Visiting HMS Queen Elizabeth at Portsmouth

05/30/2018

By Robbin Laird

I had the chance to visit HMS Queen Elizabeth in Scotland as the carrier was being built.

During a visit to Portsmouth in late April 2018, I had a chance to see the carrier again and to talk with senior UK Navy and industrial personnel involved in working the carrier into an operational combat system.

https://sldinfo.com/2015/05/the-uss-america-cvn-78-and-hms-queen-elizabeth-crafting-capabilities-for-21st-century-operations/

The carrier will come later this year to the United States for F-35 integration efforts, and will be doing sea trials next year which will involve the USMC as well.

I had a chance during my visit to meet again with Captain (retired) Chris Alcock. The last time we met was during a meeting to discuss the carrier and the way ahead for the RAF and Royal Navy with the carrier at the Ministry of Defence in 2015.

Captain Chris Alcock was then Head of the Carrier Strike Division in Navy Command Headquarters. Hewas Programme Manager for the QEC Carriers and also responsible for capability Integration of the Carrier Air Wing into the platform, specifically LII F35B, Merlin Mk2 and Crows nest.

And during that interview he highlighted how significant a change bringing the new carrier into the UK force structure was for the future of UK defense:

 Question: How demanding a shift in RN thinking is the introduction of this ship?

Alcock: It is an important shift.

There are a lot of people that have never been on a carrier before, and the Royal Navy, since the demise of the carriers, has been  very much a frigate Navy.

We are generating a new Maritime Task Force concept (MTF) to shape the concept of operations going forward.

This clearly draws on elements of the past, but requires a fresh think as well.

People say it’s not all about the carrier, but it is all about the carrier, because that will be the center of gravity around which we will provide all the other enablers for the other elements of the task group.

The constitution of the task group is critical to depending on what we do with the carrier but the carrier and its air wing are the centerpiece enabling the entire task force.

We have worked closely with the USN and the USMC in the regeneration of Carrier Strike and the close working relationship has been hugely appreciated and also the work they have done for us and with us in support of this aim.

The build of the new carrier in the UK shaped a very innovative approach to building a new large ship which mobilized UK industry and built the ship from sections shipped from various parts of the country to the Scottish shipyard.

The HMS Queen Elizabeth Delivery Director, Jon Pearson is now at Portsmouth and Chris Alcock and I met briefly with him during this visit as well.

HMS Queen Elizabeth Delivery Director, Jon Pearson and Captain (Retired) Chris Alcock. Credit: Second Line of Defense

Pearson is now identified as the Warship Support Director and wrote this note earlier in April prior to my visit.

As Warship Support Director at BAE Systems Maritime Services, part of what I do involves overseeing the work done here at Portsmouth Naval Base to support HMS Queen Elizabeth on behalf of the Royal Navy.

You could say I know a little bit about the Royal Navy’s new flagship aircraft carrier.

My involvement in the carrier programme spans from 2003 during the completion phase, all the way through to last year when, as the Aircraft Carrier Alliance’s Queen Elizabeth Delivery Director, it was my responsibility to get her ready for her delivery to Portsmouth and hand over to the Royal Navy.

Since the beginning of the carrier programme the vessels really captured the British public’s imagination. They seem to have an affinity with the Royal Navy, the military in general, and anything connected to it.

This is the biggest ship we’ve built for the Royal Navy, and it fills a gap in capability that’s been there since the 1970s when we lost the ability to fly fixed wing aircraft from carriers, plus it’s a symbol of British military might and the role we play in the world.

Because of that, the programme has really been delivered from the outset squarely in the public eye, with scrutiny from senior politicians, senior Royal Navy officers, and senior members of all three organisations involved in the build – BAE Systems, Thales and Babcock.

That’s certainly added an extra dimension to building the largest warships the Royal Navy has ever had.

Building any first in class ship is difficult, especially the latter stages when you’re incorporating all the systems and getting it ready for trials, but building something the size of HMS Queen Elizabeth, the volumes we were dealing with on a day to day basis, was something else entirely.

We had to install over 3 million meters of cable, test 80,000 pipes, commission nearly 300 systems and handover 3,000 compartments.

But throughout the programme there has been a real sense of pride in what we have delivered, not just from the ACA but also the Royal Navy and the ship’s company in particular – they were excited about being the first ship’s company even before they had a ship they were able to sail! 

The interest around Exit Rosyth, and then the international coverage of First Entry Portsmouth, plus the thousands of people who came to Portsmouth very early that August morning to welcome her in, really showed us that our pride is shared across the nation and beyond.

Chris Alcock now works for Pearson and discussed the building of the carrier and shaping the way ahead.

“The ship was designed and built in sections.  There were 26 key sections of the ship, which were built around the country at 7 locations and taken to the shipyard in Scotland.

“Even though the tolerances were tight, when the ship was put together it created the largest warship Britain has ever built.

“It is an expression of the brilliant industrial brainsof the nation and of the nation in general; and from this point of view, it is no small engineering achievement on the part of British industry and Navy leadership.”

“The ship arrived last August and has recently been undergoing sea trials, including operating helicopters off of its deck in the Mediterranean.”

We then discussed the challenges associated with bringing such a large ship to Portsmouth and its impact on the area and upon Royal Naval operations.

