2017-02-15 By Robbin Laird

Norway is in an especially interesting and perhaps precarious situation or put another way is at the crossroads of 21^st century history.

It is a small country with a very large territory bordering on one of the most active military powers, led by a skillful strategist.

Their allies are Brexit Britain, Trump America and various non-NATO allies, such as Finland and Sweden.

There is much uncertainty as well about the future of the European Union and the Euro zone and significant uncertainties hang over France as it will elect a new President and Germany is led by a beleaguered Chancellor whose handling of the immigration issue has triggered a European wide crisis.

There is a growing body of intellectual selfies about what the Trump Administration will do.

Remarks made by the President during the campaign have turned into a cottage industry of interpreting his statements with almost church-like dogma by his critics.

Global dynamics of change were there before the President and will be there after his Presidency.

What remains to determine is how his Administration will scope out its way ahead and shape its responses.

Norwegian Minister of Defense, Ine Eriksen Søreide. Credit: Second Line of Defense

While that may be uncertain, it is clear that the President is committed to rebuilding the U.S. military and its role in the world. It is also clear that he intends to reshape the American role in the world.

Again, although this generates uncertainty in terms of continuity of policy, it is likely that the United States will be a pillar of support to liberal democracies world wide. And if Putin is foolish enough to expect a close friendship with Donald Trump, I would be surprised at the naivete of a man as clever as Putin.

At the recent conference which I attended in Norway on airpower, there were three foreign policy speakers all of whom expressed deep concern with developments in the UK and the US.

One even made the amazing statement that the election of President Trump and Brexit where the most dramatic changes in the past thirty years! Even worse, another speaker quoted this as a brilliant insight. 

One of the speakers provided an indictment of the President that was truly amazing to listen to, notably because his country would have remained divided if it were not for American leadership exercised against many critics in Europe.

I felt like I was back in Europe fighting the Euro-missile battle once again and being both personally insulted and defending the “anti-detente and war-mongering” President Reagan.

I feel like I just lost thirty years and am back to the future so to speak, and the speakers who presented here had the same sense of moral authority as the critics of the Euromissile deployment as well.

It is useful to remind folks that Administration to date has just started, is not fully staffed and has several solid beginnings under its belt, notably the close working relationship with Japan, the Abe visit to New York, the Pacific and then to DC to meet the President.

General Mattis has visited the Pacific and reaffirmed the core commitments of the US in the region.

And the Vice President and Mattis are meeting this week at the talking heads European security conference at Munich.

One can suspect that there are those abroad who are using the Trump effect for their domestic advantages and creating a threat which is simply not there.

I did talk to many Norwegians at the Conference and in Oslo, and while there is concern, more about the various strategic uncertainties than anything else, my message was pretty simple – it is early days and the track record in terms of actual policy has been to reaffirm U.S. commitments and not to run from them.

The President was elected to change U.S. policy and he will.

He will not be President Obama who I might remind folks was given a Nobel Peace Prize in the first year of his presidency for having accomplishing absolutely nothing.

But as the Norwegian Defense Minister has indicated it is early days.

My observations of her at the Conference and in my discussion with her, it is clear that she is a tough minded individual who will clearly argue the Norwegian case to her allies, and certainly to her counterpart, General Mattis.

With this kind of trans-Atlantic leadership, although we face significant challenges, a solid path forward can almost certainly be found.

That happened in the early 1980s and that will happen now.

The Minister provided her perspective earlier this week in a conference on security policy held in Norway and these remarks were published on the Norwegian Ministry of Defence website and follow. Together they provide a sensible statement of concern but also of how best to proceed.

As the famous Confederate General “Stonewall” Jackson once insisted: “Never take counsel of your fears.”

Defence Minister Ine Eriksen Søreide’s opening remarks: Leangkollenseminaret 2017

February 13, 2017

By Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Søreide

Norwegian Minister of Defence Ine Eriksen Søreide held these remarks at the Security Seminar at Leangkollen February 13th 2017.

Distinguished collegues, former ministers, guests, ladies and gentlemen,

It’s good to be back here at the annual Leangkollen seminar. I want to thank the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Kate and her good associates for pulling it off – in style – once again. This has become an important venue for addressing key security issues, and I’m happy to see such a great turnout.

This year’s topic is “Security in Northern Europe after Crimea, Brexit and the U.S. election”. Let us dwell for a moment on this extraordinary combination of words in one sentence: “Security in Northern Europe. After Crimea. Brexit. And the U.S. election”…

Imagine you just woke up from a three-year hibernation and were told that Russia has taken a part of Ukraine, the UK has decided to leave the European Union and Donald Trump is now the new president of the United States.

