U.S. Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 252 fly KC-130J Super Hercules in formation near Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, June 18, 2025.
VMGR-252 conducted surge operations to exercise their ability to launch and recover multiple divisions of aircraft concurrently.
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION CHERRY POINT, NORTH CAROLINA
06.17.2025
By Pierre Tran
Paris – The key point on a planned European fighter jet lay in opting for clear program leadership with a prime contractor rather than assigning subcontractor work based on national funding, Dassault Aviation executive chairman Eric Trappier said July 22.
French officers had conducted “an audit on the efficiency of cooperation” on a new generation fighter (NGF), he told a news conference on first half 2025 financial results. Trappier was replying to a question on whether Dassault had claimed 80 pct work on the fighter project.
“We are not asking for 80 pct of work,” he said. “That is not a claim from Dassault.”
A corporate row between Dassault and its project partner Airbus Defence and Space appeared to have risen to the political summit. The issue of how to run a fighter program was due to be discussed by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, when the leaders met July 23 for a working dinner in the leafy Berlin suburbs.
A French audit was conducted by the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) procurement office, Trappier said, and presumably its Spanish and German counterparts.
“That aim was to improve governance,” he said. “A pilot” was needed to run the program.
That governance referred to how to manage the new fighter project, the critical pillar 1 in the future combat air system (FCAS) backed by France, Germany, and Spain. A combat cloud of command and communications network, and remote carriers – or combat drones – made up other parts of the complex airborne weapon system.
Timing was a factor, as a contract needed to be drafted for phase 2 in the fighter project. That phase 2 was due to begin in 2026, to fly a technology demonstrator in 2029/2030.
The row over program management was tied to work assigned to subcontractors, as Trappier insisted that Dassault should be free as architect and prime contractor to award work based on expertise of the subcontractors rather than on a contractual “juste retour” call on work share.
An active management approach conflicted with the present contractual arrangement, which designated Airbus DS as the lead subcontractor in Germany and Spain.
The contractual obligation for each of the three partner nations to receive one third of the work left Dassault constantly negotiating with the German and Spanish Airbus units which subcontractor should do the work, the French executive said.
Trappier appeared to cast doubt on the future combat air system, when asked whether Dassault would pull out of the project, in view of the corporate dispute.
“It is not a question of leaving FCAS but of deciding if it continues or not,” he said.
Merz has acknowledged there was contention on the fighter project, and has said he wanted to hold on to the existing juste retour approach, the Euractiv website reported July 9.
“I absolutely want us to stick to the agreement we made with Spain and France with regard to FCAS,” the German chancellor said, the website reported.
Merz has accepted there were “differences of opinion on the composition of the consortium,” and he hoped these would be resolved, the report said.
The European Neuron project was the business model best suited for the new fighter project, Trappier said. Dassault led a six-nation industrial partnership to build a technology demonstrator for an unmanned combat air vehicle, dubbed Neuron.
Sweden built the wings, he said, pointing up that a high value deal had been assigned to a partner nation.
Saab delivered the wings for the Neuron. Dassault placed that combat drone next to a Rafale fighter on prominent display at the Paris air show, which ran last month.
Airbus DS and the DGA procurement office were not available for comment.
Airbus DS has previously publicly accepted Dassault’s leadership on the fighter project, but insisted on receiving what it sees as its fair share of the work.
“What we don’t challenge is that there is an appointed leader for the fighter program,” Jean-Brice Dumont, head of air power at the Airbus unit, told June 17 reporters at the air show. “That leader is named Dassault Aviation.”
“Dassault has the lead of the so-called pillar one – NGWS (new generation weapon system).
There has to be an even share corresponding to the share of our governments. That doesn’t have to become toxic in the programme,” he said.
“We have to aim for something that is simple enough. Cooperation meant there would be interdependency, which had to be ‘healthy,’” he said.
Meanwhile, Dassault was working on development of an F4.3 version of the Rafale, Trappier said, and there was risk reduction on the F5 upgrade, expected to be delivered in 2035.
A combat drone based on Neuron was expected to fly with the Rafale F5, and it remained to be seen whether the upcoming military budget would set aside funds for development.
