We consider the evolution of the Australian-Japanese relationship as one of the most critical ones which can affect the reshaping of deterrent capabilities and relations in the Pacific.

Both countries are pushing out their defense perimeters to deal with the expanded reach of the Chinese.  Both are introducing new capabilities, but the Australians are focused much more than Japan on integrated force design and implementation.

Japan clearly needs to learn how to do this and Australia could well be a key partner in that learning process.

And both wish to enhance their sovereign defense industrial capabilities to build relevant 21st century defense and security capabilities.

And although the first effort to breakthrough on this dimension failed, namely with regard to the new build submarine, this area is a key work in progress.

Recently, we argued that if the French-Australian submarine agreement failed to be implemented by the current government, the new Australian government might reconsider their working relationship with Japan in this area.

“If the French government wants to complete their clear opportunity working with Australia, it would be wise for Paris to take a hard look at the changing dynamics in the Asian Pacific and the emerging ambitions of Australia to be a major player militarily and industrially.

“The Abe government in Japan is currently rethinking not only its security role in partnership with the US, but its underlying industrial support capabilities which could be applied more effectively in joint projects with Australia and the US.

“Japanese economic relations with Australia, long based on trade and direct investment, are now in a new stage where co-development of new military hardware and software would be in the mutual interests of both nations.

“That would also put Australia on the forefront of the global industrial development map, rather simply fork-lifting platforms built elsewhere into Australia.”

Recently, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Marise Payne, and the Australian Minister for Defence, Mr Christopher Pyne, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr Taro Kono, and the Minister of Defense of Japan, Mr Takeshi Iwaya, met in Sydney on 10 October 2018 for the Eighth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.

An article in The Japan Times noted that the status of forces agreement between Australia and Japan was making progress.

In regard to concluding a security agreement, since the 2014 launch of negotiations on what is known as a visiting forces agreement, Japan and Australia have pledged an early conclusion of the talks numerous times.

If realized, it would be the first such agreement for Tokyo after the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, which details the legal status of U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan.

Japan views Australia as a “quasi-ally” and “special strategic partner,” and is considering that strengthening their relationship in the field of security is becoming more important to promote Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy….”

Payne disclosed that the Japanese prime minister will visit the northern Australian city of Darwin in November to hold a high-level bilateral economic dialogue…..

The featured photo shows Foreign Minister Taro Kono and Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne laying wreaths at HMAS Kuttabul in Sydney during the Japanese visit to Sydney. Credit PhotoL AP

Appendix:

Eighth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations

Joint statement

10 October 2018

1. The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Marise Payne, and the Australian Minister for Defence, Mr Christopher Pyne, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr Taro Kono, and the Minister of Defense of Japan, Mr Takeshi Iwaya, met in Sydney on 10 October 2018 for the Eighth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.
2. The Ministers welcomed the closer engagement between Australia and Japan since the Seventh 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations, including visits to Japan by the Australian Prime Minister and by the Trade, Tourism and Investment Minister in January and July 2018 respectively. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to further deepening the Special Strategic Partnership between the two countries, founded on common strategic interests and shared values including a commitment to democracy, human rights, free trade and the rules-based international order.

(Indo-Pacific)

