An Update on Wedgetail: And Shaping a Way Ahead with a Software Upgradeable Multi-Mission 21st Century Combat Capability

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/29/2017

2017-08-23 By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Canberra in August 2017, I was able to continue my discussion with Officer Commanding No 42 Wing, Group Captain Stuart Bellingham about the Wedgetail and its evolution.

After the recent presentation by the head of the USAF Materiel Command underscored the challenge of agile software development for DoD, I had a chance to pick up some of the same themes from the Wedgetail experience which provided some useful insights into the way ahead.

“As we have discussed before, we have a software upgradable jet.

“This is brilliant and gives us a lot of agility.

“And leveraging the software has meant that we come from being a program of concern back in 2009 to becoming a cutting edge airborne command and control capability.

“We are not just focused on ourselves, but how we can evolve our jet to be a greater contributor in the joint and coalition space.

“In order to write software that supports us being able to share ones and zeros effectively is dependent on an agreed understanding on tactics techniques procedures and standards that support how we are incorporate software and how we build it to make sure we’re actually all aligned so that when we go out and work together we’re on the same wavelength, so to speak.

“That is a significant challenge.

“To do so, we are focused on engagement and education, trying to get people to understand the capability that we bring to the fight.

“With E7, everyone straight away just thinks traditional AWACS vice what we’ve got, which is a dynamic software upgradable aircraft with a very different system and approach than the legacy AWACS.”

Question: When we went to Fallon, it was clear that if the TTP efforts could be combined with software code rewrite at a place like NAWDC, the Navy’s path to a kill web would be accelerated.

What is your thought about that kind of cross-linking?

Group Captain Stuart Bellingham: “It is essential.

“As we pair up the new platforms and sort through how to work together, we will shape the TTPs, for example, operating P-8s and Wedgetails.

“As our procedures evolve, we need to rewrite the software on each platform to maximize the ability to work together.

“In fact, later this year we are holding our first two day working sessions between the P-8 and Wedgetail communities which will be a foundation towards working towards that goal.

“When one looks towards the prospects of high tempo and high intensity operations, we will need well developed interoperability and that requires the new platforms, TTPs and software development all working hand in hand before we are in combat.

“Otherwise, we are at significant risk.

“If we can already have the same base line for how our ones and zeros communicate, that’s half the battle to get there.

“Then we can just develop and evolve from that.

“I think it’s going to be increasingly important.

“It’s fundamental to how we’re going to go forward because what is clear to me from recent involvement in Talisman Sabre 17, is that if we’re not doing joint/combined, if we’re thinking component or thinking single-nation type approach, we are vulnerable and we’re not going to succeed.”

Question: The SPO is next door to your hangar. 

Could you talk about the working process between the code rewriters and the operators?

Group Captain Stuart Bellingham: “It’s a tight team.

“We have a budget within which we have funded builds of software but we have a great flexibility within each build to provide the operators with their most urgent requirements.

“We have just incorporated what we term our in-service build or ISB, 5.0 onto our Aircraft, which is a new software build.

“We’re already working on the next software build. It’s not something that we do in a reactive sense.

“These are all proactive / predictive options that we have in place and that we will utilize to continue to enhance the capability of the aircraft.  They’re roughly at about 18-month apart for the block upgrades.

“Most of the great changes come from not just the engineers but from the guys who are actually operating the radar in combat.

“It’s really challenging, not just for the engineers and the operators here in the wing as we try to harmonize and make sure that the programs are working but it’s also a challenge for the people out flying the airplane because they need to keep current with the software builds.”

“We forecast forward and we request budget allocation to support these upgrades.”

For earlier interviews with Group Captain Bellingham, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-the-australian-wedgetail-and-its-evolution-a-discussion-with-group-captain-stuart-bellingham/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-williamtown-airbase-the-wedgetail-in-evolution/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-wedgetail-at-williamtown-airbase/

https://sldinfo.com/the-wedgetail-the-raaf-and-shaping-a-way-ahead-for-the-australian-defense-force-a-discussion-with-the-commanding-officer-of-the-42nd-wing/

The first slideshow highlights the recent visit of the Indonesian Air Force to Williamtown Air Base and going onboard the Wedgetail.

The second slideshow highlights the Wedgetail at Red Flag 17-1.

The photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.

 

The Chinese Challenge WITHIN Australia

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-29 The PRC is not simply playing classic global power politics.

They are working within key allied nations, including key ones like Australia and the United States, to achieve their power ambilitions.

In an interview earlier this month, Ross Babbage, the Australian strategist discussed the challenge as follows:

We then discussed the nature of the challenge posed by the illiberal powers.

“If we focus on the Chinese and the Russians, they’ve had a substantial level of success in the last decade because they’re applying many more instruments of national power in a focused way and taking greater risks to achieve strategic success.

“They are applying economic tools, information warfare tools, geo-strategic tools, espionage, cyber as well as diplomatic and military tools, working within the liberal democracies to influence public opinion and coerce governments and they are doing so within integrated strategies.

“And even if they themselves are rivals, they are playing off of each other’s efforts to create a learning curve with regard to how to enhance their power at the expense of the liberal democracies.”

“In contrast, the liberal democracies have yet to recognize neither the true nature of the challenges nor the need to enhance their arsenal of integrated tools to deal with them.

“And notably, governments are not focused on the internal challenge which the penetration of the Chinese and Russian operations into European, American and Australian societies is posing.”

And here there is a clear parallel to what the German government did in the run up to World War II in terms of augmenting their domestic influence in France, Britain and other European societies.

“In spite of leadership differences, the liberal democracies have far more in common than they differ. There is also a generational challenge. Since the end of the Cold War, the stark contrast between democratic and authoritarian values have not been as clear to our publics, especially to our younger people.

“Yet the Chinese, the Russians, the North Koreans and the Iranians, just to mention the most prominent authoritarian powers, have little in common with our values. We are paying a big price for not highlighting the true nature of the illiberal regimes to our publics.

“Recently, the Prime Minister of Australia, despite his difficult initial discussion with President Trump, made it clear that the North Korean threat to the United States and Australia created common cause and the need for a common response.

“The fundamentals of the ANZUS alliance remain as relevant as ever. The PM was very clear that a thuggish regime with nuclear weapons threatened our way of life.

“We need more recognition of this and preparation for the contest and conflict starring us in the face. This is the real world; not the world we wish we were living in.”

