Denmark, F-35, and Shaping the Way Ahead

11/21/2018

By Dr. Gary Schaub, Jr.

Acquiring new combat aircraft is a big deal.

The combat aircraft fleets of most Western countries are nearing the end of their useful service life and therefore must be replaced.

Such acquisition programs have been among the most expensive ever pursued and have therefore been subject to significant political, military, public scrutiny.

Absent scandals of large deviations from the expected price and delivery schedule, intense scrutiny generally ends once the announcement has been made and the normal administrative tasks of implementation begin.

These tasks are many and include:

  • Having hangar and maintenance facilities ready to receive the aircraft
  • Being able to protect the aircraft from a full spectrum of threats on the ground at home as well as in deployed situations
  • Having sufficient numbers of pilots and maintenance personnel to actually use the aircraft
  • Integrating them with existing air force roles and missions
  • Establishing their role as part of a joint force
  • Pursuing interoperability with NATO and coalition partners
  • Developing new service, joint, and combined roles and missions given new capabilities inherent in the aircraft
  • Establishing and deepening multinational training and sustainment possibilities
  • And considering the possibilities that the new capabilities open for defence policy writ large.

In June 2016, the Danish Parliament approved the procurement of 27 F-35 fighter aircraft to replace the Royal Danish Air Force’s remaining fleet of 30 operational F-16s.

They will be delivered between 2021 and 2026.

The Danes will have to address the challenges of integrating these new aircraft during these years if the capability promised in the largest defence procurement in their history is to be realized.

How can they do so?

The Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen has just released a 71-page report that I and my colleague, Major Hans Peter Michaelsen, have written to address these challenges.

The report is intended to provide a guide to these issues for Danish decision makers and interested parties that provide oversight within the Danish system, such as the Parliament and the attentive media, as well as suggest courses of action to address these challenges.

We group these challenges into three: (a) aircraft, personnel, & facilities; (b) service, joint, and combined integration; and (c) defense policy implications.

We provide the following guidance.

Aircraft, Personnel, & Facilities

Aircraft

  • Finances trumped requirements in Denmark’s F-35 acquisition. Thus, additional aircraft may be required in the future.
  • Denmark’s F-16 fleet has limited flight hours remaining and potential demands from operations and the training and exercises inherent in the transition to the F-35 may stress the fleet beyond its remaining useful service life.
  • Thus, contingencies to remedy potential shortfalls, such as leasing F-16 flight hours or aircraft from European Partner Air Forces, should be considered—or Danish political leaders should be prepared to face a longer capability gap than already planned.

Personnel

  • Pilot and maintainer shortages have challenged the Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF). A continued focus on efficiency rather than resilience risks perpetuating these shortages. Thus, increases in these personnel accounts are likely warranted and could provide an opportunity to more quickly meet NATO’s 2 percent goal.
  • The F-16 pilot cadre is the most experienced in Danish history. Thus, RDAF personnelists should consider methods to retain very experienced pilots as US-based instructors beyond their active duty flying age limit and populate the new F-35 squadron with experienced F-16 pilots with sufficient active duty flying time remaining to the extent possible.
  • Maintenance personnel challenges will increase during the transition phase to the F-35. Thus, substantial efforts to recruit and train a new generation of technicians will be required.
  • It will take 10 years to adequately train 300 flight engineers and maintenance technicians. Full operational capability is planned for 2026—eight years from now.  Thus, maintenance training throughput should be maximized.
  • F-35 maintenance and sustainment will be deeply multinational. Thus, maintenance structures, processes, and labour agreements will require adjustment.

Facilities

  • Initial plans for facility construction and refurbishment at Skrydstrup Air Base have already encountered problems and significant cost increases. These have delayed the expected delivery of F-35s into Denmark by at least 6 months. Thus, expediting construction should be considered to avoid further delays and, perhaps, make up for lost time.
  • The F-35 and its facilities will be prime targets for adversary espionage. Thus, a thorough risk assessment of the physical, electromagnetic, and cybersecurity measures planned for F-35 storage and information at Skrydstrup beyond that required by the F-35 Joint Program Office should be considered.
  • The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad poses significant anti-access/area denial (A2AD) challenges in any Baltic Sea scenario. Skrydstrup is beyond the reported range of Russian ground-based missiles and will be the closest F-35 base to the Baltic states.  It may serve as a forward operating base for air operations in the Baltic Sea region and therefore requirements for facilities and defences may extend beyond those required only for national operations in peacetime.

Service, Joint, and Combined Integration

  • The capabilities of the F-35 will require additional training in new roles and missions for RDAF pilots.Further, future concepts of operation that profit from those capabilities will require participation in additional, large-scale exercises to master.  Thus, the RDAF should consider increasing its planned participation in Red Flag exercises with its F-16 force to develop pilot competencies in high intensity, multinational air contingencies with other nations’ 5thgeneration aircraft.
  • Future F-35 operational concepts will likely entail integrating sensors and shooters from multiple platforms, across domains, and with different types of capabilities. These concepts will be developed by all partner nations alone and in cooperation.  Thus, future F-35 command and control (C2) arrangements together with other European F-35 user nations should be discussed in depth to ensure the agile, flexible, and effective employment of the F-35 aircraft in multinational operations.
  • The joint nature of the F-35 and the initiatives of multiple partner nations to integrate air and maritime capabilities will require consideration of future Danish maritime communications, sensors, command and control, and concepts to coordinate the firing of munitions.

Defence Policy Implications

  • The North Sea area rests between four F-35 partner nations: The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark.Thus, developing a regional exercise area over the area’s less restrictive airspace provides an opportunity for Denmark to take the lead in one area of F-35 integration efforts.
  • Such an area would also provide a venue for Danish participation in multinational exercises involving air and maritime integration with forces from the UK and Norway.
  • Denmark will consider the acquisition of a strike capability during the next five years. While previous discussion has centered on maritime strike capabilities, such as the Tomahawksea-launched cruise missile, airborne options such as the Norwegian-developed air-launched Joint Strike Missile should be included.
  • Finally, F-16 acquisition and upgrading to support all-weather precision strike enabled Danish leaders to participate in a wide variety of expeditionary operations over the past two decades.The F-35 will likely increase prospects for Danish activism in a similar fashion.  Danish leaders should thus begin to consider these possibilities relative to their levels of ambition, resource constraints, and political will.

Our report, Integrating the F-35 into Danish Defence, examines these issues in some depth and is intended to frame discussion of them for some time to come.

It can be downloaded here—as can two companion documents in Danish: a short 4 page CMS Memo “Integration af F-35-Kampflyet I det dansk forsvar” and a graphics-laden short primer on the F-35, the Joint Strike Fighter Program, and the expected transition from the F-16, “Danmarks nye kampfly – F-35 kort fortalt.

