2017-08-09 By Danny Lam

The rapid development of North Korean ICBM capability exposed an apparent inconsistency with similar developments in other nuclear weapons powers.

Land based ICBMs, by their nature, are physically large missiles.Liquid fueled, they are difficult to transport whether empty or fueled. Solid fueled ICBMs are less problematic, but still require extensive maintenance if actively and routinely transported by road.

These problems have tended to restrict most ICBMs to either stationary land bases, or at sea where transportation by SSBNs is less stressful.

Mobile land based ICBMs, moved about on wheeled or tracked road transporter erector launchers or rail, expose missiles to many risks plus wear and tear.

To date, North Korea have demonstrated a variety of road mobile ICBM platforms that are mostly stored in bunkers. While it is well known that DPRK have extensive underground facilities, particularly for artillery, munitions, short or medium range missiles, none is known via open source intelligence to be dedicated ICBM missile silos like the US Minuteman silos. The PRC historically made extensive use of large underground bunkers with underground missile launch pads that are reloadable.

It is not known if North Korea is following this model.

Most of North Korea’s ICBM tests, to date, are either conducted on fixed above ground launch pads, or a mobile transporter erector launcher (TEL) / pad.

But how are they going to base them in the near future when their ICBM arsenal reaches initial operational capability?

The most plausible explanation is that DPRK is moving toward solely relying on mobile TELs for their liquid fueled ICBMs.   Liquid fueled ICBMs that are fueled on the launch pad require a large convoy of supporting trucks and many hours of preparation for launch.

This long lag time in the “open” enabled advanced detection of launch and at least in theory the possibility of pre-emptive strikes as a missile is fueled.

North Korea can, alternatively, master the delicate task of pre-fueling the missile horizontally prior to transport out of the storage bunker. That would shorten the time for launch to perhaps 30 minutes to an hour.

But that is still a significant window of vulnerability compared to the time required to launch a pre-fueled silo based missile, which can be launched in minutes or as quickly as the hatch can be opened.

If the choice is for a US style ICBM silo, it will likely to be large not only to accommodate the liquid fueled rocket, but potentially, large enough for “strap on” solid fueled boosters that may be required to lift an early generation thermonuclear warhead and missile packed with penetration aids and decoys from DPRK to anywhere in USA.

Construction of large ICBM silos can in theory be detected through several “national technical” means. While it cannot be ruled out that DPRK ICBM silo construction have escaped public notice, it is an open question whether they built them at all.

The PRC, who until the 21^st century, had an “assured means of retaliation” posture that presumed their ICBMs in hardened silos will survive a first strike, and can be launched afterwards.

Though this may have changed to an offensive first strike posture at least for S/MRBMs aimed at near-abroad targets.

If the North Koreans have not invested in building hardened silos for their liquid fueled ICBMs, it can be a sign that they are expecting to field a mobile solid fueled ICBM shortly — and thus, sidestep the complexity of liquid fueled missiles.

Another explanation is that DPRK do not need or anticipate the requirement for survivability provided by basing liquid based ICBMs in hardened bunkers.

Or they feel that hardened silos (of the latest design) are not survivable anyways.

Not providing for survivability of an nuclear ICBM force is inconsistent with its use as a deterrent force.  

Basing missiles in the “open” was an expedient measure used by the Soviets in the 1960s which was abandoned as soon as they found something better. It is preferable to enhance readiness and survivability by storing missiles in bunkers, silos, or place them on submarines.

Deterrent forces, by their nature, are systems that sit unused for extended periods: decades until they are obsolete without ever being used.

Occasional samples are tested to ensure the stock is reliable if ever needed.   Thus, ICBMs on the US, Russian, Chinese, and Israeli models tend to be built to be long lasting, rugged, maintainable, and can be held at readiness for long periods with modest maintenance.

No expense is spared in making nuclear deterrent systems reliable and safe during their long periods of storage while ready to launch.

But are NORK ICBMs built this way?

Another line of reasoning is that DPRK intend to strike the first blow with their ICBMs — particularly using the liquid fueled versions that are most vulnerable once conflict broke out.   If this is the case, the ICBMs will have to be able to penetrate known defensive systems like the US ground based missile defense (GMD) systems.