Chris Alcock: “How would the enterprise to support the carrier be set up and to do so in such a manner that the carrier would not simply overwhelm the base and crowd out other key activities.

“We set in motion an 18-month training cycle to put together an enterprise approach to support the carrier in such a way as to fit into the base rather than disrupt it.

“This was a challenge as we have several hundred contractors on base to support the ship, have IT systems in place to support the workload in supporting the carrier, and have a larger crew certainly than the Type 45 destroyer which is home ported here.

“We had to look more generally at the infrastructure of the base as well, road systems, storage areas, IT systems, working the waterfront modifications, just to mention a few aspects of working a new infrastructure approach for the base.”

And a key part of shaping a new infrastructure system is clearly the logistics support for carrier operations itself.

As you drive around the base, the impact of working the logistics side of the equation is quite obvious as older facilities are being replaced and newer ones being built.

To bring the different elements together and to shape a common approach, the Queen Elizabeth-Class Portsmouth Readiness Group was created to manage the process of infrastructure change.

A five-phased training program was put in place involving the key stakeholders in the carrier, including leadership of the base, the defence equipment support elements at Abbey Wood and the heads of all the key stakeholder areas.

According to Alcock, they developed their approach from watching the learning process from the standup of Terminals 5 and 2 at Heathrow airport.  The standup at Terminal Five is a noted example of what not to do.  When they came to set up Terminal 2, a process was put in place to test the terminal extensively prior to opening it up.

“They spent a year doing the training prior to opening the terminal, including running through about 30,000 non paying passengers to test the workflow and performance of Terminal 2.”

Alcock described the process for standing up the naval base for carrier operations.

“The first phase was making sure all the documentation was right. We looked at what documentation was already in place and determined what was applicable to the carrier.

“But where there were deltas, we identified deltas.

“How we would fill that delta with a new procedure or investment in infrastructure. That was done from June through Christmas of last year.

“Then from January to the end of February, the infrastructure team leader created   a mock-up of the forward lift of the ship at a mean height of tide. And he also put a high-water and a low-water passenger access point.

‘On the ship there are two points of access, one is through the traditional way of the gang-way going up to the ship and then there’s through the aircraft lift which you’ll have seen on the U.S. carriers. You can get a high volume of people on, a high volume of people off, through a brow that goes to the aircraft lift.

“There are then two bespoke bows that go to a forward and an after reception point on the ship. They are fully hydraulic telescopic powered lifts that go in and out with the tide and they move laterally as well to cope with the movement of the ship.

“So we did a load of testing on those by creating scaffolding mock-ups with cutouts of the doors there. We put them up against it and we tested with people, we tested for emergencies, we tested getting casualties off.

“And then we got cranes in, we got lorries in, we dropped loads on them, just to get a sense of how we would do things. We got bespoke cradles made to go on top of ISO’s. So it’s a very quick lift process.

“Then we were going to have the Royal Fleet Auxiliary to come alongside and we’d use it as though it was an aircraft carrier, and then we’d test all our procedures.

“But unfortunately, due to all the operational commitments, we couldn’t get one of our own assets, so the USNS Robert E. Peary, which was in UK waters, came to Portsmouth to play this role.

“This enabled us to test the fender units which are 60 ton ballasted units that go up and down with the tide. We used the Peary to act as the surrogate carrier.

“We did this through the end of March.

“After that phase we focused on working through putting stress on the procedures to see how they worked and to make modifications as we needed to.

“As a result when the ship arrived in August, we were ready to support her.

And the key point of all the preparation to stand up 21stcentury carrier support?

“She’s here, she’s fully integrated into the Naval Base, and it’s business as usual now.”

The featured photo shows HMS Queen Elizabeth, weighing 65,000 tonnes and measuring 900ft, being guided into port by two tugboats and greeted by a flotilla of vessels in August 2017.

GARETH FULLER/PA

The following article in The Times provides a good photo essay of the ship coming into Portsmouth Harbour for the first time.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/in-pictures-hms-queen-elizabeth-ii-berths-at-portsmouth-harbour-cx02llsht

For our visit to our interview with the captain of the USNS Peary after the Bold Alligator 2012 exercise where an Osprey had landed on a supply ship for the first time, see the following:

TAK-ING the Supply Ship to a Whole Other Level

Venezuela and the Varieties of “Hybrid War”

By Stephen Blank

For Clausewitz war was a chameleon.

And what we now call hybrid war is inherently a protean chameleon-like process encompassing many dimensions of human activity that are or have hitherto not been thought to be connected with war.

Venezuela, both of its own accord and as a Russian proxy embodies that chameleon-like condition even though it is clearly is a failing if not failed state.

Indeed, Venezuela’s status as a failed state makes it an inherent challenge if not threat to Latin American and Caribbean security.

Caracas’ policies and Russia’s use of Venezuela as a proxy for its own interests adds to the security challenges manifest in what we now call hybrid war and not only in Latin America or the Caribbean.

In and of itself Venezuela under the current Maduro regime has endeavored to preserve the policies embraced by Hugo Chavez.

