A US Navy Perspective on the Way Ahead for EW Capabilities: CDR Mike Paul at the Williams Foundation Seminar on EW

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
09/03/2017

2017-08-29 By Robbin Laird

Earlier, I had a chance along with Ed Timperlake to visit HAVOC at the Naval Air Warfare Development Center, and to get the perspective from Fallon on the evolution of EW within the joint force, seen from a US Navy perspective.

In that interview, there was a clear emphasis on Growler as part of a larger effort, and a piece of the puzzle to solve how best to survive and prevail in the contested battlespace.

“There are many of us around here who think that the concept of the E2D the F35 and the Growler integrating would accelerate our transition to where warfare is going with regard to the contested battlespace.

“There are many of us around here who think that would be an outstanding idea that we should really push for and should be a focus of testing and evaluation.

“But there will be people around as well who will say but how does that lead to me dropping bombs?”

https://sldinfo.com/havoc-works-the-electronic-warfare-payload-in-the-digital-battlespace/

The integration piece and getting those who think in legacy kill chains to embrace a very different way of thinking, namely the kill web was also emphasized by CDR Mike Paul when he presented at the Williams Foundation and participated in the panels and discussed these issues over dinner at the Foundation as well.

A key element of shaping the way ahead was highlighted not only in his presentation but the presence of the US Navy Growler community in Australia.

The US DoD’s new EW Strategy tells us that Electronic Warfare underpins U.S. national military objectives through demonstration of electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) superiority. “A force multiplier for a range of military operations, EW maximizes lethality of precision strike weapons, assures mission command and increases mobility by protecting complex battle networks, weapon systems and forces. EW provides rapid situational awareness and produces chaos in adversary decision-making.”

CDR Mike Paul, Williams Foundation Conference on EW,. August 23, 2017

The fact is that U.S. military operations are rarely conducted unilaterally and are increasingly reliant on contributions from our partners and allies. The Navy I think has done great work, ensuring EW development efforts are interoperable, and aligned with our allies (the Growler is a good example). The battlespace awareness you get with the passive sensing capabilities in the Growler is not free – by nature, our mission requires interoperable data sources and software formats.

In fact our Chief of Naval Operation’s Maritime Strategy states that we must also expand opportunities for coalition EW training and education in the U.S. and abroad. We’re tasked to build or enhance partner EW capabilities and capacity, and ensure partner and ally capabilities remain viable against emerging peer or near-peer threats.

Of the 4 Objectives in the DoD’s EW Strategy, we like to say we achieved the “4th Objective” – to foster access, enhance interoperability and grow warfighting capacity – at least at the operational and tactical levels.

This is Operational partnering. It’s easy to say “no,” or “you can’t,” much more difficult to say yes. We had plenty of hurdles, some seeming impossible. I count significant “No’s” that were turned into yes:

A significant part of the presentation detailed how the integration of the RAAF with the US Navy Growler force was achieved and in relatively compressed period of time.

This is a case study in many ways of the kind of integration, which the US and the core allies need to achieve to have the kind of force multiplier effect from an integrated coalition force.

This event is a great opportunity to mention some of the wins we’ve had in operationalizing our partnership in Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA).

We at Whidbey Island and leaders in NAVAIR removed years of cultural barriers limiting collaboration in a short amount of time.

That took people to lead and innovate. But that’s what it took to begin to operationalize a strategic AEA partnership.

Our stated goal was to produce 100% fully capable & interoperable EA-18G wingmen, at all security levels.

At the peak of my Wing’s support phase to 6 Squadron standup in March, we had Australian students and instructors alike in our replacement squadron, Australian officers operationally employed in 3 different squadrons – primarily in this part of the globe.

Multiple deployments to the PACOM AOR, multiple reps and sets of high end exercises, Australian aircrew were put in leadership roles in the squadrons in the air and on the ground.

Australian maintainers getting on the job training during pressurized Growler Tactics Instructor course sortie rates.

At one point we had roughly 45 Australians invading the Pacific Northwest of the US making lasting friendships… our neighbors… babies being born… We went “all in.” We formed personal relationships that make the distance between Canberra and Pacific Northwest coast seem insignificant. Now look at what 6SQN did during their IOT&E for Growler. Amazing.

CDR Paul outlined that the non-kinetic payload was growing in importance both for adversaries and the US and allied forces, but that it was clearly different from a kinetic action.

EW is unlike kinetic air-to-ground payloads that simply require target coordinates, or an air-to-air missile that needs an appropriate target.

As CDR Mike Lisa, Commanding Officer of a “combined RAAF USN squadron” best stated, “it requires our sensors to call the signals the exact same thing, employ the exact same waveforms/payloads, and deliver at the exact same time with exact positioning.”

This means that the secret ingredient within an effective EW contributor to the joint fight is a well trained, effective and coordinated workforce.

That is, in order to get the right effect or impact there is a clear need for the EW team to be on the same page, to understand the signals they are reading, what they mean and to dial up the correct response to have the desired effect or impact.

It takes work to innovatively maximize our capabilities. For the US Navy, it has taken perseverance to innovate from a standoff EA-6B Jammer mindset, to a platform and community of experts focused on distributing battlespace awareness and attacking the enemy’s kill web across all mission areas.

 It all relies on a well-trained EMW workforce

  •  Growler-specific, Operational EW-Personnel Qualification Standards for our enlisted sailors
  •  A focus on efficient improvement of pre/post mission data analysis
  •  Air Wing Fallon validation of HAVOC tactics
  •  Advanced technologies + today’s AEA suite
  • World-class Information Warfare team providing efficiencies for VAQ (Electronic Attack Squadron).

Because of the nature of the blended capability one needs between technology and the work force, for EW to work within a coalition force, there needs to be tight integration.

This is why the way the US and Australia are working the issue is so crucial to mission success.

During his presentation, he presented a photo within which showed the team necessary to execute the EW mission. And he had this to say about the team and the challenge.

On the right side of the lower picture is Petty Officer Amber Hart. She understands who does weapons-to-target pairing for non-kinetics – she does! She wears an Information Warfare pin. She’s a warfighter and understands that modern, data-hungry aircraft are a mission-kill without her.

Our CAOCs are excellent at creating a Master Air Attack Plan and JDPI apportionment. The CFACC can tell you exactly what his JDPI servicing capacity is at H-hour of a conflict.

But if we do not put the “right” payloads on the “right” target, we become less lethal.

Simply put, having the same equipment is not enough.

Mission effectiveness requires that we think alike, train alike, and speak the same EW language.

Given the differences between kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, having tight integration of technology and training (TTPs) was crucial in shaping a 21st century EW Warfighting capability.

What’s in the wingtips of that EA-18G, when operating the full capability, is unparalleled battlespace awareness distributed to the airborne force. And the Navy continues to invest in its passive sensing capabilities as our adversary systems become more complex.

And well integrated with 5th gen aircraft capability, and in about 4-5 years, next gen EA capabilities.

But EW boxes and aircraft are not what makes this work – it takes people and innovation with complicated EW technologies to realize the capability.

When we were at Fallon, we discussed how the US Navy and Air Force are working integration of EW capabilities and the challenges to doing so.

