In an effort to be in compliance with GDPR we are providing you with the latest documentation about how we collect, use, share and secure your information, we want to make you aware of our updated privacy policy here
Enter your name and email address below to receive our newsletter.
2018-01-21 RAF Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) Typhoon aircraft scrambled from RAF Lossiemouth to monitor two Russian planes approaching UK airspace on January 15, 2018.
According to an article on the Ministry of Defence website:
The Russian Blackjack Tupolev Tu-160 long-range bombers were not talking to air traffic control, making them a hazard to all other aviation.
The RAF worked closely with NATO partners to monitor the jets as they passed through a variety of international airspace, before they were intercepted by the RAF in the North Sea.
Subsequently, our fighters escorted the Russian Blackjacks north, out of the UK’s area of interest. At no time did the Russian bombers enter UK sovereign airspace
Pictured is a Russian Blackjack Tupolev Tu-160 long-range bomber. Credit: UK Ministry of Defence
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said:
“The threats this country faces are intensifying and we will not hesitate in defending our skies from acts of aggression.
“Our excellent RAF tracked the Russian aircraft every step of the way, and they continue to police UK and international airspace every hour of every day, to help keep the British people safe.”
RAF QRA was launched today because the Russian Military aircraft were not talking to air traffic agencies.
The RAF routinely intercept, identify and escort Russian aircraft that transit international airspace within the UK’s area of interest and continue to be on call; 24/7, 365.
The recent intercept by the RAF of a Russian bomber approaching UK airspace raises the question of how a QRA squadron works?
During a visit to RAF Lossiemouth, we addressed this question to one of the QRA squadrons.
2016-11-13 By Robbin Laird
When I was a kid, I remember the images of deterrence which were provided by strip alert bombers against the Soviet threat.
Now we have images in the press of the strip alert Typhoons dealing with the air defence of the United Kingdom against a wider variety of threats than simply that of the Soviet Union, but which clearly includes the successor state, that of Russia.
When I visited RAF Coningsby, I learned that the base housed QRA South or Quick Reaction Alert South.
Question: The RAF has had to focus more on British airspace protection with both the terrorist threat and the upsurge in Russian airspace activity impacting on the UK.
What role has the Quick Reaction Alert force played in this process?
Answer: At RAF Coningsby, we are more focused on the terrorist threat whereas at RAF Lossiemouth we focus more on the Russian activities.
But the demand on resources is significant. Everything at each base, from equipment, to logistics to training is focused on maintaining the alert posture and ensuring we are ready 24/7.
The aircraft and pilots on QRA are only the tip of the pyramid of activity to ensure success in such an important mission.
When I visited RAF Lossiemouth in June 2016, I had a chance to visit the QRA based at Lossiemouth which is in addition to the one at RAF Coningsby
According to an RAF article published on September 19, 2014:
Royal Air Force aircraft at RAF Lossiemouth have launched the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) for the first time since the Moray base took on the role of defending the UK’s Northern airspace. Typhoon jets were scrambled to identify aircraft in international airspace.
The aircraft identified as Russian military ‘Bears’, did not enter UK airspace.
RAF Lossiemouth’s Station Commander, Group Captain Mark Chappell, said:
“This first successful launch for QRA North has been what all of the hard work by RAF Leuchars and RAF Lossiemouth personnel over recent months has been for.
“The relocation of two Typhoon squadrons was a significant challenge, one that was met by our whole team.
“The many months of preparation and infrastructure improvements have made us absolutely ready for this launch, and shows we are in the best position to provide the service to the United Kingdom that the Royal Air Force was primarily created for – that is, the protection of our airspace.”
Royal Air Force Lossiemouth began a new era in its history on the 1st of September when it assumed the provision of what the RAF calls the ‘Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) North’ task for the United Kingdom.
The role is carried out by crews from 6 Squadron. The pilot of the first launch said:
“It was an honour to be part of what is a milestone in the history of RAF Lossiemouth. With the move of Quick Reaction Alert from Leuchars to Lossiemouth, it has been a huge ask of many personnel.
“The fact that we had a flawless scramble and intercept of two Russian Bears was a testament to the hard work and commitment of all personnel involved.
“A very proud moment, not just for the pilots who did the intercept but the engineering crews who did a fantastic job, as well as many other station personnel involved in this constant commitment.”
During my visit, I was able to address the question of the nature of the pyramid necessary to launch QRA ready aircraft.
87470random1.05.0
Visiting the QRA area demonstrated the 24/7 quality of the operation.
There was the red button to generate the movement of pilots and personnel to launch the aircraft very rapidly.
Map published by the Daily Mail on 2/19/15 showing Typhoon intercepts of Russian aircraft in 2014 and 2015 up to that point.
There are ops areas and offices, crew rooms, a dining area and kitchen to serve the staff, bedrooms for the rotational crew and a gym to remain ready.
But the question of what the pyramid looks like beyond this is simply having two pilots ready 24/7 with 2 support staff and eight engineers for each week in support as well.
1(F) Squadron, II (AC) Sqn. and 6 Sqn. provide the aircraft, pilots and engineers for the 24/7 operation. The Air Traffic Control Center is manned 24/7 to enable aircraft to launch at any time.
The Ground Support System or GSS provides support to the Typhoons with mission data and computer systems used by the aircraft.
And chefs and catering staff are on station to cook and serve meals for duty personnel, three meals a day, 365 days a year.
To put it bluntly: to be 24/7 ready is a significant demand signal for the Typhoon fleet, and one which can be overlooked in terms of the number of aircraft which are required to remain ready for operational launch, 24/7 and 365 days a year.
According to the QRA North team, the Typhoon has performed its role well, but it requires maintainers, pilots and operations personnel to pay close attention to the rotation of aircraft into the demand side of QRA.
And when the RAF deploys to the Baltics, in effect, the UK is supporting three QRA efforts.
The pyramid is demanding; the photos of the planes on strip alert simply masks the significant level of effort to ensure that they are on strip alert.
This demand side is one which can be easily overlooked by everyone, except those providing the capability and the intruders into UK airspace.
When have you read a positive review of our combat experience in Afghanistan from the Pentagon’s Inspector General?
Not a common experience for sure, but very recently, the IG underscored a significant advance in how the battle in Afghanistan is going forward.
“Less than two years after flying its first combat mission, the Afghan Air Force’s A-29 Super Tucano aircraft are playing a key role in supporting Afghan soldiers on the ground.
“When they show up overhead, the Afghan National Army have the confidence to continue attacking on ground,” the deputy commander for Train, Advise and Assist Command-South said in a new Defense Department Inspector General report.
Absent sufficient air coverage, Afghan security forces who had grown reliant on coalition air power suffered a series of defeats to the Taliban.
Building a native air strike capability within the Afghan Air Force is the key to Afghan success in the future, Army Gen. John Nicholson, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2017.
“Close air support and aerial mobility are the most critical remaining gaps that need to be addressed,” Nicholson said. “At the tactical level, the [Afghan National Army] needs to improve its integration of fires and air power.”
In its report, the DoD IG praised the Afghan Air Force for the progress it has made…
This is surely good news, but one can ask why did this take so long?
It has been clear for a number of years, that close air support is a decisive factor in dealing with insurgency in Afghanistan.
Just look at this week’s new movie on Afghanistan with Special Forces riding in Afghanistan on horseback and calling in fire from the air to respond to the attack on the World Trade Center.
We have written from the beginning of Second Line of Defense of the need to shift from a Big Army defined Afghan War to a more effective partnership approach using flexible insertion forces to support the efforts of the Afghans.
Put in other terms, we have focused on how to shape an effective strategy in Afghanistan and one in which a capability like the Super Tucano would become a key building block.
