Visiting NAWDC: A Discussion with TOPGUN

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
09/01/2017

2017-09-01  During our recent visit to NAWDC we had a chance to talk with the N7 Department, otherwise known as TOPGUN.

The lead for the discussion was the Department Head, Commander Mariner.

According to the US Navy, the role of N7 within NAWDC is as follows:

In the early stages of the Vietnam War, the tactical performance of Navy fighter aircraft against seemingly technologically inferior adversaries, the North Vietnamese MiG-17, MiG-19, and MiG-21, fell far short of expectations and caused significant concern among national leadership.  

Based on an unacceptable ratio of combat losses, in 1967, ADM Tom Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, commissioned an in-depth examination of the process by which air-to-air missile systems were acquired and employed.  Among the multitude of findings within this report was the critical need for an advanced fighter weapons school, designed to train aircrew in all aspects of aerial combat including the capabilities and limitations of Navy aircraft and weapon systems, along with those of the expected threat.

In 1969, the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) was established to develop and implement a course of graduate-level instruction in aerial combat.  Today, TOPGUN continues to provide advanced tactics training for FA-18A-F aircrew in the Navy and Marine Corps through the execution of the Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor (SFTI) Course.  TOPGUN is the most demanding air combat syllabus found anywhere in the world.  The SFTI Course ultimately produces graduate-level strike fighter tacticians, adversary instructors, and Air Intercept Controllers (AIC) who go on to fill the critical assignment of Training Officer in fleet units.

 The role of the squadron pilots is a key element driving change in any air-enabled combat force.

As Ed Timperlake, a former Naval Aviator, who was honored to engage with the first CO of TOPGUN the late “Mugs” McKeown on a worldwide assessment of tactical aviation for the CIA at the height of the Cold war, has argued:

The skillfulness and success of fighter pilots in aerial combat is an extensively researched yet modestly understood and fundamentally complex concept.

Innumerable physical and psychological factors along with chance opportunities affect a pilot’s facility for success in air combat.

Perhaps the best narrative of the intangibles of the skill and courage of a fighter pilot was captured by the author Tom Wolfe in his seminal work The Right Stuff.

From the first day a perspective fighter pilot begins their personal journey to become a valuated and respected member of an elite community, serving as an operational squadron pilot, the physical danger is real.

But so is the most significant force for being the absolute best that a fighter pilot can feel which is day in and day out peer pressure by those they really and truly respect, their squadron mates.

 http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/squadron-fighter-pilots-the-unstoppable-force-of-innovation-for-5th-generation-enabled-concepts-of-operations/

In our discussion with the TOPGUN team they emphasized that the pilots came from the fleet, and while at TOPGUN, they honed their skills in the aircraft and helped to develop future TTPs against emerging threats.

“We are looking to make the squadron pilot more capable in real world operations.”

“We have been working integration with the F-35 for some time.

“The advantage of the TOPGUN pilot is that we have wrung out the capability of the Super Hornet and have brought that knowledge to integration with the F-35.

“We look for how each platform can enable the other to maximize lethality and survivability for the fleet.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reshaping DoD Business Rules: Leverage Allied Investments in Building Out US Capabilities

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/31/2017

2017-08-29 By Robbin Laird

The title of this piece might seem obvious — why would not the US do everything possible to put the best equipment into the field?

The answer is simply that the foreign investment equation is largely absent in the US political calculus.

There would be no F-35 without allies and allied investments or certainly nothing resembling the F-35 global enterprise.

There would be fewer P-8s and less effective ASW protecting the US and allied fleets.

The usual excuse — to protect US jobs — simply is not credible for sales to any country by any other country leads to tech transfer and jobs creation.

And now there is a new urgency to get on with it.

The shift from slo mo to preparing for high tempo and high intensity operations is a major challenge for the US military and its allies. It is about a culture shift, a procurement shift, an investment shift. But mobilization is even more important than modernization.

To get ready for the shift, inventory needs to become more robust, notably with regard to weapons. In visiting US bases, a common theme in addition to readiness and training shortfalls, is the challenge of basic inventory shortfalls.

The Trump Administration has come to power promising to correct much of this. But there simply is not enough time and money to do readiness and training plus ups, mobilization and rapid modernization.

Donald Trump as a businessman might take a look at how DoD could actually functions as an effective business in equipping the force and having highlighted the question of allies might be pleased to learn of significant allied investments in new combat systems which his own forces can use, thus saving money and enhancing capability at the same time.

One way to augment the force would be to do something which would seem to be at odds with the Make America Great notion. As one of my Danish friends put it well: “I have no problem with the idea of making America great again. For me, the question is how?”

One way to do so would be leverage extant allied programs and capabilities which if adopted by the US forces would save money but even more importantly ramp up the operational capability of the US forces and their ability to work with allies in the shortest time possible. By so doing, the US could target investments where possible in break through programs which allies are NOT investing in.

It is time to take a global view as the coming of the F-35 and the P-8 have made it very clear that global technology is a key element for shaping 21st century high intensity combat forces, even when leaders seem to be at odds.

There are many examples of this low hanging fruit, which can be exploited.

And the old bromide that this would cost US jobs is simply not true – foreign producers like American ones build in the country where they export rather than simply exporting the end product.

First, there is question of rapidly inserting unmanned assets.

While the US Navy researchers how to provide for new capabilities, allies are already deploying a key underwater unmanned asset to work the demining issue.

The SAMDIS solution is in use by several allies and as Norman Polmar and I noted:

Advanced Acoustic Concepts, a DRS/Thales joint venture based in the United States, has devised SAMDIS––Synthetic Aperture and Mine Detection Imagery Sonar––a system with multiple capabilities that can be rapidly deployed to provide the underwater “big picture.”

SAMDIS has been in production for four years and is in operational service with several allied nations.

In particular, Britain and France employ SADMIS in their joint mine countermeasures program. The system is software upgradable, which means that experience with the now deployed and operational systems can easily provide data for software upgrades of contemporary as well as future versions.

Also, because SAMDIS is platform agnostic and scalable, it can be deployed on a variety of current and future platforms. Although especially configured for deployment from unmanned underwater vehicles, it can be deployed from unmanned surface vehicles.

