F-35 2.0 and Changing the Defense Eco-System

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on F-35 2.0 and Changing the Defense Eco-System
09/13/2018

By Robbin Laird

We have argued for more than a decade that leveraging fifth generation aircraft allowed for the re-norming of airpower.

With the evolution of the F-35 and with the buy of the aircraft by several key allies, those allies are starting to introduce the aircraft into their forces, but are doing so with an eye to the overall transformation of their force structure.

They are leveraging the multi-domain aircraft as a trigger for overall transformation of their force and are looking at concurrent or follow on developments to facilitate such change.

There is no better example of this than the Royal Australian Airforce and the Australian Defence Force which have looked at the acquisition of the F-35 as the beginning of a longer road of becoming a fifth-generation combat force.

One of the architects of this approach has been Air Vice Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn.

In a recent interview with him shortly after my return from Australia, we discussed the approach and the challenges to shaping a transformed ADF.

Blackburn: The acquisition of the F-35 has triggered people to expand their field of view and to start thinking about the whole force and how this can amplify the whole force and what does that mean.

“In other words, instead of just focusing on the airplane itself, we are focusing on the ecosystem of change associated with the aircraft which can provide for defense transformation.

“The real challenge of course, with any great idea, is: “How do you implement it?”

“This requires focusing on the roadblocks to change and to understand how the entire defense eco system needs to change to enable the kind of continuous change which a fifth generation force both needs and facilitates.

“We need to focus upon the roadblocks that will stop us from achieving and implementing this great idea?

Question: Clearly, the aircraft as a multi-domain asset challenges the traditional notions of C2 and ISR being located in specialized platforms or managed horizontally.

One challenge is that a number of services are still focused on fifth gen as if it was a multi-mission rather than a multi-domain asset and putting into a legacy box, rather than expanding the aperture and transforming the force.

The problem is that the plane, from the beginning, gets pushed into a box that doesn’t actuate the capabilities of the air system itself, and then the question … we should be focusing on F-35 2.0 in terms of: “What are the barriers to really changing the rest of the force?”

And that’s what you’re talking about.   

How do you go about getting a shift in focus?

Blackburn: You highlight a change in language and concepts in discussing the way ahead.

“When Secretary Wynne generated the idea of fifth gen what he clearly focused upon was changing Air Force language thinking.  We cannot operate the F-22 or the F-35 like an F-15 or F-16; these are radically different aircraft and we need to operate them very differently.

“But this is a difficult challenge to get services fundamentally to change their concepts of operations to really leverage a breakthrough technology.

“But change has occurred.

“And when our F-22 exchange pilots come back to the RAAF from flying with the USAF, they clearly have understood and have discussed with their peers how fifth generation was a revolution in air combat and had to be treated that way.

“When we generated our Plan Jericho effort we had in mind something similar to what Secretary Wynne did, namely how do talk about our approaches very differently leveraging the new platform?

“We’re using that language like Secretary Wynne did to talk now about a fifth-generation force, and we’re starting to see some progress.

“Clearly, we need to take a broad view of the dynamics of change. Just buying the platform does not get you where you want to go.  We need to focus on a broader innovation by design approach to really create a fifth-generation combat force and this really is a change in the defense eco system.

“When we buy an innovative system, like the F-35, it will not by itself lead to the kind of change which we need. What we need to do is to take a broader look at force design leveraging the aircraft to reconfigure the force.

“If we do not design an integrated force, we are always going to play catch up and do after market integration.”

Question: But to do this will require a fundamental change in the defense eco system and how defense operates a procurement and support organization.

How do you view this challenge?

John Blackburn: We are using the business model of the past twenty years when we have acquired standalone platforms and try to figure out how they would work together in the post-acquisition phase.

“But we need to change how the whole organization itself works. The warfighters get what the F-35 drives in terms of change; but this integrative approach is not being replicated on the level of acquisition which is still a stove piped process and world.

“We are preparing to fly fifth generation aircraft in a legacy eco system; this simply does not make sense.

“The design process for the overall force is where significant change needs and can occur.

“What this means is that you look at an effect which you want to create with the overall force and you look at your mix of platforms and determine which can lead the design change to achieve that effect, rather than simply doing additive modernization of every platform.

“You are targeting innovation on a lead platform rather than simply doing innovation by addition.

“The F-35 poses a significant challenge because it delivers weapons, its delivers non-lethal effects, it is an ISR platform, it is a C2 platform, and can itself deliver organic strike or simply delegate to a partner aircraft or system.

“Such a platform simply blows apart the traditional structure and if you pursue integration it is clearly a driver for change; if you don’t you will reduce the aircraft to one of its functions rather than leverage it for multi-domain, cross platform integrated innovation and combat learning.

“We need to take the energy evident at the tactical combat level and inject that into the strategic culture at the top which simply cannot tap into effectively the kind of fifth generation innovation we are seeing from operators.

“This is the first major roadblock, namely, the business model.”

Question: You have discussed other roadblocks, namely, in the energy and network space.

How do you view these roadblocks?

John Blackburn: When we focus on the design of the force, clearly a key requirement is energy supply and security.

“How do we get electricity to a base?

“How do we support our supply chains?

“What’s the energy aspects of this future force design?

“Today, there are no future energy concepts or designs in place.

“What’s happened is we have assumed that, somehow, the fuels and energy we need to operate our future force will be delivered by the market, which would be virtually impossible in a crisis in our region.

“With regard to networks, we have a multiplicity of networks and a legacy security system which cauterizes information in ways that make no sense to a rapidly operating fifth generation force.

“In terms of network design, we don’t have a good foundation upon which we can build the fifth-generation force networks.

“Another roadblock is that we do not have yet in place an industrial policy that will provide for all the sovereign capabilities we will need in terms of a severe crisis.

“Notably, we do not have an appropriate weapons policy.