Among such policies are the following:

  • Sponsorship of a Bolivarian Revolution throughout Latin America,
  • Running guns to the FARC during the Colombian insurgency,
  • Collaborating with Iran’s nuclear program,
  • Providing a haven for Arab terrorists in Latin America, becoming a transshipment center for drug trafficking throughout the Americas,
  • Buying billions in Russian arms and distributing them to insurgents across Latin America (including the FARC),
  • And Supporting Russian efforts to set up intelligence cooperation and organizations for that purpose with like-minded Latin American governments, e.g. Ecuador, relieving sanctions on Cuba  etc.

Furthermore, Chavez importuned Moscow not just for a formal alliance, which it resisted, but also for participation in the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribean (ALBA).

President Medvedev in 2008 indicated Russia’s willingness to discuss participation in this organization since it accords with Russia’s ideas about a multipolar world and international division of labor.

This move not only added a seeming legitimacy to Moscow’s presence in Latin America it accorded with past policy aiming to be a member of any multialteral associatoin that would welcome it.

Thus Russia expressed to Argentina its interest in becoming an observer at the South American Defense Council that is part of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

Russia also wants to participate as an observer in the Latin America Association of Training Centers for Peace Operations (Alcopaz)

In other words, Venezuela was and remains not only a center in suport of insurgency and what we now call (whether rightly or not) hybrid war, it also made itself available to Moscow as a willing proxy for the advancement of Rusisan military andpolitical goals in Latin America. 

And this relationship has lasted for over a decade.

More recently Moscow through Igor Sechinb’s company,  Rosneft, has sprung to the relief of Venezuela by buying up its debt in return for equity in PDVSA the national oil ocmpany.

This also gives Moscow potential leverage over the CITGO gasoline company network in the U.S. which is 50% owned by PDVSA.  Should PDVSA go bankrupt or more likely Venezuela default on its debts, an outocme that seems increaisngly inevitable, especially in thelight of its falling oil production, Moscow stands to gain the chance to take ocntrol of CITGO.

Rosneft need only buy a few bonds to take over PDVSA.

But beyond this possiblity we can easily envision another, a more direct military possiblity should Venezuela default.

Moscow has used debt for equity schemes in the former Solviet  territory to take over not just critical natioinal econoic sctors among the successor states but also to  compel them to grant it bases in perpetuity or at least for  many decades.

A similar process is occurring in Syria where the Rusisan intervention has allowed Moscow to gain not only privileged niches in Syria’s economy,  particularly the energy sector, but also a naval a base at Tartus and the KHmein im Air Base.

In Venezuela’s case we could well see a situaiton emerging under conditons ofdefault where Moscow not only seizes control of PDVSA but also uses the leverage it hasaccrued to  extract governmental support for a naval base in Venezuela.

This is hardly as far-fetched as it may seem to some observers.

On February 26, 2014 Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia would establish permanent bases in Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Singapore, the Seychelles Islands off Africa.

While these might not be naval bases on the order of the formal U.S. appellation of naval bases across the globe, it is clear that these would be used, inter alia, to facilitate Russian power projection and intelligence gathering as well as to sustain Russian political influence in the host country.

We already see the navy moving forward on its plans for bases throughout the Levant and the Eastern Mediterranean and Nicaragua is already very deeply penetrated by Russia.

A naval base there is by no means out of the question.

Similarly an air or naval base in Venezuela in return for financial and political support cannot be summarily excluded from the realm of possibility.

And at the same time Venezuela’s ongoing willingness to be Moscow’s proxy allows it to be used for purposes going beyond South America.

It is safe to say that Venezuela now depends on Russia for its economic survival and serves Moscow in ways that go beyond Latin America.

In November 2017, Russian propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik disseminated a barrage of messages on social media related to Venezuela and the ideas of its late leader Hugo Chavez to launch a withering information attack on Spain in the aftermath of the referendum on Catalonian independence.

Since then it has become a matter of public record that Moscow has routed thousands of bots and cyber-attacks on Spain in support of the Catalonian referendum on independence through Venezuela to make it more difficult to trace them and to pretend that they originated in Spanish speaking countries.

This online campaign demonstrated how Russian media access in Latin America enables Moscow to obtain the means by which it can wage information war against Spain and other Luso-Hispanic movements and communities in both the Western and Eastern hemispheres.

Indeed, US officials have recently reiterated charges that Russia is interfering in Mexico’s upcoming presidential elections.

None of the actions undertaken by Caracas in its own behalf or on behalf of Russia amounts to a casus belli or an example of war, classically understood.

But its direct and proxy actions, taken in their totality, highlight the protean political, economic, informational, and military dimensions of what is now called hybrid war, a phenomenon that “transgresses” conventional lines between war and non-war or peace.

Venezuela’s actions and role fully reflect the chameleon-like nature of contemporary war and will continue to do so.

And when the state fails completely as seems ultimately likely not only will we see the real possibility for large-scale internal violence, that violence could conceivably “jump” the state’s borders and engulf other Latin American countries in its flames.

As Venezuela suggests today, peacetime, at least for aggressor states, is increasingly nothing more than a cover for preparatory moves in a wartime scenario below the threshold that would lead to large-scale kinetic clashes.

The lessons it offers therefore merit careful and ongoing scrutiny and not only In Latin America.

Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow of the American Foreign Policy Council

The featured photo shows Russia’s President Vladimir Putin meeting with the President of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro in the Kremlin, October 2017. Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru.