“Part of the problem here, in my view, is that we have not done a good job of telling our publics about the appalling track record of the Russians, and the Chinese, and the others.

“There are some notable exceptions.

“For example, a really good series of reports on ABC Australia in June highlighted the Chinese penetration of Australia, their cyber operations, their attempts at bribery and corruption and the threat which these operations pose to Australia.

“This series triggered further press reporting and to government decisions to review policies and legal frameworks to deal with the internal espionage, cyber and broader challenge posed by the Chinese and others.”

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-04/the-chinese-communist-partys-power-and-influence-in-australia/8584270

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-11/china-communist-party-seeks-news-influence-australia-deals/8607754

 

Credit: ABC News, Australia

“There is, however, a long way to go. We need to focus much more strongly on the global competitors who don’t share our values and who are working actively to damage us seriously or bring us down. We need to make our own public’s aware of what’s going on, but also project information and other operations back into the counties that are dominated by these kinds of regimes.

An article published in the Australian Financial Review and dated August 29, 2017 focused directly on the challenge posed by Beijing stirring up “red hot patriotism: among Chinese students studying in Australia.

“The challenge for [Australia] is, how do we cope with the fact that our single biggest customer is instructing students and teachers to have red hot patriotic sentiment when they are in Australia,” said Mr Garnaut said.

He was quoting President Xi, who has previously listed “red hot patriotic sentiment” alongside economic power, abundant intellectual resources and extensive business relations as important strengths that will help realise the collective Chinese “dream”.

“One of [Chinese President] Xi Jinping’s objectives has been to ensure that the party can project its interests into the world, including following Chinese people wherever they go.”

A Look at Talisman Sabre 2017: The Perspective of Air Commodore Craig Heap, Commander of the Surveillance Response Group

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/28/2017

2017-08-25 By Robbin Laird

Last year I had a chance to talk with the Commander of the Surveillance Response Group Air Commodore Craig Heap about the way ahead for this unique and key part of the RAAF.

In our discussion, he argued that the aperture needed to be opened on what SRG is doing, including continuing the evolution of the SRG contribution to the ADF and coalition partners.

“When we talk traditionally about the SRG mission, we talk about surveillance, battle space management and maritime warfighting.

That is now too limited given the potential of the capabilities we have, and are acquiring.

We need to broaden the mission into wider intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, control of the air, battlespace control and strike roles, across multiple domains, which is where we are evolving, along with the parallel evolution of the RAAF and the ADF.

The mission statement needed to focus not only on classical air battlespace management, but control of the battlespace.”

https://sldinfo.com/recrafting-the-surveillance-response-group-for-the-extended-battlespace-an-interview-with-air-commodore-heap-commander-of-the-srg/

This time we had a chance to talk about the latest Talisman Sabre exercise and the SRG role within that exercise.

“Talisman Sabre 2017 was a combined United States and Australian exercise comprising a command post exercise and a field training exercise.

“The field training exercise – the live part — was conducted off the east coast of Australia and in Northern Australia.

“US Pacific Command and the Australian Defense Force sponsored the exercise.

“It’s the seventh iteration of Talisman Sabre, which is a biennial exercise, we do every two years.

“It’s a great exercise.

“It is now massive.

“It’s predominantly bilateral, although there is participation from a number of other countries, such as Canada and New Zealand.

“The Field Training Eexercise or FTX itself, the live part with the real Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, and the real P-8’s,Wedgetail and all the Land forces troops charging around Shoalwater Bay, that was completely de-linked from what we did in the command post exercise.”

In other words, the FTX part of exercise was heavily focused on projection of power ashore, essentially through an amphibious assault exercise.

As part of that effort, SRG was involved in establishing C2 at airfields established in the assault areas and managing the air traffic to support the stand up of capability ashore.

“SRG had personnel operating throughout the different geographical areas of the exercise, in Hawaii, in San Diego and in Australia.

“The Officer commanding 92 Wing commanded task force HQ at Townsville.

“We provided all the safety assurance, the task execution, garrison support, and coordinated the running of RAAF Base Townsville, basically so that we could more safely and efficiently support the exercise.

“There were up to 20 major military aircraft, predominantly from Australia, New Zealand, and the US Navy, Air Force and Army running out of Townsville.”

SRG utilized its different radar and C2 capabilities to provide a key thread for the air battle management piece of the exercise.

“The Wedgetail, our deployable ground based radar Tactical Air Defence Radar and deployable Air Survellance radar assets provided the key foundation for providing situational awareness and dynamic C2 during the exercise.

“The SRG also deployed mobile towers and air traffic crews throughout the exercise area to provide flexible, responsive and timely air control and airspace management during the exercise.”

In effect, the SRG was forward projecting air traffic control and providing a capability to do C-2 with a mobile insertion force.

The effort demonstrated will certainly be important for Australian efforts to help in humanitarian disaster relief if ground based infrastructure has been degraded or destroyed.

Unfortunately, disaster relief of that sort is all too common in the region.

Support for intervention in austere environments is a core SRG competence, n support of the wider ADF and government.

Earlier this year, the P-8 completed its first overseas deployment.

As an RAAF article published on June 7, 2017 highlighted this deployment:

A Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-8A Poseidon has completed its first deployment to Royal Malaysian Air Force Base (RMAF) Butterworth as part of Operation GATEWAY.

The Poseidon was deployed to Malaysia in support of the Operational Test and Evaluation of the P-8A as it is introduced to service. This deployment was a key milestone on the path to declaring Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the aircraft and its system over the next 12 months.

The Poseidon’s predecessor, the AP-3C Orion, has operated from RMAF Butterworth for a number of decades as part of the bilateral Malaysian and Australian Operation GATEWAY.

Operation GATEWAY is Australia’s enduring contribution to the preservation of regional security and stability in South East Asia. The operation provides maritime surveillance patrols in the North Indian Ocean and South China Sea.

Operation GATEWAY is a key element in the bilateral Defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia. The state of the art Poseidon is refining its ability to take over this surveillance role in 2018.

Commander of Surveillance and Response Group, Air Commodore Craig Heap said the successful first overseas deployment of the Poseidon was a significant step towards realising the full capability of the P-8A in an Australian context.

“Maritime surveillance in this part of the world has been a core mission of Number 92 Wing for decades with the Poseidon’s capabilities well suited to continue this role,”  Air Commodore Heap said.

