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The Marine Corps is being shaped for the transition from a slow motion ground war to higher intensity warfare.
This reshaping is being driven by the new aviation assets, the introduction of broad range digital interoperability within the MAGTF and by evolving concepts of operations associated with distributed warfare.
At the heart of the transition is an ability to leverage all of the key combat assets, ground, sea or in the air and to deliver a force able to operate in the distributed battlespace.
Last August, Lt. General (Retired) Davis, former Deputy Commandant of Aviation, highlighted the nature of the transition as applied to the electronic warfare case.
He described the USMC transition from a core aircraft delivering an EW effect to building out the MAGTF to include ubiquitous access to non-kinetic electronic warfare capabilities.
The core approach going forward is very clear.
“MAGTF EW transitions the Marine Corps from a focus on low density/high-demand EW platforms, to a distributed, platform-agnostic strategy – where every platform contributes/ functions as a sensor, shooter and sharer – to include EW.”
“Under MAGTF EW the Marine Corps is leveraging emerging technologies and integrating multiple platforms, payloads, nodes, and capabilities to provide commanders with an organic and persistent air and ground EW capability.”
Davis underscored that with the changing nature of warfare and how the Marines operate, shaping a distributed strategy was a necessity, not an option.
“We operate on ships, from ships to shore and ashore.”
“We cannot simply have an on call EW asset.
“We can confront the threat requiring an EW capability anywhere we operate.”
An additional case study of the evolution was evident in the Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course held in April 2017 by MAWTS-1 at Yuma Air Station.
During the exercise, the F-35B was being integrated into the overall MAGTF operations including integrated target identification and fire support to the new HIMARS system.
According to the USMC, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System is described as follows:
HIMARS is a C-5 transportable, wheeled, indirect fire, rocket/missile system capable of firing all current and future rockets and missiles in the Multiple-Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions (MFOM).
The HIMARS launcher consists of a fire control system, carrier (automotive platform), and launcher-loader module that performs all operations necessary to complete a fire mission. The basic system is defined as one launcher, one resupply vehicle, and two resupply trailers.
HIMARS addresses an identified, critical warfighting deficiency in Marine Corps fire support. HIMARS employs the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rocket to provide precision fires in support of the MAGTF.
HIMARS is a transformational, responsive, general-support/general-support reinforcing precision indirect fire weapon system that accurately engages targets at long ranges (in excess of 40 miles) with high volumes of lethal precision fires in all weather conditions and throughout all phases of combat operations ashore.
But this is a platform-centric description not one which indicates how it can contribute to the fight in a distributed battlespace.
For the Marines, HIMARS can be used ashore or as they have just demonstrated can be fired from an amphibious ship as well during Dawn Blitz.
In the photo below, U.S. Marines with Battery R, 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division are seen launching a rocket from a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) off the USS Anchorage (LPD-23) during Exercise Dawn Blitz, Oct. 22, 2017.
Dawn Blitz 17 allowed the amphibious force to integrate the F-35B Lightning II and HIMARS into the exercise to validate a capability with platforms not traditionally used at the Marine Expeditionary Brigade/Expeditionary Strike Group or Marine Expeditionary Unit/Amphibious Ready Group levels.
In the most recent WTI exercise, the F-35 continued to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for HIMARS firing.
This development can be missed or simply look like legacy aircraft support to a ground firing capability.
But it is not.
The F-35s sensors provide significant range and ability to target discriminate which can be shared with the ground force to guide their operational trajectories as well as, in the case of HIMARS, a key target to destroy.
Due to F-35 sensor fusion, F-35 pilots can identify key targets to support ground fires and can themselves add weapons to the fight.
In other words, rather than just doing close air support, the F-35 is capable of integrating air and ground fires into an overall distributed strike force that was not possible with 4th generation platforms.
HIMARS integration with F-35 and the shipboard firing are case studies of the transition of the USMC, not simply case studies of more advanced ways to do what they have been doing.
On October 23, 2017, I spoke with the Commanding Officer of MAWTS-1, Col Wellons, and one of his officers involved in the WTI course.
In an earlier interview, we discussed how the Marines were looking at the impact of the F-35 on the MAGTF:
Question: How does the integration of the F-35 into your operations, change how you think about those operations?
Col Wellons: A lot of that can be quickly become classified but let me give you an example, which does not fall into that category.
Historically, when we could come off of an L class ship with MV-22s, CH-53s, H-1s and AV-8Bs we would be faced with a serious AAA or MANPADS threat that would force us to avoid part of or an entire objective area.
With the F-35, we can leverage its increased survivability over 4th generation platforms in contested environments to accomplish the mission.
In Afghanistan and Iraq we have not had prohibitive interference in our air operations. However, that cannot be assumed in other areas of operation due to the proliferation of double digit SAMS. The F-35 allows us to operate in such areas.
The situational awareness (SA) that the airplane provides is a game changer for us.
In the past, we would receive input from the Senior Watch Officer on the ground with regard to our broader combat SA. That type of information is now resident within the cockpit of the F-35. The F-35 pilot can share information, that situational awareness, with other airborne platforms and the ground force commander in ways that are going to increase our operational tempo and allow us to do things that historically we wouldn’t have been able to do.
The ability of the F35 to be able to recognize, identify, and kill the types of prohibitive threats that would prevent us from putting in assault support platforms and ground forces is crucial to the way ahead.
The F-35 can do this now, not some future iteration.
During the recent interview, we discussed further work on F-35 integration and the expanded role of digital interoperability within the MAGTF as exercised in the WTI course.
Question: The Marines are operating the F-35 in Japan and are standing up other squadrons as well.
That is what I would call F-35 1.0; you are focusing on F-35 2.0 at MAWTS, namely how the asset is part of the overall transformation of the MAGTF, both as cause and consequence.
Can you describe what you are doing with regard to F-35 2.0?
Col Wellons: “We have expanded the hot loading capability of the F-35, which is part of our distributed operational approach.
“To date, we have hot loaded GBU-12s and 32s and most recently have done so with AIM-120s.
“That process has gone very well.
“With the next block of software which is coming shortly, we will load weapons externally as well which will expand the envelope.
“All this is part of an overall distributed approach. We are using MV-22s to bring ordnance and fuel to remote sites in order to rearm and refuel F-35s, increasing sortie generation.
“What this means is that we can bring fifth generation capabilities to the fight by deploying from FARPS throughout the battlespace, rather than having to operate from a fixed airfield.
“When you combine the ability to operate from ships moving at sea with distributable FARPS on land, we are providing for a powerful distributed, survivable, and unpredictable force to support the Commander’s objectives in the battlespace.
“This capability is going to enable aviation operations, in an anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) scenario.
“We’ll be able to take an MV-22, fly it into a FARP somewhere and have the F-35s join.
“The MV-22s provide fuel and ordnance to the F-35s.
“We can do the hot load, hot refuel, and you’re in and out of there in a very short period of time.”
Question: Can you now describe the HIMARS integration with F-35?
Col Wellons: “This class we continued the learning process.
“We were able to validate and verify, via ground testing, the ability of the F-35 to share digital targeting information with a ground node
“But I will ask my Aviation Development, Tactics and Evaluation Department Head, LtCol Ryan Schiller, to further discuss the process.”
LtCol Schiller: “Utilizing the targeting capabilities of the F-35 and its inherent survivability as a 5th-gen fighter combined with the standoff range and capability provided by HIMARS gives us a key capability to fight and strike in the A2/AD environment.
“We are clearly expanding the aperture of our focus on how to leverage the F-35 for the MAGTF.
“With regard to HIMARS we are looking to shipboard use in certain scenarios as well.
“It is important to expand the adversary’s sense of uncertainty as to how and when we might strike, generating capabilities that support a distributed force will help us reach that objective
“We intend to continue developing TTPs for HIMARS integration with F-35.
“During the next WTI class, we plan to fire a HIMARS using digital targeting information passed via an F-35.”
Question: How did the last WTI course provide a way forward on the digital transformation approach?
LtCol Schiller: “This was the first WTI class in which we integrated digital interoperability, in the form of the Marine Air Ground Tablet (MAGTAB), into every single event.
“Digital interoperability is about distributed situational awareness to the force and the new platforms and new capabilities we are developing are key to the way ahead.
“We are shaping a fifth generation MAGTF, a MAGTF where important and time sensitive information can be distributed throughout the force in order to compress the OODA loop and be proactive vice reactive on the battlefield.
Col Wellons: “Digital interoperability is one of the most important things we did in this WTI course.
“We have the ability to have a networked MAGTF, where Marines in the air and on the ground are able to see real-time position location information of friendly forces, watch sensor feeds, synchronize execution checklist items, publish 9-lines, and chat, among other key items.
“It is being fielded now although refinement continues.”
Col James B. Wellons
Commanding Officer, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One
Colonel James B. Wellons grew up in Victoria, Virginia. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in May of 1992, earning his commission as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps. After completion of The Basic School and Naval Flight Training, he reported to VMAT-203, Cherry Point, NC for AV-8B Harrier training.
Colonel Wellons completed AV-8B Harrier training in 1997 and reported to the VMA-231 “Ace of Spades,” where he served in various assignments and deployed twice with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, first in 1998 and again in 1999.
In March of 2000, Colonel Wellons returned to VMAT-203 for duties as an AV-8B instructor pilot and graduated from the MAWTS-1 Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course.
In January of 2002, Colonel Wellons returned to VMA-231 as WTI and was promoted to Major.
He then deployed as Future Operations Department Head for HMM-263 with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit from August of 2002 through May of 2003, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I.
In July of 2003, Colonel Wellons reported to MAWTS-1 in Yuma, Arizona for duties as an AV-8B instructor pilot.
While at MAWTS-1, Colonel Wellons served as AV-8B Division Head and TACAIR Department Head; he also flew as an adversary pilot in the F-5E with VMFT-401.