The Royal Marines Receive Their First New Helicopter for HMS Queen Elizabeth Operations

The HMS Queen Elizabeth is designed as a fast jet carrier for strike operations but also able to operate assault operations as well.

For the assault mission, Leonardo has developed a new variant of the Merlin helicopter.

According to a story published on the UK Ministry of Defence website on May 24, 2018, the arrival of the new helicopter was highlighted:

The helicopter, known as the Commando Merlin Mk4, has been upgraded to a faster and more powerful aircraft than its predecessor.

It now sports a maritime grey coat, has a folding main rotor and tail, upgraded flight controls and a tactical computer.

The modifications are designed to ensure it can now operate from sea, and it will take off from ships including the UK’s new 65,000-tonne aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth.

A total of 25 Commando Merlin aircraft will be delivered to the air wing of the Royal Marines – the Commando Helicopter Force (CHF) –- who will use them to deliver troops and supplies from sea to land.

Defence Minister Guto Bebb said:

“This new version of the Merlin will provide an essential bridge between sea and land for our Marines operating from ships, including our brand-new aircraft carriers.

This fleet will deliver troops and supplies to the centre of the action, be that a conflict zone or the site of a humanitarian disaster, as well as providing search and rescue cover.

Flown from the Yeovil factory to now be homed here, this is another way defence is supporting the South West, where we spent over £5bn last year – more than any other region in the UK.”

The Commando Merlin Mk4 aircraft, an upgrade from the Merlin Mk3 standard, are being delivered through a £388 million contract between the MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) and Leonardo Helicopters, supporting 175 skilled jobs at Leonardo in Yeovil, and a further 500 across the UK supply chain.

Last year the MOD’s highest spend per person in the UK was in the South West, where £920 was spent for each member of the population – totalling around £5,079,000,000.

Defence spending in the region also supported one in every 60 jobs there – the highest proportion of jobs support by MOD expenditure in the UK, totalling 33,500 jobs.

DE&S Director Helicopters Air Vice-Marshal Graham Russell said:

“DE&S is proud to have delivered the first Merlin Mk4 to the Royal Navy. Today underscores that DE&S and their industrial partners are delivering. And delivering more with less, thanks to our effective change programme and fantastic staff.

“We look forward to all 25 aircraft being fully operational by 2023. DE&S will also ensure the Commando Merlin are supported with a full training and support solution, so they are always available to be deployed across the globe.”

The delivery will allow air crews to familiarise themselves with the Commando Merlin before they enter service, expected in the summer. They have been acquired to replace the veteran Sea Kings.

When not deployed on operations the helicopters will be based at RNAS Yeovilton, the home of CHF since the unit was formed in 1997.

CHF, known as the ‘Junglies’, have served in a commando support role in theatres of operations including Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan.

It’s the ability to fold the tail section – which has been completely rebuilt for the Mk4 – and the rotor heads which assist flying from Royal Navy carriers in particular.

Colonel Lenny Brown RM, the Officer Commanding Commando Helicopter Force said:

“Commando Helicopter Force provides aerial support to the Royal Marines, be they at sea, in an assault ship or in the sand and dust of Afghanistan.

“My air crews will soon begin training to fly the Commando Merlin from the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers, marking the start of a new era of Commando support operations.”

The featured photo shows the delivery of the first of a fleet of new helicopters designed for Royal Marine aircraft carrier operations. Crown copyright

 

Navigating the Way Ahead for a Fifth Generation-Enabled Combat Force: The Perspective of Maj. General Morten Klever

05/29/2018

By Robbin Laird

The Royal Norwegian Air Force is transitioning from an F-16 to an all F-35 air combat force as part of both Air Force modernization and overall defense transformation for the Norwegian forces.

The coming of the F-35 and the interaction between the standup of the F-35 and shaping a way ahead for the RNoAF was laid out and discussed.

In my conversation with the Norwegian head of the F-35 program, Major General Morten Klever, we had a chance to discuss key elements of shaping a way ahead, which would optimize the contributions of the air system to the transformation process.

We started with a base line reality as seen from Norway.

Major General Klever: “The plane is performing very well.

“The capabilities are superb.

“The feedback we have from the pilots is excellent and we are clearly looking forward to the impact of the aircraft or more accurately, the air system can have on RNoAF, and more generally upon the Norwegian armed forces.”

He underscored that it would take time as well because moving beyond legacy thinking and legacy cultures is part of the transition challenge.

Yet “pilots are already starting to work with the Navy and the Army and to explore ways they might work the F-35 with the ground and maritime forces.”

As the standup of the air system is put in place, it is important to generate best practices to ensure that the innovations, which the air system might allow, are realized.

Or put another way, it is important to lay a foundation that goes in the right direction rather than constraining the air system with regard to antiquated practices or legacy thinking that will reduce the impact, which the new air system can have on the combat force.

One key aspect of change, which is crucial for the F-35 weapons system itself, is expanding the ability to rapidly add capabilities, based on emerging threats. 

Major General Klever: “We need to find ways to speed up the software development and insertion processes and to allow the warfighting experience of the entire range of partners to shape that software development process as appropriate.”

Another key aspect of change is to ensure that an enterprise approach can be instituted from the performance of the software on the aircraft to its replication in the simulators.

This is especially important as the training dimension for fifth generation enabled combat will require expanded training spaces.