These could be hosted by the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships (LCS) or other naval or commercial ships of opportunity.

 https://sldinfo.com/new-underwater-effectiveness-the-samdis-solution/

Second is the question of getting on with regard to the weapons revolution.

Rebuilding the stockpile of current weapons is a key priority but while doing so allied weapons could be adopted as the “new investments” to the inventory while the DoD sorts through how to get on with longer range weapons and higher speed weapons to enhance the high intensity Warfighting capabilities of the US and allied forces.

JSM with F-35A Credit: US Air Force/Forsvarsdepartementet

One example is the Joint Strike Missile which is designed for attack on surface ships flying off of an F-35 and will be used initially by the Norwegians (who have developed it) and the Japanese and Australians. As it already will be launched on an F-35A, the US can simply by it as part of the inventory upgrade effort.

https://sldinfo.com/allies-missiles-and-the-f-35-the-case-of-the-joint-strike-missile/

Another example is provided by the MBDA missiles coming on line for the F-35.

Weapons such as Meteor for air-to-air or Spear 3 for ground attack from an F-35 are in the works and could be included as well in any inventory build up.

https://sldinfo.com/the-weapons-revolution-continues-mbda-shapes-a-way-ahead-for-strike-platforms-in-the-kill-web/

The key role of allies in F-35 can simply miss the point that the global enterprise provides a unique mobilization opportunity for US and allied forces.

The Meteor being fired by F-35B. Image credited to MBDA.

The coming of the F-35 provides a significant opportunity to leverage the investment efforts of core allies as is happening in the UK with 5th Gen weapons such as Meteor and SPEAR 3:

F-35 as a global enterprise – the 9-Nation MOU encourages US allies in the program to invest in core capabilities for the benefit of the JSF partnership – Meteor and SPEAR 3 are examples of this;

F-35 is the bedrock for high end warfare and 5th generation weapons such as Meteor/SPEAR 3 will help maximize coalition capabilities with direct benefit to the US services in the joint fight;

The integration of 5th Gen weapons such as Meteor onto 4th Gen platforms also enables the allies to better utilize their whole combat air force, not just their 5th Gen platforms.

For the US, this path opens up a number of options; one example is the potential interoperability of UK and USMC F-35Bs afloat where jets would be able to fly from each other’s decks with whichever weapons are to hand.  It could go a step further and open up a scenario where the US consider adopting these new weapons onto US F-35s, which share integrative commonality with allied F-35s.

The United States could thus leverage allied investments in the weaponization of the global F-35 in a significant way, but not if it follows a protectionist policy or continues to pursue the legacy of the most recent Administration’s legacy to often have competition for competitions sake rather than simply moving ahead with the off the shelf solution.

Artist Rendition of F-35 Firing Spear 3 Missile. CreditL MBDA

Allied weapons integration on the F-35 provides a range of off the shelf solution sets for the US forces, which should be leveraged.  The US can put its investment into additional weapons capabilities rather than simply investing in areas already covered by advanced weapons capabilities developed and deployed by allies.

The F-35 global enterprise provides a way ahead for more rapid development of weapons, by leveraging allied investments and capabilities whilst the US develops new capabilities in parallel, which can then be offered to the allied F-35 users as well.  A new business model has emerged precisely when a new Administration has arrived in Washington, which has underscored its desire for new business models.

Here one is staring them directly in the face.

A third example is provided by the Wedgetail which the Aussies have made a key combat asset within the high-end force and are looking to invest in its further development. Leveraging multiple years of development and combat operations to get on with the post-AWACs world makes more sense than simply continuing the slow roll of upgrading AWACs.

For example, the Aussie Wedgetail has come to Red Flag 2017-1 and has provided advanced C2 and support to a fifth generation enabled air combat force. F-35s, F-22s and advanced legacy aircraft like Typhoons were supported throughout by the most advanced air battle management system operating today.

And it is being operated by the RAAF and not the USAF; and the RAF is also considering its acquisition. Instead of slow rolling an upgrade of AWACS, it is time to leap ahead and move beyond the 360 degree radar dome technology and embrace a very different concept of air battle management, one good for today and one very integratable into the tron warfare and distributed operations of the future.

https://sldinfo.com/why-not-buy-wedgetail-and-move-out-beyond-awacs-coming-terms-with-a-5th-generation-enabled-force/

A fourth example which would clearly roil the protectionist who care more about protectionism than the capability of an actual deployed US military force would be to get on with the KC-10 replacement and by the A330MRTT.

Not only does the USAF have NO operational new tankers, but the allies have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that the USAF made the right decision picking this aircraft over the Boeing offering.

But the Boeing plane is clearly the KC-135 replacement; but the KC-10 which has become a key tanking asset in the absence of a new tanker, has demonstrated what a larger tanker can do for a deployed force.

And the allies are operating multiple A330MRTTs so that commonality has already been established and significant investments by ALLIES in a needed US capability already in place.

For example, the Aussies are about to add an operational autonomous boom to their KC-30As.

According to the RAAF Commander in charge of lift and tanking:

“If it can anticipate and react to movements of the receiver aircraft faster than the boom operator can, then you end up with faster contacts.

You also potentially end up with more consistent contacts when the turbulence level increases, in cloud or when night falls.”

https://sldinfo.com/tanker-2-0-adding-the-robotic-boom/

The Aussies are moving onto Tanker 2.0 while the USAF is waiting for Tanker 1.0. This makes no sense.

Recently, the Minister of Defence for the UK made argument for the US opening the aperture with regard to non-US systems.

But I would argue that it is not simply a question of trade policy – it is about getting serious about rapidly equipping a US combat force which needs to prepare for the certainty of high intensity combat.

Editor’s Note: The slideshow above highlights aircraft at the Avalon Air Show in Australia earlier this year and highlight what two way street might look like if you put USAF colors onto the KC-30A and Wedgetail.

The photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.

A version of this article was first published by Breaking Defense:

Use Allied Investments To Help Rebuild US Military

Also, see our new Special Report on the subject:

Leverage Allied Investments and Combat Learning Experience in Modernizing the U.S. Military

Group Captain Braz on the RAAF and the Way Ahead on Electronic Warfare: Shaping a Core Distributed Capability for the Integrated Force

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-28 By Robbin Laird

On August 23, 2017, the Williams Foundation held a seminar on the future of electronic warfare.