That suggests that NORK may not be concerned by giving advance warning of the launches as the US and allies have not historically been willing to cross the line to pre-emptively destroy a “missile test” launch.

But what if the “test” involved volley firing of (e.g.) 10 ICBMs?

The US have not responded proactively to the PRC and DPRK volley launching multiple missiles in “tests”.   Thus, precedent favors no response if DPRK volley fired ICBMs in a “test”.

What if it is not a test?

The US will find out only when they see the trajectory heading across the Pacific.

What then?

Simultaneous firing of many ICBMs, mixed with IRBMs, will allow some of them to be used for blinding of sensors and destruction of key missile defense installations.   (e.g. Japanese and other Pacific radar sites). Before PACOM can determine if the launch is “hostile”, their sensors and communications will likely be blinded and / or disabled.

Decoys, dummy missiles and warheads can overwhelm the small number of ABM interceptors leading to a high probability that at least one thermonuclear warhead will detonate over CONUS.

US posture biased against “provocations”, rather than contribute to stability and preventing nuclear war, encourage DPRK to adopt a surprise massive first strike strategy aimed at a Pearl Harbor like knockout blow.

Do the ICBM basing plans of DPRK reveal an offensive nuclear first strike strategy being put into place?

If so, it leads to very different calculations as to DPRK intent and longer term goals.

DPRK may not be deterred.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

Where are the NORK ICBM Silos?

Editor’s Note: Earlier this year we published an article by Paul Bracken which focused on the emergence of the Second Nuclear Age as a key challenge facing the United States and the allies as the New Administration came to power.

2017-01-05 By Paul Bracken, Yale University

The most interesting thing about the second nuclear age is that it actually came about.

It wasn’t supposed to happen, at least according to most political science theory. What was supposed to happen after the cold war was a reinvigorated global nuclear nonproliferation regime, which along with U.S. leadership and muscular counter-proliferation policies, that would prevent a second nuclear age from developing.

Anti-nuclear norms — authoritative rules and principles — were expected to enforce this regime.

Nuclear weapons were thought by many to have little value even if you did get them.

What could you do with a nuclear weapon, after all? You could sit on it, in which case it would be a monstrously expensive symbol of folly.

Or, you could fire it, and become a glass parking lot from the certain retaliation.

But the second nuclear age did come about.

What significance does this have, and what can be said about the fact — in comparison to widely held expectation that a second nuclear age wouldn’t arise?

Here I highlight some answers to these questions.

Some definitions are in order. By the “second nuclear age” I mean the spread of nuclear arms for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the cold war (Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age, New York Times Books, 2012). In the 1990s there was a widely held belief that nuclear arms would join the cold war in the graveyard of history.   Nuclear weapons were analyzed in terms of nonproliferation theory, or if not that in terms of disarmament.

The argument was that there was a “twilight of the bomb,” to use a phrase widely embraced at the time. The bomb might last a few years, but its irrelevance to the security challenges of a post cold-war world would make it useful only in largely unimaginable situations. Say, a Russian surprise nuclear attack on U.S. cities. Possible, yes, but hardly conceivable.

This was a core belief in intellectual and academic circles, and in 2009 with President Barrack Obama’s Prague speech, it was brought into official U.S. policy and strategy.

But after the cold war the bomb spread, to India, Pakistan, then and North Korea. Israel’s nuclear arsenal virtually came out into the open, and Iran made a serious push to go nuclear. Others are trying to do so now, or at least hedging their bets with options to do it quickly should the need arise.

The international system is now composed of a constellation of major powers, most of which have nuclear weapons. The United States, Russia, China, India, Britain, and France qualify here. Indeed Japan is the only major power, which doesn’t have it. But Japan is linked into U.S. missile defense and protected by a U.S. security guarantee. In addition, there are three smaller powers, North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, who also have the bomb.

What do these facts tell us about our initial proposition that a second nuclear age wasn’t supposed to happen?

Obviously, that a second nuclear age wasn’t averted.

More, it says that nuclear weapons have become a foundation for being a major power.

When was the last time anyone even argued that India should give up nuclear weapons and sign the NPT as a non-nuclear state?

