo class submarines delivered from Russia, the Ouarsenis and Hoggar.

The vessels were commissioned on 9 January at the Mers El Kebir naval base in Oran by the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Chief of Staff of the National Popular Army, Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Salah.

Ouarsenis (031) and Hoggar (032) are part of a 2013/2014 order for two new Project 636 Varshavyanka (Kilo class) vessels from Russia.

It is believed the first vessel arrived in Algeria around mid-2018 and the second (032) in December after completing a transit from the Admiralty Shipyard near St Petersburg, which it left around 26 November.

Algeria in 2006 ordered two Project-636E (Kilo) submarines in a $400 million deal.

These were delivered in 2010 and jointed two Project 877EKM Kilo diesel electric submarines, which Algeria received in 1987-1988. The latter two were upgraded by Russian shipyards.

In 2014 Algeria ordered another two Project-636E submarines for delivery around 2018. Also ordered were TEST-71 torpedoes, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

The Project-636 Varshavyanka (Kilo) class is mainly intended for anti-shipping and anti-submarine operations in relatively shallow waters.

The tear-drop hulled submarine is 72.6m long, 9.9m wide and can dive to 300 meters. The design has a displacement of 3 076 tons. Underwater, it reportedly has a speed of up to 25 knots.

The complement is 52 and the submarine has an endurance of 45 days.

The boat is fitted with six 533 mm torpedo tubes and carries up to 18 homing or wire-guided torpedoes, or 24 AM-1 mines.

The type can also be fitted with four Kalibr cruise missiles.

The outer hull is covered with sound damping tiles and its machinery as well as design is regarded as very quiet.

Designed by the Rubin Central Maritime Design Bureau of St Petersburg, the type entered service in 1982.

The type was originally built at the Komsomolsk shipyard and lately by the Admiralty Shipyard in St Petersburg. It is in service with the navies of Russia, China, Vietnam, Iran, India and Poland, among others.

Some 50 have been built.

Algeria has apparently also ordered two additional Kilo 877EKM vessels, for delivery in 2020-2022.

This article was first published by defenceWeb on January 10, 2019.

 

Rafales in Reunion for Training

01/20/2019

By Guy Martin

The French Air Force has sent two Dassault Rafale fighter jets to the island of Reunion for training.

The aircraft landed at Gillot Air Force Base on 14 January after a 13 hour flight.

They were accompanied by a C-135FR aerial refueling tanker.

They were due to be joined by an Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft in its first visit to Reunion.

The MRTT is replacing the C-135FRs in service with the French Air Force and the arrival and training around Reunion is part of this process. Training was due to last for a week and also include monitoring French territories in the Indian Ocean in support of FAZSOI, the French military presence in the region.

Rafales have previously been deployed to Reunion – the type landed on the island for the first time on 22 April 2014, again accompanied by a C-135FR tanker.

They were refueled five times in their journey from France.

This article was first published by defenceWeb on January 17, 2019.

Shaping the Kill Web: The Impact on Designing the USN Fleet

By Ed Timperlake

There is a great US Navy quip about a surface combatant : “Captain we are underway with no way on.”

This saying is essentially reporting that the ship is trying to go forward but it is stopped by currents or other forces and drifting.

In a very insightful article recently published by USNI and written by Megan Eckstein, she perfectly captures a Navy leadership dynamic that tells friend or foe that the US Navy  certainly has “way on” into 21st Century war.

Navy Homing in on Requirement for Next Large Combatant; Industry Talks Start This Week

The insights presented by Rear Adm. Ron Boxall (OPNAV N96) and supported by CNO Admiral John Richardson with solid  industry dynamic  support is a real signal to all that in the grand historical tradition forward from the Navy’s first “6 Frigates” to this day and into the future, the fighting Navy is designing scalable forces at sea that can win today and tomorrow anywhere and anytime in any Ocean.

First of all, Admiral Boxall underscore: “The future surface combatant will not be called a destroyer.

“The Admiral wants to get away from viewing the future ship as a one-for-one replacement for today’s Arleigh Burke class, and the narrative of “large surface combatant” and “small surface combatant” forces the Navy to think about designing and operating the two in tandem.”

Second, he emphasized that “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson has demanded flexibility and adaptability from the future large surface combatant, and the Flight III design cannot deliver.”

Welcome to US Navy “Kill Web” thinking, where no platform fighting alone in the air, on the surface and sub-service forces all together going into the future.