In June of 2006, Colonel Wellons reported to the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, graduating in June of 2007 with an M.A. in Airpower Art and Sciences. Upon graduation, Colonel Wellons reported to Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT) for duties as an operational planner. While at MARCENT he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
In August of 2009, Colonel Wellons reported to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, where he stood up and commanded VMFAT-501, the F-35B Fleet Replacement Squadron. In February of 2012, Colonel Wellons relinquished command and reported to the U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, RI, where he graduated with highest distinction in March of 2013 with an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies.
In March of 2013, Colonel Wellons reported to U.S. Southern Command in Doral, FL for assignment as Executive Officer to the Commander. He was promoted to Colonel during this tour.
In June of 2015, Colonel Wellons reported to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, where he assumed command in May of 2016.
Colonel Wellons has held qualifications in the AV-8B, F-5E/F, and F-16C/D. His decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with gold star in lieu of third award, Air Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, and various unit and campaign awards.
Editor’s Note: In a story published by the USMC on September 21, 2017, a recent F-35B hot loading exercise during the WTI course was discussed and highlighted.
By Pfc. Ethan Pumphret
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION YUMA, Ariz. – Hot-loading is when an aircraft lands and has ordnance loaded while the engine is still running. Marines from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121 conducted a hot-load in F-35B Lightning II’s at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Az. on Sept. 21, 2017.
This hot-load was conducted using AMRAMM AIM-120 missiles.
VMFA-121 is a part of Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
The exercise was a validation/verification conducted during Weapons and Tactics Instructors course 1-18.
WTI is an exercise that takes service members from all over the world in a joint training exercise for mission readiness. WTI is hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron one.
“They will now have a publication to use,” said Cpl. Matthew Donovan an aviation ordnance technician with VMFA-121. “we took it out there and we validated it. We know it works so now in the future they will have it in writing.”
The hot-load exercise was conducted to ensure both pilots and ground crew have a real example of operations should those units deploy.
The F-35B’s were loaded with the AIM-120 missile and took off horizontally immediately after.
The AMRAMM AIM-120 is an air-to-air missile AMRAMM AIM-120 that will be used in conjunction with a Tactical Air Launch Decoy.
The TALD was loaded onto an AV-8B Harrier II to be launched and used as a target for the AIM-120.
The TALD is an expendable glide vehicle that can mimic the heat and radar signatures of a full-sized aircraft.
“You can’t shoot an air-to-air missile unless you have something to shoot at,” said Donovan. “the TALD is just a glider that comes off of the Harrier and then it glides straight and the Harrier moves out of the way.”
This hot-load exercise is to verify theory and validate publication and give the Marines involved a chance to load live ordnance while the aircraft is still hot.
While the F-35B has been loaded hot before, this is the first time it has been conducted with these air-to-air missiles.
“Decreasing aircraft turnaround time and increasing sortie generation due to the aircraft not having to power down, receive maintenance and start up again,” said Staff Sgt. Kevin Knight an Aviation Ordnance Technician with VMFA-121.
“It’s critical in developing our expeditionary capabilities.”
During WTI, VMFA-121 will also use GBU-12 and GBU-32, laser and GPS guided 500lbs bombs in their F-35B’s.
This combat themed training will provide the training and practical application to project Marine Corps air power on the battlefield.
President Vladimir Putin made one of his most anti-American presentations at the Valdai Conference in Sochi since his February 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference.
His comments suggest the prospects for future Russian-U.S. arms control are bleak due to fundamental differences between Moscow and Washington.
In a discourse that seemed out of place in a conference whose sessions aimed to help humanity grapple with 21st-century challenges, Putin devoted much of his speech to attacking the United States for violating 1990s-era arms control agreements or exploiting Russian trust and weakness to disadvantage his country.
In his view, Russia has made great exertions to comply with its agreements, while the United States has been violating or shirking its commitments.
Vladimir Putin took part in the final plenary session of the 14th annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club titled The World of the Future: Moving Through Conflict to Cooperation.
For example, the President complained about how, under the now ended Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, U.S. inspectors gained access to “the holiest of holies of the Russian nuclear weapons complex, namely, the enterprises engaged in developing nuclear warheads and ammunition, and weapons-grade plutonium and uranium.”
In return for this “absolutely unprecedented openness and trust” during the 1990s, Putin continued, Russia received “total neglect of our national interests, support for separatism in the Caucasus, military action that circumvented the UN Security Council, such as the bombing of Yugoslavia and Belgrade, the introduction of troops into Iraq and so on.”
Putin argued that, once he became president, “our cooperation with the United States entered a new stage of truly equitable partnership,” with balanced treaties and agreements such as the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA).
But in Putin’s view the United States has since violated or unilaterally abandoned these accords as well as several others, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Putin now saw the United States as angling to leave or adjust New START.
He insisted that, “We are not going to withdraw from it, although something may not work with us either.
This is always a part of some kind of compromise.
However, it is better to have some agreements rather than none at all.”
When it enters into full force in February 2018, New START will limit Russia and the United States to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads deployed on at most 700 deployed intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, strategic submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range nuclear-capable bombers.
Both countries will also possess several thousand non-deployed (reserve) strategic warheads and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons that are excluded from the Treaty limits.
Putin dismissed the “many accusations about Russia violating [the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty] as “cooking up something.”
The Treaty bans Russia or the United States from having ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles with ranges between 500km-5,500km.
Putin acknowledged that “maybe we would be tempted to do just [violate the treaty] that if we had no airborne and sea-based missiles” but, unlike when the treaty was signed in 1987, “now we have them” like the United States.
Putin took pains to warn Washington, where the Congress and the Pentagon have been developing contingency plans if Russia does not return into compliance with the INF Treaty, that Russia’s response to a U.S. withdrawal from the treaty would be “immediate and reciprocal.”
Russia could employ such missiles, even armed with conventional warheads, to attack the military and civilian infrastructure that the US Army would use to flow reinforcements into East Central Europe during a NATO-Russia conflict.
Unless Moscow changes its stance soon, the United States could proceed with the development and deployment of additional offensive and defensive systems in Europe, which President Putin has stated Russia would meet with an immediate reciprocal response.
Although the Russian-U.S. strategic stability talks that resumed earlier this year have provided a means for discussing the New START and INF issues, as well as means to decrease military accidents and miscalculations due to diverging doctrines and the rising encounters between Russian and U.S. armed forces, the talks find it hard to grapple with these contrasting arms control perspectives as well as the impact of non-nuclear domains such as cyber- and space-based threats.
Putin saw this as Americans trying to take advantage of Russia and demonstrating the Washington was incapable of treating Moscow as an equal partner.
He warned that Moscow would no longer trust the West or make concessions out of weaknesses or to garner fleeting international goodwill.
The one benefit of his frank attack was that, since nothing the United States does will please the Russian government, the Trump administration now has greater freedom in building U.S. national defenses.
For example, the administration can direct more funding to improve the Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) stationed in Alaska and California, which currently provide the United States with the only direct defense against ICBMs.
These ground-based mid-course systems consist of a multistage solid-fuel booster that rams an unarmed “kill vehicle” into a missile or warhead in outer space, obliterating the target before it can re-enter the atmosphere.
The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency could profitably use some of the additional funding to make the GBI exercises more frequent, demanding, and operationally relevant against near-term threats.
Buying more GBIs would be prudent since the United States needs more interceptors to test the Redesigned Kill Vehicle, the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle, and other missile defense capabilities that will make Americans safer in coming years.
Editor’s Note: Putin’s speech was provided by the Kremlin as follows:
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Thank you very much.
I am not sure how optimistic it will sound, but I am aware that you had very lively discussions over the last three days. I will try, as has now become customary, to share with you what I think about some of the issues. Please do not take it badly if I say something that has already been said as I did not follow all the discussions.
To begin with, I would like to welcome Mr Karzai, Mr Ma, Mr Toje, our colleagues and all our friends. I can see many familiar faces in the audience. Welcome everyone to the Valdai Club meeting.
All disputes must be resolved in a civilised manner. We are firmly convinced that even the most complex knots – be it the crisis in Syria or Libya, the Korean Peninsula or, say, Ukraine – must be disentangled rather than cut.
By tradition, this forum focuses on discussing the most pressing global political as well as economic matters. This time, the organisers, as was just mentioned again, have come up with a fairly difficult challenge asking the participants to try to look beyond the horizon, to ponder over what the coming decades may be like for Russia and the international community.
Of course, it is impossible to foresee everything and to take into account all the opportunities and risks that we will be faced with. However, we need to understand and sense the key trends, to look for outside-the-box answers to the questions that the future is posing for us at the moment, and will surely pose more. The pace of developments is such that we must react to them constantly as well as quickly.
The world has entered an era of rapid change. Things that were only recently referred to as fantastic or unattainable have become a reality and have become part of our daily lives.
Qualitatively new processes are simultaneously unfolding across all spheres. The fast-paced public life in various countries and the technological revolution are intertwined with changes on the international arena. The competition for a place in the global hierarchy is exacerbating. However, many past recipes for global governance, overcoming conflicts as well as natural contradictions are no longer applicable, they often fail, and new ones have not been worked out yet.
Naturally, the interests of states do not always coincide, far from it. This is normal and natural. It has always been the case. The leading powers have different geopolitical strategies and perceptions of the world. This is the immutable essence of international relations, which are built on the balance between cooperation and competition.
True, when this balance is upset, when the observance and even existence of universal rules of conduct is questioned, when interests are pushed through at any cost, then disputes become unpredictable and dangerous and lead to violent conflicts.
Not a single real international problem can be resolved in such circumstances and such a framing of the issues, and so relations between countries simply degrade. The world becomes less secure. Instead of progress and democracy, free rein is given to radical elements and extremist groups that reject civilization itself and seek to plunge it into the ancient past, into chaos and barbarism.
