A French Air Force Perspective on “Atlantic Trident 2017”

05/09/2017

2017-05-04 The first trilateral exercise involving fifth generation aircraft with Typhoons and Rafales was held in December 2015.

In a piece published on the French Air Force website on December 16, 2015, a brief overview of the exercise was provided.

According to General Creux: “the key challenge was to get our most modern aircraft to work together and to develop tactics together and the have strengthened their confidence in one another.”

After the briefing, General Creux met with French aviators in their work area and discussed the operation with them. 

“Our aviators learned a lot from the exercise and have had a very good experience.”

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/actus-air/exercice-tei-rencontre-au-sommet-sur-la-base-de-langley

And In a separate discussion with a senior RAF pilot, the importance of working the skills for higher end combat was crucial and the involvement of the French Air Force very important.

“The eyes of the French Air Force was clearly opened with regard to the F-22 and fifth generation, and they themselves have much to contribute with their battle hardened combat capability and their latest generation aircraft.”

For this British combat pilot, the key for working the fifth generation with other aircraft was the ability of the former to provide for more survivability and lethality and with the legacy aircraft providing significant payloads to the fight.

https://sldinfo.com/french-participation-in-the-trilateral-exercise-updated-with-an-raf-discussion/

The trilateral experience has been continued and updated with the recently completed Atlantic Trident Exercise also held at Langley Air Force Base from April 12-28 2017.

This exercise was marked by the enhanced participation of fifth generation aircraft with F-35s from Eglin AFB engaged along with the F-22s, Typhoons and Rafales.

According to an article published on the French Air Force website, the exercise began with working through Basic Fighting Maneuvers (BFM) among the four aircraft before transitioning to the core function of the exercise, which was shaping new tactics shaped by 4th and 5th generation air integration.

According to General Éric Charpentier, the Director of the French force engaged in the exercise and the Commander of the Rafale force participating in the exercise: “

We are part of club of the most powerful fighter aircraft in the world. Because of their preparation and their operational experience, our airmen play a key role.”

Dassualt Rafale of the Armée de l’air – French Air Force rotates from during Exercise Atlantic Trident ’17. Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA. Credit: Todd Miller, Second Line of Defense

He emphasized that the Blue Force of F-22s, F-35s, Typhoons and Rafales forged new tactics and capabilities in defeating the Blue Force of an AWACS led large F-15 force with T-38s participating as well.

“To prepare for tomorrow’s threats, we are preparing for high intensity air operations.

“To do this we must achieve a maximum level of integration of aircraft of the 4th and 5th generations.

“We are working to combine the strengths of each aircraft and to make the best of its capabilities.”

The exercise “enhanced our knowledge of each other and provided the opportunity to develop new tactics.”

The FAF website noted: “the exercise was especially marked by the participation of F-35As from Eglin Air Base in Florida.

“After its IOC several months ago, the aircraft is seeing its capabilities grow.”

A sense of how the way ahead with 4th and 5th generation aircraft was provided by an RAF pilot who participated in Red Flag 17-1, which involved USAF, RAF and RAAF elements.

It is clear that the F-35 has already had a major impact on the thinking of operators and, in effect, Red Flag 17-1 saw the operators reshaping how the aircraft would work together in reshaping their operational rhythm in the combat space.

And as they did so, a way ahead in terms of Weaponization, C2 and related issues would be sorted out.

The F-35 has arrived and is reshaping concepts of operations as well as the operational restructuring of roles and mission responsibilities of other air combat assets.

With regard to the RAF, they are already shaping a new approach with regard to their Typhoons as they introduce F-35s into their force.

According to this pilot: “The Typhoon because of the performance of its defensive aids could operate in key areas to support F-35 operations along with the F-22.

“The specialized capabilities of the two aircraft in turn determined how they were used in the battlespace and the F-15 and Growlers were positioned appropriate to their missions and capabilities in the battlespace.

“A key question has been raised about how to handle C2 and weapons decisions across the battlespace.

“The Sentinel and the Wedgetail both operated to provide a quarterbacking role, but given the fidelity with which the F-35 can see the battlespace sorting out relationships among the various C2 element is part of shaping the way ahead.

“It was great to have guys sit back in the Wedgetail and able to process quite a lot of information and actually operating as mission commanders for dynamic targeting missions with a range of strike or jamming aircraft.”

“The Wedgetail both in terms of the systems and the operators was really first rate, indeed cutting edge. There is no way I would fly with an AWACS if I could fly with a Wedgetail.”

“A key challenge as we integrate various assets is how to ensure we know who can see what.

“As we introduce the F-35, the pilots have to adjust to the fact that their machines will see and convey data that they themselves are not looking at. And different airplanes will have different levels of SA in the battlespace. How to adjust the operation of the force to meet this challenge?”

Translations from the French by Second Line of Defense.

And photos in the two slideshows are credited to the FAF.

Editor’s Note: Also see the following piece by Todd Miller on Atlantic Trident 2017:

Reshaping Fighter Operations in the Air Combat Space: Atlantic Trident 2017

 

 

How to Fight with the Fleet You have Today and Prepare for the Fleet of the Future?: The Perspective of Vice Admiral Tim Barrett

05/08/2017

2017-05-02 By Robbin Laird

During my most recent trip to Australia, the focus was upon how to shape an integrated ADF moving forward.

During my interviews surrounding the Williams Foundation seminar on that theme, I have had the chance to talk to key decision makers in shaping a way ahead.

Last August, I had a chance to talk with the Chief of the Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett.

A key speaker at the Williams Foundation seminar on air-land integration was the Chief of the Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett.

Barrett’s speech focused on the opportunities and challenges of the largest recapitalisation of the Australian Navy since World War II.

New submarines, destroyers and amphibious ships and associated fleet assets are being built in Australia to shape a new maritime capability for Australia.

But this force is being built in the time of significant innovation in the Pacific whereby new force concepts are being shaped, such as kill webs, distributed lethality, and fifth generation airpower.

Barrett made it very clear that what was crucial for the Navy was to design from the ground up any new ships to be core participants in the force transformation process underway.

https://sldinfo.com/vice-admiral-barrett-on-the-way-ahead-of-the-australian-navy-design-the-force-for-decisive-and-distributed-lethality/

We picked up where we left off from our August meeting.

Question: How do fight with the fleet you have and prepare at the same time for tomorrow’s fleet, especially when you have several new programs in the pipeline?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: You have to fight with the fleet you have now.

That is not an option; it is a necessity.

My focus to do that better and to lay the groundwork for the future fleet is to focus upon availability of assets.

Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN holds the floor, during the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs. Australia currently holds the Chairmanship of IONS. The regional forum was held during Sea Power 2015. *

How to we get our availability rates higher?

How do we get ships to sea more effectively and more often?

They are not going to make much difference sitting in drydocks.

One can provide for enhanced deterrence through enhanced availability.

