2017-11-01 By Kenneth Maxwell

The declaration of an independent Catalan Republic by the president of the Catalan parliament, Carles Puigdemont, on Friday 27 October, was immediately followed by the imposition of direct rule by Madrid.

The Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, following the vote in the Spanish Senate to invoke article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, sacked the Catalan government, and placed himself and his ministers in charge.

This has plunged Spain into its deepest political crisis since the end of the Franco dictatorship, and for EU, its most challenging dilemma since the vote for Brexit in the UK.

Britain wants to leave the EU.

The independent “Catalan Republic” wants to remain within the EU.

But the EU is already making the exit of the UK as difficult as possible.

And the governments of all the nations within the EU, including the UK, are opposed to Catalan aspirations for independence from Spain.

France in particular has led the way in this opposition.

As well it might. Catalonia, after all, once incorporated cross-frontier areas of southern France. The Basques, where violent armed opposition to Spanish rule by ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty), dating from the Franco period (and at the cost of 800 deaths), has only recently been mitigated, also live in a territory which historically covered cross-border regions of both Spain and France.

The repercussions of events in Barcelona is already rippling through the EU.

Scottish nationalists (who want to remain within the EU), have not given up on their aspirations to see an independent Scotland, and they have been following developments in Catalonia with more than a passing interest. Meanwhile Northern Ireland (which also wants to remain in the EU) is still without a functioning devolved administration, given the continuing impasse between the Irish nationalists (Sin fein) and the Ulster Unionists (DUP), as well as uncertainty over the Brexit negotiations in Brussels, and the future land border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

The “Northern League” in Italy has recently fortified demands for much greater autonomy from Rome.

Even the recent elections in Germany have dramatically revived the resilient differences between the political outlook of the territories of the former “west” and “east” Germany, with the rise of the far-right, and its representation in the Budestag for the first time since the ending of Nazi rule in 1945.

In Belgium the Wallons are restive.

Carles Puigdemont, while everyone thought he was in his home town of Girona (where he had been mayor), and while Girona was beating Real Madrid in the soccer stadium in town, was in fact crossing the border into France on Sunday 29th October, and then caught a flight from Marseilles to Brussels.

In Belgium he has been offered “asylum” by Theo Francken, the Belgium secretary of state for immigration. Mr Francken is a member of ther Flemish nationalist party.

He said that Mr Puigdemont and other Catalan officials who felt they were “threatened by the Spanish authorities. could apply for asylum in Belgium.”

The Peoples Party (PP) in Spain were outraged, declaring that this was an “unacceptable attitude.” Mr Puigdemont and five of his ministers appeared at a chaotic press conference at the Brussels press club, in what he called the “capital of Europe,” where he again said he was seeking dialogue and guarantees which Spain, he said, has consistently rejected. He is not he said seeking asylum.

Ironically, while the EU emphasizes it is moving towards a “post-national” future, it is also clear that  “national” identities still matter.

The Brexit vote, the resurgence of nationalist parties in France, the Netherlands, and Poland, all suggest that “federalist” agenda for “more Europe” promoted by Mr Jean Claude Juncker (and by President Macron) needs to be treated with some caution.

Puigdemont said he wanted to avoid a “traumatic split” from Spain and appealed to the EU to help mediate with Madrid.

But the EU in Brussels is poorly equipped to play a mediating role between Barcelona and Madrid.       .

Mariano Rajoy has appointed the deputy prime minister of Spain, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, to administer Catalonia (she has been the long time point person in the Spanish government for Catalonia), and he has called elections in Catalonia on December 21.

It is not clear yet if Puigdemont and other pro-independence coalition leaders of the deposed Catalan government, will be able, or will be permitted, to compete. Prosecutors in Madrid have filed charges of “rebellion, sedition and embezzlement” against Puigdemont that carry a penalty of 30 years.

They have been summoned to court in Madrid. But it is highly unlikely that any will respond.

Certainly not Mr Puigdemont and the five deposed minister who are in Brussels.

The Spanish Constitutional Court is expected to rule that the Catalan declaration of independence by the Catalan assembly was illegal.

All 70 MPs who voted for it potentially face arrest, as do the Catalan civil servants and police officers who reject direct rule.

Calling new elections in Catalonia is gamble for Rojoy.

The day that Catalonia voted in their controversial independence referendum on October 1st was marked by violence.

The Spanish national police and the Spanish Guardia Civil, which had been deployed from ships in the harbor, attempted to prevent citizens from voting by heavy handed actions, removing ballot boxes, and physically assaulting citizens at polling stations.

