By Robbin Laird

On May 14, 2024, I visited 2^nd Marine Air Wing to have the opportunity to speak with the Commanding General of the Wing, MajGen Scott Benedict. This was two days before the change of command and his subsequent retirement after a distinguished career in the Marine Corps (bio at the end of the article).

I had last visited 2^nd MAW when LtGen Michael Cederholm was 2^nd MAW commander and who is now the I MEF Commander.

At that time, I focused on what I saw as an historic opportunity for the fleet in Norfolk and the Marines in North Carolina to work through the process of Nordic integration to create a whole new defense capacity, never seen before in my lifetime.

I had written this at the time after the last visit in 2021:

The North Carolina-based Marines have equipment pre-positioned in Norway and exercise frequently with the Norwegians. And through the Cold War and beyond, those Marines have had the mission to show up to reinforce Norway in a crisis.

But in an era where there is a stated desire to have greater Marine Corps integration with the Navy how might this change?

And in what ways?

The answer in part needs to be generated by the geography, the missions and the allies.

The geography sees the growing role of the High North, and the question of using land space for operations rests on what particular allies will value and permit in a pre-crisis situation up to a full-blown crisis situation.

If one looks at the geography, it is clear the impact which enhanced Nordic integratability can have on rethinking what the Marines might do to reinforce the air-sea battle, which is really where the U.S. Navy is going in its reset to be able to fight and prevail in the 4th Battle of the Atlantic.

Given the priority concern which the Navy has with regard to Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula, those allies best positioned to reinforce U.S. and allied efforts are crucial to the warfighting and deterrence effort.

This means that Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark (Faroe Islands and Greenland), Norway, Sweden and Finland are the anchors for effective deterrence in the region and can clearly shape the outcome with regard to any Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.

What can the Marines bring from North Carolina which would make the most SIGNIFICANT impact?

MajGen Benedict and the 2^nd MAW have been deeply involved over the last two years building relationships in Scandinavia culminating in the recent Nordic Response Exercise which saw Sweden and Finland participating as full members of NATO. For the USMC, the entry of Sweden and Finland into the NATO alliance means a substantial change from the primary focus on bolstering Norway in a crisis to being able to work with all the Nordic forces in a crisis; a facet they demonstrated by exercising with all three countries during the event.

This means as well that the USMC can take its Marine Air Ground Task Force integrated capabilities and embed themselves within the network of Nordic defense and support the U.S. fleet as it operates in defense of the region.

In other words, it can operate from the land, within a significant defense belt provided by the Nordics, to support the fleet. The air capabilities of the USMC – Ospreys, F-35s, F-18s, and CH-53Ks – can operate from the land to support the fleet or to operate from the fleet to  support of land-air operations. This capability to do either is truly unique and what the USMC brings to the fight – a significant force operating from the land to the sea and from the sea to the land.

The extensive training and integration with all the Nordic countries is a very significant development and lessons learned by Marines in this key region in the defense of the North Atlantic can be applied to the Pacific as well.

MajGen Benedict provided a wide-ranging picture of Marine Corps activities in shaping this concept of operations and the key role of 2^nd MAW working with 2^nd and 6^th Fleets in the region.

He started by underscoring how he looked at USMC-Naval integration.

“I went to a senior commanders’’ course in Naples where we focused on maritime combined arms operations. It struck me that both the Navy and Marines almost solely focus on Marine capabilities being employed from the sea, but not so much on how we can come from the land to support the naval  campaign.”

“The opportunity to work with the Nordics as they continue to enhance defense integration clearly allows us to demonstrate and take advantage of that opportunity and to shape innovative ways to do so. And we did that in the Nordic Response 2024 exercise as well. There is a lot we can achieve in littoral operations without solely operating from an amphibious ship.”

We then turned to his experience during the exercise working with the air chiefs of the Nordic forces. He underscored that as they were working their way ahead, the Marines and the American forces are working closely on shaping effective C2 across the coalition force to operate as integrated as possible.

One should note that 2^nd MAW brought its first squadron of F-35s to the exercise and with the Norwegians already operating F-35s, with Denmark and Finland to follow along with F-35s from the UK coming off of their carrier, which they did in this exercise off of the Prince of Wales. The F-35s are very interoperable with one another and are very capable of operating at a higher level of integration. When one adds German and Polish F-35s to the force, the capability is a substantial one.

