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2017-05-06 According to an article published on the Italian Ministry of Defence website, Italian Air Force participation in the NATO Interim Air Policing Mission in Iceland concluded April 14, 2017.
On the evening of Friday, 14 April, after a 6-hour flight and 3 air-to-air refuelling operations most of the Italian Eurofighter aircraft and personnel have re-deployed to Italy after taking part in NATO’s Interim Air Policing Mission in Iceland.
Starting from 23 March, following NATO’s Full Operational Capability authorization, the Italian detachment has ensured the integrity of NATO airspace by strengthening surveillance activities in the Icelandic sky. The country, in fact, has no air defence capabilities and facilities of its own.
Six Eurofighter aircraft and approximately 140 servicemen and servicewomen of the Italian Air Force had re-deployed at Icelandic Coast Guard Base in Keflavik, to implement the activities provided for by NATO Interim Air Policing for the Defence of NATO Airspace in Iceland while carrying out joint training activities withe the Icelandic Coast Guard.
Air Force pilots, officers, specialists, logistics and operational personnel from 4th, 36th and 37thWings, as well as a Air defence Controller team from Poggio Renatico Air Command Operations and 22nd Radar Group Licola (Na), which provided the mission’s tactical management in the mission’s Area of Responsibility by also providing communications with the Combined Air Operation Center in Udem.
ReSTOGE also provided a significant contribution through its dedicated cell which has provided operational support to all aircraft engaged.
Force Protection for the Icelandic airport, with regard to both personnel and materiel, was ensured by the 16th Wing Air Riflemen.
All re-deployment phases, both at the beginning and at the end of the mission, have been ensured by personnel and C-130J aircraft from 46th Air Brigade Pisa, KC767 aircraft from 14th Wing Pratica di Mare and Atlantic assets from 41th Wing Sigonella. 3rd Wing Villafranca has dealt with logistics.
All technical and operational telecommunication facilities have been managed by 4th Brigade Telecommunications and Systems D.A./A.V. (ReSIA and ReGISCC).
The Italian Air Force has been taking part in various Interim Air Policing missions: in Albania, starting from 2009, and Slovenia, from 2004, in cooperation, respectively, with Greece and Hungary; it was already engaged in Iceland in 2013.
The mission falls under the responsibility of NATO Allied Command Operation Brussels and is coordinated by Headquarters Allied Air Command- Ramstein (GER).
Atlantic Trident ’17 brought together in type and capability the most advanced 21st century allied combat fighter force being flown today.
The exercise held April 12 – 28 at Joint Base Langley-Eustice (JBLE) included a “Blue Air” force of USAF F-22 Raptors of the 1st Fighter Wing (FW) JBLE and F-35 Lightning IIs from Eglin AFB, Typhoons of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Rafales of the French Air Force/Armée de l’Air (FAF).
The adversaries or “Red Air” included USAF F-15E Strike Eagles of the 391st FS “Bold Tigers” Mountain Home AFB, ID and T-38A Talons of the 71st Fighter Training Squadron (FTS) “Ironmen” based at JBLE.
Additional assets included the E-3A Sentry from Tinker AFB, OK and a variety of tankers, including a FAF KC-135 and KC-10 of the 305th Air Mobility Wing (AMW) out of Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ.
Aside from the primary training objectives the exercise also provided the opportunity to commemorate 100 years of aerial combat cooperation between the French and US stemming back to WW I.
From the outside looking in the lethal capabilities of Blue Air appeared to be overwhelming, with Red Air offering little challenge.
However, one must consider that the 71st FTS “Ironmen” fly daily as adversaries against the Raptor and possess pilots with Raptor experience.
These factors (along with the sheer numbers of Red Air fielded and their ability to “regenerate” on range) provide Red Air with the best likelihood to exploit any vulnerabilities or errors with Blue Air’s tactics – regardless their impressive platforms.
Towards the end of the exercise the Second Line of Defense sat down with Colonel Pete “Coach” Fesler, 1 FW Commander to discuss the exercise and the evolution of air combat in the context of 5th Gen aircraft.
On a broad level the USAF anticipates any future conflict to be fought with a coalition of allies.
Exercises such as Red Flag (Nellis AFB) and Red Flag Alaska, Pitch Black (hosted by Australia), Frisian Flag (Netherlands) and many others integrate Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) among participants.
When the next conflict arises the USAF and relevant coalition partners will be familiar with TTPs, and integrate day one into an effective aerial fighting force.
Fesler noted that Atlantic Trident ’17 took integration beyond historical practice.
“On a tactical level integration historically involved a serial employment of aircraft (such as a Combat Air Patrol of RAF Typhoons) or geographical deconfliction of aircraft (such as FAF assets attacking ground targets in a designated area).”
However, as Fesler explained starting with “Red Flag 17-1 integration has gone deeper, involving a variety of platforms in the same airspace at the same time.
Integration between platforms also considered the various loiter time and weapons load/type for a given platform over a given vulnerability period (vul – the period of time when an aircraft is vulnerable to harm).”
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While not being specific, it is not difficult to envision a mixed strike package of Rafales and F-35s, a combat air patrol (CAP) of Typhoons and Raptors (or mix and match on any given mission set).
This level of integration leads to big challenges for an adversary who may easily be fixated on attacking a detected Gen 4.5 aircraft, while getting blindsided by a 5th Gen platform or a be distracted by a 5th Gen threat “sensed” in the area and get bounced by a very capable Typhoon or Rafale.
Hesitation in such air to air combat will most likely be punished with an ending in a ball of flames.
This possibility will certainly lead to an increased wariness on the part of an adversary.
Given the high SA of the 5th Gen aircraft with their much shorter “observe, orient, decide, act” (OODA) loop the integrated force places an adversary at a distinct disadvantage.
A lack of decisiveness in modern air to air combat will most certainly be punished with an ending in a ball of flames.
The ability to intake, consolidate and distribute key elements of real time combat information by a fifth generation enabled combat force drives a much higher level of integration.
Fesler noted that “multiple people/assets may be involved with the finding, identifying and targeting portion of an air to air encounter.
The pilot may take care of the final step and fire the missile that kills the target, but wouldn’t have found their way to that merge unless the assets got them there.”
This discussion has implications for the debates on the F-35s kill ratios.
As Fesler expresses, “without the context, the kill ratio means nothing.
For example, what were we asking the F-35 to do at the time, was it predominantly in an air to ground role and only picking up the occasional leaker?
Well then that may lead you to the number of 15.
But if the F-35 was in a Defensive Counter Air (DCA) role with solely an air to air responsibility -one could expect a fundamentally different number.”
Atlantic Trident ’17 provided an opportunity to demonstrate how the advancement of aircraft, tactics and integration is driving change in the function of the fighter force.
For many years, the F-22 Raptor has utilized its superior sensors and SA to take the role of “quarterback” during a vul.
Given the integration of the F-35 and with weapons/loiter capabilities of the Typhoon and Rafale, the notion of a “single quarterback” is changing.
Frankly, per Fesler, the quarterback notion is starting to become “almost a misnomer now in that we have multiple quarterbacks and its less about one individual directing everything and more about multiple nodes of information being able to provide the key pieces of information at the right time to influence the fight.”
It is a foreboding thought for an adversary who now faces a team, where every position has the intelligence/capability of a great quarterback, even while performing their specific role at the highest level.
Performing at a high level is one thing, altering the playing field is another.
The 5th Gen aircraft has done that very thing, altering the classic air to air engagement in a fundamental way.
Fesler noted,” the classic approach of shooting ones missiles and turning before the adversary can get a shot is predicated on the fact that the adversary sees you.
“In the 4th gen world that is the case.
“Ideally the pilot would like to be able to shoot, let their missile do the work and get away before the adversary can get a missile off.
“In the F-22 and F-35 world, the adversary doesn’t necessarily know where you are coming from.
“The 5th Gen pilot might shoot a missile and monitor to make sure it is effective.
“If the missile misses for any number of reasons, they are in good position for a follow-up shot.
“That is one of the fundamental difference between 4th Gen fighters and 5th Gen fighters.
“In general, in the 5th Gen world the adversary doesn’t really know where you are coming from.
“They may have a general idea but not a lot of specifics.
“For 5th Gen pilots it’s a good place to be, to be able to roam around the battlefield faster than the speed of sound in an airplane that is largely undetectable all while your airplane is building a 3 dimensional picture of everything within a couple hundred miles of you.
Aside from the exceptional technical aspects that fascinate and draw attention, Felser ultimately notes that his takeaways from Atlantic Trident ‘17 fall back to the human aspect; “fighter pilots are fighter pilots regardless of what their uniforms look like. Aircraft maintainers are aircraft maintainers regardless of what their uniforms look like.
“There are some universal experiences, beliefs and cultures that transcend the national boundaries in this and that’s one of the things I have enjoyed out of both Tri-lateral exercises (2015 & AT ‘17) that we’ve had.
“The man in the machine still makes a difference.
“You can have the most lethal fighter in the world but if you make a mistake a far inferior aircraft can shoot you out of the sky.
“Training still matters.
“If that were not the case, we’d buy the machines, park them and never fly them and when war kicked off jump in them and go and fly, but that in fact is not the case and you can lose a war with the best equipment if you don’t know how to use it right, if your tactics aren’t sound, if your skills aren’t automatic, you can still lose.”
Atlantic Trident ‘17 reveals the way forward; advanced integration, people making a difference, and high level training.
This rationale drives the US Air Force working with core allies to try to ensure that it is ready with the highest capability for the next conflict on day 1.
In short, 5th Gen brought an evolving approach to integration and evolving A2A tactics to the forefront at Atlantic Trident ‘17.
The Second line of Defense expresses gratitude to Jeffrey Hood 633 ABW PA and the entire 633 ABW Public Affairs Team who were instrumental and exceptional with their support; Col. Pete “Coach” Fesler, 1 Fighter Wing Commanding Officer, and the entire 1 FW; the entire team at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, professional and gracious throughout the visit. You set the bar, our service people are the finest.
Editor’s Note: In discussions with USAF, RAF, and RAAF pilots who participated in Red Flag 17-1, the shift in how integration is done and the reshaping of combat effects was highlighted.
With the F-35 in RF17-1, the entire combat force was reconfigured to get maximum advantage from the performance of the other air combat assets.
This reshuffling was driven by the forward operating SA of the F-35 and its ability to make decisions on the fly and to drive appropriate information to informed combat assets to deliver ordinance on target.
