In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on the imperative for an independent strike deterrent held on August 23, 2018 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well.
The focus is upon shaping an effective deterrent strategy as the ADF works its way forward with force integration.
Report Author: Dr. Robbin F. Laird, Research Fellow, The Williams Foundation
By Robbin Laird
In my discussions at Penten, I learned of a very innovative approach to providing for the security for mobile systems. They have developed an approach which allows the user to connect with a variety of security systems through a very innovative USB device which allows a mobile platform – phone, computer, etc. – to connect to a range of unclassified networks to deliver information needed at the point of use.
The importance of such a capability is significant for what the Aussies define as a 5thGeneration military and its operational needs.
I had a chance to discuss both the evolving requirements of a networked fifth generation force and the kind of capability which the Penten approach could bring to solving those requirements with Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn, one of the architects of the RAAF and ADF’s approach to shaping a 5th Generation force.
As Blackburn put it forcefully about a core aspect of the transition:
“Networks as a term for describing connectivity among the forces is becoming obsolete.
“Nodes, communication bearers and protocols will become the focus as a 5thGen “Information Management Environment (IME)” is generated and built to handle emerging 5th Gen operational requirements.
“Networks will be the transportation layer in broader 5th Gen IME.
Question: How would you describe the challenge posed by the current information networks?
John Blackburn: The challenge that we face today is that the existing communications and information networks were not designed as an integrated system and do not appear to be a good foundation upon which to build the 5thGen communications and information networks we will need in the near future.
This issue was highlighted at a recent US Conference held by Defense News; presenters identified that a major impediment to multidomain operations is the disparate communications and information networks in the US Armed Forces.
They noted that the US has magnificent platforms but that it needs an integrated communications architecture and network …a systems of systems level approach is needed.
A recent Air Force Times article[1]also concluded that the US military isn’t quite at the point of the multi-domain command and control capabilities envisaged by the USAF Chief, General Goldfein.
General Goldfein was reported as saying that the biggest gap he sees is a set of common architecture standards that the Pentagon can hand to defense industry partners so that everything they build can connect.
An example of where private industry is heading with an internet framework that provides multiple independent pathways that can be used by the military for communication and information networks was raised as a model that Defence Forces need to consider.
The change in the USAF force architecture also becomes evident if we look at the proposed USAF Advanced Battle Management System.
A recent AW&ST article,[2] reported that the implication of the demise of the J-Stars recapitalization program is becoming clear and that the pending retirement signals a fundamental shift in acquisition and operational strategy.
Instead of concentrating a critical sensor and battle management center on a single platform, the distribution of such capabilities across a resilient and adaptable network, consisting of multiple, smaller platforms is envisaged.
The article noted that the USAF’s Next-Generation Air Dominance program could follow a similar model. If battle management is to be performed by a network of multiple platforms then there will need to be an integrated communication and information network that will integrate multiple platforms and systems not originally designed to communicate with each other.
These nodes on the network will need the processing power to correlate / fuse the streams of data.
This transition has profound implications for the USAF’s acquisition community.
AW&ST reported that Will Roper, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, is considering creating a new function of a systems architect.
The systems architect will approach the program with a system-of-systems mindset, shifting requirement sets between different platforms within the overall system as necessary.
So, to the question of what this means for Australia.
The journey to transform the Australian Air Force, and ideally the whole of the Australian Defence Force, into what has been termed a 5thGen Force is underway.
Whilst some in Australia might only think about 5thGen as being the platforms such as the JSF, the implications for how we network, integrate and use the force are fundamental.
Existing Defence C4ISR networks in Australia appear to have been driven by the incremental acquisition or upgrade of capabilities that require connectivity and by a platform-centric culture.
The lack of an integrating design authority for all of the Defence communications / information networks also means that confusion arises when new projects attempt to identify how their classified system will be connected and supported.
Compounding this issue is a general lack of integrated systems of systems design experience in Defence; it wasn’t really a requirement until recently.
Defence acquisition processes are consequently project focused vice program or systems focused, in the absence of a comprehensive system level architecture.
There are currently a multitude of dedicated information networks in operation in Defence with a number of network managers who attempt to manage them. This results in considerable management overhead that could not really be described as cost effective.
Deployable networks with different security level requirements also generate significant resource demands and produce mobility challenges, particularly for tactical level HQs.
Despite the valiant efforts of communications engineers, there appears to be ongoing issues with connectivity, bandwidth availability and resilience; there is little “graceful degradation” design in our C4ISR networks today.
When we talk in terms of a 5thGen Force, it would not be unreasonable to describe our current information network design as being a mix of legacy components.
As the ADF transitions to a 5thGen platform/systems-equipped force over this next decade it will need 5thGen information systems to cope with the sensor and data rich 5thGen system components.
In my discussions with Australian systems engineers, I have been advised that “networks” as a term will become obsolete. Nodes, communication bearers and protocols will become the focus as a 5thGen “Information Management Environment (IME)” is generated and built to handle emerging 5th Gen operational requirements.
Networks will be the transportation layer in broader 5th Gen IME.
So, the key question that we need to think through is “how do we move from a legacy infrastructure to a future 5thGen IME infrastructure?”
Can we utilize the private sector developments discussed by the USAF Chief to provide much greater resilience and redundancy?
If we cannot address this question properly, then Defence will not realise the potential of a 5thGen integrated force.
Question: The key demand is to have a networking system as flexible as the multi-domain assets coming into the force demand.
How to do this?
John Blackburn: The future 5thGen force will be generating large volumes of fused / correlated information. This will require a significant increase in classified network bandwidth and network complexity as new sensors and platforms are acquired with increasing integration demands resulting from capabilities such as Cooperative Engagement and Integrated Fires.
We will likely need a system comprised of interconnected and interoperable legacy and 5th generation systems, communications links, IP based networks and waveforms.
The stove piped model of current networks will create bottlenecks for the passage of essential, time-critical information and would also constrain the passage of that information to a limited number of classified pathways.