This not only isn’t going to happen, it’s an argument that isn’t even made any longer. India couldn’t be an ally to the United States as an offset to China if it also wasn’t a nuclear power.

The program for avoiding a second nuclear age — an intensive nonproliferation regime, U.S. leadership, widely embraced anti-nuclear norms by most countries, was not unreasonable. As goals they made perfect sense, for the United States if not for others. I think most strategic analysts would support them as highly desirable, although this can get complicated.

The fact that we are in a second nuclear age shows important features of the emerging international order. Let me underscore that I am talking about international order here, and not winning wars.

So the first big insight is that this order is in fact a nuclear order.

It’s security is based, at bottom, on a threat to blow up large parts of the world, even if one chooses not to acknowledge this, either by talking platitudes or simply not thinking about it. Nuclear war may be unthinkable.

But it isn’t impossible. Because for all of the talk about how no one wants a nuclear war and how inconceivable it is, these weapons are always there.

No one is getting rid of them, not India, Britain, Israel, China, or the United States.

The international system is made up of sovereign states and within the country boundaries most can do pretty much what they please. Most countries have decided not to go nuclear. But some have, and they have found ways to do so in the face of daunting opposition and powerful allies who didn’t want them to do so.

China, Israel, and Pakistan — all have different strategic situations, but share a common feature, that powerful allies opposed their getting the bomb. The biggest determinant of whether a country gets the bomb isn’t major power opposition, norms against it, arms control, or international law like the NPT. It’s whether they want to get it or not.

If they do, they can probably find a way. Short of all out military strikes to destroy their nuclear capacity, or ground invasion and occupation, it’s hard to stop them. None of this is an argument against the NPT, efforts to institutionalize norms, or arms control.

They are simply unlikely to prove effective against a determined state seeking to get the bomb.

Another feature about the second nuclear age is that international order depends to a considerable degree on the structure of the system, rather than academic blueprints for how history should evolve in the future.

We are moving toward a multipolar order.

I don’t mean to invoke any academic theory here, but only to make the point that there are multiple decision-making centers in this system. Not one, and not two, but several.

So, the second nuclear age is a multipolar nuclear order, meaning that most major powers in it have nuclear weapons. This is, obviously, a unique development, since in the cold war only two major powers with the bomb really mattered.

That this is a nuclear order means that escalation and even the willingness to use conventional force is necessarily made in a nuclear context.

A third aspect that the realization of a second nuclear age has come about has to do with military technology. Major powers have lost their monopoly over advanced military technologies. It was in the late 1990s that this happened, as second and third-rate powers (Pakistan, North Korea) could get nuclear weapons.

Now, these countries not only have atomic weapons, they have other tools like drones, cyber arsenals, and mobile missiles. Nuclear weapons were once restricted to big wealthy states with an advanced technology base, major powers. They were the only ones with wealth, and the missiles and long-range bombers to deliver it. Technology was a force that worked against multi-polarity here.

No more. Today Pakistan flies drones, and North Korea is building a nuclear ICBM. Now, technology works toward accelerating multi-polarity, further weakening the monopoly major powers once held.

Finally, the second nuclear age isn’t only a structure.

Like all big structures it has processes and dynamics.

Given the overwhelming policy focus devoted to an alternative structure — of a nuclear-nonproliferation regime and its norms — the strategic dynamics of a second nuclear age have received little attention.

Consider that India is building a triad of nuclear forces, many with MIRV warheads. India will be able to destroy from ten to twenty Chinese cities. China and Russia are expanding their own strategic forces.   Japan is buying into U.S. missile defense, big time. Japan, as well has a U.S. nuclear guarantee. Taken together, with a now certain modernization of U.S. strategic forces, a new “pentapolar war system” is forming in Asia. This has to profoundly shape how China sees the world.

The dynamics of a second nuclear age will determine world order.

They are most unlikely to simply be a replay of cold war dynamics. It’s actually quite fantastic when you think about it.

New nuclear interactions played out on the vast geography of Asia, are most unlike the cold war dynamics of Europe.

The second nuclear age calls for a fresh look at the structures, dynamics, and processes of a world order that many did not want to see come about.