These clumsy actions were widely televised and shared over social media and led to international condemnation.

But although of the 2.26 million votes cast, 2.02 million were in favor of independence, this represented less than 40% of the Catalan electorate.

In fact the numbers voting for independence has been broadly stable since 2014 when 80% voted for independence but with only a 40% participation.. .

It is this presumed pro-union “silent majority” that Rajoy is counting on in December.

But although some 3.5 million Catalans are assumed to form a “silent majority,” unity among them is hard to find, other than in rejecting secession.

Many have nothing in common with the Partido Popular of Mariano Rojoy.

They see the current Spanish government as never having addressed Catalan concerns, or providing for a new system of regional funding, or of being open to an overhaul of the Spanish Constitution to recognize Spain’s “pluri-national reality.”

Other opponents of independence include radical leftists opposed to Catalan nationalists as much as Spanish nationalists.

Pro-union forces are also presumed to include business leaders worried about the stability of the Catalan economy, and the two major Catalan banks (Banco de Sabadell and CaixaBank).

Some Catalan companies have already moved their headquarters to Madrid or to other regions of Spain.

As well a the large group of people in Catalonia feel themselves Spanish and not Catalan, or are comfortable with dual identities.

These opponents of independence turned out by the tens of thousands in a massive flag waving pro-Spanish demonstration in Barcelona on Sunday 29th October.

But the intervention of King Felipe VI on October 24th  did not help matters.

His criticism of the Catalan separatists made a compomise even less likely.  The King’s father, Juan Carlos, who abdicated in 2014, had famously intervened on television at the time of the 1981 military coup attempt against Spain’s new post-Franco democracy.

But even the mayor of Barcelona . Ada Colau, who is not pro-independence, called King Felipe VI’s  intervention an “irresponsible and unworthy speech of a head of state” for not mentioning the hundreds of  ordinary citizens hurt by the Spanish national police as they tried to cast their votes.

Though King Felipe’s speech did rally the national political parties in Madrid, the PP, the opposition socialists (PSOE), and the liberal Ciudadanos party, to support the evocation of Article 155.

But the declaration of a “Catalan Republic” by Carles Puigdemont was not accidental.

He had refused to pledge loyalty to the Spanish Constitution when he was inaugurated as premier of Catalonia, and the portrait of King Felipe on the chamber wall was veiled.

The supporters of Catalan independence are also a coalition.

The Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP)  holds ten seats in the regional parliament and without their support Carles Puigdemont has no majority.

It is a far-left  separatist party whose spokewomen is Anna Gabriel. The mainstream politicians began the call for secession a decade ago, but now the  focus has moved to mobilization not negotiation, with power shifting to the streets and to pro-independence movements like the Catalan National Assembly (ANC) led by Jordi Sanchez which has branches in every part of the region, and is the principal grassroots movement for secession, and the Omnium Cultural, led by Jordi Cuixart, a veteran activist for Catalan culture and language, both are collectives of local groups rather than a traditional political party. The Republcian Left and the PdeC which form the Catalan government many believe has ceeded the agenda to groups like the ANC, Omnium and the CUP.

There are also deeper factors at work here which are evident as well throughout Europe as a whole. 

Barcelona is very much a part of a new conflict between an internationalized and cosmopolitan city, much like London, and the hinterland.

Catalonia is one of  most developed regions of Spain, comprising almost 20 per cent of Spain’s GDP. (Catalonia’s economy larger than Portugal for instance.) Catalonia and Barcelona, moreover, attract millions of foreign tourists each year.

Barcelona is very much a part of the cosmopolitan new world order, which has developed since the emergence of European Buget Airlines and mass package tourism in the 1980s, which Spain in general, and Catalonia in particular, has benefited, especially after the Olympic Games were held in Barcelona in 1992.

Barcelona with a population of 1.6 million out of a Catalan population of 5 million and contributes 31% of Catalonia’s GDP, and has become a tourist mecca.

Its international airport saw 51 million air passengers in 2014.

It has a sophisticated port, trade fair facilities, a zona franca free trade zone, and ranks 34th in a listing of 123 global cities.

It is in many respects as divided from its immediate hinterland as is London.

Spain has also only recently emerged from the deep post-2008 recession and banking crisis.

The political consequences have been the rise of the Popular Party (PP) led by Mariano Rojoy to power. replacing the social democratic (PSOE) government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero in 2011.  Rojoy is a dour Galician who finds compromise difficult..

The conflict between Catalan nationalism and Iberian centralism is a very old one, but it has revived in recent years.