The Aussies are working Wedgetail with F-22s, and the US Navy is working Growlers with F-22s, and at the Red Flags they are now working F-35s, with F-22s, with Growlers, with the new EW capabilities on the Typhoon to shape ways to deliver integrated EW combat capabilities.

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-red-flag-16-1-air-combat-integration-and-the-role-of-the-f-22-the-typhoon-and-wedgetail/

https://sldinfo.com/f-35-at-red-flag-renorming-of-airpower-in-process/

https://sldinfo.com/red-flag-2017-1-the-perspective-of-the-6-squadron-officer-commanding/

This is clearly a work in progress.

I had the opportunity to see it up close in Red Flag Alaska last year. 4th gen Canadian classic hornets, F-15Es, VAQ-135 Growlers (with Aussie crews), Raptors, Wedgetail. Everyone has gaps – physics has limits.

But our innovative JO’s roll up their sleeves and mission plan, making EW/SEAD contracts with their counterparts – they’re talking spectrum; sensors; gaps in capabilities; and contracts to ensure that non-kinetic effects are layered and distributed to increase lethality across the force.

It takes work to maximize innovatively our capabilities. For the US Navy, it took perseverance to innovate from a standoff EA-6B Jammer mindset, to a platform and community of experts focused on distributing battlespace awareness and attacking the enemy’s kill web across all mission areas.

US Growler Operating at RAAF Base Amberley from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

As CDR Paul summarized how he saw the way ahead: “An innovative, team-based collaborative culture that ingrains Information Warfare strengthens the VAQ community’s enduring international partnership in EW.”

Editor’s Note: The photos in the slideshow were shot during  a visit this Spring to Amberley Airbase where the Aussie Growlers are based and are credited to Second Line of Defense.

See also the following:

Group Captain Braz on the RAAF and the Way Ahead on Electronic Warfare: Shaping a Core Distributed Capability for the Integrated Force

 

French and UK Militaries After Brexit? New Training Program Put in Place

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
09/02/2017

2017-09-02  According to the UK Ministry of Defence, a new agreement with France is setting in place a key training program moving forward.

Over the next few months over 2,500 British troops will train with their French counterparts, participating in exercises spanning Eastern Europe to Kenya.

The Defence Secretary will agree the new programme of UK-French training during his first bilateral meeting with Florence Parly, the newly appointed French Minister for the Armed Forces in Paris later today.

In September, over 1,500 British soldiers from 16 Air Assault Brigade will be joined by troops from 11eme Brigade Parachitiste on NATO exercise Swift Response in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

Meanwhile, French troops also plan to join 1,000 UK personnel from 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment on Exercise Askari Storm in Kenya in November, training on the prevention of instability and the spread of violent extremism.

During the visit, the Defence Secretary will also praise the French troops who have been deployed to Estonia as part of the UK-led enhanced Forward Presence battalion in the country since April this year.

Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon said:

The UK and France have a long enduring relationship and that will continue as the UK leaves the European Union.

We are deployed together in NATO, fighting against Daesh in Iraq and Syria and training together across the UK globe.

This announcement is the latest in a string of partnerships that highlight the enduring strength of the UK-French defence relationship.

Earlier this year, the UK and France signed a €100million agreement to develop future long range weapons and are working together on an unmanned combat air system.

And as the UK prepares for HMS Queen Elizabeth to reach operational capability in 2020, France is expected to play her part in supporting the Carrier Strike Group, as the UK did with the French carrier Charles De Gualle in the Gulf during 2015 when HMS Kent was integrated into her task group.

The UK and France also run a personnel exchange programme. Improving how we work together, there are currently over 40 personnel working in reciprocal roles across the three services.

The Defence Secretary has also announced that the RAF Red Arrows will start their European and Gulf tour in France on 15th September, Battle of Britain Day, with a flypast in Cannes.

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-agrees-new-military-training-programme-with-france

August 31, 2017

An Historical Perspective on RAAF Airborne Electronic Attack

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
09/01/2017

2017-09-01  On August 23, 2017, the Williams Foundation held a seminar on the future of electronic warfare. The seminar was begun with a very thoughtful overview on the history airborne electronic attack within the RAAF.

This perspective was provided by Group Captain Andrew Gilbert, Director of the Air Power Development Centre, RAAF.

His presentation follows.

To lay the foundation for today’s seminar, I have been asked to provide an historical perspective on the development of electronic attack in the RAAF. If I were to stick with that riding instruction, this would be quite a short presentation because, put simply the RAAF has no significant operational history with airborne electronic attack.

Let me be clear, I am not suggesting that the RAAF has not been interested in developing an electronic attack capability. The RAAF has had an enduring interest in electronic warfare (EW) predating the Second World War, and while the focus of our developments, modest as they may have been, were in the realms of electronic support and electronic protection, the RAAF was fully aware of the theory and possibilities of airborne electronic attack, as demonstrated by the acquisition of

Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) pods for our fighters, and our dabbling with anti- radiation missiles. The issue was no threat was sufficiently compelling to justify the investment expense or, more appropriately, the opportunity cost that would have been required to develop an electronic attack capability. This is now no longer the case.

The ability to control, exploit, and deny the electromagnetic spectrum, or the EMS, has become a defining feature of modern warfare, and is a capability that is vital to the success of a fifth-generation force. As regional military’s continue their modernisation programs and we see the rise of increasingly tech-savvy non-state adversaries, the RAAF could no longer afford to ignore the requirement for air power to deny, degrade, and disrupt our potential adversary’s ability to exploit the EMS. In this respect, the EA-18G Growler represents a vital new air power capability for the joint force.

But we have to be wary of assuming that the acquisition of 12 aircraft represents “Mission Accomplished” for airborne EW in the RAAF. Rather, we need to view the Growler as a missing piece of an ever-evolving EW puzzle.

The aim of my presentation today is to describe that puzzle in broad terms, and highlight how the evolution of airborne EW has been defined by an ongoing process of action-reaction; one in which developments in the ability exploit the EMS have driven advances in the ability to deny it. This process will continue. The key to future success lies in getting ahead of the curve, developing an attitude to EW that approaches the control and exploitation of the EMS in the joint force.

Electronic Warfare up to the End of the Second World War

The concept of EW, though not the term, dates back to the American Civil War, when Confederate cavalry regularly intercepted and misdirected Union message traffic, and cut Union telegraph wires.1 The use of kinetic force to disrupt an adversary’s use of the EMS was also widely used during the First World War. In fact, Australia’s first foray into electronic attack took this form, when in November 1915 Thomas White of the Australian Flying Corps’ Mesopotamian Half-Flight flew behind enemy lines to destroy Turkish telegraph lines, landing next the target wires and destroying them with the aid of guncotton charges.2 To call these types of operations electronic attack is to stretch the definition of the term, but I use these early examples to highlight the earliest manifestations of the action-reaction cycle in electronic warfare. When an adversary finds a way to exploit the EMS, a means was found to deny it.

EW, as we know it today, really emerged as a discreet role for air power during the Second World War. During the interwar period a number of advances in radar and communications technology in Europe, Asia and America, offered new possibilities for the exploitation of the EMS for use un surveillance, communications, and navigation. The British Chain Home radar system is undoubtedly the most famous example of the recognition of the EMS as an operational enabler. But other examples abound. The Germans, Japanese, Soviets and American also developed radio and radar technology, with varying degrees of success, in the lead up to the war.