The Finns in particular are masters of distributed air operations on their soil and the Marines worked closely with them and will continue to do so. The progress in this domain since I last talked to pilots at 2^nd MAW working with Finns is significant. When I spoke to pilots at 2^nd MAW in an earlier visit in 2018, they indicated that the Finns were teaching them about DO. Now the Marines are clearly working hard on their own approach to DO and having an ally like Finland who has lived on the shadow of a big power for a long time makes them  a key partner in evolving DO for the F-35 as well.

We then discussed distributed air operations (DO) and how it differed from simply being a Forward Arming and Refueling Point or ‘FARP’. The difference is profound.

While a FARP remains the most visible manifestation of DO, it is the final action and does not by itself reflect significant choices and work necessary to create that capability to re-arm air assets at remote and ever changing locations – allowing the force to disaggregate for protection and then aggregate to mass combat capability, all in a rapid manner to maintain tempo.

As MajGen Benedict put it: “The difference is the backside. Where is the location? Why that location? How do we get the fuel there? How do we get ordinance there? How do we provide force protection? How do we maintain the aircraft and for how long? How long are we going to be there? When do we need to move? All of these things are what I call the backside of distributed operations.”

To deal with this challenge, 2^nd MAW has added a functional area inside of its Tactical Air Command Center which is called a Distributed Operations Coordination Cell. According to Benedict: “Here we plan out and initiate coordination and execution of all the aviation ground support necessary to support an ATO in a distributed environment.”

But thinking about the Marines supporting the Navy from the Nordic land mass raises the question of how to craft their way ahead in integration and how to leverage their unique air assets. I have already spoken of the F-35, but obviously the Osprey and its speed and range and its ability to operate across the decks of the fleet – including Military Sealift Command ships – is a key enabler and connector when providing supplies and support from the Nordic region to the fleet. And as the Navy builds up their own Osprey force, this capability will be enhanced as well.

MajGen Benedict then talked about his Osprey experience. This began really when he was an SP-MAGTF commander in Spain. Here the Ospreys worked with KC-130Js and operated throughout the African operational space.

He commented on his subsequent deployment when they operated MV-22s within a MEU, saying “their capability to operate in a distributed manner within a theater is amazing. The ability of the MEU commander to move force from a disaggregated or distributed manner to get the right force in the right force at the right time is a crucial capability for the USMC and the combatant commander, and it is a unique and indispensable capability. Ospreys are the backbone of distributed assault support. There is no doubt about that. It enables us to realize operational maneuver from the sea and from the land to support the naval force.”

We then turned to the new kid on the block for 2^nd MAW, namely the CH-53K.

MajGen Benedict underscored that as a Cobra pilot, he did not often go out of his way to praise other helos, but “I have flown the Kilo and it is an amazing helicopter. With its fly by wire capability and its ability to hover over a load, the stability of the helicopter, the reduced workload on the air crew, it is a game changer.”

He highlighted a couple of illustrations of his point. In the recent case where a Kilo lifted a damaged Navy helicopter out of a mountain crevice, the Kilo was required because of its ability to hold a hover for a long time allowing the ground crew to hook the damaged helo to the Kilo for the lift out of the ravine. The ability of the Kilo versus the Echo to hold its location for a relatively long period was crucial to the success of the mission.

The second aspect we discussed was another unique capability of the Kilo which provides a significant contribution to how the Marines are now operating. He noted that the external lift capability of the aircraft is incredible, and it is what many commentators note; however, he believes that the internal load out of the helicopter is really the key force multiplier.

Because the CH-53K can hold a standard USAF pallet internally, it can take cargo from larger transport aircraft such as the C-17 or the C-130 in a ‘tail to tail’ fashion where in the past those pallets would have had to have been broken down at the landing site into smaller loads.  As a result, to support Marines deployed to a remote location, a pallet with the materials they need is cross loaded to the Kilo at a safe location, then it can be transported long range (the aircraft is refuelable in flight) and then land and the pallet removed rapidly allowing the aircraft minimum time on the deck. This reduces significantly the signature of the operations for the Marines, which is a key objective for current USMC thinking about their operational needs.

In short, MajGen Benedict’s time at 2^nd MAW has been an historically significant one as the Marines and the Navy work with Nordics as they shape a more integrated capability for North Atlantic defense.

Biography as of May 14, 2024

MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT F. BENEDICT

Major General Benedict is currently serving as the Commanding General of Second Marine Aircraft Wing, headquartered on Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. He has served as a Marine Corps Officer and Naval Aviator for more than thirty years and has commanded at all levels as a Marine Aviator. His staff appointments have spanned the operational, planning, policy, diplomatic, and acquisition arenas.