US and Norwegian Defense Ministers Meet in Munich, February 17, 2017 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

Would you believe it?

In these days of winter sports, it’s like being told that Sweden has beaten Norway in the Cross-Country World Cup.

It just wouldn’t seem very likely.

Ok, perhaps this is too grave to joke about.

After all, we take skiing very seriously up here.

But making fun of each other has been the social glue of Nordic cooperation for centuries, and I see no reason to stop now.

Dear friends,

We meet in challenging times.

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the following and continuing destabilization of Eastern Ukraine changed the European security landscape almost overnight.

Our increasingly assertive neighbor has demonstrated their will and ability to use military force and other more covert means in order to achieve their objectives.

Covert means that are specifically designed to cast doubt in decision making processes.

And, by doing so, they violated international law and shook the very foundation of the framework for peace and stability that we all built together on the ruins of two devastating world wars.

The Nordic and the Baltic countries had to think about security in a new way.

The Eastern European countries had to think about security in a new way.

And NATO as well as the EU had to think about security in a new way.

We all had to adapt quickly and united to a new, uncertain and unpredictable security environment. The EU and the US imposed restrictive measures, which Norway and other non-EU countries adopted in solidarity.

And as an alliance, NATO demonstrated its ability to rapidly adjust as well as provide reassurance to our Eastern allies.

I won’t take up your time by telling you a story you all know. But I want to point out that this was a dramatic change by way of external developments. Something that happened outside of our countries, but with great implications for our countries.

And by “our countries” I mean the transatlantic alliance and the Nordics.

Brexit and the US election, however, happened at home. Inside our own house, so to speak. The British people voted. The American people voted. And the results took many of us by surprise.

Brexit and the US election were two very different things, and I think we should be careful to compare them as such. But one thing they had in common is that they revealed a significant level of frustration and discontent amongst a lot of people. And that is something we’re seeing not only in the UK and the US, but in many European countries.

If I am to suggest common denominators between Crimea, Brexit and the US elections concerning security in Northern Europe, it must be this:

They were all major wake-up calls, albeit for different reasons.

They have all introduced uncertainty at some level.

And they have all set in motion change and developments that we do not know the extent of.

Ladies and gentlemen, we find ourselves in a time of political, economic and social disruption.

The world, as we have known it for decades, is changing. And it’s changing rapidly…..

Perhaps the liberal democracy, with all its dilemmas and compromises, is the best form of government we are capable of designing. After all, it has enabled economic growth, prosperity, peace and stability between nations for decades.

But it seems we may have arrived at a time in history where the liberal democracy, as we know it, is facing one of its most serious challenges to date.

The very framework of a stable Europe and transatlantic relationship is under pressure.

Right-wing populism is on the rise in many countries, paving the way for different forms of nationalism.

Liberal, democratic ideals of freedom, equality and inclusion are losing terrain to ideals of the opposite.

We are witnessing more distrust between people and a deteriorating belief in democratic institutions, politicians and the media.

Public discourse and political debates in many countries are increasingly characterized by fear, xenophobia, disinformation and conflict.

Social media echo and reinforce whatever reality people subscribe to, no matter where you are on the political, cultural and social spectrum.

Facts, scientific knowledge and objective truth – the very building blocks of human development – are becoming devalued currencies in a post-factual world.

It’s a sort of convergence of discontent we’re witnessing. I have for some time expressed my concerns for the health condition of European politics.

The reasons for these developments are many and complex, and I will in no way pretend I have all the answers. I don’t think anybody does. But I do think that many of us, both in Europe and in the US, failed for a long time to realize the extent and significance of the growing discontent amongst large groups of people. And by doing so, we have contributed to creating fertile ground for populism and the polarized political climate we are seeing today.

We also know that this development is actively fueled by Russia through intelligence and information operations, hacking, trolling and a range of other means in order influence elections and undermine European and transatlantic cohesion.

Ironically, the strengths of our liberal democracies – trust, transparency, free speech, independent media and rule of law – is also what make us vulnerable to Russia’s actions in the non-kinetic domain.

It’s too early to say what the implications will be of Brexit and the transnational anti-establishment movements. France, Germany and the Netherlands – as well as Norway – are having elections this year, and I would lie if I said I wasn’t concerned given the current political climate and the examples we have seen of Russian subversive influence.