Question: You certainly don’t win with Power Point slides, do you?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: You certainly don’t nor with a connected force in those slides, represented by lightening bolts but not realized in practice.

For example, we have a small submarine fleet of six submarines; they are not going deter anybody if they are not available and capable of going to see.

As we discussed last time, we have put a major effort in getting much greater availability from our Collins class submarines, and the ways we have done so will shape our approach, our expectations and our template for the operation of the new class of submarines.

We have seen a dramatic improvement in our Collins Class boats.

Question: In other words, by learning how to ramp up availability with today’s fleet you are preparing the template for future operations?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: That is clearly our approach going forward.

We should be building our sense of availability in the design right now, so that when the future frigates arrive in place, we have maximized availability, and through that deterrence given their contribution to a distributed lethal force capability.

And this clearly is a key challenge for the workforce to shape enhanced availability.

We are reworking our work force to do so today, but must prepare for the transition in the workforce to do so in the future, recognizing that tomorrow’s platforms will be different, and different skill sets required ensuring enhanced availability.

Government has committed to a future navy in terms of key new platforms.

I have that as a target goal so can work from here to there rather than simply fighting for the need to have a future fleet.

This certainty is crucial in allowing me to work the transition.

As we shape task force concepts for the current fleet, we are working connectors to make the fleet more effective in our task force approach.

As we work those connectors we are also anticipating how to build those into the design of the new fleet, rather than having to work the problem after we have acquired the platforms.

Question: And this is not simply about Navy, you focus is broader?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: It is; it is about working with industry; it is about working with the ADF; it is about working with government; in essence it is about the commitment of the nation.

We are a small force; smaller than the New South Wales Police Force.

We can not do this without a national commitment.

Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN, delivers the Ode of Remembrance at the Lone Pine commemorative service in Gallipoli.

Question: One aspect of change clearly is building 21st century defense structure.

I have just returned from the UK and witnessed their significant efforts at Lossiemouth, Waddington, Marham and at Lakenheath to have a new infrastructure built.

And certainly have seen that at RAAF Williamtown with the F-35 and at RAAF Edinburgh with the P-8/Triton.

How important in your view is building a new infrastructure to support a 21st century combat force?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: Crucial.

And that is in part what I am referring to as an industrial and national set of commitments to shaping a 21st century combat fleet.

We spoke last time about the Ship Zero concept.

This is how we are focusing upon shaping a 21st century support structure for the combat fleet.

I want the Systems Program Office, the Group that manages the ship, as well as the contracted services to work together on site.

I want the trainers there, as well, so that when we’re maintaining one part of the system at sea, it’s the same people in the same building maintaining those things that will allow us to make future decisions about obsolescence or training requirements, or to just manage today’s fleet.

I want these people sitting next to each other and learning together.

It’s a mindset.

It puts as much more effort into infrastructure design as it does into combat readiness, which is about numbers today.

You want to shape infrastructure that is all about availability of assets you need for mission success, and not just readiness in a numerical sense.

Getting the right infrastructure to generate fleet innovation on a sustained basis is what is crucial for mission success.

And when I speak of a continuous build process this is what I mean.

We will build new frigates in a new yard but it is not a fire and forget missile.

We need a sustained enterprise that will innovate through the life of those frigates operating in an integrated ADF force.

That is what I am looking for us to shape going forward.

Question: An example of your approach to the future is clearly the new submarine.

A French design house and an American combat systems company will be working together really for the first time.

And they are building a submarine which has never been built before.

 This provides an opportunity for you to shape a new support structure along the lines you have described going forward.

 How do you see this process?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: It is something new and allows us to shape the outcome we want in terms of an upgradeable sustainable submarine with high availability rates built in. We intend to see this built that way from the ground up.

It is not simply about acquiring a platform.

We will not be a recipient of someone else’s design and thought.

This will be something that we do, and we will work with those that have a capacity to deliver what we say we need.

I think the way you characterize the process makes sense.

The experiences we’ve had through Collins have taught us a lot.

With 12 of these future submarines in a theater anti-submarine role we think we can make an effective contribution to our defense and to working with core allies in the region, notably the US Navy.

Editor’s Note: Vice Admiral Barrett has published a new book this year entitled The Navy and the Nation and Ed Timperlake recently commented on this book as follows:

The Aussies are not just buying new equipment; they are rethinking how to integrated that force and make a more effective and lethal combat capability.

A recent publication by the Australian Chief of Navy illustrates the point.

Australia’s Vice Admiral Tim Barrett has written a brilliant book about maritime power.

It is what is known as a “good read” because it is written with great insights presented in easily understandable prose.

He shows the reader why “The Navy and the Nation” is a sacred bond.

This passage is one of the most powerful ever written about the role of a Navy and the connection with their citizens:

“Most People think the Navy is something else.

“They know it exists, the may even have a rough idea of what it is for, but they don’t think it’s got much to do with them.

“They’re wrong.

“The Navy is a national enterprise in which everyone is involved and which everyone is involved and which delivers peace and security to everyone in the country.

“This enterprise is a two-way street, and must be a two-way street.

“Going one way, the Navy offers peace and security. Going the other, the people offer support and contribution. Only when the street is a properly mutual two-way exchange between the Navy and the citizens can this bargain, this contract, deliver what it needs to.”

https://www.amazon.com/Navy-Nation-Australias-Maritime-Century-ebook/dp/B01NA069QS/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1493413420&sr=8-1&keywords=tim+barrett+navy

The slideshow above highlights the Collins class submarines and the photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.

The video below highlights the recent ceremony in Europe honoring those who fought at Gallipoli and the Chief of Navy delivered a powerful address at that ceremony,. 

An Update on the A400M: French-German Air Forces Shape a Common Training Effort

2017-05-08 The A400M as an operational baseline aircraft is being operated by several air forces.

According to Airbus Defence and Space there are now 42 A400Ms in service and the company currently has orders for 174 of the aircraft.

The two largest operators currently are the RAF, with 15 out of an ordered 22, and France, flying 11 out of 50 ordered.

The German Luftwaffe has eight A400Ms currently in service and has ordered 53 of the aircraft in total. Spain has taken delivery of one of an ordered 27, Turkey three of an ordered 10 and Malaysia has received the four it ordered. Belgium (seven) and Luxembourg (one) have yet to receive ordered A400Ms.

A key element of interoperability built into the aircraft is common parts and inherent potential for shaping common logistical approaches.

The British are working with Airbus and outsourcing their logistical support approach.

The A400M training centers. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space

According to an article by Andrew Chuter published earlier this year:

The British Royal Air Force’s A400M Atlas transport aircraft fleet is to be supported by Airbus Defence and Space in a £410 million ($504 million) deal announced Jan 5. 

The Defence Equipment and Support arm of Britain’s Ministry of Defence said in a statement that the contract will secure maintenance, upgrade and repair support of the planned 22-strong fleet of Airbus-built aircraft through 2026. 