But there’s an old saying that applies here. “You have to play the hand you’re dealt, not the one you wish you were dealt.”

For our earlier Forum on the Second Nuclear Age, see the following:

How to prevail in the Second Nuclear Age?

2017-07-29 By Robbin Laird

During visits to the UK and Norway earlier this year and to Denmark in the recent past, the concern and commitment to reworking defense capabilities in the North Atlantic was evident. The concern is rooted in the return of Russian power projection efforts and capabilities in the wake of actions in Crimea and elsewhere.

At the Norwegian Airpower Conference earlier this year, the emphasis was on rebuilding capabilities and enhancing core competencies.

Notably, concern was highlighted with regard to Russian actions and capabilities located in the Kola Peninsula or the bastion strategy of the Russians.

The head of the Norwegian Navy highlighted the importance of the new air platforms, and the new submarines and the need to effectively integrate the data provided by those platforms as well as crafting and evolving the C2 necessary to leverage an integrated air-sea force.

The Rear Admiral underscored that flying the same assets as the US Navy, the USAF and the RAF and the Royal Navy would provide enhanced capabilities within the North Atlantic.

The Rear Admiral noted that the Norwegians have never stopped flying their MPAs, in this case their P-3s, over their areas of interest in the North.

They did not send their P-3s to the Middle East, nor did they retire their MPAs as did the UK.

“We have kept this competence not only alive but focused on the key areas of interest to us in the region.”

The P-3s have been “critical to understand the underwater domain for our forces. We are buying the P-8 because of its capability and the priority to focus upon this capability.

https://sldinfo.com/the-norwegian-navy-and-shaping-air-sea-integration-for-norwegian-defense/

The British had let their ASW assets be retired but are now preparing to fly the P-8s from RAF Lossiemouth but in the interim period kept their skill sets alive while flying RAF ASW personnel onboard other allied ASW platforms.

The Joint Warrior exercises were especially important in this regard.

According to one senior RAF officer involved in the ASW effort: “We have continuously sent officers to work with our allies abroad to keep their skills current as well.

“We are well replaced to the new challenges.

“The training we have given our ex-MPA guys in flying and operations with our allies is crucial.

“This will allow us to slot in people very quickly as the P-8 becomes operational.”

“But it is a clear challenge.”

https://sldinfo.com/keeping-skill-sets-alive-while-waiting-for-a-replacement-aircraft-from-nimrod-to-p-8/

One of those core allies who have provided a key asset to fly on to keep those ASW skill sets alive has been the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Recently, I had a chance to talk with Lt. General Michael Hood, head of the RCAF about the Canadian ASW efforts and their approach to the way ahead as core allies rework their assets and their approach to dealing with the ASW challenges in the North Atlantic and the High North.

Lt. General Michael Hood assumed command of the Royal Canadian Air Force in 2015.

With regard to the RAF, this is what Lt. General Hood highlighted: “We have been flying two members of the RAF crews on our ASW aircraft in the interim between the sunset of Nimrod and the sunrise of the P-8.

“We have also filled the gap left by the sun setting of Nimrod with our own ASW assets. We have done so by operating from either RAF Lossiemouth or Keflavik to help manage the GIUK gap.

“Out of all of the NATO ASW platforms in there, the most effective one has been our CP-140.

“I am exceptionally proud of our ASW capability and when I couple it with the new advanced capability on our upgraded frigates, I see us a backbone of NATO’s ASW capability.”

The current ASW capabilities of Canada are built around an upgraded CP-140 with the acquisition of a new CH-148 Cyclone ASW helicopter and the modernization of the Canadian frigates integrated into the ASW coalition operations.

Over the decade ahead as the maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise is reworked with the coming of the P-8 and the Triton (among other assets) Canada will add an unmanned capability, continue upgrading the CP-140 and work closely with the allies in reshaping the maritime domain awareness and strike networks.

And added to that as well will be new satellite sensor and communications systems as well.

CP-140 Aurora. Credit: RCAF

This will allow the RCAF to leverage developments in the next decade to determine what needs to be put on their replacement manned air platform and to determine which air platform that would be.

Lt. General Hood provided an overview of how he saw the current Canadian capabilities and the way ahead.