At the heart of the Seminar and the discussion were the presentations by Group Captain Braz of the RAAF, a key figure in the introduction of the Growler into the RAAF, and CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack Wing, US Navy Pacific Fleet.

The two provided a significant look inside the standing up of the RAAF capability and the key role of the US Navy in this effort, and in turn the ability to standup up a joint capability.

The US Navy has provided an important lead in working the relationship with the RAAF in standing up this capability and in a rapid manner. In many ways, the Growler dynamic between the two forces provides a model of how capabilities can be generated rapidly in a coalition context to deal with an evolving threat environment.

For the RAAF, Growler represents a jump start to a 21st century EW effort, which includes Wedgetail and F-35. For the US Navy the cutting edge work which the RAAF is doing with regard to shaping a 21st century integrated force helps the US Navy to think through ways to break through stove piped thinking.

In this article, I will look at Group Captain Braz’s presentation with regard to the RAAF approach.

I had a chance to meet with him last Spring at Amberley Airbase where the RAAF is standing up the Growler capability.

So for me, it was a real pleasure to see him again, but this time, in the context of a broader discussion of evolving capability with other core players in the effort as well.

Group Captain Glen Braz, OC of the 82nd Wing.

The nature of the working relationship between the US Navy and the RAAF was highlighted during that interview as follows:

We couldn’t have done this without a huge commitment from the U.S. Navy. There’s simply no other way to describe that.

They have wanted us to be on this journey, and they have supported us wholeheartedly throughout it, both on what we do with the Growler training and the operational experience, the exchanges we’ve established, and how we prepare the team.

That’s furthered by exchange opportunities. We have U.S. Navy Growler aircrew joining us here, but we’ve also used folks connected to intelligence organizations and data management organizations and used U.S. Navy expertise in those areas to bring us along and further on the journey.

It’s no accident that when the Growler officially arrived in Australia at Avalon International Air Show a month or so ago, one of the four humans to step out of those two aircraft was a U.S. Navy aviator.

That was very deliberate, because we wanted both to recognize the amazing support we have had so far from the US Navy and the fact that we’re in this together.

It’s a partnership for the long term with cross learning on all sides.

https://sldinfo.com/group-captain-braz-and-the-coming-of-the-growler-to-the-australian-defence-force/

Captain Braz noted that the Aussie Growlers were on track for IOC next year and that “6SQN took part in Talisman Sabre, and they are busy baselining their operations to align with wider Air Combat Group and 82Wing standards.”

https://sldinfo.com/a-look-at-talisman-sabre-2017-the-perspective-of-air-commodore-craig-heap-commander-of-the-surveillance-response-group/

He underscored that the RAAF was focused on taking EW from a niche capability within the ADF to working into a core competence within the integrated force.

“How we might drive this jet, and wider EW and cyber thinking, into the mainstream?

“Please note my use of the word drive. We need to take this thing and forcefully insert it into our daily business.

“To let it drift or meander into some equilibrium would be a lost opportunity.

“It’s time to be bold.

“The arrival of F-35 in the next year or so is one prime opportunity, and one that will need bold leadership to harness.

“The F-35 brings unprecedented EW capability, it can fight like no other fighter we have owned.

“Growler is an exceptional complementary capability and crossing personnel over between the teams will bring amazing results.

Group Captain Braz at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare, August 23, 2017

“A good friend of mine from the US Navy planted this idea in my mind some months ago and it has significant merit.

“Setting up a Growler to F-35 exchange program won’t be easy, it won’t fit well into a transition plan and it will challenge some outdated mindsets, but it will be a brave move that will put innovation into overdrive.

“It’s an example of the new thinking we need to reshape the way we fight air combat.”

Group Captain Graz then dealt in the rest of his presentation on the challenges as he saw them in managing the way ahead.

First, there is the challenge of managing growth.

Growler is a low density, high demand asset. Shaping and managing a workforce and ensuring its integrated beyond the platform is a significant challenge.

Second, Growler will operate under significant constraints in spectrum licensing and security.

Third, “Growler is part of the overall rethinking necessary with regard to targeting or rethinking with regard to payloads for the RAAF operating as part of an integrated 21st century combat force.

“Growler is a flexible system, manned by expert crew.

“It takes the initiative whenever possible but is by design a flexible sense and respond asset that is at its best when given significant latitude in targeting.

“Being overly tied to our kinetic and lethal effects targeting mindsets will not give you the Growler you need on the day.

“New thinking in terms of dynamic targeting, particularly of non-lethal effects, many of which may be temporary in nature, will be a key to success.

“Delegating these engagement authorities forward will be essential.”

Fourth, training to ensure that EW becomes part of the force, rather than a stove piped on call capability is a major challenge.

“We have invested heavily in training and rightly so; we are not there yet but the future is positive.

“Importantly, the rapidly evolving Electronic Warfare capabilities across the ADF need new ways of thinking to get the most from our family of systems.

US Growler Operating at RAAF Base Amberley from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

“New training areas that test our ability to find, fix, track, target and engage adaptive threats are fundamental to our force.

“Of course, with the constraints already mentioned, live virtual and constructive environments are being enhanced and expanded to serve our needs.

“Ultimately fifth generation forces need fifth generation training.”

Fifth, the Group Captain emphasized the importance of what he called commonality both across the ADF and the allied forces using Growler.

“We have made changes to these jets (RAAF Growerls) based on Australian needs but they have changed the US Navy common baseline.

“Careful investment has given our Growlers targeting pods and Infra-red missiles.

“Not because it’s a fighter but because they help our active and passive kill chains.

“The US Navy is joining this path; it’s a team effort and our differences bring useful diversity to shape the growth of this aircraft.”

And the final challenge he addressed really flowed from how he saw the introduction of Growler as part of the broader evolution of the RAAF to support a payload revolution.

“Our thinking needs to cover payloads not just platforms and be driven by creative technical thinkers, connected with operators.”

Group Captain Braz ended on a very forceful note – don’t built a community of Growler operators; build a joint force within which EW is a core distributed competence.