With regard to the RAAF and its participation in Red Flag 2017-1 and the role of Wedgetail, Group Captain Bellingham had this to say about the evolving approach to fifth generation enabled air combat:
Question: I think Red Flag 17-1 is a good example of how we collectively are shaping a way ahead.
In effect, we are seeing the training of a network of operators who can shape high intensity air operations under the impact of fifth generation warfighting concepts.
The technology is crucial; the platforms are important; but it is the training towards where we need to go that is crucial, rather than simply training to the past.
Is that not where your experience with Wedgetail and working with allies comes in?
Group Captain Bellingham: That is a good way to set up the discussion.
I think the strength of everything we’re doing at the moment only comes from a strong cooperation with our allies. Obviously, we’re a tiny force, and our relevance and real strength becomes fully apparent when we tie our capabilities with those of our allies.
At Red Flag 17-1, we saw the US, the UK and Australia blending advanced assets together to make the entire force more lethal and survivable in the high end threat environment.
And in a discussion with RAF pilots participating in Red Flag 17-1, the key impact which the F-35 has on the combat force.
“As we introduce the F-35, the pilots have to adjust to the fact that their machines will see and convey data that they themselves are not looking at.
“And different airplanes will have different levels of SA in the battlespace.
“How to adjust the operation of the force to meet this challenge?”
And there are legacy and then legacy aircraft when it comes to the impact of the F-35.
“If you optimize the relationship between fourth and fifth-gen surely you’d have your fourth-gen as out of harm’s way as you could as they are not low observable amongst those things.
“Therefore, you’d want to have onboard the 4th gen aircraft longest-range weapon you could possibly manage and I don’t think a Hornet of any variety is the right platform for that.
“And actually Typhoon, whether it’s by accident or by design, does give you that especially with Meteor.”
And the RAF is moving ahead with F-35 and Typhoon integration on the connectivity level as well.
In the Babel Fish III trial in February 2017, enhanced connectivity was demonstrated.
“During the trial, the Northrop Grumman Airborne Gateway connected the fifth-generation F-35B, which communicates using the stealthy Multifunction Advanced Data Link, and the fourth-generation Typhoon, by translating MADL messages to Link 16 format. Link 16 is the U.S. and NATO military tactical data link used by some military aircraft, ships and ground forces to communicate and exchange tactical data.
The F-35 and the Typhoon can communicate directly via Link 16 but previously could not communicate or share certain fifth-generation information.”
Andrew Tyler, chief executive, Northrop Grumman Europe said:
“Being able to network sensor data between fifth-generation and fourth-generation fast-jets and other battlespace assets in a stealthy manner is critically important to enabling the full capability offered by fifth-generation aircraft.
We are pleased to have played our part in this successful trial, the output of which will help the MOD to broaden its understanding of the effect that can be generated by its fifth-generation combat-air fleet.”
Air Commodore Linc Taylor Senior Responsible Owner for the UK’s F-35 Programme said:
“I have been enormously impressed both by the collegiate effort to make the Babel Fish III trial happen so successfully, and the specific outcomes of the trial.
This marks another great step forward in interoperability between our fourth- and fifth- generation aircraft, putting the RAF at the forefront of this work. We plan to continue to understand and develop where the most capability and interoperability benefit lies through a series of future trials along similar lines.”
According to the company:
“Bridging this fifth-to-fourth generation platform interoperability gap was made possible by the inclusion of a Northrop Grumman Freedom 550™ software-defined radio in the Airborne Gateway.
The Freedom 550™ is derived from the integrated communications, navigation and identification avionics suite the company developed and manufactures for the F-35; it was validated under the Jetpack Joint Capability Technology Demonstration programme, an effort sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Air Force that concluded in 2014.
Northrop Grumman’s Airborne Gateway translates and relays information from various sources across diverse platforms and domains to enhance interoperability, situational awareness, communications and coordination for warfighters in the air, on the ground and at sea. The system is derived from the combat-proven airborne communications node that Northrop Grumman provides to the U.S. Air Force.”
F-35 aircraft have also successfully passed target data off to Typhoon jets who then successfully engaged the target during Exercise Red Flag.
The F-35 is designed to share what it sees with legacy aircraft. The US Air Force state that the lethality of the aircraft comes from ‘a combination of stealth, electronic attack, information sharing, and other features make the platform an invaluable part of a modern air-strike package.’
Col. George Watkins, 34th Fighter Squadron commander said:
“Our strength with the F-35 has been finding the threats.
We use our onboard system to geo-locate and get a picture of the target, day or night, through the weather. We pass that threat information to others while using our stealth capability. We can get a lot closer to the advanced threat than anyone else can get.
That allows us to target them out and take out critical assets.”
Lt. Col. Dave DeAngelis, F-35 pilot and commander of the 419th Operations Group said:
“During one scenario, the Airmen were given a general location by advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. The F-35s were tasked with finding a convoy carrying a high-value target.
The F-35s advanced targeting capabilities were able to pinpoint the convoy’s location. They then communicated that to British Typhoon fighters who took out the target.
The thing that’s great about having Link 16 and MADL onboard and the sensor fusion is the amount of situational awareness the pilot has. I’m able to directly communicate with specific formations and I can see the whole war, and where all the other players are, from a God’s-eye view. That makes me a lot more effective because I know who to talk with and at what times, over the secure voice.”
The F-35 uses the Link 16 secure architecture to communicate with fourth-generation aircraft in the Red Flag fight and combined with the Multifunction Advanced Data Link, which allows pilots to see the battlespace and share that data with other F-35 pilots.
Using the F-35 as a broad area sensor can also significantly increase a warships ability to detect, track and engage a target.
An unmodified US Marine Corps F-35B from the Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron, based in Edwards Air Force Base, acted as an elevated sensor to detect an over-the-horizon threat.
The aircraft then sent data through its Multi-Function Advanced Data Link to a ground station connected to USS Desert Ship, a land-based launch facility designed to simulate a ship at sea.
Using the latest Aegis Weapon System Baseline 9.C1 and a Standard Missile 6, the system successfully detected and engaged the target.
The exercise was the first live fire missile event that successfully demonstrated the integration of the F-35 to support Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air and represent a very promising exploration into the interoperability of the F-35B with other naval assets.
The F-35 will drastically increase the situational awareness of the forces with which it will deploy and for the UK, where deployed numbers may be a concern, it represents a fantastic way to enhance combat capability in any coalition or national effort.
In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on integrated force design held on April 11, 2017 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well.
Interviews with the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been woven into the evolving narrative of shaping and designing an integrated force.
But the core point is that raising questions, which drive you towards where the force needs to go, is the challenge; it is not about generating studies and briefing charts which provide visuals of what a connected force might look like.
It is about creating the institutional structure whereby trust among the services and between government and industry is high enough that risks can be managed, but creative destruction of legacy approaches is open ended as well.
It is about empowering a network of 21st century warriors and let the learning cycle being generated by this network drive acquisition, modernization and operational concepts.
It is about innovations within concepts of operations generated by the network to flow up into strategic change.
When considering Australia’s future in Asia, many of us have had difficulty looking beyond China—but we have many better options in Asia.
At the core of our misperceptions are six myths about the potential for cooperation with Beijing.
The first myth is that China is driven by a political and business culture broadly compatible with ours where business and politics operate independently.
In reality, Chinese business is inseparable from politics because of the omnipresence of the ruling party, to which all other concerns are subservient, even in private enterprises.
The Communist Party leadership sustains its legitimacy by striving to deliver economic progress and restoring the global preeminence the Chinese civilization once enjoyed. Many rules are tilted against foreigners. Corruption is common, intellectual property theft is rife, and there’s no recourse to an independent judiciary.
A second myth is that a substantial liberalisation and democratisation of China is likely.
Since he came to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has taken personal control of the primary organs of the state; dissent has been quashed; the ‘Great Firewall’ has been strengthened, drastically curbing access to international information; religious and other organisations have been suppressed and state intervention in the economy has increased.
China is a tightly-controlled authoritarian state which treats dissent harshly.
A third myth is that China is not expansionist.
In a 2011 address in London, Malcolm Turnbull stated: ‘it is important to note that China’s growth in power, both economic and military, hasn’t been matched by any expansionist tendencies beyond reuniting Taiwan.’
That would come as a surprise to Tibet, Vietnam and the Philippines, let alone the 23 million in the vibrant democracy on Taiwan.
Then there is Beijing’s effective seizure of over 80 percent of the South China Sea, an area about the size of Western Europe from Poland’s eastern border to the English Channel.
The Chinese have effectively occupied almost all of the waters from Hainan to Indonesia and Malaysia and they vigorously apply Chinese domestic law there.
A fourth myth is that China generally abides by international law.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea determined unanimously last July that there was no legal basis for China’s claim to historic rights over the resources and areas in the South China Sea.
This judgement, carrying the full force of international law, was immediately dismissed by China as ‘null and void.’
In September 2015, when Xi Jinping met President Obama in Washington, he stated that: ‘relevant construction activities that China is undertaking in the Nansha (Spratly) Islands (in the centre of the South China Sea) do not target any country, and China does not intend to pursue militarisation.’
This statement was a falsehood.
Finishing touches are now being made to three fighter bases on the islands, each with protected facilities for 24 fighter-bombers and at least four larger aircraft. Missile installations to target ships and aircraft are also nearing completion.
A fifth myth is that Beijing would never interfere in Australian affairs.
In reality, China is running substantial programs to influence Australian opinion with the acquisition of nearly all Chinese language publications; the courting of decision-makers, journalists, business executives and academics through fully paid visits to China; substantial contributions to political parties; the establishment of pro-Beijing associations, including 14 Confucius Institutes in Australian universities; the regular insertion of supplements in newspapers; and the organization of ‘patriotic’ demonstrations, concerts, and other events by its embassy, consulates and other pro-Beijing entities. Cyber and intelligence operations reinforce messages, recruit intelligence agents and ‘agents of influence,’ and intimidate, coerce, and deter counter-actions.
Beijing tolerates little foreign involvement in Chinese life but simultaneously conducts intrusive programs overseas.
A sixth myth is that Australia has no choice but to subsume its interests because China is its most important economic partner.
China is Australia’s largest trading partner in terms of imports and exports but Australian firms operating in the US earn four times the value of our simple imports and exports across the Pacific and so America is clearly our most valuable economic partner.