I am pleased that recent dialogue with, and statements from, the new US administration emphasize US commitment to NATO and transatlantic security. But at the same time, there is still much we do not know about President Trump’s foreign and security policy.

While I don’t think we should exaggerate the significance of Russian influence, we shouldn’t underestimate it either. In any case, we need to pay close attention to what is going on in our own countries now. Because these underlying currents in many countries may also undermine international defense and security cooperation at a time when the need for cooperation is greater than in a very long time. The security challenges that we are all facing from violent extremism, a more assertive and destabilizing Russia and the consequences of conflict and instability in North Africa and the Middle East, requires more trust and closer collaboration, not the opposite. And given the current situation, one of my greatest concerns is that our ability to make decisions in NATO or the EU will be challenged.

Dear friends,

Over the next two days you will cover a range of perspectives with regards to security in Northern Europe. And as we all know, the challenges to Northern European security are many and complex. I think the greatest challenge right now is not one single threat, but the combined uncertainty and unpredictability of the multitude of developments that are happening at the same time both within and outside our countries.

Very few, if any, of our challenges can be solved by military means alone. But the last three years have showed us that military power remains an indispensable part of our security policy toolbox. The fight against ISIL and violent extremism requires a military response as part of a broad, comprehensive approach. And Russia’s actions have caused a need to bolster European defense capabilities and cooperation, both through NATO, between the Nordic countries and bilaterally between friends and allies.

Norway’s top priorities in NATO for the past two years have been a renewed maritime focus with increased attention to the North Atlantic and the High North, and a functional assessment of NATO’s command structure. Both represent a clear response to the uncertainty introduced by Russia in this region.

Now, we do not consider Russia a military threat against Norway today. I want to be clear on that. However, Norway is NATO in the North, and we share a border with an increasingly assertive neighbor with superpower aspirations. A neighbor who has modernized its Armed Forces, significantly increased its military presence in the High North, reintroduced the old East versus West schismatic thinking, engaged in subversive actions against Western democracies, violated international law and undermined European stability.

While we expect Russia to remain true to our longstanding and common interest in keeping the High North stable and peaceful, we must acknowledge that tension and conflict in other places may develop into a more serious security situation in the North. And that has implications for Norwegian defense planning.

Parliament approved the government’s new long-term plan in November last year. It represents an historic prioritization of our Armed Forces. Over the next 20 years, we are increasing our defense budget by 180 billion Norwegian kroner, or approximately 22 billion US dollars. After years of insufficient funding and a gradual decline in our defense capabilities, we are now making sure that our Armed Forces have the combat power, flexibility and sustainability needed in a changing and unpredictable security environment.

We are strengthening our military presence and our intelligence capacities.

Our new fleet of F-35 combat aircraft is on its way.

In addition, we are investing heavily in new maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, air defense, land power capabilities and intelligence.

NATO and American security guarantees remain the cornerstone of our security policy, and as a NATO member, Norway has an obligation to contribute to the collective security framework that we are a part of – and depend upon. We take our obligations seriously.

In addition, defence cooperation between the Nordic countries, and between the Nordic and the Baltic countries, has picked up over the last years, not least as a result of Russia’s assertiveness and unpredictability.

The Baltic Sea region has become a center of gravity in the region. Increased Russian activity, including a more aggressive posture, has made the Nordic countries concerned. A crisis or conflict in the Baltic Sea region may also spread to the High North.

The Nordic countries have a responsibility to promote stability and security in our region. While Norway and Denmark are members of NATO, Sweden and Finland are not. But as close friends and neighbors, we are facing the same challenges. That has sparked us to strengthen our dialogue and step up our military cooperation.

We have established secure communication lines between our countries. And we continue to develop our cooperation with regards to air surveillance, international operations and joint training and exercises. Last year we signed an agreement with the aim of allowing easier access to each other’s sea-, air-, and land domain for common training and defence purposes in peacetime. Almost every week, Nordic combat aircraft are conducting Cross-Border Training in the North.

And with NATO’s partnership with Sweden and Finland, both countries’ participation in annual winter exercises in Norway, and their planned participation in next year’s NATO exercise Trident Juncture, we are taking Nordic and NATO cooperation to a new level.

Firmly rooted in our NATO membership, Norway sees Nordic cooperation as a pragmatic and sensible approach to increasing predictability, ensuring stability and promoting peaceful cooperation without confrontation or conflict in our part of the world. We have a shared understanding of the security challenges we are facing, and we are all adapting our defence capabilities. The value of close consultations has increased in a changing security security environment.