Changes in technology of networks, for example IPV6 based systems such as Boeing’s Currawong Battlefield Telecommunications Network for the Army and the security technologies offered by SMEs such as Penten suggest that we need to look to innovative industry developments and how they could support an new, emerging, IME architecture approach.
Question: If we look at the technology Penten has developed, maybe we don’t need to build separate infrastructure that’s supporting transmission of information at particular classification levels if we encrypt data at each node or sensor.
We could have a communications network that has drop off points, or gateways if you like, for each of those information types or classification types.
Do you think that this a feasible option?
John Blackburn: I think that emerging technologies, such as those developed by Penten, offer really interesting options for us to consider.
If we took an approach where the node / sensor levels are encrypted, we could employ a much wider array of data pathways, including those currently being developed and deployed in the civilian sector.
We would not be limited to using only legacy classified network pathways.
This could, in turn, make it more difficult for an adversary to interdict our operations.
It is about reinventing the infrastructure to support the warfighter at the point of operations rather than trying to push an ever-growing mass of data down thestove piped model of current classified networks.
Question: Clearly, the Twitters and Facebooks of the world are moving forward with how to deliver relevant information to the users, why can not the military move in the same direction?
John Blackburn: We need to rethink our current design approach for networks and achieve security in a different way, one built around how a 5th Gen combat force needs to operate.
The alternative is to take 5thGen platforms and connect them to the legacy architecture which is based on a hierarchical stove piped design.
We need to imagine a mobile and agile force that will generate information on the fly and the combat clusters or task forces that need information appropriate to their ability to attack and defend against an adversary in a fluid combat situation.
We have built the platforms; but we are shackling them with yesterday’s security and IT solutions.
Given the example of some emerging Australian technology solutions, perhaps we can shape a more effective way ahead for the ADF; a 5th generation force is not going to function without a 5th generation integrated communications and information management environment design.
[1]Air Force chief lays out future fight against peer-level adversaries, Kyle Rempfer, Air Force Times, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2018/09/13/air-force-chief-lays-out-future-fight-against-peer-level-adversaries/
[2]“J-Stars Demise Paves Way For Radical Shift In U.S. Air Force Strategy”,Steve Trimble, AW&ST, Sep 20, 2018
A key strategic dynamic is to expand the flexibility of the basing and operations of combat forces. This will put a premium on being able to connect key elements of the force structure into offensive and defensive force packages.
The featured photo highlights one aspect of this challenge, namely providing the information for logistical support to a mobile air combat force.
(L-R) Leading Aircraftman (LAC) Baker, a Communications Electronics Technician (CETECH) from No.1 Combat Communications Squadron (1CCS) Richmond, and LAC Damien Humphries, also a CETECH at 1CCS are attached for the first time with Expeditionary Health Squadron (EHS) during exercise Talisman Saber.
LAC Humphries and LAC Baker are pictured in front of a Sinclair antenna attached to a Raven General Purpose Mast. Their team will work on the Defence Mobile Communications Network providing communications support for the EHS detachment.
RAAF Base Tindal comes alive as Talisman Saber 2009 (TS09) provides the opportunity for Combat Support Group (Combat Support Group)to develop and trail aspects of the deployable airbase wing construct during Exercise ABW DT&E (Air Base Wing Develop Test and Evaluate). Exercise ABW DT&E commenced on the 18 June 2009.
The purpose of installing an ABW structure at RAAF Tindal to support TS09 air activities in a ground threat environment will provide realistic conditions to develop and validate the ABW construct.
Combat Support Group elements providing an ABW construct consist of an ABW Head Quarters, an Airbase Support Squadron, an Airfield Defence Squadron, and an Expeditionary Health Squadron.
Realism for deveolping the ABW construct is provided by supporting high-end war fighting operations during TS09 in a simulated ground threat environment.
Exercise Control (EXCON) consisting of Airfield Defence Gaurds, Explosive Ordnance Demolition,Security Police, Clerks, Logistic Officers, Doctors, Nursing Officers and Ground Defence Officers are providing threats to help test and run ABW.
The ground threat involves Australian Forces in the country of Monmir engaging in enemy attacks against Kamarian Forces. EXCON are providing threat scenarios on a regular basis twenty fours hours a day to help test and run the ABW during this exercise.
This ABW DT&E will trial one possible version of the Combat Support Group deployable
July 5, 2009
Australian Department of Defence
As Matthew Wilson, the CEO of Penten, noted during out interview in Canberra last month:
What we’ve essentially done is to take a heavy flyaway kit which was a network extension node and simply replace with a small USB device that enables the user’s laptop or tablet directly.
Through the use of the USB device and the authentication process, your mobile device is a peer network device on whatever network you are working on.
We have been focused to date primarily on two situations or con-ops. The first is working with the various secure buildings to be able to bring the information to the work situation in which they are engaged with others in the organization.
For example, we are working with the ADF on enabling a brigade headquarters to go wireless within a mobile HQ.
By Robbin Laird
As Australia looks to expand its sovereign options, expanding the reach of its reconnaissance-strike enterprise is a key tool set to do so.
As presenters suggested at the Williams Foundation conference, it was less a question of reaching and striking deep into potential adversaries’ territory and more influencing the behavior of those adversaries as they reached out into the Pacific to directly affect Australian interests and territory.
This means that targeting needs to be specific and be guided by accurate C5ISR systems which could provide strike options at greater reach, range and speed for the ADF. This could be done by systems at sea in the air, or launched from Australian territory or as part of a forward deployed force.
This requires shaping a range of integrated capabilities to provide for the reconnaissance and decision-making side of a strike capability.
The Aussies already have in train several capabilities to shape an extended capability in this domain, notably the F-35 and its regional reach through its interconnected sensor grid, and the P-8/Triton dyad.
And as well, the Australians could be in a good position to leverage the innovations going on in the space business which can provide some new capabilities which could be integrated as well within an expanded reconnaissance and decision-making grid operating further and deeper into the Pacific.