As the operational impact of the exploitation of the EMS began to be observed on both sides of the Second World War, attempts to deny the spectrum quickly emerged. In 1940, British scientists developed a method of disrupting the German’s use of Lorenz radio beams to guide Luftwaffe bombers onto their British targets. With the introduction of beam jammers in 1940 and 1941, the British were able to render the German Lorenz beam system largely ineffective. In March 1941 for example, of 89 beam bombing missions flown by the Luftwaffe, only 18 resulted in the aircraft receiving the bomb release signal.3 An excellent example of a successful early application of electronic attack in shaping the employment of air power.

Actual airborne electronic attack began to take form in the skies over Germany as specialised British bombers belonging to the RAF’s Number 100 (Bomber Support) Group, including the RAAF’s 462 Squadron Lancasters, began flying missions to specifically disrupt the German air defence network.4 Using window, thin strips of aluminium designed to spoof and deceive German radar, the British were able to reduce night bomber attrition rates by hiding the incoming raids, or diverting the German night fighters away from them as they chased false targets on their radar screens. 100 Group were also engaged in jamming Luftwaffe radio frequencies, and spoofing voice transmission, using Airborne Cigar aircraft accompanying bombing raids over Germany.5

These are just two examples of what was a dynamic and innovative process of action-reaction in the fight to exploit and deny the EMS during the Second World War. These experiences ushered in the era of electronic attack in the air domain. But the lessons learned were soon forgotten in the transition from a hot to the Cold War.

Electronic Warfare during the Cold War

The years immediately following the end of the Second World War provide excellent evidence of the action-reaction relationship between the developments in the ability to exploit the EMS and the corresponding investment in the ensuring the ability to deny the adversary’s use of the spectrum.

With the Soviet Union as the only strategic threat to the West, and the assessment being that they lacked a credible electronic threat; interest in electronic attack capabilities went into decline. The RAF’s 100 Group was disbanded in late 1945, and the US had removed the specialist EW operator from their operational B- 29s squadrons. American experience in the Korean War would highlight the shortsightedness of these decisions.

The Ground-Controlled Intercept, or GCI, systems controlling the North Korean MiG-15s, and the radar-directed North Korean searchlights and AAA took their toll on the American B-29s. By mid-1951, the Americans had lost 25 of their 100 B-29s deployed into theatre.6 In response, the US reintroduced spot-jamming capabilities on the B-29, in addition to a range of other initiatives aimed at denying North Korea’s use of the EMS. These measures significantly reduced the loss rate, with only three B-29s being lost during the 4000 sorties conducted in the last seven months of the war.7

The experience in Korea reinvigorated interest in electronic attack, but in EW terms the Korean War was, for all intents and purposes, ‘merely an extension of the Second World War’.8 The effectiveness of chaff and spot jamming had already been demonstrated in the skies over Europe. It was the advent of surface-to-air and air-to-air missile systems in the years that followed that provided the spark that re- ignited interest in the serious development of electronic attack in the Western world.

The growing sophistication of Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) posed a significant challenge to the operational effectiveness of Western air power from the early 1960s onwards. And experience in Vietnam and the Middle East played a critical role in shaping electronic attack into its modern form.

In Vietnam, the Soviet SA-2 surface to air missile system coupled with the GCI of the Vietnamese fighters presented American aircraft heading into North Vietnam with ‘one of the most complex electromagnetic defence threats ever to be combatted by the USAF tactical forces’.9 The US response to the threat is informative because they approached the problem a number of different ways, and in so doing laid the foundation for the modern Western approach to electronic attack.

Specialised stand-off jammers, such as the EB-66 of the USAF and the EA-6A and Bs, of the USMC and USN arrived in theatre in 1965. In the same year, the USAF Wild Weasel capability emerged on the scene, combining technology, tactics, and the cross-pollination of personnel to create a formidable SAM suppression capability.

The Israelis observed and learned EW lessons from the US, but also drew on their own bitter experiences from the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and developed a truly masterful demonstration of operational EW during the 1982 Beqaa Valley campaign. Using Remote Piloted Aircraft to deceive Syrian air defences, jamming and chaff to deny Syrian Air Defence operators an air picture, long-range artillery and rockets to attack the SAM sites and anti-radiation missiles to take out early- warning and fire control radars, the Israeli Defence Force provided the gold standard of an innovative joint approach to denying the adversary use of the EMS.

While all these innovations were happening during the Cold War, Australia remained largely uninvolved in electronic attack, due primarily to the lack of a credible threat to justify the investment. There is no better illustration of the relative priority attached to such a capability than the RAAF experience of the F-111.

As many of you are aware, one of the main reasons why the F-111s did not deploy to the 1991 Gulf War was due to the inadequacy of the self-protection systems to meet the needs of the threat environment in theatre.10 Something that was addressed subsequently with Project Echidna and other related projects.11 What is less well known, and more illustrative, is the integration trials of the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile, also known as the HARM, onto the F-111 in the late 1980s. HARM was under consideration in Australia as a complement to the AGM-84 HARPOON anti-shipping missile. The broad concept of employment was for the HARM to destroy a ship’s radars, rendering it defenceless while the HARPOON would be used to sink it. ARDU conducted trials of the HARM on the F-111 in the Southern Ocean in 1987 and 1988. Unfortunately, ‘HARM was traded off in the Defence Committee for air-to-air missiles for the F/A-18 Hornets’.12

Each of these cases highlight that the consideration of electronic attack continued to be reactive to the threat posed by the adversary. US losses in Korea and Vietnam, and the heavy Israeli losses of the Yom Kippur War may have been further reduced had investment in electronic attack occurred in parallel with the development of capabilities designed to exploit the EMS. In the Australian context, the perceived absence of a credible electronic threat resulted in neglect of an electronic attack capability in the RAAF. The 1991 Gulf War changed this.

Electronic Warfare in the modern age

The Gulf War heralded a new era of air power. I won’t digress into the debate about the decisiveness of air power that conflict spawned, that is a topic for a longer discussion in a different forum, but what we saw in 1991 was a new approach to the application of air power that continues to guide our operations today. Among the most notable features of the Gulf War air campaign was the systematic dismantling of Iraq’s KARI Integrated Air Defence System through the integrated use of electronic attack, cruise missiles, and stealth aircraft.

The emergence of stealth aircraft onto the operational scene drew attention to another dimension of electronic warfare: the denial of an adversary’s ability to exploit the EMS through signature management. This approach was not new, but the F-117’s performance over Iraq in 1991validated the science of low-observables. An ‘all-aspect low observable’ signature is now one of the defining features of fifth- generation fighter aircraft.

The 1999 Serbian shoot-down of an F-117 using an SA-3 Surface to Air Missile system, a system introduced into service in 1961, however, reinforced the fact that there is no permanent solution to the challenge of electronic warfare. Every action has a reaction, and the resulting adaptation, improvisation, and innovation by an adversary can create unexpected shocks that can undermine a perceived advantage upon which our operational concepts are developed. These may not necessarily take the form of cutting edge technology, as the Serbs demonstrated in 1999 and as we have seen from the non-state actors in our current conflicts, effective adaptation can be low-tech. We must remain wary of creeping complacency derived from a perceived technological edge.