Dassault reported first half adjusted net profit fell to €386 million from €442 million a year ago, giving respectively net profit margins of 13.6 pct and 17.4 pct of net sales.
Operating profit rose to €180 million from €170 million, with operating profit margins of respectively 6.3 pct and 6.7 pct of net sales.
Net sales rose to €2.85 billion from €2.54 billion, with the delivery of seven Rafale, of which four were for export and three for France. That compared to six Rafale a year ago.
Orders rose to €8.1 billion, based on 26 Rafale export deals and eight Falcon, from €5.1 billion, comprising 18 Rafale exports and 11 Falcon.
The total order book rose to €48.3 billion, comprising 239 Rafale and 75 Falcon, from €43.2 billion on 220 fighters and 79 business jets.
Cash holdings rose to €9.5 billion from €8.4 billion.
By Robbin Laird
The 2019 International Fighter Conference in Berlin brought together military leaders and industry representatives from nations living in the shadow of authoritarian powers. Their presentations, focused on airpower strategies for self-defense against existential threats from Russia and China, now read like a prophetic warning of conflicts to come. What seemed like contingency planning in 2019 became brutal reality just three years later.
Lieutenant General Vasyl Chernenko’s 2019 presentation on “Peculiarities of Employment Fighter Aviation” described Ukraine’s experience with Russian hybrid warfare following the 2014 seizure of Crimea. He spoke of the “sabotage-terrorist nature of the enemy’s actions” and the need for Ukrainian fighter aircraft to confront Russian air defense systems moved forward into contested areas.
His analysis proved devastatingly prescient. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine faced exactly the scenarios Chernenko had outlined but magnified exponentially. The limited pilot training and “very limited” readiness of Ukraine’s legacy MiG-29s and Su-27s that he described became critical vulnerabilities when facing the full weight of Russian airpower.
The general’s emphasis on the need for Western counter-insurgency capabilities and airpower support foreshadowed the massive international military aid effort that would emerge. His warning that any Western assistance would trigger Russian “fake news” campaigns proved accurate, as Moscow’s disinformation apparatus worked overtime to frame NATO support as escalatory aggression.
Most remarkably, Chernenko’s focus on Ukraine’s need to “buy time for partners and allies to plug into one’s defensive system” became the fundamental strategy that allowed Ukraine to survive the initial assault and mount an effective resistance.
Colonel Dainius Guzas’s presentation on “Developing Capability Against a Peer Opponent” highlighted Lithuania’s dual challenge: direct Russian threats and sophisticated political warfare designed to undermine NATO cohesion. His documentation of Russian airspace violations and “fake news” campaigns targeting Lithuanian confidence in NATO allies provided an early warning of hybrid warfare tactics that would intensify dramatically.
The Baltic Air Policing mission that Guzas described as Lithuania’s window into NATO interoperability became a crucial proving ground. When tensions escalated following Russia’s 2022 invasion, the experience gained through hosting diverse NATO air forces proved invaluable for rapid coalition operations.
Guzas’s emphasis on the political dimension of airpower or how Russian disinformation sought to weaponize every NATO flight over Baltic airspace presaged the information warfare that would accompany kinetic operations in Ukraine. His insights into how authoritarian powers use political warfare to complement military pressure became a template for understanding broader Russian strategy.
The presentations from Colonel Li-Chiang Yuan and Dr. Yu-Jiu Wang on Taiwan’s defense challenges have only grown more relevant. Yuan’s description of the People’s Republic of China’s “encirclement challenge” through South China Sea militarization has accelerated dramatically since 2019.
His concept of “multiple deterrence” which is the need for integrating active defense, air defense, and resilient ground forces anticipated the “porcupine strategy” that has become central to Taiwan’s defense planning. The emphasis on operating aircraft from highways and dispersed locations, inspired by Finnish models, reflected an understanding that traditional airfields would be primary targets in any conflict.
Dr. Wang’s focus on AESA radar technologies and C2/ISR integration proved remarkably forward-looking. The technological capabilities he projected have become essential elements of the “deterrence in depth” strategy that Taiwan and its allies continue to develop as Chinese military pressure intensifies.