All his field grade commands included operational deployments and force employment. From 2013- 2015 he commanded the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) during which time he led two overseas deployments: one while serving simultaneously as the Commanding Officer of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) during its first full rotation supporting the Africa and European Commands areas of responsibility; and the second with the MEU to the Africa, European, and Central Commands. From 2006 to 2008, Major General Benedict served as the Commanding Officer of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 367, including operations in Iraq.

Major General Benedict’s Joint assignments have included service as the Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy (J-5) at U. S. Central Command furthering Combatant Command operations and objectives in the Middle East; as the Director Politico-Military Affairs, Middle East, within the Joint Staff J-5, where he proposed strategies, plans, and policy recommendations on the Middle East to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff to support his provision of military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President; as the Special Assistant to the Assistant Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff where he traveled as part of the Secretary of State’s travel team; and as the Chief of Policy and Assessment Branch, Joint Staff J-5, Joint Operational War Plans Division.

Other senior staff assignments within the Marine Corps include service as the Director of Manpower Plans and Policy, where he was responsible for determining total manpower needs, and preparing plans, policies, programs, and instructions on manpower matters; as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation, where he provided support to assist and advise the Commandant of the Marine Corps on all matters relating to Marine Aviation; as Military Secretary to the Commandant of the Marine Corps where he served as the Director of the Commandant’s personal and extended staff group; as Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Acquisition, and Development, supporting the Department of the Navy’s Acquisition Executive; and as Head, Future Operations Group, Plans, Policies and Operations.

Early tours include Aviation Combat Element Operations Officer for 22d MEU; Squadron Logistics and Operations Officer for HMLA-167; and Operations Officer and Air Officer for 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion.

Major General Benedict has served overseas in support of several combat, contingency, and support operations. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Naval War College, the Marine Corps War College, and the MIT Seminar XXI fellowship program.

Note: Murielle Delaporte interviewed members of SP-MAGTF during her visit to Spain in 2013, and she quoted then Col Benedict with regard to the new force and its operation in Africa as follows:

According to the Commanding Officer of the SP-MAGTF-CR in December 2013, Col. Scott Benedict:

This force provides new capabilities where there has been a gap.

Historically, we would provide this kind of capability of a Marine expeditionary unit [MEU], i.e., the Marine forces that are on ships.

Where there have been some gaps in the coverage of these ships, the Marine Corps created this force and intends to create others like it in order to fill those gaps.

So in that sense, it is a new capability, but the skills that we bring as a SPMAGTF are the same types of skills that Marines have always brought to the fight.

In terms of comparing what we are doing now with what we have been doing in the past, my experience over the years has been that this is more the type of missions that Marines have done historically…..

However, what we have historically done is operate small units like this and provide very flexible and agile capabilities to respond to crisis.

We have done it for years off amphibious shipping, and now we do it with the extended range capability of the V-22 which allows us to provide some very similar capabilities over the vast areas that we are responsible for….

The Marines also are going back to some geographic roots as well, since they have had a long history in West Africa during the Cold War and in the ’90s and early 2000s.

Col Benedict added:

Well before the current ‘post 9/11,’ it has been episodic because we do exercises and theater security cooperation where we partner with nations, so we learn from them and they learn from us, keeping in mind that we might work together in the future for a common goal.

However, we have not based there.

We have been doing these operations for years, and it has paid dividends when we had to do ‘provide support’ for different countries on the continent.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Scott F. Benedict, third from left, commanding general of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, speaks with NATO service members during Exercise Nordic Response 24 in Alta, Norway, March 6, 2024. Exercise Nordic Response 24 is designed to enhance military capabilities and allied cooperation in high-intensity warfighting scenarios under challenging arctic conditions, while providing U.S. Marines unique opportunities to train alongside NATO allies and partners. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Christian Salazar)

By Robbin Laird

I have been coming to Australia since 2014 to participate in and write the seminar reports for the Sir Richard Williams Foundation.

What started out as a Foundation focusing primarily on airpower has transitioned over that period to focusing on shaping the ADF as an integrated force, increasingly focused on their region.

The latest report focused on the core conference theme which was entitled: THE MULTI-DOMAIN REQUIREMENTS OF AN AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE STRATEGY.

I have included a e-book version of the book below.

But unique in my work has been providing a detailed look at the ADF transition since 2014, which I have provided in a series of books which I highlight below as well.