Catalonia, in fact, already enjoys a great deal of autonomy, and since 1980 the Catalan police force (the Mossos d’Esquadra.) has been under the command of the Generalitat (the Catalan government), and was expanded in 1994 to 17,000 to replace the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps. Jodi Pujol who founded the Catalan Nationalist Party (CiU) ruled from 1980 until 2003 was a leader of a “Europeanist” regime.

But in 2006 Madrid’s reaction to a new generation of  Catalan leaders allowed a dispute which began over fiscal affairs to escalate into a constitutional crisis.

Under leader Artur Mas of the CiU, the Catalan electorate supported a new “statute of autonomy” which called Catalonia a “nation” and sought greater control over Catalan finances.

This was approved by the Spanish parliament in Madrid, but the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal after 4 years of deliberation, ruled against the statute’s main components.

The central government’s position hardened when Rojoy became prime minister and the PP successfully urged the constitutional court to annul or reinterpret parts of the statute ensuring that  Catalonia was not recognized as a nation within Spain and the Catalan language was not given precedence over Castilian.

In Catalonia in the meanwhile the nationalists had coalesced in 2015 behind a Junts pel Si (Together for Yes), and emerged triumphant in the 2015 regional elections, and Carles Puigdemont became premier.

But Mariano Rajoy and his minority PP government bear a large part of the blame for the escalation of the crisis. The use of the national police to disrupt the Catalan referendum was ill-judged to say the least.

And in particular for Spain’s central authorities and Mr Rojoy’s conservative Popular Party to torpedo the revised statute of autonomy agreed in 2006. and in wasting opportunites after 2011 to make a fresh start.

Support for Catalan independence grew as the financial crisis gripped the country and corruption scandals tainted the established political parties in Madrid and Barcelona.

Rajoy stands on solid technical legal constitutional grounds in resisting Catalan separatism to be sure.

But the great challenge for Spain and for Catalonia now requires political initiative, flexibility, and compromise, which Rojoy has so far not demonstrated.

And it does not help when Pablo Casado, the spokesman for the PP, said at a press conference on the 9th October, that Mr Puigdemont could “end up” like former Catalan leader, Lluis Companys, who declared Catalan independence 1934, and who was shot by the Franco regime firing squad in Barcelona in 1940 after the end of the Spanish Civil War.

Catalonia had played a decisive role in that bloody conflict and Catalonia was where Generalissimo Francisco Franco imposed a bitter, brutal, and repressive and dictatorial, and unforgiving system of government, which outlawed the Catalan language and culture, and which is far from forgotten in Barcelona, even if it is apparently forgotten by Mr Rajoy and the PP in Madrid.

So far the demonstrations and counter demonstrations in Barcelona have been largely peaceful.

But it will take great patience, as well as compromise on both sides, to find a mutually acceptable and peaceful solution.

Something both sides currently seem unable or unwilling to do.

2017-11-06 by Murielle Delaporte

The Niger Ambush puts the fight against Islamic terrorists into perspective.

During an ambush, in early October in Niger, American and Nigerian soldiers encountered terrorist fighters who caused the deaths of nine of the counter-terrorist forces.

It is also a reminder that fighting global terrorism requires working together in spite of our differences; divided indeed we shall fail.

But instead of a Ben Franklin, moment some news stories simply choose to support the efforts of the terrorists to divide us.

For example, on November 4th, Breitbart News (echoing) an article published by the Guardian that same day, claiming that the pilots of “French warplanes sent from neighboring Mali to engage the enemy (…) refused to attack due to poor weather, rough terrain and an ability to differentiate friend from foe.”[ref]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/04/special-forces-unit-ambushed-in-niger-desperately-called-for-help-sources-say ; http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2017/11/04/guardian-american-troops-fought-ambush-alone-allies-fled/[/ref]

That kind of statement is not only wrong in its formulation, it is certainly not helping at a time when the “fog of war” against Islamic Terror Groups is already dense or thick enough.

It is clear that a strong Coalition is needed to keep up the fighting in areas where terrorists are pouring in following the debacle of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Preparing the armament for the Mirage 2000 for the Mali operation, January 9, 2013, at the airbase in N’Djamena, Chad. Credit: French Ministry of Defense.

A debacle by the way made possible because of the strength of an ad hoc coalition, which succeeded in spite of incredible political divergences to implement a successful military strategy leading to the genuine and symbolic falls of Mosul and more recently Raqqa.

Winning these battles against terror has been possible because of a joint and united approach (even if temporarily) in the region.

The war against terror unfortunately goes on, and, as a result of those victories, with even more vigor in other parts of the world and especially the Sahel area.

