It is obvious that the Australian Army needs to play a key role in providing longer range fires and active defense both on Australian territory as well as in operations not on Australian soil.

This subject was discussed at the recent Williams Foundation Seminar held in Canberra on August 23, 2918 when the focus was upon the need for Australia to develop independent strike capabilities.

This is clearly a work in progress.

With the introduction of the new NASAMS  system, the topic has gained more prominence.

(More on NASAMS below).

An article published in the official Australian Army newspaper on August 9, 2018, provided an update as seen at the Integrated Air and missile Defence seminar held in Canberra on July 25, 2018.

Through the lens of integrated battle space command, talk centered on new missile and detection technologies that afford new levels of protection for ground forces.

Maj-General Gus McLachlan said developing interoperability was key to Australia’s future defense capability.

“This is an incredibly important step for Army with genuine collaborative engagement with the Air Force and Navy.

“We are about to move into an incredible new era and we are intellectually preparing for it.”

“It is the first advanced machine assistance to help decision-making.

“We got plenty of thinking and learning to do about what this capability means for the ADF and Army has a real responsibility and opportunity to help design an integrated air and missile system.

“This is just the first part of what would truly be a joint system…..

“There’s a lot of work to do,” Army’s Director General Training and Doctrine Brig. Gen. Ben James closed the seminar saying that missile defence was integral to delivering a “one defence” approach to the battlespace.”

“This is not business as usual; this is breaking new ground for Army,” BG James said.

“It’s essential we start learning from our sister services, from our industry partners and from our coalition allies analysis of similar systems in service already.”

Appendix:

With regard to the Australians and NASSAMs, an October 4, 2017 press release from Kongsberg announced the purchase of the NASSAM by Australia.

Raytheon Australia has been identified as the Prime System Integrator and KONGSBERG will be a major sub-contractor in the program. NASAMS is a proven and fielded mobile air defence system in service with seven nations today, including Norway and the United States.

“We are pleased to see that NASAMS is recognized as the preferred ground based air defence capability solution for the Australian Army and we are looking forward to the process leading to a contract”, says Eirik Lie, President of Kongsberg Defence Systems.

The inherent flexibility and modularity of NASAMS makes it a world leading solution with unique capabilities to combat modern airborne threats, as well as having the ability to integrate with networks and a variety of different sensors and weapons.

“NASAMS is one of the most successful KONGSBERG products internationally and we are proud to be part of the Raytheon Australia team for delivery of this capability to the Australian Army”, Lie said.

And by participating in the F-35 global enterprise, Kongsberg is developing a very flexible joint strike missile which will be launched by the F-35 initially, but can operate off of ships and land as well.

And by being part of the F-35 program, the JSMs Kongsberg builds for the Norwegian planes are integrable from the ground up with other F-35 partners, two of which have shown advanced interest, namely Australia and Japan.

In a February 26, 2015 press release from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the partnership was announced between Australia and Kongsberg.

The Norwegian Ministry of Defence and the Australian Department of Defence have agreed to cooperate on the development of the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), following talks between Norwegian State Secretary Mr. Øystein Bø and his Australian colleague Mr. Stuart Robert during the Norwegian State visit to Australia this week. The agreement seeks to support the introduction of an advanced maritime strike weapon on the F-35 in the early 2020’s time frame.

Although far apart geographically, Norway and Australia share many of the same challenges. We are both maritime nations on the periphery of our immediate regions, with a large land mass and even larger maritime territories, yet relatively limited populations. This means that we have to maximize the effects of the capabilities that we invest in to ensure that they cover as much of the spectrum of operations as possible, said Norwegian Minister of Defence, Ms. Ine Eriksen Søreide.

Norway and Australia have maintained a close dialogue for several years regarding the JSM within the framework of the multinational F-35-partnership. This agreement takes the process one step further, with Australia agreeing to provide expertise in missile control and guidance systems.

The cooperation between Norway and Australia on the JSM was announced at Avalon Air Show earlier today. From the left, Deputy Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Leo Davies, Norwegian State Secretary of Defence Mr. Øystein Bø, and Executive Vice President of Kongsberg Defence Systems, Mr. Pål Bratlie

– The JSM is already a very capable missile, but with the support of Australia, we hope to make it even better. Though Australia is still a few years away from making any final decisions on its future maritime strike capability, we are encouraged by the interest they have shown for both the missile and for the capabilities of Norwegian industry. We should now continue talks between our two governments, and aim to formalize this agreement in the near future, said Norwegian Minister of Defence, Ms. Ine Eriksen Søreide.