3. The Ministers reaffirmed that Australia and Japan shared elements of their strategic visions for the Indo-Pacific region. They reiterated their determination to work proactively together, and together with the United States and other partners in order to maintain and promote a free, open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region founded on the rules-based international order.
4. The Ministers recognised the importance of a stable and secure regional maritime order, including through enhanced maritime security cooperation. They reaffirmed their commitment to further enhancing bilateral and Japan-Australia-United States trilateral maritime security cooperation, in particular capacity building in the field of maritime law enforcement and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Southeast Asia as well as Pacific Island Countries through close consultation with those countries.
5. The Ministers highlighted the importance of enhancing connectivity in this region for economic prosperity through the development of quality infrastructure in accordance with international standards that are open, transparent, non-exclusive and sustainable, and which promotes fair and open competition and meets genuine needs. They affirmed commitment to advancing this agenda bilaterally and through the Japan-Australia-United States trilateral partnership for infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific region. The Ministers also shared the importance of debt sustainability, including debt transparency, for sustainable development and sovereignty, and reiterated their concern about increases in foreign debt. In this regard, the Ministers called for a wider adherence to and respect for international standards in this area.
6. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to pursue deeper and broader defence cooperation, including exercises, operations, capacity building, enhanced navy, army, and air force engagement activities and strategic visits, trilateral cooperation with the United States, and further cooperation on defence equipment, science and technology. They identified a suite of new initiatives to further enhance bilateral defence engagement. These initiatives cover a commitment to increasing the complexity and sophistication of military exercises, focusing on deepening mutual understanding of operational planning and enhancing interoperability between our defence forces. The Ministers determined to explore opportunities to conduct broader areas of bilateral/multilateral training and exercises involving the Australian Defence Force and Japan Self-Defense Forces, including in areas such as disaster response, anti-submarine warfare, and mine counter measures. The Ministers also  affirmed the commitment to pursuing the rescheduling of the first-ever fighter jet exercise “BUSHIDO GUARDIAN” to an appropriate time in 2019, and to seeking an opportunity for bilateral or multilateral training or exercises in Australia involving the Royal Australian Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force.
7. The Ministers welcomed the recent progress in the negotiations on the Reciprocal Access Agreement, which will reciprocally improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises. The Ministers reaffirmed strong commitment to conclude the negotiations as early as feasible.
8. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of their respective alliances with the United States, which are fundamental to each country’s security and underpin broader regional stability and prosperity. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific and the implementation of the Force Posture Initiatives. They reaffirmed their strong commitment to further enhancing trilateral cooperation, including through the Trilateral Summit Meeting, Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting to ensure the peaceful, stable and prosperous future of the Indo-Pacific region.
9. The Ministers reaffirmed their intention to further develop trilateral cooperation and coordination among Japan, Australia and India. They also welcomed the progress in cooperation among Japan, Australia, India and the United States.

(Regional and International issues)

10. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the goal of the international community for North Korea’s complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all its nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missiles in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). They welcomed the ongoing diplomatic engagements including those between North Korea and each of the Republic of Korea and the United States, as steps toward the comprehensive resolution of the outstanding issues regarding North Korea. They also expressed support for efforts by the United States towards the denuclearisation of North Korea in compliance with the relevant UNSCRs.
11. The Ministers reconfirmed that it is critical for all United Nations Member States to continue to implement their obligations fully under relevant UNSCRs. They reaffirmed their commitment to cooperating to that end, including through surveillance of suspicious maritime activities including illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korean-flagged vessels. The Ministers of Japan welcomed Australia’s deployment of maritime patrol aircraft to that end. The Ministers agreed that the cap on the importation of refined petroleum products for 2018 imposed by UNSCR 2397 (2017) had been breached. They called on North Korea to end its human rights violations and immediately resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.
12. The Ministers remained seriously concerned about the situation in the South China Sea (SCS).  They reaffirmed the importance of upholding the rules-based regional and international order, respect for international law, freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded trade. The Ministers also expressed their opposition to the use of disputed features for military purposes, urging all parties to pursue the demilitarisation of such features. They emphasised the importance of self-restraint and their opposition to any actions that could escalate tensions in the region. They urged relevant states to make and clarify territorial and maritime claims based on international law and to resolve disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Ministers acknowledged the recent movement towards a Code of Conduct (COC) for the SCS and supported the conclusion of negotiations for an effective COC. They called for the COC to be: consistent with existing international law, as reflected in UNCLOS; not to prejudice the interests of the non-parties to the COC or the rights of all states under international law; to reinforce existing regional architecture; and to strengthen Parties’ commitments to cease actions that would complicate or escalate disputes.
13. The Ministers shared the intention to remain in close communication about the situation in the East China Sea and expressed opposition to any coercive unilateral actions that seek to alter the status quo or increase tensions in the area.
14. The Ministers resolved to further enhance their engagement with ASEAN and noted the achievements of ASEAN in fostering peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.  They reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN centrality and unity and acknowledged the role of ASEAN as the convener of the regional security architecture. The Ministers underlined the value of the East Asia Summit (EAS) as the regions’ premier leaders-led forum for addressing political-security challenges. The Ministers also welcomed the continued contributions of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-plus).
15. The Ministers expressed their commitment to enhancing cooperation between Australia and Japan to support economic and social resilience, stability and prosperity in the Pacific, in close consultation with the Pacific Island Countries. They welcomed the success of the Eighth Pacific Island Leaders Meeting (PALM8) held in May 2018 and Japan’s commitment to the region announced there. The Ministers of Japan welcomed Australia’s enhanced engagement in the Pacific in line with its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.
16. The Ministers reasserted the importance of a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with China through dialogue, cooperation and engagement.
17. The Ministers stressed the importance of a free and open, rules-based trading system for global stability and prosperity. In this regard, they shared the determination to coordinate closely and exercise leadership towards an early entry into force of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and swift conclusion of a high-quality Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that would promote closer regional economic integration. The Ministers recognised the importance of working together to improve the functioning of the World Trade Organization so that it can address the challenges facing the multilateral trading system and benefit individuals and businesses throughout the region and the world. The Ministers reaffirmed support for global trade liberalisation and their commitment to resisting protectionism, including all unfair trade practices.
18. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to an open, free, fair and secure cyberspace and to further strengthening cooperation in this area.
19. The Ministers underlined the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the success of the 2020 NPT Review Conference. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to continue cooperation towards a world free of nuclear weapons, through efforts on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy including through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to keep urging all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without further delay towards its early entry into force and universalisation, in particular the remaining eight Annex 2 states, and including North Korea as a matter of priority. The Ministers also reiterated the importance of reinforcement of the CTBT’s verification regime.
20. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to further cooperate in areas such as counter-terrorism.