“We shouldn’t look at ship to ship; we should look at the force.

“And I would argue that I think we can get more bang for the buck out of our force out of these lethal small frigates I’m very excited about,” Admiral Boxall said.

The dynamic of ship design has been in an historically different cycle time from that of combat aircraft design trends.

The driver in aviation R&D was simply a quicker airframe technology action reaction cycle.

Now with a 21st Century technology sensor/shooter and payload utility functions driving Kill Webs, ship and aircraft design improvements are converging.

The learning curve to improve sensors, system capability and weapons carried quickly compared to building another airframe may be a new American way of industrial surging.

The American arsenal of democracy may be shifting from an industrial production line to a clean room and a computer lab as key shapers of competitive advantage.

The F-35B in the Perspective of Aviation History

The dynamic of shifting to technological improvements in both aviation airframe design as with ship hull design must be undertaken with a vision for growth into unknown capturing battle tipping dynamic sensor/shooter improvements over time.

The crossover point in melding N96, surface focus with N98 Aviation is the late Col. John Boyd USAF fighter pilot in meeting  today’s Surface Navy

To understand Payload utility with full honor to John Boyd, it can be noted that Observe/Orient (OO) is essentially target acquisition, and Decide/Act (DA) is target engagement.

Thus there is a very simple formula, better and better TA and TE =more effective employment of all payloads available to the battle commander.

It is the process of understanding the huge complexities in such a simple formula that is the challenge.

Effective employment of a Payload utility (Pu) function in combat can be seen as the end point of many human decisions aided by technology.

It is an attempt to bring together with a unifying central focus for analysis a coherent interconnected vision capturing both a shift in looking at legacy systems and a way ahead in modernization programs.

Modernization and mobilization must both exist in harmony, because numbers also do count.

Shaping a Way Ahead to Prepare for 21st Century Conflicts: Payload-Utility Capabilities and the Kill Web

The CNO and Admiral Boxall well understand the Payload utility dynamic for the next round of shipbuilding.

Thinking about building a scalable interconnected fleet of many air and sea assets to fight and win is captured perfectly in the USNI article.

Every peer-competitor that can become an enemy of America and the American Navy must understand the lasting words of the great Navy theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan, of whom John Keegan called “the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century.

“Mahan made a seminal point about fighting a war that rings true to this day, and specifically note the emphasis on “offensively and aggressively”:

“War, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively.

“The enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down.

“You may then spare him every exaction, relinquish every gain, but ’til then he must be struck incessantly and remorselessly.”

Ed Timperlake is a graduate of the US Naval Academy and served as a USMC fighter pilot and became CO of VMFA-321.

We regularly review USNI books in our book review section of defense.info.

https://defense.info/category/book-review/

The featured photo is of the potential new frigate for the US Navy.

Credit: USNI

 

 

Russia, China and Collaborative Actions: An Alliance in the Making

01/19/2019

By Stephen Blank

A virtual flood of studies and articles continues to appear concerning Russo-Chinese relations.[i]

Although the expert consensus remains that no alliance or no formal alliance between Russia and China exists despite their visibly growing intimacy; I would dispute that finding.[ii]

Indeed, Moscow keeps inventing euphemisms to disguise what is going on.

First it was called a comprehensive strategic partnership.[iii]

More recently in November 2018 President Putin called it a ‘privileged strategic partnership.’[iv]

Both these formulations sound like attempts to deceive foreign observers as to the alliance’s real nature.

Thus Putin described comprehensive strategic partnership as follows:

As we had never reached this level of relations before, our experts have had trouble defining today’s general state of our common affairs. It turns out that to say we have strategic cooperation is not enough anymore. This is why we have started talking about a comprehensive partnership and strategic collaboration. “Comprehensive” means that we work virtually on all major avenues; “strategic” means that we attach enormous inter‑governmental importance to this work.[v]

Similarly Foreign Minister Lavrov has stated that,

As regards international issues, we feel – and out Chinese friends share this view – that our cooperation and coordination in the international arena are one of the most important stabilizing factors in the world system. We regularly coordinate our approaches to various conflicts, whether it is in the Middle East, North Africa, or the Korean peninsula. We have regular and frank and confidential consultations.[vi]

It is hard to know how a privileged partnership expands upon a comprehensive one. Moreover, this alliance is not merely a political relationship but one of active military collaboration.