SLD interviewee Johan Feckhaus, a former French military officer and an advisor of Massoud, seen with the leader shortly before Massound’s assassination.
It has been also obvious for a long time that the Super Tucano is a very effective close air support weapon in dealing with the fight against drug lords and terrorists alike.
The Super Tucano’s global track record is clear; and equally clear was the fact that it was the right tool for the United States to buy and get into the hands of the Afghans to empower their ground operations against terrorists.
And when you have shown this is how to fight – CAS with ground maneuver forces–you need to empower your partners to fight the same way.
As Marine Corps General Walters put it upon his return from Afghanistan in 2012
“The Afghan National Army and Afghan Security Forces understand from their perspective, how important air is.
“We have made them big consumers.
“They know that the air is there for them; they’ll go out and operate.”
But why did this take so long when it was very clear that this was the right course?
Or put another way, what lessons can be learned about how to deal with the impediments to getting combat capability into the force as rapidly as possible?
Four A-29 Super Tucanos arrive at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Afghanistan, Jan. 15, 2016. The aircraft will be added to the Afghans’ inventory in the spring of 2016. The A-29 Super Tucano is a ‘light air support’ aircraft capable of conducting close air support, aerial escort, armed overwatch and aerial interdiction. Designed to operate in high temperature and in extremely rugged terrain, the A-29 Super Tucano is highly maneuverable 4th generation weapons system capable of delivering precision guided munitions. It can fly at low speeds and low altitudes, is easy to fly, and provides exceptionally accurate weapons delivery. It is currently in service with 10 different air forces around the world. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Nathan Lipscomb)
The current Air Combat Commander has made it clear that the USAF needs to accelerate the deployment of future capabilities into the combat force, what lessons does the Super Tucano slow roll acquisition highlight?
Ignoring the Warfighter to Have a Competition
The first clear point is that ignoring combat requirements and sidelining urgent requests from key commanders involved in the fight is not something which Congress should aid and abeit.
And how does Congress do this?
By insisting that there be a competition when there is clearly no alternative from the standpoint of combat experience and capability to an existing platform or capability.
This is what Ed Timperlake wrote in 2010:
“General Mattis then Commanding Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) testified about a special forces effort called operation Imminent Fury II. The Department of Defense supported the effort and sent a request to Congress to act.
The entire action from testinomy to request took just a month, which is relative light speed.
But nothing occured.
Then a letter was made public in the Washington Times by Bill Gertz that showed General McCrystal solidly behind the rapid fielding of Imminent Fury II. General Petraeus in the chain-of-command as then CG Central Command forwarded the letter to the Chairman. But nothing happened.
“It turns out that, unlike the recent combat success in Colombia, Imminent Fury II was stopped by Congressional Action. An immediate request for a combat program was not approved by Congress because IF II was going to use the Super Tucano.
The ST is in direct competition with the attempt by the Hawker Beech to convert their T-6 Texan trainer into a combat aircraft–the AT-6.
The T-6 Texan trainer (the basis for the proposed AT-6) is manufactured in Kansas by Hawker Beach a Canadian-owned firm currently in dire financial straits.
There have been reports that, in order to stave off disaster, management has been considering moving some production lines to Mexico.
“It now appears, looking at the Congressional reporting, that stoping IF II was part of a bigger effort to give time, so a combat version of the T-6 could be developed and tested.
Unfortunately the Afghan War goes on and time is short.
Congress has earmarked millions to try and get the T-6 Texan, a US Air Force trainer aircraft, up to combat standards ahead of a pending fly-off competition for equipping the emerging Afghan National Army Air Corps.
This fly off will be a competitive test of ready-to-fly, non-developmental tactical light attack planes that are currently available.
The “AT-6B” version of the trainer is not yet ready.
The non-combat certified AT-6B’s competitor is Brazil’s Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, the FARC killer that has been operational for several years. including several combat missions schwacking FARC guerillas in the dead of night.”
The second lesson is to demonstrate once again that the refusal to buy foreign equipment when clearly our allies have the only or the best alternative undercuts our combat performance and endangers lives.
This practice provides a slow roll that hurts the combat force and slows down real combat capabilities simply for show trials, or, sorry, competitions held to slow down the ability to kill adversaries and save American and allied lives.
Competition for competition’s sake is a life killer.
Prioritize the User Community Not the Requirements High Priests
The third lesson is that the core driving opinion that should shape key thinking about enhanced and accelerated combat capabilities are those of the warfighters.
They will rarely have a complete consensus but the user community is more important a guide to the way ahead than is Congress or bureaucratic requirements setters. And this will be especially important in the era of software upgradeable capabilities, like F-35, Wedgetail, P-8, Triton and others, where the business rules need to change to allow the warfighters to more effectively drive change.
As no less an expert than the head of the Air Force Materiel Command put it last year:
“We have to change the way we think about requirements definition if we’re going to really adopt Agile Software Development.
“Maybe the answer isn’t this detailed requirements’ slow down.”
“By the way, once you put it in the hands of the operator maybe some of those requirements you had in the beginning, maybe they don’t make any sense anymore because the operator sees how they can actually use this and they change it.”
Reinforce Partners Rather Than Always Doing the Job Yourself
The fourth lesson is that in ground operational environments involving counter terrorism we should look to shaping partner ground air capabilities rather than focusing on our need to bring in the entire combat force.
It is time to think beyond the A-10 to the Super Tucano.
Hardly the End of Manned Aircraft
The fifth lesson is that a Super Tucano in the hands of the Afghans can be a more effective tool than UAVs run at great distances away in the United States or elsewhere.
Rather than getting carried away with the “end of the manned aircraft” mantra, the Super Tucano is a case study in a different way of thinking about the future.
In an interview in 2011 with Col. (Retired) Bill Buckey, former Deputy Commander of the NATO Airbase at Kandahar in 2009 emphasized what such an aircraft can do versus a UAV:
One of the things that the special operations forces, who started the idea of the whole Imminent Fury piece, wanted was the ability to have a partner in that light attack platform; a TAC-A or supporting arms coordinator that would be above them in the air and who, if things got ugly, could then marshal in other aircraft. The guys sitting at Creech can’t do that.
The individual in the backseat of the aircraft is the one that’s going to be communicating to these jets who are still 30 minutes away – 15 minutes away, an hour away – and giving them the target brief and the whole situational awareness piece of what’s going on while they ingress; which is something that your guy at Creech is not going to be able to do.
But now that’s the tactical piece. The operational piece is back to the whole COIN environment. Again, if what you’re trying to do in a COIN environment is drive your cost of doing business down as close as you can to the level of the other guy; right now, UAVs ain’t cheap.
You’ve got a tremendous logistics piece; you’ve got the sophisticated communications infrastructure required to fly them. You’ve got the whole piece back in CONUS in order to operate them. Your cost of doing business is huge and you also have reliability issues. The accident rates are not great with UAVs right now.
And in terms of that ability to act as FAC-A, that’s something that you just can’t get with a UAV.
The Obama Administration Punting the Football
The sixth lesson is that a much more rapid introduction of the Super Tucano along with associated transition in how the Afghan forces could fight would have been a good capability for the Obama Administration to leverage to accelerate progress in the “good war.”
But they simply did not do it.
It was slow mo, slow roll and a strategic failure of the first order.
In short, rather than an LAS experiment, why not get on with the lessons learned and find out what other systems are out there that can make a difference?
As Ed Timperlake notes: “When as a Marine I received my Navy “Wings of Gold” June 1971, a classmate Naval Officer volunteered to fly combat in Vietnam with The “Black Pony” Squadron, VAL-4 flying the OV-10 very up close and personal coma bat action.