“Our true challenge, as swimmers in the mainstream, is to acknowledge the currently niche players in EW, assist their real and important growth and to drag them into our swim lane; to roll their input and concepts into every plan, to seek to understand more and engage better.

“Our new thinking must be beyond labels like EW operators but that this expertise permeates our business as an assumed skill.

“So, as a strike fighter native, I am happy to wear an EW tag but I want it to be a temporary one.

“The day where we are all suitably learned in EW that it no longer becomes a label is what we should strive for.

“That would signify success.

“That would have seen the mainstream embrace EW and cyber.

“So, my challenge to you is, regardless of your organisation, are you an operator in our age of EW?”

Inherent Resolve and the A400M: Providing a Regular Shuttle Capability

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-30 By Murielle Delaporte

Onboard the MSN 31 (April 2017)

It is just a matter of fact, but not such a well-known one, that the A400M has been used for months as a regular weekly multi-stop shuttle on all the theaters where French armed forces are present.

“Ever since it has been available, the A400M has been used on all theaters of operation: it is a priority and what is important for us is that the aircraft fulfills the requested missions it has been assigned for,” saidCaptain Cyril, 61st Wing, Operations Cell.

His mission at the time of this interview was to fly about 40 passengers with their luggage, as well as various military equipment and spares, including a Mirage 2000 engine and a generator, through four destinations: Solenzara in Corsica, Jordan, the Emirates (Al Dhafra Air Base) and Djibouti.

Restructuring With Direct Flights In Mind

Because of the range of the A400M and its ability to carry both passengers and load, the coming of the new generation of transport aircraft has led to a major restructuring of the infrastructure of the mother base, i.e. Orléans-Bricy.

“The goal is of course to carry the maximum load, i.e. up to 25 tons, in one trip.

“We have aimed at concentrating all the necessary competences at French Air Base 123, which hosts a simulator organic to the Center of instruction of transport crews called CIET (“Centre d’instruction des équipages de transport”), where a crew can train up to the day preceding a mission,” explains Captain Cyril.

By comparison the average load is 15 tons on a C130 and 6 tons on a C160, while on a 5,000 km flight, the A400M allows to skip a stop and can therefore be done in one day, when it takes two days for a Transall.

This A400M shuttle runs almost weekly to serve Chammal (i.e. the French component to Inherent Resolve), as well as Barkhane (i.e. the Sahel-Saharan theater where terrorists are being fought as well).

For the latter, airdrop capabilities are in the process of being certified to allow fret deliveries closer to the troops.

The same goes with night goggle and decoy capabilities.

But, as stressed by Captain Cyril, “a signed capability is not enough to implement it”.

Once certified, there is indeed a lot of documentary work to be done in order to make sure the right processes are being set in place to best use the new capability at the right time, so that a test pilot, an office designer or a young pilot can understand in exactly the same way.

Becoming an “Aircraft Whisperer”

From the viewpoint of the MSN31 crew, pilots and mechanics all together, the ongoing improvement of documentation in close cooperation with both the French Air Force (FAF) and Airbus Defence and Space is what has allowed for the ramp up of the A400M readiness over the last two years.

“We are currently able to fly four aircrafts, which may sound very little, but we have eight on base and three being maintained.

“Our overall readiness rate has reached 50% of the fleet, when it started at 15% and increased little by little as we integrated more aircrafts in the fleet”, notes the Captain.

By the end of 2017, the FAF should be able to rely on thirteen aircraft, fifteen by the end of 2019 out of a total order of fifty.

Even if things are tight and if crews would not mind an extra two aircrafts to ease their mission management, such a trend in readiness is totally compatible with the Gaussian curve characteristic of any armament program’s early stage and end of life cycle.

A temporary solution has been founded to solve the engine issue, while Airbus is working on a definitive version better adapted to the power of the aircraft.

But the major change over the last twelve months according to pilots and maintainers alike has to do with management of any breakdowns, as experience and practice confirmed that many initial breakdowns, as detected by very sensitive sensors, were only temporary malfunctions in need for an update.

For maintainers such as Sergent P and G from Orléans support squadron ESTA (for “Escadron de soutien technique aéronautique”), it is necessary to learn “to talk with the plane”, to become an “aircraft whisperer.”

The communication mode of the aircraft has fundamentally changed in the world of French transport aircraft the same way as the Rafale changed the world of French fighters.

“Before, since we had so few planes, we could only react to breakdowns.

Today breakdowns do not dictate mission tempo anymore!

This morning, we had one, we did a test, lost five minutes and off we went…

That same alert only eighteen months ago would have grounded us while waiting for the maintainers’ diagnostic at the mother base.

We would have left in the afternoon instead of the early morning…”

This new level of performance in logistics management has allowed the A400M to have become a solid asset and a regular shuttle on which French forces.

And this also true for the other A400M European allied forces via the European Air Transport Command mechanism.

In short, these air forces can now rely on and build their operations with the A400M for any theater of engagement.

The slideshow highlights the A400M during the Middle East engagement on which Murielle Delaporte flew. And the photos are credited to her.

Editor’s Note: The A400M is emerging at an interesting juncture affecting lift and tanking aircraft.

They are becoming part of the integrated battlespace, and whether reworked within a contested air combat environment, or becoming part of the weapons revolution, or part of the shooter-sensor reset, or part of the evolution of multi-mission aircraft for force insertion, the A400M configured for the new epoch ahead can become a very interesting asset indeed. 

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/8/25/global-demand-for-special-operations-aircraft-grows

The A400M Debuts at Mobility Guardian 2017: The Premier USAF Global Reach Exercise

Canada and North Korea: How to Meet the Threat?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-29 By Danny Lam

Canada is a participant in the Korean War under UN Security Council Resolution 84.   The war is paused by an Armistice in 1953 but never formally ended with a peace treaty between belligerents.   Since then, the Republic of Korea (South) have developed into the 11th largest in the world, just after Canada.

The Democratic Republic of Korea (North), have developed into a heavily armed regime with an arsenal that within two years, will be able to credibly conduct thermonuclear missile strikes anywhere in the world including Ottawa, Canada.

Canadas remain technically at war with DPRK today.

