By Murielle Delaporte

For thousands of years, military commanders have considered mass — having more troops and equipment than the enemy — a critical factor in winning battles.

The last fifty years have seen a shift from mass to precision, a trend that has accelerated since the end of the Cold War.

The period of peace dividends and the era of expeditionary operations that prevailed for thirty years were based on the concept of technological superiority.

Today, we are witnessing the collapse of this binary distinction between mass and precision, with emerging technologies now making it possible to deploy numerous and precise systems simultaneously, particularly in the field of drones, as current conflicts continue to demonstrate.

Both in Ukraine and in the Middle East, we are seeing this trend, which could in many ways be described as an asymmetric attrition strategy. At the start of the war in Ukraine, Ukrainian forces used a few Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. Two years later, they are deploying a multitude of autonomous systems.

Another illustrative theater is the Red Sea, where the Houthis have targeted numerous commercial and military vessels, severely disrupting international maritime traffic. According to the French expertise center MICA Center for Maritime Information Cooperation & Awareness, in 2024 alone, the Houthis used approximately 700 munitions for their attacks, including 40% ballistic missiles, 2% cruise missiles, 56% aerial drones, and 2% surface drones.

This transformation fundamentally changes the cost-effectiveness of military operations, as relatively inexpensive missile or drone strikes can force the mobilization of much larger defense expenditures, thereby creating an unsustainable financial imbalance in the long term solely for defensive purposes.

From a strictly military point of view, this crisis highlights the characteristic equation of 21st-century conflicts, namely, how to balance the need for mass — or to counter mass —with the need for technological superiority: two strategies that seem to be at odds with each other in terms of defense spending.

Here I am exploring some of the hybrid strategies that Western countries are beginning to put in place to shape a new approach, first highlighting some examples of operational optimization that have already proven their worth in the past, then describing two concrete examples of adaptation: one by the French Army Aviation during Operation Barkhane in Sahel and the other, more recent, by the U.S. armed forces in response to the Houthis’ capacity for disruption.

Operational Optimization: A Few Proven Examples

There are, of course, many examples of innovative operational optimization of existing resources, both on the offensive and defensive sides, if we examine the lessons learned from a number of past conflicts.

Here are a few examples in the following areas:

The Use of Mines: Historically, relatively simple and inexpensive naval mines have often posed significant challenges to sophisticated and expensive warships. This is a classic example of low-cost asymmetric technology that has been able to counter effectively much more expensive systems.

Increased strike capability by adapting naval rockets for use against land targets: During the Gulf War, the U.S. Navy modified Harpoon anti-ship rockets to strike land targets. This inexpensive adaptation significantly expanded strike capabilities without requiring new weapons systems.

Countering Improvised Explosive Device (IED): Faced with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the armed forces equipped their vehicles with jamming capabilities. These jammers were designed to disrupt remote detonation signals, offering a much less expensive (and often more tactically effective) protection than the acquisition and deployment of specialized armored vehicles.

Counter-Drone Solutions: The number of examples in this field continues to grow.

• Portable anti-drone devices such as the DroneDefender and DroneGun use RF jamming to neutralize commercial drones without destroying them. These systems cost only tens of thousands of dollars, compared to the hundreds of thousands of dollars required to purchase conventional military systems.
• Precision rifles against drones: Snipers have been deployed as a cost-effective solution against small drones. This approach uses existing skills and equipment rather than investing in expensive anti-drone technologies.
• Modified commercial drones: Ukraine has converted recreational drones into reconnaissance and attack platforms. These modified drones, costing a few thousand euros, have proven effective against Russian military equipment worth millions.
• Nets and eagles against drones: Some security forces have experimented with very low-cost, low-tech methods of capturing drones, such as nets fired from hand-held launchers or training eagles to intercept small drones.
• Directed energy anti-drone weapons: Low-power portable laser systems have been developed as a cost-effective alternative to interceptor missiles in anti-drone warfare. These systems can engage multiple targets at a much lower cost per shot than conventional missiles.