(See the appendix below to read further on the impacts of each of these systems on the reconnaissance side of the strike enterprise, namely, the F-35 global enterprise, the P-8/Triton dyad, and the space business. We have written extensively about Wedgetail but it too is a key element of the learning curve for how to operate a longer range reconnaissance strike enterprise).
At the Williams Foundation seminar, Michael Tarlton, Program Director, Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, provided an overview of how the evolving capabilities of remotely piloted aircraft could play an enhanced role for the ADF as they rework the range and reach of their reconnaissance-strike enterprise.
He started his presentation by examining the range and reach which the RAAF might wish to prioritize in the evolving strategic environment in their region.
What this graphic highlights is the importance of expanded reach in the defense of Australia and its interests and the importance of being able to curtail the intrusions of adversaries into the air and maritime space crucial for Australian defense.
To do so, will require both persistence and reach, for which remotely piloted vehicles, such as Triton can provided, and can do so in a complimentary role to other air, maritime ground and space systems.
He argued that a remotely piloted vehicle had several advantages for a combat force.
First, there is a significant increase in the ability to conduct missions for longer periods of time.
Second, there is enhanced survivability in persistent operations.
Third, there was no aircrew capture/casualty risk.
And, finally, there are significant potential cost effectiveness advantages, notably with regard to life-cycle costs.
He argued that by flying aerial refuellable remotely piloted vehicles, one could achieve a good balance between endurance and payload to perform the core missions which the vehicle would perform
The core endurance of the unrefueled air vehicle of 8-10 hours is clearly feasible and with aerial refueling much longer periods of operation are possible.
Remotely piloted vehicles can be configured for a variety of platforms. By building an aircraft capable of carrying multi-role mission payloads, air-to-surface and air-to-air roles can be performed. And a mix or core focus on ISR/T, EW or Strike roles can be prioritized.
But a key element for the future considerations of remotely piloted vehicles within the overall combat force really rest on their flexibility in terms of the configurability noted above, but also life cycle costs.
With regard to the costs of operating manned aircraft about 60% of the cost is for operations and support. He argued that comparing a pilot versus a UAS operator support model highlighted why life cycle costs will be much lower for the UAS.
In short, as the ADF worked on shaping a longer range reconnaissance-strike enterprise, Tarlton argued that remotely piloted vehicles could play an important role in the evolving integrated force designed to deliver the kind of strike capabilities which could support an integrated ADF.
Shaping Redundant Response U.S. Military Space Capabilities
by Robbin F. Laird and Ed Timperlake — June 27, 2012
In a recent report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the evolving threat to U.S. space capabilities was highlighted. “China is pressing forward with an ambitious counterspace program, including a ground- and space-based space surveillance systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and kinetic kill vehicles,” the report said.
As the United States shapes an Asian pivot, the ability to network U.S. and allied forces is growing in importance. The Chinese understand this, and their counterspace program is designed precisely to degrade such U.S. and allied capabilities and to undercut confidence in what the U.S. and its allies can do to deal with threats in the Pacific and beyond.
The answer to such a challenge is clearly robust and redundant space-enabled C5ISR(command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities. But the response is not simply in terms of space platforms, it is about building from the recognition that air breathing systems being deployed and about to be deployed into the Pacific provide crucial building blocks for robust redundancy.
“No platform fights alone” is a key point in understanding the design of the attack and defense enterprise of the 21st century. Space platforms are not being tasked to provide the only response to a Chinese counterspace threat. Rather, the entire C5ISR enterprise built into a honeycomb is the correct response and approach.
The Pacific capability of the U.S. military can be built around three principles: presence, economy of force and scalability. Presence refers to having U.S. forces present and interdependent with allied forces in the Pacific. Economy of force is built around not having to bring overwhelming force to presence. But that only works if the force is scalable and has the capability to reach back and up to a surge of capability to provide for overwhelming force as necessary.
The key linchpin to do this is the C5ISR enterprise in the Pacific. With robust and redundant ISR, the enterprise enables a distributed force presence to be honeycombed. That is, the network is not about hierarchy and the ability of an adversary to whack the head of the hierarchy; it is about a honeycomb of deployed and distributed capability that no adversary can cripple with a single or easy blow.
A key element for shaping a robust and redundant ISR system in the Pacific is the F-35, a tactical aircraft with strategic impact. The new aircraft is a flying combat system that has C5ISR built into the cockpit. As a fleet, the F-35s provide a critical layer in shaping a robust and redundant ISR system, which is both synergistic with space systems and complementary to those systems.
A deployed fleet of F-35s — allied and U.S. — provides a powerful deterrent to any Chinese thought of a first strike on U.S. military space systems. It makes such a strike significantly less effective and useful to Chinese military planners. From the outset, the deployed fleet and space systems forge a powerful deterrent capability.
To understand how the F-35 can intersect with the deployed C5ISR systems and provide robust redundancy for military space, it is important to understand briefly what the F-35 actually is. The F-35 is often simply referred to as a tactical aircraft, and a replacement for fourth-generation or legacy aircraft. It is really something quite different.
It represents a dramatic shift from the past. Individual F-35 pilots will have the best database of real-time knowledge in the history of combat aviation. And all of this is internal to their cockpit and enabled by advances in computer processing and sensor information fusing.
Each F-35 pilot combined with human sensing (seeing visual cues outside the cockpit) will be enabled by machine-driven sensor fusion to have combat situational awareness better than any opponent.
Concurrent with their ability to look-see, which is limited by physical realities, the F-35 pilots will be able to “see” using cockpit electronic displays and signals to their helmet allowing them not to just fight with their individual aircraft but be able to network and direct engagements at more than 1,200 kilometers in 360 degrees of three-dimensional space out to all connected platforms.
A fleet of F-35s will be able to share their fused information display at the speed of light to other aircraft and other platforms, such as ships, subs, satellites and land-based forces, including unmanned aerial vehicles and eventually robots. Tactically, “Aegis is my wingman,” “SSGN is my fire support” will be developed for conventional warfare.