“The tragic, the comic, the terrifying, the poignant are all part of the story of the Black Pony pilots who distinguished themselves in the Mekong Delta between 1969 and 1972. Flying their Broncos “down and dirty, low and slow,” they killed more enemies and saved more allies with close-air support during the three years they saw action than all the other naval squadrons combined. The U.S. Navy’s only land-based attack squadron, Light Attack Squadron Four (VAL-4) flew support missions for the riverine forces, SEALs, and allied units in borrowed, propeller-driven OV-10As.”
“Consequently when we began the quest to put the A-29 into Afghan combat operation, especially with three very impressive ground combat General’s Mattis, McCryatal and Petraeus all in support, I figured seven months to success not seven years!”
“Shame on the entire political process that is going on to today which will simply repeat this kind of strategic failure if it is not corrected.”
It has taken the USAF more time to acquire the Super Tucano than it took the United States to fight World War II.
And this in spite of the fact that the combat leadership clearly indicated its desires and intents to the political leadership in the last Administration.
But it simply did not matter in terms of getting capability in the hands of the warfighter and getting on with changing how the Afghan war could be fought.
Editor’s Note: At Second Line of Defense we pride ourselves on working on the emergence of key issues and capabilities important to the warfighter and that is why we called ourselves Second Line of Defense.
We focus on combat capabilities, and avoiding the Greek Chorus of critics of new systems, and capabilities, such as the barrage of criticism of the Osprey when it was clear to us that it was a core transformational capability, which would redefine the USMC and the joint force.
The focus on the Osprey whereby we engaged with the Marines as the Osprey was first stood up at Second Marine Air Wing and then went to Afghanistan and then became a key redefiner of the ARG MEU into the amphibious task force is a good illustration of our approach.
We have done that from the beginning of our publication and work.
The Super Tucano and its projected role in Afghanistan is also a good example of how we have addressed the opportunity to enhance combat capabilities and we saw the Super Tucano and its proven combat record as a low hanging fruit in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.
Edward Timperlake played a key role in defining and shaping this story and the political roadblocks and needless competitions put in the way by the political system to creating ground truth in Afghanistan is stunning.
SLD: So to summarize your thinking about a COIN aircraft, you want to drive down the cost of providing close air support to the guys on the ground. You want manned air for the roles that you have described – to be involved with the ground commander, the ability to loiter, the engagement, the systems to provide the “find/fix” piece and the persistence to be there for the “finish.” You want sufficiently lethal manned airborne presence but at lower cost than a fast jet.
Buckey: We have the systems and the weapons to pair up with a turboprop aircraft that has the persistence to get us through the entire “find/fix/finish” process at a substantially reduced cost that is more appropriate for air operations in a COIN environment.
Is it not interesting that Boeing’s current effort to acquire or work more closely with Embraer could already have been built from a fighter decision which was driven in part by the negative politics of US defense acquisition over the Super Tucano?
And then the Chinese tried to enter the game by trying to buy the company working hard within Congress and the Administration to derail getting on with the Super Tucano acquisition.
Well, the Super Tucano is built by a FOREIGN company and even though the ST was to be built in the United States, an AMERICAN company and its supporters mounted a counter attack.
Sounds familiar. Northrop and then EADS North America were to build a FOREIGN designed tanker in the United States, but then Boeing and its supporters mounted the charge about FOREIGN or even worse FRENCH companies getting a share of a U.S. (read their) contract.
In both cases, the Kansas Congressional delegation has been heavily involved. In the first case, they were rewarded with their effort by Boeing pulling out of Wichita AFTER having won an initial tanker contract.
The Kansas Congressional delegation worked overtime to insure that THEIR AMERICAN company, Hawker Beechcraft, would get a contract for its AT-6 trainer (did someone forget the proven combat aircraft piece?) to supply the Afghans.
But along the way the AMERICAN company might well become Chinese. This is a new twist on BUY an American company to BUY American.
In 2013, “The Way Ahead for Airpower in Afghanistan”
Well we could not do it with Super Tucanos, but we could do it with Russian helicopters!
With all the many words on the Super Tucano versus AT-6 competition, what has been lost in the public debate is the real issue: equipping and training the Afghan Air Force to be an effective fighting force able to work with other Air Forces in providing for enhanced Afghan security.
The broad trajectory of change has been to move from a Russian-equipped force in disrepair to shaping a mixed fleet of aircraft able to support the various missions which the Afghans would need: transport, ground support and counter-insurgency ISAR and strike.
A new one is replacing the core fleet of aging Mi-35s and AN-32s.
In 2013, “Colombia Battles the FARC: Turboprops Provide Key Tools”
It is clear that at the critical point in the initial destruction of the Taliban, that the United States could have avoided a full blown engagement in Afghanistan.
The problem with occupying a country with such a radically different culture from that of the United States will always be clash of cultures, and the legitimacy challenge facing any outside power.
No amount of counter-insurgency theory can change the fundamental reality that occupation by a foreign power will always have a legitimacy problem built in…..
And where we are now in Afghan history, it is important not to provide once again the Big Army solution set of occupation, training and cultural failure.
Another option can be to assist those forces that have been trained, to the level possible, within the constraints of the viability of the political and legal systems.
In 2016, “First Super Tucano’s Heading to Afghanistan: Can the US Strategy Leverage Them?”
We will stop there but feel free to search the website and add more stories; these are just a few of the many we have published about ruggedized airpower and the case of the Super Tucano.
We have written extensively on the Afghan war and how to shift the strategy from a “Big Army” engagement with the other services providing support and jointness being defined to a strategy more likely to lead to longer term success.
Below is an article we published on the 10th anniversary of 9/11 which highlighted interviews we had already done which underscored how to shape an effective strategy and one in which a capability like the Super Tucano would become a key building block.
09/14/2011 As Americans observe the day 10 years ago when terrorists in hijacked planes attacked New York and the Pentagon, the people of northern Afghanistan remember what for them was a greater tragedy two days earlier on Sept. 9, 2001. It was then that two agents of Al Qaeda posing as journalists detonated a bomb hidden in a television camera during an interview with Mr. Massoud, killing him instantly.
For his closest aides, who first tried to keep his death secret, fearing the truth would sink the besieged Northern Alliance for good, the collapse of the World Trade Center towers was a sign of hope. They instinctively saw a nexus in the two acts — though one has never been proved — and knew that the Americans would soon be on their way.
“I sort of woke up out of this shock I had been in since Sept. 9,” Abdullah Abdullah, the Northern Alliance’s former foreign minister, recalled about hearing the news of the attacks in New York. “It automatically came to my mind that out of this tragedy, there might be an opening.”
Earlier we had an opportunity to discuss with Johan Feckhaus, a former French military officer and an advisor of Massoud about the way ahead in Afghanistan.
In our interviews with Freckhaus he connects two broad points.
First, the light footprint followed by the Bush Administration after 9/11 was the right strategy.
The piling on of foreign troops has stirred up a hornets nest of Taliban activity who are using the large scale foreign presence as a recruiting issue.
The point simply put is that Afghans distrust foreign motives and the large number of troops.
And the foreign troops are backing a centralized government, which is out of sync of broader Afghan national aspirations and objectives.
Certainly, recent events in the Middle East suggest that building up the power of the Presidency, as a focus of Western activity might well be counterproductive for political progress.
In a recent speech to the Kuwait National Assembly, on 22 February 2011, the UK Prime Minister admitted: “For decades, some have argued that stability required highly controlling regimes (…). [We] faced a choice between our interests and our values. And to be honest, we should acknowledge that sometimes we have made such calculations in the past. But I say that is a false choice.”