And even though Norway has significant air space in which to operate, there is little interest in letting potential adversaries learn how coalition F-35s will work together to empower and extend defensive and offensive force.

Virtual integration of aircraft and simulators across the enterprise and between partners will enhance daily training, and turn out to be a force multiplier in operations.

Major General Klever: “This means that we will still need to train in the United States and elsewhere, but even more importantly we will need to find ways to connect our air forces across key coalition partners to shape extended live virtual constructive training as well.”

And the infrastructure supporting the F-35 as a global air system needs to be shaped effectively.

This means that a global sustainment approach, grounded in an effective regional support structure, is established so that fifth generation aircraft can fly to the crisis rather than having to move large amounts of equipment prior to setting up and operating.

Major General Klever underlined the central importance of such an effort and expressed his concerns with the way ahead.

“The USAF is taking over the global sustainment approach as early as 2019.

“And currently, the USAF is continuing its legacy approach, , where the USAF transports its support equipment and parts to the fight, rather than relying on a more agile support structure.

“And even though they have an excellent PBL in the  C-17 program, generally they do not do performance based logistics, and that is what is needed for this program.

“The USAF is currently too committed to a strategy of organic ownership of parts.”

Major General Klever argued that the partners did not sign up for such an approach. 

Under the leadership of JPO, all partners and services have designed a global sustainment concept to be implemented and from this standpoint the USAF could learn from partners, notably UK and the RAF and their approach to aircraft availability.

My visit to the UK the week after this interview highlighted how significantly the RAF is innovating with regard to Typhoon support and how those innovations are clearly relevant to the F-35 2.0 approach to sustainment.

And during that visit, the RAF maintenance community highlighted a visit of then then head of the Joint Program Office, Lt. General Bogden, who kept focusing on the legacy question of trust: how could I know the part was there when I needed it.”

During a visit to RAF Coningsby a few years ago, he repeatedly asked that question to the RAF maintainers who all had the same answer: that is the wrong question.  We will ensure that the aircraft going into combat has parts priority and we have set up a system to ensure that that happens.

And for Major General Klever, the key is getting the right support to the right aircraft at the right time, at the right place.

That will NOT happen unless there is a global sustainment approach with an established management structure supported by agreed business rules to ensure priorities are supporting the needs of the warfighter.

Major General Klever underscored that Norway has had an excellent experience with Pratt and Whitney with regard to a PBL contract on F-16 engines and P&W is currently standing up a support structure in Norway for the F-35.

He believed that the some US services could learn from the partners on this issue; and more to the point, this is what the partners and services signed up to; not a legacy maintenance and support structure for their F-35s.

And with allies flying as many F-35s as the US in the next few years, clearly the U.S. needs to pay attention to this approach.

And beyond that, if the F-35 will enable the kind of military transformation necessary to turn adversary anti-access and aerial-denial bastions into Maginot Lines, an ability to provide combat sustainment at the point of critical interest is the key.

The image put by one analyst in a discussion about the shift highlighted that when United Airlines flies to Australia it does not have a cargo plane carrying parts to ensure that it can fly back.

Major General Klever concluded: “How often have you missed a flight because of unavailability of aircraft due to maintenance?

“The commercial world has taught us a significant lesson about the way ahead.

“In the end, this boils down to affordability, and subsequently increased operational effect.”

The featured photo shows Maj. Gen. Morten Klever, the program director of the Norwegian F-35 program, accepts the first two Norwegian F-35 Lightning IIs after they arrived at Luke Air Force Base, Ariz., Nov. 10, 2015.

Shortly after, a Norwegian pilot flew the F-35 for the first time, in conjunction with the Royal Norwegian Air Force’s birthday.

(U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Staci Miller)

The Arrival of the Sea Ceptor Missile System

“A world-class missile system that will protect the Royal Navy’s new aircraft carriers has officially entered service, Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson has announced  on May 24, 2018.”

According to a story published on the UK Ministry of Defence website on May 24, 2018:

Sea Ceptor provides a powerful shield against airborne threats, including hostile combat jets, helicopters and other missiles, and has been developed and manufactured through Ministry of Defence contracts worth around £850m.

It will be carried by the Royal Navy’s Type 23 frigates, and has been successfully demonstrated through a trials and test firing campaign that started last year. Most recently, Plymouth-based HMS Montrose became the third ship to test fire the system.

Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said:

“Sea Ceptor will protect our nation against the intensifying threats we face today and in the future, giving our ships a powerful shield against everything from supersonic missiles to enemy fighter jets.

“Fitting our warships with this ground-breaking technology not only protects our Navy but shows we are world leaders at sea. HMS Argyll will be the first ship to deploy with this cutting-edge system when she heads to support peace and security in the Asia Pacific region later this year.”

The announcement, made at the RUSI Sea Power Conference in London, follows detailed analysis of data gathered during the first of class firing trials by HMS Argyll, which took place last year. HMS Westminster and HMS Montrose, the second and third ships to be fitted with Sea Ceptor, have since also carried out successful firings.

Sea Ceptor has been designed and manufactured by MBDA and is directly supporting 600 jobs in Bristol, Stevenage and Bolton as part of the Team Complex Weapons partnering agreement between MOD and MBDA.