 

 

 

By Robbin Laird

October 11, 2018, the Danish Atlantic Treaty organization hosted a conference sponsored by our partner Risk Intelligence entitled, “Threat Perception 2018: The Northern European Perspective.”

The hosts will provide a full report of the proceedings of the day.

The conference provided a detailed look at the presentations and the arguments made during the day.  The seminar was opened by a presentation by the Danish Defense Minister, Claus Hjort Frederiksen, which framed the day and posed some of the initial questions to be considered.

Programme – Threat Perception

In effect, the Danes like the other Nordics, are having to focus on direct defense as their core national mission, within an alliance context.

This will mean as well a shift common to other alliance members from a focus on out of area operations, such as in Afghanistan, back to the core challenge, namely, the defense of the homeland.

The Danes are raising their investment in defense and there is growing public support in Denmark for such a course of action.

Russian actions starting in Georgia in 2008 and then in the Crimea in 2014 have created a significant environment of uncertainty for European nations, one in which the refocus on direct defense is required.

Denmark is not only earmarking new funds for defense, but buying new capabilities as well, such as the F-35.

And they are reworking their national command systems as well as working with Nordic allies and other NATO partners on more effective ways to operate to augment defensive force capabilities in a crisis.

It was very clear from the day’s discussions that the return of direct defense is not really about a return to the Cold War and the Soviet-Western conflict.

Direct defense has changed as the tools available to the Russians have changed, notably with an ability to leverage cyber tools to leverage Western digital society to be able to achieve military and political objectives with means other than direct use of lethal force.

This is why the West needs to shape new approaches and evolve thinking about crisis management in the digital age.

It means that NATO countries need to work as hard at infrastructure defense in the digital age as they have been working on terrorism since September 11^th.

New paradigms, new tools, new training and new thinking is required to shape various ways ahead to shape a more robust infrastructure notably in a digital age.

Article III within the NATO treaty underscores the importance of each state focusing resources on the defense of its nation.

In the world we are facing now, this may well mean much more attention to security of supply chains, robust infrastructure defense and taking a hard look at the vulnerabilities which globalization has introduced within NATO nations.

Put in other terms, robustness in infrastructure can provide a key element of defense in dealing with 21^stcentury adversaries, as important as the build up of classic lethal capabilities.

The return of direct defense but with the challenge of shaping more robust national and coalition infrastructure also means that the classic distinction between counter-value and counter-force targeting is changing.