Defending Canada and Canadians against existential threats is the duty of any Canadian Government. Existential threats are not just limited to threats to existence (e.g. annihilation with nuclear weapons), but “permanently change another group’s values and the way it governs itself against the latter’s will”. (Phil Waller, 2016)

DPRK’s thermonuclear ICBM arsenal capability is necessary but not sufficient to be an existential threat. Few Canadians would regard (e.g. U.K. and France’s) nuclear missile arsenal to be a threat to Canada.

What is different about DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is their motivations and intentions: What are they going to, or likely to do with their nuclear arsenal?

If DPRK is to become a conservative “establishment” nuclear weapons power that used their arsenal as a deterrent against regime change, that leads to one set of strategies for dealing with DPRK.

On the other hand, if DPRK’s motives and intentions are not defensive, but have greater ambitions that include the offensive use of their nuclear arsenal, it would, a) represent a fundamental break from all first nuclear age power; b) require very different strategies for Canada to defend against this existential threat.

Existential threats from North Korea against Canada, accordingly, do not necessarily require the use of nuclear weapons. It can involve the threat of using nuclear weapons that compelled Canada to pay tribute, or protection money, pay indemnities from the Korean war or compensations for sanctions against DPRK, or whatever injustice the North Korean mind can conjure.

DPRK demanded US$75 trillion in compensation or war indemnities from the US alone for the Korean war and damages from sanctions to 2006. If Canada is assessed a proportionate share, that will be in the range of US$ trillions.

Should North Korea compelled Canada with the threat of nuclear annihilation to pay tribute or indemnities of this magnitude, it would fundamentally alter Canadian values and how Canadians govern ourselves.

If allowed to become institutionalized, DPRK modus operandi will be copied by other powers and alter the liberal international order upon which Canadian prosperity depend.

Thus, it is fair to say that DPRK’s motives for their nuclear ICBM arsenal, when confirmed to be financial and economically motivated, represent a fundamental break in post war international norms. DPRK is about war for profit.

That is not just an existential threat to Canada, but to the post war liberal international order that the Trudeau regime appear to be so proud of participating in.

Canadian defense policy against North Korea must be cognizant of both the rapid growth / development of the DPRK nuclear ICBM threat, but also their motives and posture. DPRK have adopted an offensive, or surprise first strike posture with their nuclear ICBM arsenal that makes it an urgent issue for Canada to field a credible defense by all means necessary within a year or two, before DPRK can credibly threaten Canada and the allies with a thermonuclear ICBM force.

A credible existential threat to Canada from DPRK nuclear missiles by 2020 or sooner leaves little time and few options for Canada.  

Canada is not a partner in the US missile defense system. NORAD does not include ballistic missile defense in its mandate.

Canada cannot count on NATO members’ assistance (including USA) under Article 5 as Canada have not met Article 3 obligations for self-defense.

Canadians are deluded if they think the US Missile Defense system is like Girl Guides or Boy Scouts that they can join at will.  The option to join the US missile defense system is moot as becoming a partner (via the existing formal process) is a long, drawn out process even if Canada appropriated substantial funds up front, decided to join today and the US MDA agreed immediately.   Membership in the US missile defense would not deliver a usable Canadian capability for years — if that.

What about procuring a missile defense system?

In order to meet the DPRK threat by 2020 or sooner, Canadians have no time for the usual multi decade debate, politics, and slow motion defense procurement that have bedeviled Canadian DND and Public Services and Procurement in almost every recent major defense program including the Canadian Surface Combatants, Fighter Aircraft Replacement, Maritime Helicopters, etc.

Moreover, there is zero chance that any major government, let alone supplier of state-of-the-art missile defense systems will entertain standard Canadian procurement terms like 100% offsets (Industrial and Technological Benefits), or demands for proprietary information including intellectual property and software source code.

Even the smoothest, most expedited traditional procurement in recent Canadian history would not be sufficient.  An expedited process that require elimination or waiver of many extant Canadian defense and public procurement rules is a must if Canada is to procure a missile defense capability expeditiously.

Suppose Canadian Parliament achieved an all-party consensus and unanimously voted to fund and urgently procure a missile defense system including waiving many rules?

It is not clear that vendors will have the available capacity to deliver in the short term given existing factory capacity and orders.

Additional orders from allies will further constrain manufacturers.

US-DoD will likely veto any foreign orders that compete with DoD priorities without a political decision by the Trump Administration and Congress.

Canada is in a weak position to secure scarce defense resources from the Trump Administration for missile defense for many reasons. Canada has virtually no relationship with Japan and South Korea in missile defense.

Missile defense in depth begins with not just US systems like the Space Based Infra Red (SBIR) system and other assets, but also on Japanese and South Korean ISR that give early warning of missile launches.   This will likely extend in the future to engaging missiles during the boost phase or mid-course from forward deployed assets and allies working close together to defeat missiles at the earliest opportunity.

By the time intercepts default to using scarce Ground Based Missile Defense Missiles, the risk of a successful strike rises sharply.

On what basis can Canada have a claim to US allies like South Korea and Japan sharing data, let alone the thought of using up one of their valuable interceptors to shoot down an ICBM heading for a Canadian target?

Joining the US missile defense in no way address the problem of Canada having no claims on allied defense capabilities for the benefit of Canada unless Canada is prepared to offer them a quid quo pro.

Do Canadian politicians understand this?

Japan and S. Korea certainly do.

Beyond negotiating a claim on allied assets for missile defense, it is technically impossible to field a missile defense alone (defeating arrows) without participating in an allied campaign to eliminate the archers.

That would require Canadians commit to an expeditionary capability to the Korean peninsula — something few Canadian leaders have contemplated or have prepared the Canadian public for.

The flippant and lackadaisical attitude Canada have demonstrated to key US allies security concerns is illustrated by Canada’s disregard and ignorance of DPRK threats — barely warranted a mention in the Canadian defense and foreign policy unveiled in June, 2017 that failed to recognize the existential threat to Canada from DPRK.

Both documents were obsolete before they were made public.

On a majority of occasions in recent years, Canada could not even be bothered to issue a statement as DPRK undertook provocative acts like nuclear or missile tests that directly threatened the security of Canada, USA, Japan and S. Korea.

Nor did as provocative an act as a missile test coinciding with a NATO meeting in May 2017 awaken Canada to the threat.