Gary Schaub, Jr. is a Senior Researcher within the Centre for Military Studies of the University of Copenhagen.

The Centre is a strategic partner of Second Line of Defense and defense.info.

The featured photo shows an F-16 taking off to accompany the F-35 at Eglin AFB. Credit: Major Roganov, while she was the PAO for Team Eglin.

CMS_Report_2018__5_-_Integrating_the_F-35_into_Danish_Defence

Defence Web at 10

By Robbin Laird

For many years, Airbus Defence and Space hosted an annual media event. These were well run events where Airbus provided overviews on their various programs in front of an invited audience of journalists from many parts of the world.

There was a clear opportunity to meet new friends and to discuss with Airbus their thinking on the way ahead.

These were well attended and well reported events.

Several years ago, I had the opportunity to meet Guy Martin, the founder and editor of the South African-based publication defenceWeb.  We set up a partnership with Second Line of Defense and over the years I have reposted a number of articles from the website on both Second Line of Defense and our new companion website defense.info.

We also flew on the A400M together during an Airbus Defence and Space event as well.

The analyses on defenceWeb are of good quality and shine a light through the fog of a world beset by “fake news.” And given that it is a challenging continent from which to generate analyses and news of high quality, this is doubly to be appreciated.

We salute Guy Martin and his team as they celebrate their 10th year of publication.

And below, we are reprinting their piece highlighting their 10th anniversary.

2018 is an important year for defenceWeb as it marks the culmination of a successful decade of publishing as South Africa – and Africa’s – only dedicated defence and security online news site.

Acknowledgement that defenceWeb has a role in the broader South African defence sector comes from Armscor chief executive Kevin Wakeford: top defence and military analyst Helmoed Heitman; SANDF Chief: Joint Operations Lieutenant General Barney Hlatshwayo and Chief: Defence Reserves Major General Roy Anderson.

An indication of defenceWeb’s acceptance by readers can be seen from traffic to the site which started with just over a thousand readers. A year later this figure was 14 000 plus a month and three months ago 86 0000 visitors and 230 000 hits were recorded.

In his congratulatory message Wakeford notes “it was courageous to start defenceWeb in 2008 during the global financial crisis” adding the publication defied the odds and now dominates defence journalism in South Africa.

“It has always been on top of matters defence and military. defenceWeb has an understanding of our sector and the publication sticks to what the defence sector means to the national economy.

“Armscor has always had a good relationship with defenceWeb. It keeps us timeously informed on defence matters. defenceWeb is first to report on events, conferences, annual reports, corporate plans and the SA National Defence Force. It adds value in keeping AMD, the South African defence industry and the SANDF up to date with current information and trends. defenceWeb covered Armscor’s new vision and strategy professionally. Armscor recognises that defenceWeb is supportive of Armscor’s new vision and strategy.

“Armscor congratulates defenceWeb on its tenth anniversary and encourages future endeavours. Go from strength to strength. May the next ten years be yet another growth phase.”

Heitman offers a “well done over the past decade as the only regular source of defence-related news in a country that sadly neglects defence, even to the extent of most of the media knowing little and caring less”.

“defenceWeb has filled a vital gap, not least in providing a platform for opinions of those interested in defence issues, and will I hope, continue to do so for the next decade and more,” he said adding tongue-in-cheek, “in the world of electronic journalism 10 years must mark at least the attainment of majority, so someone should be giving defenceWeb the key to the front door. Not sure which front door, perhaps the one to the Armscor/Department of Defence building?”

Hlatshwayo points to the important role of the media in ensuring the public is aware of what the SANDF does.

“Since the launch of defenceWeb at the Africa Aerospace Defence (AAD) exhibition in 2008 there has been a symbiotic relationship between defenceWeb and the Joint Ops Division. In my many years spent at Joint Operation in different posts, I have been involved in many articles carried by defenceWeb. I consider defenceWeb a professional, neutral and ethical media house whose purpose it is to provide factual information for its readers. I look forward to more successful interactions with defenceWeb.

“Thank you for your contribution in informing stakeholders of what is happening in the joint operations environment as well as sharing our successes. Congratulations on your 10 year anniversary and may you go from strength to strength with your successful electronic publication. Hlatshwayo said.

Andersen adds his congratulations saying “the publication is an invaluable source of information on defence matters, not only in South Africa but also the rest of the world”.

“Wearing my hat as Chief Defence Reserves, I am grateful to defenceWeb for consistent coverage of the Reserve Force which is read extensively by our members. Recent articles on the Updated Reserve Force Service System have done a great deal to communicate the intended future direction of the Reserves.

“The number of monthly hits on defenceWeb website is growing impressively and augurs well for the future.”

 

Industry 4.0: The Case of the F-35

11/19/2018

By Robbin Laird

Because the F-35 has been built from the outset on a digital thread production approach and foundation, the program can incorporate, and contribute to a broader set of industrial transformations, known as Industry 4.0.

In other words, the F-35 can produce an innovative combat aircraft but it is part of a much broader industrial transformation process designed to be able to leverage that transformation process.

It is a two way street.

The F-35 approach enables Industry 4.0 in the defense domain but also draws from a much broader industrial transformation process as well.

Prof. Dr.-Ing. Thomas Bauernhansl, director of Fraunhofer Institute for Manufacturing Engineering and Automation IPA, provides a perspective on the advance of digitalization and the changing face of production in the context of Industry 4.0.

There are many different interpretations of Industrie 4.0. Professor Bauernhansl, what’s your view?

Industrie 4.0 is about complete digital connectivity: between the means of production; their virtual representations, or digital twins; and the employees involved in that process.

This facilitates revolutionary developments in production operations by allowing highly qualified, flexible workers to collaborate with intelligent cyber-physical systems in smart processes.

While Industrie 4.0 has not yet found its way into all companies, it is a trend that’s being talked about throughout Germany, and we expect this to trigger a revolutionary shift in the way we approach value creation – a fourth industrial revolution. 1

The digital thread production approach of the F-35 program is congruent with the trend lines associated with Industry 4.0.

During my most recent discussion with Don Kinard, Senior Fellow for Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Production, he underscored how important developments in Industry 4.0 were for the evolution of F-35 production processes.

This discussion took place in October 2018.

In effect, the F-35 as a military aircraft has a very different approach to what the supply chain actually means compared to a legacy production military combat aircraft.

It is not just about what the production of the aircraft; it is about the evolution of the aircraft and its sustainment in a dynamic feedback process.

It is a software upgradeable aircraft produced and maintained through a digital process.

As Kinard explained the approach as applied to F-35 production:

“We are shifting significantly from manual collection of data to automated data which allows us to see the entire production process.