Eroding infrastructure with non-lethal means is as much counter-force as it is counter-value.

We need to find new vocabulary as well to describe the various routes to enhanced direct defense for core NATO nations.

Virtually every national representative provided example of Russian cyber trolling and cyber-attacks which have affected their countries.

It is also clear that a new strategic geography is emerging in which North America, the Arctic and Northern Europe are contiguous operational territory targeted by the Russians and the NATO states need to focus on ways to enhance their capabilities to operate seamlessly in a timely manner across this entire chessboard.

The Nordics have clearly enhanced their cooperation and with Poland and the Baltic states as well in an effort to shape more interactive capability across a common but changing strategic geography.

It is changing as the Russians evolve the reach and lethality of their air and maritime strike capabilities.

An example of a very different dynamic associated with direct defense this time around is how to shape a flexible basing structure.

What does basing in this environment mean?

How can allies leverage national basing with the very flexible force packages which will be needed at the point of defense or attack to resolve a crisis?

The Poles recently offered to invest in a US/NATO base which unfortunately the US Secretary of the Army decided was not a good idea.

Perhaps to put US Army capabilities into Poland is not a good idea; but this has little to do with the general challenge of crafting a new basing approach for the Northern European-North Atlantic-Arctic chessboard.

Indeed, the Polish Ambassador to Denmark drove home the point of how important a permanent presence was to the Poles and that they were very open to what this might actually look like.

In short, this is not a new Cold War.

There is a return to direct defense as the primary task for the Northern European nations, rather than out of area activities.

But now the very tasks which direct defense need to deal with have changed, expanded and mutated.

This Danish conference provided an important opportunity for the participants to discuss the challenges and the way ahead.

The featured photo is of the Danish Defense Minister and Secretary General of the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association, Lars Bangert Struwe.

 

 

 

 

 

 

By Robbin Laird

In our work on Northern Europe, we have focused in several trips and reports on how, why and in what ways the Nordics are cooperating more closely and effectively to enhance their joint security.

We have highlighted how we see this as part of a broader trend in which clusters of states are working together to enhance their ability to enhance their defense and security against the return of Russia and the rise of China.

We see clusterization as the next phase whereby liberal democracies do more for themselves in their joint defense rather than simply relying on diplomatic globalization initiatives through organizations like the EU or NATO to do that for them.

Clusterization is a key to generating enhanced capabilities that can work interdependently with key allies outside of a regional cluster to reinforce the capabilities in a realistic and effective way to deter core adversaries.

In the case of the Nordics, clearly the United States is the key outside power, with Brexit Britain and those states within continental Europe which have capabilities which can show up effectively to bolster the underbelly of the Nordic region.

But at its heart, the Nordics need to bolster their own capabilities as well to work more effectively with their offshore allies and their continental European partners.

But to be blunt: this requires looking more realistically at what the defense of the Nordic region means against the evolution of Russian policies, strategies and capabilities rather than simply to assume that NATO as multi-member alliance simply shows up.

The current Trident Juncture 2018 exercise ongoing in Norway is a good example of how a leading Nordic nation is rethinking its policies.

On the one hand, Norway is working their national mobilization approach.

On the other hand, they will host several allies within Norway and in part it is a question of what capabilities can be brought in a timely manner that would really make a difference in a crisis.

It is not simply a question of showing up; it is about blending those domestic and allied capabilities into an effective crisis management force against specific and targeted Russian threats.

A good example of enhanced cooperation among the Nordics is the cross border training being conduct among the Finns, the Swedes and the Norwegians.

According a recent article published by Front Line Defence, this training was the focus of attention.

Cross-Border Training (CBT) started between Sweden and Norway in 2009 and then the Finns joined in 2010. By 2011, they were operating at approximately one event per week. And by 2012, were engaging in about 90 events at the CBT level.

That shaped a template which allowed more cost effective and regular training, and laid the foundation for hosting a periodic two-week exercise where they could invite other nations to participate in air defense exercise in the region. This regular and flexible cooperation led to the emergence of the Arctic Challenge Exercise (ACE).