It took until August 11, 2017 for that Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland to call North Korea “A Grave Threat” to the World. Freeland then pledged support to the US (but not other allies) verbally without any specifics or deliverables.

Canada did not bother to protest the missile barrage test of August 25, 2017 though Global Affairs found time to announce Minister Freeland’s meeting about NAFTA in Montreal.

An oversight that might also afflict verbal commitments to the US?

This Canadian attitude of being disconnected from Northeast Asian security concerns is reflected in defense policy. Canada do not regularly participated in major regional military exercises (except RIMPAC) with Japan (except PASSEX) or S. Korea (except 15 troops to ULCHI Freedom Guardian).

When this is compared to Canada’s deployment to EU and Ukraine, it is understandable that allies regard Canada as a not so credible partner in the region.

There is still time to turn this around, beginning with building an all-party consensus in the Parliament of Canada that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and war aims is an existential threat to Canada, and then, begin to consider what can be done in time to meet the threat.

Future articles will explore how Canada can field a credible defense against DPRK quickly and affordably.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, you can see the following:

http://www.sldforum.com/2017/08/meeting-north-koreas-existential-threat-canada/

 

The Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/30/2017

2017-08-26 By Robbin Laird

On August 23, 2017, the Williams Foundation held a seminar on the future of electronic warfare.

With the introduction of the Growler, this has provided a natural hook into the broader discussion of the evolving payloads which need to be part of an integrated 21st century combat force.

The seminar background and focus was described in the run up to the seminar as follows:

An increasingly sophisticated and rapidly evolving threat with ready access to advanced, commercially available off-the-shelf technology is transforming the operational context in which the Australia Defence Force must now survive and fight. 

Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman, Williams Foundation

The next generation battlespace will be contested across multiple domains with control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum becoming just as important as control of the Air if the Joint Force is to operate with the freedom of manoeuvre necessary to ensure campaign success.

This Seminar seeks to build a common understanding of how the EA-18G Growler, in particular, will impact the Australian Defence Force at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and how Airborne Electronic Attack is likely to shape future Australian Defence and Security policy. 

It will provide a historical perspective on the development of the Royal Australian Air Force’s Electronic Warfare capability dating back to World War 2, and describe how today’s Air Force personnel are raising, training and sustaining the Growler Force in partnership with the United States Navy. 

We will hear the perspectives of the Australian Army, Navy, and the Joint Commanders, as well as contributions from our senior coalition partners in the United States and the United Kingdom.  The emphasis will be on gaining a better understanding of the key enablers and technologies, such as C4I, Electronic Warfare Battle Management, and training systems, which turn the manned and unmanned platforms into Joint Capability delivering sophisticated battlespace effects.

The Seminar will also serve as an opportunity to provide an industry perspective on Electronic Warfare and, in particular, the role they can play as a Fundamental Input to Capability. It will highlight the importance of disruptive technologies, speed to market, and the increasing emphasis on non-kinetic effects to gain operational advantage. Industry participants are invited to address topics including Electronic Warfare Battle Management, training, and the emerging technologies associated with networked, force level effects.  

Above all, the seminar will emphasise the need for a new attitude to Electronic Warfare and, in particular, a need to embrace the arrival of the EA-18G Growler as a catalyst for change.  In doing so, it provides an opportunity to make Electronic Warfare more accessible and understandable to the Joint Force, and develop the Information Age Warfighters necessary to deliver campaign success on future operations.

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/event-2527349

The Williams Seminars now for several years has been looking at the emergence and potential evolution of a fifth-generation combat force.

The most recent seminars have focused directly on shaping and integrated force; and the last one upon how to design an integrated force, rather than to simply shape after market platform integration.

The next seminars will address the challenges of transitioning and shaping a combat force able to operate in and prevail in high tempo operations up to and including high intensity warfare.

In effect, the recent seminar was a case study of the tron warfare piece of building an integrated force which can operate a variety of payloads in a diversity of conflict situations.

At first blush, the Growler and its integration was the focus of attention; but in reality, the seminar was much broader than that due to the focus of attention of the speakers and the interactions with the audience throughout the day.

Group Captain Braz

A report will be produced and along the way articles will be published on Second Line of Defense highlighting the seminar presentations.

In this piece, I simply want to give a sense of the day, rather than to provide detailed reportage on the comments, for that will come in the next few weeks.

The heart of the seminar was provided by a fascinating and wide ranging presentation by the RAAF and US Navy Growler participants.

The presentations highlighted the very flexible and innovative working relationship between the US Navy and the RAAF in delivering Growler to Australia.

This effort provides a model of how to deliver joint combat effects by an allied force.

But both highlighted, that Growler was in many ways a means to an end.

Group Captain Braz emphasized that the RAAF did not want stovepipe EW specialists but rather the delivery of EW or what we call Tron Warfare payloads in the battlespace.

CDR Mike Paul

And even though the Aussies are just now getting Growler, the US Navy is just now working beyond the land wars to sort out how Growler fits into the high intensity battlespace.

And it is clear that the US Navy has much to learn from Australia, a point driven home by the US Navy representative, CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack ‘Wing, Pacific Fleet.

In an interview which I did with Group Captain Graz last Spring in Amberley, he highlighted how he saw the Aussie approach.

We need to get the experience which Growler can deliver and share the knowledge.

The difficult thing with Growler is that it delivers non-kinetic effects, and sometimes they’re difficult to measure. We’re used to being able to deliver effects through other systems where the outcome is tangible and measurable.

For a Growler, if you’re attacking a threat system or the people operating that threat system, then often it’s difficult to truly assess how much you’re affecting that system.

You can do trials and tests in certain scenarios, but it’s never quite the same, and so you get a level of confidence about what immediate effect you can achieve, but it’s the secondary and tertiary effects that we’re often looking for that are sometimes harder to measure.

The difficult challenge will become knowing how degraded the network is and how reliable the information is at any given point. 

If you create enough uncertainty in the operators, then you can achieve an effect even if it’s not degraded.

https://sldinfo.com/group-captain-braz-and-the-coming-of-the-growler-to-the-australian-defence-force/

Lt. General (Retired) Davis, recently the Deputy Commandant of Aviation, built from the core perspective of these two Tron Warriors to emphasize that for the USMC, electronic warfare capabilities are something which the insertion force needed as a core capability, not a specialized asset to be flown in from time to time.