“And that allows us not simply to capture and automate descriptive data but apply analytics to derive predictive and prescriptive information as well.

“We increasingly will be able to see into the field supply chain requirements and combine this with the demand side from operations.

“The supply chain with regard to a production process is largely stable but the demand side from the field is not so predictable and as we can get greater understanding of both demand sides and combine them, we can get better understanding and control of the broader supply chain process.

“And this ability will go up as we marry the enterprise systems, including ALIS (the sustainment digital system) with our ERP, our PLM, and our MES systems to create the future vision for the Intelligent Enterprise.

“Industry 4.0 for us is about automating all of the data in the factory as well as enterprise data such as cost, quality, and schedule performance.

“And it is about automated data as I said not just for descriptive data but prescriptive data as well.

“And we will then be able to look at demand fluctuations across the board to manage the supply chain.”

In a recent paper which he delivered at a 2018 Aviation Technology, Integration and Operations Conference, Kinard provided an overview on digital thread and advanced manufacturing used in the F-35 manufacturing process

The F-35’s development and early production benefitted significantly from the phased adoption of a digital thread philosophy. Designers produced 3-D solid models, constructed them to support factory automation, and facilitated their consumption by downstream manufacturing and sustainment functions.

Recently, technology has allowed the rapid validation of as-designed to as-built configuration verification through the use of laser scanning and structured light technologies.

The term digital thread was reportedly coined by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and Lockheed Martin during the early days of F-35 development.

Dr. Kinard defines it as the “creation, use, and reuse of the 3-D models by engineering and downstream functions, including manufacturing and sustainment.”

Phase 1

In Phase 1 of the digital thread implementation, engineering produced exact 3-D engineering models and 2-D drawings. Partner and supplier models, 3-D tool designs, drawings, specifications, and related analysis data, were released into a common product life-cycle management system for accessibility and configuration integration. Manufacturing produced 3-D models for tools and factory layouts that improved facilities development and installation.

For many of the airframe parts, engineering was able to produce reduced-dimension drawings that decreased engineering costs and facilitated supplier NC machining. Fiber placement was used for composites based on the digital thread. Coordinate-measurement machines’ inspection points were programmed directly into the solid models since the solids contained the master engineering data.

These models also supported the supportable low observable structures processes…involving the machining of the IML/OML and cured laminate compensation.

3-D models were used for virtual mockups, manufacturing, and sustainment simulations. Significant successes of the 3-D solids led to large reductions in the quantities of engineering and tooling changes. Solid models reduced engineering changes, compared to historical numbers, because of the ability to provide accurate surfaces and improved integration between parts.

Because of solid model engineering and solid model tooling, Lockheed Martin was able to reduce tool design changes due to tool interferences with released parts. Interferences between parts were also reduced, compared to non-solid model programs, and suppliers were able to produce and validate machined parts to the released solid model masters. These improvements were especially important to the F-35 because there were three variants to design.

Assembly interface control drawings, typical of legacy programs, were not required because the solid models facilitated coordination among partners and suppliers.

Virtual manufacturing simulations, encouraged by the digital thread technology, turned out to be time consuming and expensive, so only a few areas were even attempted. This is one area requiring tool development for future programs. Physical mockups were used for specific bays depending on complexity. Sustainment engineering was able to use virtual reality helmets to assist in simulating maintenance actions with the completed 3-D engineering models.

The digital thread allowed significant increases in producibility and variation management analysis during the F-35 SDD program.

Geometric dimensioning and tolerancing was introduced on the F-35, and variation management analysis was performed by manufacturing engineering. This included using specialized 3-D software to perform complex assembly variation studies. Critical installations were identified, followed by the collection of process capabilities facilitating the variation studies and the creation of variation management documents containing assembly datum schemes.

Variation analysis led ultimately to the definition of engineering tolerances that were flowed into the models, drawings, and tooling, and to the identification of key characteristics (KCs).

A KC is a feature of a material, process, or part (including assemblies) whose variation within the specified tolerance significantly influences product fit, performance, service life, or manufacturability. The F-35 identified many KCs early on, but would likely revise selections for future programs.

KC selections should be made with the understanding that their selection will drive costs into the production system. They will have this effect by requiring the development and imposition of KC management plans, the formal collection of data by fabricators and assemblers, and reporting and analysis of deliverables. KCs should only be selected under certain conditions. Plans must first be in place to alter the engineering or manufacturing build-to-packages (BTP) designs.

Similarly, requirements must first be identified and implemented to better control or take advantage of the variation reduction. KCs that simply accentuate but do not drive changes to engineering accept/reject criteria or BTPs are not KCs.

For example, KCs were put on the diameters of holes on previous programs, but there was never a plan to change the tolerances. As such, these should not have been regarded as KCs.

Phase 2

Phase 2 of the digital thread transformation is about constructing the engineering data to support factory automation. Examples are automated drilling and robotic coatings applications. Automated drilling is used by all the F-35 partners, and we drill 20 percent of the total holes using automation. This includes 80 percent of the accessible OML holes. Automated drilling is about four times faster than manual drilling and its quality is nearly perfect, with remarkable repeatability.

Lockheed Martin uses automated drilling for the wing boxes, forward fuselage skins, and upper skin to center wing skins. We also use it for the center wing at Marietta, Georgia. Northrop Grumman uses a metrology-assisted robot to drill the narrow inlets on the F-35. BAE Systems drills its empennage skins and structure separately using its high-precision machining centers. This is a remarkable feat of high-precision machining, considering the bolt-to-hole tolerances it requires. There is a plan in place to implement even more automated drilling in the future as part of the continual effort to drive costs down and improve quality.

Other automation used for the F-35 include fiber placement technology, which Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and other suppliers use to lay up complex inlets, nacelles, and large wing parts. Recently BAE Systems also introduced a robot to countersink its composite skins.

Phase 3

Phase 3 provides the digital thread directly to the mechanics to create such products as work instruction graphics. These graphics were facilitated by the 3-D solid models, which can be used to create graphics through visualization software tools. Ideally, they would visually instruct mechanics on the floor or maintainers in the field and reduce the time it takes them to understand their tasks. However, for production this intended benefit on the floor ended up being very difficult to maintain. This was because graphics are static images that are incapable of affordably being updated as engineering or manufacturing changes. For the F-35 program specifically, with concurrent engineering and manufacturing development, graphics must frequently be updated to accommodate a steep initial learning curve and significant engineering, tooling, and planning changes.

An unexpected factor in this process was the impact of flow-to to-takt manufacturing on graphics creation. As the takt time (production rate) changed, new tool positions were added and hours per unit decreased. As a result, the manufacturing sequencing needed to be adjusted constantly by breaking up planning cards and redoing graphics. In an effort to circumvent static graphics costs, graphics can be made available on the factory floor. This is done by granting the mechanics access to the visualization tools from their work terminals. Harness installations are a good example of how this can work because harness routings are especially difficult to understand from a 2-D drawing. Early in SDD, large television monitors were placed in some of the work areas, and the mechanics used these until experience was gained with the installations.