The history of the past few years graphically illustrates all of this. It is enough to see what has happened in the Middle East, which some players have tried to reshape and reformat to their liking and to impose on it a foreign development model through externally orchestrated coups or simply by force of arms.
Instead of working together to redress the situation and deal a real blow to terrorism rather than simulating a struggle against it, some of our colleagues are doing everything they can to make the chaos in this region permanent. Some still think that it is possible to manage this chaos.
Meanwhile, there are some positive examples in recent experience. As you have probably guessed, I am referring to the experience of Syria. It shows that there is an alternative to this kind of arrogant and destructive policy. Russia is opposing terrorists together with the legitimate Syrian Government and other states of the region, and is acting on the basis of international law. I must say that these actions and this forward progress has not come easy. There is a great deal of dissension in the region. But we have fortified ourselves with patience and, weighing our every move and word, we are working with all the participants of this process with due respect for their interests.
Our efforts, the results of which were questioned by our colleagues only recently, are now – let me put it carefully – instilling us with hope. They have proved to be very important, correct, professional and timely.
There is a great deal of dissension in the region [Syria]. But we have fortified ourselves with patience and, weighing our every move and word, we are working with all the participants of this process with due respect for their interests.
Or, take another example – the clinch around the Korean Peninsula. I am sure you covered this issue extensively today as well. Yes, we unequivocally condemn the nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK and fully comply with the UN Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea. Colleagues, I want to emphasise this so that there is no discretionary interpretation. We comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.
However, this problem can, of course, only be resolved through dialogue. We should not drive North Korea into a corner, threaten force, stoop to unabashed rudeness or invective. Whether someone likes or dislikes the North Korean regime, we must not forget that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a sovereign state.
All disputes must be resolved in a civilised manner. Russia has always favoured such an approach. We are firmly convinced that even the most complex knots – be it the crisis in Syria or Libya, the Korean Peninsula or, say, Ukraine – must be disentangled rather than cut.
The situation in Spain clearly shows how fragile stability can be even in a prosperous and established state. Who could have expected, even just recently, that the discussion of the status of Catalonia, which has a long history, would result in an acute political crisis?
Russia’s position here is known. Everything that is happening is an internal matter for Spain and must be settled based on Spanish law in accordance with democratic traditions. We are aware that the country’s leadership is taking steps towards this end.
In the case of Catalonia, we saw the European Union and a number of other states unanimously condemn the supporters of independence.
You know, in this regard, I cannot help but note that more thought should have gone into this earlier. What, no one was aware of these centuries-old disagreements in Europe? They were, were they not? Of course, they were. However, at one point they actually welcomed the disintegration of a number of states in Europe without hiding their joy.
Why were they so unthinking, driven by fleeting political considerations and their desire to please – I will put it bluntly – their big brother in Washington, in providing their unconditional support to the secession of Kosovo, thus provoking similar processes in other regions of Europe and the world?
You may remember that when Crimea also declared its independence, and then – following the referendum – its decision to become part of Russia, this was not welcomed for some reason. Now we have Catalonia. There is a similar issue in another region, Kurdistan. Perhaps this list is far from exhaustive. But we have to ask ourselves, what are we going to do? What should we think about it?
It turns out that some of our colleagues think there are ”good“ fighters for independence and freedom and there are ”separatists“ who are not entitled to defend their rights, even with the use of democratic mechanisms.
As we always say in similar cases, such double standards – and this is a vivid example of double standards – pose serious danger to the stable development of Europe and other continents, and to the advancement of integration processes across the world.
At one time the apologists for globalisation were trying to convince us that universal economic interdependence was a guarantee against conflicts and geopolitical rivalry. Alas, this did not happen. Moreover, the nature of the contradictions grew more complicated, becoming multilayer and nonlinear.
Indeed, while interconnectedness is a restraining and stabilising factor, we are also witnessing an increasing number of examples of politics crudely interfering with economic, market relations. Quite recently there were warnings that this was unacceptable, counterproductive and must be prevented. Now those who made such warnings are doing all this themselves. Some do not even conceal that they are using political pretexts to promote their strictly commercial interests. For instance, the recent package of sanctions adopted by the US Congress is openly aimed at ousting Russia from European energy markets and compelling Europe to buy more expensive US-produced LNG although the scale of its production is still too small.
We unequivocally condemn the nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK and fully comply with the UN Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea. However, this problem can, of course, only be resolved through dialogue. We should not drive North Korea into a corner.
Attempts are being made to create obstacles in the way of our efforts to forge new energy routes – South Stream and Nord Stream – even though diversifying logistics is economically efficient, beneficial for Europe and promotes its security.
Let me repeat: it is only natural that each state has its own political, economic and other interests. The question is the means by which they are protected and promoted.
In the modern world, it is impossible to make a strategic gain at the expense of others. Such a policy based on self-assurance, egotism and claims to exceptionalism will not bring any respect or true greatness. It will evoke natural and justified rejection and resistance. As a result, we will see the continued growth of tensions and discord instead of trying to establish together a steady and stable international order and address the technological, environmental, climate and humanitarian challenges confronting the entire human race today.
Colleagues,
Scientific and technological progress, robotic automation and digitalisation are already leading to profound economic, social, cultural changes, and changes in values as well. We are now presented with previously inconceivable prospects and opportunities. But at the same time we will have to find answers to plenty of questions as well. What place will people occupy in the “humans–machines–nature” triangle? What actions will be taken by states that fail to provide conditions for normal life due to changes in climate and environment? How will employment be maintained in the era of automation? How will the Hippocratic oath be interpreted once doctors possess capabilities akin to all-powerful wizards? And will human intelligence finally lose the ability to control artificial intelligence? Will artificial intelligence become a separate entity, independent from us?
Previously, when assessing the role and influence of countries, we spoke about the importance of the geopolitical factor, the size of a country’s territory, its military power and natural resources. Of course, these factors still are of major importance today. But now there is also another factor – the scientific and technological factor, which, without a doubt, is of great importance as well, and its importance will only increase over time.
In fact, this factor has always been important, but now it will have game-changing potential, and very soon it will have a major impact in the areas of politics and security. Thus, the scientific and technological factor will become a factor of universal and political importance.
It is also obvious that even the very latest technology will not be able to ensure sustainable development on its own. A harmonious future is impossible without social responsibility, without freedom and justice, without respect for traditional ethical values and human dignity. Otherwise, instead of becoming a world of prosperity and new opportunities, this “brave new world” will turn into a world of totalitarianism, castes, conflicts and greater divisions.
Today growing inequality is already building up into feelings of injustice and deprivation in millions of people and whole nations. And the result is radicalisation, a desire to change things in any way possible, up to and including violence.
By the way, this has already happened in many countries, and in Russia, our country, as well. Successful technological, industrial breakthroughs were followed by dramatic upheavals and revolutionary disruptions. It all happened because the country failed to address social discord and overcome the clear anachronisms in society in time.
Everything that is happening [in Catalonia] is an internal matter for Spain and must be settled based on Spanish law in accordance with democratic traditions.
Revolution is always the result of an accountability deficit in both those who would like to conserve, to freeze in place the outdated order of things that clearly needs to be changed, and those who aspire to speed the changes up, resorting to civil conflict and destructive resistance.
Today, as we turn to the lessons of a century ago, namely, the Russian Revolution of 1917, we see how ambiguous its results were, how closely the negative and, we must acknowledge, the positive consequences of those events are intertwined. Let us ask ourselves: was it not possible to follow an evolutionary path rather than go through a revolution? Could we not have evolved by way of gradual and consistent forward movement rather than at a cost of destroying our statehood and the ruthless fracturing of millions of human lives.
However, the largely utopian social model and ideology, which the newly formed state tried to implement initially following the 1917 revolution, was a powerful driver of transformations across the globe (this is quite clear and must also be acknowledged), caused a major revaluation of development models, and gave rise to rivalry and competition, the benefits of which, I would say, were mostly reaped by the West.
I am referring not only to the geopolitical victories following the Cold War. Many Western achievements of the 20th century were in answer to the challenge posed by the Soviet Union. I am talking about raising living standards, forming a strong middle class, reforming the labour market and the social sphere, promoting education, guaranteeing human rights, including the rights of minorities and women, overcoming racial segregation, which, as you may recall, was a shameful practice in many countries, including the United States, a few short decades ago.
Following the radical changes that took place in our country and globally at the turn of the 1990s, a really unique chance arose to open a truly new chapter in history. I mean the period after the Soviet Union ceased to exist.
Unfortunately, after dividing up the geopolitical heritage of the Soviet Union, our Western partners became convinced of the justness of their cause and declared themselves the victors of the Cold War, as I just mentioned, and started openly interfering in the affairs of sovereign states, and exporting democracy just like the Soviet leadership had tried to export the socialist revolution to the rest of the world in its time.
We were confronted with the redistribution of spheres of influence and NATO expansion. Overconfidence invariably leads to mistakes. The outcome was unfortunate. Two and a half decades gone to waste, a lot of missed opportunities, and a heavy burden of mutual distrust. The global imbalance has only intensified as a result.
We do hear declarations about being committed to resolving global issues, but, in fact, what we see is more and more examples of selfishness. All the international institutions designed to harmonise interests and formulate a joint agenda are being eroded, and basic multilateral international treaties and critically important bilateral agreements are being devalued.
I was told, just a few hours ago, that the US President said something on social media about Russia-US cooperation in the important area of nuclear cooperation. True, this is the most important sphere of interaction between Russia and the United States, bearing in mind that Russia and the United States bear a special responsibility to the world as the two largest nuclear powers.
However, I would like to use this opportunity to speak in more detail about what happened in recent decades in this crucial area, to provide a more complete picture. It will take two minutes at most.