I am the only American who is a fellow with the Foundation, and find the recent surge of American expertise on Australia associated with AUKUS to be of some concern.

AUKUS is a Rorschach test. You can see in it what you want.

It is loaded with ambiguity, the kind that can lead to serious conflict in the United States, the UK and in Australia about who is supposed to do what.

Our alliance is too important to be reduced to chanting AUKUS, rather than frankly discussing our common interests and our differences.

And the domestic divergencies in our societies are very significant and has clear implications for the future.

An AUKUS totem doesn’t solve this.

When the past government and the current one underscored that the warning time for the defence of Australia has been dramatically reduced because of Chinese behavior and lack of commitment to the “rules-based order”, it seemed like a critical turning point.

Only it really is not.

The current government has cut significantly current and already planned ADF capability, such as the eliminating the 4^th F-35 squadron in favor of a new SSN and new surface ships in the future decade.

Not only is this not only a Paul Revere moment, it looks punting the ball moment.

And the shift being planned is dramatic.

Marcus Hellyer has carefully gone through the figures in the defence industrial plan and concluded that there is indeed a dramatic shift.

As he concluded about the plan:

It’s clear we’ve moved on from a balanced force. But what have we moved on to? The NDS states that the ADF is now becoming a focused force. However, it’s not quite clear what it is focused on doing since the NDS states (page 7) that the ADF still needs the capacity to:

• defend Australia and our immediate region;
• deter through denial any potential adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;
• protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;
• contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and
• contribute with our partners to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.

That pretty much covers every task in every part of the world which doesn’t sound very focused. The NDS also says that the ADF force structure is focused on deterrence and supporting a ‘Strategy of Denial’. It doesn’t really say who it is trying to deny or deter from doing what. One can assume it’s China, but from doing what exactly is not quite clear. Whatever it is, we seem to need significant maritime capabilities to deter China from doing it—but only at some point in the distant future.

We’ve noted that Maritime capabilities absorb an unprecedented 38% of the acquisition budget over the coming decade. Those are split into two main categories: Undersea warfare at $63-76 billion and Maritime capabilities for sea denial and localised sea control operations (when somebody comes up with as clunky a title as that, you know we are in the realm of deep conceptual confusion) at $51-69 billion. Those total to $114-145 billion with a mid-point at $129.5 billion.

However, only two projects dominate that spending: the SSN enterprise at $53-63 billion and the Hunter-class frigate at $22-32 billion. Again those two figures sum to $75-95 billion with a mid-point at $85 billion. Two capabilities alone consume $85 billion (remember those figures are just the spend over the decade, not the total acquisition cost). That’s 65.6% of the Maritime spend. If we multiply 38% by 65.6% we can see that 25% of Defence’s acquisition spend over the decade goes on just two capabilities.

But it gets worse because those projects—all going well—will only have just started to deliver actual capability by the end of the decade. The first Hunter is due to be delivered in 2032 and enter service in 2034. The first SSN is scheduled to be handed over to the RAN around 2032—all going well in Defence’s most complex megaproject ever. And even then, one submarine or frigate does not a capability make.

In summary, we get virtually no in service, sovereign capability in return for 25% of Defence’s acquisition spend over the coming decade—and Defence has had to give up or defer a lot of planned capability to achieve that result. Whatever the balanced force is moving on to, it’s going to take a lot of time and money to get there with little medium-term return on that investment.

I would add to his argument that the actual role of the Royal Australian Navy within the Australian defence strategy is not at all clear.

When one has what is in the future the force which is programmed, just what is the con-ops of that force in the defence of Australia?

I had a chance to continue my discussion with Peter Jennings during my April visit to Australia.

And he explained why it is so difficult for an Australian government to surge rather than to plan.

As he noted: “Our professional military discuss with their counterparts, joint operations and the challenges to be met. But no government wants to discuss in public what we would actually do in a crisis. In fact, officials in government do not even wish to discuss such issues.”

The government is reluctant, according to Jennings, to discuss openly realistic scenarios for joint operations. Discussing military contingencies at the political level is not an Australian political art.

I would add that failure of the political class in the West to spend time in training in crisis management is a major one. During the Cold War, I personally participated in a number of exercises with actual political leaders honing crisis management skills. This is certainly evident today.

Jennings added that for a Labour Government there is little interest in discussing military contingencies for another reason.

Australia’s sovereignty will be “compromised” by working in a coalition where Australia is clearly a subordinate partner.