Another downside of graphics is that the mechanics typically only need them for a short time. Despite this, however, graphics do help mechanics who are new to the F-35 program during ramp-up to full-rate production. Recently, movies of the critical installations were produced that could be accessed as needed through the electronic work instruction terminals that mechanics use on the floor.

One of the unique ways for mechanics to use the digital thread is through optical projection technology.

Mechanics can use this to visually project work instructions directly onto the aircraft. For example, fastener locations and part numbers are projected onto the inlets being built at Lockheed Martin’s Marietta facility. The conventional procedure requires mechanics to look at drawings and write down part numbers and inlet locations to do their work. With the digital thread’s procedure, mechanics can instead view the projected instructions while performing their work.

Continuing work is being done to capture the actual fastener grip during automated drilling operations. This information will be used to eliminate grip validation time and support fastener projection. In addition, it will be used to kit, clean, and promote fasteners and deliver these to the point of use. This is also a great example of how IoT, the Internet of things can connect the equipment on the floor with the internet for cost savings and efficiency. 

An additional example of Phase 3 is the technology for laser ply projection in the composites shop. This was one of the first Phase 3 digital thread technologies used in the aerospace industry. Bulkhead marking was initiated on the F-35 where ink jet markings for bracket locations were printed directly onto large bulkheads. This saved span and costs and eliminated thousands of tools that had to be designed and maintained.

The production of tools for the mechanics and sustainment modifications using additive manufacturing is another digital thread success.

Lockheed Martin has produced more than 5,000 tools for the floor and field using fused deposition modeling (FDM) of polymers. FDM provides a fast, low-cost approach to producing temporary tools (temporary because of the FDM material’s durability issues) to assist the mechanics. The development of more durable FDM materials continues in the industry. The objective is to enable producing permanent tooling and replacing more expensive metal, fiberglass, and other typical hole-drilling tooling.

Phase 4

Phase 4 of the digital thread is the validation of engineering as-designed to the as-built structure using advanced noncontact metrology techniques, including laser scanning and structured light. This technology can identify deviations from engineering early in the build or fabrication process and rapidly correct them, reducing cost by stopping defects from traveling downstream.

A truly revolutionary technology, it may eventually replace coordinate measuring machine inspections and become a requirement for suppliers prior to shipping parts, tools, and equipment.

Additively manufactured tools configured to mimic various F-35 weapons normally take about a full shift to be installed and pass clearance checks. Now, a laser can scan the bays and compare the as-built aircraft to the engineering models, which only takes a few hours.

As another example, when there is a fit problem with a tube on the floor, the cause is not readily apparent. The tube could be bad, the bracket location could be incorrect, or there might be a problem with the structure. To overcome the problem, the tube can be brought to a scanner and rapidly validated, or equipment can be brought to the aircraft to have the brackets and structure checked.

Current scanning technologies typically depend on targets being placed on the aircraft or parts.

However, this will eventually be replaced by feature-based recognition as the digital thread connections to the 3-D scanner technology matures. This scanning technology can also replace the thousands of the manual mismatch, gap, and flushness measurements required today.

Further, it can inspect detail parts, tooling, and assemblies on a first-article basis today. Identifying defects during first-article inspections will significantly reduce the cost and flatten the learning curve for concurrently developed products like military aircraft. Early identification will also reduce the recurring cost for measurements. In the future, the use of 3-D non-contact metrology for recurring real-time validations in an assembly, as well as for supplier acceptance, may become routine.

Applying the digital thread on the F-35 program has brought significant benefits, including the:

1) development of the BTPs(build to packages including engineering models and drawings, specifications, tool designs, and work instructions),

2) use of automation to reduce touch labor and improve quality,

3) integration of the digital thread on the factory floor, and

4) opportunity to validate the configuration using digital thread technologies (e.g., laser scanning and structured light).

There has been an explosion of digital technologies in the past five years and a tremendous amount of continued development in the industry.

In that paper, Kinard went on to add insights with regard to Industry 4.0 and the way ahead for the F-35 program.

Industry is recognizing that the data in IT systems can provide tactical insight to drive efficiency in operations. It can also lower support costs for data collection, analysis, and performance visibility and transparency. The connected enterprise depicted in the figure below is the key to enterprise efficiency.

It improves the integration of systems data, facilitates automated data collection and dashboard metrics, and supports descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive analytics. It also connects factory equipment with the IT systems, driving efficient usage and secure data transfer.

Data security is one of the enabling technologies for the connected enterprise. This revolution is in its early stages but will rapidly drive industry to become more efficient in above-the-factory-floor functions.

Further, it will provide needed insight for continued productivity gains on the factory floor and in the supply base.

Lockheed Martin has already deployed a phone/computer application for aircraft on the production floor. It provides information about locations, schedule performance, part shortage, non-conformances, and other factors for every aircraft and component in work.

This pertains to not only those in the Fort Worth factory but also the aircraft and components in Italy and Japan. The application is being combined with a factory-wide part kit and tool radio frequency identification system (RFID). Ultimately, it will be able to automate updates of each aircraft on monitors located at each tool position with status and performance data.

Put in other words, a key way to understand the supply chain or the manufacturing support base is to see it from several optics.

The first optic is to see it from a more traditional supply chain perspective.  Who are the major suppliers to the core sections of the aircraft assembled in Texas, Japan and Italy?

The second optic is to see it from a sustainability perspective whereby the performance of the parts in the field drive performance evaluations of the parts being supplied worldwide.

Performance can drive decisions with regard to global suppliers and lead to decisions to add global providers or shift from one provider to another.

The third optic is to look at the underlying man-machine providers for building the aircraft.

Here there is a broad participation of global producers for machines, tools and technologies, which can be folded into the production process.

Also, because of the digital nature of the production and sustainment process, commercial companies, which produce digital tools and capabilities, can be ported into the production and sustainment process as well.

At each level there are a variety of providers of parts, tools and capabilities to the production and sustainment process, much broader than if one simply stays at the level of the first optic.

For example, Fraunhofer which is a key player in Industry 4.0, is a part of the supply chain for the F-35 in terms of the third optic.

It is a whole new world for military aircraft production and sustainment.  But the new world is a challenge to the acquisition, modernization and sustainment bureaucracies.

While they remain largely stove piped; the F-35 is not.

In this Defense News video, an interview with Don Kinard, Senior Fellow for F-35 Production, provides an overview on the production process used to deliver the F-35.