Several landmark bilateral agreements were signed in the 1990s. The first one, the Nunn-Lugar programme, was signed on June 17, 1992. The second one, the HEU-LEU programme, was signed on February 18, 1993. Highly enriched uranium was converted into low-enriched uranium, hence HEU-LEU.
The largely utopian social model and ideology, which the newly formed state [the USSR] tried to implement initially following the 1917 revolution, was a powerful driver of transformations across the globe, caused a major revaluation of development models, and gave rise to rivalry and competition, the benefits of which were mostly reaped by the West.
The projects under the first agreement focused on upgrading control systems, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials, dismantling and scrapping submarines and radioisotope thermoelectric generators. The Americans have made – and please pay attention here, this is not secret information, simply few are aware of it – 620 verification visits to Russia to check our compliance with the agreements. They visited the holiest of holies of the Russian nuclear weapons complex, namely, the enterprises engaged in developing nuclear warheads and ammunition, and weapons-grade plutonium and uranium. The United States gained access to all top-secret facilities in Russia. Also, the agreement was almost unilateral in nature.
Under the second agreement, the Americans made 170 more visits to our enrichment plants, touring their most restricted areas, such as mixing units and storage facilities. The world’s most powerful nuclear enrichment plant – the Urals Electrochemical Combine – even had a permanent American observation post. Permanent jobs were created directly at the workshops of this combine where the American specialists went to work every day. The rooms they were sitting in at these top-secret Russian facilities had American flags, as is always the case.
In addition, a list was drawn up of 100 American specialists from 10 different US organisations who were entitled to conduct additional inspections at any time and without any warning. All this lasted for 10 years. Under this agreement, 500 tonnes of weapons-grade uranium were removed from military circulation in Russia, which is equivalent to about 20,000 nuclear warheads.
The HEU-LEU programme has become one of the most effective measures of true disarmament in the history of humankind – I say this with full confidence. Each step on the Russian side was closely monitored by American specialists, at a time when the United States limited itself to much more modest reductions of its nuclear arsenal, and did so on a purely goodwill basis.
Our specialists also visited enterprises of the US nuclear arms complex but only at their invitation and under conditions set by the US side.
As you see, the Russian side demonstrated absolutely unprecedented openness and trust. Incidentally – and we will probably talk about this later – it is also common knowledge what we received from this: total neglect of our national interests, support for separatism in the Caucasus, military action that circumvented the UN Security Council, such as the bombing of Yugoslavia and Belgrade, the introduction of troops into Iraq and so on. Well, this is easy to understand: once the condition of the nuclear complex, the armed forces and the economy had been seen, international law appeared to be unnecessary.
In the 2000s our cooperation with the United States entered a new stage of truly equitable partnership. It was marked by the singing of a number of strategic treaties and agreements on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which is known in the US as the 123 Agreement. But to all intents and purposes, the US side unilaterally halted work within its framework in 2014.
The situation around the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) of August 20 (signed in Moscow) and September 1 (in Washington) is perplexing and alarming. In accordance with the protocol to this agreement, the sides were supposed to take reciprocal steps to irreversibly convert weapons-grade plutonium into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and burn it in nuclear plants, so that it could not be used for military purposes. Any changes in this method were only allowed by consent of the sides. This is written in the agreement and protocols to it.
What did Russia do? We developed this fuel, built a plant for mass production and, as we pledged in the agreement, built a BN-800 plant that allowed us to safely burn this fuel. I would like to emphasise that Russia fulfilled all of its commitments.
In our opinion, the UN, with its universal legitimacy, must remain the centre of the international system. Our common goal is to raise its authority and effectiveness. There is no alternative to the UN today.
What did our American partners do? They started building a plant on the Savannah River Site. Its initial price tag was $4.86 billon but they spent almost $8 billion, brought construction to 70 percent and then froze the project. But, to our knowledge, the budget request for 2018 includes $270 million for the closure and mothballing of this facility. As usual, a question arises: where is the money? Probably stolen. Or they miscalculated something when planning its construction. Such things happen. They happen here all too often. But we are not interested in this, this is not our business. We are interested in what happens with uranium and plutonium. What about the disposal of plutonium? Dilution and geological storage of the plutonium is suggested. But this completely contradicts the spirit and letter of the agreement, and, most important, does not guarantee that the dilution is not reconverted into weapons-grade plutonium. All this is very unfortunate and bewildering.
Next. Russia ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty more than 17 years ago. The USA has not done so yet.
A critical mass of problems is building up in global security. As is known, in 2002 the United States pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. And despite being initiators of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and international security, they initiated that agreement themselves, they are failing to meet their commitments. They remain as of today the only and largest holder of this form of weapon of mass destruction. Moreover, the USA has pushed back the deadline for eliminating their chemical weapons from 2007 to as far as 2023. It does not look proper for a nation that claims to be a champion of non-proliferation and control.
In Russia, on the contrary, the process was completed on September 27 of this year. By doing so our country has made a significant contribution to enhancing international security. By the way, the western media preferred to keep quiet, not to notice it, though there was one fleeting mention somewhere in Canada, but that was it, then silence. Meanwhile, the chemical weapons arsenal stockpiled by the Soviet Union is enough to destroy life on the planet multiple times over.
I believe that it is time to abandon an obsolete agenda. I am referring to what was. Without a doubt, we should be looking forward, we have to stop looking back. I am talking about this so as to understand the origins of the current situation that is taking shape.
It is high time for a frank discussion among the global community rather than just a group of the chosen, allegedly the most worthy and advanced. Representatives of different continents, cultural and historical traditions, political and economic systems. In a changing world, we cannot afford to be inflexible, closed off, or unable to respond clearly and quickly. Responsibility for the future – this is what should unite us, especially in times like the current ones when everything is changing rapidly.
Never before has humankind possessed such power as it does now. The power over nature, space, communications, and its own existence. However, this power is diffuse: its elements are in the hands of states, corporations, public and religious associations, and even individual citizens. Clearly, harnessing all these elements in a single, effective and manageable architecture is not an easy task. It will take hard, painstaking work to achieve this. And Russia, I will note, is willing to take part in it together with any partners who are interested.
Colleagues, how do we see the future of the international order and the global governance system? For example, in 2045, when the UN will mark its centennial anniversary? Its creation has become a symbol of the fact that humanity, in spite of everything, is capable of developing common rules of conduct and following them. Whenever these rules were not followed, it inevitably resulted in crises and other negative consequences.
However, in recent decades, there have been several attempts to belittle the role of this organisation, to discredit it, or simply to assume control over it. All these attempts predictably failed, or reached a dead end. In our opinion, the UN, with its universal legitimacy, must remain the centre of the international system. Our common goal is to raise its authority and effectiveness. There is no alternative to the UN today.
With regard to the right of veto in the Security Council, which is also sometimes challenged, you may recall that this mechanism was designed and created in order to avoid direct confrontation of the most powerful states, as a guarantee against arbitrariness and recklessness, so that no single country, even the most influential country, could give the appearance of legitimacy to its aggressive actions.
No matter what amazing heights technology can reach, history is made by humans. We can have only a shared future. There can be no separate futures for us, at least, not in the modern world.
Of course, let us face it, the experts are here, and they know that the UN has legitimised the actions of individual participants in international affairs after the fact. Well, at least that is something, but it will not lead to any good, either.
Reforms are needed, the UN system needs improvement, but reforms can only be gradual, evolutionary and, of course, they must be supported by the overwhelming majority of the participants in the international process within the organisation itself, by broad consensus.
The guarantee of the UN effectiveness lies in its representative nature. The absolute majority of the world’s sovereign states are represented in it. The fundamental principles of the UN should be preserved for years and decades to come, since there is no other entity that is capable of reflecting the entire gamut of international politics.
Today, new centres of influence and growth models are emerging, civilisational alliances, and political and economic associations are taking shape. This diversity does not lend itself to unification. So, we must strive to harmonise cooperation. Regional organisations in Eurasia, America, Africa, the Asia-Pacific region should act under the auspices of the United Nations and coordinate their work.
However, each association has the right to function according to its own ideas and principles that correspond to its cultural, historical and geographical specifics. It is important to combine global interdependence and openness with preserving the unique identity of each nation and each region. We must respect sovereignty as the basis underlying the entire system of international relations.
Colleagues, no matter what amazing heights technology can reach, history is, of course, made by humans. History is made by people, with all their strengths and weaknesses, great achievements and mistakes. We can have only a shared future. There can be no separate futures for us, at least, not in the modern world. So, the responsibility for ensuring that this world is conflict-free and prosperous lies with the entire international community.
As you may be aware, the 19th World Festival of Youth and Students is taking place in Sochi. Young people from dozens of countries are interacting with their peers and discussing matters that concern them. They are not hampered by cultural, national or political differences, and they are all dreaming about the future. They believe that their lives, the lives of younger generations will be better, fairer and safer. Our responsibility today is to do our best to make sure that these hopes come true.
The declaration of an independent Catalan Republic by the president of the Catalan parliament, Carles Puigdemont, on Friday 27 October, was immediately followed by the imposition of direct rule by Madrid.
The Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, following the vote in the Spanish Senate to invoke article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, sacked the Catalan government, and placed himself and his ministers in charge.
This has plunged Spain into its deepest political crisis since the end of the Franco dictatorship, and for EU, its most challenging dilemma since the vote for Brexit in the UK.
Britain wants to leave the EU.
The independent “Catalan Republic” wants to remain within the EU.
But the EU is already making the exit of the UK as difficult as possible.
And the governments of all the nations within the EU, including the UK, are opposed to Catalan aspirations for independence from Spain.
France in particular has led the way in this opposition.
Carles Puigdemont making a statement in Barcelona last week.