Since 2015, the three air forces have been shaping a regular training approach that is very flexible and driven at the wing and squadron level. “We meet each November, and set the schedule for the next year, but in execution it is very, very flexible. It is about a bottom-up approach and initiative to generate the training regime,” says Ertsgaard.

The impact on Sweden and Finland has been significant in terms of learning NATO standards and having an enhanced capability to cooperate with the air forces of NATO nations.

The air space they are operating in is very significant as well. Europe is not loaded with good aviation training areas. The range being used for CBT is a very large and open airspace, which allows a wide variety of training opportunities for the three nations, and those who fly to Arctic Challenge or other training events. The range includes over land and water, so there is an opportunity for multi-domain operational training as well.

But the challenges of providing for enhanced Nordic capability within a broader trans-Atlantic framework remains a work in progress, notably when measured against Russian activities, behavior and evolving capabilities.

The scope and nature of that change was well described and analyzed In a recent article published by a retired senior Swedish officer, Major General (Ret) Karlis Neretnieks.

Scandinavian military security must be seen as a whole where all countries concerned, Norway, Sweden and Finland are heavily dependent on each other in case of a war in the region. A fact quite seldom discussed or analysed in depth. Something that is quite surprising as it has implications not just for the Scandinavian countries but also for NATO´s possibilities to defend Europe.

He then provides a careful look at that the defense situation in part based on what we already know or should now from the 1930s and its challenges.

Although Finland has a well organised “economic defence” with stockpiles of food and other vital necessities a modern society will have great problems if its industry is cut off from the outside world.

This leads to perhaps Finland´s greatest vulnerability – its dependence on reasonably safe lines of communications, by sea, air and land.

If there is an armed conflict in the Baltic Sea region it is very probable that more or less all shipping to and from Finland will cease. Thereby affecting approximately 80 % of Finland´s trade.

Finland would become totally dependent on what could be transported through Sweden or in Swedish airspace.  

This interdependence; Finland protecting the northern half of Sweden and Sweden keeping lines of communication open to Finland unfortunately has not been given enough consideration in Swedish defence planning.

This of course also has great implications for Finland´s possibilities to receive help from NATO.

In the nineteen-thirties, there were plans to support Finland by sending Swedish forces and weapons to Finland in case it was attacked by the Soviet Union. The plans to support Finland with ground troops were never implemented, a fact that still to some degree plays a role in discussions regarding Finnish-Swedish military cooperation.

Regardless of not wanting to participate in a war when the Soviet Union attacked Finland in 1939 it was not just out of solidarity with a small neighbour that Sweden in 1939/40 provided Finland with 25 fighter planes (every fourth plane in the Swedish air force), 144 pieces of artillery, 135 000 rifles and 51 million cartridges.

Finland´s role as a “flank guard” for Sweden was fully understood. During the Cold War the plans were less ambitious but it was still very clear to the Swedish government, as well as in Finland, that the defence of Finland also was a part of the defence of Sweden, and that it was in the interest of both countries to support each other.

In the sixties and seventies when both countries operated the same type of jet fighters, the SAAB 35 Draken, Sweden kept a number of Drakens, officially a part of the Swedish air force, in store that could be transferred to Finland on short notice.

At the same time Finland had a larger number of trained pilots than necessary just to fly the then existing Finnish planes (at the time Finland was forbidden to have more than 60 fighter aircraft according to the Finnish- Soviet peace treaty of 1947).  

Such options don´t exist anymore. Sweden has nothing to spare if there would be a serious crisis or a war in the region.   

He underscored the importance for Sweden and Finland to ensure that they could receive support from allies through the SLOCs in the North Atlantic as well as form Northern Norwegian bases as well.

NATO is again planning for shipping reinforcements across the Atlantic and Russia has partly rebuilt, and continues to increase, it its capability to act in the Atlantic.

This makes the defence of northern Norway not just a problem for the Scandinavian countries but for Europe as a whole.

It is no coincidence that both the UK and Norway are buying new P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft, nine respectively five, to patrol the Norwegian Sea and the northern Atlantic.

From Scandinavian or Nordic point of view these increased Russian capabilities and their strategic importance is quite alarming. Not just that it creates strong motives for Russia to attack NATO facilities in northern Norway, it also threatens the whole regions connections with the outside world.