And this is what we are seeing unfold in our region. The concept of the anti- access and area-denial, or A2/AD, that has attracted so much attention over the last few years is ‘as old as warfare itself’.13 What are new and innovative are the technologies and the ways in which A2/AD strategies are being implemented by various states. In our own region, the EMS, both in its tradition manifestation and in the realm of cyber, will be one of the defining battlegrounds of any future conflict. Realisation of this fact has driven the realisation of an airborne electronic attack capability for the ADF.

My mention of cyber within the context of EW is intentional, though perhaps slightly controversial. But I include it to highlight the continually evolving nature of the non-physical dimensions of modern operations. We cannot afford to be tribal and create stove-pipes around capability based on dogmatic perspectives of domains. Cyber and EW are linked and will continue to be inextricably linked into the future, and we must account this fact for as our attitude towards EW evolves.

The RAAF’s introduction of the Growler, as I am sure we will hear from the speakers that follow me today, is an invaluable addition to Allied capability in this region and beyond. However, our potential adversaries will not remain static. They will continue to evolve their ability to exploit and deny the EMS to our detriment. Disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum radars, Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), and wake detection technology will enable the exploitation of non-traditional areas of the EMS and require us to continue to adapt and evolve our own electronic capabilities so as to maintain advantage in the EMS. The introduction of the Growler is not the end of the journey in electronic attack, but the beginning.

CONCLUSION

Much has changed in the 102 years since Thomas White flew his Farman pusher behind enemy lines to destroy Turkish telegraph lines. Where before we needed to rely on kinetic action to deny our adversary their use of the EMS, we now fight for the spectrum in the spectrum, with explosives now complemented by ones and zeroes. What this highlights is that the technology and tactics will invariably change; they will advance, develop and evolve. As our reliance on the EMS continues to grow, we need to ensure that we stay ahead of the curve in anticipating change and adapting to the disruption that will inevitable occur in the battle for dominance in the EMS.

The challenge laid down in this seminar is to discuss how the introduction of the Growler can be seen as a catalyst for changing the RAAF’s attitude towards electronic warfare. In my opinion, what the Growler has done has been to focus the RAAF on the missing piece long journey trying to solve the EW puzzle. We can now more clearly see and understand the full picture of what constitutes operations in the EMS look like. But what history has shown us is that the EW picture is dynamic, it evolves and changes.

To my mind, and to conclude, the RAAF needs to look beyond the Growler and continually bear in mind these three questions:

  1. How do we ensure the RAAF remains ahead of the action-reaction cycle in electronic warfare?
  2. How do we ensure we do not focus on the platforms and instead focus on the effects we need to generate? and,
  3. How do we ensure our airmen remain innovative and not reactionary in providing an air power perspective on the battle to control and exploit the EMS as part of the joint force?

Endnotes

1 JPR Browne and MT Thurbon, Electronic Warfare, Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology Series, vol. 4, Brassey’s, London, 1998, p.3.

2 TW White, Guests of the Unspeakable, John Hamilton, London, 1928, pp. 46-47.

3 Alfred Price, Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare, Macdonald and Jane’s, London, 1967, p.49.

4 Royal Australian Air Force, Pathfinder Collection, vol. 6, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2014,

p.121.

5 Price, Instruments of Darkness, p.182.

6 Browne and Thurbon, Electronic Warfare, p.26.

7 Browne and Thurbon, Electronic Warfare, p.26

8 Price, Instruments of Darkness, p.252.

9 United States Air Force, Pacific Air Forces, Directorate of Tactical Evaluation report quoted in Mark D Howard, ‘Crow Ressurection: The Future of Airborne Electronic Attack’, unpublished thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 2013, p. 9.

10 Mark Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge: A History of the F-111 in Australian Service, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 2010, p. 191.

11 Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge, p. 192.

12 Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge, p. 168.

13 Sam LaGone, ‘CNO Richardson: Navy Shelving A2/AD Acronym’, USNI News, 3 October 2016, viewed 17 August 2017, <https://news.usni.org/2016/10/03/cno-richardson-navy-shelving-a2ad-acronym>.

EW23Aug17_Gilbert Presentation notes

 

Visiting NAWDC: A Discussion with TOPGUN

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-09-01  During our recent visit to NAWDC we had a chance to talk with the N7 Department, otherwise known as TOPGUN.

The lead for the discussion was the Department Head, Commander Mariner.

According to the US Navy, the role of N7 within NAWDC is as follows:

In the early stages of the Vietnam War, the tactical performance of Navy fighter aircraft against seemingly technologically inferior adversaries, the North Vietnamese MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21, fell far short of expectations and caused significant concern among national leadership.  

Based on an unacceptable ratio of combat losses, in 1967, ADM Tom Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, commissioned an in-depth examination of the process by which air-to-air missile systems were acquired and employed.  Among the multitude of findings within this report was the critical need for an advanced fighter weapons school, designed to train aircrew in all aspects of aerial combat including the capabilities and limitations of Navy aircraft and weapon systems, along with those of the expected threat.

In 1969, the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) was established to develop and implement a course of graduate-level instruction in aerial combat.  Today, TOPGUN continues to provide advanced tactics training for FA-18A-F aircrew in the Navy and Marine Corps through the execution of the Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor (SFTI) Course.  TOPGUN is the most demanding air combat syllabus found anywhere in the world.  The SFTI Course ultimately produces graduate-level strike fighter tacticians, adversary instructors, and Air Intercept Controllers (AIC) who go on to fill the critical assignment of Training Officer in fleet units.

 The role of the squadron pilots is a key element driving change in any air-enabled combat force.

As Ed Timperlake, a former Naval Aviator, who was honored to engage with the first CO of TOPGUN the late “Mugs” McKeown on a worldwide assessment of tactical aviation for the CIA at the height of the Cold war, has argued:

The skillfulness and success of fighter pilots in aerial combat is an extensively researched yet modestly understood and fundamentally complex concept.

Innumerable physical and psychological factors along with chance opportunities affect a pilot’s facility for success in air combat.

Perhaps the best narrative of the intangibles of the skill and courage of a fighter pilot was captured by the author Tom Wolfe in his seminal work The Right Stuff.

From the first day a perspective fighter pilot begins their personal journey to become a valuated and respected member of an elite community, serving as an operational squadron pilot, the physical danger is real.

But so is the most significant force for being the absolute best that a fighter pilot can feel which is day in and day out peer pressure by those they really and truly respect, their squadron mates.

 http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/squadron-fighter-pilots-the-unstoppable-force-of-innovation-for-5th-generation-enabled-concepts-of-operations/

In our discussion with the TOPGUN team they emphasized that the pilots came from the fleet, and while at TOPGUN, they honed their skills in the aircraft and helped to develop future TTPs against emerging threats.

“We are looking to make the squadron pilot more capable in real world operations.”

“We have been working integration with the F-35 for some time.

“The advantage of the TOPGUN pilot is that we have wrung out the capability of the Super Hornet and have brought that knowledge to integration with the F-35.

“We look for how each platform can enable the other to maximize lethality and survivability for the fleet.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reshaping DoD Business Rules: Leverage Allied Investments in Building Out US Capabilities

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/31/2017

2017-08-29 By Robbin Laird

The title of this piece might seem obvious — why would not the US do everything possible to put the best equipment into the field?