Major General Dato’ Muhamad Norazilan Bin Aris’s emphasis on “Striking the Balance Between Affordability and Capability” highlighted challenges that have only grown more acute. His focus on Link 16 capabilities for better integration with partner air forces, particularly Australia, anticipated the growing importance of coalition interoperability in contested regions.
Malaysia’s two-theater defense requirements and emphasis on maritime domain awareness presaged the multi-domain challenges that have become central to Indo-Pacific strategy. The Royal Malaysian Air Force’s focus on light attack aircraft for multiple roles reflected budget constraints that many nations now face as defense spending struggles to keep pace with growing threats.
Several key insights from the 2019 conference have proven remarkably prescient:
Perhaps most striking was the shared recognition among 2019 presenters that their nations faced “existential threats” requiring immediate attention, not distant contingency planning. While many in Western capitals still viewed major power competition as a manageable challenge, military leaders from frontline states understood the urgency of their situation.
Their focus on defensive capabilities that could deter aggression without threatening authoritarian homelands proved particularly insightful. This distinction between defensive deterrence and offensive threat has become central to alliance strategies aimed at avoiding escalation while maintaining credible defense.
The 2019 International Fighter Conference presentations now read as a strategic warning that was largely unheeded until events forced recognition of their accuracy. The military leaders who spoke in Berlin understood their operational environment with a clarity that broader policy communities would only achieve through bitter experience.
As we face continued challenges from authoritarian powers, the insights shared in 2019 remain relevant. The emphasis on self-reliance, coalition interoperability, dispersed operations, and integrated deterrence strategies continues to guide defense planning for nations on freedom’s frontlines.
The tragedy is not that these military professionals lacked foresight — their analysis was remarkably accurate. The tragedy is that it took actual war to validate warnings that were clearly articulated years before the shooting started.
The featured photo shows President Tsai Ing-wen and senior Taiwanese military staff during an exercise in southern county Changhua, not far from one of the island’s main airbases at Taichung. Photo: Facebook
The Emergence of the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World: Looking Back from 2024
A U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion helicopter assigned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, departs for an air assault during Marine Air-Ground Task Force Distributed Maneuver Exercise 1-25 at Camp Willson, Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, Feb. 11, 2025.
MDMX prepares Marines for future conflicts by combining constructed virtual training with offensive and defensive live-fire and maneuver training scenarios. Service Level Training Exercise 1-25 is designed to enhance readiness across core Mission Essential Tasks and prepares the MAGTF to execute distributed operations across vast, diverse environments by emphasizing decentralized command and control.
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA
02.11.2025
Photo by Staff Sgt. Armando Elizalde
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center
On July 28th, Textron Aviation Defense announced that it’s proposing the Beechcraft M-346N jet trainer as a solution for the U.S. Navy’s Undergraduate Jet Training System (UJTS) program.
The company has partnered with Leonardo in a teaming agreement to meet the Navy’s requirements for this new aircraft procurement.
The M-346N is based on Leonardo’s proven M-346 design, with over 100 of these aircraft already in service with air forces worldwide for training 4th and 5th generation fighter pilots.
The partnership leverages Leonardo’s aircraft design expertise with Textron’s American manufacturing heritage.
The M-346N is a twin-engine, tandem-seat advanced trainer featuring fully digital flight controls, fly-by-wire systems with quadruple redundancy, and modern avionics including Head-Up Displays and HOTAS controls.
Powered by two Honeywell F124-GA-200 turbofan engines, it can reach cruise speeds over 590 knots and operate at altitudes up to 45,000 feet.
Safety features include an Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System.
The aircraft is positioned as bridging the gap between basic flight training and advanced carrier-based fighter operations, with design features that provide excellent instructor visibility and exceptional maneuverability for effective pilot training.
For the press release, go here.
Training on Display at the Paris Air Show 2025: The M-346 and International Flight Training School
By Robbin Laird
The comfortable world of middle power diplomacy is disappearing. For decades, countries like Brazil and Australia have thrived by maintaining strategic flexibility. They are trading with multiple partners, participating in diverse institutional frameworks, and avoiding definitive alignment with any single major power. This hedging strategy worked well within the relatively stable architecture of the post-Cold War liberal international order.