Even if Russia might encounter problems attacking ships and planes moving across the Atlantic it is obvious that isolating the Scandinavian Peninsula would be a quite easy task if NATO could not operate from bases in northern Norway.

Just as in the case of Finland, both Norway and Sweden, are dependent on secure sea lanes for export and import of vital goods and for receiving military help.

Both countries, as well as Finland to some extent, build their war planning on help from NATO, in reality from the US.

The defence of Norway, especially northern Norway, therefore is a vital common interest for all the Scandinavian countries as well as for NATO.

After further analyses of the situation facing the Nordics, the author then considered some of the key efforts which they need to make to enhance the defense and security of the Nordic region.

Considering the dependencies and the vulnerabilities that have been described, what ought to be done?

Some actions have already been taken.

Norway is redirecting its thinking and its preparations towards Article 5 operations. Sweden and Finland have concluded Host Nation Support agreements with NATO. They have also signed bilateral agreements with the US and the UK regarding enhanced cooperation in areas as sharing and developing military technology and joint training.

Both countries are also participating in NATO exercises as Trident Juncture 2018 in northern Norway engaging some 45 000 personnel from more than 30 countries.

Regarding what should to be done on a national level, in general terms it ought to be: Sweden should increase its capabilities to secure Finland´s communications with the outside world and increase its ability to protect Norway´s back, Finland and Sweden together should increase their common capabilities to protect the Aaland Islands and sea lanes across the Gulf of Bothnia, Norway should allocate still more resources to anti-submarine warfare and air defence in the high north.

Although Finland and Norway could and should do a bit more in the areas mentioned above the great culprit at the moment is Sweden.

Geographically being the hub in the region on which the security of other countries depend it is not taking on the responsibilities it should, thereby jeopardising not just its own security but also the security of its neighbours. At the moment (2017) Sweden spends just 1 % of GDP on defence, Norway spends 1,6 % and Finland 1,4%….

Apart from strengthen their own defence capabilities, one other measure that would drastically increase Nordic security, and take cooperation between the Scandinavian countries to much higher level, would be Finland and Sweden joining NATO.

It would not just solve the problem with an isolated attack against those countries which would put NATO in a very precarious situation when it comes to defend the Baltic States or northern Norway in a later stage, it would also make it possible to coordinate plans and operations between the Scandinavian countries.

Making it possible to get more joint fighting power of the money spent on defence. It would also open up for “work sharing” where each country could take on a more specialised role.

Just to take one example.

Must the sea lanes to the Swedish west coast have to be a Swedish problem or could it be something that NATO as an alliance could handle?  

What more, any Russian attempt to seize territory in Scandinavia will probably come in the form of a surprise attack.

In such a situation a swift and coordinated reaction will be crucial. It will be too late to start discussions on who should do what, sort out command arrangements etc…..

To conclude, all the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, have good reasons to consider how their own defence capabilities affect their neighbours, and adapt their planning and defence structures accordingly. Something that will not come cheap.

Probably we are speaking of defence budgets of at least 2 % of GDP.

Although such measures would raise the threshold for Russian military adventures in the region and increase their ability to fight a war in, they would still have limited value as long as not all Scandinavian countries are members of NATO.   

Major General (Ret) Karlis Neretnieks was born 1949, and has served as: head of department in the Army Staff, G-3 in an armored division, Commander of 18. Mechanized Brigade, Chief of Operations in the Central Joint Command and as President of the Swedish National Defence College (University). KN has graduated from both the Swedish and Norwegian General Staff courses and also pursued academic studies at the Graduate Institute in Geneva. He is a fellow of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences and also a board member of the Swedish Atlantic Council.

His article can be read in full and found here:

http://karlisn.blogspot.com/2018/10/nato-and-scandinavian-strategic.html?m=1

We would like to thank our colleague and partner, Hans Tino Hansen, the CEO of Risk Intelligence, for bringing this article to our attention.

Our most recent report on Nordic security, can be found here:

The Nordics and the Strategic Shift

The featured photo shows the Nordic Prime Ministers during a meeting in Helsinki last year. Credit Photo: Finnish Foreign Ministry.