China is only the seventh largest source of foreign investment in Australia, far behind the US and Europe. In 2015 alone, the US invested more than the entire stock of Chinese investment here.
China isn’t Australia’s most important economic partner and, because of rising production costs, mounting debt and slowing growth, it may never achieve that.
Even if it did, taking a ’value-free’ approach of absolute deference to China would be cynical because it would place Australia’s economic interests above all else and put a price tag on our sovereignty. It would also be naïve because China’s appetite for our compliance could never be satisfied.
In order to make the most of the Indo-Pacific century, Australia should certainly cooperate with China where we can and sell a wide range of goods and services there.
However, if are to maximize our success and retain our independence, we need to recalibrate risks and turn increasingly to other parts of the region, especially to our ASEAN neighbours and India.
Malcolm Turnbull’s recent visit to Delhi and his enthusiasm for expanded links is an important advance. India and a number of other Asian countries offer more trustworthy governments, more compatible business and legal cultures, higher rates of economic growth and more sustainable political, economic and strategic partnerships.
Ross Babbage is CEO of Strategic Forum in Canberra and a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington DC.
Republished with permission of the author.
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Two years ago during a visit to Australia, I had a chance to interview the head of Thales Australia, Chris Jenkins.
In that interview, we focused on the business model followed by Thales in Australia, namely to transfer technology, grow indigenously and export from Australia.
The Government’s commitment to building a 21st century combat force continues, and new programs like the submarine program have been launched as part of that modernization process.
During my April 2017 visit to Australia, I had a chance to talk again with Chris Jenkins, but this time focused on the broader issues of the relationship between industry and government in the Australian defense sector.
Jenkins is not only CEO of Thales Australia but is also National President of the Australian Industry Group, Chairman of the AIG Defence Council, and an Advisory Board member of the Centre for Defence Industry Capability.
He has a longstanding involvement in large-scale projects in critical industry sectors, and was previously Chairman of the International Centre for Complex Project Management, as well as a member of the Defence Portfolio Ministerial Advisory Council and the DSTO Advisory Board.
Question: The Australian government has set in motion a significant modernization programs.
What is the role and impact on industry?
Chris Jenkins: There are several aspects to that subject.
Australia is spending more on defense. At the same time as doing so, there have been clear changes within defense as an organization to shape new ways to implement that policy, following the First Principles Review and its recommendations.
There’s also been very clear policy around enhancing the impact of defense modernization on Australian industrial skill sets.
There has been keen interest to enhance the level of engineering and technology and program management skills and to grow those skills over the long term, both within the Defence industry sector but also more broadly in Australian industry.
I’ve been really impressed that within a very short period of time there’s been buy-in from the defense service chiefs, and changes within the defense acquisition and sustainment organization to start to implement these policies and make them real.
Overall the most important impact, in my view, is the inclusion of industry as a Fundamental Input to Capability (FIC) for Defence.
This drives a new, more integrated relationship with mutual responsibilities between Defence and industry.
This really gets to the heart of how industry can be engaged as a FIC.
Finding more effective paths to deliver integrated capabilities within and across Defence platforms and systems is something that can only be done efficiently by close partnering between Defence and industry.
Chris Jenkins, CEO Thales Australia and National President of the Australian Industry Group, Chairman of the AIG Defence Council, and an Advisory Board member of the Centre for Defence Industry Capability.
Question: I spent time with the head of Air Force this morning, Air Marshal Davies, and he is keen on shaping an integrated force.
It is not just about platforms, but finding ways to deliver integrated capabilities.
What is the challenge and impact on industry of such an approach?
Chris Jenkins: There are very clear actions being taken to support that by the service chiefs and by the people in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group.
You’re also seeing industry gaining confidence in the approach as the new paradigm. Industry is also starting to work more collaboratively together, forming the team sets that can deliver and evolve combined platform and system capability.
Companies are starting to work together to share workload because of the complementarity of the skill sets that one company might have compared to another.
Industry is responding to the opportunity to engage in a collaborative set of partnerships between defense and industry and this is showing some good results in terms of greater delivery and sustainment capability.
Prior to these government initiatives, Australia has been one of the lower end performers on collaborative development.
Reshaping this relationship is crucial to get the kind of success Australia wants through more efficient, more agile integrated capability delivery.
Question: Clearly, this means that even when platforms are bought abroad, there needs to be a working relationship where that platform evolves over time within an ADF context, not simply replicating whatever has been done to modernize the platform in the originator’s home market.
How will Australia do that?
Chris Jenkins: There’s a smart buyer approach in the market now, which is looking for the elements that will go onto the key platforms that are specifically focused on the Australian defense requirement.
Rather than buying a complete platform and system from overseas off the shelf, I think the realization is Australia does have some unique operational requirements, and so building into the procurement process a way of evaluating how best to bring those teams together that can deliver and sustain those requirements through the life of the vehicle, or the ship or whatever it might be, is being done more efficiently and effectively.
This slide was presented as part of Rear Admiral Tony Dalton, Head Joint Systems Division, Australian Ministry of Defence’s brief to the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.
The customer is helping shape the market or the way the market responds to the requirements more effectively. I think that is a fundamental change.
How well projects deliver as a consequence of that overall change, time will tell, but I think all signs are actually quite positive.
The first principles review made strong recommendations, and it looks like that the actions that need to underpin those recommendations are being taken.
Question: How does this evolving approach affect Thales Australia?
Chris Jenkins: It’d be difficult to observe and/or be part of the wider changes that are happening in defense industry and not be practicing them yourself in your own company.
The simple fact is that Thales in Australia has been a very strong supporter of the partnership approach with Defense but also as an industry teaming advocate.
We’ve been taking very proactive steps to put more work outside the company into our SME supply chain, and develop strategic and important relationships long-term with our SME suppliers, developing their capabilities, working with their design teams so that we’re effectively multiplying the engineering capability my company has access to by virtue of the engineering capabilities in our supply chain.
A good example can be seen in the case of the development of the Hawkei protected combat vehicle.
The vehicle is an incredible breakthrough in terms of capability for army, and I believe is globally leading in levels of protection.
We’ve been able to achieve that by having a very strong team of SMEs support us in the design phase, so that all the innovation, fresh ideas that come from those SMEs, is built into our Hawkei design.
That now creates a very positive outcome not only for the company, a great outcome for defense, but it’s a great outcome for the SME backbone of the defense industry based in Australia.
Question: Key platforms are being bought which are software upgradeable.
This means a very different approach to upgrading and modernizing platforms, and if you want to shape an integrated approach you clearly need to find ways to shape cross cutting software integration.
How do you do this?
Chris Jenkins: The Defense Department for a long time have been saying open architecture’s what they want to see in platform systems.
The goal is to be able to insert, with relative ease, new software developments, new applications, new functionalities, to enable agility, the ability to adapt the capability in our systems more rapidly.
We learned a lot about that in Afghanistan with some of the land-based platforms we had.
We have also learned about the capability advantage of having open architecture in things like Australia’s submarines and surface ships as well.
Today, what we’re seeing is that open architecture capability is really being valued in the acquisition process, and we’re seeing the service chiefs and the forces being much more effective in requesting and getting open architecture implementations for the systems into ships and vehicles and so on.
It’s putting pressure into some suppliers to review their previous business model of delivering hardware and software “locked in” to a single source of capability upgrade. It could be communications systems or battle management systems or whatever.
The new model is going to be open architecture.
This brings much greater flexibility and speed to adapt to changing operational needs.
We found that in the Bushmaster vehicles going to Afghanistan, with the upgrades to systems progressively through that whole conflict.
The number of capabilities that were trying to be inserted in the vehicle required hardware changes, more and more hardware being built up inside the vehicle, more power demand, more weight and a great difficulty to ensure the safety of the people inside the vehicle.
Just the practical aspects of getting the equipment in there are a problem, but it means you have lots of equipment that can be dislodged during a blast.
It becomes very difficult for the occupants, say for example, of the Bushmaster.
Some of the work done on the Hawkei learning from the Bushmaster experience was to create only a single integrated computing system with open architecture that then allows all the suppliers that Defense wants to work with to drop in their communications systems, their remote weapons system, their surveillance system, their battle management system.
The simple matter is exactly as you say.
That’s where the market is going.
That’s what defense forces want, and of course from an agility standpoint that’s what they need to have, so industry has to adapt how it works to make sure we make this happen quickly.
There are some very good examples of that now happening.
I think it’s a great change.
It’s a real change clearly delivering the agility our forces need.
Question: My final question is about the submarine program.
A new submarine is being built by DCNS of which Thales is a major shareholder, and by Lockheed Martin with regard to the combat system.
What role might Thales Australia play in this program?
Chris Jenkins: Lockheed Martin is the combat systems integrator on the new submarine where Australia is looking for a combination of interoperability with the United States and integrateability with the ADF.
Artist’s rendering of short fin barracuda. Credit; DCNS
What we have experienced with the Collins class submarines and their upgrades is the capability to integrate our sonars with Lockheed and Raytheon software.
We’ve been doing it for over 30 years with the Collins-class submarine program, with the sonar systems we’ve been producing and putting onboard.
Throughout this time Australia has developed in our sonar team working with Defence, Navy and very importantly the Defence Science and Technology Group, the essential knowledge and skill sets to design and develop some of the most advanced sonar sensor and systems capability in the world.
Obviously, we look forward to continue to do that on the new submarine.
In sensitive areas like submarine technology, we are well positioned I think, for us to work well with both Lockheed Martin as a combat system integrator on the future submarine and with DCNS obviously as the platform provider and the vehicle upon which the sonars must perform optimally.
That’s for me a good combination of companies for a very complex project, and a program of such great importance to Australia.
I think you need companies with a high level of maturity in this very specific area of sovereign capability to mitigate the through the life of such a program.
On April 11, 2017, the Williams Foundation held its latest seminar on shaping a way ahead in the shaping of a 21st century combat force.
This seminar followed a series of seminars exploring the coming of a fifth generation force and the way ahead for reshaping the ADF into a more lethal and effective joint force.
The Terms of Reference for the Seminar were as follows:
Integrated Force Hypotheses Discussed During Williams Foundation Seminar, April 11, 2017.
And as part of the seminar effort, a case study of the nature of the challenge to be met with regard to integrated force design, namely, a careful look at Integrated Air and Missile Defense.