24/7 “participatory” intelligence or low-cost surveillance networks: Ukraine has developed a mobile app that allows civilians to report Russian troop and equipment movements. This participatory intelligence system runs on ordinary smartphones and provides valuable information at a much lower cost than traditional military surveillance systems required for permanent coverage.

These examples illustrate how ingenuity and adaptation can often provide effective and economical solutions to emerging threats by fine tuning the response in proportion to the value of the targets to be neutralized, where possible.

The war in Ukraine has shown that one does need mass to counter mass, a reality that has been virtually absent from Western armed forces’ thinking on the nature of warfare since the end of the Cold War.

In a world where a growing number of actors can deploy drones and missiles and access inexpensive satellites and cutting-edge commercial technologies, many countries are demonstrating ingenuity in countering threats that are “not worth the cost” of sacrificing expensive missiles or ammunition or exposing valuable military assets to disproportionate risks, by combining mass and technological sophistication in a disruptive way.

This concept could be described as “smart mass,” by analogy to the concept of “precision mass” developed by some military analysts in the United States.

The tactical adaptation of French forces in Mali is an excellent example of operational innovation and optimization to deal with asymmetric threats using economic means. Such an approach of favoring the use of conventional weapons (cannons, machine guns) over expensive missiles is consistent with the more recent example of the U.S. F-16s using APKWS II rockets against Houthi drones.

In both cases, this is an adaptive and economical response to threats that do not justify the use of expensive ammunition at the risk of rapid attrition.

Providing a response proportionate to the value of the targets to be neutralized: the example of the French Army Aviation in Sahel.

During the Barkhane Operation in Sahel in the 2010’s, helicopters proved particularly effective against targets such as pickup trucks, thanks to their ability to loiter and engage such targets with more suitable low-cost weapons such as rockets, 30 mm cannons, and 20 mm cannons.

As the ALAT opted to use onboard cannons rather than expensive missiles to neutralize armed terrorist groups, Gazelle, Puma, and Cougar helicopters, as well as Tiger helicopters, were able to support operations in the Sahel and neutralize these groups.

One of the main tactics involved the use of the Puma “Pirate” equipped with a 20 mm gun in a gun port. This configuration has regularly provided valuable support to units in contact with armed terrorist groups in Mali. This was particularly the case during fighting in 2013.

An innovative weapon configuration in anti-drone warfare in the Red Sea: the example of the US Air Force against the Houthis.

To save expensive anti-missile weapons, the U.S. Air Force adapted its F-16s with laser-guided rocket pods, a combination that has led to economically viable anti-drone warfare F-16s operating in the Middle East were able to use their LITENING targeting pods to identify and neutralize targets with laser-guided weapons traditionally used in air-to-ground operations.

This new weapon configuration features F-16s carrying two seven-shot 70mm rocket pods on a single pylon under the right wing using a triple ejection rack (TER). These rockets are equipped with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II), which converts standard unguided 70mm rockets into precision munitions by adding laser guidance kits.

The complete configuration includes:

• 2 seven-shot 70mm rocket pods (14 rockets in total);
• 2 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles;
• 2 AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles;
• 1 LITENING targeting pod;
• 1 HARM Targeting System (HTS) pod;
• 2 external fuel tanks.

What makes this configuration particularly noteworthy is that it significantly increases the aircraft’s strike capability compared to traditional air-to-air configurations. While a typical air defense configuration might include only 6 missiles in total, this adapted configuration offers up to 14 engagement opportunities with laser-guided rockets alone, plus additional conventional air-to-air missiles.

The economic benefits of this approach are considerable. Each APKWS II guidance kit costs approximately $15,000 to $20,000, with complete rockets totaling approximately $25,000 including warheads and motors. In comparison, traditional air-to-air missiles cost hundreds of thousands of dollars each: an AIM-120 AMRAAM missile costs approximately $1 million and an AIM-9X Sidewinder approximately $400,000.