The answer is simply that the foreign investment equation is largely absent in the US political calculus.

There would be no F-35 without allies and allied investments or certainly nothing resembling the F-35 global enterprise.

There would be fewer P-8s and less effective ASW protecting the US and allied fleets.

The usual excuse — to protect US jobs — simply is not credible for sales to any country by any other country leads to tech transfer and jobs creation.

And now there is a new urgency to get on with it.

The shift from slo mo to preparing for high tempo and high intensity operations is a major challenge for the US military and its allies. It is about a culture shift, a procurement shift, an investment shift. But mobilization is even more important than modernization.

To get ready for the shift, inventory needs to become more robust, notably with regard to weapons. In visiting US bases, a common theme in addition to readiness and training shortfalls, is the challenge of basic inventory shortfalls.

The Trump Administration has come to power promising to correct much of this. But there simply is not enough time and money to do readiness and training plus ups, mobilization and rapid modernization.

Donald Trump as a businessman might take a look at how DoD could actually functions as an effective business in equipping the force and having highlighted the question of allies might be pleased to learn of significant allied investments in new combat systems which his own forces can use, thus saving money and enhancing capability at the same time.

One way to augment the force would be to do something which would seem to be at odds with the Make America Great notion. As one of my Danish friends put it well: “I have no problem with the idea of making America great again. For me, the question is how?”

One way to do so would be leverage extant allied programs and capabilities which if adopted by the US forces would save money but even more importantly ramp up the operational capability of the US forces and their ability to work with allies in the shortest time possible. By so doing, the US could target investments where possible in break through programs which allies are NOT investing in.

It is time to take a global view as the coming of the F-35 and the P-8 have made it very clear that global technology is a key element for shaping 21st century high intensity combat forces, even when leaders seem to be at odds.

There are many examples of this low hanging fruit, which can be exploited.

And the old bromide that this would cost US jobs is simply not true – foreign producers like American ones build in the country where they export rather than simply exporting the end product.

First, there is question of rapidly inserting unmanned assets.

While the US Navy researchers how to provide for new capabilities, allies are already deploying a key underwater unmanned asset to work the demining issue.

The SAMDIS solution is in use by several allies and as Norman Polmar and I noted:

Advanced Acoustic Concepts, a DRS/Thales joint venture based in the United States, has devised SAMDIS––Synthetic Aperture and Mine Detection Imagery Sonar––a system with multiple capabilities that can be rapidly deployed to provide the underwater “big picture.”

SAMDIS has been in production for four years and is in operational service with several allied nations.

In particular, Britain and France employ SADMIS in their joint mine countermeasures program. The system is software upgradable, which means that experience with the now deployed and operational systems can easily provide data for software upgrades of contemporary as well as future versions.

Also, because SAMDIS is platform agnostic and scalable, it can be deployed on a variety of current and future platforms. Although especially configured for deployment from unmanned underwater vehicles, it can be deployed from unmanned surface vehicles.

These could be hosted by the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships (LCS) or other naval or commercial ships of opportunity.

 https://sldinfo.com/new-underwater-effectiveness-the-samdis-solution/

Second is the question of getting on with regard to the weapons revolution.

Rebuilding the stockpile of current weapons is a key priority but while doing so allied weapons could be adopted as the “new investments” to the inventory while the DoD sorts through how to get on with longer range weapons and higher speed weapons to enhance the high intensity Warfighting capabilities of the US and allied forces.

JSM with F-35A Credit: US Air Force/Forsvarsdepartementet

One example is the Joint Strike Missile which is designed for attack on surface ships flying off of an F-35 and will be used initially by the Norwegians (who have developed it) and the Japanese and Australians. As it already will be launched on an F-35A, the US can simply by it as part of the inventory upgrade effort.

https://sldinfo.com/allies-missiles-and-the-f-35-the-case-of-the-joint-strike-missile/

Another example is provided by the MBDA missiles coming on line for the F-35.

Weapons such as Meteor for air-to-air or Spear 3 for ground attack from an F-35 are in the works and could be included as well in any inventory build up.

https://sldinfo.com/the-weapons-revolution-continues-mbda-shapes-a-way-ahead-for-strike-platforms-in-the-kill-web/

The key role of allies in F-35 can simply miss the point that the global enterprise provides a unique mobilization opportunity for US and allied forces.

The Meteor being fired by F-35B. Image credited to MBDA.

The coming of the F-35 provides a significant opportunity to leverage the investment efforts of core allies as is happening in the UK with 5th Gen weapons such as Meteor and SPEAR 3:

F-35 as a global enterprise – the 9-Nation MOU encourages US allies in the program to invest in core capabilities for the benefit of the JSF partnership – Meteor and SPEAR 3 are examples of this;

F-35 is the bedrock for high end warfare and 5th generation weapons such as Meteor/SPEAR 3 will help maximize coalition capabilities with direct benefit to the US services in the joint fight;

The integration of 5th Gen weapons such as Meteor onto 4th Gen platforms also enables the allies to better utilize their whole combat air force, not just their 5th Gen platforms.

For the US, this path opens up a number of options; one example is the potential interoperability of UK and USMC F-35Bs afloat where jets would be able to fly from each other’s decks with whichever weapons are to hand.  It could go a step further and open up a scenario where the US consider adopting these new weapons onto US F-35s, which share integrative commonality with allied F-35s.

The United States could thus leverage allied investments in the weaponization of the global F-35 in a significant way, but not if it follows a protectionist policy or continues to pursue the legacy of the most recent Administration’s legacy to often have competition for competitions sake rather than simply moving ahead with the off the shelf solution.

Artist Rendition of F-35 Firing Spear 3 Missile. CreditL MBDA

Allied weapons integration on the F-35 provides a range of off the shelf solution sets for the US forces, which should be leveraged.  The US can put its investment into additional weapons capabilities rather than simply investing in areas already covered by advanced weapons capabilities developed and deployed by allies.

The F-35 global enterprise provides a way ahead for more rapid development of weapons, by leveraging allied investments and capabilities whilst the US develops new capabilities in parallel, which can then be offered to the allied F-35 users as well.  A new business model has emerged precisely when a new Administration has arrived in Washington, which has underscored its desire for new business models.

Here one is staring them directly in the face.

A third example is provided by the Wedgetail which the Aussies have made a key combat asset within the high-end force and are looking to invest in its further development. Leveraging multiple years of development and combat operations to get on with the post-AWACs world makes more sense than simply continuing the slow roll of upgrading AWACs.

For example, the Aussie Wedgetail has come to Red Flag 2017-1 and has provided advanced C2 and support to a fifth generation enabled air combat force. F-35s, F-22s and advanced legacy aircraft like Typhoons were supported throughout by the most advanced air battle management system operating today.

And it is being operated by the RAAF and not the USAF; and the RAF is also considering its acquisition. Instead of slow rolling an upgrade of AWACS, it is time to leap ahead and move beyond the 360 degree radar dome technology and embrace a very different concept of air battle management, one good for today and one very integratable into the tron warfare and distributed operations of the future.

https://sldinfo.com/why-not-buy-wedgetail-and-move-out-beyond-awacs-coming-terms-with-a-5th-generation-enabled-force/

A fourth example which would clearly roil the protectionist who care more about protectionism than the capability of an actual deployed US military force would be to get on with the KC-10 replacement and by the A330MRTT.