According to a recent United Nations report, the number of attacks in that part of the world has increased by more than 100% between June and September of this year, while in October both Niger and Mali, and their border where the ambush occurred, have been the theater of increasing recruiting and violence by Al Qaida-linked Jihadists)(part of  “Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin.”)[ref] http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/04/selon-lonu-17-militaires-francais-ont-ete-blesses-au-mali-au-cours-des-trois-derniers-mois.[/ref]

What has been characterizing this region for centuries is complex marble cake of multiple infighting, battles and trafficking which are constantly going on.

The current enemy – or more to the point, the enemies – have no border, are polymorphic, are always on the move and constantly adapt.[ref]See for instance General Brethous interview in >>> http://www.sldmag.com/fr/archives/issue/23/operationnels-slds-33-34-printemps-2017[/ref]

This observation has led to the way both US and French military forces have been operating in a theater, which other characteristics are its size and roughness.

Following the death of U.S. Green Berets in Niger, the political debate in Washington shifted once again about the War Powers Act and the need for an “africanization” of the fight against terrorism.

But this is exactly what has been going on in the past years with efforts to train and equip African partner nations and conduct trans-border mixed patrols.

Indeed, it is interesting to note that the ambush just took place when the armed force of the G5 countries – i.e. the five African countries involved in the fight against terrorists in Sahel (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad) under a 2014 French initiative and military support via Barkhane Operation[ref]See for instance >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane[/ref]- had been preparing their very first joint military operation called Haw Bi[ref] http://www.opex360.com/2017/11/02/la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-lance-sa-premiere-operation-anti-jihadiste/[/ref] and when Washington was taking a decision whether or not to fund the G5 initiative.

So much for that calculation, if true, since Haw Bi did take place at the end of October and the Trump administration just decided to add some 60 million dollars to match the European Union and French financial support.[ref]See for instance >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/deaths-of-four-us-soldiers-in-niger-hint-at-the-shadow-war-against-isis-in-africa/2017/11/03/abfd2d2f-be00-4d50-a4e8-b8b5f1151bf4_story.html?utm_term=.8c188c012357 ; http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/30/les-etats-unis-vont-financer-la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-hauteur-de-60-millions-de-dollars/[/ref]

As for trying, through a false debate, to decouple the action of the two mains allies in a Coalition in which the Spanish and the German armed forces also participate, facts speak for themselves.

The truth is the truth.

Franco-American cooperation has been very successful over the past years, with the U.S. supporting the French forces in terms of ISR and logistics and the French maintaining a 3ooo to 4,000 men presence ever since 2014, while suffering casualties on a regular basis.

In the case of the October 4th ambush specifically and the question of French close air support, General Mattis himself rebuked any hint of criticism stressing that French jets were on site within thirty minutes of the call for help initiated from the ground.

And Colonel Patrick Steiger, spokesman for the Chief of Staff of the French armed forces, explained that the reason the Mirage 2000 only did a “show of force” and did not shoot was because of the imbrication of the fighters.

When you cannot distinguish between friends and foes, it is better to abstain from killing them all, isn’ it?

Military rules of engagement are the same for everybody on this one.

This reason alone is enough; but to go back to the Guardian’s asserted quote, poor weather could also be held responsible, since according to some published reported accounts of the ambush, one of the Green Berets’initial missions had been cancelled earlier on, precisely because of bad weather.

When the Mirage 2000 arrived although not on alert for that specific mission, the fight stopped and the enemy was dispersed limiting the number of casualties, while French Puma helicopters coming from Gao in nearby Mali evacuated injured soldiers.

A joint counter-offensive was organized right in the aftermath of the deadly attack.[ref]See for instance >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/deaths-of-four-us-soldiers-in-niger-hint-at-the-shadow-war-against-isis-in-africa/2017/11/03/abfd2d2f-be00-4d50-a4e8-b8b5f1151bf4_story.html?utm_term=.8c188c012357 ; http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/30/les-etats-unis-vont-financer-la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-hauteur-de-60-millions-de-dollars/[/ref]

Using the death of American soldiers for various domestic political agendas the way it is currently done inside the Beltway is nothing new, but it is no less revolting as well as aiding the terrorists more than focusing on ways to prevail.