This enables a “tactical” aircraft to evolve into a key technology for strategic operations and impacts.
The F-35 is known as a fifth-generation player in the state-of-the-art for both the air-to-air fighter and air-to-air attack combat roles. It also adds an electronic warfare component to the fight.
Electronic warfare is a complex subject with many discreet but also connected elements. It was designed inherently into the F-35 airframe and C5ISR-D (for decision) cockpit.
Electronic warfare can include offensive operations to identify opponents’ emissions in order to fry, spoof or jam their systems. In successful electronic war, often-kinetic kill weapons can be fired. An F-35 can be a single sensor/shooter or offload its track to other platforms such as planes, ships and subs and eventually unmanned aerial combat systems.
The kinetic kill shot is usually a high-speed missile designed to home on jam. It has been said on the modern battlefield — air, sea or land — if not done correctly,
“You emit and you die.”
Defensively in electronic warfare there are a lot of other issues, such as electronic countermeasures, electronic counter-countermeasures, and all things “cyberwar,” which is a subject unto itself, extremely complex and not well understood.
Electromagnetic pulse concerns, infrared sensing, always protecting “signals in space” of the friendly info being transmitted and, as mentioned, jamming opponents’ signals, all are key considerations in electronic |warfare.
What is necessary to succeed in evolving capabilities to fight in the age of electronic warfare?
In taking a lesson from history, before World War II, AT&T long lines research found that in order to build and keep operational a U.S. phone system, the key to success was the need for “robust and redundant” systems.
Two generations later, the F-35 was designed as both inherently robust and redundant with many sensors and systems built into the airframe structure from initial design forward. All the F-35 systems designed and developed sent electronic information into the aircraft cockpit “fusion engine.” Trusted fusion information generated by inherent aircraft systems, queued up electronically by threat, will send to the cockpit displays and the pilot’s helmet battle-ready, instantaneous situational awareness.
The ability of the deployed F-35s — again owned by allies as well as U.S. forces — presents a diversified and honeycombed presence and scalable force. This baseline force is significantly enhanced by reachback to space assets, but the space assets now receive redundancy by being complemented as well by a deployed fleet of flying combat systems. This joint capability means that the value of space-based targets goes down to the Chinese or whomever, and diversification provides significant enhancement of deterrence as well.
In short, in rethinking the way ahead with regard to military space — notably in a period of financial stringency — getting best value out of your entire warfighting enterprise is highlighted. Reorganizing the space enterprise within an overall C5ISR approach enabled by a honeycombed fleet of F-35s is a strategic opportunity of the first order.
And this re-enforces an American and allied advantage in facing competitors like China. In countless articles on the People’s Liberation Army and its way of war, author after author refer to the brilliance of Sun Tzu and his “Art of War.” The point they often make is always be alert to advantages accruing to the side that creates an “asymmetric war” advantage.
The evolving capability described above actually foreshadows U.S. and allied asymmetric robust and redundant strategic technologies. It is the beginning of a new level of deterrence against proliferating 21st century threats.
However, one of the best examples of the American “Art of War” was forcefully stated by William Tecumseh Sherman, a West Point-trained officer who arguably was one of the most visionary and capable generals in history. His words 150 years ago cautioning the South not to trigger a war still ring true to this day: “You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical and determined people on Earth — right at your doors. You are bound to fail.”
In an interview with the Commander of the RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group, Air Commodore Craig Heap, the role of Triton in expanding the reach of the ADF was highlighted.
“For example, in a HADR event, the first thing we’ll send out is a Triton.
“It will be there probably within five to 10 hours of the first reports.
“It can be sitting on top of a remote disaster area, a South Pacific nation for example affected by a cyclone, earthquake or tsunami, obviously with the nations permission, to pushback real-time information regarding the situation on the ground, in areas that previously might have taken weeks to assess
“It might even be relaying.
“It will be providing significant information that can then inform other whole of government international relief capabilities, be they C-17’s, maritime, orland assets, that are going to roll in with a better understanding of the support required to help the people in the affected area.
“We see that as one of our key roles.
“And that’s obviously one of the reasons we are acquiring the Triton, because of the extreme ranges we have to deal with, including the huge expanses of water, but also on occasions in the region in an overland scenario.”
In a story which we published on July 11, 2016, we discussed the role of the P-8/Triton as a dyad providing significant enhancement of the reconaissance strike capabilities for the US Navy.
On May 23 and 24, 2016, during a Jacksonville Naval Air Station visit, we spent time with the P-8 and Triton community which is shaping a common culture guiding the transformation of the ASW and ISR side of Naval Air. The acquisition term for the effort is a “family of systems” whereby the P-3 is being “replaced” by the P-8 and the Triton Remotely Piloted Aircraft.
But clearly the combined capability is a replacement of the P-3 in only one sense – executing the anti-submarine warfare function. But the additional ISR and C2 enterprise being put in place to operate the combined P-8 and Triton capability is a much broader capability than the classic P-3. Much like the Osprey transformed the USMC prior to flying the F-35, the P-8/Triton team is doing the same for the US Navy prior to incorporating the F-35 within the carrier air wing.
In addition to the Wing Commander and his Deputy Commander, who were vey generous with their time and sharing of important insights, we had the opportunity to interviews with various members of the VP-16 P-8 squadron from CO and XO to Pilots, NFOs and Air Crew members, along with the wing weapons and training officer, the Triton FIT team, and key members of the Integrated Training Center. Those interviews will be published over the next few weeks.
The P-8/Triton capability is part of what we have described as 21st century air combat systems: software upgradeable, fleet deployed, currently with a multinational coalition emerging peer partnership. Already the Indians, the Aussies and the British are or will be flying the P-8s and all are in discussions to build commonality from the stand-up of the P-8 Forward.