In preparation for the Seminar, the Williams Foundation has run a six month IAMD Study, exploring the challenges of the IAMD program and the concept of integrated force design, as one example of the forty programs that the Department of Defence has embarked upon.
The IAMD Study Report will be launched at the seminar.
The Context
The program featured a number of the key officials involved in building the integrated force within the Department of Defence along with industrial stakeholders as well in the redirection of DoD design efforts.
The focus of the day was to have an honest set of presentations and debates about what was realistic, and what was not; what key drivers of change required more integration within the force as well as the importance of domain competence as the force is reconfigured for more joint effect.
It was an unusual seminar in that were more questions than answers; but what was clear was that the notion of reshaping the force for greater joint effect was a vector of change and not simply implementing a set of abstract principles.
But what did emerge was a fairly clear sense of the core realities and requirements needed to move to this next step – namely designing the force for greater joint effect.
The ADF is in the throes of significant modernization as new platforms are acquired and new approaches adopted.
And the ADF is working to provide the extended defense of Australian territory, which by its very nature needs to see significant integration among, ground, air, maritime, space and cyber domains.
The legacy approach has been to acquire platforms and then to cobble together linkages among the platforms to create a “joint force.”
But this is simply after market linkages rather than thinking through how to integrate more effectively from the ground up as new platforms are acquired or legacy systems modernized.
Air Marshal (Retired) Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation, April 11, 2017.
The key shift being envisaged is to move from the project approach to a program and capability stream approach.
The project approach is centered on platforms and linear acquisition within a fixed budget as the main trajectory.
A program approach considers several projects in their interconnection to get the kind of effect one would want to generate synergy.
And the capability stream approach introduced in the first principles review is seen as a key element of how to more effectively bundle individual efforts into a more synergistic whole.
In the first principles review, several streams or functions were identified to which platforms, and programs can be seen to contribute.
But the goal is to get more strategic visibility with regard to new platform acquisition or legacy modernization in terms of trade offs, which provide best value for money or best capability from an asset.
The First Principles Review of Defence outlining ways to craft a more effective One Defence approach was released by the Minister of Defense April 2015.
The key recommendations are laid out in the report but are summarized in the report as follows:
This review of Defence from rst principles has shown that a holistic, fully integrated One Defence system is essential if Defence is to deliver on its mission in the most effective and efficient way.
In order to create One Defence and give effect to our rst principles, we recommend Defence:
Establish a strong, strategic centre to strengthen accountability and top level decision-making
Establish a single end-to-end capability development function within the Department to maximise the ef cient, effective and professional delivery of military capability
Fully implement an enterprise approach to the delivery of corporate and military enabling services to maximise their effectiveness and ef ciency
Ensure committed people with the right skills are in appropriate jobs to create the One Defence workforce
Manage staff resources to deliver optimal use of funds and maximise ef ciencies
Commence implementation immediately with the changes required to deliver One Defence in place within two years
What was in evidence at the seminar was the initial results of the review in terms of shaping within DoD a more integrated approach to the evolution of the 21st century combat force.
It is obviously a work in progress, but you don’t know what you don’t know.
If you do not set of the objective of trying to optimize combat capability and consider that shaping the joint effect as a key means to doing so, then the challenge is clear: how to you get a strategic handle on where your force is moving to and how do you ensure that it is as effective, lethal and sustainable as possible?
In effect, what the Aussies are addressing is what Secretary Wynne highlights as the Macro Management challenges facing a Department trying to build a 21st century combat force.
“You can not build a force delivering fifth generation warfare capabilities with a stove piped management system.
“This is our challenge.”
The Need for a Strategic Approach
Notably, each of the Service Chiefs has put in place on the service level a very clear programmatic focus on developments in their domains with a growing regard to the joint effects.
And these Service Chief commitments have been in evidence in earlier Williams Foundation Seminars as well.
Put in other terms, the Service Chiefs are looking at the evolution of their capabilities from the perspective of how could they more effectively leverage other services and how might they more effectively support other services, dependent on the mission or tasks to be achieved.
Starting from that foundation, the next logical step is to try to gain a strategic handle on how the acquisition and modernization of assets can be more effectively conducted with regard to their synergy with assets within the joint force.
VADM Ray Griggs, Vice Chief of Defence Force, speaking at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Force Integration Design, April 11, 2017.
And this effort is very synergistic in term with the evolution of the evolving warfighting operational approaches and the concepts of operations, which are being developed to reshape the framing, and execution of core tasks and missions.
There are a number of key factors or reasons why getting a better strategic grip on the evolution of the force from a joint perspective is essential.
First, given the shift in focus to high intensity operations the need to maximize one’s combat effect compared to the adversary is essential.
A connected force can provide an advantage but only if it is synergistic and survivable; otherwise it is vulnerable and can generate fratricide rather than destruction of the adversary’s forces.
Second, the core enablers of combat power, such as C2 and ISR, are being dispersed throughout the services.
Creating a tower of Babylon is not the outcome you want to have.
Third, a number of the new platforms being acquired are software upgradeable.
It is desirable to be able to be able to manage tradeoffs among these platforms in terms of investments to get the best impact on the joint force.
It is also the case that getting the kind of transient advantage one wants from the software enabling the combat force requires agility of the sort that will come with applications on top of middleware on top of an open architecture system.
Brigadier David Wainwright, Director General Land Warfare during a panel discussion at the Williams Foundation seminar on integrated force design, April 11, 2017.
Fourth, much of the force, which will be operating in 2030, is already here.
This means that there will be considerable adaptation of the platforms towards greater joint effect.
How to ensure that the legacy modernization programs provide effective joint effects, rather than simply stovepiped upgrades?
Fifth, the information and communication systems, which are the enablers for the joint force, are dynamic elements subject to market change and adversary disruptions.
How to best develop IT and Coms packages which can support cross-cutting modernization and evolving force integration?
Sixth, to get the kind of cross cutting modernization one needs with an evolving 21st century force, how can the acquisition system be altered in order to provide for open-ended change?
How to move from a platform linear project approach to a broader program approach which allows trade offs to be made with regard to platforms within a capability stream?
Seventh, the only way there will be the ongoing rapid transformation of the force will be shaping an effective industrial-military partnership whereby there is shared understanding and shared risk to achieve outcomes which are more targets than well defined platforms.
How can this be achieved?
There are just some of the core questions, many of which were discussed during the seminar.
But the core point is that raising questions, which drive you towards where the force needs to go, is the challenge; it is not about generating studies and briefing charts which provide visuals of what a connected force might look like.
It is about creating the institutional structure whereby trust among the services and between government and industry is high enough that risks can be managed, but creative destruction of legacy approaches is open ended as well.
It is about empowering a network of 21st century warriors and let the learning cycle being generated by this network drive acquisition, modernization and operational concepts.
It is about innovations within concepts of operations generated by the network to flow up into strategic change.
The danger to such an effort is the bureaucratic desire even necessity to constrain chaos and to constrain change.
The focus can become on processes to the detriment of outcomes; the focus can become on shaping lightening bolts in charts showing how connected assets should be rather than allowing tasks forces and joint force packages to creative find ways to generate combat synergy.
It is also the case that the general can defeat the particulars.
What is needed is the generation of real world case studies of generating joint effects from cross cutting modernizations and synergy, rather than mandating a set of principles, which would appear on the wall of various defense organizations.
Guidance needs to be empowerment of the network; not providing detail lists of outcomes desired by the bureaucratic center.
The first principles review called for the creation of a strategic center; the danger is that it can become a center for process generation, and not the fostering of the kind of innovation which is required for shaping the joint effects need to prevail in 21st century warfare.
The Perspective of VADM Ray Griggs
The first major presentation at the seminar was appropriately that by VADM Ray Griggs, Vice Chief of the Defence Force.
The VCDF Group was empowered by the defense reform process to spearhead the effort to build out the integrated force.
According to the Australian DoD webpage:
The VCDF Group enables Defence to meet its objectives through the provision of military strategic effects and commitments advice and planning, joint military professional education and training, logistics support, health support, ADF cadet and reserve policy, joint capability coordination, preparedness management, and joint and combined ADF doctrine.
Vision: The VCDF Group Vision is to be the Defence leader in the design of the Australian Defence Force structure and in the delivery of military enabling capabilities.
Mission: The VCDF Group Mission is to design and develop Defence Joint Capability and deliver military enablers in order to protect and advance Australia and its national interest.
The organizational chart below indicates his direct reports, and two of them are especially important to the focus of the seminar, namely the Force Design office headed by AVM Mel Hupfeld and the Joint Capability and Management and Integration Office headed by RADM Peter Quinn.
In his presentation to the seminar, VADM Griggs underscored that “we are seeing real changes in culture and behavior across defense.”
In part this is due to the fact that the warfighting domains are blending and becoming highly interactive with one another.
He argued that as we returned to a more congested and contested environment the five war fighting domains are becoming increasingly blurred.
Effective integration then is critical to gain superiority in 21st century warfighting.
He argued for an integrated strategic direction but flexibility in shaping operating concepts. “We need central orchestration of the effort rather than a top down dictat.”
He highlighted the need to shape a continuous capability review cycle within which to manage ongoing modernization, new acquisitions and effective management of trade offs in budget terms.
He chairs the investment committee where the principals met to make strategic decisions on investments. Obviously, control of the purse strings is crucial to make suggestions turn into recommendations with clout for force structure development.
And finally he saw the capability streams as key elements to reshaping the strategic approach to force structure development – as modernization choices are made.
The Perspective of the Force Design Division
And indeed, in the next presentation by Brigadier Jason Blain, Director General Force Options and Plans from the Force Design Division, the importance of shifting to a capability stream and program approach was seen as fundamental to the shift to enable enhanced joint capabilities.
Capability stream approach applied to force integration by design. Slide presented by BG Blain in his presentation to the Williams Seminar, April 11, 2017.
BG Blain highlighted throughout his presentation a number of key principles or guidelines to the thinking within the Force Design Division.
Integration is a force multiplier.
BG Blain during a panel session held at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.
If we don’t “design” the integrated force we are committed to “after-market” integration.
To enhance the ability to do integrated force design, the Division has developed a force design cycle whereby they evaluate opportunities to augment integrative efforts.
If we are not an integrated team from the design to the operation of the force, we will incur unacceptable risk in operations.
To get where Force Design Division wants to go with regard to integrated force design remains they need to engage in dialogue across the industrial and innovation ecosystem.