The first firings of Sea Ceptor were conducted from HMS Argyll at the Hebrides range off the coast of Scotland and saw the system tested against a range of complex scenarios – including engaging multiple targets at once.

Sea Ceptor is a major improvement on the existing Seawolf missile system which is being replaced. It offers improved performance against current and projected future threats, the ability to engage multiple targets, and allows the frigates to protect escorted vessels. The system is to be fitted to the Royal Navy’s new Type 26 frigates.

Richard Smart, Director Weapons for the MOD’s procurement organisation Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), said:

“Sea Ceptor’s entry into service with the Royal Navy is a significant milestone, a massive achievement for everyone involved and a proud moment for the team.

“It’s really exciting to be delivering a new capability that will form part of the protection for the new aircraft carriers and will help to keep our service personnel and our country safe.”

Recently, HMS Montrose took part in the third test firing of the system and successfully intercepted a fast-moving drone target. Within seconds of the missile bursting from the ship’s silo, the simulated threat was destroyed.

Commander Conor O’Neill, the Commanding Officer of HMS Montrose, said:

“The test firing we carried out represents the successful culmination of a great deal of hard work by many people from Babcock, the Short Range Air Defence team, DE&S, MBDA and the Royal Navy.

“I am extremely proud of my ship’s company for their professional attitude which enabled the test firing to go so smoothly. This missile system represents a vastly-improved capability for the Royal Navy, and puts us ahead of the game in being able to defend ourselves and our new aircraft carriers from threat.”

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/850m-sea-ceptor-missile-system-enters-service-with-royal-navy

The featured photo shows Sea Ceptor missile system as sit enters service with Royal Navy. Crown copyright.

Royal Netherlands Air Force Receives New UAV Simulator: A Contribution from the European Defence Agency

The Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) 306 Squadron at Leeuwarden Air Base received a desk-top simulator for UAV training.

The simulator is part of the Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) Training Technology Demonstrator (TTD) project managed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) and is part of a network of training simulators for unmanned aircraft.

The MALE was established to provide up to nine networked procedural trainers to the MALE RPAS community.

The multinational European MALE RPAS shares operational experience and maintenance of similar assets, logistics, training, doctrine, concepts and procedures.

Participating countries can share information and experiences directly with each other.

https://militarysimulation.training/air/rnlaf-acquires-uav-simulator/

 

Shaping a Way Ahead: The Perspective from the Norwegian Joint Headquarters

By Robbin Laird

The Norwegians are reworking their defense systems to shape a 21stcentury capability which can enhance their own capabilities but importantly work those capabilities into allied ready combat forces.

It is about shaping an effective 21stcentury combat force which when combined with allies provides a very credible deterrent force.

And given the proximity to Russia and the lack of strategic depth, it needs to be deterrence in depth back through the North Atlantic and continental Europe.

The Norwegians are adding new capabilities, like the F-35, the P-8, a new tanker, new missiles and other combat capabilities.  But they are reworking their infrastructure as well to work more effectively in both the national and NATO interests.

One aspect of this is reworking the C2 systems within Norway, including building new or rebuilding older, whichever way, one wants to put it, within the Norwegian Joint Headquarters.

According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence:

The Norwegian Joint Headquarters plans, conducts and leads the Norwegian Armed Forces’ operations in times of peace, crisis and war.

​​​​​​​The Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) operates day and night, and has the overall command and control of all military activity in Norway. It also commands the Norwegian military personnel abroad. 

NJHQ is located in a mountain complex about 22 km from the city of Bodø in Northern Norway. From its joint operation centre, experienced officers continuously monitor the activity in Norway’s vast land and sea territories.

This is possible thanks to our many sensors such as radars, the Coast Guard and the maritime surveillance aircraft P-3 Orion. The headquarters gathers all the information and makes a complete picture of the current situation.

This picture is shared with other departments in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and with NATO.

The NJHQ Commander is the Chief of Defence’s most important advisor in questions concerning military operations and activity.

NJHQ M​AIN TASKS:

  • Keep an eye with Norway’s vast sea and air territories, and have a current understanding of the overall situation.
  • Exercise sovereignty in Norway’s land, sea and air territories – and exercise national jurisdiction in these areas.
  • Be present, and be able to handle crisis of any kind.
  • Support civil society.
  • Plan and lead military exercises.
  • Provide control and suppo​rt to Norwegian forces in international operations.

The operations center is located in a mountain facility and is focused on providing a common operational picture for the forces and for NATO as well as building modern C2 capabilities as well to leverage the changes underway to provide for enhanced situational awareness as well.

Recent Russian exercises have highlighted the importance not only of having rapid acquisition of an accurate combat picture but an ability to rapidly respond with the right force in the right place to defend Norway.

The Russians have been simulating attacks against Norway over the past couple of years. Thomas Nilsen in article published by the Barents Observer on March 5, 2018 provided an overview on recent Russian actions.

“Less than a year ago, on March 24th, Russian bombers were flying tactical flights towards the intelligence service’s installations in Vardø. The bombers were conducting offensive profiles before they returned to bases on Kola. A total of nine aircraft participated in the operation,” said Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde in his annual speech at Oslo Military Society….

Two months later, Russian bombers were again simulating an attack against targets even further west in Northern Norway, the intelligence director could tell.