As well it might. Catalonia, after all, once incorporated cross-frontier areas of southern France. The Basques, where violent armed opposition to Spanish rule by ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty), dating from the Franco period (and at the cost of 800 deaths), has only recently been mitigated, also live in a territory which historically covered cross-border regions of both Spain and France.
The repercussions of events in Barcelona is already rippling through the EU.
Scottish nationalists (who want to remain within the EU), have not given up on their aspirations to see an independent Scotland, and they have been following developments in Catalonia with more than a passing interest. Meanwhile Northern Ireland (which also wants to remain in the EU) is still without a functioning devolved administration, given the continuing impasse between the Irish nationalists (Sin fein) and the Ulster Unionists (DUP), as well as uncertainty over the Brexit negotiations in Brussels, and the future land border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.
The “Northern League” in Italy has recently fortified demands for much greater autonomy from Rome.
Even the recent elections in Germany have dramatically revived the resilient differences between the political outlook of the territories of the former “west” and “east” Germany, with the rise of the far-right, and its representation in the Budestag for the first time since the ending of Nazi rule in 1945.
In Belgium the Wallons are restive.
Carles Puigdemont, while everyone thought he was in his home town of Girona (where he had been mayor), and while Girona was beating Real Madrid in the soccer stadium in town, was in fact crossing the border into France on Sunday 29th October, and then caught a flight from Marseilles to Brussels.
In Belgium he has been offered “asylum” by Theo Francken, the Belgium secretary of state for immigration. Mr Francken is a member of ther Flemish nationalist party.
He said that Mr Puigdemont and other Catalan officials who felt they were “threatened by the Spanish authorities. could apply for asylum in Belgium.”
The Peoples Party (PP) in Spain were outraged, declaring that this was an “unacceptable attitude.” Mr Puigdemont and five of his ministers appeared at a chaotic press conference at the Brussels press club, in what he called the “capital of Europe,” where he again said he was seeking dialogue and guarantees which Spain, he said, has consistently rejected. He is not he said seeking asylum.
Ironically, while the EU emphasizes it is moving towards a “post-national” future, it is also clear that “national” identities still matter.
The Brexit vote, the resurgence of nationalist parties in France, the Netherlands, and Poland, all suggest that “federalist” agenda for “more Europe” promoted by Mr Jean Claude Juncker (and by President Macron) needs to be treated with some caution.
Puigdemont said he wanted to avoid a “traumatic split” from Spain and appealed to the EU to help mediate with Madrid.
But the EU in Brussels is poorly equipped to play a mediating role between Barcelona and Madrid. .
Mariano Rajoy has appointed the deputy prime minister of Spain, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, to administer Catalonia (she has been the long time point person in the Spanish government for Catalonia), and he has called elections in Catalonia on December 21.
It is not clear yet if Puigdemont and other pro-independence coalition leaders of the deposed Catalan government, will be able, or will be permitted, to compete. Prosecutors in Madrid have filed charges of “rebellion, sedition and embezzlement” against Puigdemont that carry a penalty of 30 years.
They have been summoned to court in Madrid. But it is highly unlikely that any will respond.
Certainly not Mr Puigdemont and the five deposed minister who are in Brussels.
The Spanish Constitutional Court is expected to rule that the Catalan declaration of independence by the Catalan assembly was illegal.
All 70 MPs who voted for it potentially face arrest, as do the Catalan civil servants and police officers who reject direct rule.
Calling new elections in Catalonia is gamble for Rojoy.
The day that Catalonia voted in their controversial independence referendum on October 1st was marked by violence.
The Spanish national police and the Spanish Guardia Civil, which had been deployed from ships in the harbor, attempted to prevent citizens from voting by heavy handed actions, removing ballot boxes, and physically assaulting citizens at polling stations.
These clumsy actions were widely televised and shared over social media and led to international condemnation.
But although of the 2.26 million votes cast, 2.02 million were in favor of independence, this represented less than 40% of the Catalan electorate.
In fact the numbers voting for independence has been broadly stable since 2014 when 80% voted for independence but with only a 40% participation.. .
It is this presumed pro-union “silent majority” that Rajoy is counting on in December.
But although some 3.5 million Catalans are assumed to form a “silent majority,” unity among them is hard to find, other than in rejecting secession.
Many have nothing in common with the Partido Popular of Mariano Rojoy.
They see the current Spanish government as never having addressed Catalan concerns, or providing for a new system of regional funding, or of being open to an overhaul of the Spanish Constitution to recognize Spain’s “pluri-national reality.”
Other opponents of independence include radical leftists opposed to Catalan nationalists as much as Spanish nationalists.
Pro-union forces are also presumed to include business leaders worried about the stability of the Catalan economy, and the two major Catalan banks (Banco de Sabadell and CaixaBank).
Some Catalan companies have already moved their headquarters to Madrid or to other regions of Spain.
As well a the large group of people in Catalonia feel themselves Spanish and not Catalan, or are comfortable with dual identities.
These opponents of independence turned out by the tens of thousands in a massive flag waving pro-Spanish demonstration in Barcelona on Sunday 29th October.
But the intervention of King Felipe VI on October 24th did not help matters.
His criticism of the Catalan separatists made a compomise even less likely. The King’s father, Juan Carlos, who abdicated in 2014, had famously intervened on television at the time of the 1981 military coup attempt against Spain’s new post-Franco democracy.
But even the mayor of Barcelona . Ada Colau, who is not pro-independence, called King Felipe VI’s intervention an “irresponsible and unworthy speech of a head of state” for not mentioning the hundreds of ordinary citizens hurt by the Spanish national police as they tried to cast their votes.
Though King Felipe’s speech did rally the national political parties in Madrid, the PP, the opposition socialists (PSOE), and the liberal Ciudadanos party, to support the evocation of Article 155.
But the declaration of a “Catalan Republic” by Carles Puigdemont was not accidental.
He had refused to pledge loyalty to the Spanish Constitution when he was inaugurated as premier of Catalonia, and the portrait of King Felipe on the chamber wall was veiled.
The supporters of Catalan independence are also a coalition.
The Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) holds ten seats in the regional parliament and without their support Carles Puigdemont has no majority.
It is a far-left separatist party whose spokewomen is Anna Gabriel. The mainstream politicians began the call for secession a decade ago, but now the focus has moved to mobilization not negotiation, with power shifting to the streets and to pro-independence movements like the Catalan National Assembly (ANC) led by Jordi Sanchez which has branches in every part of the region, and is the principal grassroots movement for secession, and the Omnium Cultural, led by Jordi Cuixart, a veteran activist for Catalan culture and language, both are collectives of local groups rather than a traditional political party. The Republcian Left and the PdeC which form the Catalan government many believe has ceeded the agenda to groups like the ANC, Omnium and the CUP.
There are also deeper factors at work here which are evident as well throughout Europe as a whole.
Barcelona is very much a part of a new conflict between an internationalized and cosmopolitan city, much like London, and the hinterland.
Catalonia is one of most developed regions of Spain, comprising almost 20 per cent of Spain’s GDP. (Catalonia’s economy larger than Portugal for instance.) Catalonia and Barcelona, moreover, attract millions of foreign tourists each year.
Barcelona is very much a part of the cosmopolitan new world order, which has developed since the emergence of European Buget Airlines and mass package tourism in the 1980s, which Spain in general, and Catalonia in particular, has benefited, especially after the Olympic Games were held in Barcelona in 1992.
Barcelona with a population of 1.6 million out of a Catalan population of 5 million and contributes 31% of Catalonia’s GDP, and has become a tourist mecca.
Its international airport saw 51 million air passengers in 2014.
It has a sophisticated port, trade fair facilities, a zona franca free trade zone, and ranks 34th in a listing of 123 global cities.
It is in many respects as divided from its immediate hinterland as is London.
Spain has also only recently emerged from the deep post-2008 recession and banking crisis.
The political consequences have been the rise of the Popular Party (PP) led by Mariano Rojoy to power. replacing the social democratic (PSOE) government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero in 2011. Rojoy is a dour Galician who finds compromise difficult..
The conflict between Catalan nationalism and Iberian centralism is a very old one, but it has revived in recent years.
Catalonia, in fact, already enjoys a great deal of autonomy, and since 1980 the Catalan police force (the Mossos d’Esquadra.) has been under the command of the Generalitat (the Catalan government), and was expanded in 1994 to 17,000 to replace the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps. Jodi Pujol who founded the Catalan Nationalist Party (CiU) ruled from 1980 until 2003 was a leader of a “Europeanist” regime.
But in 2006 Madrid’s reaction to a new generation of Catalan leaders allowed a dispute which began over fiscal affairs to escalate into a constitutional crisis.
Under leader Artur Mas of the CiU, the Catalan electorate supported a new “statute of autonomy” which called Catalonia a “nation” and sought greater control over Catalan finances.
This was approved by the Spanish parliament in Madrid, but the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal after 4 years of deliberation, ruled against the statute’s main components.
The central government’s position hardened when Rojoy became prime minister and the PP successfully urged the constitutional court to annul or reinterpret parts of the statute ensuring that Catalonia was not recognized as a nation within Spain and the Catalan language was not given precedence over Castilian.
In Catalonia in the meanwhile the nationalists had coalesced in 2015 behind a Junts pel Si (Together for Yes), and emerged triumphant in the 2015 regional elections, and Carles Puigdemont became premier.
But Mariano Rajoy and his minority PP government bear a large part of the blame for the escalation of the crisis. The use of the national police to disrupt the Catalan referendum was ill-judged to say the least.
And in particular for Spain’s central authorities and Mr Rojoy’s conservative Popular Party to torpedo the revised statute of autonomy agreed in 2006. and in wasting opportunites after 2011 to make a fresh start.
Support for Catalan independence grew as the financial crisis gripped the country and corruption scandals tainted the established political parties in Madrid and Barcelona.