F35 Production from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

 

 

Putin Bails Out the Troika of Tyranny

By Stephen Blank

Recently John Bolton, Director of the National Security Council, gave a speech attacking what he called the Troika of Tyranny: Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, and announcing new sanctions on these states.

Perhaps it is not coincidental that Bolton’s speech, announcing a new tough-minded U.S. policy towards Latin America, coincided with Vladimir Putin’s actions to bail out these allies of Moscow.

Certainly it is no coincidence that they are allies of Moscow.  Putin’s actions merely confirm what observers have long known, namely that he is challenging the U.S. in Latin America just as he believes Washington is challenging Russia on its peripheries.

Not only are these states classic Latin American authoritarian if not dictatorial regimes, Nicaragua and Venezuela are either close to being or actually are failing states.

Venezuelan energy production has collapsed along with the national economy thanks to the kleptocratic and misguided policies of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. Almost 2,000,000 people have fled Venezuela in the last three years creating a major refugee problem across Latin America that could become a crisis for Latin America and the U.S. Inflation on a year on year basis has reached 488.865% as of September 2018 so it is clear this is a failing state yet its leaders refuse to allow reforms.

Worse yet Venezuela is  what the Center or Strategic and International  Studiescalls a Mafia state, the hub of a wide range of smuggling and narcotics trafficking operations throughout the Americas.

Similarly the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INCSR)  reported that Nicaragua remains a primary drug transport route despite the fact that part of Russian aid is supposedly training its military and police to conduct counter-drug operations.

Given what we know of the Moscow-Managua relationship it is more likely that Russian advisors if not forces are involved with their Nicaraguan partners in this trade.

But like Venezuela it is on the verge of fragmentation as popular anger over Daniel Ortega’s dictatorship and corruption have grown to a very high level.

Given these three states’ addiction to personalist, “socialist” and intrinsically anti-American policies it is hardly surprising that Moscow has used them over the years to run guns to insurgent movements and terrorists across Latin America, and in 2008 tried to use Venezuela to unseat the Colombian government allied to the U.S.

Moscow has also sought to use these states as the basis for implanting itself economically in Latin America, primarily in energy sectors, but also to use their media as a platform for flooding the continent with an anti-American information campaign that is part of Russia’s larger global IW campaign.

Finally since 2014 if not earlier, Russia has been seeking to get naval and/or air bases in Nicaragua and Venezuela. More recently, in meetings with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel Putin and Canelpledged to increase integration between Moscow and Latin American nations in general, no doubt with Cuba once again trying to play or playing a leading role in that process.

Both men also denounced U.S. “interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations.”

But Russo-Cuban tiesgo beyond these more or less traditional denunciations of Washington and the U.S. embargo on Cuba.  While Canel was meeting Putin in Moscow, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, whose portfolio includes Russia’s military-industrial complex and arms sales with foreign countries, visited Havana. In meetings there both sides agreed on contracts worth more than $2675 million in the military sphere alone, a dramatic increase in Russian investment, presumably to offset and counter the U.S. embargo.

Russian analysts,writing about these meetings, argued that Moscow now has the desire, if not necessarily the means to develop intelligence and communications facilities in Cuba e.g. by reopening the old facility at Lourdes and possibly developing new ones.  The expense of opening such facilities or new bases as some have argued would be enormous and its benefits would likely be symbolic.

Nevertheless the Russian Navy long ago stated its desire for bases in Latin Americaor at least port call facilities and could be arguing for a base in Cuba if other locales are unavailable. In any case it is clear that Russia’s ties with Cuba will grow and that likely it will rely more on Cuba, especially given the situation in Nicaragua and Venezuela, more than in the recent past, to be its “spear-carrier” in Latin American.

Given the extensive ties all three states have with Russia and the fact that through their own misrule Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela are permanently under achievers and now in the cross hairs of U.S. policy, it is hardly surprising that Putin is bailing them out.

Putin is giving Cuba $43 million to spend on acquiring Russian military equipmenteven though a U.S. invasion is quite unlikely.

As regards Venezuela, its crisis is so huge that Moscow cannot afford to give it money.

But it has given it something equally precious.  Through various mechanism it has conferred international legitimacy upon the Maduro regime and it may have brokered a gold transaction between Venezuela and Turkeylast summer whereby Venezuela shipped its gold to Turkey to be refined in a move that both states openly stated was aimed at destroying the “Hegemony of the dollar.”

Putin has just sent a high-level official delegation to Venezuelato advise the government on how to escape from its self-made crisis.

In other words, from Putin’s standpoint Venezuela is too big to fail.

And while he may not throw too much good money after bad, he will do what he can to sustain these states as a base for anti-American operations throughout Latin America.

Bearing all this in mind, it is necessary for the U.S. to craft a policy for Latin America that goes beyond sanctions to address, and if possible, forestall a massive refugee and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and with other Latin American states, facilitate a transition to more representative rule in Nicaragua. 

Cuba on its own is little more than a nuisance but the prospect of one or two failed states or civil war in Venezuela and/or Nicaragua could become a major challenge to American interests and capabilities.  Already the incoming Prime Minister of Brazil, Jair Bolnosaro, has had to deny rumors that he and the Colombian government is planning an invasion of Venezuela.

But it is clear that both Maduro and Ortega have no scruples about using violence if that is the only way for them to remain in power.

And it is equally clear that whatever they will do they will enjoy Russian support.

Our previous neglect of Latin America has turned out to be malign in its consequences.

That is no longer a viable option for Washington and the Administration needs to recognize that sooner rather than later.

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council.

Featured Photo: Vladimir Putin se comunicó con Nicolas Maduro y le ofrece su apoyo frente a las protestas en Venezuela (Composición).

 

SIMBEX-18

11/15/2018

By India Strategic

Visakhapatnam, November 10, 2018

There are only a few militaries that can boast of continuity and cooperation in the field of maritime combat drills like the navies of India and Singapore and that too sustained for 25 years.

When the frontline ships of the Eastern Fleet of the Indian Navy and those of the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) made their entry into the azure waters of Port Blair in the pristine Andaman and Nicobar Islands on 10 November 2018, it was a treat for the on lookers.

The ships arrived at Port Blair for the commencement of the 25th edition of the SIMBEX – Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise. Started as Basic ASW exercises in 1994, today these exercises have graduated to complex maritime combat drills including missile and torpedo firings and shore based intensive professional exchanges.

Home to India’s only Tri-Services Command, the crew of the participating warships and the Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft and integral helicopters, would go through the last minute exercise coordination details with a fine comb at Port Blair. During the harbour phase, in addition to operational conferences towards preparation of the sea phase of the exercises in the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal, courtesy calls by both sides on the Senior Officers are also scheduled.