But as majorpower competition intensifies and competing visions of international order emerge, the middle ground that enabled such strategies is rapidly eroding.
The current moment presents democratic middle powers with an unprecedented challenge: they can no longer simply navigate between competing major powers but must actively choose between competing systems of international order. More fundamentally, they may need to become architects of new frameworks rather than mere consumers of existing ones.
The conventional wisdom often treats middle powers as inherently democratic entities, countries like South Korea, Japan, Australia, India, and Brazil that occupy the space between major powers and smaller states while maintaining democratic governance. This framing, while appealing, obscures important historical and contemporary realities.
Middle power status has never been inherently linked to democratic governance. During the Cold War, countries like Egypt under Nasser, Yugoslavia under Tito, and Indonesia under Sukarno operated as classic middle powers precisely because they could navigate between superpowers while maintaining non-democratic systems. Today, countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia continue to exercise middle power influence with varying degrees of democratic legitimacy.
The current clustering of democratic middle powers may reflect the particular circumstances of the post-Cold War liberal international order rather than any structural relationship between middle power status and democratic governance. This historical contingency becomes important when considering how these countries might adapt to a changing international system.
Even within the presumed democratic middle power category, the picture is more complex than it initially appears. India’s democratic credentials are increasingly contested among scholars, given concerns about press freedom, minority rights, and institutional erosion under Modi’s BJP. This complicates any simple equation between middle power status and democratic governance.
Brazil’s engagement with BRICS exemplifies the challenges facing democratic middle powers in the current international environment. President Lula’s approach to BRICS reflects a classic middle power strategy, namely, leveraging multilateral institutions to amplify influence and create alternatives to Western-dominated frameworks. The organization offers Brazil opportunities for South-South cooperation, economic partnership, and enhanced global influence.
However, BRICS increasingly presents Brazil with uncomfortable choices about international order. The organization includes authoritarian members (Russia and China) and increasingly authoritarian ones (potentially India), creating tensions with Brazil’s democratic identity. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea place Brazil in the difficult position of either implicitly endorsing authoritarian behavior or undermining the cohesion of an organization central to its middle power strategy.
The expansion of BRICS to include countries like Iran, Egypt, and the UAE further complicates Brazil’s position. While expansion increases the organization’s global reach and influence, it also dilutes whatever democratic character it might have possessed and potentially commits Brazil to defending an increasingly authoritarian bloc’s interests.
More fundamentally, BRICS is not merely an alternative forum for international cooperation. It represents an active challenge to key elements of the existing Western generated international order. Alternative payment systems, parallel legal frameworks, and explicit rejection of Western-led institutions suggest that sustained engagement with BRICS may require Brazil to choose sides in a broader competition between democratic and authoritarian models of international order.
Australia’s position illustrates the “middle power dilemma” with particular clarity. The country faces the challenge of maintaining an economic relationship with China which accounts for roughly 30% of Australia’s trade while preserving a strategic alliance with the United States as competition between these great powers intensifies.
Australia’s recent experience demonstrates how quickly traditional hedging strategies can collapse under great power pressure. China’s economic coercion following Australia’s calls for COVID-19 investigations, trade restrictions on Australian products, and broader pressure campaigns revealed the fragility of compartmentalized relationships. The assumption that economic and security relationships could be managed separately proved false when China explicitly used economic tools to pursue broader strategic objectives.
The Australian response which was to deepen security ties with the United States through AUKUS while attempting to rebuild economic relationships with China represents a more sophisticated form of hedging.
However, this approach faces inherent limitations as major power competition intensifies. China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Taiwan tensions, and broader competition with the United States make it increasingly difficult for Australia to maintain relationships with both powers without compromising core interests.
Australia’s engagement with alternative frameworks such as the Quad, regional partnerships with Japan and India, and enhanced ASEAN relationships suggests recognition that traditional bilateral hedging may be insufficient. However, these multilateral approaches still operate within the basic framework of choosing between competing major power systems rather than creating genuine alternatives.