Software upgradeability provides for a lifetime of combat learning to be reflected in the rewriting of the software code and continually modernizing existing combat systems, while adding new capabilities over the operational life of the aircraft. Over time, fleet knowledge will allow the US Navy and its partners to understand how best to maintain and support the aircraft while operating the missions effectively in support of global operations.
Reflecting on the visit there are five key takeaways from our discussions with Navy Jax.
A key point is how the USN is approaching the P-8/Triton combat partnership, which is the integration of manned, and unmanned systems, or what are now commonly called “remotes”. The Navy looked at the USAF experience and intentionally decided to not build a the Triton “remote” operational combat team that is stovepiped away from their P-8 Squadrons.
The team at Navy Jax is building a common Maritime Domain Awareness and Maritime Combat Culture and treats the platforms as partner applications of the evolving combat theory. The partnership is both technology synergistic and also aircrew moving between the Triton and P-8
The P-8 pilot and mission crews, after deploying with the fleet globally can volunteer to do shore duty flying Tritons. The number of personnel to fly initially the Tritons is more than 500 navy personnel so this is hardly an unmanned aircraft. Hence, inside a technological family of systems there is also an interchangeable family of combat crews.
With the P-8 crews operating at different altitudes from the Triton, around 50K, and having operational experience with each platform, they will be able to gain mastery of both a wide scale ocean ISR and focused ASW in direct partnership with the surface navy from Carrier Strike Groups, ARG/MEUs to independent operations for both undersea and sea surface rather than simply mastering a single platform.
This is a visionary foundation for the evolution of the software upgradeable platforms they are flying as well as responding to technological advances to work the proper balance by manned crews and remotes.
The second key point is that the Commanders of both P-8 aviator and the soon to be operational Triton community understand that for transformation to occur the surface fleet has to understand what they can do. This dynamic “cross-deck” actually air to ship exchange can totally reshape surface fleet operations. To accelerate this process, officers from the P-8 community are right now being assigned to surface ships to rework their joint concepts of operations.
Exercises are now in demonstration and operational con-ops to explain and real world demonstrate what the capabilities this new and exciting aspect of Naval Air can bring to the fleet. One example was a recent exercise with an ARG-MEU where the P-8 recently exercised with the amphibious fleet off of the Virginia Capes.
The third key point is that the software upgradeability aspect of the airplane has driven a very strong partnership with industry to be able to have an open-ended approach to modernization. On the aircraft maintenance and supply elements of having successful mission ready aircraft it is an important and focused work in progress both inside the Navy (including Supply Corps) and continuing an important relationship with industry, especially at the Tech Rep Squadron/Wing level.
The fourth point is how important P-8 and Triton software upgradeability is, including concurrent modification to trainer/simulators and rigorous quality assurance for the fidelity of the information in shaping the future of the enterprise. The P-8s is part of a cluster of airplanes which have emerged defining the way ahead for combat airpower which are software upgradeable: the Australian Wedgetail, the global F-35, and the Advanced Hawkeye, all have the same dynamic modernization potential to which will be involved in all combat challenges of maritime operations.
It is about shaping a combat learning cycle in which software can be upgraded as the user groups shape real time what core needs they see to rapidly deal with the reactive enemy. All military technology is relative to a reactive enemy. It is about the arsenal of democracy shifting from an industrial production line to a clean room and a computer lab as key shapers of competitive advantage.
The fifth point is about weaponization and its impact. We have focused for years on the need for a weapons revolution since the U.S. forces, and as core allies are building common platforms with the growth potential to operate new weapons as they come on line. The P-8 is flying with a weapon load out from the past, but as we move forward, the ability of the P-8 to manage off board weapons or organic weapons will be enabled.
For example, there is no reason a high speed cruise or hypersonic missile on the hard points of the P-8 could not be loaded and able to strike a significant enemy combat asset at great distance and speed. We can look forward to the day when P-8s crews will receive a Navy Cross for sinking a significant enemy surface combatant.
In short, the P-8/Triton is at the cutting edge of naval air transformation within the entire maritime combat enterprise. And the US Navy is not doing this alone, as core allies are part of the transformation from the ground up.
In a recent article published in The Australian by Alan Dupont, resident fellow at the Lowry Institute, the potential for Australia to leverage the new space industry was highlighted.
The US operates several kinds of satellites to which Australia has access because of our alliance and membership of the “five eyes” intelligence community that includes Britain, Canada and New Zealand. There are satellites equipped to provide imagery from: visible light photographs, radar or reflected infra-red emissions; early warning of ballistic missile launches; signals analysis from monitored radio and electronic emissions; and measurements of seismic, acoustic, chemical and biological signatures.
In 2001, the US used nearly 50 satellites in the search for Osama bin Laden. A decade later several intelligence satellites were used to help track him down and kill him in his Pakistani hide-out. If North Korea were to contemplate a nuclear attack against Australia, the first indication of a ballistic missile launch would come from a US missile early warning satellite relayed through a ground station that forms part of the Australia-US Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap outside Alice Springs.
The ADF is also a heavy user of the US Wideband Global Satcom system, which provides rapid and secure communications for deployed troops and links them to our new ships, aircraft and drones. The holy grail of this increasingly integrated satellite architecture is a comprehensive picture of the battlefield and an adversary’s strategic capabilities regardless of weather, terrain and time.
Maintaining privileged access to this network of US satellites will be far more difficult under Donald Trump’s transactional approach to alliances, which places a premium on burden sharing. Developing complementary, niche space capabilities would blunt criticism we are not pulling our weight and strengthen our alliance credentials as well as the economy.
Obvious candidates for investment include: “launch on demand” Australian rockets and satellites to monitor a geopolitical crisis or support our troops on operations; a network of ground stations, incorporating advanced machine learning, to receive and process the information retrieved from satellite downloads; and nurturing promising technologies such as laser tracking of space junk where our science is leading edge.
While it is not the ASA’s role to pick commercial winners, the agency would be wise to keep abreast of national security requirements when thinking about the strategic direction of our space industry. Biddington is adamant Australia “needs a space strategy that embraces all aspects of space activity”, both civilian and military, as they are joined at the hip.