“We build traditional ammunition but not missiles.  This makes no sense, in terms of the inherent capabilities which we have or could have to develop and build weapons in country.

“And without weapons, the JSF is not much use.

“If we do not address such roadblocks, we could end that with the platforms that aren’t integrated properly, that aren’t supported properly, and that’s a risk that we’ve got to really face today, not in five or ten years when we actually get the platforms in service.”

The featured graphic highlights F-35 and Aegis integration, which is an element of F-35 2.0, namely reshaping the role of fires associated with the tactical aircraft.

WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE, N.M., Sept. 13, 2016 

Two pre-eminent weapon systems, the F-35 Lightning II and Aegis Weapon System, worked together for the first time during a live fire exercise…..

During the Sept. 12 test, an unmodified U.S. Marine Corps F-35B from the Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 1, acted as an elevated sensor and detected an over-the-horizon threat. The F-35B sent data through the aircraft’s Multi-Function Advanced Data Link (MADL) to a ground station connected to the Aegis Weapon System on the USS Desert Ship (LLS-1), a land-based ship. The target was subsequently engaged and intercepted by a Standard Missile 6.

“One of the key defining attributes of a 5th Generation fighter is the force multiplier effect it brings to joint operations through its foremost sensor fusion and external communications capabilities,” said Orlando Carvalho, executive vice president, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics. “Those attributes were successfully proven at White Sands Missile Range in a very realistic demonstration of distributed lethality leveraging a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B and the U.S. Navy’s Aegis Weapon System. This only scratches the surface of the potential warfighting capabilities F-35 aircraft will ultimately enable across our military forces.”

This capability, when fully realized, will significantly increase the warfighters’ situational awareness using Aegis and the F-35 together to better understand the maritime operational environment. Using any variant of the F-35 as a broad area sensor, the aircraft can significantly increase the Aegis capability to detect, track and engage.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Onboard the USS Kearsarge with the 22nd MEU

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Onboard the USS Kearsarge with the 22nd MEU
09/12/2018

By Todd Miller

The 22ndMarine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) VMM-264 Reinforced takes us on board the USS Kearsarge during deployment work-ups

For many, the Marines will always be defined by the tenacious and bloody battles in the South Pacific during WWII.

Rightly so.

Today, these specialists in amphibious warfare and mobility are in transition to an even more mobile, lethal and self-contained capability.  Marines are mobile by nature,  with “Marine Air-Ground Task Force,” (MAGTF) and “Expeditionary” built into their identity.

One of the consistent (24/7/365) demonstrations of Marine mobility is seen in the ARG/MEU. The U.S. Navy provides specialized assets to facilitate amphibious deployments, the “Amphibious Ready Group” (ARG).

Onboard the USS Wasp with the 22nd MEU from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

In this case the Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) includes:

  • USS Kearsarge (LHD-3), Wasp-Class Amphibious Assault ship
  • USS Arlington (LPD 24), San Antonio-Class Amphibious Transport ship.
  • USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43), Whidbey Island-Class Dock Landing ship.

The U.S. Navy ARG has a straightforward mission – “deliver the warfighter to theater.”  The graphic from Marine Corps literature is an indication of just how much capability is packed on an ARG.

The Navy can add additional resources to the ARG and form an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) or add a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) – or two…

With 70% of the earth’s surface covered by water, the ARG provides the ability to forward deploy a very capable “base” offshore in proximity to a nation of interest.  Smaller nations without the resources to scan the seas may never see them coming.

More advanced adversaries may be aware that the ARG/MEU is in the vicinity – and think twice about their activity.  Granted, the ARG/MEU most typically break into the news cycle while providing humanitarian relief or during exercises with coalition forces worldwide.

Seen or unseen, expect them to be at the heart of any global crises; intercepting illegal weapons shipments on vessels; deploying “elements” to support ongoing military operations around the globe; evacuating Americans from a country that falls into chaos; or major theater war.  If one wants to be at the heart of the action – the U.S. Marines is a great place to start.

The 22ndMarine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) forms the Marine component of this force and consists of;

Command Element (CE):22ndMarine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC.

Ground Combat Element (GCE):1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (1/2) is an Infantry battalion based at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC.

Aviation Combat Element (ACE):Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 264 (Reinforced) “Black Knights.” They belong to the 2ndMAW, MAG-26, Marine Corps Air Station New River, NC.  Aircraft types operated include; AV-8B Harrier II, MV-22B, CH-53E, AH-1W and UH-1Y.

Logistics Command Element (LCE):Combat Logistics Battalion 22(CLB-22) is a USMC logistics battalion Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, NC.

The VMM-264 (Reinforced) is a composite squadron specifically for the MEU ACE.  The ACE is brought together from units where crews have honed their platform specific capabilities.  Embarked – they work as one aviation squadron, as one MEU, as one ARG/MEU.

The Marine Expeditionary Unit as described by General James F. Amos, U.S. Marine Corps.;

Forward-deployed amphibious forces remain a uniquely critical and capable component of our national strategic demands for forward presence, crisis response, power projection and theater security cooperation. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and associated Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) provide the Geographic Combatant Commanders with forward-deployed, sea based, expeditionary forces that can operate across the range of military operations. Capable of enabling joint, interagency and coalition forces seamlessly integrating with Special Operations Forces, no other type of force possesses these capabilities together with the ability to sustain itself logistically for significant periods of time.

Operating as a team, the ARG/MEU provides operational reach and agility, as well as assured access for joint force in major contingencies. It is ideally suited to operate forward and from over the horizon to protect America interests.

“Amphibious Ready Group AND Marine Expeditionary Unit Overview” U.S. Marine Corps.

We land on the Kearsarge moments before a Visit, Board, Search and Seizure(VBSS) exercise.

The operational pace is high and resources are gathered topside. VBSS is one of the many mission sets the Kearsarge ARG and 22nd MEU perfect prior to deployment.