The fundamental challenge facing democratic middle powers is that traditional hedging strategies assume a degree of systemic stability that no longer exists. Hedging works when great powers compete within a shared framework of international order, allowing middle powers to benefit from multiple relationships while avoiding definitive alignment.
Contemporary major power competition is different. China and Russia are not simply challenging American hegemony within the existing international system. They are actively working to reshape or replace key elements of that system. The Belt and Road Initiative, alternative payment systems like SPFS and CIPS, expanded BRICS membership, and various regional security arrangements represent not just parallel institutions but efforts to create alternative frameworks that could eventually supplant existing ones.
This systemic competition creates several challenges for middle power hedging strategies:
The erosion of traditional hedging strategies creates both challenges and opportunities for democratic middle powers. While the comfortable ambiguity of the post-Cold War period is disappearing, the current moment also presents possibilities for institutional innovation and leadership that may not have existed under more stable conditions.
Rather than simply choosing between American-led and Chinese-led systems, democratic middle powers might need to become architects of new frameworks that reflect contemporary democratic values while addressing legitimate criticisms of the existing international order. This would require moving beyond the traditional middle power role of diplomatic facilitation toward more active institutional entrepreneurship.
What would democratic institutional entrepreneurship look like in practice?
This approach would require democratic middle powers to work together more systematically than they have historically. Countries with different regional priorities, economic interests, and strategic relationships would need to develop joint initiatives and shared frameworks, something that has proven difficult in the past.
Brazil and Australia, despite their different regions and relationships, face remarkably similar challenges that illustrate the broader middle power dilemma. Both countries have prospered under the existing international order while maintaining some distance from American leadership. Both face pressure to choose between economic relationships with China and strategic relationships with the United States. Both are exploring alternative institutional frameworks while trying to maintain democratic credentials.
Their different approaches to these challenges — Brazil’s BRICS engagement versus Australia’s alliance deepening — suggest different strategies for addressing the same fundamental problem. However, both approaches face limitations that point toward the need for more innovative solutions.
A collaborative approach between countries like Brazil and Australia might offer possibilities that neither could achieve alone. Their different regional perspectives, economic relationships, and institutional memberships could provide the foundation for new frameworks that transcend traditional regional or ideological boundaries.
Such collaboration would require both countries to move beyond their comfort zones and accept greater responsibility for global governance outcomes. It would mean investing serious political capital in institutional innovation rather than simply managing existing relationships. Most importantly, it would require recognition that the comfortable world of middle power hedging is disappearing and that new approaches are necessary for maintaining both national interests and democratic values.
The comfortable world of middle power diplomacy is ending. The strategies that enabled countries like Brazil and Australia to prosper while maintaining strategic flexibility are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as major power competition intensifies and competing visions of international order emerge.
The response to this challenge will likely determine not only the future of individual middle powers but the broader trajectory of international order. Democratic middle powers can continue attempting to hedge between competing major powers, but this approach faces inherent limitations as systemic competition intensifies. They can choose sides in the emerging competition between democratic and authoritarian models, but this risks reducing them to junior partners in major power conflicts.
Alternatively, they can attempt to become architects of new frameworks that transcend traditional great power competition while maintaining commitment to democratic values and international law. This approach is more demanding and uncertain than traditional middle power strategies, but it may be the only way to preserve both national interests and democratic principles in an increasingly complex international environment.
The question is not whether the current moment represents a crisis for middle powers for it clearly does. The question is whether democratic middle powers will respond to this crisis with institutional innovation and leadership, or whether they will find themselves forced to choose between unsatisfactory alternatives created by others. The answer to this question will likely shape the future of international order for the period ahead.
Sailors aboard the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) display chocks and chains to the pilots of an MV-22B Osprey, assigned to the “Nighthawks” of Marine Helicopter Squadron (HMX) 1, during flight operations.
HMX-1 tests tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment to support high-level military principals and other executives, such as the President of the United States, and is the primary Operational Test and Evaluation unit for Marine assault support helicopters and related equipment.