The work will take place at the RAF’s air transport hub at Brize Norton where a £62 million hanger capable of housing three Atlas aircraft at one go is on schedule to be fully equipped in the next few months. 

The RAF fleet currently stands at 14 A400Ms following the delivery of two aircraft at the end of last year. 

The fleet is scheduled to reach 22 in 2019 and be the backbone of the RAF’s air-transport capability alongside smaller numbers of Boeing C-17 and Lockheed Martin C-130J aircraft. 

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/uk-air-force-picks-airbus-to-support-a400m-fleet-in-500-million-deal

In addition to the capability to shape common logistical approaches are common training approaches.

During a visit to Seville two years ago, there was a chance to talk with key Airbus personnel involved with the A400M who were shaping the standup and evolution of training for the aircraft.

At Seville, training is provided for the basics for operating the aircraft and to provide general training across various national air forces.

The French and the Germans are going to the next level and are focused on more advanced training.

At Bricy, the training is focused on operations, tactics and integration with the French Air Force.

A recent article published by the French Air Force highlights recent Franco-German common training at the Orleans base.

The article focuses on training at Orleans with the 61 Wing of the German Air Force. In March a delegation from the Wunstorf Air Base in Germany where the German A400Ms are based came to Orleans.

The visit provided an opportunity for a French instructor to provide final certification for a German pilot with regard to Type Rating certification.

“After a few sessions on the FFS, Simulator and on the aircraft, the commander of the CIET completed the flight test certification of the German pilot.”

The German Air Force is leveraging the technical expertise of the FAF with regard to A400M training.

The article also highlighted that German and French logisticians have started working together looking at comparing their ways of working in support of a mission.

“This is a first and fundamental setp toward interoperability between the two Air Forces with regard to mission support.”

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/actus-air/cooperation-aerienne-franco-allemande-sur-la-base-aerienne-d-orleans

This is an implementation of an agreement signed in the Fall of 2013 whereby the French and German air forces agreed to joint training for the A400M.

http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsfrench-german-air-forces-team-up-for-a400m-training

The challenge for the A400M as an operational force is to keep those aspects of commonality, which enhance interoperability across a multi-national fleet of A400Ms, and to integrate those aircraft within the national doctrines, tactics and approaches of the individual national forces.

The Franco-German training effort is a solid contribution to that outcome.

The photos in the slideshow are credited to the French Air Force.

 

Designing an Integrated Force: Alignments and Challenges

2017-05-08 By Robbin Laird

The Williams Foundation has provided a crucial venue for thinking through the challenges of building a flexible, agile 21st century combat force grounded in a capability to fight and win in a high intensity combat setting.

The background is a real world effort by the Australian government to recapitalize their defenses forces via the acquisition of new platforms, leveraging legacy ones and shaping an integrated force going forward.

Integration is crucial not simply because Australian forces are relatively modest; but with new equipment coming on line, capabilities such as software upgradeability in key platforms and the digital revolution provide a unique opportunity to rethink integration.

Rather than pursuing after market integration or simply connecting stove piped service platforms after the fact with a bolt on network, how might integration be built from the ground up?

The approach being taken is not theological or an application of set of propositions or laws written down in a guidebook.

The approach is to work greater integrative processes within and among the services, and to highlight the need to pose hypotheses along the way concerning how greater integration is achievable where appropriate and ways to achieve more effective outcomes for the development of the force.

It is a quest which is being shaped by realigning organizations, and trying to build from the ground up among the junior officers a willingness to shape interconnectivity from the ground up.

It is about building a 21st century network of operators who are empowered to find force integration solutions, again where appropriate or service specific outcomes appropriate to the different warfighting domains.

Shaping a way to conduct the quest is very difficult; but the ADF is clearly been empowered to do so by Government.

Such a quest inevitably will fail and succeed along the way; but without setting this objective from the ground up, it will be difficult to change the operating concepts and the then the concepts of operations which can drive the transformation of the force.

The United States may have Joint Forces Quarterly; the ADF has a transformation process underway.

And for the United States, even when the Aussies are adopting out own platforms, they are doing so in a very different context in which force integration is set as a strategic goal, rather than the pursuit of service modernization.

In effect, the Aussies are providing the experimental model which can be quite relevant to others, including the United States.

In the mid 1990s when I worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, one of the tasks on which I worked was for the Roles and Missions Commission. One of the key tasks, which the Congress had tasked the Commission to pursue, was to determine what the United States might learn from allies.

We worked hard on our white paper but when delivered to the Commission we were told by a very senior member of the Commission: “Good work; but why did you really examine the question? We are so much bigger than any of our allies, there is very little we could learn from them or apply to our own practices!”

Unfortunately, not much as changed in the attitude of many defense civilians, but many leaders in the US military do not share such views, notably with allies and the US adopting some of the same key platforms at the same time, like P-8, Triton, and the F-35, and some allies operating more advanced equipment than the US itself.

After the April 11, 2017 seminar I had a chance to discuss the challenges with Air Vice-Marshal Mel Hupfeld, Head Force Design in the Force Design Division in the Department of Defence as well as Brigadier Jason Blain, Director General Force Options and Plans, Force Design Division.

The office is a joint office and the time spent was really a discussion of what the office was doing and the challenge of shaping an effective way ahead.

Indeed, the discussion for that was what it was, very much highlighted the approach which is a work in progress rather than the forced application of a set of solutions to the complex evolving organism which a modern defense organization certainly is, and one such as the ADF which is very globally engaged and learning combat lessons on the fly.

BG Blain presented at the seminar and in his presentation highlighted the focus on the force design cycle, which the office has developed to map out ways to put in place an ongoing realignment of the force structure towards more joint solutions.

At the heart of the effort is a shift to a stream approach whereby functions become crucial frameworks for platform decisions, modernization decisions and future investment decisions moving forward.

Slide from presentation by BG Blain to Williams Foundation Seminar, April 11, 2017

Obviously this is a work in progress and perhaps always will be.

The challenge is to get in place a template which allows for greater capabilities to shape force integration but in an ongoing manner; more of an directive ongoing inquiry rather than a fixed point on the compass.

Slide from presentation by BG Blain to Williams Foundation Seminar, April 11, 2017

A key effort has been to align processes within the Department to maximize the possibility that a joint consideration is built into the acquisition, operational concepts and doctrinal development processes.

At the same, concrete outcomes need to be demonstrated to highlight that all of this work makes a difference in terms of the deployed force as well.

 

The Force Design office consists of approximately 180 personnel and consists of two interactive branches. On looks at evolving futures and then works from that analysis to the development of appropriate operating concepts.

The second looks at current operations and training and draws lessons learned which amounts to “harvest the best and leave the rest” moving forward.