And with the prospect of Trump returning to the U.S. presidency and demanding “where is the beef” in current ADF capability, such a prospect is not one which the Labour Government would look forward to.

We then discussed acquisition reform difficulties.

Jennings noted that the so-called AUKUS 2 basket whereby Australia would gain access to technology which could rapidly be inserted into the ADF will not be if the traditional acquisition system holds sway. A prototype is not a capability until someone actually embeds it into the operating force.

I was quite struck by the difference between the activity of the Nordics whom I have visited over the same time as the Aussies and the activity of the current government.

This quote from the Swedish Chief of Staff says it all:

“We look at Ukraine, they are masters in using already developed civil technology to solve military problems. This is an area I look very carefully into because this is very interesting and very promising — if you also have the courage of sitting together in rooms and making sure that we understand each other, that this is what we need to solve this problem. Do you have it? Can we adjust it to something? If we start from the very beginning on a sophisticated system, it takes like 10 years. The time is not there.

“We have been working in a situation for decades, with a lot of time, no money. Now it’s opposite: there is finance, but the time is limited. So for my generation of officers, it’s a mental transition and change right now where we need to find a way ahead where we speed up.”

And that is the challenge facing Australia but where the plan for the future is funded by cutting currently capability.

By Robbin Laird

As the United States faces a global overload of strategic challenges and the concomitant challenge of shaping an effective and capable force to deal with these challenges but having serious budget stringencies, leveraging the unique capabilities which the United States already possesses is crucial.

It is nice to think of 6th generation aircraft, new AI autonomous systems, new weapons, and the like, but adapting what you have and leveraging unique capabilities which you possess is a key part of the way forward.

Whether it be the Aegis global enterprise, or the F-35 global enterprise or the tiltrotor enterprise, the United States has shaped unique warfighting capabilities which it can leverage as it shapes effective forces moving forward for today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

I have written extensively about the Aegis global enterprise and the F-35 global enterprise, but we should also focus on a core capability which the United States has crafted and evolved since its introduction into Iraq in 2007, namely the tiltrotor enterprise.

If the Chinese had developed this capability and had built on its use since 2007 and its proliferation in the joint force, I guarantee there would be a robust literature on this threat and how do deal with it.

But since we have done it, we spend as much time criticizing it as understanding how the tiltrotor enterprise has transformed the capabilities of the USMC, the USAF and now the U.S. Navy with the U.S. Army next up.

This is a story of a unique capability which has reshaped the USMC in ways that are unimaginable without it. It has given the USAF special operational capabilities and now the U.S. Navy will experience a very different capability and approach to sustaining its distributed fleet.

And as the U.S. Army focuses on how to distribute its force, the new tiltrotor capability will become a backbone for an effort to leverage speed and range which no rotorcraft possesses.

When I worked for SECAF, he decided to implement a day without space for the USAF. It was not a pleasant experience. And we have now experienced what it is like to operate without an Osprey across the services. This has simply meant that core missions have not been met. Full stop.

When I went to visit MAWTS-1 earlier this month, I talked with the outgoing commander of this key training command, and discussed the recent WTI course. Unfortunately, the Osprey was not available due to the grounding of the aircraft by the three services.

This is what I learned from that discussion:

Col Purcell started by underscoring that the grounding of the Ospreys by the services after the accident last year with an Air Force Osprey, created a challenge for them. Not having Ospreys – which frankly are a bedrock platform in the transformation of their concept of operations – caused a problem in the WTI. There were some missions they simply could not do, and shifted assets around to do missions which was not their primary mission focus….

One mission which has been identified and which MAWTS-1 has been training for is the TRAP mission associated with a maritime strike mission. The need to recover rapidly any personnel downed in a maritime assault mission is something the Osprey is uniquely positioned to do. Only you can’t do it if it is not there. Fortunately, the ban on Osprey use was lifted in time for them to be able to use the Osprey in the maritime strike event within FINEX.

But it does not stop there.

If you want to deliver an engine to a large deck carrier for the F-35C and don’t have an Osprey, well you are out of Schlitz.

Or if the USAF is tasked with what President Carter asked the military to do in Iran in 1979, how would that work out? I remember specifically talking with my former professor Dr. Brzezinski about that mission failure and how the Osprey would have led to a different outcome, at least in his view.

You have heard of mission creep: but what missions missing in action?

That is what happens when you ground the tiltrotor enterprise.

Featured Image: Overview of the wreckage at the Desert One base in Iran. Credit: Wikipedia