Integrating the security and civilian dimensions of space policy into a cohesive national strategy to create a 21st-century industry should not be beyond us, but sceptics worry our latest venture into space may crash and burn on the rocks of complacency, indifference and unrealistic expectations.
Such an outcome would be an indictment of our political culture, a failure of vision and another lost opportunity to develop a sovereign space industry that could help make Australia a genuinely smart country. Let’s hope we get it right this time.
EOS is a world leading sensor company and is an important player in the space business and well aware of developments globally.
In an interview with the CEO and founder of EOS, Dr. Ben Greene, the space side of the business was discussed.
Question: Let us turn now to the space side of your business. Could you describe the focus of your payload business in this domain?
Dr. Greene: We have built core capabilities to enhance situational awareness in space. We irradiate certain areas of space with lasers, and we then analyze the reflected returns.
We can determine range from that. We can also determine other elements of the spacecraft from a light signal directed at that spacecraft.
We have been in this business area for 40 years.
Question: How would you describe the complementarity of radars with lasers in terms of providing key ISR performance?
Dr. Greene: They’re very complimentary. Radars are exceptionally good at detecting anything that’s moving in a large area of space. Lasers are very good at characterizing that object and that motion very accurately.
For example, we can detect UAVs with radars and kill them with lasers.
The same thing applies on a much larger scale in space.
So space is really consists of two domains. There’s 2,000-kilometer zone around the Earth, which is the lower Earth orbit.
In the space domain above two or three thousand kilometers, only optics applies, and so the lasers can operate to two or three times the range that radars can operate, and beyond that we have passive optical techniques with extreme range, where both laser and radar techniques fail.
And so the entire space domain from 3,000 kilometers to 50,000 kilometers is managed optically with lasers and light.
Question: Your work is rooted in a very strong working relationship between Australia and the United States.
How would you describe that relationship?
Dr. Greene: I think that there’s a very strong two-way relationship.
Australia can offer special aspects of territory in terms of where we sit in the world physically, in terms of our geography. In addition, our technology combined with operating within our specific climate, means that if we deploy optical technologies from Australia, they are of immense value in terms of the information captured from the platforms that we deploy here.
That information can complement and support the intelligence database that US would apply for space information. And we would like to contribute to space information superiority for the alliance in that sense.
We’ve had a very strong program here that has always been a joint program with the US from its inception.
There’s always been significant US participation in our program.
An offensive cyber-force to combat hostile states, terrorist groups and domestic gangs will be set up by the Ministry of Defence and GCHQ, The Timesunderstands.
The £250 million unit will comprise about 2,000 digital warriors, with experts recruited from the military, security services and industry. It will quadruple the number of personnel in offensive cyber-roles and marks a step change in the nation’s ability to disrupt and destroy computer networks and internet-connected devices.
The creation of the force comes as the threat from Russia is escalating and follows successful UK cyber-attacks against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Recruits will also target criminal gangs, including people-traffickers and paedophile rings.
The force is expected to be announced soon and follows a review ordered by Gavin Williamson, the defence secretary. Initially given the working name “joint cyber-force”, it will have its own headquarters because GCHQ’s central base in Cheltenham is at capacity. Sites under consideration include RAF Wyton in Cambridgeshire and MoD Corsham in Wiltshire.
For the full story, see “Britain launches £250m cyber‑force to wage war on terrorists,” The London Times, September 21, 2018.
The featured photo which appeared in the article:
GCHQ will set up a new cyber-force base because its headquarters in Cheltenham is at capacityALAMY
See also, the following:
https://sldinfo.com/2018/07/uk-mobilizes-reserves-for-cyber-conflict/
By Robbin Laird
When I was in Australia, I had a chance to meet with the Australian company EOS which has very innovative laser tracking technologies which provide for Australia and her allies a key space tracking capability.
This technology has evolved to the point that not only can they asset with the domain knowledge on where satellites are but also working with tracking space debris and will soon have a deployed capability to use lasers to reduce the problem.
This capability was highlighted in an article in the Daily Mail which was published on March 21, 2018.
Australian military defence contractor Electro Optic Systems has developed a laser capable of pushing space debris in orbit around so collisions can be avoided.
The company, under its EOS Space Systems arm based in Mt Stromlo near Canberra, will use lasers to track space junk and then another higher-powered laser to avoid impacts by nudging the debris.
Professor Craig Smith, from EOS Space Systems, said researchers had developed a photon pressure laser that was ‘able to nudge space debris objects around, change their orbits.’
He said the next step would be to build ‘bigger and bigger lasers’ that were capable of pushing the debris out of orbit while avoiding breaking up the space junk into smaller pieces.
‘If they get smaller they get harder and harder to track, and so they start to become invisible — but also still lethal to satellites.’
Now another innovative player in the industry has announced success in the same domain using a different approach.
According to a story released by the University of Surrey,
The RemoveDEBRIS satellite has successfully used its on-board net technology in orbit – the first demonstration in human history of active debris removal (ADR) technology.
This satellite was built by Surrey Satellite Technology.
Sir Martin Sweeting, Chief Executive of Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd commented: “SSTL’s expertise in designing and building low cost, small satellite missions has been fundamental to the success of RemoveDEBRIS, a landmark technology demonstrator for Active Debris Removal missions that will begin a new era of space junk clearance in Earth’s orbit.”
Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd is a spin-off company from the University of Surrey and is majority owned by Airbus.
The successful mission was described in the University of Surrey article as follows:
The spacecraft began the experimental phase of its mission on Sunday 16 September, when it used a net to capture a deployed target simulating a piece of space debris.
RemoveDEBRIS was designed, built and manufactured by a consortium of leading space companies and research institutions led by the Surrey Space Centre at the University of Surrey. The spacecraft is operated in orbit by engineers at Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd in Guildford, UK. The project is co-funded by the European Commission.