And obviously, they tie in with other organizations, such as Defense Science and Technology, and the Defense Industry Policy Division.

A key partner is the Joint Capability Management and Integration Division in the same area of the Department of Defence.

Both Divisions work together for the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), to provide support to his role as the Joint Force Authority to ensure an Integrated Force by Design. This organization shapes the architecture for integration and interoperability for the evolving force. They work on the integrating enablers for the force, including that of C4ISR Design.

“We look at force development options and assess gaps and opportunities as we move forward.

“We examine as well what capabilities are not longer most useful to us.

“Through VCDF, who also holds authority as the Chair of the Defence Investment Committee, we then make proposals to government concerning our judgment about investment decisions from a joint perspective.”

The other part of the Force Design office deals with defense preparedness and mobilization.

Air Vice-Marshal Mel Hupfeld (centre) chats with industry partners during the Industry Event held during the Avalon International Airshow 2017. Credit: Australian Department of Defence

This effort requires the office to consider the whole of the defense of Australia concept and approach.

What capabilities does Australia need for integrated territorial defense?

A number of themes were highlighted in the discussion with Air Marshal Hupfeld and BG Blain.

First, shaping a cross departmental narrative about the design of the integrated force as a guiding effort is an ongoing challenge and requirement in shaping decisions about the development of the operating force.

Second, ensuring that there is thrust forward is crucial. Concrete outcomes need to be defined and executed to ensure visible forward thrust which will in turn drive further change. How will we do rapidly in six months what the Department would normally take three to five years to do?

Third, the reshaping of operational concepts around the ongoing design of the integrated force is a key aspect of the ongoing challenge. And taking that down to the next level, namely, the concepts of operations, is crucial because a key foundation for success is empowering the younger generation of officers who are leading the force design in practice being down with the introduction of the new platforms.

“We have CONOPS for the current fight but we need to shape future CONOPS as the pull function for the design of the joint force.”

BG Blain during a panel session held at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.

Fourth, there need to be successful case studies along the way to create a demonstration effect for the Department and beyond.

In short, shaping a way ahead for the design of an integrate force is a work in progress.

But what is required is to extract modernization of the current force combined with new platforms and enablers to shape the ongoing capabilities of the ADF as an integrated force.

As John Blackburn put it in an interview after the seminar:

“Now where we’re at now is moving to the next stage, of applying a bit of thrust as one of the speakers said, getting on with building this integrated force and not just talking about it.

“We see elements of force integration in the United States, but the integration there is by each Service.

“There’s integrated force happening within Navy with NIFC-CA.

“The USAF is looking at their future, Aerospace 2030 concepts.

“We have to follow the ideas in the U.S. but take one step further.

“Because we’re small, we might be able to take the step straight to JIFC-Australia, Joint Integrated Fire Control for Australia.

“We want to learn from the U.S., follow it closely, but actually take a step which is hard for the U.S. to do because of its size, and that’s go truly integrated by design across the whole of the joint force.”

 

 

Reshaping the Australian Industrial-Government Working Relationship to Enable Integrated Force Design

05/07/2017

2017-05-05 By Robbin Laird

The Williams Foundation seminars on the crafting and empowering of an integrated force has focused largely on key elements for reshaping the force and enabling the capability to shape a more effective and integrated combat force.

This will simply not occur without a significant reworking of the partnership with industry and the capability to bringing outside players in shaping innovation inside the process of defining, designing and building the force over time.

The process requires a much greater degree of openness to the inclusion of industry in shaping capabilities.

In an article about Plan Jericho and the new approach towards industry, a way ahead was highlighted.

With the backing of RAAF leadership, the team decided to apply this new approach to the challenge of retrofitting the Hawk 127 Lead-in-fighter jet with the technology needed for it to operate under a new airspace management system in Australia. OneSKY requires all civilian and military aircraft to be fitted with an automatic dependent surveillance broadcast (ADS-B) system that digitally shares their precise location. 

It will be significant investment in time and money to have ADS-B on all military aircraft. 

But the Hawk 127 posed a problem. “There’s very little real estate in which to put anything and the plane’s original manufacturer told us the solution was going to be very costly and take considerable time to develop,” Wing Commander Reid says. 

“So we partnered with BAE Australia and invited all the aerospace sector players – some 20-odd players, including the primes such as Airbus, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon as well as small Australian players such as Enigma Aviation – into the Design Innovation Research Center. There were over 40 people there from around the world, and we locked them in a room and said, ‘Let’s understand the complexities and then solve this problem.”

There was a lot of resistance initially as the DIRC team pushed the group outside their comfort zone of a traditional engineering approach, Professor Bucolo says.

“One of the really crucial things we did was we brought the stakeholders, the end users, into the room,” says Wing Commander Reid. “We had an air traffic controller who told us about what it’s like on a dark and stormy night, with zero visibility and a plane coming in with no ADS-B. 

“We had a pilot who had a near-miss incident of less than 50 feet. He told us what went through his mind at that particular time – including his three young children.

“We had the Chief Engineer talk to us about the complexities involved in trying to fit this capability into an aircraft with little or no room to fit anything.

“Suddenly all of these tough engineers started to empathise and become design thinkers – and the solutions they came up with were just incredible.”

On the last day of their week with the DIRC the group helped write the requirements for the Hawk 127 project – Wing Commander Reid says such early, comprehensive and open supplier involvement in the requirement definition phase of an acquisition is unheard of in Defence. The tender went out the following week, with 10 days to respond.

“We had 16 responses but, more importantly, four of the companies said they wouldn’t respond because it was not for them and that we had saved them over $2 million in bid costs,” he says.

On the face of it, this project was about building a ‘thing’ for an aircraft, he says. “But what I really care about is the shift in thinking that’s happening.”

The Hawk 127 was an example of design thinking applied to a specific problem, Professor Bucolo says, but design thinking is also being applied to big-picture strategy within the RAAF, showing the way for others.

Wing Commander Reid says defence forces around the world – like many businesses – realise that they can’t sustain an advantage for long, that ‘transient’ advantage is the new normal. 

“Our potential adversaries are moving at a pace that is unpredictable, with threats and capabilities increasing rapidly,” he says. 

“We develop a capability advantage, and it will last as long as we don’t deploy it. As soon as we deploy it the advantage will be gone – which means we have to have the next capability advantage ready to go, and the next one and the next one.

“To do that we need a system of systems, not just one thing. We need speed and capacity. And design thinking is going to be at the forefront of that.”

 https://www.uts.edu.au/research-and-teaching/our-research/design-innovation-research-centre

The kind of partnership approach is crucial to any effort to effectively incorporate new technologies within an open ended approach to program or capability stream development envisaged within joint force design efforts for the ADF.

At the Williams Foundation seminar on Integrated Force Design, the kind of partnerships envisaged in shaping a new acquisition approach was described by Air Commodore Leon Phillips, Director General Aerosapce Maritime, Training and Surveillance, looked at ways to reshape the acquisition and sustainment of the integrated force to address some of the concerns raised by RADM Dalton.