Johan Freckhaus also suggested an interesting lesson from history that might just work — a Swiss “neutrality” model from the time of Napoleon. His observations in his own words are extremely interesting.
The West can work with Russia, Pakistan and others to shape a neutrality treaty and can assist where appropriate in countering foreign fighters like Al Qaeda and the Taliban seeking to penetrate Afghan territory.
But the West needs to leave security to the provinces, and work with a much smaller central government tasked with dispensing aid to the provinces, control of the Army and collecting taxes. B
ut the provinces cannot, nor need, manage large police forces.
In the earlier interview, Olivier underscored the following remarks by Johan:
There is indeed an insurgency in Afghanistan because you have 30 000 or 40 000 rebel fighters – according to allied military intelligence – backed by millions of Afghan civilians, in growing numbers, who feed them, house them, transport them, protect them, give them information and so on.
These civilians are doing it foremost to drive foreign troops out of the country and in rejection of the system we are trying to impose, but do not want the return to power of the mullahs either.
Withdrawing our troops is therefore the right strategy to effectively drive a wedge between the rebels and their supporters.
This famous momentum, this magic moment where the power relationship can be reversed, will come from fair and complete withdrawal of foreign forces, because then the fate of the country will return to its population.
Then the Afghan security forces, as they exist today, would very well be capable, with the help of villagers, of chasing away those rebels on motorcycles mainly armed with Kalashnikovs and rocket launchers, whose most lethal know-how is simply to trigger explosives remotely.
The strategy of “always more” prevalent until today for the Afghan security forces is a dangerous illusion: more troops, more money, more power to the central government, all of this is counter-productive, it fuels the insurgency!
We are building oversized security forces in Afghanistan that the country is far from being able to afford.
We imagine a police state, supported from abroad, which would subject the population to the decisions of Kabul.
We imagine building in a few years, for one of the poorest countries in the world, an army that could successfully maintain in power a hyper-centralized system.
This is not sustainable.” Let’s remember, for the record, that the Afghan government, which now has 140, 000 military and 109, 000 police officers, aims at a 240,000 military and 240,000 police officers force. And that is for a country of about 20 million inhabitants.
In comparison, France, for a population three times larger, has fewer than 170,000 military personnel (ground and air) and 265 000 gendarmes and police officers.
2018-01-15 The title of a new report issued by our partner the Air Power Development Centre of the Royal Australian Air Force is entitled 5th Generation Air C2 and ISR.
A key aspect of the F-35 global enterprise is that air warriors are working throughout the enterprise to reshape air operations.
This paper is a core example of the kind of thinking going on in the enterprise.
The paper is written by a Dutch Air Force officer during his time in Australia.
The author is Lt. Col. Bart Hoeben of the Royal Netherlands Air Force.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bart Hoeben was born 3 March 1965. He joined the Netherlands Royal Air Force at age 21. After five years of military training and academic studies at the Royal Military Academy, Bart received his officer’s commission in 1991. After training as a Fighter Controller and Air Battle Manager, Bart spent the first part of his career serving in Air Command and Control positions in The Netherlands and Germany, including a four-year tour on NATO AWACS. He was deployed several times for NATO peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations.
In 2007 Bart moved to Washington DC, to work in the F-35 Joint Program Office in the Interoperability Integrated Product Team. After returning to The Netherlands in 2009, Bart was assigned to a Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance requirements position in the Ministry of Defence. After a year of study at the Netherlands Defence College from 2012 to 2013, he returned to the Ministry of Defence to work as a Senior Staff Advisor in Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Space and Air Operations Control. In 2016, Bart filled the position of International Fellow at the Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Development Centre in Canberra, Australia.
In his paper, Lt. Col. Hoeben looks at the co-evolution of C2, ISR and the coming of the F-35 as a fleet air combat asset.
“The goal of 5th Generation Air C2 and ISR is to adjust military actions better as the situation unfolds and thus reach better and quicker effects and objectives…..”
He then cited another work where the authors “make the case that traditional command and control approaches lack the agility required for 21st century missions, that are simultaneously more complex and more dynamic. These authors conclude that C2 approaches that are agile and take full advantage of all the available information and assets, are better suited.
In their research they define three key factors that can be thought of as the dimensions of a C2 approach towards an edge (agile) organisation (see Figure 3). These dimensions are:
• Allocation of decision rights
• Distribution of information
• Patterns of interaction among the actors…
He then noted that although these authors “….take a slightly different approach through this decomposition of C2, they implicitly acknowledge the importance of new (Air) C2 and ISR concepts to achieve a higher degree of agility. After all, the fundamental function of ISR is to distribute information (‘getting the right information and intelligence, to the right people, in the right format, at the right time’13) and Air C2 is predominately about making decisions. By adding patterns of interaction among actors as the third dimension, they stipulate the importance of collaboration.
“This decomposition gives an opening to explore the utility of current and new systems (including the F-35) and processes for distribution of information (ISR) and their ability to collaborate with each other.
“Furthermore, decomposing (Air) C2…, gives opening for a discussion on allocation of decision rights that is relevant in relation to the introduction of the F-35. The F-35 will supply pilots with an, until now, unprecedented situational awareness through the use of on-board ISR capabilities (sensors).
“This leads to a greater ability to adjust actions upon the situation as it unfolds.
“In order to capitalise on this ability, F-35 may require more freedom to act. In other words, allocation of more decision rights at the tactical (F-35) edge may be required to enhance operational agility.”
The Lt. Col. adds argues that “the first 5th Generation aircraft by RAAF and RNLAF does bring unprecedented opportunities for situational awareness and the application of 5th Generation concepts for Air C2 and ISR. Together with the introduction of F-35, these concepts may very well become essential stepping stones towards creating a 5th Generation Air Force.”
One could argue that for the smaller allied air forces, the F-35 will be leveraged as a core ISR/C2 aircraft in ways that the larger USAF will not.
But this also means that the allies in the global enterprise may well drive innovation in ways the USAF might not as well, which provides a significant cross-learning opportunity.
The executive summary of the paper is as follows:
In future conflict, we may end up having to fight a peer adversary.
In such a fight, we will not have a decisive technology advantage.
Furthermore, it is likely that we will be physically outnumbered.
In that fight, the way we orchestrate our force will be vital in gaining us the advantage and ultimately to win the conflict.
Air Command and Control (Air C2) is all about orchestrating our Air Forces.
Through exercising Air C2, we strive for decision superiority.
A major stepping stone towards achieving decision superiority is achieving information superiority. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aims at just that.
The future operation environment in which we fight a peer adversary has the potential to become very complex and highly dynamic. In that environment, we need to be able to adjust our actions constantly to cope with any situation that may develop and react in real-time to emerging threats and opportunities.
We need to be agile; ready to resort to high degree of dynamic (re-)tasking to out-pace and out-manoeuvre the adversary.
This puts extraordinary strain on the real-time link between Air C2 and ISR to achieve and maintain decision superiority.
Both the RAAF and the RNLAF will significantly transform during the next decade, as captured in Plan Jericho and CLSK 3.0.1
Two F-35 Lightning IIs, F-001 and F-002, of the Royal Netherlands Air Force landed at Edwards Jan. 16, 2015 after a five-hour flight from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. The Joint Strike Fighters arrived for an operational test and evaluation phase here in the High Desert. (U.S. Air Force photo by Jet Fabara)
One of the driving factors for the transformation is the introduction of the F-35 Lightning II. To employ it effectively and efficiently,
RAAF and RNLAF will have to look critically at how we operate, and probably apply new concepts.