Design is about more than just platforms and systems…it is about how we design, acquire, operate and sustain an integrated force in a more complex interconnected context.
And to achieve such a design approach a number of key attributes need to be incorporated into the evolving approach:
Force Design analysis of gaps and opportunities must consider the complete program design, including new integration challenges
The Stream view will drive deeper understanding of how critical these challenges are to the warfighter in achieving joint effect sand reinforce the joint understanding of our gaps and opportunities.
Force options must be developed with integration and interoperability as part of the up front design.
The Perspectives of the Services on Forging an Integrated Force
The next group of military presentations represented the services and provided a realistic sense of what the services wanted out of the joint design process.
They provided a sense of the constraints within which joint force design could occur, and the outcomes desired by the various services with regard to the joint effect.
But again, the Service Chiefs have already redesigned the way ahead for each of these services built solidly on a joint perspective.
What was in play in the presentations and discussions was not so much service stovepipes or focus on joint integration at the service level, but how best to leverage each service’s core competencies and how those competencies could support or be supported by the joint force, dependent on the tasks or missions.
The Air Force Perspective
The Air Force perspective was provided by former Plan Jericho co-team lead, Air Commodore Chipman.
In his remarks to the Williams Foundation seminar on force integration, he argued that integration, as a goal was laudable but not likely to happen as an abstract concept.
Air Commodore Robert Chipman, Williams Foundation Seminar on Force Integration, April 11, 2017
“I don’t believe that we share a common understanding about integration across the ADF or with our international partners.
“We place too much emphasis on whole of system design, rather than prioritizing integration efforts.”
He argued that integration would progress with clear focus on clear and realistic priorities.
And working organizationally to achieve core priorities would then open the pathway for accelerating real achievements with regard to decisive integration efforts.
Leveraging networks, leveraging sensors, and off boarding strike are key aspects of integrative behavior but sharing is not in and of itself integration.
In many cases, collaboration is sufficient as the means to achieve the joint effect, rather than a whole of system design.
“We need to integrate sufficiently to take advantage of networked capability.
“That is why network taxonomy is so important in clarifying priority efforts to achieve greater capability to leverage networks and deliver a joint effect.”
In the taxonomy, he highlighted that there are four levels of operational dynamics with regard to networks: isolation, collaboration, cooperation and integration.
Taxonomy used by Air Commodore Chipman to prioritize program efforts. Slide was part of his presentation to Williams Foundation Seminar April 11, 2017.
In effect, arguing the best could be the enemy of the good, Air Commodore Chipman argued that in many cases pursuit of collaboration or cooperation will deliver the superior combat effect than to enforced integration, particularly if such efforts reduce the force to the lowest common denominator.
“And this effects prioritization.
“We want E-7 integrated with Air Warfare Destroyer and both able to cooperate with JSF.
“Which elements need to be tightly integrated versus generating cooperative effects for the ADF?”
He argued for a pragmatic, flexible, and priority driven approach.
“We need to generate thrusts forward in terms of greater combat effect. Integration is not a stationary target and after-market integration efforts will always be required to enhance collaborative and cooperative capabilities within the force.
‘We need to have the flexibility to deliver aftermarket-integrated effects as a core activity as well as designing in integration from the outset where feasible.
“It depends on the priority for enhanced combat force performance.”
Brigadier General David Wainwright, Director General of Land Warfare in the Australian Army, provided the Army approach.
In his presentation and discussions at the Seminar, he highlighted the thinking of head of Army with regard to Army modernization with a core vector on the integrated force.
He quoted Lt General Angus Campbell’s comments made last year to the Lowry Institute for International Policy.
“The Army and more broadly the ADF needs to be able to influence and shape effects from and across multiple domains, as other protagonists will seek to do against us.
“This is why mastering ‘joint operations’ is even more important and much harder than ever before.
“We need to generate, coordinate and anticipate multiple cross-domain actions and reactions.
“No one service or domain can or will have a monopoly on success.”
And then added the comment by Lt General Campbell made in the same presentation last year with regard to the nature of real world challenges and combat outcomes as a driving test of combat success.
“Notwithstanding the proliferation of technology and the associated emergence of new domains, war without submission requires decision on land, where people live.
“The need for Orwellian ‘rough men’ (and women) is not going away anytime soon.
“War as a contest of wills, settled by close combat, is the enduring responsibility of the Army.
“However, the context in which that contest takes place has and continues to change.”
The focus of BG Wainwright’s presentation was on the outcome of evolution of the jointly enabled and jointly contributing ground maneuver force.
“The Land Force Must be ready to fight into, through and beyond Complex Terrain – Here I will steal the Marine Corps definition of complex terrain; where the additional layers of informational and human complexity further complicate traditional geo-physical challenges.”
“Future land forces will face unprecedented levels of complexity in cluttered, congested, hyper-connected and lethal future operating environments.
“Even the most benign mission may pose hidden challenges.
“This will require ready land forces capable of achieving tactical objectives in complex, possibly contaminated urban environments – in and amongst fragile populations; all while being challenged across multiple domains, simultaneously.”
“The Land Force Must have the ability to form robust, lethal, and networked combined arms teams; fully integrated into the wider joint force and capable of operating dispersed or distributed, then to aggregate rapidly to deliver precise and discriminate effects.
“Not simply another insatiable consumer of information, fires and enabling support, or a stand-alone ‘battlespace owner’… but a true joint player capable of delivering and integrating joint effects in partnership with, and as an important element of a larger inter-governmental, interagency and multinational team.”
“Land forces must be survivable. Even the most seemingly benign operational contingencies can deteriorate rapidly and even the smallest commitment can require hard fighting, against well-equipped, determined and adaptive enemies.
“As much as we might wish for a future where long range sensors and stand-off fires mitigate the joint force need for land forces ready and prepared for the demands of sustained close combat in complex terrain – this represents wishful thinking, not sound force design.”
“Moreover, the proliferation of next generation Air to Ground Missiles, explosive Unmanned systems, loiter munitions, advanced IED and mines, CRBN threats including everything from chemicals to thermobarics,
“And the consequences of efforts to disrupt our access to the Electro magnetic Spectrum and space borne enablers must be accounted for by a holistic approach to survivability and force protection.”
“To achieve this will require the Integrated Joint Force to evolve from the best-equipped Army in our history, to the best-equipped land force, of its size, in the world.”
The land force needs to be inherently joint given the evolving nature of warfighting domains.
“Future land forces must be capable of potent cross-domain effects – projecting landpower from the land into multiple domains, including the electromagnetic spectrum and the arena of human perception.
“This will undoubtedly create new challenges, demand new responses and require cultural change to see where land forces may best serve the interests of the joint interagency intergovernmental and multinational ‘team of teams’.”
CDRE Spedding, RANR, DG Navy Program Support and Infrastructure provided the Navy perspective.
His presentation like that of BG Wainwright focused on the kinds of outcomes which Navy needed to achieve both to leverage and to contribute to enhanced joint warfighting effects.
The Australian Navy has moved from a perspective of providing single naval assets to work alongside core allies, notably the US Navy, to providing task forces to meet government objectives.
The focus upon building and operating task forces inherently requires integration at the task force level; and leveraging the task force to support government objectives inherently requires broader level of ADF and government integration within combat and political objectives.
The shift to a continuous shipbuilding strategy provides a significant foundation for how navy will address its modernization needs within a joint strategic framework.
Naval platforms have both static and dynamic elements.
The static elements will be grounded in fundamental ship design and maritime operating demand.
The dynamic elements, combat systems and weapons, will be software driven and inherently open to integration with the joint force.
CDRE Spedding, RANR, DG Navy Program Support and Infrastructure, participating in a panel at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Structure Design, April 11, 2017.
And the adoption of the Ship Zero concept provides an opportunity to provide a test bed for continuous development of the dynamic systems carried onboard maritime platforms.
In my interview with Chief of Navy last year, he discussed the Ship Zero concept as a foundational element in the way ahead for the Navy to provide for more rapid combat innovations.
Question: Wedgetail shows an interesting model, namely having the combat squadron next door to the Systems Program Office.
This facilitates a good working relationship and enhances software refresh as well.
You have something like this in mind for your ship building approach.
Could you discuss that approach?
Vice Admiral Barrett: “We do and are implementing it in our new Offshore Patrol Vessel program. And with our ‘ship zero’ concept we are looking to integrate the various elements of operations, upgrades, training and maintenance within a common centre and work flow to get greater readiness rates and to enhance an effective modernization process as well.
“We are reworking our relationship with industry because their effectiveness is a key part of the deterrence process. If I have six submarines alongside the wharf because I can’t get them away, they are no longer lethal and they are no longer a deterrent force.
“Again, as an example we have dramatically improved availability by building maintenance towers alongside the submarine—rather than the previous way that it was done, where people arrived into that one gangway under the submarine then dispersed to do their maintenance work—is an example of how we need to work.
Key Strategic Challenge: Building the Integrated Force While Fighting With the Force You Have
The final three military presentations focused on the challenges of shaping a more integrated force fighting with the force you have while you are incorporating new platforms, software, communications systems and other key assets within the ADF.
How do you fight with the force you have while you pursue development of a more integrated force?
RADM Tony Dalton, Head of the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, focused exactly on that question.
Rear Admiral Tony Dalton making his presentation at the Williams Foundation seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.
“How does the legacy force come into play and affect new platform decisions?
“Before we can think about a future integrated force we have to make decisions now about force upgrades and modernization.”
The shift, which needs to be made, is to ensure that upgrades and modernization of the legacy force are informed by options to shape a more effective force.
“We have to work with the projects that are already in play and several of these simply do not point the way forward for a more fully integrated approach.”
And if we are going to open the aperture with regard to more flexible development within the force, the challenge of how to manage cost is crucial.
“If we buy an off the shelf system our schedule as well as costs are on a solid timeline.
“When we Australianize a system cost will go up 12-15% and with it schedule slippage.
“And if we are talking developmental systems we are looking at a 25-30% cost increase and with it schedule slippage as well.”
He highlighted that in the smart buyer approach currently in place, the contribution of a particular project to overall force integration was a key consideration.
The presentation by Air Commodore Leon Phillips, Director General Aerosapce Maritime, Training and Surveillance, looked at ways to reshape the acquisition and sustainment of the integrated force to address some of the concerns raised by RADM Dalton.
In his presentation, Phillips contrasted the traditional project approach with what he referred to as a new engagement model to allow for more flexibility in development but ways to constrain cost and shape realistic outcomes.