In this presentation, Phillips contrasted the traditional project approach with what he referred to as a new engagement model to allow for more flexibility in development but ways to constrain cost and shape realistic outcomes.

Put bluntly, without organizational change it would not be possible to achieve effective ways to shape integrated design cost effectively and in light of the dynamics of software development.

To achieve a joint design outcome, it would be necessary to shape an engagement model in which industry was a full partner. It was crucial as well to feed learning back into requirements generation as well.

Budgeting changes were required as well.

“We don’t do enough funded work with industry to get a realistic assessment of the domain of the feasible nor with regard to how to price evolving options and capabilities. How do you price the evolution within the force of options and opportunities when you manage with fixed priced contracts? You don’t.”

He argued that the new engagement model would divide programs into three phases: a partnership, appraisal and executive phase within which different approaches would be combined to deliver a capability.

In the partnership phase, one establishes the steering group and the stakeholders to be involved in program definition. The focus is upon the vision or the wish list of the capability, which is the target of the effort.

In the appraisal phase, there are funded studies which allow education about what is realistic to achieve for the target funding and to shape choice and determine how to reduce risk.

In the execution phase, the core decisions have been taken and the target objectives defined and pursued. The execution phase adjusts the vision to realistic outcomes within the targeted budget. It is not about requirements it is about outcomes driven by the partnership as a procurement force.

The industrial presentations made during the seminar highlights various aspects of the challenge in shaping a new working relationship with industry.

Software Upgradeability: Ensuring Transient Combat Advantage

The core importance of shaping software approaches to provide for the kinds of transient advantage necessary to deal with a constantly evolving threat was discussed by Stephen Froelich, Director, Operational Command and Control, Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems.

In his presentation, Froelich highlighted the importance of open systems architecture, and agile development through software evolution to gain transient advantage. He argued for the importance of a business model that supports an open, agile and spiral development approach.

This requires the simultaneous management of current capability, hardware and fielded capability.

Steve Froelich, Lockheed Martin, RMS, making his presentation to the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April, 11, 2017.

Lockheed is involved in the new submarine program as the combat systems designer and clearly will be involved along with a number of companies teamed with it in providing Navy with the kind of transient advantage necessary for the maritime arm of the ADF.

When I interviewed Chief of Navy prior to the seminar we discussed the new submarine as a case study of the continuous shipbuilding approach which is essential not just to the Navy but to joint force enablement.

Question: One aspect of change clearly is building 21st century defense structure.

I have just returned from the UK and witnessed their significant efforts at Lossiemouth, Waddington, Marham and at Lakenheath to have a new infrastructure built.

And certainly have seen that at RAAF Williamtown with the F-35 and at RAAF Edinburgh with the P-8/Triton.

How important in your view is building a new infrastructure to support a 21st century combat force?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: Crucial.

And that is in part what I am referring to as an industrial and national set of commitments to shaping a 21st century combat fleet.

We spoke last time about the Ship Zero concept.

This is how we are focusing upon shaping a 21st century support structure for the combat fleet.

I want the Systems Program Office, the Group that manages the ship, as well as the contracted services to work together on site.

I want the trainers there, as well, so that when we’re maintaining one part of the system at sea, it’s the same people in the same building maintaining those things that will allow us to make future decisions about obsolescence or training requirements, or to just manage today’s fleet.

I want these people sitting next to each other and learning together.

It’s a mindset.

It puts as much more effort into infrastructure design as it does into combat readiness, which is about numbers today.

You want to shape infrastructure that is all about availability of assets you need for mission success, and not just readiness in a numerical sense.

Getting the right infrastructure to generate fleet innovation on a sustained basis is what is crucial for mission success.

And when I speak of a continuous build process this is what I mean.

We will build new frigates in a new yard but it is not a fire and forget missile.

We need a sustained enterprise that will innovate through the life of those frigates operating in an integrated ADF force.

That is what I am looking for us to shape going forward.

Question: An example of your approach to the future is clearly the new submarine.

A French design house and an American combat systems company will be working together really for the first time.

And they are building a submarine which has never been built before.

 This provides an opportunity for you to shape a new support structure along the lines you have described going forward.

 How do you see this process?

Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: It is something new and allows us to shape the outcome we want in terms of an upgradeable sustainable submarine with high availability rates built in. We intend to see this built that way from the ground up.

It is not simply about acquiring a platform.

We will not be a recipient of someone else’s design and thought.

This will be something that we do, and we will work with those that have a capacity to deliver what we say we need.

I think the way you characterize the process makes sense.

The experiences we’ve had through Collins have taught us a lot.

With 12 of these future submarines in a theater anti-submarine role we think we can make an effective contribution to our defense and to working with core allies in the region, notably the US Navy.

Working the Way Ahead: The Wedgetail Case Study

There were two other industrial presentations at the seminar as well.

The first was by Lt. General (Retired) Jeff Remington of Northrop Grumman and provided him with an opportunity to highlight the challenges to building the joint force seen from an American perspective.

He highlighted how the service specific architectures placed barriers in terms of shaping a more general approach to the integrated force.

Lt. General USAF (Ret.) Jeff Remington, Northrop Grumman, presenting to the Integrated Force Design Seminar held by the Williams Foundation on April 11, 2017.

And as the key enabler of several Australian systems, Wedgetail and Triton, clearly Northrop is a key player in shaping the way ahead for an evolving integrated force for Australian defense, and one which is interoperable with its closest allies as well.

The Wedgetail case illustrates the path of how the ADF actually got onto the path of working beyond a narrowly requirements dominated approach and taught the ADF and MoD more generally the importance of shaping a new approach.

Boeing is the prime contractor, but Northrop provides the key radar system around which Wedgetail is built.

The Chairman of the Williams Foundation, Air Chief Marshal Brown (Retired) described the learning curve whereby the RAAF got the new capabilities.

Question: As Chief you decided to push your new aircraft – Wedgetail and the KC-30A – out to the force rather than waiting for the long list of tests to be complete.

Why?

Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: Testers can only do so much. 

Once an aircraft is functional you need to get in the hand of the operators, pilots, crews and maintainers. They will determine what they think the real priorities for the evolution of the aircraft, rather than a test engineer or pilot.

And you get the benefit of a superior platform from day one. 

When I became Deputy Chief of Air Force, the Wedgetail was being slowed down by the Kabuki effort to arrange specification lines for the aircraft. There was much hand-wringing amongst the program staff as to how it didn’t meet the specifications that we had put out.

I said, “Let’s just give it to the operators.”

And the advantage of basically giving the aircraft to the operators was what the test community and the engineers thought were real limitations the operators did not. Sometimes it took the operators two days to figure a work around.