VMM-264 (Reinforced)the “Black Knights” have their machines at the ready, along with US Navy MH-60S Knighthawks from HSC-26 of Norfolk, VA.

Procedures ensure the highest degree of safety possible.  Given the nature of the activity – danger is never far away.  I observe activity on a hot, but otherwise perfect day. Add inclement weather, pitching decks and night operations – and one may grasp what risks these young men and women of the Marines and Navy face.  The sea and many forward deployments are inhospitable, and unforgiving.

Fast roping, Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction (SPIE), hot arrivals and departures – all are trained too and perfected.  Man and machine are put through grueling paces by our nation’s finest so they can serve as first responders to any number of global crises. Maintenance professionals from VMM-264 work tirelessly on board to ensure all platforms are ready to go.

A combination of instructions bark from the loudspeakers aboard the Kearsarge. Simulated threats are identified, and timely safety reminders regarding deck activity are made.   Today, the deck is lightly loaded with only a handful of active and parked ACE assets.  During deployment the parking area of the deck will be packed with the aircraft, fitted together like a jigsaw puzzle.

The AH-1Ws launch (I suspect Harriers would be up in the air already if this took place near hostile shores). Regardless, the message is clear, firepower is up in the air long before the Marines of BLT 1/2 arrive on the scene.  The MH-60 Knighthawks from HSC-26 launch next – with observers and Marines.

The CH-53E launches and somewhere out of sight an MV-22B travels with a full complement of Marines.  Additional assets may have launched from other members of the Kearsarge ARG, the USS Arlington (LPD-24) and USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43).

The USMC is about many things, but perhaps at the heart of it is “putting warfighters on the ground, wherever that ground may be.”  VMM-264 does their part.

Seasoned pilots operating capably night or day in good and poor weather and in both friendly and hostile space.  It is their job to ensure the safety of the Marines, execute the plan and move those warfighters to and from theater.

A handful of Marines (BLT 1/2) wait on board the Kearsarge, extra’s at the ready if required.  They are geared up and wait patiently.  As the afternoon passes they become aware that their presence is not required for the VBSS.  The disappointment is accepted, but palpable.

The blend of young and seasoned Marines joined the service for the very reason; to be “first in.”

While none I come across desire war, they are ready and to a Marine desire to be at the epi-center of the action.

They are polite, disciplined and focused.  They are examples of America’s ultimate wealth – our youth.  It is a privilege to encounter them as friend and to know they are forward deployed around the globe to respond to any number of global crises.

The capabilities of the ARG/MEU in its current state are impressive and more than adequate.  However, the Marines are not at rest.  The world is changing rapidly, and the Marine Corps is transitioning to platforms that increase their capability exponentially.

These upgrades are driving by Integration, Resiliency, Evolution, Maneuverability, Scalability, Competence and more.

Put simply, the Marines are evolving to ensure success in contested environments against peer and near-peer competitors.

The 2018 Marine Aviation Plan details the impressive aviation upgrades coming;

The AV-8B Harrier II will have its sundown by 2026 when the transition to F-35Bs is complete.  The F-35Bs bring a quantum leap in situational awareness, ISR, tactical air capability, interoperability with Navy, Air Force, Army and Coalition force weapons systems.

Last year, the U.S.S. America (LHA-6) America Class of amphibious assault ship with emphasis on airborne assault went on its first deployment, providing the option to focus on amphibious assault from the air.

Today the Essex ARG / 13thMEU is on deployment with the F-35B.

It is early in the introduction of the F-35B and deployments such as these are as much an integration exercise as a combat ready deployment.

The AV-8Bs of VMM-264 (Reinforced) are proven and capable to support the ARG/MEU during the transition to the F-35B.

They will receive a host of upgrades to enhance capability and operability through until sundown.

The AH-1W gunship is in the process of transition to the more capable and lethal AH-1Z (complete by about 2021).  The CH-53K will replace the CH-53E – with an impressive increase in lifting and operational capability.

Around ½ the incming CH53Ks will be operational by around 2025, with the transition complete by 2030.

The introduction of unmanned aircraft systems (VMU) and the platform centric Intrepid Tiger EW packages, communications, ordinance and systems upgrades complete the ongoing transformation to a what is already a lethal expeditionary force.

It all means that Marines will come ashore – at the place and time of their choosing – even if that place is contested and 100’s of miles inland.

When they arrive, they will do so with unparalleled capability.

The featured photo:

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Sept. 2, 2018) The Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD3) transits the Atlantic Ocean during the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Exercise.

The Kearsarge ARG and 22nd MEU are enhancing joint integration, lethality and collective capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team through joint planning and execution of challenging and realistic training scenarios. CSG 4 mentors, trains and assesses East Coast units preparing for future deployments (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Megan Anuci/Released)

The slideshow highlights the F-35B onboard USS Essex.

 

The Indian-US Defense Partnership: New Steps Forward

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Indian-US Defense Partnership: New Steps Forward
09/11/2018

By Richard Weitz

The inaugural meeting of the U.S.-India ‘two-plus-two’format that met on September 6, 2018 in New Delhi made substantial progress in deepening and broadening the bilateral defense relationship.

Now the challenge is to seize the opportunities generated by the new format.

The September 6 meeting brought together Indian Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj and Indian Minister of Defence Nirmala Sitharaman with U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis. Prime Minister Modi and President Trump launched this new two-plus-two dialogue format during their summit in Washington last June.

As Sitharaman noted, the recent progress in defense collaboration confirms Modi’s observation that “India’s relations with the United States has overcome the hesitations of history.” These were quite evident in India’s de facto alignment during the Cold War with the Soviet Union and U.S. sanctions against India for its nuclear weapons program.

It has taken two decades to overcome these obstacles, beginning with the lifting of U.S. sanctions in 2001, the 2004 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative launched in 2012, and the 10-year framework agreement on bilateral defense cooperation that was adopted in 2005 and renewed in 2015.