Professor Guglielmo Aglietti, Director of the Surrey Space Centre, said: “We are absolutely delighted with the outcome of the net technology. While it might sound like a simple idea, the complexity of using a net in space to capture a piece of debris took many years of planning, engineering and coordination between the Surrey Space Centre, Airbus and our partners – but there is more work to be done. These are very exciting times for us all.”
Ingo Retat, Airbus RemoveDEBRIS project head, said: “To develop this net technology to capture space debris we spent 6 years testing in parabolic flights, in special drop towers and also thermal vacuum chambers. Our small team of engineers and technicians have done an amazing job moving us one step closer to clearing up low Earth orbit.”
In the coming months, RemoveDEBRIS will test more ADR technologies: a vision-based navigation system that uses cameras and LiDaR technology to analyse and observe potential pieces of debris; the first harpoon capture technology used in orbit; and a drag-sail that will finally bring RemoveDEBRIS into the Earth’s atmosphere where it will be destroyed, bringing its mission to a close.
The US Space Surveillance Network tracks 40,000 objects and it is estimated that there are more than 7,600 tonnes of ‘space junk’ in and around Earth’s orbit – with some moving faster than a speeding bullet, approaching speeds of 30,000 miles per hour.
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme [FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement n°607099.
The RemoveDEBRIS consortium consists of:
A London Times article provided further detail.
The article quoted the project leader and then went on to describe the potential use of the technology.
We are absolutely delighted,” Guglielmo Aglietti, director of the Surrey Space Centre., said “The target was spinning, which we had not expected. This was a demonstration of capturing an uncompetitive target.”
If the net was being used for real the satellite would then tow the junk to a lower orbit, where it would burn up as it entered the Earth’s atmosphere.
Professor Aglietti envisages nets being used to capture large pieces of debris, such as defunct satellites.
The featured graphic was contained in The Times article and is completed by the second graphic below:
By Guy Martin
Saudi Arabia’s military industry is open for business – and hoping to secure South African ventures before the end of this year.
Set up in May last year as part of Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman’s 2030 project to reform and modernise the kingdom, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) began operating this year on a two-pronged mission: to coordinate and combine all existing local Saudi defence companies under its umbrella and to find strategic international joint venture partners.
CEO Dr Andreas Schwer wants to achieve both by the end of this year. He is in Pretoria this week at the tenth iteration of the Africa Aerospace and Defence (AAD) exhibition being held at Waterkloof air force base. The African showpiece is the first international arms fair that SAMI has attended.
“The Crown Prince’s target to us is to be among the top 25 defence players internationally by 2030,” he said. Milestone targets for that date include directly employing 40 000 people in Saudi Arabia, directly contributing $3.7 billion to the kingdom’s GDP and investing $1.6-billion in research and development (R&D).
Combining all the local defence companies under one umbrella, a process which is currently under way in Saudi Arabia, will create an immediate workforce of 8 000 people. The next phase is to announce a raft of key defence joint ventures with international contractors and manufacturers by the end of the year – with the end result being half the kingdom’s defence budget being spent locally by 2030.
SAMI is open to all and any defence projects, from aeronautics to land systems, defence electronics, weapons and missiles. Schwer hopes some of SAMI’s partners will be South African, especially in – but not limited to – missiles, ammunition and optoelectronics. Negotiations have been underway ever since President Cyril Ramaphosa’s visit to the kingdom in July.
“These ventures will be the backbone of our future,” Schwer explained. “Those companies who work with us will get great incentives, but most of all exclusive contracts in the kingdom for decades to come in a country with the fourth biggest defence budget in the world.
“It’s a marriage for life.”
The Saudi defence budget last year was actually the third biggest in the world, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which estimates that Saudi Arabia spent $69.4 billion on defence last year, more than Russia at $66.3 billion. China remained in second position spending $228 billion, while the US remained in the lead at $610 billion – more than the next seven countries’ defence budgets put together.
To qualify though for the kind of contracts SAMI envisages, manufacturers will have to properly partner with Saudi companies, sharing local intellectual property and training Saudi personnel so that the next generation of equipment, weaponry or ammunition is jointly developed, not merely produced under licence.
SAMI has already signed memoranda of understanding agreement with Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Russia’s state manufacturer Rosoboronexport.
“We are prepared to invest in South Africa, we will inject cash, we will buy shares but we will expect our partners to share their technology.
“This business model is unique simply because of the sheer size of the Saudi market,” he said.
Nobody else has the same proposition, he said, and is something that he thinks is very important for the South African defence industry.
“We will ensure growth and create jobs here, rather than the current situation which is shrinking.”
On the eve of AAD 2018, Jane’s estimated that while South Africa remained the third biggest defence spender in Africa with a budget of $3.6 billion, behind Algeria ($9.5 billion) and Morocco ($4.8 billion) it would fall to fifth by 2023, pipped by Egypt and Angola.
“Huge multi-billion-dollar contracts have been approved on our side, the money budgeted for and set aside, but now pushed back pending the signing of joint venture partners.”
Schwer intends meeting with defence contractors and manufacturers as well as ministerial representatives to progress the negotiations that have already taken place.
“If we sign agreements, we will set up SAMI offices here with a research and development hub – and duplicate the process in Saudi.
“We don’t take anything out of the country, we merely mirror it. South Africa won’t lose anything from the process, only gain.”
An example, he says, could be South Africa’s missile technology which could be adapted in tandem with SAMI for use on differing aircraft platforms, rendering it a truly international proposition in the global arms trade.
Time though is not standing still.
“We want agreements before the end of this year, otherwise we might lose that window of opportunity.”
This article is republished with permission of our partner defenceWeb and was first published on September 20, 2018.
Pushing back on the Chinese projection of power into the Pacific is a key priority for the US and the allies.
At a recent Williams Seminar, a senior Australian Army official argued that China had already pushed its way out to achieve its first island defense strategy.
Clearly, it is time to do something.