In addition, Subject Matter Expert Exchanges or SMEE as they are commonly known by militaries worldwide are also scheduled. The SMEEs, have over the years provided a platform to formally exchange best practices of respective navies so that learning and improvement never ceases. Cross deck visits by air crew towards deck familiarisation are also planned.

Over the next two days, Port Blair is playing host to Indian Naval Ships Ranvijay, Satpura, Sahyadri, Shakti, Kirch, Kadmatt, Sumedha and Sukanya along with the RSN Ships, Formidable, Steadfast, Unity, Valiant and Vigour. Maritime Patrol Aircraft of both countries – the versatile P8I of the Indian Navy and Fokker F50 from Singapore would also be based out of Port Blair. Local Flotilla ships based at Port Blair would be ensuring seafront security including in the exercise areas towards smooth conduct of the exercise.

Also participating in the exercises are RSS Swordsman, an Archer Class submarine and Swift Rescue, a Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV). While the Indian Navy recently inducted a DSRV on the western seaboard and is slated to induct another on its eastern seaboard, it continues to exercise with various navies and assimilate best practices as well as enhance interoperability.

The exercises at sea this year are unprecedented and largest of kind in terms of the complexity and weapon firings. The sea phase would be held under Commander Task Group of Joint Forces of SIMBEX-18, Rear Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi, Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet. Senior Lieutenant Colonel Ho Jee Kien, Commanding Officer of 188 Missile Corvette Squadron would be leading the Republic of Singapore Navy during the first sea phase and would also be the Deputy Task Group Commander.

This article was first published by our partner India Strategic.

Nigerian JF-17 Acquisition

by defenceWeb

Pakistan has provided an $184 million government guarantee to cover production of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets for the Nigerian Air Force as the Nigerian government continues to fund the type.

Pakistan’s Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) approved the $184.3 million sovereign guarantee for the production of three Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC)/Chengdu JF-17 fighters, according to the Pakistan Express Tribune.

The newspaper reported that Ministry of Defence Production officials had said PAC Kamra had signed a contract for the sale off three JF-17s to Nigeria. It is not clear how many JF-17s Nigeria will ultimately order, as it has only made small payments over the last several years towards the fighters.

According to Nigeria’s 2018 Federal Appropriation Bill that was approved by President Muhammadu Buhari in June this year, the Nigerian government approved a part-payment of $47 million towards three JF-17s in addition to $33 million for the existing procurement of three JF-17s. In 2016 Nigeria budgeted $25 million for the JF-17 purchase.

The Nigerian acquisition of the JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter jets is part of an ongoing fleet modernisation programme that includes the procurement of eight Russian-made Mi-35M attack helicopters and up to 12 A-29 Super Tucano close air support aircraft from the US.

This article was first published by our partner defenceWeb on October 30, 2018.

China, South Africa and Military Logistics

By Kabelo Tsogang

A delegation from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Central Military Commission Logistics Support division, steered by its Deputy Chief of Administrative Office, Senior Colonel Huang Dongping, have visited the South African Department of Defence Logistics Division in Pretoria and Cape Town to finalise hosting the first military logistics symposium between the two countries.

The visit took place between 29 October and 2 November.

According to the agreement between the two Armed Forces, they are scheduled to host the logistics symposium in March 2019 at the Logistics University of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Chongqing, China). A few topics under discussion will include preservation of warehouses and technical maintenance and repair, uniform production and supply.

The General Officer Commanding DOD Logistics Support Formation, Maj Gen John Kobbie, headed a Logistics Command Group that welcomed the Chinese delegation at the DOD School of Logistics Training in Wynberg, Cape Town.

“The atmosphere that welcomed us on our arrival portrayed the professionalism that is upheld in this School,” Dongping said. According to her it is imperative and logical to nurture on fresh soldiers by exposing them to foreign learning opportunities.

Caption: General Officer Commanding DOD Logistics Support Formation, Maj Gen John Kobbie and Deputy Chief of Administrative Office of the Department of Logistics Support, Senior Colonel Huang Dongping.

This article was first published on November 5, 2018 by our partner defenceWeb.

 

Rethinking Networks from a 5th Gen Perspective

By Ian McDonald AM, MSc, DipEng & AVM John Blackburn (Retd) AO, MA, MDefStud

The phrase “5th Generation” (Gen) is often dismissed as just another fad, whilst totally missing the paradigm shift in both technology and operations that is implied or intended by it.

It is envisaged that mature 5th Gen forces will incorporate sensor proliferation across all imaginable spectra, exponential growth in data generation, data fusion analytics and integrated artificial intelligence.

The RAAF is already headed in this direction as it acquires platforms such as P8, JSF, and Triton that are already equipped with multi-spectrum sensors.

Decades ago, United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd developed the model of the OODA loop, the decision cycle of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. He noted that in order to win (in combat), we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversary’s OODA loop.

This will be a significant challenge for the ADF in the future 5th Gen environment.

The projected threat from ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles, for example, will produce time compression and fire control integration issues that will make current OODA loop processes, networks and communications bearers obsolete.

Time Sensitive Targets take on a increasingly new meaning for the future.

The Joint environment, in which the Space domain is now a key fundamental component, also creates a level of complexity as the focus shifts from platform and Service to multi dimensional Joint capability.

A significant challenge faced in thinking about the design of the future force is the technical terminology and language. When we discuss C4ISR networks today, we typically think and act in terms of extant capabilities such as “RF, Link-16, Link-11 and a series of messaging protocols such as J series, K series and VMF formats.”

When we discuss the future 5th Gen force, there are terms such as the “Kill Web” and the range of C2+, ISREW, IFC and IAMD capabilities2

As technology permits, an eventual shift toward IP data is anticipated as it will be essential within a multi-nodal and cross-domain environment. Network proliferation has already occurred with many special purpose applications, e.g. CEC, Special Ops Networks, TTNT, TDL and SINGCARS.3

Network proliferation across multiple communication bearers, nodes and protocols will continue but in a 5th Gen environment greater focus will likely be on the Common Operating Picture and the tactical subsets of the “Recognised Air, Land and Maritime Pictures” to enhance situational awareness. These will be focussed on the Boyd OODA loop and execution of what has been described as a multi-nodal “Kill Web” environment.

We will now try to minimise the technical terminology for the remainder of this discussion.

 What is the current vector?

The RAAF’s Plan Jericho noted that RAAF members cannot be complacent in thinking that simply by having the F-35A aircraft the RAAF have a 5th Gen capability 4

It highlighted the need to think about how the RAAF employs air combat forces as a system of systems. The Plan foresaw that the operating environment will be increasingly complex, with high volumes of rapidly produced data moving along contested lines of communication to challenge our decision capacity.

In order to exploit new capabilities and win in challenging operating environments, it stated that the RAAF needed to transform along with the wider ADF into an integrated, networked force.