The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and embarked 22nd are underway executing Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), which tests the amphibious ready group’s ability to deliver combat power wherever the nation’s leadership requires, and is informed by U.S. Navy Fleet Commander requirements and assessment of ongoing operations around the globe. COMPTUEX is the Department of the Navy’s commitment to deliver highly capable, integrated naval forces to promote our nation’s prosperity and security, deter aggression and provide tailorable options to our nation’s leaders. COMPTUEX also allows the Navy to assess all aspects of prior readiness generation activities, which provides leaders information needed for process and resource allocation decisions for future warfighting development.
06.28.2025
Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Savannah Hardesty
USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
In July 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth unveiled a new Pentagon drone policy, formally entitled “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance.”
The idea is to have a sweeping overhaul designed to accelerate the acquisition, deployment, and use of small drones across the entire U.S. military.
The policy shift comes at a critical juncture as global military drone production has skyrocketed, with adversaries collectively producing millions of cheap drones annually while the U.S. has struggled with bureaucratic red tape.
As Hegseth noted in his announcement, “Drones are the biggest battlefield innovation in a generation, accounting for most of this year’s casualties in Ukraine.”
A key element of the policy is the reclassification of small drones as “consumables” rather than durable property. Group 1 and Group 2 unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) — those weighing under 55 pounds — will now be “accounted for as consumable commodities, not durable property,” according to the policy documents.
This shift acknowledges a battlefield reality that has emerged from conflicts like the war in Ukraine: drones are expected to be used up and lost in combat, much like ammunition or grenades. “Small UAS resemble munitions more than high-end airplanes. They should be cheap, rapidly replaceable, and categorized as consumable,” the Pentagon’s guidance states.
The Pentagon defines Group 1 drones as systems weighing up to 20 pounds that can fly up to 1,200 feet altitude and reach speeds of 100 knots. Group 2 includes drones between 21 and 55 pounds, capable of reaching 3,500 feet altitude and speeds up to 250 knots.
The new policy dramatically expands who can buy, test, and deploy drones within the military hierarchy. For the first time, commanders at the colonel and Navy captain level can independently procure and test drones, including 3D-printed prototypes and commercial off-the-shelf systems, as long as they meet national security criteria.
This represents a significant departure from previous procurement processes that required multiple layers of approval and could take months or years to complete. The policy also enables troops to modify drones in the field as necessary for specific operational needs, fostering innovation at the tactical level.
This makes a great deal of sense as the development of the software and AI systems guiding the drones has to constantly be adapted to changing battlefield realities. These are not platforms to be acquired as platforms; but embodied AI and software systems which morph over time in their platforms and require the code writers and the users to be symbiotically connected.
The Pentagon has established ambitious deadlines that underscore the urgency of this transformation:
By September 1, 2025: All military branches must establish specialized experimental drone units designed to rapidly scale small drone use across the joint force. By end of fiscal year 2026: Every Army squad must be equipped with small, “one-way” attack drones (expendable kamikaze drones), with Indo-Pacific units receiving priority.
By September 2026: The Pentagon aims to have procured and fielded thousands of drones, with some Army programs already seeking to purchase 10,000+ units for less than $2,000 each.
The policy also mandates that by 2027, all major training events across the Department of Defense must integrate drone capabilities, fundamentally changing how the military trains for modern warfare.¹¹
One of the most significant barriers to rapid drone deployment has been the lengthy certification process.
The new policy addresses this with strict deadlines: certification requests must receive answers within 14 days, compared to months under the previous system. Weapons approvals for small drones will take just 30 days instead of the previous 90-120 days.
The long-criticized “Blue sUAS” approval system is being comprehensively reformed. The program, which maintains a list of Pentagon-approved drones, is being transferred from the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) by January 1, 2026, with significantly expanded resources and staffing.
The Pentagon is taking unprecedented steps to support American drone manufacturers and expand the industrial base. Within 30 days of the policy announcement, the Office of Strategic Capital and Department of Government Efficiency were tasked with proposing financing options including advance purchase commitments, direct loans, and other capital incentives to help domestic drone companies scale up quickly.
The policy specifically states that major purchases “shall favor U.S. companies,” signaling a clear preference for domestic production capability. Third-party testing is now permitted, allowing multiple assessors to certify products rather than relying solely on government testing, which should dramatically reduce bottlenecks.