Furthermore, Indian and U.S. officials have signed several major defense cooperation agreements designed to build an enabling foundation to broaden and deepen the security partnership.

The first major bilateral military accord was the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) adopted two years ago.

At the “two-to-two” meeting, the ministers finalized the bilateral Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which has been under discussion for more than a decade. The COMCASA will allow the Indian military to employ the most secure links on U.S.-provided defense equipment when they communicate with the U.S. armed forces.

Unlike the earlier LEMOA, a type of accord that Washington has negotiated with some 80 countries, the U.S. has such secure military communications agreements with fewer than 30 other countries.

Sovereignty concerns made New Delhi reluctant to sign these admittedly intrusive agreements.

However, the Indian armed forces’ interest in employing more advanced U.S.-origin weaponry, sharing intelligence with the Pentagon on mutual threats, and achieving greater interoperability with Western countries as well as between the Indian services apparently overrode these objections.

Though the additional hotlines established at the meeting between the defense and foreign ministers are primarily symbolic given the many other ways the two governments can communicate, the newly enhanced Indian military engagement with the Central Command will strengthen shared Maritime Domain Awareness between the two navies in the vital Persian Gulf region.

The United States is already India’s most important defense training and exercise partner—Indian holds more military exercise with the U.S. than with any other country—but last week’s decision to go beyond single-service exercises to include, the first time, a tri-service joint exercise in 2019 off the eastern coast of India represents a more realistic “joint” format of how modern militaries normally now fight modern conflicts.

Since India is not a formal U.S. military ally, the Obama administration created a new category, equivalent to that of a non-NATO ally without using that sensitive language, of “Major Defense Partner of the United States” to facilitate arms sales and bilateral defense collaboration.

Building on this, the Trump administration recently promoted India to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Tier 1 Strategic Trade Authorization level, which allows Indians to purchase many hi-tech “dual-use” U.S. products without applying for specific licenses or using a streamlined process.

Given this progress and the broad purpose of the inaugural two-plus-two session, it is unsurprisingly that no specific arms deals were announced at the September 6 meeting.

Still, the COMCASA’s entry into force will allow Indian armed forces to acquire U.S. armed drones to strengthen their Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities over the Indian Ocean.

The Trump administration agreed to supply the UAVs in principle last year despite Pakistani objections.

Since there is a limit to the number of turn-key major U.S. weapons systems that India will buy, the future clearly lies in deepening defense industrial cooperation at an earlier stage in the process, with greater integration of India’s increasingly important private military sector into joint research, development, and production.

As a timely example, shortly before the “two-plus-two” meeting, Lockheed Martin announced that its Indian partner, Tata Advanced Systems Limited, would build the wings for all its future F-16s.

For this reason, “the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to continue to encourage and prioritize co-production and co-development projects through the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), and to pursue other avenues of defense innovation cooperation such as the Memorandum of Intent to promote cooperation between their two defense innovation agencies.”

It is also important to make progress on the newly launched negotiations on a bilateral Industrial Security Annex, which will complement the existing Indian-U.S. General Security Of Military Information Agreements by encompassing the Indian private sector.

According to Minister Sitharaman, the U.S. side agreed to New Delhi’s request to designate a DOD point of contact “to help address procedural complexities and facilitate Indian companies to join the manufacturing supply chains of the U.S. defense companies.” India, meanwhile, should raise its defense FDI ceiling to international standards and relax some of its onerous offset requirements.

The parties still need to implement the last of the foundational enabling accords, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), for cooperative geospatial intelligence collection and the sharing of satellite navigation data.

Other future steps should include expanding the Malabar, Quad (including Australia and Japan as well as India and the U.S.), and other multilateral military exercises to engage more participants, including European navies that have been sending warships on some prominent recent freedom of navigation operations in the contested international waters off China.

Besides stationing more personnel at major defense headquarters, the Indian and U.S. governments could exchange civilian professionals through mutual defense education and training in order to enhance the conceptual readiness of the two militaries to cooperate on joint missions.

It is noteworthy and welcome how the bilateral defense relationship has become institutionalized.

President Barack Obama and Defense Secretary Ash Carter both prioritized improving U.S.- Indian military ties. There has been as well the double postponement of the first “two-plus-two” dialogue.

Yet the two defense bureaucracies, previously an impediment to progress, have now under the surface worked successfully to sustain it.

The featured photo shows U.S. Navy, Indian Navy, and Royal Australian Air Force P-8 Poseidons staged at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam for Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise 2018. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Kevin A. Flinn/Released)

In our recent interview with Air Commodore Craig Heap, the cooperation among the Aussies, the Indians and the Americans was highlighted with regard to the P-8.

Question: Your P-8s were clearly at the Exercise, even though they were not under your command in your cAir Component Commander role.

How did they operate with the other P-8s, namely the USN and Indian Navy P-8s?

Air Commodore Heap: Seamlessly.

“We demonstrated  the  clear capability for the US and Australian Mobile Tactical Operations Centres to work closely together, optimizing synergies.

“The Indian Navy P-8’s were operated from the same tarmac at Hickham, with their operations element collocated next to the USN and RAAF Mobile tactical Operations centre.

“All P-8 teams ended up working very well with each other in the tactical operations space.

“The Indian Navy aircrew and maintenance personnel were highly professional and clearly comfortable with advanced airborne ASW concepts as well.

“RIMPAC also provided a rare opportunity to exercise significant multi-national airborne MPRA assets, P-8s and P-3 from the US, Australia, India, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, in the conduct of Theatre ASW, (TASW).

“The P-8s in particular  are a force multiplier in this piece, the overall objective of which is to deny or deter an adversary submarine force from affecting our friendly forces.”

 

 

Finnish Air Force in Air-to-Air Refueling Training with USAF

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Finnish Air Force in Air-to-Air Refueling Training with USAF
09/06/2018

Karelia Air Command conducts Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) training for F/A-18 pilots in cooperation with the 100th Air Refueling Wing, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), from 11 to 13 September.