In addition, leading officials in both countries expect this relationship to deepen, including in its military dimensions, during 2019.[vii]   Indeed, President Xi Jinping told Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that not only can both militaries deal with “common security threats” but also they should increase cooperation and unswervingly deepen their strategic coordination.[viii]

And we can already see practical examples of such coordination as both governments jointly conducted a series of experiments in the atmosphere that not only could alter earthly environments but also apparently disturb electrical connections in the territories below these experiments.[ix]

These experiments look suspiciously like preliminary efforts to test both ground-based and space-based capabilities to achieve the effects of an EMP (Electro-Magnetic Pulse) attack on earth against their adversaries.

Indeed, commenting on these tests, the Chinese journal Earth and Planetary Physics observed that the results were satisfactory but also “such international cooperation is very rare for China.”[x]

Similarly, the Vostok-2018 exercises involving large-scale Russian forces and about 3200 Chinese forces in September -2018 may have originally been intended as an exercise in anticipation of a U.S. attack on North Korea.[xi]

In fact Russian writers, e.g. Vasily Kashin, Senior Research Fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of the Far East, claim that the 2001 Russo-Chinese treaty enshrined at the very least strategic military and political coordination between both governments.

Specifically, he observes that,

Chapter 9 of the treaty stipulated that “in case there emerges a situation which, by [the] opinion of one of the Participants, can crate threats to the peace, violate the peace, or affect the interests of the security of the Participant, and also in case when there is a threat of aggression against one of the Participants, the Participants immediately contact each other and start consultations in order to remove the emerging threat.[xii]

Kashin further notes that, “While the treaty did not create any obligations for mutual defense, it clearly required both sides to consider some sort of joint action in the case of a threat from a third party.”[xiii]

This means that even before these events in the military sphere, we see a well-developed process of shared learning and exchange of operational and strategic concepts to enhance bilateral relations.[xiv]

This parallels the wider and extensively developed network of bilateral consultations across many ministries of both governments that are then manifested in practice and thereby reflect an alliance, even if it remains an informal one.[xv]These postures and operations go considerably beyond the joint exercises and arms sales that others have written about.[xvi]

The point here, as confirmed by many analysts, is the extensive inter-military dialogues that have gone on for over a decade as part of the larger program of inter-governmental exchanges.[xvii]

Certainly the joint air and missile defenses exercises of 2017 suggests an alliance for in such exercises both sides must put their cards on the table and display their C4ISR.

As Vasily Kashin observes, this exercise took the form of a computer simulation where both sides constructed a joint air/missile defense area using long-range SAM systems like the Chinese HQ-9 and the Russian S-300/400 series.[xviii]

Likewise, both the preceding and ongoing naval exercises before and after 2017 point to deepening collaboration and a vibrant bilateral military dialogue.

Conclusions

Analysts have long chronicled the political, economic, and ideological manifestations of the evolving Sino-Russian partnership. But the steadfast denials of a military alliance dynamic here are not based on the evidence of arms sales, technology transfer, joint exercises, conventional and nuclear coordination and long-term strategic dialogues.

Inasmuch as the U.S. has singled out China and Russia as its adversaries misreading the true nature of their relations gravely undermines the chances for successful American strategy and policy and not only in Asia.[xix]

It is long since time that analysts and policymakers acknowledged the reality that is evolving right before their eyes and stopped taking refuge in clichés and wishful thinking.

Only on the basis of realism can we move forward to deal with this alliance and the challenge of either defeating or disassembling it in exclusively peaceful ways.

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the American Foreign Policy Council.

Editor’s Note

One can debate what kind of alliance these two authoritarian states are forging.

But clearly as the Australian strategist, Ross Babbage has argued, both are working towards the goal of making the world safe of authoritarian states.

It is important to factor in how these two states reinforce one another’s actions, plan joint actions, or operate counter to one another as a key element of the strategic shift from the land wars to crisis management with peer competitors.

And the study of how authoritarian states work together — in both support as well as cross purposes — is a neglected study.