“The government’s new defense policy lays out a twenty-year funding line that recapitalizes our air force.

“The eventual replacement of the CP-140 is funded in that defense policy but this is not a near term need.

“We have better capability from an ASW perspective in the CP-140 than comes off the line presently in the P-8.

“We have just gone through a Block III upgrade that has completely modernized the ASW capability as well as adding an overland ISR piece.

“We have replaced the wings on many major empennage points and the goal is to get our CP-140 out to about 2032 when we’re going to replace it with another platform.”

He noted that next year, the CP-140s will receive a Block IV upgrade which will include new infrared counter measures, a tactical data link 16 to complement link 11 and full motion video, imagery, email, chat, and VOIP.

The General noted that the new defense policy has authorized adding a UAs capability for the ASW effort as well.

“In the next three years, we’ll be under contract for a medium altitude UAS system that is going to have both domestic and coastal abilities as well as expeditionary strike capabilities.

“We participate in NATO AGS as well.

“We’ve got a number of people and have funded significantly NATO AGS in a Triton-like capability.”

And now that the RCAF has been given the space mission, the General discussed as well the satellite side of the equation with regard to ASW and the High North as well.

The new RADARSAT constellation will provide enhanced sensor coverage and Canada plans to launch a polar constellation satellite system to provide for High North communication needs.

“That is actually going to finally allow us to see operate UASs up above 70 degrees north.”

We discussed throughout the interview the evolving maritime domain awareness network and the reshaping of its capabilities as new sensors, platforms and C2 systems come on line.

“What will the network be able to deliver?

“As we add new UAS capabilities with manned capabilities how do we reshape what is on each platform?”

Canada’s CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters are now well into test and evaluation. Crews are reportedly impressed with their anti-submarine and above-water warfare suites. MCpl Jennifer Kusche Photo

And it is from this context that the head of the RCAF sees the question of a replacement aircraft for the CP-140.

“What do we need to put onto the new manned platform from the standpoint of the evolution of the network.

“Canadian industry has played a key role in shaping capabilities onboard the CP-140 and I would see that role continuing on our replacement manned aircraft.

“It’s less about the platform, but the brains of that platform.”

And we extended that discussion to more general set of challenges facing NORAD as well.

Lt. General Hood highlighted the importance of the working relationship within NORAD and relevant US commands as part of the overall effort to reshape the systems which can deliver defense to North America.

“I’ve just had staff talks with General Dave Goldfein and General Jay Raymond from US Space Command and I can tell you that certainly on the space side, we are the critical partner of your country in sharing that burden in space and making sure that we’re ready for the future.”

When we interviewed the former head of Northcom/Norad Admiral Gortney he highlighted the growing threats to the 10 and 2 O’Clock as he put it.

But the challenge for us is to shape what we in the US Navy call the NIFC-CA or Naval Integrated Fire Control—Counter Air battle network solution for North American defense.

Put in simple terms, we need to shape a more integrated air and maritime force that can operate to defend the maritime and air approaches to North America as well as North America itself.

We can look at the evolving threat as a ten o’clock and a two o’clock fight, because they originate from the ten and two.

 And the ten o’clock fight is primarily right now an aviation fight.

 They’re moving capability there, but it’s nothing like what they have at the two o’clock fight.

 The two o’clock fight is more of a maritime fight.

This is a notional rendering of the 10 and 2 O’Clock challenge. It is credited to Second Line of Defense and not in any way an official rendering by any agency of the US government. It is meant for illustration purposes only.

And Admiral Gortney highlighted the importance of Canada in this effort.

For 58 years, we have had a bi-national command, NORAD.

“The current government faces a set of tough problems, not the least of which due to past governments not addressing re-capitalization.

 Clearly, what they need to do is to recapitalize their air and maritime force, and preferably one that can work together from the ground up as an integrated force.

 I think NORAD needs to become a multi-domain command, and their forces could flow into that command and out of that command as a key enabler.

Editor’s Note: The photos and video are credited to the Royal Canadian Air Force.

North American Defense and the Evolving Strategic Environment: Admiral Gortney Focuses on the Need to Defend North America at the Ten and Two O’clock Positions