Not only does the USAF have NO operational new tankers, but the allies have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that the USAF made the right decision picking this aircraft over the Boeing offering.

But the Boeing plane is clearly the KC-135 replacement; but the KC-10 which has become a key tanking asset in the absence of a new tanker, has demonstrated what a larger tanker can do for a deployed force.

And the allies are operating multiple A330MRTTs so that commonality has already been established and significant investments by ALLIES in a needed US capability already in place.

For example, the Aussies are about to add an operational autonomous boom to their KC-30As.

According to the RAAF Commander in charge of lift and tanking:

“If it can anticipate and react to movements of the receiver aircraft faster than the boom operator can, then you end up with faster contacts.

You also potentially end up with more consistent contacts when the turbulence level increases, in cloud or when night falls.”

https://sldinfo.com/tanker-2-0-adding-the-robotic-boom/

The Aussies are moving onto Tanker 2.0 while the USAF is waiting for Tanker 1.0. This makes no sense.

Recently, the Minister of Defence for the UK made argument for the US opening the aperture with regard to non-US systems.

But I would argue that it is not simply a question of trade policy – it is about getting serious about rapidly equipping a US combat force which needs to prepare for the certainty of high intensity combat.

Editor’s Note: The slideshow above highlights aircraft at the Avalon Air Show in Australia earlier this year and highlight what two way street might look like if you put USAF colors onto the KC-30A and Wedgetail.

The photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.

A version of this article was first published by Breaking Defense:

Use Allied Investments To Help Rebuild US Military

Also, see our new Special Report on the subject:

Leverage Allied Investments and Combat Learning Experience in Modernizing the U.S. Military

Group Captain Braz on the RAAF and the Way Ahead on Electronic Warfare: Shaping a Core Distributed Capability for the Integrated Force

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-28 By Robbin Laird

On August 23, 2017, the Williams Foundation held a seminar on the future of electronic warfare.

At the heart of the Seminar and the discussion were the presentations by Group Captain Braz of the RAAF, a key figure in the introduction of the Growler into the RAAF, and CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack Wing, US Navy Pacific Fleet.

The two provided a significant look inside the standing up of the RAAF capability and the key role of the US Navy in this effort, and in turn the ability to standup up a joint capability.

The US Navy has provided an important lead in working the relationship with the RAAF in standing up this capability and in a rapid manner. In many ways, the Growler dynamic between the two forces provides a model of how capabilities can be generated rapidly in a coalition context to deal with an evolving threat environment.

For the RAAF, Growler represents a jump start to a 21st century EW effort, which includes Wedgetail and F-35. For the US Navy the cutting edge work which the RAAF is doing with regard to shaping a 21st century integrated force helps the US Navy to think through ways to break through stove piped thinking.

In this article, I will look at Group Captain Braz’s presentation with regard to the RAAF approach.

I had a chance to meet with him last Spring at Amberley Airbase where the RAAF is standing up the Growler capability.

So for me, it was a real pleasure to see him again, but this time, in the context of a broader discussion of evolving capability with other core players in the effort as well.

Group Captain Glen Braz, OC of the 82nd Wing.

The nature of the working relationship between the US Navy and the RAAF was highlighted during that interview as follows:

We couldn’t have done this without a huge commitment from the U.S. Navy. There’s simply no other way to describe that.

They have wanted us to be on this journey, and they have supported us wholeheartedly throughout it, both on what we do with the Growler training and the operational experience, the exchanges we’ve established, and how we prepare the team.

That’s furthered by exchange opportunities. We have U.S. Navy Growler aircrew joining us here, but we’ve also used folks connected to intelligence organizations and data management organizations and used U.S. Navy expertise in those areas to bring us along and further on the journey.

It’s no accident that when the Growler officially arrived in Australia at Avalon International Air Show a month or so ago, one of the four humans to step out of those two aircraft was a U.S. Navy aviator.

That was very deliberate, because we wanted both to recognize the amazing support we have had so far from the US Navy and the fact that we’re in this together.

It’s a partnership for the long term with cross learning on all sides.

https://sldinfo.com/group-captain-braz-and-the-coming-of-the-growler-to-the-australian-defence-force/

Captain Braz noted that the Aussie Growlers were on track for IOC next year and that “6SQN took part in Talisman Sabre, and they are busy baselining their operations to align with wider Air Combat Group and 82Wing standards.”

https://sldinfo.com/a-look-at-talisman-sabre-2017-the-perspective-of-air-commodore-craig-heap-commander-of-the-surveillance-response-group/

He underscored that the RAAF was focused on taking EW from a niche capability within the ADF to working into a core competence within the integrated force.

“How we might drive this jet, and wider EW and cyber thinking, into the mainstream?

“Please note my use of the word drive. We need to take this thing and forcefully insert it into our daily business.

“To let it drift or meander into some equilibrium would be a lost opportunity.

“It’s time to be bold.

“The arrival of F-35 in the next year or so is one prime opportunity, and one that will need bold leadership to harness.

“The F-35 brings unprecedented EW capability, it can fight like no other fighter we have owned.

“Growler is an exceptional complementary capability and crossing personnel over between the teams will bring amazing results.

Group Captain Braz at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare, August 23, 2017

“A good friend of mine from the US Navy planted this idea in my mind some months ago and it has significant merit.

“Setting up a Growler to F-35 exchange program won’t be easy, it won’t fit well into a transition plan and it will challenge some outdated mindsets, but it will be a brave move that will put innovation into overdrive.

“It’s an example of the new thinking we need to reshape the way we fight air combat.”

Group Captain Graz then dealt in the rest of his presentation on the challenges as he saw them in managing the way ahead.

First, there is the challenge of managing growth.

Growler is a low density, high demand asset. Shaping and managing a workforce and ensuring its integrated beyond the platform is a significant challenge.

Second, Growler will operate under significant constraints in spectrum licensing and security.

Third, “Growler is part of the overall rethinking necessary with regard to targeting or rethinking with regard to payloads for the RAAF operating as part of an integrated 21st century combat force.

“Growler is a flexible system, manned by expert crew.

“It takes the initiative whenever possible but is by design a flexible sense and respond asset that is at its best when given significant latitude in targeting.

“Being overly tied to our kinetic and lethal effects targeting mindsets will not give you the Growler you need on the day.

“New thinking in terms of dynamic targeting, particularly of non-lethal effects, many of which may be temporary in nature, will be a key to success.

“Delegating these engagement authorities forward will be essential.”

Fourth, training to ensure that EW becomes part of the force, rather than a stove piped on call capability is a major challenge.

“We have invested heavily in training and rightly so; we are not there yet but the future is positive.

“Importantly, the rapidly evolving Electronic Warfare capabilities across the ADF need new ways of thinking to get the most from our family of systems.

US Growler Operating at RAAF Base Amberley from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

“New training areas that test our ability to find, fix, track, target and engage adaptive threats are fundamental to our force.

“Of course, with the constraints already mentioned, live virtual and constructive environments are being enhanced and expanded to serve our needs.