References

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/04/special-forces-unit-ambushed-in-niger-desperately-called-for-help-sources-say

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/04/politics/us-forces-hostile-fire-niger/index.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/04/selon-lonu-17-militaires-francais-ont-ete-blesses-au-mali-au-cours-des-trois-derniers-mois/

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/26/quinze-jihadistes-mis-hors-de-combat-par-les-militaires-francais-dans-le-nord-du-mali/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane

http://www.france24.com/en/20171105-diverging-stories-account-niger-attack-killed-4-us-soldiers

https://www.wsj.com/article_email/u-s-forces-in-niger-were-denied-armed-drone-1509146561-lMyQjAxMTI3NTI3ODUyMzg0Wj/

http://www.france24.com/fr/20171005-mort-trois-soldats-americains-niger-revele-presence-sahel-forces-speciales-terrorisme

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/05/des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-au-niger_5196282_3212.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/20/le-pentagone-ouvre-une-enquete-sur-lembuscade-qui-coute-la-vie-4-commandos-americains-au-niger/

http://time.com/4986918/us-military-niger-soldier-deaths-investigaton/

http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171005-niger-tongo-tillabery-nord-mali-frontiere-embuscade-bsr-soldat-mort-americain-sahra3/4Surlem%C3%AAmesujet%EF%84%B7%EF%84%B8Floren

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/world/africa/special-forces-killed-niger.html

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/la-david-johnson-niger-ambush-may-have-been-captured-islamic-militants/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/deaths-of-four-us-soldiers-in-niger-hint-at-the-shadow-war-against-isis-in-africa/2017/11/03/abfd2d2f-be00-4d50-a4e8-b8b5f1151bf4_story.html?utm_term=.8c188c012357

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/05/des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-au-niger_5196282_3212.html

http://www.jeuneafrique.com/481109/politique/embuscade-meurtriere-au-niger-un-quatrieme-soldat-americain-retrouve-mort/

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/10/29/death-us-soldiers-in-niger-restarts-debate-about-military-involvement-post-vietnam.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/05/des-commandos-nigeriens-et-americains-sont-tombes-dans-une-embuscade-pres-du-mali/

http://www.rfi.fr/ameriques/20171024-embuscade-niger-trump-polemique-soldat-tue-myeshia-johnson

https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKBN1CA14U-OZATP

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-usa/french-nigerien-forces-operating-where-three-u-s-soldiers-killed-idUSKBN1CA14K

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/hours-before-death-in-niger-us-soldiers-were-targeting-militants-in-mali/2017/11/05/57861ad2-c243-11e7-9922-4151f5ca6168_story.html?utm_term=.1d96ea7fa9fd

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/africa/niger-ambush-isis.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/11/02/la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-lance-sa-premiere-operation-anti-jihadiste/

http://www.france24.com/fr/20171005-mort-trois-soldats-americains-niger-revele-presence-sahel-forces-speciales-terrorisme

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/05/des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-au-niger_5196282_3212.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/20/le-pentagone-ouvre-une-enquete-sur-lembuscade-qui-coute-la-vie-4-commandos-americains-au-niger/

http://sldmag.com/fr/archives/issue/23/operationnels-slds-33-34-printemps-2017

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/17/le-secretaire-general-de-lonu-plaide-pour-un-soutien-accru-la-force-du-g5-sahel/

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/30/les-etats-unis-vont-financer-la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-hauteur-de-60-millions-de-dollars/

http://s.ouest-france.fr/labs/grand-format/operation-barkhane-desert-malien/

http://time.com/4986918/us-military-niger-soldier-deaths-investigaton/

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-details-ambush-niger-soldiers-dead/

http://www.jeuneafrique.com/480547/politique/niger-des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-a-la-frontiere-avec-le-mali/

http://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-41507683

https://qz.com/1110216/niger-ambush-after-us-and-nigerien-soldiers-were-killed-questions-linger-for-trump-administration/

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-forces-in-niger-were-denied-armed-drone-1509146561

http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/niger-la-mort-de-trois-soldats-americains-revele-leur-presence-au-sahel-05-10-2017-2162355_24.php

http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171005-niger-tongo-tillabery-nord-mali-frontiere-embuscade-bsr-soldat-mort-americain-sahra

http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2017/10/05/97001-20171005FILWWW00025-niger-huit-soldats-tues-dans-une-embuscade.php

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http://afrique.le360.ma/autres-pays/politique/2017/10/05/15558-secretement-presents-au-niger-des-soldats-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-155

Murielle Delaporte is the editor of the French journal OPERATIONNELS and has been embedded with French forces in Mali and other areas in Africa and the Middle East. 

2017-11-02 By Danny Lam

President Trump’s begins a 2 day Visit to PRC on November 8 will be his first occasion to meet President Xi since his anointment as a “core leader” by the CCP.

Notwithstanding that this status has been conferred to Mao, Deng, and Jiang before, western “China experts” overwhelming endorsed this, and the delay in designating a successor, as a sign that Xi is the “most powerful leaser since Mao” that may be seeing a third term as President in a break from recent CCP practice post Mao.