And the real advantage of the development was that they would prioritize what was really needed to be fixed from the operational point of view, not the testing point of view.

In other words, you can spend a lot of time trying to get back to the original specifications.

But when you actually give it to the operators they actually figure out what’s important or what isn’t important and then use the aircraft in real world operations.

And what this has meant is a new working relationship between operators and industry to deliver ongoing modernization of the platform.

This approach was highlighted during my visit to Williamtown last year with the Wedgetail squadron.

Question: It is clearly a system in progress with the capability to evolve into what the US CNO calls a key capability to operate in the electromagnetic battlespace, and to do so for the joint force.

Could you talk about the joint evolution?

Group Captain Bellingham: “Army and navy officers are part of the Wedgetail crew. . We are not just extension of what the air defense ground environment or the control reporting units do from the ground. We take our platform airborne and we do air battle space management.

“Recently, in the Army led Hamel exercise, we pushed the link piecutre down to the ground force headquarters. Their situational awareness became significant, compared to what they have had before.

“And since the Williams seminar on Air-Land integration, several senior Army officers have been to Williamtown to take onboard what we can do and potential evolution of the systems onboard the aircraft.

“We are seeing similar developments on the Navy side. A key example is working with the LHD. My opinion is that the Wedgetail will be critical to making all the bits of an amphibious task group come together. And not just that but as the P-8 joins the force, we can broaden the support to Navy as well. And the new air warfare destroyer will use its systems as well to pass the data around to everyone, and making sure everyone’s connected.

“The E-7 is a critical node in working force integration and making sure we’re all seeing the same thing at the same time, and not running into each other, and getting each other space. We’re not on a ten second scan. We are bringing the information to the war fighter or to whoever needs it right then.”

Question: During the visit, we have been in the squadron building, the hangar and in the System Program Office collocated with the squadron.

What advantages does that bring?

Group Captain Bellingham: “It facilitates a close working relationship between the combat force and the system developers.

“We can share our combat experiences with the RAAF-industry team in the SPO and to shape a concrete way ahead in terms of development.

“The team is very proactive in working collaboratively to get to the outcome we’re looking for.”

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-williamtown-airbase-the-wedgetail-in-evolution/

A New Industrial-Government Working Relationship: The Case of Team Complex Weapons in the UK

Finally, Andy Watson from MBDA missile systems focused on the evolving relationship between industry and government which has generated by the Team Complex Weapons approach of the British government.

According to MBDA:

Team Complex Weapons (Team CW) defines an approach to delivering the UK’s Complex Weapons (CW) requirements in an affordable manner.

This value for money proposition also ensures a viable industrial capacity. The PMA aims to transform the way in which CW business is conducted by MoD with its main supplier.

At the heart of this is a joint approach to the delivery of the required capability based on an open exchange of information and flexibility in the means of delivery.

http://www.mbda-systems.com/about-us/mission-strategy/team-complex-weapons/

Andy Watson, Managing Director MBDA Australia, presenting to the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.

A recent example of the fruits of this approach was latest agreement reached between MBDA and the UK government. According to the British government:

Secretary of State, Sir Michael Fallon, has today (April 21, 2017) announced three new missile contracts worth a combined £539 million for state-of-the-art Meteor, Common Anti-air Modular Missile (CAMM) and Sea Viper missile systems at MBDA Stevenage.

The deal ensures our Armed Forces have the best equipment available to protect the new Queen Elizabeth Class Carriers and the extended fleet from current and future threats.

The half a billion-pound contracts will sustain over 130 jobs with MBDA in the UK, with missile modification and service support being carried out in Stevenage, Henlow, Bristol and Bolton.

Secretary of State, Sir Michael Fallon, said:

“This substantial investment in missile systems is vital in protecting our ships and planes from the most complex global threats as our Armed Forces keep the UK safe.

“Backed by our rising Defence budget, these contracts will sustain high skilled jobs across the UK and demonstrate that strong defence and a strong economy go hand in hand…..”

Meanwhile, a £175 million in-service support contract for the anti-air Sea Viper weapon system will ensure that the Royal Navy’s Type 45 Destroyers can continue to provide unparalleled protection from air attack to the extended fleet. Under the contract, the missiles will be maintained, repaired and overhauled as and when required to ensure continued capability.

The Sea Viper missile defends ships against multiple threats, including missiles and fighter aircraft.

The final contract is a £323 million deal to purchase the next batch of cutting-edge air defence missiles for the British Army and Royal Navy, offering increased capability at  a lower cost. Designed and manufactured by MBDA UK at sites in Bolton, Stevenage and Henlow, the next-generation CAMM missile will provide the Armed Forces with missiles for use on sea and on land. CAMM has the capability to defend against anti-ship cruise missiles, aircraft and other highly sophisticated threats.

Signalling our continued investment in Type 26 programme, CAMM will provide the anti-air defence capability on the new Type 26 Frigates for the Royal Navy and will also form part of the Sea Ceptor weapon system on the Type 23 Frigate and will also enhance the British Army’s Ground Based Air Defence capability by replacing the in-service Rapier system.

Tony Douglas, Chief Executive Officer of Defence Equipment and Support, the MOD’s procurement organisation, said:

“Work on these cutting-edge missiles, which will help to protect the UK at home and abroad and secure jobs across the country, demonstrates the importance of Defence investment. That is why, working closely with our industry partners, we continue to drive innovation and value into everything we do; securing next generation equipment for our Armed Forces at the best possible value for the taxpayer.”

Dave Armstrong, Managing Director of MBDA UK, added:

“MBDA is delighted by the continued trust placed in us by the Ministry of Defence and the British military.

“The contracts announced today for Meteor, CAMM and Sea Viper will help protect all three UK Armed Services, providing them with new cutting-edge capabilities and ensuring their current systems remain relevant for the future.

“They will also help to secure hundreds of high-skilled people at MBDA UK and in the UK supply chain, maintaining the UK’s manufacturing base and providing us with a platform for exports.”

https://sldinfo.com/recent-developments-for-mbda-new-uk-investments-and-progress-with-integration-efforts-on-typhoon-and-f-35/

Shaping A Way Ahead

In short, reshaping Government’s approach to working with government and expanding the portfolio of partnering arrangements is essential to generating the intellectual capital, property rights, and innovations necessary to deliver a dynamic integrated combat force.

New approaches to shaping outcomes from the acquisition engagement process are crucial in order to empower successful partnering arrangements.

After the seminar, I had a chance to talk with Chris Jenkins, head of Thales Australia, and National President of the Australian Industry Group with regard to the challenge of reshaping the Government-Industry partnership.

Question: The Australian government has set in motion a significant modernization programs. What is the role and impact on industry?

Chris Jenkins: There are several aspects to that subject.

Australia is spending more on defense. At the same time as doing so, there have been clear changes within defense as an organization to shape new ways to implement that policy, following the First Principles Review and its recommendations.