In total 8-14 F/A-18 Hornet multi-role fighters from Karelia, Lapland and Satakunta Air Commands will participate in the training.

The aim of the AAR training is to provide AAR proficiency and currency training for Finnish Air Force F/A-18 pilots. The operations take place over the regions of Northern Ostrobothnia, Kainuu and southern Lapland.

The training is conducted in cooperation with a KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), based at RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom.

This article was published by the Finnish Ministry of Defence on August 28, 2018.

 

 

Reshaping Royal Australian Asset Availability: The Case of the Collins Class Submarine

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Reshaping Royal Australian Asset Availability: The Case of the Collins Class Submarine
09/05/2018

By Robbin Laird

It would be hard to find a key combat asset for the Australian Defence Force, which has received more criticism over the years than the Collins class submarine.

Yet while the past is behind us, the narrative has clearly changed.

The Royal Australian Navy working with its industry partners has clearly shaped a new narrative, one in which more ships are available on a reduced time scale to provide for the maintenance of this key asset.

And learning how to do so is a crucial part of the learning curve PRIOR to building a new submarine, one that will be bought at twice the numbers and be a larger ship as well.

Clearly, the Royal Australian Navy is looking to build a more maintainable submarine this time around and is building from lessons learned on the Collins class.

In my past discussions with recently retired Vice Admiral Tim Barrett when he was Chief of Navy, he highlighted the importance of getting the Collins class availability on the right footing.

During a 2016 interview, Vice Admiral Barrett put it this way:

Question: Clearly, building a sustainable navy from the outset is crucial to your design effort.

How do you view the challenge of building a more sustainable navy from the outset?

Vice Admiral Barrett: “It is crucial to deterrence.  If your ships are not operating at sea they will have little effect.

“For example we have changed our approach to the Collins submarine largely around sustainment and working more openly with industry to achieve much greater at-sea operational tempos.

“We have put in place an enterprise approach, which focuses on availability of submarines; Industry and Navy are working closely together now to achieve that core objective.

“I’ve got industry keenly interested in the results of what the submarines do when they leave port and go on operations. And we’ve had a dramatic turnaround in submarine availability as partnering has improved.

“For me, deterrence, lethality, availability, sustainability, and affordability are highly interrelated for a Navy and its combat performance.

“And clearly as we design new ships, designing in more sustainable systems and ships is crucial.”

And he added the following during one of our 2017 interviews:

For example, we have a small submarine fleet of six submarines; they are not going to deter anybody if they are not available and capable of going to sea.

As we discussed last time, we have put a major effort in getting much greater availability from our Collins class submarines, and the ways we have done so will shape our approach, our expectations and our template for the operation of the new class of submarines.

We have seen a dramatic improvement in our Collins class boats.

Question: In other words, by learning how to ramp up availability with today’s fleet you are preparing the template for future operations?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: That is clearly our approach going forward.

We should be building our sense of availability in the design right now, so that when the future submariness arrive in place, we have maximized availability, and through that deterrence given their contribution to a distributed lethal force capability.

And this clearly is a key challenge for the workforce to shape enhanced availability.

 During my current visit to Australia, I had the opportunity to visit the Osborne shipyards in Adelaide, South Australia, and get a look first hand at the changes in the Collins sustainment approach.

During that visit I had a chance to meet with Brad Hajek, Director Upgrades, Collins Submarine Program, who provided a comprehensive and thoughtful overview of the achievements of the new sustainability approach.

In addition, I was given a really first rate tour by Kerry Fisher, the Naval Representative for South Australia, of the current Collins class submarine undergoing deep maintenance, namely HMAS Waller.

This process used to take three years for what they refer to as Full Cycle Docking (FCD), but have reduced to closer to two years. The FCD cycle is a 10-year one, so getting the savings of one year is clearly a major improvement.

And at dockside, HMAS Collins was preparing to leave after its FCD to go back to sea.

With the very significant upgrades Collins received, it was going to sea as a much more capable ship, notably with regard to its communications and warfare suites.

In 2016, the Collins review report was published and has been referred to as the Coles Report after its main author. In that report, the key challenge identified was to ramp up availability of the submarine itself.

The focus was upon getting Collins up to the high end of international standards with regard to availability.

According to Hajek: “The international benchmark of submarine availability was set as a target and goal for the Enterprise to achieve.

“We’ve achieved that, and at the heart of reaching this goal has been establishing the 10+2 Usage Upkeep Cycle and an integrated master schedule for the class.

“This reduced the planned duration of FCDs to two years.

“Prior to that, there were a number of different submarine schedules developed by each individual group, Navy, ASC, and CASG (formerly DMO). Neither were aligned and they were in constant change.

“We now have an Enterprise agreed master schedule that now has all partners focusing on the one thing – the availability target.”

The integrated master schedule provides stability to the program and provides the means to plan the necessary upgrades to modernize the submarines more effectively.

According to Brad Hajek with the current maintenance approach of two year FCDs and 12 month Mid-cycle dockings (MCD) we have the opportunity plan an aggressive upgrade program to modernize the Collins fleet.

With every major maintenance period  there a large number of upgrades and updates implemented in the submarines.

Examples include a new iteration of the combat system, and a new communications suite.

In broad terms, the approach has been to find ways to reduce the time in maintenance and to find ways to improve the ability of the work force to shorten core tasks in that cycle through process and productivity improvements.

The Enterprise approach has established a governance structure and collaborative relationship between Navy, CASG, and Industry partners.

Through this approach, the direct relationship between industry involved in maintenance and the navy itself have become tightly integrated into an overall effort with the focus upon fleet availability.

According to Hajek, “the crucial aspect to the submarine program is the enterprise collaborative approach.

“The Enterprise partners all work towards a shared vision and Navy’s requirements.