The Joint Strike Missile is an advanced long range precision strike missile, tailor made to fit the internal weapons bay of the F-35. The F-35, combined with the JSM, provide the ability to both locate and defeat heavily defended targets, both on land and at sea, at extended ranges, significantly enhancing the strategic capabilities of the aircraft. The missile utilizes advanced navigation, a passive infrared seeker, low signature and superior manoeuvrability to ensure mission effectiveness, thereby providing user nations with significantly enhanced combat capabilities.

Norway intends to procure up to 52 F-35A aircraft to enhance the ability of its Armed Forces to meet future security challenges, with first delivery planned for late 2015. Norway’s first four aircraft will be based at the F-35 International Pilot Training Centre at Luke Air Force Base Arizona, while the first F-35 will arrive in Norway in 2017. Australia has so far committed to procuring 72 F-35A, out of a planned 100, with the first two aircraft delivered in 2014.

 

By Robbin Laird

The Williams Foundation has held a series of seminars over the past few years, which have progressively looked at the transformation of the Royal Australian Air Force and to the shaping of cross-modernizing Australian Defence Force.  Referred to overall as building a fifth generation force, the focus has been upon how force integration can be enhanced in the process of Air Force, Army and Navy modernization.

The core point is that an integrated force can provide a more effective impact for what their force can achieve as well as to enhance its deterrent impacts.

But with the growing nature of the challenges in the region, notably from the North of longer range strike and systems able to operate against Australia, what needs to be woven into the force integration process to give the Australian government a wider range of sovereign options?

While the main thrust of Australian investments is upon force integration, the sovereignty focus is very clear but how best to bring a more decisive edge to the force and give it greater reach is not.

Sovereignty is clearly evident in the shipbuilding program where Australia is tapping the United States, Britain and France to shape a way ahead in building the new Australian Navy. With the United States, a key emphasis is commonality with regard to combat systems and a continuing recognition of the key role working with the United States military in the region really is for the operational approaches of the Australian forces themselves.

Both Britain and France present interesting cases of sovereign emphasis by the most significant military powers within Europe.  For the Brits, the shipbuilding relationship is a key part of preparing for the post-Brexit process, which is rooted in the expression of sovereignty.  For the French, de Gaulle invented the French approach to sovereignty in defense within NATO by building the French nuclear deterrent.

It is clear that the working relationship with the United States, Britain and France is a work in progress while Australia crafts its way forward in shaping its 21^stcentury defense force and its approach to crisis management.

And in the background of this strategic reconfiguration is the future of Japanese security and defense policy in the region and how Japan will build its forces and invest in defense industry for the next two decades.

It is clear that United States remains the core partner for these states; but reconfiguration of those relationships is clearly under way.

The latest Williams Seminar focused on discussing the idea of building an independent strike capability Australia, one that builds upon or leverages the integrated force building process?

What should Australia do faced with nuclear threats in the region?

What should Australia do with the Chinese building out strike capabilities clearly capable of striking Australian operational forces and evolving capabilities for greater reach into the continent itself?

The seminar was held on August 23, 2018, and a report will follow.  The main thrust of the seminar was to discuss the changing strategic environment and considerations for what Australia might do next.

It was less focused on the types of systems or capabilities Australia might acquire and more focused on cutting through the Australian strategic culture to put independent options onto the table.

After the seminar, I sat down with Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation, to discuss the seminar and the way ahead for the ADF.

Question: How do you view the way ahead with regard to the evolution of the ADF to provide a wider range of sovereign options?

Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: The Defence White Paper of 2016 guides the current modernization effort. It provided a coherent framework for force modernization.

But a lot has changed since then and we need to rethink the strategic guidance and the shape some additional force modernization elements.

The future is much more unpredictable. With Trump, we have seen a honest statement of the priority of American interests.  We need to take account of the priority, which America will place, on its interests when we go forward. And to be clear, this is not simply Trump, but the reality of what powers will do in an Alliance as well.

We need a much more sovereign approach to defense.

That’s not saying we should walk away, or not contribute to or benefit from the American alliance. But, we’ve got to be much more prepared to be able to act on our own in certain circumstances.

And by being able to do so, we will be a better Alliance partner as well,

Question: There clearly is the nature of the changing threat to Australia as well, notably in terms of North Korean nuclear weapons and the Chinese pushing their capabilities out into the Pacific and expanding their regional presence as well.

 How do you view this part of the equation of the need for greater sovereignty?

Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: We need to have a greater capability to hold competitors at risk at greater range and distance.

The North Korean case shows that nuclear weapons are not going away any time soon. The Chinese have clearly focused on significant investments in longer range strike.

This means as we do the next defense review, we need to focus on options which can allow us to deal directly wit these challenges and to shape how we do so within the reworking of the relationship with our allies going forward.