Ladies and gentlemen,

This year’s topic is “security in Northern Europe”. It’s difficult to navigate in this new and complex security environment, and you will have plenty of time to dive deeper into these and other issues over the next two days.

I don’t have all the solutions. But if there is one thing I am sure of, it’s that the challenges we are facing are so big, interlinked and complicated that we must face them together. And right now, I am concerned that the European and American political climate change may get in the way of that. Let’s not make that our biggest challenge on top of all the others.

I hope you have a good seminar, and remember – whatever you do in this Nordic setting – don’t start any discussions about cross-country skiing.

Thank you.

https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/defence-minister-ine-eriksen-soreides-opening-remarks-leangkollenseminaret-2017/id2538839/

Video: U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis meets with Norwegian Minister of Defence Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide in Munich, Germany before the 53nd Munich Security Conference on February 17, 2017. Credit: US Department of State.

 

2017-02-22 By Danny Lam

Secretary Mattis delivered an impassioned plea for increased defense spending by NATO allies at the Brussels summit.

“If your nations do not want to see America moderate its commitment to this alliance, each of your capitals needs to show support for our common defense,” Mattis made clear.

NATO, including the US, cut defense spending from 2010 onwards in the aftermath of the Great recession. As recently as 2009, America spent 5.3% GDP on defense, and NATO Europe spent 1.7%.  As of 2015, US expenditures fell to 3.6% GDP, while NATO Europe averages 1.43%.   Critically, in 2015, large, major, healthy economies like Germany (1.2%) and Canada (1%) are spending well below their capacity.

How will allies respond to the end of year (2017) deadline set by the Trump Administration?

If history is any guide, Europeans are more than capable of endless dialogue and in this case it is the dialogue of the deaf.

Exhortations by the Trump Administration to increase spending have fallen on deaf ears.

Chancellor Merkel will only raise spending gradually to 2% GDP by 2024.

Jean-Claude Junker advocated resisting American demands on the grounds that development and humanitarian aid is also spending for “security”.

Canada’s Trudeau regime is leading the pack with fictitious and fraudulent accounting and hallucinations of Canada doing “heavy lifting” in NATO.

Defense Minister Sajjan’s Enron grade accounting moved defense spending up to 1.3 – 1.5% GDP – well short of the 2% NATO standard even before deductions for wasteful spending like Canada’s infamous CAD $4,800 a copy Bolt Action Canadian Ranger Rifles – Comparable weapons available at retailers like Cabelas for about CAD$300.

Europe, likewise, waste an estimated €20.6 billion annually that result in “a cost of more than half of that of the US, Europeans obtain only a tenth of the [military] capacity.”

Staggering wastage like this was acceptable in peacetime, but not when Canada and EU are unwilling to raise defense budgets while facing real, serious existential security threats like Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Since no NATO countries had any difficulty financing abrupt rises in social spending on things like refugee programs (e.g. Germany spent .35% GDP in 2016 according to IMF), during the past few years, or running deficits, it is hard to believe that fiscally sound NATO allies like Canada are unable to raise defense spending by year end if their regime wanted to.

The Trump Administration’s demands for increased expenditures will more likely than not, result in recalcitrant allies engaging in a round of whining and creative accounting for the May NATO Summit.   

Any improvement in burden sharing will have to be sharply discounted even if the 2% goal is reached.   Though there are a few symbolic moves.  Realistically, the 2% target must be accompanied with major reforms to ensure the efficacy of spending as well as increased spending — neither is likely forthcoming anytime soon in any serious way from NATO allies.

Spending is no longer an effective and useful gauge of capabilities for gauging a NATO member’s treaty obligations under Article 3 “by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid… maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

For example, NATO in Europe, at present, consist of mostly light formations that have been conclusively demonstrated to be unsuitable against Russian New Generation Warfare used in the Crimea and Ukraine.   Except for Norway and a few other NATO members, there is no serious move to urgently field counters by key players like Germany beyond symbolic deployments to show “resolve”.

Canada, historically the biggest whiner of NATO, is presently going through the motions of “major procurement” for fighters and surface combatants that do not meet the self-evident requirement for Ballistic Missile Defense against North Korean threats. That, plus the failure to join the Missile Defense Program or aid allies with not so much as a protest against North Korea’s latest missile test, disqualify Canada under NATO Treaty Article 3 for aid under Article 5.  None of these facts matter to the Trudeau regime, who insisted they are doing more than enough for their allies. With Canadians, there is not even a consensus about existential threats to Canada or allies.