That same Army officer highlighted that he saw one of the roles of the Army as providing protection for any Australian engagements where forces might be based or operate deeper into the Pacific.
In a September 20, 2018 article in The Australian, Ben Packham, provided some insight into where one of those engagements might be.
“Australia is working on plans with Papua New Guinea to develop a joint naval base on Manus Island, edging out Chinese interest in the strategically vital port with a new facility that would be capable of hosting Australian and US warships.”
The article went on to note that “Plans for the joint facility were under way as Australia moved to block Chinese involvement in another regional military development — the upgrade of Fiji’s Black Rock military camp in Nadi. Mr Turnbull led the negotiations with Fiji President Frank Bainimarama to ensure Australia became the sole foreign donor in the redevelopment of the base, which will be used as a regional training hub for South Pacific defence forces.”
Packham quoted a leading Australian analyst who described how he saw the potential development.
“Australian Strategic Policy Institute director Michael Shoebridge, a former Defence Department official, said using Manus as a base for PNG, Australian and US forces “makes good sense … It would help give the US a wider operating and support footprint in the Pacific, and give Australian naval forces a location 2000km away from Darwin and some 1600km north of Cairns — the two closest Royal Australian Navy bases”.
He said the PNG Defence Force, which will receive three new Guardian-class patrol boats from Australia, would be a major beneficiary, gaining new facilities and a closer working relationship with Australian and US navies.”
The Evolving Role of Australian Ground Forces in Australia’s Deterrent Strategy
An article published in the London Times on September 21, 2018 highlighted The Australian story and added some additional comments as well.
Australia is all too aware of the vast amounts of money that China has been pouring into Papua New Guinea, which won independence from Australia 43 years ago. The nation will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Summit (APEC) in November, and President Xi will attend in person, arriving two days early for a state visit. China has paid for and built the multimillion-dollar convention centre for the meeting, as well as new highways in Port Moresby, the capital.
Mr Xi is expected to use the summit of Asian and Pacific leaders to press six small Pacific nations — not including Papua New Guinea — to cut diplomatic ties with the self-governing island of Taiwan, which China insists is part of its territory. He is also expected to announce a free-trade agreement between China and Papua New Guinea, and possibly another substantial construction project to rival the one that created the first transport links between Port Moresby and the nation’s remote highlands.
Australia has done what it can to block China’s growing influence elsewhere in the Pacific. This year it stopped China rebuilding the Black Rock military camp on Fiji by itself becoming the sole foreign donor.
In June, it prevented Huawei, the vast Chinese telecommunications firm, laying internet cables linking the Solomon Islands, east of Papua New Guinea, with Australia. The fear was that Huawei was seeking to gain access to a broadband hub in Sydney, and that the security of the country’s communications network could be compromised.
Interestingly, a combination of a Danish transport company, Chinese shipbuilding and Russian clients have put together the next phase of global transit. A Maersk ship has left Asia bound for Russia through the Northern Passage.
“A brand new ice-strengthened containership is heading straight into the annals of maritime history. As the first containership ever Venta Maersk is on its way through the still ice-plagued North East passage north of Russia from Asia to Europe.
“Venta Maersk belongs to Seago Line, a shipping company owned by Denmark’s A.P. Moller Maersk A/S, the world’s largest container-shipping agency.”
This development was highlighted in an article by Martin Breaum in an an article published by the EUObservor on September 17, 2018.
Venta Maersk is the first of seven ice-strengthened container ships being built in China for Maersk.
The first stop in Europe will be in Bremerhaven, Germany before continuing on to St. Petersburg.
“Venta Maersk is a signal to COSCO (the Chinese shipping company), who has been the most active player in the North East Passage,” says a Danish industry source, who askedfor anonymity.
“Maersk illustrates that they are ready for it and that they have the ships for it. This is about being prepared. Maersk has found its inner Viking. They do not any longer focus only on growth and on reducing costs but also look offensively at new opportunities,” this source told EUobserver.
Increased political instability in the world also plays a role, he thinks: “In such a situation it is good commercial thinking to be first-movers. There is war on the Horn of Africa where we had the pirate challenge. We have seen terrorist groups block the Suez canal. The Strait of Mallaca may also quickly turn into a bottleneck. In this state of affairs it might be really nice to have an alternative like the North East Passage, if everything else closes”.
No-one in the industry expects the North East Passage to ever rival the route through the Suez canal as the main artery for cargo between Europe and Asia, but many now see the North East Passage as a potentially important niche for the industry.
In a story by Atle Staalesen published by The Independent Barents Observer dated September 12, 2018, further details were provided on the voyage of the new ship.
With a speed of 11 knots the Venta Maersk sailed through the most difficult part of the Northern Sea Route, in the Russian Arctic.
The brand new container ship designed for voyages in icy conditions in late August set out from Busan, South Korea, and was from 8th September accompanied by nuclear icebreaker 50 let Pobedy through the East Siberian Sea and Laptev Sea (Russian east-Arctic).
It is said to be the first regular container ship that has crossed the Russian Arctic route.
The icebreaker escort was completed as the ships had sailed into the Laptev Sea on the 11th September, nuclear power company Rosatom informs (in Russian).
Ice data from the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute show that there is still more than one-meter thick ice in major parts of the East Siberian Sea, while the whole Kara Sea and practically all of the Laptev Sea is ice-free.
“The convoy successfully proceeded through the Sannikova Strait, which is the shortest route, with an average speed of 11 knots”, says Rosatom Chief of maritime operations Vladimir Artyunyan.
The Venta Maersk is now independently continuing its voyage towards its end destination of Bremerhaven in Germany. It will proceed through the Laptev Sea, and subsequently the Kara Sea (Russian Arctic) and Barents Sea (European Arctic) before it enters Norwegian waters.
The featured photo shows the Venta Maersk in the port of Vladivostok (Russian far-east) as it prepares to set off for the Northern Sea Route, on August 22, 2018. (Yuri Maltsev/Reuters)