Both Forces have a vested interest in understanding how current and planned Air C2 and ISR systems and concepts support exploiting the RAAF and RNLAF combat potential to the max.
They furthermore share the interest in evolving Air C2 and ISR to suit F-35 employment in a future, 5th Generation Air Force to achieve the required agility to operations at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This paper explores these new concepts for Air C2 and ISR related to F-35 employment.
The paper provides tangible recommendations about improving Air C2 and ISR systems, their integration, collaboration and Information & Communication Technology (ICT) at the tactical level, including the possible application of a combat cloud, and towards F-35 employment and follow-on development.
It furthermore explores the possibility for distribution of control towards the tactical edge, concluding that RAAF and RNLAF should further pursue this concept.
The paper also looks at command and ISR at the operational level and strategic employment of F-35 and draws two conclusions: first, that new concepts for Air C2 and ISR related to F-35 employment deserve increased attention from RAAF and RNLAF, and second, that successfully employing F-35 requires strong(er) influence of RAAF and RNLAF at the operational and strategic level.
Overall, the paper recommends possible ways in which RAAF and RNLAF could cooperate to face the Air C2 and ISR challenges and opportunities that come with the transition to a 5th Generation Air Force. This could involve stimulation and facilitating international discussion on new concepts for Air C2 and ISR.
The paper provides a framework for 5th Generation Air C2 and ISR, which illustrates the importance of coherence among Air C2, ISR, collaboration and ICT when formulating requirements for system improvements, tied to enhancing Air C2 – ISR integration at the tactical level.
It can also be used as a framework to further discuss the new concepts for Air C2 and ISR related to F-35 employment. Furthermore, the framework supports a broader view of these concepts, including the required professional mastery, collaboration and ICT.
Hence, it could also be used as a point of departure for further Air C2 and ISR analysis and concept development to support the transformation towards a 5th Generation Air Force.
Editor’s Note: For an opportunity to read the complete paper, please go to the following:
The US military has been focused along with core allies in fighting counter-terrorism land wars for more than a decade, which represents a defining generation of combat experience for the joint, and coalition force.
There has been significant combat learning in shaping new approaches to counter-terrorism and land engagements.
But the strategic shift in the global situation, the rise of peer competitors in conventional forces and the return of the salience of nuclear weapons via second nuclear age powers, concepts of operations and technology developed for the land wars are challenged by the emergence of the next phase of warfare, one might characterize as a multi-domain spectrum of conflict.
There are several elements of the new situation which are recasting the spectrum of conflict within which high intensity warfare capabilities are being interwoven into political military realities facing the US and allies when dealing with peer competitors.
The Nuclear Dimension
Both Russia and China are nuclear powers, and certainly in the Russian case modernization of their nuclear arsenal is providing new capabilities within their operational force which could allow for earlier use.
And the North Korean nuclear efforts along with anticipated other second nuclear powers, perhaps Iran, have posed fundamental considerations about where exactly to find the nuclear threshold in potential global conflict.
Put in other terms, engagements with second nuclear age powers or with peer competitors will always have a nuclear dimension, either in terms of deterrence or engagement.
The return of Herman Kahn and thinking the unthinkable is upon us, whether we want it or not.
A nuclear device need not necessarily be a WMD with a more up to date definition used by the CCA that do not define nuclear as WMD by default.
Prevention of mass destruction & casualties may require the nuclear threshold to be crossed in a judicious and tightly controlled manner when there is no other feasible method.
It does not follow that crossing the nuclear threshold in such a manner will automatically lead to wholesale nuclear war.
There is no reason why an escalatory latter have to exist for a given adversary or for it to be operative.
On the contrary, nuclear explosives may be the only practical way to prevent war caused by indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons in dangerous hands like North Korea.
Technology and doctrine have evolved since nuclear weapons were used last in 1945 and WMD taboos became institutionalized in international law.
The laws are now obsolete.
The nuclear threshold as it was formulated in the 20th century may be no less an obsolete concept than the Pope Innocent III’s prohibition on the use of crossbows on Christians.
Peer Competitors and High End Conventional Capabilities in the Service of Global Engagement
A second key element is the changing nature of the threat posed by peer competitors, which has been characterized by some as anti-access area denial capabilities.
What this entails is shaping missile enabled air, ground and naval forces which can leverage both defensive systems such as the S-400 and strike missiles, for now cruise but with perhaps hypersonic systems in the mid term future.
The US and the allies engaging peer competitors with evolving capabilities is requiring nothing less than changing our own template of operations and introducing new capabilities, fifth generation aircraft, new C2 systems, laying down the foundation for distributed operations, developing enhanced multi-domain operational capabilities.
There is a major shift in operational foci for both peer competitors and the US and its allies, which is being empowered by new systems, new training, new concepts of operations, and new areas of conflict, such as in the cyber domain.
And this in turn in resetting the spectrum of conflict within which engagements are occurring and will occur.
As Admiral Wang put it with regard to how he saw the challenge to Denmark and to Northern Europe posed by the Russians and their advanced systems:
Wang clearly argued that the Russian challenge has little to do with the Cold War Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat to the Nordics. The Soviet-Warsaw threat was one of invasion and occupation, and then using Nordic territory to fight U.S. and allied forces in the North Atlantic. In many ways, this would have been a repeat of how the Nazis seized Norway during a combined arms amphibious operation combined with a land force walk into Denmark.
In that scenario, the Danes and their allies were focused on sea denial through use of mines, with fast patrol boats providing protection for the minelayers.
Aircraft and submarines were part of a defense in depth strategy to deny the ability of the Soviets to occupy the region in time of a general war.
He contrasted this with the current situation in which the Russians are less focused on a general war, and more on building capabilities for a more limited objective, controlling the Baltic States. He highlighted the arms modernization of the Russian military focused on ground-based missile defense and land- and sea-based attack missiles, along with airpower, as the main means to shape a denial-in-depth strategy which would allow the Russians significant freedom of maneuver to achieve their objectives within their zone of strategic maneuver.
A core Russian asset is the Kalibr cruise missile, which can operate off of a variety of platforms. With a dense missile wolf pack, so to speak, the Russians provide a cover for their maneuver forces. They are focused on using land-based mobile missiles in the region as their key strike and defense asset. “The Russian defense plan in the Baltic is all about telling NATO, we can go into the Baltic countries if we decided to do so. And you will not be able to get in and get us out. That is basically the whole idea,” the admiral said.
Wang argued for a reverse engineering approach to the Russian threat. He saw this as combining several key elements: a combined anti-submarine (ASW), F-35 fleet, frigate- and land-based strike capabilities, including from Poland.
The Russian takeover of the Crimea was the first step in the reshaping of the spectrum. Here the Russians introduced a multi-domain approach to victory, backed by having a significant combat force, which could deter NATO from doing much about it.
And as Russia looks to the Baltics or the Chinese look to expand their control over the South China Sea, tactics and strategy are relying on their new power projection tools in support of a proactive engagement to reshape the strategic situation to their advantage.
Put in other words, military means associated with high intensity warfare capabilities, combat ships, combat aircraft and a strong missile force are being combined with a proactive strategy of engagement and expansion.
Dealing with the Threat
The nature of the threat facing the liberal democracies was well put by a senior Finnish official in a recent briefing: The timeline for early warning is shorter; the threshold for the use of force is lower.
What is unfolding is that capabilities traditionally associated with high end warfare are being drawn upon for lower threshold conflicts, designed to achieve political effect without firing a shot.
Higher end capabilities being developed by China are Russia are becoming tools to achieve political-military objectives throughout the diplomatic engagement spectrum.