We recently reviewed a book about Japan and Nazi Germany which had many insights into the alliance and its dynamics.

https://defense.info/book-review/2018/12/germanys-last-mission-the-failed-voyage-of-u-234-to-japan/

There is also interesting information on the Japanese-Nazi alliance contained in a book on Bletchley Park which we have reviewed as well.

https://defense.info/book-review/2018/11/the-secrets-of-station-x-how-the-bletchley-park-codebreakers-helped-win-the-war/

[i]To give three of many examples, Marcin Kaczmarski, Mark N. Katz, and Teija Tillikaiinen, The Sino-Russian and US-Russian Relationships: Current Developments and Future Trends, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 2018 www.upi.fiia.fi; Richard J. Ellings and Robert Sutter, Eds., Axis of Authoritarians: Implications of China-Russia Cooperation, Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Research, Asia 2018; Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo Eds., Sino-Russian Relations In the 21stCentury, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018,

[ii]Ibidem.

[iii]““Interview to the Xinhua News Agency of China,” www.kremlin.ru, June 23, 2016

[iv]Alla Hurska,” Flawed ‘Strategic Partnership’: Putin’s Optimism On China Faces Harsh Reality,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 12, 2018, www.jamestown.org

[v]“Interview to the Xinhua News Agency of China,”

[vi]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement and Answers to Questions From the Media by Russian Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov at the Press Conference on the Results of Russia’s Chairmanship of the UN Security Council, New York, October 1, 2015,” BBC Monitoring.

[vii]“Russia, China To Bolster Ties In 2019: Envoy,” http://tass.com/politics/1038117 December 27, 2018; “China, Russia Agree To Boost Military Ties, XinhuaDecember 21, 2018, Retrieved from BBC Monitoring

[viii]“China: Xi Meets Russia Defence Minister,” Xinhua, October 20, 2018, Retrieved from BBC Monitoring

[ix]“China, Russia Test Controversial Technology Above Europe-Paper,” South China Morning Post, December 17, 2018, www.scmp.com

[x]Ibid.

[xi]Brian G. Carlson, “Vostok-2018: Another Sign Of Strengthening Russia-China Ties,” SWP Comment, No. 47, November, 2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C47_Carlson.pdf,

[xii]Vasily Kashin, The Current State Of Russian-Chinese Defense Cooperation, Center For Naval Analyses, 2018, p. 14

[xiii]Ibid.

[xiv]Ibid.

[xv]Marcin Kaczmarski, An Asian Alternative? Russia’s Chances of Making Asia an alternative to Relations With the West, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, www.osw.waw.pl, 2008, p.p. 35-36

[xvi]Schwartz, Wishnick, Vostok-2018

[xvii]Kaczmarski, pp. 35-36; Jacob Kipp, “From Strategic Partnership to De facto Military Alliance: Sino-Soviet Mil-Mil Contacts in the Modern Era, 1945-2018, Presented to the NPEC Conference, Washington. DC, 12 July 2018

[xviii]Kashin, p. 20.  C4ISR stands for Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

[xix]The National Security Strategy of the United States Of America, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, December, 2017

The featured photo can be found here:

Russia and China actively collude to bring down the only thing America cares about

Brexit and Identity Politics: A Case Study of Globalization in Flux

01/18/2019

By Kenneth Maxwell

On January 15, 2019, the British prime minister, Mrs Theresa May, suffered the greatest parliamentary defeat in British history when members of the House of Commons voted 432 to 202 to kill her BREXIT deal which sets out the terms of Britain’s exit from the EU on March 29th.

She had pulled a previously scheduled vote before the Christmas parliamentary recess fearing defeat.

But the delay only added to the disenchantment.

She tried mightily to keep the 10 members of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) on board. She has depended on the support  of the DUP to sustain her minority Conservative government since she lost conservative seats in an ill-timed general election she called in 2017.

But it was the so called “back stop” in the EU/UK exit agreement which involved the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, the only land border between the EU and UK, that proved totally unacceptable to the DUP, and consequently they vociferously failed to support her.

In fact it was the “back stop” that became the final straw that broke the camel’s back of her EU/UK Brexit deal.

The problem was in some respects of Mrs May’s own making.

Her “red lines” had called for Britain to leave the customs union and the single market.

The back-stop was an insurance policy that in the event that the two sides could not reach an agreement, Northern Ireland was to remain within the EU’s regulatory and customs arrangements.

This was intended to prevent the re-emergence of a hard border between the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland, the elimination of which was one of the great achievements of the “Good Friday” agreement which ended the violent Northern Irish “time of troubles” when the British army intervened and Catholic and Protestant paramilitary forces clashed throughout the province, and the IRA carried out a bombing campaign and political murders in Ulster and England.

There is some irony that the perennial British-Irish question should become a stumbling bloc to British exit from the EU.