“Also, on the 22nd of May last year were Russian aircraft again flying tactical flights towards a fleet of NATO vessels exercising in the Norwegian Ocean. They conducted offensive operations before they returned to different bases on the Kola Peninsula,» Morten Haga Lunde explained. 

“A total of 12 aircraft participated in this operation, including MiG-31, Fencer [Su-24], Fullback [Su-34] and Backfire [Tu-22M]…..”

Russia’s simulated offensive operations against Northern Norway did not stop with that, the intelligence director told.

“Less than a week later, on May 27 was a similar mission directed towards our military installations in the Bodø area. This happened in connection with a larger allied air force exercise led by Norway in cooperation with Sweden and Finland. Nine [Russian] aircraft participated in the operation…”

Talking about Russia’s largest military exercise last autumn, the Zapad-2017, Haga Lunde said Iskander missile systems were moved to an area close to the Norwegian border. 

“Another significant element in connection with Zapad it that the missile system Iskander was transferred to the high north, specifically to the Pechenga valley, less than 40 kilometers from Storskog, approx. 15 kilometers from Korpfjell, not far from the border to Norway…..”

At Bodø Airbase, I had a chance to meet with Brigadier General Jan Ove Rygg and to discuss the geographical situation facing Norway as well as the changes being made to enhance the operational picture and to improve crisis management capabilities going forward.

CV Jan Ove Rygg (English)

The map below provides one with a sense of how Norway looks at the Russian challenge.

The Russians are building out infrastructure in the High North and even if the primary purpose not might be military, the build out of infrastructure does provide for presence, engagement and can host the operation of dual capable systems.

And the vast maritime zones surrounding Norway provides another challenge to ensure that threats can be identified monitored and dealt with.

With significant shipping in the area, determining anomalies and threats to be dealt with is an ongoing challenge.

http://www.highnorthdialogue.no/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Haakon-Tronstad.pdf

It is clearly not a zero sum game with the Russians, as Norway works with Russia on a number of issues, such as fisheries.  The two countries collaborate on ensuring that fishing in the maritime zones is regulated and “farmed” rather than exploited.

The goal is to have a sustainable fisheries industry and the two countries cooperate closely on this commercial and environmental objective.

In other words, a major demand is to be able to provide the military and civilian authorities with accurate and timely information through progress in situational awareness capabilities.

Brigadier General Rygg: “Everything that flies in Norway to support the government is operated by the air force.

“This means that we work closely with civilian authorities to provide for capabilities such as search and rescue and coast guard activities.”

With the coming of new ISR capabilities, such as P-8 and F-35, it will be an opportunity to leverage these new systems to enhance the situational awareness picture and to provided targeted information to decision makers to support cricis management efforts as well.

Brigadier General Rygg“I do not want to turn the F-35 into an ISR asset but it can cleaelry contribute to our efforts.

“More generally, the question how do we work ISR and C2 with the new assets?

“How do we use them in ways that inform us and not a potential adversary?”

The High North for Norway is a way of life, not some future scenario of activity being opened by global warming.  As such, this means that activity needs to be supported and monitored.

Brigadier General Rygg: “The maritime situation is changing as the Arctic changes and we are seeing significant growth in tourism.

“The problem is that with the large cruise ships, if there is an accident, we will be called upon to contribute assets, which we will do.

“But the best form of working rescue if a large cruise ship goes down will be another ship.”

The change in our ISR capabilities will flow into our National Joint Headquarters.  And we need to work those evolving capabilities with evolving C2 capabilities as well.

Brigadier General Rygg: “We are building out new C2 capabilities within the National Joint Headquarters.  It is about technology and reworking the workflow.

“We are bringing the key players into a close working relationship within the mountain to provide for better crisis management support as well.”

As infrastructure changes, the focus will as well to provide for crisis management support.

Brigadier General Rygg: “We are shifting from a classic joint targeting approach to a joint effects approach.  Every time that you do something with the military, you are creating an effect.

“We are fielding new systems, which provide capabilities we have not had in the past.

“How do we use these systems to create the appropriate joint effect?”

The kind of C2 system needed is clearly an agile, scalable and flexible one.

Brigadier General Rygg: “We may need to provide for mission control where the autonomy of key systems will be maximized.

“We may need to have a tight hierarchical C2 system.

“It depends on the threat; it depends on the mission and on the crisis management situation.

“But we need to build in redundancy and flexibility from the ground up.

“And we are.”

The featured photo shows the Norwegian Joint Headquarters. Credit: Norwegian Ministry of Defence

 

The Coming of HMS Queen Elizabeth: A Trigger Point for UK Defense Transformation

05/27/2018

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I had a chance to visit Portsmouth, UK and talk with senior Royal Navy officers about the coming of the carrier and did so after talking with the team of senior RAF and Royal Navy officers standing up F-35 at RAF Marham.

Those interviews will be published in the next few weeks.

But getting a chance to see HMS Queen Elizabeth again and to talk with the RAF and the Royal Navy about her as well provided an opportunity to think about the context in which the carrier is being launched and about its impact on that context.

I have just finished a new Special Report which focuses on the approach of the Nordics to the strategic shift and the need to operate in what a senior Norwegian official referred to as the “new normal,” namely, dealing with the impact of Russian capabilities and behavior on the defense of the North Atlantic.