There’s also been very clear policy around enhancing the impact of defense modernization on Australian industrial skill sets. There has been keen interest to enhance the level of engineering and technology and program management skills and to grow those skills over the long term, both within the Defence industry sector but also more broadly in Australian industry.

I’ve been really impressed that within a very short period of time there’s been buy-in from the defense service chiefs, and changes within the defense acquisition and sustainment organization to start to implement these policies and make them real.

Overall the most important impact, in my view, is the inclusion of industry as a Fundamental Input to Capability (FIC) for Defence. This drives a new, more integrated relationship with mutual responsibilities between Defence and industry.

This really gets to the heart of how industry can be engaged as a FIC. Finding more effective paths to deliver integrated capabilities within and across Defence platforms and systems is something that can only be done efficiently by close partnering between Defence and industry.

Question: I spent time with the head of Air Force this morning, Air Marshal Davies, and he is keen on shaping an integrated force. It is not just about platforms, but finding ways to deliver integrated capabilities.

What is the challenge and impact on industry of such an approach?

There are very clear actions being taken to support that by the service chiefs and by the people in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group. You’re also seeing industry gaining confidence in the approach as the new paradigm. Industry is also starting to work more collaboratively together, forming the team sets that can deliver and evolve combined platform and system capability. Companies are starting to work together to share workload because of the complementarity of the skill sets that one company might have compared to another.

This slide was presented as part of Rear Admiral Tony Dalton, Head Joint Systems Division, Australian Ministry of Defence’s brief to the Williams Foundation Seminar on Integrated Force Design, April 11, 2017.

Industry is responding to the opportunity to engage in a collaborative set of partnerships between defense and industry and this is showing some good results in terms of greater delivery and sustainment capability.

Prior to these government initiatives, Australia has been one of the lower end performers on collaborative development. Reshaping this relationship is crucial to get the kind of success Australia wants through more efficient, more agile integrated capability delivery.

Question: Clearly, this means that even when platforms are bought abroad, there needs to be a working relationship where that platform evolves over time within an ADF context, not simply replicating whatever has been done to modernize the platform in the originator’s home market.

How will Australia do that?

Chris Jenkins: There’s a smart buyer approach in the market now, which is looking for the elements that will go onto the key platforms that are specifically focused on the Australian defense requirement.

Rather than buying a complete platform and system from overseas off the shelf, I think the realization is Australia does have some unique operational requirements, and so building into the procurement process a way of evaluating how best to bring those teams together that can deliver and sustain those requirements through the life of the vehicle, or the ship or whatever it might be, is being done more efficiently and effectively.

The customer is helping shape the market or the way the market responds to the requirements more effectively. I think that is a fundamental change.

How well projects deliver as a consequence of that overall change, time will tell, but I think all signs are actually quite positive.

The first principles review made strong recommendations, and it looks like that the actions that need to underpin those recommendations are being taken.

   

 

North Korea, the Second Nuclear Age and Nuclear Extortion: It is Not About Deterrence as “Usual”

05/06/2017

2017-05-01 By Danny Lam

The US Senate was briefed by Secretary Tillerson, and Mattis, and CJCS Gen. Joseph Dunford, and DNI Dan Coats in an hour long classified briefing last week.

Since then, the silence from Senators and their surrogates have been deafening. Aside from general comments and a few snipes, Senators appeared to have abstained from the normal rough and tumble rhetoric against the Trump Administration.

The briefing covered key issues as the magnitude of threat posed by DPRK developments; including the growth trajectory of DPRK nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities; past and present diplomatic efforts to denuclearize; and parameters for US and Allied policy.

Senators were told that key assumptions behind decades of past Administration policy such as the efficacy of tightening multilateral sanctions and negotiated settlements with DPRK have failed.

Moreover, after the rise of Kim Jong Un in 2013, economic reforms have successfully produced a noticeable and sharp rise in the standard of living and in parallel, a sharp acceleration in DPRK deployable WMD capabilities despite tightening sanctions.

The trajectory of DPRK WMD development documented by the UN: nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle development (land and sea based, liquid vs. solid fuel, etc.) is at a rate that is faster than any other previous regime in history.

For example, DPRK progressed from metal to wound filament missile frames — a major step to increasing throw weight and range, within years.

Much of these developments can be explained away by the post-cold war availability of ex Soviet talent “for hire”; elements of the Khan network; Iranians, Pakistanis, etc.; the proliferation of computational technologies that enable simulations to do in seconds work that formerly required tens of thousands of man hours by skilled engineers and technicians; and the open market availability of many dual use COTS components.

But to take advantage of these require a fertile ground of technical infrastructure, resources, a vision and organizational will(s) to achieve the goals.

In terms of technical goals, there is no doubt that DPRK is developing a WMD capability to strike any nation around the world from Korea.

Yet, we know very little about the perceptions of key players, their calculus of risk and reward, “red lines”, thought processes, and what they intend to (whether knowingly or not) achieve with such a military capability.

Nor do we understand the same issues from the point of view of other non DPRK players.

The Senate briefing by and large glossed over the motives of DPRK and key players like Kim Jong Un and concentrated on documentable facts.  

By doing so, it implicitly assumed that the behavior of DPRK and Kim Jong Un (absent the madman theory) can be understood and managed in terms of traditional arms control models that kept the world safe from nuclear war from 1945 onwards.

From the classical arms control perspective, DPRK is just the latest arrival into the non-NPT “unofficial” nuclear club: India, Israel, South Africa (deproliferated) & Pakistan. Every nuclear power, whether NPT P5 or not, have become cautious, conservative, and by and large, perceived their nuclear arsenal as “last resort”.

Why shouldn’t DPRK fall into this pattern after a time?

Hence the policy of strategic patience.

But what if there is a fundamentally different dynamic at work in the “Second Nuclear Age”?

Professor Paul Bracken observed that the first nuclear age was characterized by “icy rationality and cool logic” and a shared desire to avoid mutual destruction by two dominant nuclear powers. Lesser nuclear powers tended to view their arsenal as “insurance policies” that did more to stabilize the status quo between states as to stoke conflict.

However, the second nuclear age see the rise of nationalism, insecurities, rage, as factors.

But there is more.

Non-Western concepts of international relations that we once though have been banished have reappeared. Beijing China is in the process of establishing a set of relationships that bear striking resemblance to late Ming tributary states system.

The reappearance of behavior banished from the Western psyche, such as war or conflict for profit, have largely gone unnoticed in the foreign policy community dominated by western trained scholars and institutions.

The last time America paid tribute dates from the Barbary Wars in the 18th Century after the newly independent America lost British protection. It was such a humiliating experience to have to ransom American shipping and captives in 1794, Congress created the US Navy.

From that time onwards, the United States established a longstanding policy of refusing to pay tribute on principle and where necessary, use military power to defeat the extortionists.