Put bluntly, without organizational change it would not be possible to achieve effective ways to shape integrated design cost effectively and in light of the dynamics of software development.
To achieve a joint design outcome, it would be necessary to shape an engagement model in which industry was a full partner. It was crucial as well to feed learning back into requirements generation as well.
Slide from presentation by Air Commodore Leon Phillips, Director General Aerospace Maritime, Training and Surveillance, to Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017
Budgeting changes were required as well.
“We don’t do enough funded work with industry to get a realistic assessment of the domain of the feasible nor with regard to how to price evolving options and capabilities.
“How do you price the evolution within the force of options and opportunities when you manage with fixed priced contracts? You don’t.”
He argued the new engagement model would divide programs into three phases: a partnership, appraisal and executive phase within which different approaches would be combined to deliver a capability.
This slide is taken from the presentation by AIRCDRE Leon Phillips, Director General Aerospace Maritime, Training and Surveillance. to the Williams Foundation Seminar on Joint Force Design, April 11, 2017.
In the partnership phase, one establishes the steering group and the stakeholders to be involved in program definition.
The focus is upon the vision or the wish list of the capability, which is the target of the effort.
In the appraisal phase, there are funded studies which allow education about what is realistic to achieve for the target funding and to shape choice and determine how to reduce risk.
In the execution phase, the core decisions have been taken and the target objectives defined and pursued. The execution phase adjusts the vision to realistic outcomes within the targeted budget. It is not about requirements it is about outcomes driven by the partnership as a procurement force.
The final presentation addressed the challenges of the digital nature of the joint force.
How to best leverage dynamically developing IT and communication systems to deliver a force able to leverage a diversity of networks and to deliver a joint effect?
In his presentation, BG Wainwright defined how he saw this challenge:
“The range, array and potential of next generation sensor technologies – matched to long range, precision fires – will demand low signature land forces capable of operating well below an adversary’s detection and discrimination thresholds.”
“Which leads me to offer a note of caution: A highly networked and integrated joint force is one that may on one hand draw great strengths, but equally exposes real and rich targetable vulnerabilities to our adversaries. It is here that the lessons of the past also hold the key to preparing for our future.”
In the presentation by Air Vice Marshal Andrew Dowse, Head of Information Communications Technology Operations, a diversity of challenges facing the development of a proper set of glues for evolving force integration was the focus of attention.
One of the most interesting aspects of the discussion was the need to evolve the IT and Coms systems to support the ADF as its reach were expanded for the extended defense of Australia.
This meant that reach, security and flexibility were crucial to ensure that platforms were not flying blind and their contributions minimized by lack of an ability to leverage various networks.
“The proliferation of networks proliferates the risks.
“And this could affect the availability and contribute of very expensive combat platforms at crucial points in combat operations.”
Various networks is really the point.
It is not about everyone being on the same network: it is about shaping ways for force packages to integrate by leveraging discrete, diverse and flexible networks.
“Mobility is a serious consideration; we need to provide digital capabilities where the force operates.”
Shaping a Way Ahead – The Perspective of Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Blackburn
This seminar was different from the earlier Williams Seminars.
In the earlier seminars, the new platforms on air, sea and land transformation was discussed in detail and the service perspectives highlighted.
This seminar built upon these earlier presentations and proceeded with the question of how one would build by design more integration into such a force, rather than doing so after the fact.
After the seminar, I had a chance to sit down with John Blackburn and to discuss the challenges and way ahead in designing an integrated force rather than cobbling together platforms into a force, which is, integrated piece meal after the fact.
Question: The seminar looked at a very tough issue. US services are individually looking at service integration, rather than force integration. The seminar explored how one might design in joint force integration. Could you describe the approach used in the seminar, which might will anticipate how this would be done in practice?
Blackburn: The hypotheses were put together as a set of questions to give a focus for the discussion, and each of the presenters were asked to do two things.
One was to talk about their particular area and how it’s going to be a part of integrated force, but secondly, just test the hypotheses, or propose other ones if they thought they were better.
If we can agree a simple list of hypotheses, then we’ve got a really good starting point upon which to design the force. If we can’t, we end up having an argument right down in the technical detail levels.
That was the intent.
The other different thing about this seminar was that I was able to meet with the three service representatives and the joint staff together to discuss what we were trying to achieve, what the hypotheses were, what the question sets were, and so the presentations you saw from the three services and from the VCDF here, were not people just coming into a seminar and giving their separate views.
They actually set down as a team and discussed it, to make sure the way they were looking at the problem and what they were going to present was coordinated, and to some degree integrated.
This normally doesn’t happen at seminars. People get invited, and they all come up with a set of PowerPoint slides that usually their staff has produced for them, and they all give the standard story.
This didn’t happen in this case.
Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn at the Williams Foundation seminar April 11, 2017
Question: For sure, what you usually get is what Piaget referred to as parallel play?
Blackburn: That is right and we wanted here was serious consideration of how we might actually design an integrated joint force to get the full combat effects which force modernization could deliver.
In this case, we chose one stars to make the presentations.
Why did we do that?
When you get three stars, or senior officers, making presentations, everyone sits there and listens, but the folks who actually have to design the future force and lead the teams that are doing it are the one stars and the colonels, the O-6s.
You can see that each of our service chiefs have a very strong future focus. Our Chief of Navy and the documents which he’s been writing, our Chief of Air Force talking about the change in the whole way of culture we have to do this, and our Chief of Army driving his force forward.
When you’ve got 240 people in the audience, and these are by and large, apart from the industry folks, O-7s, one stars and below, they collectively are the ones that are going to have to do the hard work on doing the design under the guidance of the senior officers.
What we were trying to do for the 240 people in that room was have a conversation at peer level. In other words, it’s peer-to-peer conversation. We, as a team, are going to have to address this.
That’s why we decided not to ask the service chiefs to speak. At the conferences, we’ll get the service chiefs, because they think it’s important to have the head of the organization speak. We think it’s important to have a conversation amongst those levels in the organization that are actually doing the design and the thinking themselves, so they can express some ideas. They can exchange ideas.
It also is a really good way to set up networks, because not too many people are going to go ring up the Chief of the Service after a seminar and say, “Hey, I want to ask you about your question.” It’s not that hard to ring up one of the one-stars who had a conversation and say, “Hey, I heard what you said.”
There were some important messages that came out from those one-stars that showed they were thinking deeply about the issue and talking to each other about it. That’s the way to get an integrated force.
Question: When we’re talking about a 21st-century integrated force and why that’s important, a lot of people’s minds go back to the network-centric warfare days, and that’s not what we’re talking about.
You clearly are not talking about connecting platforms after the fact and calling that integration.
How do you see the difference?
Blackburn: Let me go back to the difference between the two. I was head of strategic policy at the time and we worked with Admiral Cebrowski as he launched the NCW discussion. He told us “NCW is an idea which we are just getting out there. If 40% of what I’m saying ever comes true, that’ll be a fantastic result, because it’s an idea. It’s to get the language out there.”
The reality is, we’re never going to be totally network-connected. It’s not going to happen. It’s like saying you’re going to have unlimited bandwidth and everybody can actually connect without the adversary disrupting those networks. You’ve got to start with the idea. You’ve got to get people talking about it and to get the language out there into the debate.
Now where we’re at now is moving to the next stage, of applying a bit of thrust as one of the speakers said, getting on with building this, not just talking about it but building it.
We see elements of force integration in the United States, but the integration there is by service. There’s integrated force happening within Navy with NIFC-CA. The USAF is looking at their future, Aerospace 2030 Concepts. We have to follow the ideas in the U.S. but take one step further – to integrate the whole force.
Because we’re small, we might be able to take the step straight to JIFC, the Joint Integrated Fire Control idea for Australia. We want to learn from the U.S., follow it closely, but actually take a step which is hard for the U.S. to do because of its size, and that’s go truly joint by design.
Editor’s Note: AVM (Retired) Blackburn led a study on integrated air and missile defense to explore the boundaries of how design from the outset of integration for the force might proceed.
According to a piece on the Williams Foundation website:
The Williams Foundation conducted an Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) study between Sep16 and Feb17 to explore the challenges of building Australia’s IAMD capability and the implications for the Department of Defence’s integrated force design function.
The study was focussed at the Program level of capability.
The study incorporated a visit to the US for a month to explore the IAMD challenge with United States Defense Forces and Agencies, think tanks and Industry. The initial study findings were then explored in Australia in three Defence and Industry workshops on 31 Jan17 and 1 Feb 17, using a Chatham House model of unattributed discussions.
Many of the statements made in this report are not referenced as they are derived from these Chatham House discussions and associated meetings.
IAMD is a highly complex issue; comments made in this report should not be construed in any way as being critical of the IAMD approach of the Department of Defence. This report cannot account for the full complexity of the integrated force design process that is being addressed within Defence; however, it may offer some value in providing suggestions based on the study findings.
This study would not have been possible without the support and assistance of several areas within the Australian Department of Defence, the US Defense Department, Industry and think tanks. The Williams Foundation deeply appreciates the support of the IAMD Study major sponsors, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Thanks are also due to Jacobs in funding the services of Dr. Gary Waters who provided valuable support in the research for the study and in the production of the workshop notes.
This report represents the views of AVM Blackburn (Retd), the IAMD Study lead. This study report is intentionally high level and brief; in the author’s experience, long and detailed reports are rarely read by senior decision makers.
During my recent visit to Australia to attend the Williams Foundation seminar on integrated force design, I had a chance to discuss Army modernization with the head of the effort, Brigadier General Chris Mills.
This is the third time I have had the opportunity to interview Mills, and during this interview, he provided an update on how the Australian government was approaching defense modernization and the evolving Army perspective.
At the heart of the Australian Army modernization effort is ensuring enhanced lethality and survivability for the modular force packages being shaped by a 21st century approach to force development and integration.
The objective of Army modernization is to empower smaller army units and ensure their modular integration into larger force packages, as and when required.
Army modernization is focused on evolving and developing capabilities which provide for agility, flexibility and integration.
And to do so, Army is relying on joint capabilities, whether ISR, fires or C2.
But it must also ensure that its ground maneuver elements have sufficient organic combat power to operate on their own as well.
Australian Army officer Brigadier Chris Mills, Director General of Army Modernisation, officially launches the Human Performance Network research at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, on 12 December 2016
In one of the earlier interviews, this is how BG Mills put it.