Rajoy stands on solid technical legal constitutional grounds in resisting Catalan separatism to be sure.
But the great challenge for Spain and for Catalonia now requires political initiative, flexibility, and compromise, which Rojoy has so far not demonstrated.
And it does not help when Pablo Casado, the spokesman for the PP, said at a press conference on the 9th October, that Mr Puigdemont could “end up” like former Catalan leader, Lluis Companys, who declared Catalan independence 1934, and who was shot by the Franco regime firing squad in Barcelona in 1940 after the end of the Spanish Civil War.
Catalonia had played a decisive role in that bloody conflict and Catalonia was where Generalissimo Francisco Franco imposed a bitter, brutal, and repressive and dictatorial, and unforgiving system of government, which outlawed the Catalan language and culture, and which is far from forgotten in Barcelona, even if it is apparently forgotten by Mr Rajoy and the PP in Madrid.
So far the demonstrations and counter demonstrations in Barcelona have been largely peaceful.
But it will take great patience, as well as compromise on both sides, to find a mutually acceptable and peaceful solution.
Something both sides currently seem unable or unwilling to do.
The Niger Ambush puts the fight against Islamic terrorists into perspective.
During an ambush, in early October in Niger, American and Nigerian soldiers encountered terrorist fighters who caused the deaths of nine of the counter-terrorist forces.
It is also a reminder that fighting global terrorism requires working together in spite of our differences; divided indeed we shall fail.
But instead of a Ben Franklin, moment some news stories simply choose to support the efforts of the terrorists to divide us.
That kind of statement is not only wrong in its formulation, it is certainly not helping at a time when the “fog of war” against Islamic Terror Groups is already dense or thick enough.
It is clear that a strong Coalition is needed to keep up the fighting in areas where terrorists are pouring in following the debacle of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Preparing the armament for the Mirage 2000 for the Mali operation, January 9, 2013, at the airbase in N’Djamena, Chad. Credit: French Ministry of Defense.
A debacle by the way made possible because of the strength of an ad hoc coalition, which succeeded in spite of incredible political divergences to implement a successful military strategy leading to the genuine and symbolic falls of Mosul and more recently Raqqa.
Winning these battles against terror has been possible because of a joint and united approach (even if temporarily) in the region.
The war against terror unfortunately goes on, and, as a result of those victories, with even more vigor in other parts of the world and especially the Sahel area.
According to a recent United Nations report, the number of attacks in that part of the world has increased by more than 100% between June and September of this year, while in October both Niger and Mali, and their border where the ambush occurred, have been the theater of increasing recruiting and violence by Al Qaida-linked Jihadists)(part of “Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin.”)[ref] http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/04/selon-lonu-17-militaires-francais-ont-ete-blesses-au-mali-au-cours-des-trois-derniers-mois.[/ref]
What has been characterizing this region for centuries is complex marble cake of multiple infighting, battles and trafficking which are constantly going on.
This observation has led to the way both US and French military forces have been operating in a theater, which other characteristics are its size and roughness.
Following the death of U.S. Green Berets in Niger, the political debate in Washington shifted once again about the War Powers Act and the need for an “africanization” of the fight against terrorism.
But this is exactly what has been going on in the past years with efforts to train and equip African partner nations and conduct trans-border mixed patrols.
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the ambush just took place when the armed force of the G5 countries – i.e. the five African countries involved in the fight against terrorists in Sahel (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad) under a 2014 French initiative and military support via Barkhane Operation[ref]See for instance >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane[/ref]- had been preparing their very first joint military operation called Haw Bi[ref] http://www.opex360.com/2017/11/02/la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-lance-sa-premiere-operation-anti-jihadiste/[/ref] and when Washington was taking a decision whether or not to fund the G5 initiative.
As for trying, through a false debate, to decouple the action of the two mains allies in a Coalition in which the Spanish and the German armed forces also participate, facts speak for themselves.
The truth is the truth.
Franco-American cooperation has been very successful over the past years, with the U.S. supporting the French forces in terms of ISR and logistics and the French maintaining a 3ooo to 4,000 men presence ever since 2014, while suffering casualties on a regular basis.
In the case of the October 4th ambush specifically and the question of French close air support, General Mattis himself rebuked any hint of criticism stressing that French jets were on site within thirty minutes of the call for help initiated from the ground.
And Colonel Patrick Steiger, spokesman for the Chief of Staff of the French armed forces, explained that the reason the Mirage 2000 only did a “show of force” and did not shoot was because of the imbrication of the fighters.
When you cannot distinguish between friends and foes, it is better to abstain from killing them all, isn’ it?
Military rules of engagement are the same for everybody on this one.
This reason alone is enough; but to go back to the Guardian’s asserted quote, poor weather could also be held responsible, since according to some published reported accounts of the ambush, one of the Green Berets’initial missions had been cancelled earlier on, precisely because of bad weather.
When the Mirage 2000 arrived although not on alert for that specific mission, the fight stopped and the enemy was dispersed limiting the number of casualties, while French Puma helicopters coming from Gao in nearby Mali evacuated injured soldiers.
Using the death of American soldiers for various domestic political agendas the way it is currently done inside the Beltway is nothing new, but it is no less revolting as well as aiding the terrorists more than focusing on ways to prevail.
Murielle Delaporte is the editor of the French journal OPERATIONNELS and has been embedded with French forces in Mali and other areas in Africa and the Middle East.
2017-11-07 Second Line of Defense has underscored the importance of the evolving challenges as well as strategic responses of the Nordics to those challenges.
Apparently, Secretary Mattis agrees.
Yesterday, he visited Finland and highlighted their contribution to democracy and to the defense of the region.
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis applauded Finland’s contributions to democracy and global security today after meeting with the country’s most-senior government official.
As part of his five-day trip to Europe, Mattis spoke today in Helsinki, after meeting with Finnish President Sauli Niinistö.
“My country highly values Finland’s contribution to the global coalition to defeat [the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria],” Mattis said in a press appearance with Niinistö.
“I think that your tactically skillful and ethically sound troops have brought courage and competence to the battlefields against terrorism in the same manner in which your country has brought compassion to the humanitarian fields on so many occasions,” the secretary said.
Mattis added, “The lessons of our success in reducing the terrorist threat is a reminder that we are strongest when we democracies stand together, united in the face of barbarism, united in the interest of peace.”
He also highlighted the standup of the new European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.
“With this center, Finland has created an institution fit for our time, and I thank you, Mr. President, for your foresight,” Mattis commented.
efense Secretary Jim Mattis and Finland’s President Sauli Niinistö speak to the media at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki, Finland, Nov. 6, 2017. DoD photo by Air Force Staff Sgt. Jette Carr
The secretary complimented Finland’s commitment to Nordic defense cooperation, to include assuming the chair for the Arctic Council.
“By tightening such cooperation here in the north, we see the deterrent capability of democracies strengthened,” he said. “In today’s conversations, we reaffirm that relations between Finland and the United States have never been stronger.”
Finland is looking to modernize its defense forces, including replacing their F-18s.
Finland has increasingly participated with other Nordic states in enhancing deterrence in the region.
According to an article by John Vandiver in Stars in Stripes published November 6, 2017:
Finland is assembling what is expected to be its largest military exercise in years, modeled on Sweden’s recent “Aurora” drills that concluded in September. About 20,000 troops, including roughly 1,400 U.S. servicemembers, took part in Sweden’s biggest military exercise in two decades.
Helsinki is following suit.
“The exercise (in Finland) is planned to broadly gather conscripts, reservists and soldiers to practice … together with our main partners like Sweden, the United States and other countries,” Finland Defense Minister Jussi Niinisto told reporters ahead of a visit by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis.
“If there’s a crisis, it will be good for us to practice receiving help,” Niinisto said.
Editor’s Note: For our look at the new Finnish center, see the following:
2017-10-31 The F-22s have somehow gone from being “Cold War relics” to cutting edge multi-mission deterrent capabilities.
From the beginning, the F-22 held the promise it has clearly demonstrated now globally, from Syria to the Pacific, namely being able to operate in a redefinition of what an air dominance fighter is all about.
As the then commander of the Air Combat Command, General Carlisle, put it in an interview with us in 2015:
“It is important to look at the impact of the F-22 operations on the total force. We do not wish, nor do the allies wish to send aircraft into a contested area, without the presence of the F-22.
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It’s not just that the F-22s are so good, it’s that they make every other plane better. They change the dynamic with respect to what the other airplanes are able to do because of what they can do with regard to speed, range, and flexibility.
It’s their stealth quality. It’s their sensor fusion. It’s their deep penetration capability. It is the situational awareness they provide for the entire fleet which raises the level of the entire combat fleet to make everybody better.”
The shift is to a new way of operating.
What is crucial as well is training for the evolving fight, and not just remaining in the mindset or mental furniture of the past.
It is about what needs to be done NOW and training towards the evolving and future fight.
General Carlisle: “The F-22s are not silver bullets.
The F-22s make the Eagles better, and the A-10s better, and the F-16s better. They make the bombers better.
They provide information. They enable the entire fight.
And its information dominance, its sensor fusion capability, it’s a situational awareness that they can provide to the entire package which raises the level of our capabilities in the entire fight.
This is not about some distant future; it is about the current fight.”
Most recently, the F-22s are deploying again to Europe.
As Maj. Richard Komurek, U.S. Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa noted in an October 20, 2017 USAF story:
RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, Germany — F-22 Raptor aircraft from the 1st Fighter Wing at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia have deployed to Europe for a Flying Training Deployment (FTD) to conduct air training with other U.S. Europe-based aircraft and NATO Allies.
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Six aircraft and approximately 150 Airmen, who are returning to the United States from the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility, arrived to RAF Lakenheath, U.K. on Oct. 8.