“The aircraft, the aircrew who operate it, and the maintenance and support teams that keep the jet flying, have all performed extremely well during the deployment.”

Following testing of the Poseidon’s ability to deploy and operate from forward bases on the north and north-west Australian mainland in April, this deployment to RMAF Butterworth marks the first time a RAAF P-8A Poseidon has operated from an overseas environment since the first aircraft arrived in November 2016.

Missions flown by the aircraft included patrols in the Northern Indian Ocean and South China Sea aimed at testing and refining how the P-8A will be operated in those environments. Each mission utilised the Poseidon’s advanced sensor suite and data connectivity.

During each mission the aircraft conducted routine maritime surveillance on merchant and naval shipping along some of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

“With this overseas deployment complete, the next step from June through to July will be the completion of the operational evaluation of the Poseidons’s Search and Rescue capability. This will be another important step as we move toward declaring Initial Operational Capability of the P-8A system,” Air Commodore Heap said.

https://www.airforce.gov.au/News/RAAF-P-8A-Poseidon-completes-first-overseas-deployment/?RAAF-PoTc7BdFg9ZVxpCUwb2U4Ck6U9TTOp0k

In Talisman Saber 17, the P-8A continued its process of preparing for full operational capability.

The Aussie P-8A worked with the Ronald Reagan during the exercise in providing maritime domain awareness missions and ASW strike capabilities.

“We deployed our mobile tactical operation cal center or MTOC to Townsville, which is integral to the P-8A and future Triton wide area surveillance system, for the first time as well. ”

The RAAF is moving ahead as well to work the synergies between its three 737 based aircraft, the Wedgetail, P-8 and VIP Special purpose BBJ, two of which are part of SRG.

Later this year, they are holding a two-day working session to launch the synergy effort.

“Last year we conducted a review to look at how to leverage lessons learned from Wedgetail.

“We were looking not just to leverage the front end, but the mission systems and the maintenance and technical systems as well.”

With regard to the Talisman Saber Command Post Exercise or CPX, a key part of the effort was working distributed, dynamic C2.

“The PACFLT Commander Admiral Swift was involved and as we learned at Fallon, Admiral Swift is working the challenge of how to devolve authority in a distributed battlespace and part of the Talisman Sabre exercise was working this challenge.

https://sldinfo.com/expanding-the-reach-of-the-battlefleet-the-evolving-role-of-the-advanced-hawkeye/

We then focused on looking ahead at the next 18 months of the Air Commodore’s time as commander of SRG and asked him what he was focused on achieving in this period of time.

“I want the P-8A capabilities to benormalized as best we can.

“When I leave, I want the P-8 bedded down across all roles, including our deployable maritime Search and Rescue capability.

“We are in the process of trialing our interim deployable life raft capability at the moment, and that is going very well so far.

“We are also focused as well on sustaining and enhancing our air traffic control services, in other words, our 44 Wing’s capability, which are eventually transitioning into the new One Sky system, including a new deployable radar capability and fixed air traffic control radars on the bases as well.

“Wedgetail is undergoing its upgrade at the moment.

“Wedgetail is already about 15 years old as an airframe, including some of the mission systems, but really it was only cut loose out of the blocks three to four years ago, and it has excelled.

“Balancing this upgrade with operational and critical training activities is also our aim.

“We are also working our links between space capabilities and our over the horizon radar to provide even better situational awareness. This is part of our effort to work distributed and redundant C2.

“We are working to integrate Wedgetail with ground based radars, with space and with other assets so we can have redundant, flexible, and projectable command and control throughout the integrated force.

“We are working to establish a level of command and control, integrated with the Hobart Class Air Warfare destroyer, the new Army GBAD capabilityto potentially provide localized control of the air effects, without a friendly fighter in sight.

“And our air combat assetswill be happy with that, because they’re hopefully off doing something more appropriate to their tremendous 5th Generation capabilities. ”

We then concluded by discussing Triton and its potential impact for the ADF.

“For example, in a HADR event, the first thing we’ll send out is a Triton.

“It will be there probably within five to 10 hours of the first reports.

“It can be sitting on top of a remote disaster area, a South Pacific nation for example affected by a cyclone, earthquake or tsunami, obviously with the nations permission, to pushback real-time information regarding the situation on the ground, in areas that previously might have taken weeks to assess

“It might even be relaying.

“It will be providing significant information that can then inform other whole of government international relief capabilities, be they C-17’s, maritime, orland assets, that are going to roll in with a better understanding of the support required to help the people in the affected area.

“We see that as one of our key roles.

“And that’s obviously one of the reasons we are acquiring the Triton, because of the extreme ranges we have to deal with, including the huge expanses of water, but also on occasions in the region in an overland scenario.”

Air Commodore Heap closed by emphasizing that all these new capabilities need to be enabled by a new generation of specialist personnel within the ADF and Defence, and that much of his emphasis is on allowing those people who are the future to be trained, mentored and empowered to innovate.

In short, the SRG is a key part of the evolving transition of the ADF as it works through its processes of shaping enhanced integration as a cutting edge power projection force. 

Editor’s Note: The first slideshow highlights the Talisman Sabre 2017 exercise; the second RAAF P-8s; and the third Air Commodore Craig Heap.

All the photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.

It should be noted that one of the projects mentioned by the SRG Commander will pose some significant challenges to resolve in the short to mid term.

The new air traffic control system is not yet under contract and has been highlighted by government as a project of concern.

Contract challenges put OneSKY on Projects of Concern list

Russian-Chinese Naval Reach Expands in Joint Baltic Sea Operation

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-24 By Richard Weitz

Although Sino-U.S. military ties have showed surprising residence in the phase of numerous China-U.S. security differences, they lag considerably behind Beijing’s defense relations with Moscow.

During the last week of July, the Chinese and Russian navies conducted a week of joint drills in the Baltic Sea, representing the first stage of their planned two-phased bilateral maritime exercise for 2017.

These drills, held from July 21-28, are part of a comprehensive joint program to deepen Sino-Russian defense cooperation.

The July 2017 exercise in the Baltics was the latest iteration of a series of drills termed “Joint Sea” by the Chinese and “Naval Interaction” by the Russians.

The second phase will take place in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk in mid-September.