The question is, what levers and inducements do the Trump Administration have to enforce the demand for fairer burden sharing among allies?   

There is the blunt instrument of withdrawing support, reducing commitments to allies like NATO but not much else. After all, these are sovereign states and there is no mechanism for enforcing commitments in the NATO treaty except for chiding them for failing to meet Article 3 obligations — which up until now, is ambiguous.

As it stands, details of commitments to allies by the US are shrouded in secrecy.   Treaties like NATO and other bilateral pacts like US-Japan, Taiwan Relations Act, NORAD, are worded in the most general terms.

Thus, NATO Article 5 calls for “armed attack against one or more … shall be considered an attack against them all” triggering “such action as [individual NATO ally] deems necessary”.

The lesson from World War I is that detailed agreements that publically committed nations to go to war can result in seemingly minor events cascading into war.  Treaty obligations trigger war plans that once set in motion, was difficult to unwind.

Thus, the US have a longstanding policy of keeping details of commitments known to very few and secret.

The specifics and details of security guarantees given by the US are only known to a handful of allied senior officials in each country. Thus, such details can be amended and alter or changed as needed.   Whether the threat or actual implementation of such action to water down commitments, which by its nature must remain secret, will be enough to change the behavior of politicians like the Trudeau or Merkel regime is an open question.

Regimes like those of Merkel and Trudeau are committed to their course of undermining the Trump Administration’s demands for better burden sharing.

And why not?

Delay, ignore, whine worked against GW Bush and Obama Administrations.

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis hosts a joint press meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, Feb. 15, 2017. (DOD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Brigitte N. Brantley)

Why shouldn’t it work again?

Just wait Trump out – he be gone at most in 7 years.

Liberal Internationalists will be back in charge in Washington.

Under the existing US system, the worse that can happen is that Trump water down security guarantees, withdraw troops and pre-positioned equipment, close bases, cut joint training and exercise, and other symbolic moves, the most dramatic being withdraw from NATO under Article 13.

But at the end of the day, if there is a real threat to Europe, the US will be compelled to intervene anyways.

If the US did withdraw from NATO, it is not obvious that Europe will break out in war, or the enfeebled Russia will have designs on Europe in the near future.

Though it is very obvious that terrorism and Russia will remain as issues.

What can the Trump Administration do about fair weather allies?

There is a way ahead if the Administration makes this a serious priority rather than simply a campaign tweet or bumper sticker.

Editor’s Note: Danny Lam will continue his discussion of an alternative way ahead to the dialogue of the deaf on defense spending. 

If you wish to comment on this article, you can do so here:

What if NATO and other US Allies Fail to Deliver?

 

2017-02-17 By Danny Lam

North Korea’s rapid progress in fielding a credible land and undersea nuclear arsenal capable of reaching CONUS calls for a prompt, clear and unambiguous response.

Multilateral diplomacy and sanctions to date have not slowed or hindered the progress of under a youthful Kim Jong Un looking to make his mark and secure his claim to the Kim dynasty.

Likewise, existing and planned upgrades of defenses fielded by South Korean and Japanese allies have failed to deter aggressive moves toward a capability to threaten the US and allies like, Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand.

Time is of the essence for urgent defense upgrades with the goal of deterring DPRK and defending against potential nuclear attacks. Procurement cycles and logistical issues like training and deployment for new weapons systems (absent imminent or actual war) are too slow to match the pace at which DPRK is advancing and becoming existential threats.

Under Kim Jong Un, the pace of progress accelerated. The third nuclear test in 2013 moved in parallel with the moves to fielding a credible nuclear arsenal.  Crude liquid fueled ICBMs have been supplanted by solid fueled, cold launch ballistic missiles tested in February 2017 ideal for a nuclear first strike.

Such rapid technical progress since 2013 suggest deployment of considerable resources from a supposedly impoverished regime.

Iran, Pakistan, China (whether official or not) and others are known to have aided the DPRK nuclear and missile program.   Resources, be it financing, access to critical materials, basic technology, skills, etc. are not a major problem for the DPRK nuclear program.

It is a matter of time before they succeed.

Sanctions have not only not hindered the DPRK regime, but reports from visitors to DPRK show they have not hindered recent improvement in North Korean living standards.  As recently as 2011, Pyonyang roads are notable for their silence and the lack of vehicular traffic. Satellite images show a “blacked out” state too poverty stricken to afford street lights.