We need a major reset building upon the force integration process which we have set in motion.

Do Japan or South Korea go nuclear?

We need to have a realistic discussion of the nuclear impact on our defense policy as well.

What makes sense to do?

And how to do it?

Question: The question of the reach of Australian forces in a conventional sense also raises the question of the relationship between Australian territory, notably NW and Western Australia and the evolution of your defense forces?

 How does the territorial dimension come back into play?

Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: Clearly, we need to look at ways to enhance our force mobility and to build out both active defense and long range conventional strike in our territories closest to the areas of operational interest, both ours and the competitors.

The Australian Army is focusing in part in the evolution of fires both defensive and offensive, but we need a bigger commitment on this side of the force and with longer range, which could operate from our own territory as well as being projected forward outside of Australia.

Question: How does the strategic shift in Australian industry fit into this calculus of enhanced sovereignty?

 Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: It is crucial.

As you noted, the shipbuilding side of industry is clearly about sovereignty and we need to look to expand sovereignty in the strike domain as well.

A key area going forward clearly should be in the missile development, build and sustainment area, where we can clearly build out our own capabilities in relationship with core allies also interested in this process.

And by flying the F-35 with a number of partner nations, there clearly is an opportunity to build out this capability as well.

Question: I assume if you are interested in longer range strike you would be looking to something in the range of a 2,000 mile missile but given the focus on industry and working with allies, wouldn’t a modular build process make the most sense, where you can build various ranges into your missile production based on modularity?

Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: That would make sense.

But I think we need a serious look within our focus on shaping industry that both meets Australia’s needs as well as those of key allies in the missile or strike areas.

We build ammunition and general purpose bombs in Australia but we have never taken that forward into a 21^stcentury approach to missiles and related systems. We should rethink this aspect of our approach.

There are plenty examples of success in arms exports; there is no reason we can not do so in the weapons area, for example.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By Robbin Laird

Sydney, Australia

During my August 2018 visit to Australia, I had a chance to meet with and discuss the question of the evolving approach to the defense of Australia with a member of the Australian National University, Andrew Carr.

Dr. Carr is working towards the conclusion of his forthcoming book on the defense of Australia and has looked back to identify key themes and key points in the evolution of policy over the post World War II period.

And he has done so with an eye with regard to the next phase of the evolution of Australian defense policy, one which is very likely to feature greater emphasis on Australian sovereignty and continuing the modernization of the ADF with this in mind.

Question: How would you describe the focus of your book?

Dr. Carr: It’s an effort to think through the question: “How do you actually defend a continent and land mass as large as the Australian continent?”

We have a very large landmass with a relatively small population.

“Throughout most of our history we have been part of a larger defense effort, first with regard to the British Empire, and then working with the Americans during and after World War 2.

Australians often see themselves as having to go overseas to achieve their security.

“This book addresses the importance for us to address seriously defense in our immediate region and to shape concrete ways that the continent can work strategically for us.

“In the book, I address how thinking about the continent and its role in defense has changed over time.

“With the Japanese in World War II, their primary interest in Australia was denying its use by the Americans.  During the War Prime Minister Curtin started focusing on a strategy of holding the islands to our north in the post-War period.  The British were on the way out, the Cold War was not evident, and the United States, although deeply engaged during World War II, was expected to go back to its post-World War I turtle strategy.

“Curtin’s focus was on preparing for Australia to play a key role with regional allies in taking responsibility for our part of the world around Australia and New Zealand and the South Pacific.

“There was a clear desire to carve out more capabilities for Australian sovereignty and independence as the post World War II period approached.

“But they like many later government’s did not want to pay for a force that could achieve the large task they had set.

“But it was not until the Menzies Government invested in the F-111, that we saw a commitment to resources to enhance sovereignty in the region.

“In the early 1960s, the Menzies Government invested in range of new strike capabilities. The F-111 is ordered at that point. They ordered the Oberon submarines. They make significant upgrades to the frigates. There is a significant increase in defense spending.”

Question: I assume that it was the emergence of the Indonesian threat in the 1970s, which was the next impetus to thinking about Australian defense capabilities in support of Australian interests?

Dr.. Carr: The Indonesian dynamic was a key trigger point, or to be specific Jakarta’s policy of Konfrontasi, including threats to Papua New Guinea.

“This meant that Australia had to defend against a direct threat to the then territory of Australia.

“Most of the history of the Australian military has been three independent services up to 1976. Each was very good at operating with their sister services overseas. That’s how they fought WWI and WWII, and that’s how they saw themselves.

“After 1976, you get this idea of an actual Australian defense force as a single, integrated force. Still keeps its three services, unlike Canada, but sees itself as having one larger mission, which is defending Australian interests.