However, the Conservative Party and the DUP do agree on one thing. That is they will unite to prevent a general election and to keep the Labour Party out of government.

So when the Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn put down a no-confidence motion in the government after Mrs May’s catastrophic defeat they joined together the very next day to defeat Corbyn by 325 to 306.

Not that Corbyn was surprised by this outcome.

He has never been a great fan of the EU which he has long seen as a capitalist plot.

Nor is he a fan of the DUP having for years been a sympathiser with Sinn Fein, the Irish nationalists.

And despite the total disarray of Mrs May’s government, Corbyn is still behind in the opinion polls.

The Northern Irish question and the “back stop” is in a curious way a revenge of King James the First and his 1609 “plantation” of English and Scottish Protestants in Northern Ireland on the land seized from the exiled Catholic Irish earls.

By 1620 there were 40,000 Scottish Presbyterians in Ulster. The Protestant Oliver Cromwell’s violent repression in Ireland took place after his victory in the English Civil War.

The failed attempt by King James the Second with French support to take back the English throne via Ireland was defeated by the Protestant Dutch William of Orange, King William III, then co-ruler of Britain, and who was married with the protestant Queen Mary II, who was James’s eldest daughter.

It was Ulster Protestants that invented identity politics.

The bonfires and marches and noisy commemorations of “King Billy” and of the 1690 Battle of the Boyne, and extreme presbyterianism, is at the core of Northern Irish identity politics, and is the life blood of the DUP.

If Theresa May thought the DUP had it in their DNA to compromise she was sadly deluded.

They inherit 400 years of stubbornness.

David Cameron who was caught by a television crew while on his morning jog the day after Theresa May’s catastrophic defeat in the House of Commons, said that he “did not regret” calling the referendum, which of course, caused all the trouble in the first place.

It was his deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, moreover, who during the Conservative-Liberal-Democrat coalition government that Cameron led, introduced the Fixed Parliament Act of 2011, which introduced fixed-term elections and which created a five year period between general elections.

This allows Theresa May to lose a vote in the House of Commons on the central plank of her policy and yet remain as the prime minister, and then to go on and win the support of her party and the DUP in a non-confidence vote twenty four hours later.

Nick Clegg is now in California as a chief adviser to Mark Zuckerberg where he is Vice President for global affairs and communications at Facebook.

So while Cameron jogs and Clegg defends Zuckerberg, Brexit is back to gridlock in the British Parliament, which knows want it does not want, but does not know want it wants.

The country meanwhile remains bitterly divided.

The business community dispairs and prepares for a “no-deal” crash out at 11 pm on March 29, 2019, the date and time set in law for Britain’s EU exit.

Which is something the hard line Brexiters in the Conservative party, led by Jacob William Ress-Mogg, the MP for North West Somerset, their alt-right wing leader, has always wanted all along.

Jacob Rees-Mogg has been called the “honourable member from the 18th century.” He is an alt-Catholic who, he says, would prefer to take the “whip from the Roman Catholic Church, not with the Parliament.” (The “whip” in question is the parliamentary party member who guarantees voting according to the party leadership’s directives.)

His personal wealth (together with his wife) was estimated to be £150 million in 2016. He has six children and is opposed to abortion under any circumstances and voted against same sex marriage. Though it is unlikely he much approves of the current Argentinian Pope on Rome.

But Jacob Rees-Mogg, much like the DUP,  is better described a being an MP from the 17th century. 

It is a very odd irony that the alt-Protestant DUP and the alt-Catholic Ress-Mogg should now hold the Conservative party and the fate of Brexit in their collective uncompromising obstructionist hands.

Editor’s Note: As the EU crisis deepens, a key aspect of the crisis is how identity politics community wide redefine the collaborative framework which has been put together, in many ways cobbled together, which is called the European Union. Many aspects of what is referred to as the EU are not part of the initial treaty of Rome, notably the agreement for the free flow of Europeans within the EU geographical space.

But more broadly the past two decades of globalization are being rolled back yet it is not the return of the classic nation state. Although the Pentagon has referred to the return of great power politics, what can be lost in characterizing the next phase of historical development, is the semi-sovereign nature of the world’s most powerful nations.

Collaboration and global rules are a key part of how the great nations conduct their trade, commerce and global security; at the same time identity politics and national identities are being reasserted to modify to some extent how collaboration and global rules are themselves being redefined.

The featured photo is of Jacob Rees-Mogg and is credited to the Edmund Burke Institute.