This means that not only do the liberal democracies need to shape more effective higher end capabilities but they need to learn how to use force packages which are making up a higher end, higher tempo or higher intensity capability as part of a range of both military operations but proactive engagement to shape peer adversary behavior.
For example, one is buying fifth generation aircraft not simply to prepare for an all out war to defend the democracies, but to provide tools for governments to defend their interests throughout the spectrum of warfare and co-associated diplomatic activity as well.
For example, as the Russians were consolidating gains from the Crimean seizure, we noted ways moving forward one might deal with this kind of behavior, which although not at the high end was, informed an enabled by the presence of higher end warfare capabilities, both conventional and nuclear.
An Air Force B-2 bomber along with other aircrafts from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fly over the Kitty Hawk, Ronald Reagan and Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike groups during the photo portion of Exercise Valiant Shield 2006. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training among U.S. military forces, enabling real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces and in detecting, locating, tracking and engaging units at sea, in the air, on land and cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas. Credit: Headquarters USMC, 6/18/06
We wrote in 2014 about ways to leverage higher end capabilities into the spectrum of warfare introduced by the Russians into Ukraine in a way that would matter in perhaps both shaping more favorable political outcomes and laying a foundation for more robust ways ahead if needed.
Simply asking Putin to man up and take responsibility is not going to get the job done. The United States needs to shape its own capabilities for 21st century warfare.
We could start by trying to actually engage in the information war which the Russians are conducting. Clearly, leveraging intelligence assets and putting the story into the Western press in DETAIL is crucial to position oneself for an effective information war engagement.
This is not about feeling good; it is about defeating the Russian information war gambit, which is holding the West responsible to trying to take advantage of the crisis for political advantage. We may feel privately that his position is less than credible; but it can be clearly believed worldwide.
But we need a hard power response to go with the diplomatic kabuki dance in which we are not engaged. And one clearly is at hand.
We argued in our book with Richard Weitz on Pacific strategy, that U.S. military power needed to be rebuilt around a modular, scalable force that could be effectively inserted in crisis. We also argued for the economy of force, that is one wants to design force packages appropriate the political objective.
If this was the pre-Osprey era, an insertion might be more difficult, but with the tiltrotar assault force called the USMC a force can be put in place rapidly to cordon off the area, and to be able to shape a credible global response to the disinformation campaign of Russia and its state-sponsored separatists. Working with the Ukrainians, an air cap would be established over the area of interest, and airpower coupled with the Marines on the ground, and forces loyal to Kiev could stop Putin in his tracks.
In other words, countering Russian 21st century warfare creativity is crucial for the United States to do right now with some creativity of our own.
Again it is about using military force in ways appropriate to the political mission.
The approach described here only gets better with the coming of the F-35 to US and allied forces.
The multi-mission capabilities of the aircraft means that a small footprint can bring diversified lethality to the fight.
THAAD can play a role in the defense of Taiwan. The US Army deployed on Taiwan working with the ROC can provide a credible DEFENSIVE deterrence capability. Credit Photo: US Army
An F-35 squadron can carry inherent within it an electronic attack force, a missile defense tracking capability, a mapping capability for the ground forces, ISR and C2 capabilities for the deployed force and do so in a compact deployment package.
In addition, an F-35 fleet can empower Air Defense Artillery (ADA), whether Aegis afloat or Patriots and THAAD Batteries, the concept of establishing air dominance is moving in a synergistic direction.
An F-35 EW capability along with it’s AA and AG capability will introduce innovate tactics in the SEAD mission.
Concurrently, the F-35 will empower U.S. and Allied ADA situational awareness. The current engagement of the IDF employment of their Irion Dome in conjunction with aviation attacks is a demonstration of this type of emerging partnership being forged in battle.
To get a similar capability today into the Area of Interest would require a diversified and complex aerial fleet, whose very size would create a political statement, which one might really not want to make.
With an F-35 enabled ground insertion force, a smaller force with significant lethality and flexibility could be deployed until it is no longer needed for it is about air-enabled ground forces. A tiltrotar enabled assault force with top cover from a 360 degree operational F-35 fleet, whether USMC, USN, USAF or allied can allow for the kind of flexibility necessary for 21st century warfare and operational realities.
Reinforcing Ukrainian defense might be assisted by defensive weapons of the sort being considered but deployable allied offensive defensive force packages which could decisively stop Russian forces and lay down a foundation for expanded operations if the Russians did not desist.
F-35s, F-22s supported by integrated by a strong missile capability, both to defend and to attack, but integrated by a viable distributed C2 system is both part of high end warfare but what is needed to deal with lower ends of conflict as well as the power competitors shift the spectrum of conflict where mix and match of higher end, lower end and capabilities in between are conjoined into a force package to support political objectives.
The US and allied militaries face challenges to get to the point where they have operational multi-mission, multi-domain distributed C2 force packages fully available to decision makers.
But the acquisition of new systems, new training approaches, redesign of C2 systems, focusing upon abilities to the various services to operate more effectively in an integrated battlespace are underway.
The Missing Factor: Are Civilian Strategists and Politicians Up to the Challenge in the Liberal Democracies?
What is more problematical is whether the strategic elites in the liberal democracies and notably their political masters are ready for the shift in the global game away from diplomacy as an hermetically sealed art craft.
The non-liberal powers are clearly leveraging new military capabilities to support their global diplomacy to try to get outcomes and advantages that enhance their position and interests.
The systems there are building and deploying are clearly recognized by the Western militaries as requiring a response; less recognized is how the spectrum of conflict is shifting in terms of using higher end capabilities for normal diplomatic gains.
The decade ahead is bound to be interesting.
To be blunt, the distinction which Joe Nye suggested between hard and soft power is being changed by the military revolution.
21st Century military systems are really about hard power redesigned to be more useful in supporting political objectives, which if one wants to call that soft power then I am not sure the distinction has meaning.
If you wish to comment on this article. see the following:
The USS Wasp has spent the last few years as the workhorse of F-35B testing for the amphibious fleet.
While it was doing this, the Osprey was revolutionizing the strike force onboard the amphibious fleet. And waiting in the wings is the coming of the new Super Stallion, which will add a whole new lift capability to the ampbhious strike force.
With the Marines deployed in Japan with the first F-35Bs and now the USS Wasp joining them, the F-35B now has operational sea legs. This means that the very flexibility, which a vertical lift aircraft has both on sea and on the land, has come to a theater where threats abound and challenges are certainly real,
As allies look forward to augmenting their capabilities, they are looking in part to new amphibious ships or adding to the “amphibiosity” of the combat fleet as one Marine Corps General put it.
The US and the allies engaging peer competitors with evolving capabilities is requiring nothing less than changing our own template of operations and introducing new capabilities, fifth generation aircraft, new C2 systems, laying down the foundation for distributed operations, developing enhanced multi-domain operational capabilities.
There is a major shift in operational foci for both peer competitors and the US and its allies, which is being empowered by new systems, new training, new concepts of operations, and new areas of conflict, such as in the cyber domain.
And this in turn in resetting the spectrum of conflict within which engagements are occurring and will occur.
The amphibious task force empowered by Ospreys and F-35s, and other key assets coming to the fleet provide an evolved tool set to operate in changing combat conditions and threats.
There is always the reactive enemy; then there is the innovation which the United States and its allies can deliver as well to affect an adversary’s calculus.
The USS Wasp and its crew along with any embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit is a key part of the innovation which the United States is bringing to the defense of the democratic world.
During my visit to Sikorsky’s West Palm Beach facility on October 26, 2017, I had a chance to visit what seems at first blush a rather odd sight for a helicopter testing program, namely, a fully operational CH-53K, except for one thing.
It does not fly, conventionally. It doesn’t fly because it is physically restrained and anchored to the Earth.