This cost difference makes the APKWS II solution particularly attractive for engaging lower-value targets such as unmanned aerial vehicles, allowing forces to reserve their inventory of expensive missiles for higher-threat scenarios.

The targeting methodology uses the F-16’s LITENING pod to “light up” or designate targets. The pod’s sensor can be connected to the aircraft’s radar, enabling accurate tracking and engagement of relatively slow-moving targets such as drones and cruise missiles. The targeting system can also support wingman tactics, in which one aircraft designates targets while another performs the attack run.

These adaptations represent more than just a tactical solution to an immediate threat. They demonstrate how creativity and operational flexibility can leverage existing technologies in new ways to meet emerging challenges. By reconfiguring proven systems rather than developing entirely new platforms, armed forces achieve both cost savings and rapid deployment of capabilities.

This article was first published in French and English by Eurosatory.

The article was published on May 5, 2025 and is republished by permission of the author.

By Robbin Laird

Dateline: Canberra, Australia

Recently, General “Buzz” Moseley spoke via video link to the May 22, 2025 seminar held by the Sir Richard Williams Foundation in Canberra, Australia.

General Moseley was the 18^th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. Moseley was a distinguished war fighter who lived in the world as it is rather than the world we hoped to see. His entire service was focused on how the USAF could contribute to the deterrence of conflict but win it if you must fight.

I knew him when I worked for the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, and the two of them formed one of the most remarkable pairings of defense leaders in my lifetime.

They were fired by the then Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates because of their opposition to the path Gates preferred which was to move from the way ahead for an air force built around air superiority to one that was not.

The significance of their firing was historic, a fact not lost on the late Senator Molan, whom I had the privilege to know and to discuss many things with him, including this event with him.

This is what the retired Australian General and Senator Jim Molan in his 2022 book on the need for Australia to deal with the China challenge:

“The U.S. is surfacing from decades of war in the Middle East with worn-out equipment, understandably having allocated a lot of its funding to ‘today’s wars’ rather than investing in the future. During the Iraq War, for instance, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates wanted more drones to carry on the day-to-day fight in Iraq and found himself in conflict with the U.S. Air Force, which wanted to continue building the fighters and bombers that it thought would be needed in the future.

“Gates sacked the chief of the U.S. Air Force and restricted the production of aircraft such as the stealth F-22 fighter and the B-21 bomber, in order to build the drones and other aircraft he needed.

“The result was that only a limited number of the extraordinary F-22s were built and the B-21 is still not in production. The impact of diverted spending and focus will be felt for a long time to come.

“The likely war with China, if it is ever fought by weapons of this type, is going to be fought by a very small number of modern stealth fighters, but mainly by U.S. fighters and bombers that are 20 to 30 years old.

“The result of all this is that the U.S. will not be able to marshal sufficient military power to deter China in the Western Pacific, possibly for years.”[1]

I have written about this and many other items related to shaping an effective force for the strategic age we are in in a book about the work of Secretary Wynne entitled: America, Global Military Competition, and Opportunities Lost.

The point is we are playing catch up in the face of the rise of the multipolar world, a world in which airpower matters even more than when Moseley was the Chief.

In providing the opening remarks to the seminar, General Moseley began his analysis by contrasting today’s threat landscape with the relative simplicity of the Cold War era. “Think about 50 years ago, 60 years ago, there was a major threat. Now there are multiple threats,” he observed, highlighting the emergence of what he sees as an unprecedented coalition of adversaries.

Unlike the bipolar world of the past, today’s security challenges involve China’s assertiveness, Russia’s aggression, Iran’s support for global terrorism, and North Korea’s unpredictable behavior. More concerning, according to Moseley, is that “these folks seem to be collaborating and cooperating with each other, sharing munitions, sharing munition stocks.” This cooperation represents a fundamental shift that complicates traditional deterrence strategies.

The general’s assessment extends beyond state actors to include transnational criminal organizations affecting border security, particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border. This multi-faceted threat environment, he argues, requires a robust and capable air force to maintain the rules-based international order that has underpinned Western security for decades.