Following an opening ceremony and land-based planning phase, the active stage of the July Baltic exercise included a drill in which the dozen ships (three Chinese) formed two tactical groups, consisting of mixed Chinese and Russian detachments, which simulated offensive and defensive operations included ship-to-sea gunnery, maritime search and rescue, liberating vessels seized by pirates, joint air and anti-submarine defense, and underway cargo replenishment.

The Russian Defense Ministry stressed how these joint drills contribute to furthering the Sino-Russian defense relationship and improving binational naval interoperability.

The Chinese side held the same perspective. Wang Xiaoyong, deputy captain of a participating PLAN destroyer detachment, concurred that an operational objective of the exercise was “enhancing coordination and tacit understanding between commanders of the two countries.”

In this photo, a Russian naval vessel fires a shell during the China-Russia joint naval exercise in the Yellow Sea Thursday, April 26, 2012. Credit: Daily Telegraph

Russian analysts also emphasized the defense and deterrence value of drills.

Konstantin Sivkov, director of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems, said that the participation of Chinese warships at such distance exhibited a historic level of cooperation with Moscow on maritime issues.

In his view, “China is demonstrating to the world that in the event of conflict, it will conduct military operations on Russia’s side as its ally.”

Russian political commentator Alexander Khrolenko likewise commented that the exercises “demonstrate the significant potential for cooperation between the two countries in the area of defense, and will be sure to cool the hot heads of admirals and generals in Brussels and Washington.”

The Russian ambassador to China, Andrei Denisov, said that “the degree of cooperation in the military sphere is a reflection of the degree of political affinity and trust” between Moscow and Beijing. “If we see the same threats facing us and have a similar assessment of those threats,” he added, “it will be natural to attempt to compare our respective methods to counter those threats.”

Russia benefited from having the joint drills occur, for the first time, in the Baltics, an area of great military and political significance for Moscow. At the time of Naval Interaction 2017, some of Russia’s largest ships were maneuvering into the Baltic Sea for the July 30 naval parade at St. Petersburg.

Russia was then also preparing to hold its latest ZAPAD drill with Belarus in September; which, with a predicted 100,000 troops, worried NATO governments.

The Baltics are a vital region for the Alliance, due to NATO’s need to send reinforcements through the territory to protect Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

NATO has expanded its air and troop presence since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. NATO held its own military exercise, BALTOPS-2017, near the Polish-Lithuanian border in June 2017.

NATO had also recently announced its largest upcoming joint exercise with Sweden, “Aurora 17,” scheduled for September 2017. NATO leaders have criticized Russia for conducting provocative military maneuvers in the region, with military ships and aircraft operating close to the border without adequate notification or transparency.

The Russian and Chinese governments understand that the high-profile drills attract the attention of third parties. On this occasion, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius expressed concern that the Baltic drill could elevate regional tensions.

NATO allies monitored the PLAN flotilla as it moved through European waters-–for example, British, Dutch, and Danish warships accompanied China’s fleet through the North Sea and English Channel.

 

The Russian nuclear submarine Dmitrij Donskoj, center, sails through Danish waters, near Korsor, on July 21, 2017, on it’s way to Saint Petersburg to participate in the 100th anniversary of the Russian Navy, held July 29-30. The submarine is 172 meters long and is thus the largest nuclear-powered submarine in the world. It’s the first time it sailed into the Baltic Sea. (Sarah Christine Noergaard/AFP/Getty Images)

At the time of the drills, the Russian government issued a new doctrinal statement –“Fundamentals of Russia’s State Naval Policy Through 2030” –which profiles the importance of the Russian Navy in the defense of Russia’s global economic and security interests.

According to the doctrine, these interests include maintaining access to the energy-rich Middle East and Caspian Sea regions, as well as sustaining a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean.

Although the Chinese Navy will likely surpass the size and diversity of the Russian fleet, the Russian Navy should be able to project power in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East –as confirmed by its extensive combat support role in the Syrian War.

The Chinese Navy also will strengthen its capacity and presence in coming years.

A 2015 Chinese government white paper states that “It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests […] so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.”

According to the PLA, China commissioned 18 ships in 2016, with a total displacement of 150,000 tons. In April 2017, China launched its first domestically built aircraft carrier; in June, its first destroyer took its maiden voyage.

In late June 2017, moreover, the PLA Navy launched its first Type 055 destroyer which, at 12,000 tons, is larger than the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruisers. The Type 055 ships are expected to serve as the air defense control centers for future Chinese aircraft carrier battle groups.

China’s second carrier is expected to enter into service in 2020.

China plans to build four more carriers, giving the PLAN the second-largest carrier fleet after the United States.

Some forecasts indicate that the PLA will have a 500-ship fleet by 2030, compared with an estimated 350 vessels for the U.S. Navy unless U.S. shipbuilding rates increase significantly in coming years.

In short, the mass and reach of the Russian and Chinese Navies is on the upsurge.

What the impact of this will be in the future is a work in progress.

Editor’s Note: And the Russians are innovating with regard to their concepts of operations.

For example, they have operated their own version of a kill web with missiles launched from frigates in the Caspian sea against Syrian targets obviously guided by target acquisition and C2 nodes in Syria. 

Chris Cavas wrote about the Caspian fleet in this piece while he was at Defense News:

Few naval strategists would count Russia’s Caspian Sea flotilla among significant units in an order of battle. The inland sea features naval forces from the four bordering countries — Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan in addition to Russia — but most vessels are small missile-armed or patrol craft, nearly all well under 1,000 tons. The forces have been viewed purely as local craft.

But that changed on Oct. 7, when four Russian warships in the Caspian Sea launched a reported 26 Kalibr SS-N-30A cruise missiles at targets in Syria, nearly 1,000 nautical miles away. While most analysts dismissed the military effects of the missile strikes, the fact that such small, inexpensive and relatively simple craft can affect ground operations that far away is significant.

“It is not lost on us that this launch from the Caspian Sea was more than just hitting targets in Syria,” said a US official. “They have assets in Syria that could have handled this. It was really about messaging to the world and us that this is a capability that they have and they can use it.”

And to remind everyone that they are a Pacific power, recently the Russians flew their bombers into the face of South Korea and the United States as their own statement against US and South Korean military drills. 

Russia, which has said it is strongly against any unilateral U.S. military action on the peninsula, said Tupolev-95MS bombers, code named “Bears” by NATO, had flown over the Pacific Ocean, the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, prompting Japan and Seoul to scramble jets to escort them.