While in the European theater, the Airmen and aircraft will participate in the Royal Air Force (RAF) exercise Eastern Zephyr to conduct realistic training in a joint environment and bolster capabilities with NATO allies.
In addition to participation in the RAF exercise, Airmen and F-22 aircraft have forward deployed from the U.K. to Germany and Poland to demonstrate their ability to quickly respond and reassure allies and partners that the United States Air Force is here, in Europe, forward and ready.
“The deployment of fifth-generation combat aircraft to the European AOR is a concrete example of how the U.S. is engaged, postured and ready with a credible force to assure, deter and defend in an increasingly complex security environment,” said Gen. Tod D. Wolters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa commander. “There is simply no substitute for our forward presence here in Europe.”
The F-22 FTD is funded by the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which enhances the U.S. deterrence posture in Europe by improving the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces.
EDI will provide approximately $1 billion in funding to the U.S. Air Force for Increased Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance processing; continued support of missions such as NATO Air Policing and Theater Security Packages; enhanced prepositioning of contingency air operations equipment; improvements to airfield infrastructure and prepositioning of air operations equipment and enablers in NATO ally countries.
The deployment of the fifth generation F-22 fighter marks the third time Raptors have deployed to Europe.
The first deployment was to Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, together with visits to Estonia and Poland in August 2015.
The second was to RAF Lakenheath, U.K., along with forward locations in Lithuania and Romania in April 2016.
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The F-22 Raptor is the world’s premiere operational fifth-generation fighter. Fifth-generation capability combines the attributes of maneuverability, advanced and fused avionics, multi-role capability and stealth technology.
Last month, when Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David L. Goldfein hosted President Donald Trump at the Joint Base Andrews Air and Space Expo, Goldfein said air superiority is and will continue to be paramount to the success of the U.S. military and that when it comes to air superiority, the fifth generation raises the game of the fourth generation.
“The most important thing the Air Force provides the joint force is air superiority,” said Goldfein. “These developments allow the Air Force to overcome advanced enemy defenses that inhibit fourth generation aircraft.”
Editor’s Note: The first slideshow highlights the arrival of the F-22s to RAF Lakenheath; the second their deployment to Poland and the third their arrival in Germany. The photos are credited to the USAF.
President Trump’s begins a 2 day Visit to PRC on November 8 will be his first occasion to meet President Xi since his anointment as a “core leader” by the CCP.
Notwithstanding that this status has been conferred to Mao, Deng, and Jiang before, western “China experts” overwhelming endorsed this, and the delay in designating a successor, as a sign that Xi is the “most powerful leaser since Mao” that may be seeing a third term as President in a break from recent CCP practice post Mao.
With respect to the pressing issues facing the US and allies, namely DPRK’s nuclear arsenal and intentions, the future direction of PRC’s economy, and aggressive moves in the South China Sea and abroad, the “most powerful man in China” either have no interest or intent to address allied concerns, or have so little power to effect change. President Trump is ready to make up his mind about President Xi.
That is the question that President Trump need to answer when he is in Beijing.
How this question is answered will in many ways, determine the feasibility of US options for North Korea and China.
First, a bit of history.
Mao Tse Tung was at the height of his power in when he ordered PVA “volunteers” to enter the Korean war in October, 1950 in concert with Soviet forces. After an initial success, the combined might of DPRK, PRC, and USSR was beaten back until General Ridgeway re-established the status quo ante bellum that became the basis for the armistice.
Few western observers recognized that Mao’s “unlimited manpower” deployed as PVA in Korea was an artifact of the CCP’s need to get rid of many former KMT or warlord soldiers who swelled the PLA ranks. Human wave attacks on UN forces by these potential traitors to the CCP was an effective means to disposing of them.
American and UN troops saw these “human waves” and presumed that PRC is 10 Japans worth of fanatical soldiers. In fact, it was neither a reflection of the loyalty of the troops to the CCP or the PRC’s ability to raise and fight with a large army.
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together after their meetings at Mar-a-Lago in Florida. Photo: AP
The CCP was, in fact, husbanding their very scarce supply of trusted CCP loyalists who largely remained behind in rear positions, with only low level (and poorly connected) party cadres serving as political officers with the troops of questionable loyalty. When Mao’s own son was killed in November 1950 in a supposedly safe rear base, his enthusiasm for the war waned once he heard the news. Correspondingly, as General Ridgeway’s use of massed firepower inflicted unacceptable casualties, the CCP pulled back.
Post Korean war, Mao’s power and prestige declined with the failure to “win” the Korean war; and, as Mao made successive blunders culminating in the “Great Leap Forward” that virtually collapsed the economy, resulting in his removal from power in all but name.
Mao ultimately had to launch a counter-revolution “The Cultural Revolution” that decimated the PRC in order to regain control of a much weakened and wrecked PRC — which paved the way for the de Maoization under Deng after his passing.
Few western analyst that gushed about Xi Jinping’s “core leader” status recognized that maintaining power internally within the PRC was, historically going back dynasties, the “core problem” for any Chinese leader.
No Chinese leader, even Mao at the height of their power, was in fact safe and secure from the threat of internal rebellion and palace coups.
Do the names Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wen yuan, Wang Hongwen, Hua Gofeng, or more recently, Bo Xilai, or Zhou Yangkong, etc. speak to stability or orderly transfers of power?
On any reasonable set of metrics that measure power internally within and without PRC (i.e. military, economic, prestige, etc.), Xi Jinping is at best, comparable to Chiang Kai Sek prior to the Japanese invasion, but Stalin he is not, and is unlikely to be during his term.
Yet this has not prevented normally sane and reputable publications like the Economist from proclaiming Xi more powerful than President Trump — despite the clear evidence to the contrary.
If President Xi is at least as powerful as his propaganda organs allege, he could have, without resorting to military force, compelled DPRK to denuclearize as the US did for Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan without resorting to force.
Xi and his predecessors could not, and did not do this. Nor does he have a viable military option to denuclearize North Korea by force without risking an attack on PRC.
President Xi, for all his alleged power, do not have a conventional or nuclear (except deterrent) option against DPRK.
Nor do the PRC have the option of compelling DPRK by economic sanctions or non-kinetic means.
That can potentially trigger a nuclear missile attack by DPRK against Beijing for which PRC is defenseless. Beijing China is loath to admit their weakness in the face of DPRK — and until President Trump, their opposition to tight sanctions (i.e. because of fear of DPRK refugees) was taken at face value.
Beijing China being impotent in the face of DPRK is far from the mind of most Western analysts that seem incapable of comparing PRC with the power of USA – who forced denuclearization on many allies under similar circumstances.
President Trump will be visiting Beijing against this backdrop where President Xi’s paper tiger status can no longer be hidden. Nearly seven months have passed since they met at Mar-A-Lago, and despite intense US pressure, Xi have proven himself to be incapable and/or unwilling to resolve the DPRK problem.
The question for President Trump will be whether Beijing China, under President Xi have the willingness and capability to at least, prevent Chinese elements from interfering in a US and allied solution to the problem.
This brings us to the problem of laws of war.
The last time the PRC fought a major war beyond their borders is against Vietnam in 1979. It has been decades since the Chinese forces encountered western militaries in force.
Routinely, PRC forces are enforcing maritime claims in the South China Sea in violation of UNCLOS. These activities suggest that PRC have a view that hybrid warfare by paramilitary and other forces is an acceptable norm in “peacetime”. This begs the question of what the Beijing China will deem to be acceptable conduct short of war with the US in the event of a Korean conflict.
The ideas of neutrality, or non-belligerent status is rooted in the Western tradition of armed conflict. There is no historical precedent to a Chinese regime practicing a “permanent neutrality” policy like Belgium or Switzerland. When CCP organs speaks of “staying neutral” if North Korea “attacked first”, it is temporary neutrality that can change at any time.
But even that declaration leaves much room for doubt when examined from the PRC perspective.
We should bear in mind that the Sino-Vietnam war was termed “self-defensive counteroffensive” against Vietnam irrespective of its offensive and geopolitical nature. PRC have also carefully concealed their offensive posture against US and allied installations in east Asia while formally pleading “no first use” of nuclear weapons.
Thus, Beijing-China’s pronouncements offer few clues as to how they will actually behave regardless of how the Korean war started. Neutrality may simply mean that Beijing will encourage (or do nothing to prevent) “People’s Volunteers” or other means of aiding DPRK. In other words, Beijing China’s official stance may not apply to the “local” governments near North Korea or other Chinese elements.
A critical task for President Trump is to impress upon President Xi the US and Allies understanding of precisely what “being neutral” mean to the US and allies. That is to say, that any material aid, assistance, covert or overt, that originate from outside DPRK that can be traced as Chinese origin — including from PRC operatives in Japan or South Korea — will be regarded as breaches of neutrality.
Violations of neutrality by PRC CCP operatives will make them legitimate military targets, regardless of their location on PRC or neutral territory or on the high seas. (i.e. PLN “fishing boats” relaying warnings of aircraft taking off from Guam heading toward DPRK).
Covert aid to DPRK like the provision of sensor data by PRC installations anywhere, including space, or assistance in command and control or targeting, or shelter for DPRK officials in hardened PRC facilities will all fall under violations of PRC neutrality.
That will extend to provision of “relief supplies” that act as cover for delivery of military aid.
Neutrality will extend to the idea of “unrestricted warfare” suggested by PLA colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiansui, that expressly suggest the use of both armed force and “all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests”.
That is to say, trade, financial, terror, and ecological war against US and allies are all on the table.
Any effort to weaponized trade, disrupt financial markets, cyber attacks, terror, etc. by Chinese elements, whether formally operating under Beijing China control or not, will be treated as violations of neutrality.
Beyond this, the use of “informationalized warfare” and “hybrid war” will all be regarded as belligerence and subject to allied retaliation and sanctions immediately.