With respect to the pressing issues facing the US and allies, namely DPRK’s nuclear arsenal and intentions, the future direction of PRC’s economy, and aggressive moves in the South China Sea and abroad, the “most powerful man in China” either have no interest or intent to address allied concerns, or have so little power to effect change.   President Trump is ready to make up his mind about President Xi.

Is Xi Jinping PRC-CCP’s Joseph Stalin?

Or more likely Chiang Kai Sek?

That is the question that President Trump need to answer when he is in Beijing.

How this question is answered will in many ways, determine the feasibility of US options for North Korea and China. 

First, a bit of history.

Mao Tse Tung was at the height of his power in when he ordered PVA “volunteers” to enter the Korean war in October, 1950 in concert with Soviet forces.  After an initial success, the combined might of DPRK, PRC, and USSR was beaten back until General Ridgeway re-established the status quo ante bellum that became the basis for the armistice.

Few western observers recognized that Mao’s “unlimited manpower” deployed as PVA in Korea was an artifact of the CCP’s need to get rid of many former KMT or warlord soldiers who swelled the PLA ranks.   Human wave attacks on UN forces by these potential traitors to the CCP was an effective means to disposing of them.

American and UN troops saw these “human waves” and presumed that PRC is 10 Japans worth of fanatical soldiers. In fact, it was neither a reflection of the loyalty of the troops to the CCP or the PRC’s ability to raise and fight with a large army.

US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together after their meetings at Mar-a-Lago in Florida. Photo: AP

The CCP was, in fact, husbanding their very scarce supply of trusted CCP loyalists who largely remained behind in rear positions, with only low level (and poorly connected) party cadres serving as political officers with the troops of questionable loyalty. When Mao’s own son was killed in November 1950 in a supposedly safe rear base, his enthusiasm for the war waned once he heard the news.   Correspondingly, as General Ridgeway’s use of massed firepower inflicted unacceptable casualties, the CCP pulled back.

Post Korean war, Mao’s power and prestige declined with the failure to “win” the Korean war; and, as Mao made successive blunders culminating in the “Great Leap Forward” that virtually collapsed the economy, resulting in his removal from power in all but name.

Mao ultimately had to launch a counter-revolution “The Cultural Revolution” that decimated the PRC in order to regain control of a much weakened and wrecked PRC — which paved the way for the de Maoization under Deng after his passing.

Few western analyst that gushed about Xi Jinping’s “core leader” status recognized that maintaining power internally within the PRC was, historically going back dynasties, the “core problem” for any Chinese leader.  

No Chinese leader, even Mao at the height of their power, was in fact safe and secure from the threat of internal rebellion and palace coups.

Do the names Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wen yuan, Wang Hongwen, Hua Gofeng, or more recently, Bo Xilai, or Zhou Yangkong, etc. speak to stability or orderly transfers of power?

On any reasonable set of metrics that measure power internally within and without PRC (i.e. military, economic, prestige, etc.), Xi Jinping is at best, comparable to Chiang Kai Sek prior to the Japanese invasion, but Stalin he is not, and is unlikely to be during his term.

Yet this has not prevented normally sane and reputable publications like the Economist from proclaiming Xi more powerful than President Trump — despite the clear evidence to the contrary.

If President Xi is at least as powerful as his propaganda organs allege, he could have, without resorting to military force, compelled DPRK to denuclearize as the US did for Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan without resorting to force.

Xi and his predecessors could not, and did not do this. Nor does he have a viable military option to denuclearize North Korea by force without risking an attack on PRC.

DPRK is capable of a nuclear attack on PRC/Beijing for much of the past decade, and is closing in on an assured second strike capability against PRC. PLA forces stationed on the DPRK border do not suggest a massive mobilization on the scale of the Korean war. Though there is steady work on roads and infrastructure to support moving in a modern army quickly.

President Xi, for all his alleged power, do not have a conventional or nuclear (except deterrent) option against DPRK.    

Nor do the PRC have the option of compelling DPRK by economic sanctions or non-kinetic means.

That can potentially trigger a nuclear missile attack by DPRK against Beijing for which PRC is defenseless. Beijing China is loath to admit their weakness in the face of DPRK — and until President Trump, their opposition to tight sanctions (i.e. because of fear of DPRK refugees) was taken at face value.

Beijing China being impotent in the face of DPRK is far from the mind of most Western analysts that seem incapable of comparing PRC with the power of USA – who forced denuclearization on many allies under similar circumstances.