The Ground Test Vehicle (GTV) was built by Sikorsky as part of the developmental test fleet and began its testing in early 2014 almost 2 years in advance of program first flight.
The utilization of a GTV is very effective in light that inherent in a development test program for any new aircraft is “discovery” of issues that are subsequently resolved through procedural, hardware or software changes.
Early GTV testing identifies issues and facilitates mitigating improvements to the hardware and software in a safer and more cost effective manner.
This allows for early incorporation of these improvements into the 4-ship fleet of Engineering Developmental Models (EDMs) and minimizes likelihood of discovery during flight test.
And the GTV as a fully functional helicopter in everything but actually taking off, and provides training for flight crews as well.
Without the GTV, many test discoveries would not have been found until the test program aircraft were in actual flight, which would have caused delay to the test program with much higher cost for discovery mitigation.
In many cases discoveries “on the deck” were found in the GTV and were already in the process of being resolved while, in parallel, other test regimes were productively being evaluated on the GTV. This may not have been possible with an aircraft in flight. The result is greater reliability, safety, envelope expansion testing, and security for the test program.
As a fully integrated air vehicle its testing has already demonstrated system level and component behavior while exercising the full dynamic system at power levels at or above those representative of flight.
The GTV is surrounded by a safety fence and connected to a “block house” control center where flight test engineers monitors the GTV operation.
When I was there, the vehicle was exercising various lift functions and flight test engineers were evaluating how the engines, the gear boxes, and the flight controls worked together when lifting significant loads for the Marines in operations.
To review its role in the program, I had a chance to talk with Chris Harrington, Deputy Program Manager for CH-53K Testing and Evaluation.
During my onsite visit, I was able to discuss the software upgrade process of the CH-53K which is a key part of what makes the 53K a 21st century air system and that earlier interview has already been published.
The follow up interview allowed me to focus specifically on the role of the GTV in the development process and get a report on its role throughout the program.
Question: What has been the role of the GTV in the program?
Chris Harrington: “The GTV was our first fully integrated and operational CH-53K aircraft, although it was destined to never break the bonds of earth under its own power.
“We have done GTVs before on other programs, for example on S-92 and Comanche, and for each of these programs the GTV has provided a path to effectively risk reduce and mature the development aircraft.
Question: When will the GTV for this program retire and how many hours will it have put in by that time?
Chris Harrington: “We are planning to end our use of GTV next year and deliver the vehicle to China Lake for live fire test & evaluation by our customer.
“With over 700 operational hours accumulated on the GTV we have just a couple of hundred hours to go until we retire the GTV and send it off to its “demise” as a live fire test article.
“So you see the CH-53K GTV, from cradle to grave, will serve multiple purposes to effectively benefit the program and our customer.”
Question: This is a very complex air system as you are integrating several new pieces of hardware – engines, gear boxes, rotor blades and the like – and integrating those pieces of hardware with a digital aircraft governed by a flight by wire flight control system.
How has the GTV been useful in that integration process?
Chris Harrington: “It has been useful both on the hardware as well as software integration sides.
“The GTV has been a key part of working the physical shakedown of the components all working together as an air vehicle system.
“GTV testing can be broken down into initial shakedown of the integrated systems and endurance testing which is conducted to accumulate operational hours on the GTV’s dynamic system components in advance of the equivalent systems on the flight test EDMs to “lead the fleet” of flight test assets on dynamic system components.
“Thus the rotor head and transmissions were exercised on the GTV in advance of testing on any of the flying vehicles, and this allowed us to get the dynamic system to a level maturity necessary for safety and performance on EDM aircraft and enabled us to ramp up flight test operational tempo “OPTEMPO” very quickly.
“From a software perspective we worked software loads initially on the GTV before incorporating them onto the flying EDM aircraft.
“We ran the GTV for almost two years as we folded our lessons learned into our first flight of the EDM aircraft, so the GTV served as the launch vehicle so to speak and then has functioned as the prologue of further developments and enhancements we then transitioned to a flying fleet in combination with the GTV.”
Question: And the GTV has been part of the pilot training process as well.
Could you describe this approach?
Chris Harrington: “The chief test pilot has to sign off on CH-53K pilot qualification after they have the requisite hours to fly the aircraft.
“We use the GTV as part of this training process and we also use it today to maintain currency among Sikorsky and US Marine Corps test pilots who fly the aircraft as an integrated test team.
“We similarly utilize the GTV as an aircraft familiarity training tool for new flight test engineers to the program.
“New engineers are indoctrinated to the test program through the GTV as part of the learning process and preparation prior to working on any flight aircraft.
In short, the GTV has been a key part of the process of maturing the integration of this innovative 21st century heavy lift system which represents the next generation of rotary wing heavy lift capability that will serve the U.S. Marine Corps and the free world for decades to come.
Editor’s Note: For a look at the GTV at the outset of the development process, please see the following:
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS)—if fully executed in the Pentagon’s upcoming National Defense Strategy in January and its Nuclear Posture and Ballistic Missile Defense Reviews in February—would provide robust protection against WMD threats, whether wielded by terrorists or hostile countries.
Reflecting the bipartisan foundation of cooperation against WMD threats, the administration notes that these moves will build on existing U.S. and international counter-proliferation initiatives.
Administration representatives have made clear that they are “determined to prevent or deter WMD use of any kind” since employment “lowers the threshold for others.”
The NSS indirectly justifies last April’s U.S. missile strikes in Syria to discourage further WMD use by any actor.
The text warns state terrorism sponsors that Washington will hold them responsible for any proxy use of WMDs.
It tells the terrorists directly that the United States will join with foreign allies and partners to employ all means to target their “WMD specialists, financiers, administrators, and facilitators.”
The NSS supports new initiatives for detecting and disrupting WMD smuggling, enhancing counter-proliferation missions, targeting WMD terrorist enablers, increasing integration among counter-WMD capabilities, and bolstering homeland missile defenses.
The text further stresses the importance of fortifying the U.S. resilience against all kinds of mass attacks since better preparedness can help deter attacks as well as limit their damage. For this reason, the administration will work with foreign as well as domestic partners, including the private sector and civil society, to counter WMD terrorist threats.
Yet, the new strategy rejects the idea that the United States can simply fortify its borders and be safe.
As Christopher Ford, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for WMD and Counterproliferation on the National Security Council, observed at Hudson Institute in mid-November, “crude isolationism” is a flawed approach given that WMD terrorist threats exploit “global networks, and that sensitive nuclear or radiological material acquired anywhere could be used against U.S. interests either at home or abroad.”
Unlike the Obama administration’s strategies, Trump’s NSS does not reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the short term or envisage a nuclear-free world in the long run.
Administration officials have argued that such thinking and statements has weakened the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees and encouraged other states to seek nuclear weapons.
The current NSS, like previous strategies, supports retaining a triad of nuclear delivery vehicles, modernizing U.S. nuclear command and control networks, and upgrading the U.S. nuclear enterprise of scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities.
One novelty is that Trump’s NSS affirms that U.S. nuclear forces can avert “non-nuclear strategic attacks” as well as conventional and nuclear aggression.
This is an apparent reference to deterring cyber strikes against U.S. critical infrastructure.
The section on cyber security remarks that, “the United States will be risk informed, but not risk averse, in considering our options” to thwart malign cyber actors.
Such deliberate ambiguity is likely designed to both deter cyber threats while also reassuring partners that U.S. officials will consider the risks of inadvertent escalation without being paralyzed by such a dynamic.
Yet, the NSS does not call for a massive U.S. nuclear weapons buildup.