The flight, which also included planes with advanced intelligence gathering capabilities, was over international waters and was announced by the Russian Defence Ministry on the same day as Moscow complained about the U.S.-South Korean war games.

“The US and South Korea holding yet more large-scale military and naval exercises does not help reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula,” Maria Zakharova, a spokeswoman for the foreign ministry, told a news briefing in Moscow.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-southkorea-bombers-idUSKCN1B40MP

North Korean Intentions: Avoiding Self-Deterrence by the Democracies

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/25/2017

2017-08-22 By Danny Lam

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich believing that he settled the Czechoslovakian problem, “Peace for our time”.

Chamberlain earnestly believed that Hitler was like any other European statesman who is core concern is the survival of the Nazi German regime, and the rapid pace of rearmament by Britain, France and the USSR will deter any further adventures. No sane statesman want, or can risk another war so soon after the peace of Versailles.  Mein Kempf cannot be what Hitler really believes.

The rest, is history.

Diplomacy and negotiations relies on accurately gauging intent and long term goals of all parties.  That requires that analysts assume the perspective of the “other” side, see things from their point of view, understand their constraints, opportunities, perception of risks and rewards.

And exercise extreme caution when project our own calculus and biases onto others.

To do this requires detailed hands-on knowledge of DPRK.

Much of the institutional memory and knowledge about DPRK from the Armistice negotiations of 1953 have been lost. The Korean war armistice of 1953 was not followed by a Peace Treaty as negotiations were unsuccessful.    Few current allied officials have “first hand” experience with DPRK’s demands or negotiating stances from the 1950s.

That knowledge has been lost to allies.

DPRK have, on at least these occasions: 1994, 1996, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2013; formally threatened to withdraw from the Armistice and resume hostilities.

This is in addition to overt acts such as the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and other incidents.

In each case, things settled down, leading to complacency about DPRK’s intent and long term goals.

Another more recent source of knowledge about DPRK intentions is from the negotiations leading to the 1994 “Agreed Framework”, Six Party Talks, and other initiatives (e.g. missile technology proliferation) since.

Each of these negotiations resulted in face-to-face meetings with DPRK negotiators and senior allied officials where DPRK presented their demands.

Dr Jane Harman who visited DPRK in 1997 with a Congressional delegation, recently recalled:

“I asked a senior [DPRK] minister what it would take to get his government to stop proliferating missile technology, something our intelligence community believed they were doing. “How much will you pay us?” was his immediate reply. That North Korea views proliferation in monetary terms is deeply disturbing.   An alternative to deploying its own nukes might be to sell some to ISIS’s willing buyers and willing users.”

Allied officials in general, and US officials in particular, together with their counterparts from PRC and Russia/USSR, have generally been discrete about the demands by DPRK made behind closed doors.

By dismissing the DPRK opening offer stance as “ridiculous” and then negotiating them down to what the possible and acceptable and then only publicizing the end product (e.g. “Agreed Framework”, or “Six Party Talks”), outside observers are deprived of insights into the thought process of DPRK’s officials.

Understanding the thought process of DPRK officials is critical in gauging their motives and long term goals. Allied officials that have firsthand experience with dealing with DPRK have occasionally broken the silence and revealed what DPRK really wanted or felt they are entitled to even as they dismissed them.

But generally, there is little discussion of DPRK motives and long term intentions as the Trump Administration openly warn of war.

DPRK’s propaganda on these issues are blithely dismissed.

Western experts on Korea in general, and North Korea in particular, have by and large been discrete in sharing their firsthand knowledge of DPRK behavior and intentions with the exception of scholars like B. R. Myers (“The Cleanest Race”) who take DPRK’s intentions and perspectives as expressed in their propaganda seriously.

The conspiracy of silence by the priesthood of Korean experts resulted in an intellectual vacuum, in which allied prejudices and preconceived notions about what Korea wants is filled by our own hallucinations.   American values and percepts are projected onto DPRK as a “given”:   North Koreans are presumed to be rational actors who place absolute priority on regime survival in general, and survival of Kim Jong Un in particular.

DPRK cannot possibly be willing to risk the destruction of North Korea by launching a nuclear attack on US and Allies that will result in American nuclear retaliation.

DPRK must be deterrable if the US only strengthened missile defenses and raised DPRK’s risk and costs.

Denuclearization of Korea is out of the question.

Therefore, let’s negotiate with DPRK and get it over with.

DPRK can become a normal nuclear power like every other one before them that only possess a nuclear arsenal for deterrence.

Let’s apply these projections and see how valid our prejudices are against history.

The Nazi regime of 1938, including their Axis partners, was militarily not equal to France, Britain, and USSR, let alone USA.  German rearmament was done in breath, not depth, and not slated to be complete before mid-1940s.   Nazi Germany was not ready for war.

Yet, this same regime was not deterred from going to war and defeating all but Britain – a “mop up” operation that did not have to be finished before going to war against USSR.   The roadmap laid out in Mein Kempf was followed despite expert advice from the General Staff and the risks.

The same analysis could have informed Japan’s decision to go to war against the US in view of the advice of Admiral Yamamoto, and Saddam Hussein’s decision to fight rather than withdraw from Kuwait in the face of overwhelming odds.

Historians and war gamers can debate how these historical conflicts ended, and alternate outcomes could have been produced had Hitler defended what he had before invading USSR.

Or if Nazis made common sense realist moves like recruiting Ukrainian allies to fight the USSR. Imperial Japan could have circumvented the US oil embargo or executed a limited campaign against the Dutch East Indies to secure their oil supply or coordinated an attack with Nazi Germany against USSR.

Saddam Hussein could have withdrawn from Kuwait and forced the US to make the tough decision of invading — and then quietly bid his time while developing a nuclear weapon.

The point is, it is not at all certain from the perspective of the historical losers that they must lose.  

The same goes for DPRK – it is not at all clear that DPRK will automatically lose a war against the US and allies.

DPRK’s professed goal of victory in the Korean war is not entirely unrealistic.

DPRK’s longstanding goal and objective for the Korean war (from 1950s) is, a) expel UN (US and allied troops) from the Korean peninsula;  b) reunification of the Korean race and homeland on DPRK terms;  c) victory.    These long terms goals have not changed in decades.

Regime survival and security, particularly if it means status quo of a divided Korea with US and ROK in alliance, is not the goal for DPRK.