Question: In some ways, what you are describing is taking the mental furniture of the Special Forces and applying more broadly to the Army?
Answer: That is a fair way to put it. The Special Forces are generally able to access a whole range of joint effects for their particular tactical tasks. As a result, allowing small teams to achieve large effects.
We need to take, as you said, that mental framework and apply that to what we call the joint land force.
Within the ADF context the joint land force refers to all of those services that are collectively working to fight with Army to fight the land battle . By its nature that joint land force is by its nature, purple.
Importantly, not only do you have to package this small team appropiratly, but we have to ensure these small teams are capable of being dynamically repackaged on the fly with joint effects. For example, if a combat team now needs additional EW because of a change in threat or mission, the combat team will be able to leverage the required additional EW support from the joint force in time frames far quicker than the past.
The reality is that as we move beyond this decade we need to be capable of pushing support further down from division level and making it more readily available and more dynamically available to the small group level.
Empowering the small group with joint effects in seconds and minutes not hours and days.
Slide from presentation by BG Wainwright, Williams Foundation, April 11, 2017
The time responsiveness of an Air Tasking Order that’s 72 hours old is really not going to cut it.
I would suggest that time line needs to be radically truncated.
The Chief of Army made the point at the Airpower Conference that in many ways we are still using procedures and approaches that go back to World War II for air-ground operations; this makes no sense in terms of technological advances and operational shifts.
We need to shape a 21st century approach.
It is also no longer just about air-land integration, it is about multi-domain integration at the small group level.
During our April 2017 discussion, BG Mills highlighted the evolving approach to defense modernization for the ADF.
With the new Defence White Paper, a new organization was created namely, the Defence Innovation Hub.
According to an MoD White paper released on December 2016:
On 25 February 2016 the Government released the 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement (Industry Policy Statement).
The Industry Policy Statement, together with the 2016 Defence White Paper and the 2016 Integrated Investment Program, set out the Government’s strategy to enhance Australia’s defence capability including through collaboration with defence industry and other science and technology research partners.
A key element of the Industry Policy Statement is the establishment of the Defence Innovation Hub (Innovation Hub) for the Department of Defence (Defence).
The Innovation Hub will rationalise and simplify the existing Defence innovation programs into a streamlined program that nurtures and matures proposals through a single innovation pipeline.
Critical to the success of the Innovation Hub will be a supporting policy framework to transform the way that Defence approaches innovation and collaborates with industry and other research organisations.
The Innovation Hub is connected as well with the Defense Science and Technology Group’s Next Generation Technologies Fund.
“The Defense Innovation Hub, which works under Kate Louis which was announced in December of last year, has a significant amount of funds to support innovation initiatives, and it’s also linked to the Defense Science and Technology Group’s Next Generation Technology Fund.
Working with DSTG and the Innovation Hub provides the Australian Army with opportunity to solicit good ideas from industry, and then look at working with the respective companies at shaping innovative technologies to the point where they can eventually affect major capital acquisition projects.”
BG Mills then went on to describe some examples of innovation over the past three years, which illustrate how Army wants to shape its modernization approach.
The first example was the development and acquisition of a micro-UAV, a product that he highlighted during a presentation at the Williams Foundation last year.
“It started with an Army Innovation Day in which we put the challenge to industry of providing a small UAV which could be used by small army units.
“A number of companies trialed their capabilities and we then picked one – the Black Hornet – for further trials.
“We established a trial in one of our brigades and within Special Forces. It was deployed to Iraq for a short period of time.
“We like it. Patrol reports were very favorable.
“We are now looking to enter into a contract with a company to procure enough nano-UAVs to equip every one of our platoons and vehicle troops with its own nano-UAV.”
A second example and one that involves working with the Innovation Hub involves the development of autonomous vehicles and how these vehicles should inform “our future requirements.”
The LAND 400 project is seeing the replacement of the venerable M-113 with a new vehicle. According to the Ministry of Defence:
LAND 400 – will acquire and support the next generation of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV) with the firepower, protection and mobility to defeat increasingly lethal and adaptive adversaries well into the future.
LAND 400 will deliver enhanced levels of survivability to the Joint Land Force including sensors, weapons and information systems which will be networked to strategic intelligence platforms.
At its foundation, the project will deliver replacements for the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) fleets.
The project will also provide specialist Manoeuvre Support Vehicles (MSV) to properly enable Army’s combat brigades to undertake joint land combat.
LAND 400 has four discrete phases:
LAND 400 Phase 1 – Project Definition Study (completed).
LAND 400 Phase 2 – Mounted Combat Reconnaissance Capability, primarily enabled by the Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) mission system (the ASLAV replacement)
LAND 400 Phase 3 – Mounted Close Combat Capability, primarily enabled by the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) (the M113 APC replacement) and MSV mission systems.
This is a major procurement program within MoD for Army modernization.
But BG Mills highlighted the importance of a potential offshoot program to be supported by innovation involving the development of autonomous vehicles technologies, which could complement the main acquisition project.
“One of the options we could explore is to take legacy vehicles, such as the M113, and install an autonomous vehicle kit.
“As a result we could get a vehicle which could be used for the dirty and dangerous missions which are currently being done by our troops. Further more this would be a relatively cheap and value for money option for the Australian tax payer.”
“For example under this context the M113 could now become an autonomous resupply vehicle. I need the resupply to go from X to Y. Its protection level is not as high as our manned vehicles, LAND 400, but it doesn’t need to be. There’s just bullets, beans, etc. in these vehicles, but they can make their way autonomously from point X to point Y.”
Another example where autonomous capability could be leveraged in the army modernization approach is to replace humans doing counter-mine searches with autonomous vehicles.
“I don’t want a man or a woman doing that in the future.
“I want an autonomous robot, autonomous vehicle, clearing the ground in front of the patrol.
“There are a number of companies around the world that have got very advanced autonomous vehicles robotics that could do that task now.
“We’re looking to run trials in the back end of this year and throughout the next couple of years.”
The Army is modernizing and doing so within the evolving joint context.
“The Australian Army is presented with the opportunity of transforming itself.
“It’s really understanding and ensuring that we get more than the sum of the individual parts, that they work collectively together and what we get is more than just the individual pieces of equipment.
“And for us, this means a focus on a modernized combined arms team.”
“We need to ensure that as we modernize the combined arms team, that it is configurable, with the right troops and equipment for the task, and scalable, with the right number of people, from a combat team of about 200 people to a battle group, three to five combat teams and their support elements, to a brigade, 3000 to 5000 people, which is three to five battle groups and their support elements, and ensuring that the glue that makes the collective capability operates effectively in a range of combat settings.”
When I was last in Australia, the LHD trials were starting and the Army was looking at ways to make effective use of this new capability.
I asked him to provide an update on progress to date.
“It is going well.
“We have put our Land battlefield management system on the ship and we can now use it to prepare for ground force insertion.
“We can do collaborative planning on the ship digitally and then prepare the force for deployment off of the ship.”
“Next we are looking to incorporate beyond line of sight communication capabilities to the Land battle management system on the ship and to have that ready by the next Talisman Saber exercise.”
Editor’s Note: For a look at the Australian Army’s Battle Management System, see the following:
Brazil is continuing its long plunge into the murky world of profound political crises.
Past corruption revelations, simmering judicial conflict between the federal judges and the political and private sector elites, and challenges to a system of government and the constitutional arrangements, which emerged when Brazil re-democratized in the mid 1980’s, are all in play.
The crisis in Brazil is self-made.
Although Brazilian intellectuals (and Brazilian politicians) are always prone to blame all their ills on the machinations of nefarious outsiders, particularly on the United States, this one is “made in Brazil.”
The depth of the crisis is existential for the regime. It has profoundly shaken the political and business elites of Latin America’s most important country.
But fixing the crisis of democracy will be fraught with difficulties.
The government of Michel Temer is part of the problem. It lacks legitimacy, is extremely unpopular, and is composed almost entirely of men in the 70’s, who have been for decades been part of the problem.
There are some new leaders on the political scene, but they are political outsiders, most prominently the new mayor of Sao Paulo, Joao Doria, a Trump like figure from the private sector who ran the Brazilian TV edition of “the apprentice.”
Meanwhile the economic crisis continues.
Brazil is suffering its worse economic recession in over half a century. The nation’s fiscal problems are also critical: A huge and bloated obligation to pensions for example which the country can ill afford, but where reforms are strenuously, and at times violently, opposed by those who most benefit from them, particularly the police (the state military and civil police and the armed forces).
But it is clear that the Brazilian federal government, and the governments of the Brazilian states, can ill afford these escalating obligations in the long term.
Already Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, and Minas Gerais, three of the most important Brazilian states are bankrupt, and have difficulty in paying their civil servants and their police forces.
A police strike in the southeastern state of Espírito Santo in February led to widespread looting, dozens of murders, and a breakdown of order on the streets, and forced President Michel Temer to send in 200 troops.
The depleted public finances have crippled basic health services, education, and public security in other states as well.
The political parties (and there are any of them) are all now revealed to have been involved since the end of military rule in the mid-1980’s in cozy clandestine cartels where payoffs and kickbacks, and toxic relationships between the public sector, politicians, and state enterprises, linked them all in a downward spiral, which has undermined and subverted the very functioning of the democratic state.
Because Brazil is now a major international player in the petrochemical and petroleum industries, in the export of raw materials, and in agricultural-business, these shady cartels have all had international ramifications, which has made hiding their dealings (legal and illegal) from international scrutiny much more difficult.
In the end this has contributed to their revelation to public view.
And all of this has been helped by the simultaneous grown of the internet in Brazil. Brazil is now the second largest user of Facebook in the world. Very little that passes does not very soon become public.
The “car-wash” (“Lavo-Jato” in Portuguese) got its name from a money laundering operation at a petrol station in Brazil’s capital, Brasilia. The investigation by the Federal Police of Brazil, Curitiba Branch, and judicially commanded by Federal Judge Sergio Moro, revealed corruption at the highest levels of government and at the state-controlled oil company Petrobras, where executives were accepting bribes to award contracts.
The investigations have already led to large (and expensive) legal settlements for Petrobras in the U.S. and in Switzerland.
The investigation also led to the activities of the large Brazilian multinational construction company Odebrecht, a Brazilian conglomerate involved in engineering, construction, chemical and petrochemicals, with operations in South and Central and North America, Africa, the Caribbean, Europe and the Middle East.