“This has ensured alignment as everyone has a mutual need of driving to that metric.

“The mutual need has driven key initiatives such as improving supply chain management by removing the Commonwealth from within the value chain of the supply chain, thereby reducing a level of complexity in getting the supply chain to be more effective in terms of delivery at the right time in the maintenance process.

“We also have granted a level of engineering authority to our key Platform and Combat System Integrators by bringing them  under our authorized engineering organization.

“The focus is making them more responsible and accountable at the right levels across the business.”

And having achieved much better results on availability, they can now focus on enabling the Royal Australian Navy to address a broader concern with which availability if correlated, namely how does the Australian Navy use the ship and how is use correlated with availability?

As Hajek described this aspect of the effort:

“It’s great to have the submarines available, but are they doing what the navy wants them to do?

“We are focused on deployability as a key metric. Can the submarine do the mission the navy wants it to do when the navy wants it to?

“This is obviously not something that we can do in isolation. We have to do it as an enterprise metric.”

Another aspect associated with the correlation of availability and deployability embedded in the supply aspect of maintainability is clearly learning what needs to be where and when as the fleet operates.

Hajek described this challenge as follows:

“We need to make sure we’ve got the correct critical levels of spares.

“We need to make sure we’ve got the right number and types of spares on the submarine so the crew can repair it at sea and it doesn’t necessarily have to reach back to our contractor support to fly somewhere around the world to do that repair.

“It is also about effective forward staging of materials so having materials dotted around the globe, dotted around the country where we can effect a repair in a timelier manner.”

When I visited the yard, it was clear from the tour a major step which they have taken to ramp up repairs in the FCD.  They have cut the submarine in two which allows them to remove the main motor and diesel engine  generators. This allows them to be worked on them out of submarine and in the workshop, which clearly is a major shift which allows workers to be much more efficient.

Rather than being forced to work within the confined space of the submarine, they can now work directly on the key parts in an open work area therefore providing great access and improved productivity.

Further supply chain improvements is the procurement of a rotatablepool of key equipment to more effectively to be able to repair key parts and then swap them from submarine to submarine, which can reduce the time for the next submarine to come in for an FCD.

In fact, one way they could further reduce FCD time would be if more resources were available to support the rotatable pool approach.

This would especially refer to motors and the long lead-time necessary to build or rebuild motors.

Kerry Fisher highlighted the importance of the rotatable pool for providing for greater fleet availability as follows:

“Having an effective rotatable pool means that we do not need to take things off the boat, and then sending it away for the refurbishment and have to wait for that refurbishment process to give us back the parts.

“We’re can take them off and replacing it right away with one from the shore. This is especially true of things like diesel  engine frames.”

Another key challenge faced by the ongoing repair and maintenance cycle is the obsolescence of key parts.

Given how long the submarine is in operation, several parts are no longer built which means that the repair cycle is challenged with regard to how to replace those parts or repair them.

One approach being taken by the team is to have the prime contractors focus on the obsolescence of parts by working with their suppliers to learn about upcoming obsolescence and perhaps buy up in advance parts that will be leaving the marketplace.

This problem is real one as parts suppliers can be purchased by global suppliers, which in turn changes who is responsible for what and may well effect which supplies stay in production or not as well.

At the heart of the change is reworking the relationship between Navy and industry.

As Hajek noted: “There’s a big focus this year on embedding our CASG staff within our primes as part of our training and development strategy.

“This provides a broadening opportunity for our staff to learn the business of how they operate, this will help to improve their ability to perform second-level, third-level quality assurance governance roles.”

Another aspect of change is how procurement of parts is being pursued.

Hajek highlighted how this is being worked.

“We have transfer inventory to the suppliers and made them Stock Item Owner.

“This in turn provides clear lines of responsibility for supporting and keeping the right materials on the shelf.

“We are focused on getting the right critical level of spares on the shelf, on board the submarines, so if there’s a defect, the crew can then affect the repair, or the contracted support and affected the repair without delay.”

The Collins submarines will be in operation through the mid 2030’s.

And the current cycle is to have two deployable submarines  consistently available, with four available to the fleet commander, and of these four, three submarines consistently available for tasking with one in shorter term maintenance, and two submarines in long term maintenance and upgrade.

A new submarine is coming to the fleet in the 2030s, but given the experience with the Collins class, the Royal Australian Navy will play close attention to the question of built-in modernization and enhanced maintainability for the new class of submarines.

Within the overall defense business, there is a dynamic underway whereby the payload providers and the platform builders are dynamically changing their roles as the payload evolution is considerable more rapid than platform changes.

How might the platform side of this work more effectively with rapid changes on the payload and systems side of the house?

In short, the folks working Collins sustainment are clearly thinking forward to what comes next.

Which given how important building platforms with enhanced modernization and maintainability built it is a good thing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reshaping the Australian Air Force Cadets Program: A Key Element of 21st Century Defense Infrastructure

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Reshaping the Australian Air Force Cadets Program: A Key Element of 21st Century Defense Infrastructure
09/04/2018

By Robbin Laird

When one thinks of defense infrastructure, a key element is the people in the force and the infrastructure, manufacturing, science, technology, and engineering that support it.

But clearly, having a dedicated committed and capable pool of recruits both into the support structure and the force is absolute central.

But this part of the effort – working with the youth and preparing them for the careers crucial to national security – receives considerably less attention in the defense press than it should.

During my latest visit to Australia in August 2018, I had a chance to talk with Air Commodore Gary Martin, whom I first met with and interviewed when he was in Washington DC as the air attaché for the Australian Government. Previous to that he was the Air Mobility Commander in the RAAF.

https://sldinfo.com/2015/02/the-raaf-and-culture-change-building-sustainable-reach/

Martin is now in Canberra where he is Director General Cadets – Air Force, which is the first time the program is under the direction of a permanent one star that indicates the growing attention being paid to shaping a more effective set of approaches to preparing the kind of work force and support structure the ADF needs in the future.