This has had a major impact on the UK, which the Chief of the Royal Air Force highlighted during his presentation earlier this year in Canberra at the Williams Foundation seminar on the strategic shift:

Let me offer some examples of how this feels at the moment from a British perspective. Just over two weeks ago, a foreign country, Russia, used military-grade nerve agent in an attempt to murder people on the streets of the United Kingdom. 

Not only an extraordinarily aggressive and reckless act, but the first offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since 1945.

Russia’s also illegally annexed Crimea, the first time since the Second World War that one sovereign nation has forcibly annexed territory from another in Europe. This is in addition to the appalling destruction, which has been visited on the Syrian civilian population by the Russian military itself, and the criminal activities of the Russian state under Putin in cyberspace and elsewhere; they’re well known.

So the post-Second World War consensus that has provided the basis of the rules-based international order and, I might say, peace in Europe, is being challenged and undermined.

We must respond, collectively, to reassure our citizens that hostile acts by Russia against our countries, our interests, and our values, will not be tolerated. And closer to home here, we can see many of these same issues and concerns being played out in relation to, for example, North Korea.

The UK like several other liberal democracies are responding to the strategic shift by transforming their military capabilities.

But the UK has another strategic dynamic at play, namely, the negotiation of it new relationship with the European Union, known as Brexit. 

A key aspect of defining a post-Brexit Britain is clearly reworking the nature of the UK defense relationship with Europe as well sorting out how UK defense transformation relates to a post-Brexit UK defense narrative.

The new UK carrier is coming into this strategic context, which is complex enough, without the considerations of operationally standing up the carrier.

And the new carrier is itself a trigger or magnet to a UK force transformation process.

In the recent update published this year by the UK government of its earlier 2015 defense review, the carrier was highlighted a centerpiece of joint force transformation.

“The Joint Force that we are building will need to be versatile and agile.  It will need to be effective in the full range of environments and across all five domains – land, sea, air, space and cyber.

“It will be international by design, routinely exercising and operating with allies and partners.

“It will be credible and capable of addressing state and non-state threats both alongside other nations and on our own.”

“Notably, the report then identified the major elements of defense modernization designed for Joint Force 2025 to meet these criteria and with little surprise the first one identified was as follows:

“A maritime task group centered on a Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carrier with F-35 Lightning combat aircraft.”

Most of the analysis of the new carrier really focuses on the platform and what is necessary to get that platform operational but that is far too narrow an approach. 

The carrier is a centerpiece, trigger or magnet for broader UK defense transformation within a unique historical context, namely, the broader strategic shift to dealing with higher end operations and the coming of Brexit.

From a force structure transformation piece, the focus on the carrier can be approached in several ways.

The first way is to look at the workups and training associated with getting the carrier ready for its 2021 maiden deployment.

This is a significant challenge and the focus of attention of the Royal Navy and its industrial partners and a major element of my discussions while at Portsmouth.

From this point of view, the integration of the aircraft to fly on the carrier is a major challenge as well, and includes three new aircraft, the F-35, Commando Merlin, and the Crow’s Nest.

The second way is to look at the impact of the new carrier on the Royal Navy as it shifts from a single ship deployment focus to reshaping the Navy as a maritime task force navy. 

And given how different the new UK carrier is from the US large deck carriers, this maritime task force will draw upon US experience but shape a new approach as well.

The shift to a maritime task force requires other changes as well with new shapes and capabilities coming to the fleet, new aircraft, new missiles and ultimately directed energy as well to the force.

The third way to look at the carrier is how the coming of the F-35 to the RAF and Royal Navy will intersect with the global partners also flying the aircraft, and notably the partners within Europe. 

With the UK flying the same aircraft as the Northern Europeans, including the Dutch, this shapes new opportunities and capabilities as well.

And the close working relationship with the US Navy and Marine Corps will be evident as the HMS Queen Elizabeth comes this summer for F-35 integration training off of the Virginia Coast and when the Marines operate off of the ship, including next year during further ship trials off of the British coast as well.

The fourth way to look at the carrier is the impact of distributed decision-making, distributed operations and mobile basing upon the concepts of operations which the carrier will enable and participate in.

Put in another way, the concepts of operations being shaped 21stcentury combat forces are in transformation, a transformation which is built around distributed capabilities, distributed C2 and flexible or agile basing.

The new carrier both supports and interacts with all of these trends.

How will the carrier both contribute to and learn from these broader macro allied military transformation dynamics?

The fifth way to look at the coming of the carrier is to examine its intersection with and contribution to the transformation of airpower more generally.

The F-35 is a multi-domain flying combat system, rather than being a legacy multi-mission aircraft.

This provides an opportunity to both leverage and reshape multi-domain capabilities, as other aircraft are modernized or new assets added to the air combat force.

Clearly, the modernization of Typhoon is being done in close alignment with the coming of the F-35 and provides a significant plus up of the overall air combat force.

The coming of the P-8 to RAF Lossiemouth will provide as well a maritime domain awareness strike aircraft, which will provide a significant capability, which will be part of the operational envelope of the new maritime task force navy being forged around carrier.

In short, one can take a picture of the carrier.

But what one is not seeing is the tissue of relationships being reshaped by what you see in that picture.

It is a multi-domain warfare asset, which can only be understood as a driver for change within an overall UK defense transformation process and the new strategic setting.