The Joint Plan Aurora is intended to implement joint “Integrated Force Realisation” targets and to drive C4ISR Architectures, Standards and Goals.

However, it is still in its embryonic stage and apart from a short brief given to industry in May 2018, there is, as yet, little detail in the public arena apart from a PowerPoint slide pack.5

What is anticipated in this future 5th Gen Force is that large volumes of fused / correlated data / information will require a significant increase in classified network bandwidth and network complexity as new sensors and platforms are acquired with increasing integration demands resulting from capabilities such as CEC and IFC.

The ADF will need a system comprised of interconnected and interoperable legacy and 5th Gen systems, communications links, IP based networks and waveforms within an ever growing cross-domain environment.

It has become evident to the US Armed Forces that a major impediment to multi domain operations is their existing, disparate, communications and information networks.

Commentators have noted that the US has magnificent platforms but that it needs an integrated communications architecture and networks; in other words, a system of systems level approach is needed.6

A recent Air Force Times article also concluded that the US military isn’t quite at the point of the multi-domain command and control capabilities that are envisaged by General Goldfein, the USAF Chief.7

General Goldfein highlighted the example of how military forces could connect in the future via systems being built by private industry, such as the space-based internet framework.

This capability will provide multiple, independent, pathways that could be used by the military for communication and information networks, whilst increasing the cost and effort of interdiction by an adversary.

The impending change in force architecture is also evident in the proposed USAF Advanced Battle Management System.

In September 2018, Aviation Week & Space Technology (AW&ST), reported that the implications of the demise of the J-Stars recapitalization program are becoming clear and that the pending retirement signals a fundamental shift in acquisition and operational strategy.8

Instead of concentrating a critical sensor and battle management centre on a single platform, the distribution of such capabilities across a resilient and adaptable network, consisting of multiple, smaller platforms is envisaged.

The article noted that the USAF’s Next-Generation Air Dominance program could follow a similar model.

If battle management is to be performed by a network of platforms, then there will need to be an communication and information network that will integrate multiple platforms and systems that were not originally designed to communicate with one another.

These nodes on the network will need the processing power to correlate, fuse and even store the streams of data.

In public discussions in Australia about a 5th Gen ADF, future force characteristics /attributes that have been postulated include:

  • A design tailored for 5th Gen Battle Management role with functionality to maximise effect of 5th Gen capabilities.
  • Centralised Command with Distributed Control using Distributed Control /Communications Nodes.
  • Redundancy and resiliency by design through duplication of select functionality across the Nodes.
  • Open and standards based architectures to support rapid upgrade / adaptation.
  • Fusion where appropriate / possible.
  • Integrated cyber protection.9
  • Sensors integrated as a part of a broader “sensor mesh.”10
  • An ability to operate in both legacy and future Concepts of Operations (CONOPS.)

The transition to such a future force design has profound implications for Defence communities.

For example, AW&ST reported that Will Roper, the Assistant Secretary of the (US) Air Force for Acquisition, is considering creating a new function of a “systems architect.”

The systems architect will approach the program with a system-of-systems mindset, shifting requirement sets between different platforms within the overall system as necessary.

Such a function is not just the purview of the acquisition community; in the case of Defence in Australia it should be a VCDF Force Design function

What is the problem in Australia?

The journey to transform the RAAF, and the wider ADF, is underway and the implications for how we will network, integrate and operate the 5th Gen force are fundamental.

Existing Defence information networks in Australia have historically been driven by a platform-centric culture with incremental acquisition or upgrade of capabilities.

Joint integration has only been a relatively recent requirement driven by the latest Defence White Paper and encapsulated in plans such as RAAF’s Plan Jericho, Joint Plan Aurora and Navy’s Plan Pelorus.

The “as is” reality within the ADF is that there are a multitude of information networks in operation with a number of network managers effectively managing them in isolation, despite the intent of the First Principles Review to establish integrated organisational structures.

The considerable management overhead costs that result could not be described as either efficient or economical.

The “as is” structure also results in the “as is” network design being prolonged. Projects such as Air 6500 (IAMD), Air 7000 (P8 and Triton) and Air 5077 (AEW&C) will confront the “as is” network barriers of limited connectivity, bandwidth, temporal sensitivity and resilience as they try to identify alternate data paths in a contested, congested and denied operational environment.

Defence lacks a “systems architecture vision” with the result that the existing infrastructure is not a good foundation upon which to build the 5th Gen communications and information networks that will be needed in the near future.

System of systems integration across a Joint environment is not a capability that can be bought off the shelf, it has to be purposely designed, tested, certified, accredited and maintained through life as a weapon system in its own right.

It requires legacy capture and management along with constant, ongoing, transition to 5th Gen and beyond.

The current fragmentation of the design of information components across the Services and Groups, which effectively falls to individual component levels, also has an adverse effect on Industry where expertise is developed and maintained at the project delivery level, rather than on the overall system of systems that needs to be integrated for the Joint environment.

The lack of a “systems architect vision” and an integrating design authority for all of the Defence communications / information networks also results in confusion when new project staffs attempt to identify how their system will be connected and supported.

Compounding this issue is a general lack of integrated “system of systems” design experience in Defence as a result of a historically focused approach of platform-centric design; frankly, the system of systems integrated approach wasn’t really a requirement until the last decade when a Network Centric Warfare model was adopted.11

Defence acquisition processes are likely to remain project focused in the absence of a comprehensive system of systems level architecture vision and architects who bridge the conventional systems engineering and information management boundaries.

As the ADF transitions to a 5th Gen platform/systems-equipped force over this next decade it will need a 5th Gen information systems design.

Discussions with some Australian systems engineers suggest that “networks” as a term will become obsolete.

Nodes, communication bearers and protocols will become the focus as a 5th Gen “Information Management Environment (IME)” is designed and built to handle emerging 5th Gen operational requirements.

Networks will be the transportation layer or grid in broader 5th Gen IME with data, information, knowledge and insight across the Joint environment being the primary requirement .

The need for the future CONOPS discussed previously is emerging as one of the main roadblocks to realising a 5th Gen Force in Australia.

The development of such a force level concept is a complex undertaking which has not been achieved to date despite a number of attempts; it is a key missing piece in this 5th Gen puzzle.

Much of the work effort today related to communications and information networks is focused on the current CONOPS and, at the technical level, on the mapping of the complete “as is” state within the ADF across IP and non-IP based systems and communications infrastructure in order to develop an Integration Interoperability Framework.

The present technical architecture focus on the “as is” state is commendable; however, it may remain constrained to the current state, as a technical architecture for a 5th Gen Force cannot be started until a future operational architecture, based on a future CONOPS, is developed.

This is not an engineering design issue, it is an operational design issue.