According to a Department of Defence article on their website, the ADF Cadets program is described as follows:

The Australian Defence Force Cadets (ADF Cadets) is a personal development program for young people, supported by the Australian Defence Force in cooperation with the community. The program benefits the nation by developing the capacity of Australian youth to contribute to society, while fostering an interest in Defence Force careers and developing ongoing support for Defence.

 The ADF Cadets ‘enterprise’ comprises three Cadet organisations administered by the Navy, Army and Air Force, and a newly established ADF Cadets Headquarters, which is tasked with the governance of common elements of the three organisations’ programs.

 Approximately 26,000 cadets are currently enrolled in the three Cadet programs; 3,200 officers and instructors of cadets and ‘approved helpers’ supervise and support the young people engaged in the programs; and there are 508 ADF Cadets units across all states and territories. Cadet units occupy facilities in Defence establishments, Defence-owned or leased buildings, schools, and buildings leased by individual units.

And with regard to the RAAF Cadet program, the Department of Defence posting noted:

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) is providing increased opportunities for members of the Australian Air Force Cadets to gain exposure to aviation activities through its aviation program for cadets.

The RAAF has purchased a fleet of 22 gliders, and is leasing eight powered aircraft, to facilitate the aviation program. Australian Air Force Cadets flying training is being reviewed, with consideration of a ‘flying continuum’ that includes advanced flying to a recognised level of competency, which could be recognised for civil or military training.

According to Air Commodore Martin:

“What we do is that we work with a civil volunteer force, about 2,000 adults and approximately 7,500 Air Force cadets, between the ages of 13 and 18. The Army has 17,500 students and the Navy has about 2,500. In a size comparison, the AAFC is approximately half the size of the RAAF permanent force numbers.

He described the shift in direction of the program as the ADF looks to expand the aperture on preparation for the future.

“The program is shifting from citizen preparation as a primary task to shaping a construct where we are building from that to a broader focus on an employment or career path.

“We are aiming to help the cadets focus on the broader skill sets which the country and the ADF needs.

“By assisting them in this way we should see cadets finish their schooling, entering the right universities and/or getting the right qualifications to support the overall national effort for the defense of Australia.

“And obviously, engineering and science and technology are key skill sets from this point of view.”

Question: How are you doing that?

Air Commodore Martin: By pursuing a variety of activities that give our youth a picture of the opportunities that actually exist in our working environment.

“These range from gaining knowledge of drones, to seeing engineers at work or what Air Force is doing when the cadets come to the Avalon Air Show.

“We are intending to take them to the major aviation engineering facilities in Australia that Air Force already has working partnerships with.

“When we bring them to Avalon for the Air Show, we are arranging to take them backstage to talk with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Rolls Royce and Northrop Grumman engineers and trade show exhibitors to get a taste of what they do and get a sense of the excitement of building the future and their potential roles in that effort.”

Question: So you are taking the broader and long range view of what support to what the ADF might mean?

Air Commodore Martin: We are.

This is a really important area of our youth development.

“We are focused on ways to get them aware of what Defence and our national aerospace industry is doing in the broader sense; what they could do in Defence or what they could do in the defense industry sector in support of a national effort by Australia in the defense of our nation.”

Question: You also participate in an international program as well.

Could you describe that?

Air Commodore Martin: We have the international program where 17 nations get together annually to plan on how to have over 500 Cadets travel to host countries to expand their horizons by experiencing their cultures and where possible visit their defense forces.

“During their international travel the visiting cadets engage in a two-week intensive course of what’s going on in that country.

“They go and visit that particular country’s Cadet’s establishment, to see Cadets in operation and meet representatives to understand more of the approach that country is taking to enhance that nation’s national power.

“The program was initiated in 1947 with an exchange of 46 students between Canada and the UK .

“As our world environments are now more closely linked together and our nations share so many common issues and challenges, by conducting these visits our cadets can get a much deeper appreciation of the realities that those nations are actually facing.

“Our youth need to get that broader international perspective.

“For example, at a recent event in Australia, a Norwegian cadet got a call from home and learned that he was going to become a pilot in the Royal Norwegian Air Force and he shared that event with the other visiting national cadets that we were hosting and our Australian Cadets.

“Discussing what that meant to the Norwegian Cadet and the opportunities that now offered that young man meant a lot for his Australian and other nation cadet counterparts.

“In effect, this level of international relationship is both about shaping a broader understanding of what defines each nations’ national support, and provides the opportunity for visiting cadets to understand the international context within which the Australian defense force operates and evolves.”

China and the Politics of Space Control

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on China and the Politics of Space Control
09/03/2018

By Richard Weitz

In late August, 2018 the Chinese Foreign Ministry published its position paper regarding the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly, which will run from September 18 and October 5 in New York.

In this document, Beijing has again professed concern about the militarization of space—somewhat awkwardly given China’s growing military capabilities in this realm.

According to the paper, “The Chinese government stands for the peaceful use of outer space and opposes weaponization and arms race in outer space.”

Beijing has stated this position for years, well before President Trump and others called for a Space Force to better address Chinese threats in the space realm.

Though it began years after the U.S. and Soviet (Russian) space programs, China has demonstrated a strong commitment to develop space power. PRC leaders view development of outer space as necessary for the country to achieve military, economic, and political security.

Space provides China with ample opportunities to grow economically (i.e. commercial launches, advancing aerospace technology) and also to become stronger militarily (i.e. improving methods of accessing and controlling information).

Since Xi Jinping became president in 2013, China’s civilian space program has shown great strides. That year, China became the first country in decades to land a spacecraft on the moon. Its Jade Rabbit rover spent two years investigating the lunar surface.

Since then, China has been sending spacecraft into earth and lunar orbit in preparation for landing a spacecraft on the moon’s remote far side later this year.