Professor B. R. Myers argues:   “The only logical answer is that it’s pursuing something greater than mere security — and there’s only one logical conclusion as to what that is.”

The goal is, victory defined by DPRK.

What does DPRK want as the victor?

DPRK firmly believes that they are, or will be the victor of the Korean war.    Expulsion of US troops and ending the alliance with ROK is only the first, necessary step to a peace treaty with the US.

A peace treaty, however, will not be concluded without DPRK receiving sizable compensation from the US (and allied) forces.

As recently as 2010, DPRK have demanded US$ 75 trillion in compensation from the US for the Korean war and “six decades of hostility”.   That breaks down to US$26.1 trillion from US “atrocities” during the war, and losses from 60 years of sanctions for a loss of US$13.7 trillion to 2005, plus property damage of US$16.7 trillion. Damages from sanctions since 2006 is in addition.   (See:  N Korea seeks $75 trillion).

Note that the demand is for US$ 75 trillion, or roughly 4 years of US total GDP of $18.6 trillion (2016).

The demands from other allies that participated in the Korean war under the UN like UK, Thailand, Canada, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, etc. are in addition to the USD $75 trillion from USA to 2006.

But do the demands end there?

DPRK is demanding from Japan compensation for colonialism and other wrongs.

Reviewing the ongoing debate over DPRK’s motives and long term intentions if they are allowed to develop a thermonuclear arsenal with the capability of reaching any place in the world, one is hard pressed to find any commentary or analysis that pay any attention to the financial / economic demands being made by DPRK, or, the consequences of DPRK being able to back up their financial demands with their thermonuclear arsenal.

The conspiracy of silence from “Korea experts” is deafening.

Let’s talk to DPRK, find out if their intent, motivations and long term plans have changed and make the findings public before we allow our governments to negotiate a Sudetenland compromise for “Peace for our time”.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

Conspiracy of Silence about DPRK Intentions

The Impact of Brexit on European and NATO Defense: Key Considerations

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-25 By Robbin Laird

There seems to be a growing and vast literature on Brexit: pro and con, and increasingly framing the negotiations and the way ahead.

And this could prove to be longer than many people believe.

Article 50, the exit clause, in the European treaty, allows for continued negotiations after the initial two year period.

And given the speed of the Brussels bureaucracy this is probably already a fast track.

A clear impact of Brexit is focusing a considerable degree of attention on negotiations with the framework already established by the European Union and sorting out how a Brexit Britain meshes with this framework.

But lost in all of this is the broader strategic context.

Leaving aside the obvious point, that the relationship of Britain (and the internal dynamics within Britain to the EU, which is not the same thing) to continental Europe is clearly in play once again.

There is a very long history of British relationships with the continent; the EU settlement provided the latest approach to that relationship; now Brexit opens the fundamental question of the broader strategic realtiionship to the continent.

And no question is more important in this regard than defense. 

The Russian challenge is clear and significant.  Northern Europe is clearly focused on sorting through ways to defend their nations dealing with the threat from Russia, including the soft underbelly of the Baltics.

The recent Chinese-Russian naval exercise in the Baltic Sea is yet the latest reminder of the reach Russia wishes to have in determining the fate and future of Northern Europe.

For the UK, a major focus of their defense modernization approach focuses on this part of Europe. 

Assuming that Brexit exit costs are manageable, the significant infrastructure rebuild in the UK clearly supports a Northern European revamp of defense capabilities. Notably, the coming of the P-8, the Queen Elizabeth carriers and the F-35 are all part of this effort.

The heart of credible European defense has been the UK-French relationship.

But what will this relationship look like concretely a decade from now?

And underlying all of this is the unanswered question of the industrial basis for European defense.

UK firms and their relationships on the continent have been an essential part of shaping a modern defense industrial capability.

What will be the fate of these relationships?

What will Thales look like after Brexit?

What will Airbus, including both the commercial and defense side, look like after Brexit?

Obviously, a key issue is how the working relationships within the continent and both a procurement or customer side as well as a development and production side look like moving ahead post-Brexit.

And the Russian challenge is not going away while Brussels and London negotiate.

The Way Ahead for the RAAF in an Integrated Defense Force: The Perspective of the New Air Commander Australia, Air Vice-Marshal Zed Roberton

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/24/2017

2017-08-21 By Robbin Laird

During the current visit to Australia, I had a chance to talk with the newly appointed Air Commander Australia, Air Vice-Marshal Zed Roberton.

I have had the chance to talk with him before so this meeting was more in the mode of continuing the conversation and shifting to the focus of his new responsibilities.

And that is where we started the interview.

Question: You have gone from being the head of the fighters in the RAAF (Air Combat Group) to now dealing with the entire sweep of the RAAF (Air Commander Australia).

What is the major difference for you as you shift positions?

Air Vice-Marshal Roberton: I am going from making a contribution to shaping a fifth-generation air force to ownership of the transition.

It is only changing one word, but it is a big change.

The focus changes from working the F-35 / Growler / Super Hornet mix that air combat group has to contribute, to the transition of the entire RAAF into a fifth-generation joint force.

A key challenge is recruiting and training the new force; how to target the right people and how to train them.

Air Commander Australia, Air Vice-Marshal Steven “Zed” Roberton, DSC, AM is greeted by Officer Commanding No 92 Wing, Group Captain Darren Goldie, AM, CSC during his visit to No 92 Wing. Credit: Australian Department of Defense.

We focus on things like categorization schemes, which is our way of accrediting and giving mission assurance for our people.

For example, a section lead, which is our category C, is significantly different for an F-35 pilot than it was for an F-18 pilot. Fundamentally different.

And this is true for Growler and other aircraft types as well.

Question: You have raised the question of the shift in recruitment and training with regard to your pilots.

How would you regard the shift on the demand side for the pilot?

Air Vice-Marshal Roberton: You go from having to manage a package to being a node, a sensor, and a shooter in a network.

We are no longer operating as little bespoke package and building block of a force.

If you’re doing this properly to prepare for a fifth-generation fight, you start them in the middle of the web, and our warfighters understand what they can contribute and where they can draw upon to be a sensor and a shooter in that web.

And that’s not just airpower, that’s across the entire joint space.

This requires us to fundamentally change our exercise approach to train aviators in the kill web. It is a fundamental in dealing with the kinds of adversaries we find in the real world.