How could the ADF move from a legacy infrastructure to a future 5th Gen IME infrastructure?

The existing stove piped model of networks creates bottlenecks for the passage of essential, time-critical information and will also constrain the passage of that information to a number of limited bandwidth classified pathways.

Changes in technology of networks suggests that we need to look to innovative industry developments and how they could support a new IME architectural approach. There is an opportunity to rethink the problem by using a broader framework than that used to acquire the component parts to date.

This will however require a change in thinking and therefore culture. Emerging technologies offer numerous options to consider; today’s commercial infrastructure connects us in our everyday lives and we take for granted the bandwidth and the ability to have video calls across the globe, yet we struggle to achieve that connectivity and resilience with our military systems.

The technology developments discussed earlier, such as the space-based internet, should come to market in the near-to-mid term. In addition, multi-link broadband communications systems, that can create IP based relay networks across air and surface platforms, will provide resilience through multiple link pathways that are not satcom dependent.

The major impediment to the use of such diverse pathways by the military to date has been that of security. A technology example that could also help reframe our IME design in this case is the potential to move encryption from the existing network level to the node or component, which could in turn permit the use of multiple, independent, commercial, as well as military, pathways for communications and information. This could improve the ADF’s overall capacity and operational resilience in that the use of multiple pathways would significantly complicate an adversary’s interdiction task.

A move to encryption at the node or component level may also offer innovative methods of cross-domain data sharing.

Some of the technologies discussed are in use today, are becoming more affordable and have been, in a number of instances, developed by Australian companies. For example, IP-based communications capabilities are being deployed for parts of the ADF and advanced encryption technologies are now used in Defence to support mobility of individuals / teams that can utilise civilian unclassified networks for the transmission of high-classification data.

What is needed is to take technologies currently focussed on parts of the ADF or on individual mobility and apply them to the whole of force level under an integrated design and architecture.

A significant challenge that will need to be addressed is an organisational one.

A 2017 report on Integrated Air and Missile Defence, by one of the authors of this article, concluded that Defence cannot build and operate an integrated force using business models developed for acquiring stand-alone, stove-piped capabilities.

Despite the original intent, the Program structure developed under the First Principles Review was not resourced adequately and did not result in a business model capable of supporting the design and development of an integrated force. It is time to face up to that reality and address the shortfalls.

This latter statement is in no way meant to denigrate the good work being done by many individuals within Defence today; however, their work is significantly constrained by the current business model.

For example, an integrated force design cannot be developed using only internal Defence staff resources. It is a complex task that needs a diverse and highly experienced team with the pooled expertise of Defence personnel, Defence Industry, Commercial Industry, Academics, Scientists and domain experts. There is apparently no mechanism or funding at the strategic level in Defence to create such a team.

The vast majority of funds available to engage Industry are in the acquisition organisation, allocated by Project, and cannot be used to fund the engagement with industry to design the force at the Program level. Simplistically, Defence can expend funds to study project level specifications but not for the integrated design of the force.

Surely it is smarter to expend some funds up front in the program design phase to avoid repeating the project level mistakes of the past and to better prepare the ADF for a 5th Gen future?

Next Steps

With the foregoing discussion on the problems and the opportunities as background, the following are some suggestions for consideration:

The design of the 5th Gen IME is not an IT issue that can be delegated to the CIOG or an IT contractor; it is the foundation of the future 5th Gen Force and it requires, as a first step, the development of a future CONOPS.

It is a whole of force design issue and as such it should be under the direct control of the VCDF.

The lack of funding for engagement with Industry and a wider range of domain experts must be addressed and a mechanism created to build an integrated design team. A mechanism that could be considered is an adaptation of the Rapid Prototyping, Development and Evaluation (RPD&E) initiative that commenced under the NCW program in 2002 and ran for over 15 years. RPD&E engaged a coalition of industry participants very early in the process of project development, with the aim of trying to get a solution to the warfighter quickly.

If the model was adapted to address the Integrated Design at the Program and Capability Stream level it may produce similar rapid and effective force design outcomes.

If Defence is to develop a 5th Gen force integrated architecture there needs to be a resourced IME Strategy and Roadmap that incorporates:

  • The Design of an Integration and Interoperability Framework that supports the design and development of the 5th Gen Force.
  • The documentation of the “As Is” architecture (already underway.)
  • The development of a “To Be” technical architecture and design that is driven by a future operational architecture that is derived from a future force CONOPS.
  • Design to ensure “graceful degradation” of the 5th Gen IME in the operational environment which will be increasingly congested, contested and constrained.
  • Appropriate tools, simulations and exercise to prove capability as a part of the Plan Aurora implementation.

It is also worth reflecting on the current Defence Sovereign Industrial Capability Priorities announced by the Australian Government in 201812

Whilst the Priorities include complex systems integration as a part of a national surveillance and intelligence data collection, and analysis dissemination capability, the notion that Australian industry should have the capability to support the integrated design of the whole of the force does not appear to have been considered.

This is in contrast to the United States where Complex Systems Engineering, Integration, and Operations were proposed as core competencies of the Department of Defense (and the industrial base) as being key to any future offset strategy.13

A further example of where the Sovereign Industrial Capability Priorities may need to be expanded is in the example of the advanced encryption technologies discussed previously.

The ADF has acquired / is acquiring platforms and systems from a range of international suppliers including the US, UK, France and Israel.

Surely encryption capabilities are a critical sovereign industry capability that will allow the ADF to employ these platforms and systems as a part of an integrated force.

Conclusions

The ADF is acquiring 5th Gen platforms and systems; however, there is a risk that they will be shackled with an outdated communications and information network architecture.

Emerging technologies give Defence the opportunity to rethink the problem by using a broader framework than that used to acquire the component parts to date. To take advantage of this opportunity will however require a change in thinking and therefore culture.

A 5th Gen force is not going to be effective without a 5th Gen IME design.

Will 5th Gen be an ADF force enabler or will it be constrained by the roadblocks?

This article was republished with the permission of the authors.

It first appeared on Australian Defence.

Ian McDonald AM, MSc, DipEng, is a Weapons Design Engineer in the system of systems and countermeasures environment with over 43 years in ADF, USDOD ICT technology and Coalition militaries focused on interoperability and technology driven paradigm change.

 Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn (Retd) AO, MA, MDefStud, retired as the Deputy Chief of the RAAF in 2008 and is now the Board Chair of the Institute for Integrated Economic Research (IIER) – Australia and a Fellow of both the Institute For Regional Security and the Sir Richard Williams Foundation.

Distributed networks are not about hierarchy and the ability of an adversary to whack the head of the hierarchy; it is about a honeycomb of deployed and distributed capability that no adversary can cripple with a single or easy blow. Credit Image: Bigstock