President Trump will be visiting Beijing against this backdrop where President Xi’s paper tiger status can no longer be hidden. Nearly seven months have passed since they met at Mar-A-Lago, and despite intense US pressure, Xi have proven himself to be incapable and/or unwilling to resolve the DPRK problem.

The question for President Trump will be whether Beijing China, under President Xi have the willingness and capability to at least, prevent Chinese elements from interfering in a US and allied solution to the problem.  

This brings us to the problem of laws of war.

The last time the PRC fought a major war beyond their borders is against Vietnam in 1979.  It has been decades since the Chinese forces encountered western militaries in force.

PRC forces agreed to a protocol for “Unplanned Encounters at Sea” only in 2014 well after the Hainan Island incident of 2001. This, did not prevent potentially dangerous behavior like radar “lock-on” by PRC military units on others or probes of the Senkaku Islands.

Routinely, PRC forces are enforcing maritime claims in the South China Sea in violation of UNCLOS.   These activities suggest that PRC have a view that hybrid warfare by paramilitary and other forces is an acceptable norm in “peacetime”. This begs the question of what the Beijing China will deem to be acceptable conduct short of war with the US in the event of a Korean conflict.

The ideas of neutrality, or non-belligerent status is rooted in the Western tradition of armed conflict. There is no historical precedent to a Chinese regime practicing a “permanent neutrality” policy like Belgium or Switzerland. When CCP organs speaks of “staying neutral” if North Korea “attacked first”, it is temporary neutrality that can change at any time.

But even that declaration leaves much room for doubt when examined from the PRC perspective.

We should bear in mind that the Sino-Vietnam war was termed “self-defensive counteroffensive” against Vietnam irrespective of its offensive and geopolitical nature. PRC have also carefully concealed their offensive posture against US and allied installations in east Asia while formally pleading “no first use” of nuclear weapons.

Thus, Beijing-China’s pronouncements offer few clues as to how they will actually behave regardless of how the Korean war started. Neutrality may simply mean that Beijing will encourage (or do nothing to prevent) “People’s Volunteers” or other means of aiding DPRK. In other words, Beijing China’s official stance may not apply to the “local” governments near North Korea or other Chinese elements.

A critical task for President Trump is to impress upon President Xi the US and Allies understanding of precisely what “being neutral” mean to the US and allies.   That is to say, that any material aid, assistance, covert or overt, that originate from outside DPRK that can be traced as Chinese origin — including from PRC operatives in Japan or South Korea — will be regarded as breaches of neutrality.

Violations of neutrality by PRC CCP operatives will make them legitimate military targets, regardless of their location on PRC or neutral territory or on the high seas. (i.e. PLN “fishing boats” relaying warnings of aircraft taking off from Guam heading toward DPRK).

Covert aid to DPRK like the provision of sensor data by PRC installations anywhere, including space, or assistance in command and control or targeting, or shelter for DPRK officials in hardened PRC facilities will all fall under violations of PRC neutrality.

That will extend to provision of “relief supplies” that act as cover for delivery of military aid.

Neutrality will extend to the idea of “unrestricted warfare” suggested by PLA colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiansui, that expressly suggest the use of both armed force and “all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests”.

That is to say, trade, financial, terror, and ecological war against US and allies are all on the table.

Any effort to weaponized trade, disrupt financial markets, cyber attacks, terror, etc. by Chinese elements, whether formally operating under Beijing China control or not, will be treated as violations of neutrality.

Beyond this, the use of “informationalized warfare” and “hybrid war” will all be regarded as belligerence and subject to allied retaliation and sanctions immediately.

If Beijing China intends to remain neutral, they must demonstrate and prove the ability to control their forces and prevent such violations of neutrality broadly defined.

President Xi must be made to understand that the western concept of neutrality in international law makes no distinction between intentional or unintentional violations of neutrality.  

Xi Jinping, ostensibly the most powerful man in PRC, may not be capable of control his military to abide by these strict rules of war.   The PLA/N, like most traditional Asian militaries, are notable for the short shift they give to training and indoctrination of troops on western notions of the rules of war and the western idea of separation of civilian from military control with the former having primacy.

Chinese military arts was historically based on the personal views of the local commanders, who in the Chinese martial tradition, was, and is historically relieved of any concept of civilian oversight once the military is given command.

This is directly contradictory to western ideas of the primacy of civilian over military rule.   Placing the Chinese military as a branch of the CCP (rather than the state) have only made a nominal dint in this tradition.

Hence, the regular, and frequent, exhortation by top leaders including President Xi to the military to obey the CCP.