Hegseth’s directive rescinds several restrictive policies that had hindered drone procurement, including a 2022 memo about requirements for Blue sUAS systems and a 2021 memo outlining operational procedures that implemented congressional restrictions on drones from certain foreign entities.
“I am rescinding restrictive policies that hindered production and limited access to these vital technologies, unleashing the combined potential of American manufacturing and warfighter ingenuity,” Hegseth wrote in the policy memo.
The urgency behind these changes becomes clear when examining global production capacity. China has developed the ability to produce approximately 100,000 small drones monthly, while the U.S. defense industrial base currently produces only 5,000 to 6,000 small drones monthly.
This production gap has significant implications for any potential large-scale conflict, where drone consumption rates could be enormous. The war in Ukraine has provided a preview of this reality, with both sides consuming drones at unprecedented rates.
The Pentagon’s fiscal year 2026 budget request reflects this new strategic priority, with $13.6 billion allocated for autonomous military systems, including $9.4 billion specifically for unmanned and remotely piloted vehicles. This represents the largest research and development investment in drone technology in Pentagon history.
Additional funding includes $210 million for autonomous land vehicles, $1.7 billion for Army sea drones, $1.1 billion for Army reconnaissance drones, and $1.2 billion for software development across all military services’ drone programs.
The policy builds on a June 2025 White House executive order titled “Unleashing American Drone Dominance,” which focused on civilian drone operations and commercial integration. The Pentagon’s approach aims to leverage civilian innovations, including artificial intelligence and commercial drone technologies, to leapfrog current military capabilities.
The military will develop a “dynamic, AI-searchable Blue List”—a digital platform cataloging approved drone components, vendors, and performance ratings. By 2026, this system will be operated by DCMA and powered by nightly AI retraining pipelines.
The policy mandates a complete transformation of military training. By next year, Hegseth expects to see drone capabilities integrated into “all relevant combat training, including force-on-force drone wars.” Military departments must establish at least three national drone training ranges with diverse terrain, including over-water areas, within 90 days of the policy announcement.
This policy shift creates opportunities for American drone manufacturers while fundamentally changing the strategic calculus for military operations. The emphasis on mass production of low-cost, expendable systems mirrors lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict, where cheap, numerous drones have proven more effective than smaller numbers of expensive platforms.
The policy also reflects a broader recognition that future conflicts will likely be decided not just by technological superiority, but by the ability to produce and deploy military systems at scale and speed. By treating drones as consumables and dramatically streamlining procurement, the Pentagon is positioning itself for a new era of warfare where quantity, speed of deployment, and rapid replacement capabilities may be as important as individual platform sophistication.
As Defense Secretary Hegseth concluded in his announcement, “Lethality will not be hindered by self-imposed restrictions, especially when it comes to harnessing technologies we invented but were slow to pursue. Drone technology is advancing so rapidly, our major risk is risk-avoidance. The Department’s bureaucratic gloves are coming off.”
All of this can lead to effective change for the “fight tonight” force but only if it is worked with evolving C2, EW and ISR capabilities. Drones are NOT a substitute for how to work a kill web — they are simply paylloads.
A danger is always the new bit of warfare suggesting that warfare is transformed only by incorporating that new kit.
It isn’t.
Being able to integrate effective ISR and C2 in working combat clusters using manned and unmanned systems effectively is the challenge. Drones do not solve that problem but they can provide tools to do so.
Finding ways to integrate the payloads of the evolving force into an effective and lethal and focused force is the challenge.
When looking at the Ukrainian conflict, one can be mesmerized by drones and forgetting the years of training with Western militaries and the significant Western kit they operate with. It is a hybrid or blended force we are looking, one which can incorporate drones rather than being enamored of them.
Also, the platform element can be very critical when working a deployed force to assist the manned force. Not all platforms are alike — some are truly like bullets, others are more like effective carriers of payloads which you want to resuse and load with divergent payload packages. This is espeicallly true when understanding that the “fight tonight” force needs to be sustainable, and flooding such a force with many disposable drones may be a path to reducing significantly the combat effectivenss of a force.
The Hegseth action is a significant opening on change; but it is just that — only an opening.
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