“Ultimately fifth generation forces need fifth generation training.”

Fifth, the Group Captain emphasized the importance of what he called commonality both across the ADF and the allied forces using Growler.

“We have made changes to these jets (RAAF Growerls) based on Australian needs but they have changed the US Navy common baseline.

“Careful investment has given our Growlers targeting pods and Infra-red missiles.

“Not because it’s a fighter but because they help our active and passive kill chains.

“The US Navy is joining this path; it’s a team effort and our differences bring useful diversity to shape the growth of this aircraft.”

And the final challenge he addressed really flowed from how he saw the introduction of Growler as part of the broader evolution of the RAAF to support a payload revolution.

“Our thinking needs to cover payloads not just platforms and be driven by creative technical thinkers, connected with operators.”

Group Captain Braz ended on a very forceful note – don’t built a community of Growler operators; build a joint force within which EW is a core distributed competence.

“Our true challenge, as swimmers in the mainstream, is to acknowledge the currently niche players in EW, assist their real and important growth and to drag them into our swim lane; to roll their input and concepts into every plan, to seek to understand more and engage better.

“Our new thinking must be beyond labels like EW operators but that this expertise permeates our business as an assumed skill.

“So, as a strike fighter native, I am happy to wear an EW tag but I want it to be a temporary one.

“The day where we are all suitably learned in EW that it no longer becomes a label is what we should strive for.

“That would signify success.

“That would have seen the mainstream embrace EW and cyber.

“So, my challenge to you is, regardless of your organisation, are you an operator in our age of EW?”

Inherent Resolve and the A400M: Providing a Regular Shuttle Capability

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-30 By Murielle Delaporte

Onboard the MSN 31 (April 2017)

It is just a matter of fact, but not such a well-known one, that the A400M has been used for months as a regular weekly multi-stop shuttle on all the theaters where French armed forces are present.

“Ever since it has been available, the A400M has been used on all theaters of operation: it is a priority and what is important for us is that the aircraft fulfills the requested missions it has been assigned for,” saidCaptain Cyril, 61st Wing, Operations Cell.

His mission at the time of this interview was to fly about 40 passengers with their luggage, as well as various military equipment and spares, including a Mirage 2000 engine and a generator, through four destinations: Solenzara in Corsica, Jordan, the Emirates (Al Dhafra Air Base) and Djibouti.

Restructuring With Direct Flights In Mind

Because of the range of the A400M and its ability to carry both passengers and load, the coming of the new generation of transport aircraft has led to a major restructuring of the infrastructure of the mother base, i.e. Orléans-Bricy.

“The goal is of course to carry the maximum load, i.e. up to 25 tons, in one trip.

“We have aimed at concentrating all the necessary competences at French Air Base 123, which hosts a simulator organic to the Center of instruction of transport crews called CIET (“Centre d’instruction des équipages de transport”), where a crew can train up to the day preceding a mission,” explains Captain Cyril.

By comparison the average load is 15 tons on a C130 and 6 tons on a C160, while on a 5,000 km flight, the A400M allows to skip a stop and can therefore be done in one day, when it takes two days for a Transall.

This A400M shuttle runs almost weekly to serve Chammal (i.e. the French component to Inherent Resolve), as well as Barkhane (i.e. the Sahel-Saharan theater where terrorists are being fought as well).

For the latter, airdrop capabilities are in the process of being certified to allow fret deliveries closer to the troops.

The same goes with night goggle and decoy capabilities.

But, as stressed by Captain Cyril, “a signed capability is not enough to implement it”.

Once certified, there is indeed a lot of documentary work to be done in order to make sure the right processes are being set in place to best use the new capability at the right time, so that a test pilot, an office designer or a young pilot can understand in exactly the same way.

Becoming an “Aircraft Whisperer”

From the viewpoint of the MSN31 crew, pilots and mechanics all together, the ongoing improvement of documentation in close cooperation with both the French Air Force (FAF) and Airbus Defence and Space is what has allowed for the ramp up of the A400M readiness over the last two years.

“We are currently able to fly four aircrafts, which may sound very little, but we have eight on base and three being maintained.

“Our overall readiness rate has reached 50% of the fleet, when it started at 15% and increased little by little as we integrated more aircrafts in the fleet”, notes the Captain.

By the end of 2017, the FAF should be able to rely on thirteen aircraft, fifteen by the end of 2019 out of a total order of fifty.

Even if things are tight and if crews would not mind an extra two aircrafts to ease their mission management, such a trend in readiness is totally compatible with the Gaussian curve characteristic of any armament program’s early stage and end of life cycle.

A temporary solution has been founded to solve the engine issue, while Airbus is working on a definitive version better adapted to the power of the aircraft.

But the major change over the last twelve months according to pilots and maintainers alike has to do with management of any breakdowns, as experience and practice confirmed that many initial breakdowns, as detected by very sensitive sensors, were only temporary malfunctions in need for an update.

For maintainers such as Sergent P and G from Orléans support squadron ESTA (for “Escadron de soutien technique aéronautique”), it is necessary to learn “to talk with the plane”, to become an “aircraft whisperer.”

The communication mode of the aircraft has fundamentally changed in the world of French transport aircraft the same way as the Rafale changed the world of French fighters.

“Before, since we had so few planes, we could only react to breakdowns.

Today breakdowns do not dictate mission tempo anymore!

This morning, we had one, we did a test, lost five minutes and off we went…

That same alert only eighteen months ago would have grounded us while waiting for the maintainers’ diagnostic at the mother base.

We would have left in the afternoon instead of the early morning…”

This new level of performance in logistics management has allowed the A400M to have become a solid asset and a regular shuttle on which French forces.

And this also true for the other A400M European allied forces via the European Air Transport Command mechanism.

In short, these air forces can now rely on and build their operations with the A400M for any theater of engagement.

The slideshow highlights the A400M during the Middle East engagement on which Murielle Delaporte flew. And the photos are credited to her.

Editor’s Note: The A400M is emerging at an interesting juncture affecting lift and tanking aircraft.

They are becoming part of the integrated battlespace, and whether reworked within a contested air combat environment, or becoming part of the weapons revolution, or part of the shooter-sensor reset, or part of the evolution of multi-mission aircraft for force insertion, the A400M configured for the new epoch ahead can become a very interesting asset indeed. 

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/8/25/global-demand-for-special-operations-aircraft-grows

The A400M Debuts at Mobility Guardian 2017: The Premier USAF Global Reach Exercise

Canada and North Korea: How to Meet the Threat?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-29 By Danny Lam

Canada is a participant in the Korean War under UN Security Council Resolution 84.   The war is paused by an Armistice in 1953 but never formally ended with a peace treaty between belligerents.   Since then, the Republic of Korea (South) have developed into the 11th largest in the world, just after Canada.

The Democratic Republic of Korea (North), have developed into a heavily armed regime with an arsenal that within two years, will be able to credibly conduct thermonuclear missile strikes anywhere in the world including Ottawa, Canada.

Canadas remain technically at war with DPRK today.