“The new ADF still often wants to go back overseas, and do coalition operations, but much more as a larger unified national service, rather than being plug and play single service efforts within coalition operations.

“These efforts will lead eventually to the Defense of Australia doctrine. This process starts in the early 1970s but it is not until the mid-1980s, that greater clarity is achieved with regard to how to shape a more integrated force in service of the broader defense of Australia effort.

“But with the end of the Cold War, and the focus on global peacekeeping operations, and expeditionary engagement with coalition operations, the ADF as an integrated force for the sovereign defense of Australia does not really materialize.

“We clearly are focused upon shaping an integrated force which de facto clearly can serve sovereign purposes, but where do we take the force?

“With the kind of direct threats which a China or Indonesia can pose directly against the Australian continent, what should and could Australia do to defend the continent directly?

“This is the big question facing Australian defense in the period ahead.”

Question: You have worked what you see as key elements of the past Australian approach, which are part of the fabric of Australian defense going forward as the focus on the defense of continental Australia proceeds in the new strategic situation.

What are these basic key elements, which you have identified?

Dr. Carr: The first is that the threat emerges from the North; but our population lives in the East and South. This leads to a key challenge of geography, namely how to work the Australian geography to deal with a threat from the North?

“We are a country that doesn’t quite understand its geography in part because of where the people are clustered, and yet, Northern and Western Australia provide some of the most important geography in a defense sense.

“The second is that Australia is both a continent and an island. This reality goes to the fundamental division between the Army and Navy. A lot of Australian defense thinking actually came from the British, not just because of the kind of the cultural history, but as an island that is offshore from a heavily populated continent.

“The Australian Army thinks of itself in expeditionary terms and by that not operating on Australian soil but in expeditionary operations with allies.  How might this change with a return to considerations of leveraging Australian geography to defend the continent from threats to the North?

“The third is that the defense of Australia can not begin with a narrow continental or fortress Australia focus. It doesn’t make sense to simply line up people and give them a rifle and tell them to stand on the beach and protect the continent at that point.

“Geography matters, but you have to have at least some understanding of what’s going on beyond your borders. The great fear has always been a hostile major power having control of an island base, or some significant piece of territory just off the Australian continent that can directly threaten the continent.

“The fourth is that Australia’s greatest security threat depends on how valuable it is to its allies. In WWII, the Japanese weren’t concerned by the Australian behavior. They saw us as too small, too irrelevant, not a significant security threat.

“But, because our continent was very valuable to the Americans, in trying to respond to their sphere of influence efforts, it then became attractive to the Japanese.

“I think this is something the Australians don’t always understand, when they think about alliance relationships.

“It’s not just about Australia and America as separate countries with distinct capabilities, but it’s also about the nature of the Australian continent and its significance within the region.

“I think this will probably play out again in the future.

“The Chinese won’t see Australians as a substantial direct threat, but they will see the Australian continent as substantial base for projecting power by Australia in an allied context.”

Dr. Laird is a Research Fellow of the Williams Foundation, Canberra, Australia 

It must be remembered that the Japanese followed up their attack on Pearl Harbor a few months later with virtually the same force in a major attack on Darwin in the Northern Territories.

The featured photo highlights that attack and is credited to the RAAF.

An article by Damien Murphy published on February 18, 2017 in the Sydney Morning Herald highlighted the anniversary of the attacks brought and brought back the memory of what a threat from the North looks like to the continent:

Australia marks the 75th anniversary of the bombing of Darwin on Sunday but for generations the country was kept in the dark about the true dimensions of the Japanese attack.

At 9.58am on February 19, 1942, just four days after the supposedly impregnable British garrison in Singapore collapsed, Japanese bombers escorted by Zero fighters appeared in the skies above Darwin.

The first wave attacked the CBD and harbour infrastructure, and sank 11 ships either at anchor or berthed. A second wave came for the RAAF base.

By noon, 243 people – including 53 civilians – were dead, 400 wounded. The wharf was cut in two, 30 aircraft were destroyed and the post office levelled; postmaster Hurtle Bald, his wife Alice, daughter Iris and six post office workers died when a bomb hit their slit trench.

The dead were buried in temporary graves at Vestys Beach near the meatworks. Later, their bodies were transferred to the Adelaide River Cemetery where they lie today.

Tokyo had no intention of invading – Japanese army leaders knew they lacked the capacity – but nobody fully informed the Australian people.

There was a brief report in The Age on February 20, but Prime Minister John Curtin subsequently banned media reports on the Darwin bombing.

“Unauthorised reports of this nature cause needless anxiety, especially to wives and children who have been evacuated,” Mr Curtin said in a memo to the Advisory War Council…..