We cannot take yesterday’s “block and tackle” combat aircraft approach to train to be the kind of distributed mission commanders we need in the future air combat force.

We need to focus on the sensor-shooter relationship in which we can deliver distributed kinetic and non-kinetic effects.

And this comes from within the kill web.

Put another way, you are training for autonomy in all of the weapon shooter nodes and crafting the overall impact accordingly.

Our decisive advantage is going to be in our ability to operate in high-tempo ops, fully networked.

That’s what will make it a completely unfair fight.

It’s not going to be about mass and numbers; that will always have a part to play.

But our decisive advantage has to be our ability to just run our kill web at high speed.

We have parts of our organization that are now thinking at the tactical and operational level in fifth-generation sense, but we are yet to exercise the enabling and support function in that same mindset.

That’s a challenge for us.

Question: One of your first tasks as Air Commander Australia was to participate in Talisman Sabre 2017.

 What was your role and what did you find during the command post segment of the exercise?

Air Vice-Marshal Roberton: I was a month and half in the job when I had the chance in July to work as the deputy CFACC to General O’Shaughnessy at PACAF for the exercise.

I was on the CPX side, and the scenario was good for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, it commenced on day 42 of a war, assuming established air superiority.

Then the exercise transitioned where a near-peer country came into the war and we had to reestablish air superiority.

It was challenging to deal with the problem.

It was absolutely fascinating to observe asset distribution, and where did you put your fifth gen contributors.

This was fifth gen fighters and systems to reestablish air superiority.

That old metaphor: air superiority is like oxygen; when you’ve got it you never even think about it. But when you haven’t got it, you cannot think about anything else.

And so the surface combatants’ commanders became fascinated with our ability to reestablish air control, and that was fundamentally driven by the disposition of fifth gen assets in the exercise region.

In the Pacific theater, the USAF has F-22s which is great.

However, the US are well behind several other countries in getting F-35s in their orbat.

When we had to reestablish air superiority, the discussion was no longer: where do we put our mass?

It actually became: where is our fifth-generation effect?

And that drove the fight, driving the entire operational design for the campaign.

And it was immensely successful.

We lost air superiority for minimal time with the introduction of a near-peer adversary.

Question: The F-35s are already in the Pacific with the Marines and you soon will have some in Australia.

 How do you view this transition in terms of where you want to go with the entire combat force?

Air Vice-Marshal Roberton: The Marines actually have a very modest number of F-35s here now but they are quite critical in certain areas.

I have a great affinity for the Marines having done an exchange with them.

They are making a great contribution.

There’s no hiding that stark difference between legacy and fifth generation aircraft.

When you actually see it, or don’t see, as the case may be!

And when operators see the difference the reaction is very clear: “So now I get it.

“Imagine what we could do with those systems if they were working with our ground forces, our ships, with our other aircraft like the Wedgetail.”

And that is a major challenge: to work together to take advantage of the new assets to shape an overall fifth generation force.

For example, we’re doing a command-and-control futures study at the moment.

We are trying to get folks to think about how to command-and-control in a higher tempo, contested environment with a fifth-generation force?

We are sponsoring it through our Air Warfare Center, but we’re involving the other services and components.

We are not going to be an effective force unless our army and navy joins the RAAF on that fifth-generation journey.

Air Vice-Marshal Steve Roberton, DSC, AM

Air Vice-Marshal ‘Zed’ Roberton is a Category A Fighter Pilot with 3500 total hours, mostly in F/A-18A through F model fighters.

He entered the RAAF in 1989 as a direct entry pilot trainee having completed a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemistry and Mathematics at Queensland University. He graduated from Number 153 Pilots Course in 1990 and F/A-18 conversion in 1993.

He flew fighter tours at Number 3 Squadron RAAF Williamtown; an exchange flying F/A-18s with the United States Marine Corps at Beaufort, South Carolina; and at Number 3 Squadron as the A Flight Commander until 2000.

Roberton completed a joint staff tour in Capability Development Group in Canberra and Australian Command and Staff College. He then deployed to the Middle East for Operations Slipper and Falconer for which he was awarded a Chief of Air Force Commendation.

He commanded Number 75 Squadron at RAAF Tindal for three years from November 2003 before returning to Canberra to stand up the Air Combat Transition Office and lead the RAAF’s transition to F/A-18F Super Hornet.

He commanded Number 82 Wing at RAAF Amberley and then completed the UK’s Higher Command and Staff College in 2012. He returned on promotion as Director General Aerospace Development.

AVM Roberton was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia on 26 January 2012 for exceptional service to the ADF in air combat capability during command of 75 Squadron, 82 Wing and leading the Super Hornet introduction.

AVM Roberton commanded the inaugural Air Task Group 630 on Operation OKRA to the Middle East, for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, prior to taking command of ACG in 2015. He assumed Air Commander Australia role on 01 May 2017.

https://www.airforce.gov.au/Our-People/Our-Leaders/Air-Commander-Australia/?RAAF-NobGotDDyuO+rDXqTQ/8ce4kHNl59b+g

 

 

Remembering Jefferson and Adams: Moving Beyond the Confrontation in Charlottesville

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-21 By Kenneth Maxwell

The long and troubled legacy of slavery unfolded again last weekend in Charlottesville, which is the home of the University of Virginia.  Thomas Jefferson designed its Rotunda.

His recently restored statue stands before it.

This is where the white “nationalists” marched with their burning torches, as well as gathering at the statue in Charlottesville of the Confederate military commander, General Robert E Lee.

Charlottesville is close to Jefferson’s hill top mansion of Monticello.

As President Donald Trump pointed out in an angry confrontation with the press at Trump Tower in Manhattan this week, Jefferson was a major slave owner. As was his fellow Virginian and America’s first president, George Washington.

The foundation of the University of Virginia was among Jefferson’s proudest achievements and the third he wished recorded on the epitaph he wrote for himself for the obelisk he designed to stand over his grave at Monticello.

This was the third achievement mentioned after the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom.

Jefferson’s close adviser on the curriculum for his new university and its projected botanical garden was the Abbe Jose Correa da Serra, the ambassador to the United States from the then Rio de Janeiro based “United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil.”

The erudite Correa da Serra was the founding secretary of the Lisbon Academy of Sciences where he had delivered a eulogy for Benjamin Franklin, who had been Jefferson’s predecessor as U.S. envoy in Paris. Correa da Serra was a frequent visitor to Jefferson at Monticello.