Perhaps the most startling revelation in Moseley’s presentation was the current state of U.S. Air Force readiness. The statistics Moseley presented are concerning: ten different aircraft types that first flew over 50 years ago still comprise approximately two-thirds of the Air Force’s total fleet of 2,600 aircraft. The KC-135 tanker, a workhorse of military operations, began delivery during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

This aging fleet problem is compounded by nearly four decades of continuous deployment. Since the early 1990s, when the first aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, American air power has maintained a persistent presence in the Middle East. The cumulative effect has been devastating to equipment readiness and personnel morale.

The Budget Reality

Moseley’s analysis of defense spending reveals a fundamental mismatch between mission requirements and available resources. With defense budgets hovering around 3% of GDP, he argued for a baseline of 4-4.5% under normal circumstances, and closer to 5-5.5% given the current recapitalization needs across all services.

The budget structure itself presents challenges. Approximately 50% of Air Force funding goes to personnel costs – necessary and appropriate but leaving limited resources for modernization. After accounting for infrastructure, operations, and maintenance costs for aging aircraft, the investment account that funds new capabilities consistently bears the brunt of budget cuts.

Moseley revealed that since 9/11, the Army has received $65 billion annually from Air Force and Navy budgets – representing over a trillion dollars in shifted priorities that he suggests weakened air capabilities during a critical period.

Central to Moseley’s argument is the primacy of air and space superiority as the Air Force’s fundamental mission. While the service has five core mission areas – air and space superiority, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, rapid mobility, global strike, and command and control – he emphasized that the first enables all others.

“What happens to those service components inside those strategic commons, or those operative domains, if the Air Force does not get air and space superiority?” Moseley asked rhetorically. “What happens to freedom of movement on the surface? What happens to movement to place? What happens to the logistics baseline?”

This perspective challenges recent discussions within Air Force leadership about whether air superiority remains affordable or achievable. Moseley’s response is unequivocal: it’s not just affordable, it’s essential for all joint operations.

The Drone Debate: Promise and Peril

While acknowledging his role in pioneering unmanned systems – he commanded the first drone wing with minimal resources and a squadron commander who had “no people, no money,” just “a folding card table and a blender” for making margaritas while figuring out operations – Moseley expressed concern about current enthusiasm for replacing manned aircraft entirely.

His skepticism is grounded in practical experience. Drawing parallels to dropped cell phone calls, he questioned the wisdom of relying on data links for platforms operating at high altitude and speed in contested environments. “I’m not willing to put something 9000 feet [away] in and out of weather at night that’s running with me at 1.4 Mach that I can’t keep a link to.”

The general’s vision for unmanned systems is more nuanced. He sees value in “little buddies” that can accompany manned fighters to suppress integrated air defense systems but remains nervous about autonomous air-to-air combat in crowded airspace. His 2005 priorities for the Air Force Chief Scientist, the legendary Mark Lewis,  included hypersonic weapons, directed energy systems, and drones that could “run with the fighters” – but as supplements, not replacements.

Moseley concluded his remarks by pointing to recent military operations that demonstrate the continued relevance of manned air power. Israeli strikes in Iran, operations in Yemen, and the destruction of Iraqi Republican Guard divisions during Operation Iraqi Freedom all underscore that reports of manned aircraft’s obsolescence are greatly exaggerated.

His broader message resonates beyond U.S. borders. The challenges he described – aging fleets, budget pressures, technological transitions, and complex threat environments – face many Western air forces. His emphasis on maintaining service identity while building joint capabilities offers a framework for allied cooperation without losing essential military expertise.

General Moseley’s presentation serves as both warning and roadmap.

The warning is clear: current trends in force structure, readiness, and strategic thinking threaten the air superiority that has underpinned Western military dominance for generations.

The roadmap emphasizes returning to basics – understanding core missions, properly funding modernization, and maintaining the technological edge that air power requires.

His closing observation was I think particularly poignant: “Officers and NCOs are not born joint. They become joint. They’re born a soldier, a sailor, an airman.”