Contrast this with the Northeast Asian institutional memory of war.  

Beijing China’s storytelling begins with the “Century of humiliation” that began with the Opium wars by Western powers. But what it neglects is in the interim period between the ending of the Opium war and the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894, the Ching recovered and built a modern navy around two German built pre-Dreadnoughts that was on paper the most powerful in Asia.

Japan, as the inferior naval power, was able to defeat the stronger Beiyang fleet.The economic consequence of this victory on Japan was largely forgotten.

Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese war resulted in about 40m pounds sterling in indemnity paid by the Ching.   That amounted to roughly four times the budget of Imperial Japan and well exceeded their war expenditures.   It resulted in a major economic boom in Japan and facilitated financing their modernization — particularly in the building of a modern Navy and Army capable of challenging the west.

An indemnity of this size against the Chinese was not unusual or out of character in the tradition of European international relations.  Prussia demanded 5 billion francs from France after the 1871 armistice and occupied France until it was paid in 1873.

Next came World War I, a war that no one really wanted.

World War I ended with devastation on an industrial scale so much that the term “indemnity” became converted to “reparations” for all parties recognized any reasonable sum of indemnities can never be paid.   That signified the ending of profit as a legitimate motive for war in the European theater.   It was only much later, after World War II, that acknowledged that reparations too, can be so large and burdensome that it can lead to more war.

Hence, reparations paid by Germany, Japan and other belligerents are notable for their modest size.

The ending of profit as a motive for war (or for that matter, reasonable reparations for the victor) is an alien concept new to Asians.    

War is, and can be a profitable venture for the winner is deeply embedded in the psyche in the memories of statesmen in East Asia outside of Japan.

The pausing of the Korean war with an armistice with no clear loser and consequences for the North Koreans set the stage for a revival of these regional international relations norms. During the negotiations leading to the 1994 Agreed Framework DPRD demanded substantial economic incentives (e.g. two light water nuclear power plant built for them and $6 billion) as their price.

Separately, DPRK demanded $500m to halt their missile exports in 1998.

Subsequent negotiations for the “disablement” of three nuclear facilities in 2007 produced demands including US$400m in fuel oil (2 million tons) and aid.

Western trained diplomats by and large viewed these demands by DPRK as moves by a desperate regime starving off collapse in the years before Kim Jong Un.

But extortion was not seen as a modus operandi except by a few observers.

What if it is now that DPRK is in no immediate danger of collapse or famine?

Looking at the historical pattern in DPRK behavior from the 1990s, it is clear that the regime have just about broken every international norm including having their diplomats engaging in narcotics trafficking.   Proliferation of nuclear technology, WMDs, weapons, missiles, to virtually anyone with cash is their way.   And expected to be paid well, or bribed, (in equivalent to foregone revenues) to stop.

Would DPRK behave any differently with nuclear weapons, sensitive materials, or ICBMs?

Should we be asking about the consequences of DPRK acquiring a gene splicing based biowarfare capability?

North Korea’s pattern of behavior show that it is improbable that they will abandon their modus operandi and become “respectable” nuclear powers. Nuclear weapons is not just about an insurance policy for them.

It is about making money for the regime in quantity.

DPRK is doing too well with their nuclear and missile programs and it is almost certain that they will find ready customers worldwide willing to pay cash for their weapons and knowhow. Beyond this source of revenue, there is the question of whether East Asian states, including longtime US allies, will consider it expedient to simply pay off DPRK unless the US confront and defeat DPRK when negotiations fail unless the US act expeditiously to end this threat.

The challenge that DPRK and Kim Jong Un pose is not just about them.

It is a fundamental challenge to the system of international relations by a nuclear armed extortionist.

If DPRK succeeds, they will not be the last.

Nor will they just be nuclear armed.

 

 

Italian Air Force Concludes NATO Mission in Iceland

2017-05-06  According to an article published on the Italian Ministry of Defence website, Italian Air Force participation in the NATO Interim Air Policing Mission in Iceland concluded April 14, 2017.

On the evening of Friday, 14 April, after a 6-hour flight and 3 air-to-air refuelling operations most of the Italian Eurofighter aircraft and personnel have re-deployed to Italy after taking part in NATO’s  Interim Air Policing Mission in Iceland.

 Starting from 23 March, following NATO’s Full Operational Capability authorization, the Italian detachment has ensured the integrity of NATO airspace by strengthening surveillance activities in the Icelandic sky. The country, in fact, has no air defence capabilities and facilities of its own.

Six Eurofighter aircraft and approximately 140 servicemen and servicewomen of the Italian Air Force had re-deployed at Icelandic Coast Guard Base in Keflavik, to implement the activities provided for by NATO Interim Air Policing for the Defence of NATO Airspace in  Iceland while carrying out joint training activities withe the Icelandic Coast Guard.

Air Force pilots, officers, specialists, logistics and operational personnel from 4th36th and  37thWings, as well as a Air defence Controller team from Poggio Renatico Air Command Operations and 22nd Radar Group Licola (Na), which provided the mission’s tactical management  in the mission’s Area of Responsibility by also providing communications with the Combined Air Operation Center in Udem.

ReSTOGE also provided a significant contribution through its dedicated cell which has provided operational support to all aircraft engaged.

Force Protection for the Icelandic airport, with regard to both personnel and materiel, was ensured by the 16th Wing Air Riflemen.

All re-deployment phases, both at the beginning and at the end of the mission, have been ensured by personnel and C-130J aircraft from 46th Air Brigade Pisa, KC767 aircraft from 14th Wing Pratica di Mare and Atlantic assets from 41th Wing Sigonella. 3rd Wing Villafranca has dealt with logistics. 

All technical and operational telecommunication facilities have been managed by 4th Brigade Telecommunications and Systems D.A./A.V. (ReSIA and ReGISCC).

The Italian Air Force has been taking part in various Interim Air Policing missions: in Albania, starting from 2009, and Slovenia, from 2004, in cooperation, respectively, with Greece and Hungary; it was already engaged in Iceland in 2013. 

The mission falls under the responsibility of NATO Allied Command Operation Brussels and is coordinated by Headquarters Allied Air Command- Ramstein (GER).

 

Designing the Integrated Force

05/05/2017

In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on integrated force design held on April 11, 2017 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well.

Interviews with the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been woven into the evolving narrative of shaping and designing an integrated force.

But the core point is that raising questions, which drive you towards where the force needs to go, is the challenge; it is not about generating studies and briefing charts which provide visuals of what a connected force might look like.

It is about creating the institutional structure whereby trust among the services and between government and industry is high enough that risks can be managed, but creative destruction of legacy approaches is open ended as well.

It is about empowering a network of 21st century warriors and let the learning cycle being generated by this network drive acquisition, modernization and operational concepts.

It is about innovations within concepts of operations generated by the network to flow up into strategic change.