It is one of Brazil five largest private sector manufacturing companies, and owns Braskem, one of the county’s largest petrochemical companies.
In June 2015 the CEO Marcelo Odebrecht was arrested. On March 7, 2016, Judge Moro sentenced him to 19 years and 4 months in jail for arranging US$30 million in bribes to executives of Petrobras in return for contracts and influence.
Odebrecht has been involved in corruption fueled deals in Cuba, Peru, Angola, the Dominican Republic, where it will pay US$ 184 million, twice what it paid in bribes for public contracts between 2001 and 2014. In the U.S. the Department of Justice released documents detailing US$788 million paid by Odebrecht in 12 counties in Latin America and Africa.
On April 17, 2017, Judge Raymond Dearie, of the U.S. Federal Court in Brooklyn ordered Oderbrecht to pay a fine of US$2.6 billion for bribing public officials abroad: US$ 2.39 to Brazil: US$ 93 million to the US: and US$116 million to Switzerland. This is the largest settlement in the U.S. since Siemans settled for US$ 1.6 billion in 2008.
These revelations have been helped in part by the new global transparency of financial transactions and off-shore bank accounts. It has been added as well by publicity about them though leaks to the press and over the internet, and as a result of Swiss-leaks, the Panama Papers revelations (and the use of the British “overseas territories” in the Caribbean island “fiscal paradises” for off-shore and clandestine banking operations), and the new banking transparency in Switzerland where many of the corrupt Brazilian politicians had parked their ill-gotten cash.
The “car wash” investigation reached new depths just before Easter when the list of those being investigated was released by the Brazilian Supreme Court justice, Luiz Edson Fachin, who had assumed the responsibility for the case on the supreme court following the death of Justice Teori Zavascki, in a plane crash when approaching the airport in the Rio de Janeiro’s colonial tourist city of Paraty.
Justice Fachin’s “list” included 8 ministers in the government of Michel Temer, who had become president of Brazil after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. It also included 24 senators, 3 governors, and 39 Federal deputies. The ministers in Temer’s government include Eliseu Padilha, who is his closest political ally and is the head of his “casa civil” (the head of his presidential staff), Moreira Franco (Secretary-General of the government), Blairo Maggi (Agriculture), Aloysio Nunes (Foreign Affairs), Helder Barbalho (National Integration), Marcos Pereira (Industry) and Gilberto Kasseb (Communities).
So far all remain in office.
It is also apparent from Marcelo Oderbrecht’s testimony that Michel Temer, former president Dilma Rousseff, Guido Mantega, former minister of finance, Senator Aecio Neves, the leader of the PSDB and former PSDB presidential candidate in the last presidential election when he was defeated by Dilma Rousseff, and Graça Foster, the former head of Petrobras, are also involved.
All strenuously deny the allegations.
But like so much in this case the videotaped testimony of those imprisoned by Judge Moro is now available on the Internet, much of it released prior to the Easter weekend. Brazilians now have the opportunity of watch and to make up their own minds about who is (and who is not) telling the truth.
Meanwhile, Dilma Rousseff has been visiting American university campuses (of all places given the history of her government’s polices and its relationship with Washington during her term in office), where she had been received a martyr for democracy.
But the key target in Brazil remains former Brazilian president, Inácio Lula da Silva.
Despite the multiple scandals that have engulfed Brazil and the Worker’s Party and many of his closest associates over the past three years, Lula he remains, according to the most recent public opinion polls, the most popular candidate for the next presidential election in 2018.
But the noose is tightening.
Last week the patriarch of the Oderbrecht familty, Emilio Oderbrecht, claimed in testimony before Judge Moro that “I was, basically, not the owner of the government, I was the stooge of the government.” (Eu, no fundo, nao era o dono do governo, Eu era o otario do governo”).
And Jose Aldemario Pinheiro, known as Leo Pinheiro, ex-president of OAS, a major privately owned Brazilian multinational conglomerate, involved in civil construction of highways, airports, hydro-electric power plants, dams and ports, said in testimony that Lula knew off payments to the “caixa dois.” These are the black boxes of Brazilian politics where corrupters meet the corrupted in off-the-books payments for political campaigns, and expect to receive preferential treatment, favorable legislation, and bloated government contracts, where they could often skim an extra 5 per cent over costs.
Moreover, Leo Pinheiro also said that OAS had paid for Lula’s luxury triplex apartment in Guaruja, a tourist coastal town known for its beaches in Sao Paulo.
Lula has adamantly denied that he even owns the triplex apartment in question or knows anything about these valuable freebees. Though photographs have emerged of Lula and the late wife, Leticia, who died in early February (they had been married for 43 years), visiting the apartment and ordering improvements.
Leo Pereira also testified that Lula had at a secret meeting in May 2014, instructed him to destroy all evidence of their relationship because of the “Lava-Jato” investigations.
Lula’s supporters dismiss all these allegations and leaks as being part of a plot to remove him as a presidential contender.
But Lula has been called to testify before Judge Moro on May 3. Also Judge Moro has ordered that Lula be present during all testimony the 87 witnesses called by the lawyers for the prosecution and by the defense.
This May will be an “interesting” month for other reasons as well. The Brazilian Supreme Court is scheduled in late May to decide on restrictions on the “foro priveligiado”. That is the law, which in effect protects member of the government and members of congress by restricting the cases only to the Supreme Court. A majority on the court is apparently in favor of lifting these restrictions so that lower federal courts can take on these cases, but this opposed by at least two members of the court.
The web of corruption revealed by the “car wash” investigations and the plea bargaining with the large private sector company owners and executives, and with the money launderers and publicity agents, in order to obtain reduced sentences in return for credible and proven testimony (the “delacoes premiados” in Portuguese), have also implicated other leaders of the main opposition party the PSDB.
In addition Aecio Neves, including the current governor of Sao Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin has been implicated as well.
But above all it has involved Jose Serra, the former mayor and governor of Sao Paulo, former presidential candidate for the PSDB, and former foreign minister under Temer, until he resigned to return to his senatorial seat from Sao Paulo, ostensibly he has claimed because of “back problems”
The next major shoe to drop in Judge Moro’s investigations is the potentially devastating testimony of Antonio Palocci, who was Lula’s former long term intimate colleague, his former finance minister, campaign chairman, and PT insider and bigwig. Palocci if anyone (apart from Jose Dirceu, Lula’s former factotum, who is also held in jail by Judge Moro), certainly knows where the bodies are buried.
He has indicted in testimony before Judge Moro that: “I believe I could open the way for what might be another year of work – but work that would be good for Brazil.” Palocci could well make the plea bargain of all plea bargains, if he strikes a deal to speak on the record.
And what he has to say will be instantly available on the Internet as well.
Much of the focus of the investigations has been has been on the so-called “caixa dois” that is the black box of undeclared contributions to the political campaigns at all levels of government, from the municipal, to the state, to the federal, as well above all to the presidential campaigns.
Odebrecht kept a list of the nicknames it used for the recipients of these off-the-book political donations. Emilo Odebrecht said in his testimony before Judge Moro that this had been going on for thirty years. And he was surprised he said that anyone was surprised by these cozy relationships between private business, state enterprises, and government officials.
Undoubtedly it began much earlier under the military regime (and probably much earlier than that).
But Emilio Oderbrecht should know all about this from the history of his Bahia based enterprises, and the intimate relationship he enjoyed with the “boss” of Bahia and national power broker, Antonio Carlos Magalhães, whose son is now the the mayor of Salvador, Bahia’s capital.
The one bit of good news is that parts of the system do work in Brazil.
It is Brazilian investigators and judges, and the supreme court, which have all acted, and have brought the perpetuators of these crimes to justice. Leading politicians and leading businessmen have been jailed, and many sentenced to long periods in prison.
But it does appear the scale of corruption increased exponentially under the PT governments after 2003. Though the “delações privilegiado” have already (reportedly) also implicated the other great icon of democratic Brazil, former two term PSDB president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (who has also always been very associate of Jose Serra.)
Like, Lula, who succeeded him as a two term president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) also adamantly denies these allegations. The investigators have set their sights on the banking and financial institutions which have turned a blind eye to money laundering, and to the parts of the judiciary which tolerated these shady dealings.
But already the lives of federal investigators and judges have been threatened. And such threats are not to be taken lightly in Brazil.
But the sad truth is that the “new republic” established in the mid 1980s has been paralyzed by these multiple scandals, betrayed by the very politicians from both sides of the political spectrum who promised so much, and offered so much hope, but in the end, unfortunately for Brazil, delivered so little.
Chris Jenkins, CEO Thales Australia and National President of the Australian Industry Group, Chairman of the AIG Defence Council, and an Advisory Board member of the Centre for Defence Industry Capability.
This slide was presented as part of Rear Admiral Tony Dalton, Head Joint Systems Division, Australian Ministry of Defence’s brief to the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.
Artist’s rendering of short fin barracuda. Credit; DCNS
Integrated Force Hypotheses Discussed During Williams Foundation Seminar, April 11, 2017.
Air Marshal (Retired) Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation, April 11, 2017.
VADM Ray Griggs, Vice Chief of Defence Force, speaking at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Force Integration Design, April 11, 2017.
Brigadier David Wainwright, Director General Land Warfare during a panel discussion at the Williams Foundation seminar on integrated force design, April 11, 2017.
Capability stream approach applied to force integration by design. Slide presented by BG Blain in his presentation to the Williams Seminar, April 11, 2017.
BG Blain during a panel session held at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.
Air Commodore Robert Chipman, Williams Foundation Seminar on Force Integration, April 11, 2017
Taxonomy used by Air Commodore Chipman to prioritize program efforts. Slide was part of his presentation to Williams Foundation Seminar April 11, 2017.
Rear Admiral Tony Dalton making his presentation at the Williams Foundation seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.
Slide from presentation by Air Commodore Leon Phillips, Director General Aerospace Maritime, Training and Surveillance, to Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017
This slide is taken from the presentation by AIRCDRE Leon Phillips, Director General Aerospace Maritime, Training and Surveillance. to the Williams Foundation Seminar on Joint Force Design, April 11, 2017.
Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn at the Williams Foundation seminar April 11, 2017
Australian Army officer Brigadier Chris Mills, Director General of Army Modernisation, officially launches the Human Performance Network research at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, on 12 December 2016
Slide from presentation by BG Wainwright, Williams Foundation, April 11, 2017