This insight challenges current thinking that views service identity as an obstacle to joint operations, instead positioning it as the foundation upon which effective joint capabilities are built.

The stakes, as Moseley makes clear, extend far beyond military readiness. They encompass the ability to deter aggression, work together effectively as allies, and allows what used to be called the West to deal effectively with the rise of the multi-polar authoritarian world.

Note About General Moseley: General “Buzz”  Moseley played a significant role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, serving as the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). He was responsible for all aspects of aerial operations, including mission planning, air tasking orders, and airspace management, and oversaw a large number of personnel and assets.

General Moseley successfully integrated joint and coalition forces, including those from the Royal Saudi Air Force, Royal Air Force, and Royal Australian Air Force, into a cohesive air campaign.

He was involved in the planning and execution of numerous missions, including those targeting Iraqi regime leaders and infrastructure, and those supporting ground forces.

General Moseley was known for his leadership and vision, and his ability to inspire and motivate his troops. He also served as a role model for other military leaders, and his accomplishments were recognized with numerous awards, including two Defense Distinguished Service Medals.

[1] . Jim Molan. Danger On Our Doorstep (pp. 106-107). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.

Robbin Laird

Dateline: Canberra, Australia

On May 22, 2025, the first seminar of 2025 for the Sir Richard Williams Foundation was held at the National Gallery of Australia in Canberra.

The seminar was entitled: The Imperatives for Cost Effectiveness in Multidomain Operations. The program for the seminar laid out the basic aim for the seminar as follows:

The 2025 seminar series will identify and discuss strategic themes which impact the Whole of Australian Government, Defence and industry, as well as international partners in a multi- domain context. Given the increasingly complex set of threats and operational risks, it is also set within the context of the emerging issues aligned with the development of NDS26 and beyond.

The seminar series will address the need to balance near-term decisions in air and space capability to ensure Defence and industry investment also provides the sustainable foundations for future force structure planning and growth.

In recognition of the increasing pressures on Defence spending, the aim of the May 2025 seminar is to examine the imperative for cost effectiveness in multi-domain operations.

The Chairman of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Mark Binskin, provided the opening remarks for the seminar. He underscored that “the global rules-based order that we’ve relied on and benefited from for many decades is now gone” and warning that it “won’t be back in its form that we were used to.”

He highlighted that the international system is transitioning from one governed by the rule of law to one dominated by “rule of strength and rule of threat.” This fundamental shift places enormous pressure on like-minded nations to actively shape the evolving order through “strong national power, trusted alliances and partnerships and collective will.”

As Binskin emphasized, the required response is needed “now, not 2040,” highlighting the immediate nature of the strategic threat facing Australia and its allies.

The seminar’s central theme—the imperative for cost-effectiveness in multi-domain operations— reveals a critical paradox facing modern defense planners. As Binskin noted, “an affordable force may not actually be an effective force,” particularly when the strategic benefits of military capabilities are poorly understood or misapplied.

This challenge manifests in several concerning ways:

• Defense forces risk focusing on single capabilities with limited employment options while neglecting those that could provide government with broader response options at lower operational, strategic, and political risk.
• High-end, exotic capabilities across all domains can distort the cost-effectiveness of military forces, potentially drawing resources away from essential but less glamorous core enabling capabilities.
• Fixed defense budgets combined with unexpected cost pressures create a cash flow problem that inevitably affects force preparedness.

Australian defense planners face the complex task of maintaining two distinct but interconnected focuses. The first involves long-term strategic planning extending to 2040, anticipating how threats and capabilities might evolve over the coming decades.

Simultaneously, they must ensure that current personnel are properly equipped and prepared for immediate challenges. As Binskin pointedly noted, the men and women serving today need to be ready to “compete this afternoon, fight tonight, survive and win.”

The seminar’s strong industry sponsorship underscores the critical role of public-private partnerships in addressing these challenges.

International cooperation remains equally vital, with speakers joining from the UK and the United States (including one virtually due to airline disruptions), reflecting the interconnected nature of modern defense challenges and solutions.

The Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar represents more than an academic exercise — it’s a critical forum for addressing one of Australia’s most pressing national security challenges. How to build and maintain military forces that are both affordable and effective in an era where traditional strategic assumptions no longer apply?

The collapse of the post-World War II international order, combined with the emergence of new threats and the constant pressure of fiscal constraints, requires defense leaders to make increasingly difficult choices about capability development and force structure.

By Robbin Laird

Dateline: Canberra, Australia

Australia’s approach to littoral defense represents a strategic pivot that extends far beyond simple territorial protection. As outlined in the national strategy, this approach demands a fundamental rethinking of force deployment and equipment, creating opportunities for enhanced regional cooperation and security integration.

Reframing Territorial Defense

The importance of Australia’s littoral region cannot be overstated in strategic terms. Rather than serving merely as a narrow territorial defense zone, these littoral areas function as a critical component of Australia’s broader perimeter defense system. More significantly, they provide a vital platform for engagement with regional neighbors — a politically crucial dimension of Australia’s defense posture.

This engagement helps Australia maintain familiarity with its regional environment and build trust among neighboring nations, even when diplomatic relationships may be strained. The Australian Defence Force’s presence in these areas serves the national interest by establishing Australia as a credible and consistent regional security partner.

This evolution requires sophisticated command and control networks along with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. New technologies are already being deployed to enhance these capabilities, including “blue bottle” unmanned systems being launched from Darwin.

The Manned-Unmanned Challenge

One of the most promising aspects of Australia’s littoral strategy involves the integration of manned and unmanned systems across its northern territories. These areas provide real-world testing grounds for experimental deployments that combine human operators with autonomous systems — creating a laboratory for operational innovation in a geographically relevant context.

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) is actively working to improve its deployment capabilities across northern and Western Australia, collaborating with the U.S. Marines to develop new operational concepts. Simultaneously, the Marines are advancing their distributed aviation operations doctrine, leveraging their unique position as both an air and land force.

This creates potential for a powerful symbiotic relationship between Australian forces and the Marines, particularly in integrating emerging technologies. The Marines’ dual-domain expertise offers valuable insights for both the Australian Army and Air Force as they adapt to new operational realities.

Strategic Drivers Before Shopping Lists

A key insight from this developing approach is the importance of letting strategic concepts drive equipment acquisition, rather than the reverse. Too often, defense procurement follows an “abstract shopping list” model disconnected from operational requirements and conceptual innovations.

Australia’s littoral engagement strategy represents a different approach — one that begins with understanding how forces will operate differently and then determines what technologies and capabilities will enable those operations. This means focusing on enhancing “fight tonight” capabilities of existing forces rather than pursuing acquisitions without clear operational contexts.

Building Skills Before Systems

Australian defense forces are wisely focusing on developing the skill sets necessary to understand and effectively employ new technologies before making major acquisition decisions. This approach ensures that defense personnel can provide informed advice about genuine priorities — whether for the Army’s independent operations, joint efforts with the RAAF, or collaborative deployments with U.S. Marines and Air Force elements.

Future Directions

As Australia continues developing its littoral defense capacity, several pathways appear particularly promising:

1. Further integration of unmanned systems, particularly in surveillance and reconnaissance roles
2. Enhanced command and control networks that enable distributed operations
3. Specialized aircraft and maritime platforms designed specifically for littoral environments
4. Continued deepening of interoperability with U.S. forces, especially the Marine Corps
5. Development of a regional engagement strategy that leverages littoral capabilities to build trust

By pursuing a strategically-driven approach that prioritizes operational concepts before acquisition decisions, Australia positions itself to maximize the effectiveness of its defense investments while strengthening regional security relationships.

The littoral domain represents not just a geographic area of responsibility, but a conceptual space where Australia can reimagine its approach to regional security through thoughtful integration of new technologies, operational innovations, and strategic partnerships.

Featured image: The graphic is taken from the Australian Army publication The Australian Army Contribution to the National Defece Strategy (2024).