Defending Canada and Canadians against existential threats is the duty of any Canadian Government. Existential threats are not just limited to threats to existence (e.g. annihilation with nuclear weapons), but “permanently change another group’s values and the way it governs itself against the latter’s will”. (Phil Waller, 2016)

DPRK’s thermonuclear ICBM arsenal capability is necessary but not sufficient to be an existential threat. Few Canadians would regard (e.g. U.K. and France’s) nuclear missile arsenal to be a threat to Canada.

What is different about DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is their motivations and intentions: What are they going to, or likely to do with their nuclear arsenal?

If DPRK is to become a conservative “establishment” nuclear weapons power that used their arsenal as a deterrent against regime change, that leads to one set of strategies for dealing with DPRK.

On the other hand, if DPRK’s motives and intentions are not defensive, but have greater ambitions that include the offensive use of their nuclear arsenal, it would, a) represent a fundamental break from all first nuclear age power; b) require very different strategies for Canada to defend against this existential threat.

Existential threats from North Korea against Canada, accordingly, do not necessarily require the use of nuclear weapons. It can involve the threat of using nuclear weapons that compelled Canada to pay tribute, or protection money, pay indemnities from the Korean war or compensations for sanctions against DPRK, or whatever injustice the North Korean mind can conjure.

DPRK demanded US$75 trillion in compensation or war indemnities from the US alone for the Korean war and damages from sanctions to 2006. If Canada is assessed a proportionate share, that will be in the range of US$ trillions.

Should North Korea compelled Canada with the threat of nuclear annihilation to pay tribute or indemnities of this magnitude, it would fundamentally alter Canadian values and how Canadians govern ourselves.

If allowed to become institutionalized, DPRK modus operandi will be copied by other powers and alter the liberal international order upon which Canadian prosperity depend.

Thus, it is fair to say that DPRK’s motives for their nuclear ICBM arsenal, when confirmed to be financial and economically motivated, represent a fundamental break in post war international norms. DPRK is about war for profit.

That is not just an existential threat to Canada, but to the post war liberal international order that the Trudeau regime appear to be so proud of participating in.

Canadian defense policy against North Korea must be cognizant of both the rapid growth / development of the DPRK nuclear ICBM threat, but also their motives and posture. DPRK have adopted an offensive, or surprise first strike posture with their nuclear ICBM arsenal that makes it an urgent issue for Canada to field a credible defense by all means necessary within a year or two, before DPRK can credibly threaten Canada and the allies with a thermonuclear ICBM force.

A credible existential threat to Canada from DPRK nuclear missiles by 2020 or sooner leaves little time and few options for Canada.  

Canada is not a partner in the US missile defense system. NORAD does not include ballistic missile defense in its mandate.

Canada cannot count on NATO members’ assistance (including USA) under Article 5 as Canada have not met Article 3 obligations for self-defense.

Canadians are deluded if they think the US Missile Defense system is like Girl Guides or Boy Scouts that they can join at will.  The option to join the US missile defense system is moot as becoming a partner (via the existing formal process) is a long, drawn out process even if Canada appropriated substantial funds up front, decided to join today and the US MDA agreed immediately.   Membership in the US missile defense would not deliver a usable Canadian capability for years — if that.

What about procuring a missile defense system?

In order to meet the DPRK threat by 2020 or sooner, Canadians have no time for the usual multi decade debate, politics, and slow motion defense procurement that have bedeviled Canadian DND and Public Services and Procurement in almost every recent major defense program including the Canadian Surface Combatants, Fighter Aircraft Replacement, Maritime Helicopters, etc.

Moreover, there is zero chance that any major government, let alone supplier of state-of-the-art missile defense systems will entertain standard Canadian procurement terms like 100% offsets (Industrial and Technological Benefits), or demands for proprietary information including intellectual property and software source code.

Even the smoothest, most expedited traditional procurement in recent Canadian history would not be sufficient.  An expedited process that require elimination or waiver of many extant Canadian defense and public procurement rules is a must if Canada is to procure a missile defense capability expeditiously.

Suppose Canadian Parliament achieved an all-party consensus and unanimously voted to fund and urgently procure a missile defense system including waiving many rules?

It is not clear that vendors will have the available capacity to deliver in the short term given existing factory capacity and orders.

Additional orders from allies will further constrain manufacturers.

US-DoD will likely veto any foreign orders that compete with DoD priorities without a political decision by the Trump Administration and Congress.

Canada is in a weak position to secure scarce defense resources from the Trump Administration for missile defense for many reasons. Canada has virtually no relationship with Japan and South Korea in missile defense.

Missile defense in depth begins with not just US systems like the Space Based Infra Red (SBIR) system and other assets, but also on Japanese and South Korean ISR that give early warning of missile launches.   This will likely extend in the future to engaging missiles during the boost phase or mid-course from forward deployed assets and allies working close together to defeat missiles at the earliest opportunity.

By the time intercepts default to using scarce Ground Based Missile Defense Missiles, the risk of a successful strike rises sharply.

On what basis can Canada have a claim to US allies like South Korea and Japan sharing data, let alone the thought of using up one of their valuable interceptors to shoot down an ICBM heading for a Canadian target?

Joining the US missile defense in no way address the problem of Canada having no claims on allied defense capabilities for the benefit of Canada unless Canada is prepared to offer them a quid quo pro.

Do Canadian politicians understand this?

Japan and S. Korea certainly do.

Beyond negotiating a claim on allied assets for missile defense, it is technically impossible to field a missile defense alone (defeating arrows) without participating in an allied campaign to eliminate the archers.

That would require Canadians commit to an expeditionary capability to the Korean peninsula — something few Canadian leaders have contemplated or have prepared the Canadian public for.

The flippant and lackadaisical attitude Canada have demonstrated to key US allies security concerns is illustrated by Canada’s disregard and ignorance of DPRK threats — barely warranted a mention in the Canadian defense and foreign policy unveiled in June, 2017 that failed to recognize the existential threat to Canada from DPRK.

Both documents were obsolete before they were made public.

On a majority of occasions in recent years, Canada could not even be bothered to issue a statement as DPRK undertook provocative acts like nuclear or missile tests that directly threatened the security of Canada, USA, Japan and S. Korea.

Nor did as provocative an act as a missile test coinciding with a NATO meeting in May 2017 awaken Canada to the threat.

It took until August 11, 2017 for that Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland to call North Korea “A Grave Threat” to the World. Freeland then pledged support to the US (but not other allies) verbally without any specifics or deliverables.

Canada did not bother to protest the missile barrage test of August 25, 2017 though Global Affairs found time to announce Minister Freeland’s meeting about NAFTA in Montreal.

An oversight that might also afflict verbal commitments to the US?

This Canadian attitude of being disconnected from Northeast Asian security concerns is reflected in defense policy. Canada do not regularly participated in major regional military exercises (except RIMPAC) with Japan (except PASSEX) or S. Korea (except 15 troops to ULCHI Freedom Guardian).

When this is compared to Canada’s deployment to EU and Ukraine, it is understandable that allies regard Canada as a not so credible partner in the region.

There is still time to turn this around, beginning with building an all-party consensus in the Parliament of Canada that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and war aims is an existential threat to Canada, and then, begin to consider what can be done in time to meet the threat.

Future articles will explore how Canada can field a credible defense against DPRK quickly and affordably.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, you can see the following:

http://www.sldforum.com/2017/08/meeting-north-koreas-existential-threat-canada/