He highlighted the Marine Corps approach to enabling the MAGTF with integrated EW capabilities, ranging from Intrepid Tiger pods on aircraft, to the F-35B, to the payloads on Blackjack, and to the coming new UAV which will be payload configurable.

The seminar organizer, John Conway, highlighted during the seminar and in talks after the seminar, the centrality of building EW into the operational art for the evolving combat force.

It is about reshaping the payloads which can be delivered by the integrated force across the spectrum of warfare.

The introduction of the Growler is an important jump start to Australian capabilities, but it comes into the force as the Aussies are working force integration hard.

This effort will inform how they use Growler and according to CDR Mike Paul will be very helpful as the US Navy transitions from a kill chain to a kill web focus.

In short, the seminar provided a case study of shaping a way ahead for broadening the capability which the evolving 21st century combat force can deliver.

Lt. General (Retired) Jon Davis

And as Lt. General (Retired) Davis put it with regard to the Williams Foundation contribution:

“Hats off to the Williams Foundation for what you do.

“You provide a venue where you can share your ideas, be challenged, and to do so in a joint community.

“And it is done in public so can inform a broader discussion.”

Meeting the Challenge of Preparing for Future Conflicts: An Aussie Perspective

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-29 By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to Australia, I had a chance to continue my discussion with Major General (Retired) Jim Molan. He is a frequent commentator in the press and on the media generally on defense issues and with the recently announced Trump policy on Afghanistan as well as the North Korean crisis we had a chance to discuss the evolving policy environment for Australia.

Question: One of the impacts of the Korean crisis is clearly to remind us once again that we need to ramp up our capabilities and focus on the threat of coming high intensity and high temp military operations to defend our democracies.

Given the nature of our evolving forces, how should we view the mobilization challenge underlying the shift towards high intensity warfare?

Major General (Retired) Molan: It would seem to me that mobilization in relation to highly advanced systems is all about increased utilization on them.

I’m not sure that we have even considered that in the ADF. We have a fantastic system for training pilots but in peace time we may aim to train 1.5 pilots per airframe or something along those lines. Whereas, we should at least have plans and capability to very quickly increase our training for an airplane like the JSF, which is easier to fly than the F-18.

The idea of mobilization through increased utilization or whatever must start with government and flow down from government because like all things, it costs.

Question: Perhaps government needs to set up a mobilization department for national security and to provide a funding line.  This would increase not only monies available to the Department of Defence for preparation but also enhance public awareness about the nature of the conflicts we are facing.

Would this make sense?

Major General (Retired) Molan: We clearly need to do something along this line. Mobilization is not focused upon.  For example, the work of John Blackburn where he highlights the relatively small stocks of fuel that we have in Australia provides an example of not being prepared for the kind of disruption which an adversary would clearly aim at in the case of the run up or execution of high intensity operations.

There will be little point of having JSFs in Darwin if you cannot provide them with fuel. This is more than just a Defence issue, it is a national issue like building up Defence Industry in Australia which we are doing relatively well.

To get at this kind of mobilization capability, it will require a significant focus by government on funding and focusing on the core requirements and not just in defense per se. It also needs to be the responsibility of a minister so that someone is accountable and visibility is greater.

Question: Recently, President Trump announced his new policy on Afghanistan.  It is a clear attempt to focus the attention on the broader strategic situation, notably Pakistan and India, and to get out of the endless war ghetto into which Afghanistan has fallen.

 What is your take on the Trump approach?

Major General (Retired) Molan:  This is the first time that we have tried a sustained military presence to train the Afghan Army and to pursue tough action on the neighbors. I think this is the best policy that I have seen, the question I have is, can President Trump implement this policy the way it reads?

I think it’s a good policy but as with every one of these policies, the devil is in the detail of the implementation.

Can he achieve whatever he wants to achieve within four years, or eight years?

It is certainly refreshing that he has said that he is no longer providing operational details in relation to troop numbers.

Question: With regard to Australia and the US approach to allies, what do think the best approach going forward might be?

Major General (Retired) Molan: The first thing I’d say is that the U.S. is too polite to its allies. Far, far too polite to its allies. If anyone is going to change that, President Trump is going to change that.

When military realists like us are saying things internally about supporting the U.S., supporting the allies, and improving our own defense, we don’t get backed up by visiting U.S. people who come to this country and are too polite to us.

I believe that’s a real problem because it creates in the mind of Ministers and Prime Ministers the fact the Americans are very happy with the current state of affairs.

The second one, I think that we need to do much more. The U.S. needs to be frank in relation to the threat. That can be very hard but you can do it at a confidential or secret level.  We need to be much more realistic about the high-level threat.

The third thing is that Australia needs to realize and possibly the U.S. can assist us to realize that a disjointed development of our defense force does not benefit the U.S., or the Western cause as much as a balanced development of our defense force.

What I mean by that is that we are in the process of producing a magnificent Air Force. The Army and the Navy are so far behind that it will detract from where we’re going. The results of producing a magnificent Air Force but an Army and a Navy that cannot keep up means that the only thing the U.S. gets is a squadron of Growlers and a couple of squadron of JSFs.

If the U.S. encourages Australia to produce a balanced force, then either we can operate independently as a balanced and integrated joint force, or we can operate as part of the coalition as a balanced and integrated joint force.

The ADF has never been better than it is now and that our defense policy has never been better. But the strategic environment is significantly worse than when we planned for our force modernization.

We need to develop a generic operational concept, which expresses how Australia should react to a significant threat below the level of a fight for national survival. In a fight for national survival, anything goes.

What I’m saying is that a significant war of necessity may require from Australia an equally significant force deployment, far in excess of what we have done for years and years and years, because the strategic environment is so challenging.

If we are serious about Australian defense then we need to be serious about such a contingency. The question we need to ask is: Are we really designing a force capable of joint and integrated operations or are we creating an ADF that is still only capable of sending small contingents to fight beside a major ally.

We have done various analytical assessments along this line which suggest that an objective force of about 15,000 to 20,000 personnel is the minimum that would be needed, involving most Navy and Air Force assets (but not necessarily personnel), but a third of Army personnel in units.