The text affirms readiness for dialogue and verifiable arms control to limit nuclear risks and bolster strategic stability.
For example, administration officials have pledged to reduce excess U.S. nuclear material and warned that the growth of nuclear arsenals in Russia and South Asia raise nuclear security as well as nonproliferation challenges for the international community.
The NSS explicitly affirms that Washington “does not need to match the nuclear arsenals of other powers.”
The United States only needs to maintain a force “that meets our current needs and addresses unanticipated risks” in fulfilling the missions of deterring hostile powers, reassuring partners and allies, and attaining unspecified “U.S. objectives if deterrence fails.”
These goals likely include defeating aggressors and minimizing damage from adversary strikes.
Regarding the latter, and likely foreshadowing the Ballistic Missile Defense Review to be released in February, the NSS envisages “a layered missile defense system focused on North Korea and Iran to defend our homeland against missile attacks.”
These layers are bolstered by a sensor network ranging from satellites, terrestrial radars, and information-empowered aviation platforms such as the F-35.
The NSS says the United States will help partners and allies to “procure interoperable missile defense and other capabilities to better defend against active missile threats.”
Of these missile defense systems, only the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program provides a direct defense of the U.S. homeland from ICBMs.
The system uses multistage solid-fuel boosters, the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) stationed in Alaska and California, to ram an unarmed “kill vehicle” into warheads flying through outer space, obliterating them before they can re-enter the atmosphere.
The kill vehicle is being redesigned to make it more effective while the number of operational GBIs is increasing, though not fast enough.
The NSS is but the latest report to express alarm that countries hostile to U.S. interests are obtaining more missiles with greater ranges and accuracy.
In particular, the text relates how North Korea’s growing portfolio of missiles could deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical munitions.
Undoubtedly extrapolating from the Korean experience, the NSS warns against ignoring “countries determined to develop and proliferate WMD” since doing so typically result in the threats becoming worse and the United States having fewer response options.
The Continuing Resolution enacted by Congress in mid-December provides some additional funding for these counterproliferation, nuclear modernization, and missile defenses programs.
To have a sustained impact, and to get ahead of future proliferation threats, the funding boost must be replicated in the upcoming FY2019 presidential budget request.
We did have more rain than I can remember but, most of it was during weekdays and nearly every time there was an airshow the weather miraculously cleared.
We were lucky, both with the weather, and with Sally B not having any serious mechanical problems so we were able to display at almost all our booked venues. Looking back, it was a very good season.
Late September saw Sally B towed into her winter home in Hangar T2. It was good to have her back under cover once again protected from the harsh winter weather.
How the Season Began
After the Spring Air show at Duxford and our annual pilgrimage to the American Cemetery at Madingley, June was a quiet month, with just one display booked for RAF Cosford.
Displaying at Cosford proved to be one of the great highlights of the season.
Peter Kuypers who was the display pilot on this flight explains why, “Turning in for our last pass, we spotted a USAF B-52 Stratofortress running into our display area. The American Air Force bomber was starting his display before we had even finished ours!
“As it passed us, I was able to turn in behind this huge jet bomber and follow for an impromptu two bomber pass with us smoking on the two-left side radial engines while they smoked black smoke from all eight jet engines – what a sight that must have been: to put these two historic Boeing bombers in the same piece of sky was an opportunity not to be missed.”
Will we ever again see a B-17 and a B-52 in the same piece of sky in the UK; probably not?
More on the Season
July and August were busy months. During July we displayed at Old Warden, Cleethorpes, Duxford Flying Legends, RAF Fairford, Sunderland and Old Buckenham. Sadly, we missed out on East Fortune and one display at Sunderland on the Saturday because of bad weather.
During August we displayed for our very special Roll of Honour day as a thank you to those who support Sally B; Biggin Hill followed, then Dunsfold and Bournemouth.
September saw Sally B displaying at RAF Scampton, Southport and the Battle of Britain show at Duxford. For Sally B, the display season was quite a busy one, and as is the norm, began and ended at a Duxford show – long may that continue.
I visited the Old Buckenham airshow on 30 July where the crowd were treated to a solo display by Sally B, with Roger Mills putting our lady through her paces in typically dignified fashion. This nostalgic little gem of a show is brilliantly organised by Matt Wilkins, a great friend of Sally B. In 2018 the show will be on 28 and 29 July.
Sally B Needs a New Coat of Paint
This brings me to the subject of hangarage for our aircraft at Duxford. Just imagine how wonderful it would be if Sally B could be under cover all year round!
This way she would escape the elements which are seriously damaging her skin and paintwork: the sunlight is fading her exterior coat of paint whilst the rain is dripping through and damaging her interior.
But, and here is the big BUT, even if the Museum allowed us hangarage all year round, it is just not possible because the hangar doors in Hangar T2 do not open sufficiently enough to let the B-17 in or out without removing the wingtips.
To remove and replace the wingtips before and after each flight is, in practice, not possible!
Also, as far as I am aware, there is no other hangar big enough to house Sally B at Duxford, or at least none we could possible use.
I really don’t know what the solution is, unless the hangar doors are fixed, which I believe is very expensive if not impossible, or another hangar is built, and that really is unthinkable.
Another fact is that with Sally B being outside every summer, she now needs another repaint. This, together with the expected cost and difficulties in changing engine no 3, ‘Smokey Joe’, means that this is now a major issue and we need to raise more funds and need more help.
As I mentioned in the Summer bulletin, keeping Sally B flying for one year, let alone for forty-two, is incredible
Editor’s Note: Sally B is a partner of Second Line of Defense and it is time for our readers to consider this year’s contribution to keeping this privately funded B-17 operational for 2018.
Pictured is a Russian Blackjack Tupolev Tu-160 long-range bomber. Credit: UK Ministry of Defence
Four A-29 Super Tucanos arrive at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Afghanistan, Jan. 15, 2016. The aircraft will be added to the Afghans’ inventory in the spring of 2016. The A-29 Super Tucano is a ‘light air support’ aircraft capable of conducting close air support, aerial escort, armed overwatch and aerial interdiction. Designed to operate in high temperature and in extremely rugged terrain, the A-29 Super Tucano is highly maneuverable 4th generation weapons system capable of delivering precision guided munitions. It can fly at low speeds and low altitudes, is easy to fly, and provides exceptionally accurate weapons delivery. It is currently in service with 10 different air forces around the world. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Nathan Lipscomb)
“This decomposition gives an opening to explore the utility of current and new systems (including the F-35) and processes for distribution of information (ISR) and their ability to collaborate with each other.
Two F-35 Lightning IIs, F-001 and F-002, of the Royal Netherlands Air Force landed at Edwards Jan. 16, 2015 after a five-hour flight from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. The Joint Strike Fighters arrived for an operational test and evaluation phase here in the High Desert. (U.S. Air Force photo by Jet Fabara)
Projected S-400 range from Kaliningrad.
An Air Force B-2 bomber along with other aircrafts from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fly over the Kitty Hawk, Ronald Reagan and Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike groups during the photo portion of Exercise Valiant Shield 2006. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training among U.S. military forces, enabling real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces and in detecting, locating, tracking and engaging units at sea, in the air, on land and cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas. Credit: Headquarters USMC, 6/18/06
THAAD can play a role in the defense of Taiwan. The US Army deployed on Taiwan working with the ROC can provide a credible DEFENSIVE deterrence capability. Credit Photo: US Army
“Thus the rotor head and transmissions were exercised on the GTV in advance of testing on any of the flying vehicles, and this allowed us to get the dynamic system to a level maturity necessary for safety and performance on EDM aircraft and enabled us to ramp up flight test operational tempo “OPTEMPO” very quickly.