The extent to which a Chinese military is still a law onto itself is illustrated by President Xi’s July 2017 90^th anniversary PLA celebration speech to the PLA that exhorted them:

“[PLA]… must be unwavering in upholding the bedrock principle of absolute party leadership of the military,” and “Always obey and follow the party. Go and fight wherever the party points.”

It is unthinkable for any US President or close ally like UK, Australia to even imagine such a speech having to be made that would cast doubt on the loyalty and reliability of their armed forces and the supremacy of civilian control.   Yet, in the PRC controlled by the new strongman Xi, it is essential.

President Xi’s plea for the PLA to be loyal was followed by a major reshuffling of personnel that resulted in the appointment of two trusted associates General Zhang Youxia and General Xu Qiliang to the new, smaller, Central Military Commission at the end of the 19^th CCP congress to tighten his grip on the military.

This follows a longstanding tradition where a newly installed top CCP leadership require much of the first 5 year term gradually replacing personnel and only comes onto their own in terms of power in the second term when the process migrates to the lower levels so as to build up sufficient momentum and critical mass to replace the most powerful top leaders.

Xi broke from this tradition by targeting Zhou Yongkang’s faction early on that resulted in their fall in 2012 that in turn resulted in wholesale removal of this faction.

But Xi was unable to follow through his purge immediately — he had to wait for the 19^th Party Congress.   That is to say, Joseph Stalin he is not.   Stalin would simply order his opponents summarily executed.

Dealing with a weak leader of Beijing China creates problems in the face of war on the Korean peninsula creates other problems. Xi may have sufficient power to prevent the use of the PRC nuclear arsenal — but even that is not absolutely certain.

Command and control of nuclear forces in PRC is shrouded in mystery. Though it is well known that Xi did not have the C2 capabilities of Air Force One when he travels abroad.   That begs the question of who have authority to launch nuclear weapons in PRC.

Allied contingency plans need to be created in the event that it is likely that Xi (or his successor post coup) may seize control of the nuclear arsenal and use them. Or in the event that deterrence against PRC failed.   Chinese political history suggest that if the Chinese nuclear arsenal fall into the hands of a group, they may elect to use it on domestic enemies so as to install a new dynasty.

China is not the Soviet Union that fortunately, collapsed in an orderly fashion without a nuclear mishap.

Returning to deterrence, President Xi and his successors in the PRC need to be cognizant that SSBNs off the coast of PRC can deliver a nuclear strike anywhere in China within 15 minutes.   A submarine launched counterforce strike can potentially disable the majority of the PRC’s nuclear forces before they can be launched or lay waste to PRC.

Although no US President will want to test the theory,

Mutually Assured Destruction may not be operative against the US.   This may be one of the best assurance that PRC will not intervene in the Korean conflict.

The best case scenario may be that Xi, however weak, remains in nominal control much like Generalissimo Chiang Kai Sek, even though he may not be able to control the pro DPRK elements and preventing them from becoming belligerents against allied forces.

Xi can, under that circumstance, accede to the US and Allied use of force against pro DPRK chinese forces, and at the same time, prevent the outbreak of general or nuclear war by the PRC. This will ensure that PRC under Xi survive.

During this two day visit, both Presidents will be using this as the opportunity to take the measure of each other and make up their minds about each other.

President Xi’s propaganda have not fooled President Trump nor altered his determination to eliminate the nuclear threat from DPRK before the US faces a threat from a nuclear armed extortionist.

President Xi face the momentous decision of either believing his own propaganda and attempt to take on the US and allies — with the high probability that it would result in failure that will result in defeat for the PRC in general, and his regime in particular.

Alternatively, President Xi can cooperate with the US and secure peace for at least a generation by preventing the PRC from becoming a belligerent in the Korean war — to the extent he is capable of.

That will give breathing room to the PRC to reform into an acceptable regime to the international community.  PRC’s present course to be an ideological, great power and economic rival to the US and allies is unlikely to be sustainable much longer.

No more will the US and allies tolerate the PRC’s challenge and undermining of the liberal international order without repercussions. The question is, which course will President Xi choose?

The US and allies is more than capable of surviving and winning a cold, or hot war with the PRC.

The PRC, on the other hand, will be severely challenged should the US and allies initiate a cold war by (i.e.) impose a trade embargo and seized PRC assets abroad, as America did to Japan on July 26, 1941. This will almost certainly happen should PRC elements become belligerents.

Momentous decisions will have to be made by two Presidents that will shape the balance of the 21^st Century.

Let’s hope they both choose well.

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President Trump Visit to the PRC: Two Days That Could Change the World