This force should be able to be mobilized in a relatively short period of time (my judgement as an objective for government would be in less than 6 months) to be capable of conducting joint sophisticated warfighting operations against a peer competitor, and be sustained before rotation in various levels of combat for at least six to 12 months.

For the earlier interview, see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/shaping-a-21st-century-australian-defense-major-general-retired-jim-molan-looks-at-the-challenges/

Editor’s Note: The following biography of Jim Molan was taken from Wikipedia:

Major General Andrew James “Jim” Molan AO, DSC (born 11 April 1950) is a former senior officer in the Australian Army.

During his career he was Commanding Officer of the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, Commander of the Army’s mechanised 1st Brigade, Commander of the 1st Division and its Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, and the Commander of the Australian Defence College.

In April 2004, he deployed for a year to Iraq to serve as the Chief of Operations for the new Headquarters Multinational Force in Iraq. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by the Australian Government, and the Legion of Merit by the United States Government. In August 2008 Molan released his first book, Running the War in Iraq.

Following his retirement from the army, Molan was appointed by the Abbott Government as a special envoy for Operation Sovereign Borders and was subsequently credited with being an architect of the coalition’s Stop the Boats Australian border protection and asylum-seeker policies.

In 2016 Molan was endorsed by the Liberal Party as a candidate for the Senate representing New South Wales at the 2016 federal election.

In August 2008 Molan released his first book, Running the War in Iraq. The book concentrated on his experience as Chief of Operations in Iraq during 2004–05, and contained some criticism about Australia’s capacity to engage in military conflict.

In an August 2008 speech, Molan stated that: “Our military competence was far worse than even we thought before East Timor, and people may not realise that the military performance bar has been raised by the nature of current conflict, as illustrated in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Writing in a February 2009 article, Molan called for a doubling of the Australian military presence in Afghanistan, from about 1,100 troops to 2,000.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Molan

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

Preparing for Future Conflicts: A Discussion with Major General (Retired) Jim Molan

 

 

An Update on Wedgetail: And Shaping a Way Ahead with a Software Upgradeable Multi-Mission 21st Century Combat Capability

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/29/2017

2017-08-23 By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Canberra in August 2017, I was able to continue my discussion with Officer Commanding No 42 Wing, Group Captain Stuart Bellingham about the Wedgetail and its evolution.

After the recent presentation by the head of the USAF Materiel Command underscored the challenge of agile software development for DoD, I had a chance to pick up some of the same themes from the Wedgetail experience which provided some useful insights into the way ahead.

“As we have discussed before, we have a software upgradable jet.

“This is brilliant and gives us a lot of agility.

“And leveraging the software has meant that we come from being a program of concern back in 2009 to becoming a cutting edge airborne command and control capability.

“We are not just focused on ourselves, but how we can evolve our jet to be a greater contributor in the joint and coalition space.

“In order to write software that supports us being able to share ones and zeros effectively is dependent on an agreed understanding on tactics techniques procedures and standards that support how we are incorporate software and how we build it to make sure we’re actually all aligned so that when we go out and work together we’re on the same wavelength, so to speak.

“That is a significant challenge.

“To do so, we are focused on engagement and education, trying to get people to understand the capability that we bring to the fight.

“With E7, everyone straight away just thinks traditional AWACS vice what we’ve got, which is a dynamic software upgradable aircraft with a very different system and approach than the legacy AWACS.”

Question: When we went to Fallon, it was clear that if the TTP efforts could be combined with software code rewrite at a place like NAWDC, the Navy’s path to a kill web would be accelerated.

What is your thought about that kind of cross-linking?

Group Captain Stuart Bellingham: “It is essential.

“As we pair up the new platforms and sort through how to work together, we will shape the TTPs, for example, operating P-8s and Wedgetails.

“As our procedures evolve, we need to rewrite the software on each platform to maximize the ability to work together.

“In fact, later this year we are holding our first two day working sessions between the P-8 and Wedgetail communities which will be a foundation towards working towards that goal.

“When one looks towards the prospects of high tempo and high intensity operations, we will need well developed interoperability and that requires the new platforms, TTPs and software development all working hand in hand before we are in combat.

“Otherwise, we are at significant risk.

“If we can already have the same base line for how our ones and zeros communicate, that’s half the battle to get there.

“Then we can just develop and evolve from that.

“I think it’s going to be increasingly important.

“It’s fundamental to how we’re going to go forward because what is clear to me from recent involvement in Talisman Sabre 17, is that if we’re not doing joint/combined, if we’re thinking component or thinking single-nation type approach, we are vulnerable and we’re not going to succeed.”

Question: The SPO is next door to your hangar. 

Could you talk about the working process between the code rewriters and the operators?

Group Captain Stuart Bellingham: “It’s a tight team.

“We have a budget within which we have funded builds of software but we have a great flexibility within each build to provide the operators with their most urgent requirements.

“We have just incorporated what we term our in-service build or ISB, 5.0 onto our Aircraft, which is a new software build.

“We’re already working on the next software build. It’s not something that we do in a reactive sense.

“These are all proactive / predictive options that we have in place and that we will utilize to continue to enhance the capability of the aircraft.  They’re roughly at about 18-month apart for the block upgrades.

“Most of the great changes come from not just the engineers but from the guys who are actually operating the radar in combat.

“It’s really challenging, not just for the engineers and the operators here in the wing as we try to harmonize and make sure that the programs are working but it’s also a challenge for the people out flying the airplane because they need to keep current with the software builds.”

“We forecast forward and we request budget allocation to support these upgrades.”

For earlier interviews with Group Captain Bellingham, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-the-australian-wedgetail-and-its-evolution-a-discussion-with-group-captain-stuart-bellingham/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-williamtown-airbase-the-wedgetail-in-evolution/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-wedgetail-at-williamtown-airbase/

https://sldinfo.com/the-wedgetail-the-raaf-and-shaping-a-way-ahead-for-the-australian-defense-force-a-discussion-with-the-commanding-officer-of-the-42nd-wing/

The first slideshow highlights the recent visit of the Indonesian Air Force to Williamtown Air Base and going onboard the Wedgetail.

The second slideshow highlights the Wedgetail at Red Flag 17-1.

The photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.