Jefferson wrote in 1821: “Mr. Correa’s approbation of the plan of principals of our university flatters me more than that of all its other eulogists because no other could be put in a line with him in science and comprehensive scope of mind.”

The Neo-Nazis, Klu Klux Klan, and White Supremacy advocates, who marched with burning torches in Charlottesville, were protesting the decision to remove the statue of the secessionist commander of the Confederate States. Their targets were not only African Americans. They also chanted virulent anti-Semitic slogans. At Jefferson’s and at General Lee’s statues they cried out:  “You will not replace us. Jews will not replace us.”

Worried by the overt hostility of the neo-Nazis, the Charlottesville synagogue, Congregation Beth Israel, complained that the police did not provide the requested protection.

One of Jefferson’s proudest achievements was the Virginia statute of religious freedom. In fact, his hill top mansion of Monticello owns its preservation to its purchase by Commodore Uriah Phillips Levy in 1834. The mansion was then in a state of near terminal disrepair. Commodore Levy was a Sephardic Jew. A veteran of the war of 1812, captured by the British he was held for sixteen months in England at Dartmoor prison. He served for half a century in the US Navy.

Despite the anti-Semitism of his fellow officers, he reached the highest rank, and commanded the US naval squadron in the Mediterranean. His uncle was hazan (minister) of the congregation Shearih Israel, the Spanish and Portuguese synagogue that was founded in New York City in 1654 by Portuguese Jews fleeing Recife after the fall of Dutch Brazil.

Commodore Levy made a lot of money like Trump in New York property.

He commissioned and donated the statue of Jefferson that now stands in Capitol in Washington. He admired Jefferson precisely because he “established our Republic in a manner whereby the religion of a man did not make him ineligible to participate in political life or in government.”

Jefferson was as controversial and hard hitting a politician as has ever held the Presidency.

He generated animosity and confrontation in his political life, but his focus on religious liberty was founded on the importance of accepting tolerance for opposing views. In his religious beliefs, he argued that one should be judged on how they act; not their stated religious creed.

What can be lost in the various confrontations recently in Charlottesville is the need to accept diversity, to accept differences of opinion and to protect the body politic against being undercut by violent confrontation whether from the right or left.

But Heather Heyer, who was peacefully protesting against the white supremacists in Charlottesville lost her life, when a car was driven at high speed by a racist and nazi sympathizer into the crowd where she was standing.

Trump said: “You also had people that were very fine people on both sides,” including those who “innocently” demonstrated against the removal of the statue of Confederate General Robert E Lee.  Standing beside Trump at Trump Tower was Gary Cohn, his Jewish director of the White House’s Economic Council and former Goldman Sachs president. As was Steven Mnuchin, another former Goldman Sachs veteran, who is Trump’s Jewish Secretary of the Treasury.

After the violence at Charlottesville, the chiefs of all the branches of the US Armed Forces issued unprecedented statements repudiating racism.

The head of the Marine Corps wrote: There is “no place of racial hatred or extremism…”

Among those who resigned from Trump’s business council (before Trump preempted them by dissolving it) was Stephen A. Schwarzman, the chairman and CEO of the Blackstone Group, who has already received over 400,000 signatures of protest at his links to Trump. Gary Cohn is said to be “upset” and “disgusted” by Trump’s comments. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld of the Yale School of Management has said that markets would crash if Cohn resigned. But Cohn has his eye of becoming the next chairman of the Federal Reserve (the US Central Bank), which may constrain him from jumping ship now.

Trump has lost his White House “chief strategist” and advisor, Steve Bannon, the latest exit from Trump’s inner circle, much to the relief of the Democrats, as well as many Republicans, in the Congress.

But Trump is far from retreating from his comments on the Charlottesville confrontations, again denouncing on his twitter account the removal of the “beautiful” Confederate statues as “foolish.”

Trump’s Jewish convert daughter Ivanka, and his Jewish son-in-law, Jared Kushner, might also have something to say about the virulent Anti-Semitic Neo-Nazi’s who marched in Charlottesville.

Jefferson’s Rotunda at the University of Virginia was inspired by the Patheon in Rome. It represented for Jefferson: “The authority of nature and the power of reason.” Jefferson was certainly a slave owner as Trump says. But he was also the author of the Declaration of Independence which proclaimed that all men are created equal.

His words on the Rotunda at the University of Virginia are noble aspirations.

But Jefferson was no saint, nor a stranger to political confrontation.

Negative campaigning in the United States is not new. It can be traced back to the campaign of Jefferson versus Adams for President. The tone and substance of the criticisms rivals anything seen today in the United States.

Things got ugly fast. Jefferson’s camp accused President Adams of having a “hideous hermaphroditical character, which has neither the force and firmness of a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman.”

In return, Adams’ men called Vice President Jefferson “a mean-spirited, low-lived fellow, the son of a half-breed Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto father.

As the slurs piled on, Adams was labeled a fool, a hypocrite, a criminal, and a tyrant, while Jefferson was branded a weakling, an atheist, a libertine, and a coward. Even Martha Washington succumbed to the propaganda, telling a clergyman that Jefferson was “one of the most detestable of mankind.”

http://mentalfloss.com/article/12487/adams-vs-jefferson-birth-negative-campaigning-us

It is the legacy of Jefferson to support the rule of law, the equality of man and to focus on the right of free debate, which needs to be recalled in a time of confrontation.

And to remember his challenge to all those driving rivets of division in the American system:

“The greatest good we can do our country is to heal its party divisions and make them one people.”

He also added to that challenge the following: “To restore… harmony… to render us again one people acting as one nation should be the object of every man really a patriot.”

Former president John Adams and former president Thomas Jefferson in the end had one of the most memorable reconciliations in American History, and conducted in the process one of American History’s finest and most mutually respectful correspondences.

And, certainly unintended, a symbolic reconciliation was that they both died on the same day, July 4, 1826 and within five hours of each other.

We can remember their confrontation; but more memorable was the reconciliation of political rivals and opponents.

Not an easy task but one which Americans are certainly capable of doing.

Editor’s Note: Dr. Maxwell visited the University of Virginia and lectured on the friendship and the accomplishments of Jefferson with Correa da Serra. 

For Dr. Maxwell’s bio, please see the following:

http://krmaxwell.com/Kenneth_Maxwell/Home.html