If Beijing China intends to remain neutral, they must demonstrate and prove the ability to control their forces and prevent such violations of neutrality broadly defined.
Xi Jinping, ostensibly the most powerful man in PRC, may not be capable of control his military to abide by these strict rules of war. The PLA/N, like most traditional Asian militaries, are notable for the short shift they give to training and indoctrination of troops on western notions of the rules of war and the western idea of separation of civilian from military control with the former having primacy.
Chinese military arts was historically based on the personal views of the local commanders, who in the Chinese martial tradition, was, and is historically relieved of any concept of civilian oversight once the military is given command.
This is directly contradictory to western ideas of the primacy of civilian over military rule. Placing the Chinese military as a branch of the CCP (rather than the state) have only made a nominal dint in this tradition.
Hence, the regular, and frequent, exhortation by top leaders including President Xi to the military to obey the CCP.
The extent to which a Chinese military is still a law onto itself is illustrated by President Xi’s July 2017 90th anniversary PLA celebration speech to the PLA that exhorted them:
“[PLA]… must be unwavering in upholding the bedrock principle of absolute party leadership of the military,” and “Always obey and follow the party. Go and fight wherever the party points.”
It is unthinkable for any US President or close ally like UK, Australia to even imagine such a speech having to be made that would cast doubt on the loyalty and reliability of their armed forces and the supremacy of civilian control. Yet, in the PRC controlled by the new strongman Xi, it is essential.
President Xi’s plea for the PLA to be loyal was followed by a major reshuffling of personnel that resulted in the appointment of two trusted associates General Zhang Youxia and General Xu Qiliang to the new, smaller, Central Military Commission at the end of the 19th CCP congress to tighten his grip on the military.
This follows a longstanding tradition where a newly installed top CCP leadership require much of the first 5 year term gradually replacing personnel and only comes onto their own in terms of power in the second term when the process migrates to the lower levels so as to build up sufficient momentum and critical mass to replace the most powerful top leaders.
Xi broke from this tradition by targeting Zhou Yongkang’s faction early on that resulted in their fall in 2012 that in turn resulted in wholesale removal of this faction.
But Xi was unable to follow through his purge immediately — he had to wait for the 19th Party Congress. That is to say, Joseph Stalin he is not. Stalin would simply order his opponents summarily executed.
Dealing with a weak leader of Beijing China creates problems in the face of war on the Korean peninsula creates other problems. Xi may have sufficient power to prevent the use of the PRC nuclear arsenal — but even that is not absolutely certain.
Command and control of nuclear forces in PRC is shrouded in mystery. Though it is well known that Xi did not have the C2 capabilities of Air Force One when he travels abroad. That begs the question of who have authority to launch nuclear weapons in PRC.
Allied contingency plans need to be created in the event that it is likely that Xi (or his successor post coup) may seize control of the nuclear arsenal and use them. Or in the event that deterrence against PRC failed. Chinese political history suggest that if the Chinese nuclear arsenal fall into the hands of a group, they may elect to use it on domestic enemies so as to install a new dynasty.
China is not the Soviet Union that fortunately, collapsed in an orderly fashion without a nuclear mishap.
Returning to deterrence, President Xi and his successors in the PRC need to be cognizant that SSBNs off the coast of PRC can deliver a nuclear strike anywhere in China within 15 minutes. A submarine launched counterforce strike can potentially disable the majority of the PRC’s nuclear forces before they can be launched or lay waste to PRC.
Although no US President will want to test the theory,
Mutually Assured Destruction may not be operative against the US. This may be one of the best assurance that PRC will not intervene in the Korean conflict.
The best case scenario may be that Xi, however weak, remains in nominal control much like Generalissimo Chiang Kai Sek, even though he may not be able to control the pro DPRK elements and preventing them from becoming belligerents against allied forces.
Xi can, under that circumstance, accede to the US and Allied use of force against pro DPRK chinese forces, and at the same time, prevent the outbreak of general or nuclear war by the PRC. This will ensure that PRC under Xi survive.
During this two day visit, both Presidents will be using this as the opportunity to take the measure of each other and make up their minds about each other.
President Xi’s propaganda have not fooled President Trump nor altered his determination to eliminate the nuclear threat from DPRK before the US faces a threat from a nuclear armed extortionist.
President Xi face the momentous decision of either believing his own propaganda and attempt to take on the US and allies — with the high probability that it would result in failure that will result in defeat for the PRC in general, and his regime in particular.
Alternatively, President Xi can cooperate with the US and secure peace for at least a generation by preventing the PRC from becoming a belligerent in the Korean war — to the extent he is capable of.
That will give breathing room to the PRC to reform into an acceptable regime to the international community. PRC’s present course to be an ideological, great power and economic rival to the US and allies is unlikely to be sustainable much longer.
No more will the US and allies tolerate the PRC’s challenge and undermining of the liberal international order without repercussions. The question is, which course will President Xi choose?
The US and allies is more than capable of surviving and winning a cold, or hot war with the PRC.
The PRC, on the other hand, will be severely challenged should the US and allies initiate a cold war by (i.e.) impose a trade embargo and seized PRC assets abroad, as America did to Japan on July 26, 1941. This will almost certainly happen should PRC elements become belligerents.
Momentous decisions will have to be made by two Presidents that will shape the balance of the 21st Century.
Let’s hope they both choose well.
Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please go to the following:
The Nordics are responding to what they see as a new situation in their region.
The Arctic opening expands the range significantly of the challenge in what might be called the Nordic Security Zone (NSZNS) and the use of military power in Europe and beyond by the Russians has changed the defense environment of the post-Cold War period.
The Russians under Putin are clearly not the Soviets. They are not protecting their Empire in Eastern Europe; freed from this burden they can now pursue more narrowly considered policies in the perceived Russian interest.
This includes expanding Russian territory to include areas which the Russian leadership regards as inherently theirs, such as in the Crimea. And this includes as well expanding Russian geopolitical influence through insertion of force into the Middle East and strengthening Russian bases in the region.
The visits of the Israelis and Saudis to Moscow have highlighted ways in which the Russians are expanding their practical influence and shaping greater maneuvering room to achieved their designated objectives.
Under Putin, the Russian military has been downsized and modernized and with this modernization much greater integration if air and maritime power has been highlighted. Illustrative of the change is building a fleet of missile armed frigates operating in the Caspian Sea which are used to support Middle Eastern operations.
For the Nordics, the Russian dynamic creates a fluid NSZ from the Arctic through to the Baltics.
And in the heart of the NSZ is heavily armed Kaliningrad which is home to a significant missile and air defense force which given the Caspian example is part of a broader strategic capability to influence events within the NSZ.
As Jorge Benitez wrote in an article published on January 19, 2017:
The Russian exclave of Kaliningrad hosts significant military capabilities and lies between NATO members Poland and Lithuania. Over the years, the Russians have deployed so much firepower in this small territory deep inside NATO’s eastern borders that NATO’s former top military commander, retired Gen. Philip Breedlove, testified to Congress in February that Kaliningrad “is a very militarized piece of property … a fortress of A2AD [anti-access/area denial].”
Since then, the situation has gotten even worse. In addition to the advanced S-400 missiles with a 250-mile range already stationed in this area, in October the Russians deployed Iskander-M nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad. These missiles have a range of more than 300 miles, which means they are capable of reaching six NATO capitals: Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, Copenhagen, and Berlin. Also in October, the Russians announced that they deployed Bastion land-based coastal defense missile launchers in Kaliningrad. These supersonic missiles have a range of about 190 miles and cover the heart of the Baltic Sea, threatening maritime access to NATO’s Baltic members.
As if this arsenal of Russian missiles wasn’t cause enough for concern, Putin’s most recent act was to move two missile corvettes (the Serpukhov and the Zeleny Dol) from their base in the Black Sea to Kaliningrad. These Russian warships are equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles, which Putin used to demonstrate his ability to strike inside Syria from as far away as the Caspian Sea. In fact, the Kalibr missiles have a range of more than 900 miles and from Kaliningrad can reach most NATO capitals.
The Nordics have been playing close attention to the strategic shift in their region.
Norway and Denmark are putting in place modernization efforts and have reshaped their public discourse about the challenges in their region.
The Swedes have just concluded their first major military exercise in more than 20 years; and the Finns are working more closely with Nordics and allies for regional defense.
At the same time, the UK is in the throes of working out post-Brexit defense plans, and it is clear that Northern Europe will play a major role in shaping the way ahead. New aircraft are coming to the region – F-35s and P-8s, tankers and lifters – which will provide for enhanced capabilities to deal with challenge which Russia presents.
And the US and other NATO forces, such as Canada, which have major strategic interests in the region are working together to shape a more collaborative and nuanced force structure, to provide for deterrence in depth.
With the coming of the P-8s and Tritons, the return but in reality, transformation of ASW into a maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise is being shaped.
And Canada is contributing to this with a new helicopter and significant modifications of its legacy P-3s.
And the coming of the F-35 as a key coalition force could generate significantly greater collaborative integration to shape an offensive-defensive force necessary to be taken seriously by the Russians.
In this Special Report, we are looking at the evolution of Nordic thinking, the focus on force transformation to deal with the evolving Russian threat and challenge and posing some key questions about how best to shape the way ahead.
This Special Report picks up the threads of earlier reports, and lays the foundation for continuing work in addressing innovations in the region and how these innovations might inform the transformation of the forces of the liberal democracies in dealing with enhanced threats and challenges posed by the illiberal forces seeking to shape the evolving global order to their advantage.
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Preparing the armament for the Mirage 2000 for the Mali operation, January 9, 2013, at the airbase in N’Djamena, Chad. Credit: French Ministry of Defense.
US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together after their meetings at Mar-a-Lago in Florida. Photo: AP