Other goals include landing an astronaut on the moon by 2025, send a probe to Mars that returns soil samples to earth in 2028, and establish a permanent research and mining facility on the moon by 2050.

Chinese military writings specifically highlight the need to interfere with, damage, and destroy reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellitesto “blind and deafen the enemy.”

People’s Liberation Army analysts of U.S. and coalition military operations note that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors … will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.”

While the 2015 Chinese military strategy white paper states that the Chinese are officially opposed to the weaponization of space, it observes that the PLA shall “deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.”

The Chinese government describes its national defense policy, including space policy, as “purely defensive in nature,” but Western experts note that Mao described “active defense” as “offensive defense or defense through decisive engagements…for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive.”

In other words, Beijing’s “active defense” policy is “politically defensive,” but “operationally offensive”.

According to testimony offered earlier this year by the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, “the PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the weaponization of space.

“Beijing has invested in space system improvements, with an emphasis on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, satellite communications, satellite navigation, meteorology, and human spaceflight and interplanetary exploration.”

China also continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary’s use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict.

The latest Chinese Military Power report released last month states that Chinese strategists regard space and counterspace capabilities as “central to modern warfare.”

The report sees China’s space priorities as achieving “the unconditional security of network data across long distances, ultimately creating a global quantum network of classical (i.e.non-quantum) data secured by quantum cryptographic keys,” as well as the deployment and “hardening” of an growing constellation of multi-purpose satellites.

When Vice President Mike Pence announced the new U.S. space policy last month, he cited China’s 2007 downing of one of its satellites as a “highly provocative demonstration of China’s growing capability to militarize space.”

Since then, China has been developing a portfolio of kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry, include a direct ascent ASAT system that deploys on a ballistic missile, a co-orbital ASAT that can maneuver in space into a target, a spacecraft with a robotic arm to seize adversary satellites, and a hit-to-kill exo-atmospheric kinetic interceptor that could hit missiles as well as satellites.

The United States has more military and commercial satellites than any other country. The Pentagon relies on space- based assets for communications, reconnaissance, intelligence, navigation, and targeting.

To protect its own communications, China recently launched the world’s first quantum communications satellite.

The Trump administration has made a strong effort to counter Chinese space threats.

The administration has vowed to increase U.S. investment in anti-satellite defenses and has called for creating a new Space Force to better manage the era of renewed great power competition.

On August 28, Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford detailed plans to enhance U.S. military space capabilities by increasing lethality; strengthening international alliances; and reforming economic efficiency within the department.

The Department plans to establish a unified space command, upgrade the space acquisition processes, and work with Congress to build a separate space force.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon should continue to strive to decrease reliance on satellite resources (such as employing more land and UAV links) and make all these links more resilient by increasing redundancies in communications links and interoperability with allies and partners.

There is a need as well to expand use of commercially available launch facilities to enlarge the fleet of satellites and the means to rapidly replace them, as well as prepare, in doctrine and exercises, to fight with only degraded data and communications.

Furthermore, U.S. diplomacy needs to harmonize its space policies better with its European partners.

Despite U.S. limits on space engagement with Beijing, China has significantly increased international cooperation with other countries, especially the European Space Agency (ESA) and Roscosmos.

The ESA has designated the Chinese National Space Administration as one of its strategic partners, alongside Russia and United States.

This lack of unity on the part of Western countries makes it harder to achieve the shared goal of directing China’s space programs in less threatening directions.

The featured graphic is attributed to the following source:

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3380665/Is-China-preparing-SPACE-war-Nation-creating-military-unit-achieve-control-low-Earth-orbit-claim-experts.html

 

 

New Australian Maintenance Facility: TAE Aerospace

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on New Australian Maintenance Facility: TAE Aerospace
09/02/2018

Australia is a key member of the F-35 global enterprise and as the arrival of the first squadron approaches, the country is building the appropriate infrastructure at Williamtown and Tyndall Airbases and shaping the support structure in country.

According to an article in the Australian Defence Magazine published on August 31, 2018, the standing up of a new facility in Queensland was highlighted.

TAE Aerospace will develop a turbine engine maintenance facility in Bundamba, south-east Queensland, which will support in-country sustainment of Australia’s fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets.

The facility will enable deeper-level maintenance, where engine modules are disassembled, repaired and reassembled for testing. 

Minister for Defence Christopher Pyne said the new facility is a testament to the strength of Australia’s defence industry and the its contribution to the global F-35 Program.

“TAE Aerospace’s new facility will support maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade (MRO&U) activities for not only Australian F135 engines but also engines from around the Asia Pacific region and the world,” Minister Pyne said.

“TAE Aerospace is 100 per cent Australian-owned with 237 employees at several sites across Australia, with contracts to support Classic Hornet, Super Hornet, Growler and M1 Abram tank engines. 

“The addition of the F135 engine MRO&U activities will add a minimum of 15 aerospace technician jobs to its workforce and up to 85 additional jobs as part of the future F-35 Global Support Solution.” 

The ADF is acquiring 72 F-35A JSF aircraft to replace the current fleet of 71 ageing F/A-18A/B Classic Hornets.

Australia’s first two Australian F-35s, AU-1 and AU-2, are expected to arrive in Australia in December, and Lockheed Martin plans to deliver the next eight Australian aircraft, AU-3 to AU-10, to Luke Air Force Base in Arizona this year. The aircraft will then be delivered to Australia in pairs and are expected to achieve initial operating capability in 2020.

Australia will also be home to the F-35 South Pacific Regional Warehouse, operated by BAE Systems at RAAF Base Williamtown. Ejection seat manufacturer Martin Baker has also set up at Williamtown in advance of the F-35 arrival.

“The global F-35 Program has had a positive impact on Australia’s growing defence industry, which has collectively been awarded in excess of $1 billion in production contracts and will support up to 5000 Australian jobs by 2023,” Minister Pyne added.