Fast forward to 2016, and credible observers report “there is a lot of traffic—a lot of cars, a lot of trucks, and a lot of taxis”. Unless all of this is a Potemkin village, one must surmise that sanctions, especially since 2013, have failed.

This is not a regime that is being harmed by existing sanctions. If anything, the evidence indicate that the regime is rapidly raising the living standard of their people, providing North Koreans (at least in Pyonyang) with luxury goods that could not be imagined a few years ago.

All of this is happening despite Beijing’s grudging “co-operation” in “tightening” sanctions.

Incredulously, the Beijing regime proudly noted after the last round that sanctions are not meant to harm “normal” trade or affect civilians.  As if it is possible to clearly delineate civilian from military in DPRK or to prevent diversions even if the sanctions are actually implemented.

The US and allies have virtually expended all their diplomatic capital with Beijing over the past decade dealing with the North Korean issue.

Other issues, like Beijing’s massive arms buildup and armed forces transition to an offensive posture, tantalizing hints of PRC plans for launching a surprise nuclear first strike on Japan, repeated threats to US and allies of nuclear war, invasion and occupation of the South China Sea and other moves in the military sphere have met with little US response.

Nor is there any call for the PRC to join existing US-Russia arms control regimes if they want their security concerns like the opposition to South Korean THAAD to be taken seriously.

Recently, PLAN openly engaged in piracy, announced their intention to ban and/or regulate foreign submersibles and military vessels from “Chinese waters” by 2020 which presumably include areas claimed by the PRC as “sovereign territory” to solidify their sea grab.

Likewise, non military issues like the PRC’s beggar thy neighbor currency devaluation, mercantilism, hostile campaigns against foreign firms, widespread theft and pillage of technology, cyber warfare, or even mundane issues like PRC becoming the center for synthetic narcotics manufacture and distribution around the world, etc. have largely fallen by the wayside because of DPRK.

The Beijing regime is the greatest beneficiary from the fear created by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. By going through the motions of “co-operation” with the US and allies to “restrain” DPRK, the regime have essentially forced the US and allies to take almost all other issues off the table.

Had the PRC regime delivered results with DPRK similar to the denuclearization of South Africa or the dismantlement of Libya’s program, this might have been arguably a worthwhile sacrifice.

But the fact is not only did Beijing not deliver, but DPRK have become a larger, not smaller, threat with Beijing’s helpful “cooperation”.

The PRC regime cannot be counted on to cooperate on more sanctions, and even if they did, sanctions are unlikely to work.

Yet, “China experts” continue to extoll the benefits of concessions to Beijing.

The US and allies have to come to terms with the PRC that will not take action that will reliably and credibly roll back the DPRK nuclear and ballistic missile threat.

In other words, multilateral diplomacy have failed.   Beijing, happen to prefer the status quo and DPRK’s growing capabilities as the tip of Beijing’s spear.

If the Beijing regime cannot be relied on to do whatever it takes to proactively remove the DPRK threat, perhaps it is time to compel the PRC and Russia to sit out a conventional war to avoid an all out war with the US and allies.

At present, there is not a credible conventional capability in place to proactively (or upon provocation) eliminate the NORK nuclear threat. Such a campaign cannot be a limited, ad hoc move, but will require invasion and occupation of North Korea. The US and allies are ill prepared and not equipped for such a campaign.

In the absence of this capability, the only deterrent the US and allies have is the threat of using nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsular, which is a blunt instrument that cannot be used without serious considerations of collateral damage and the risk of escalation to war with PRC and Russia.

A conventional military option is preferable as an alternative.

Having a conventional military option in place as quickly as possible to deter the Kim regime will require substantial changes in the financing, posture, equipment and training of allies like South Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, etc. Ideally, this option must be in place no later than 1H2018 in order to head off the growing threat.   Such a timeline leaves no room and option for dithering or delays.

Relying on the PRC’s best efforts to constrain DPRK, if they are willing, will not deliver “Peace for our time.”

But the threat of a credible conventional military option, might.

Let’s end this Kabuki theater of kowtowing to Beijing as is it was an aspect of deterrence with regard to North Korea.

Editor’s Note 1: Recently the Missile Defense Advocacy Association reached a similar conclusion to Lam about the origins of the technology, but called for inclusion of the Beijing leadership in the solution.  

Unequivocally, North Korea is simply not capable of developing a completely organic, sophisticated, and complex sea- and land-mobile solid fuel missile that successfully flew a lofted trajectory.

North Korea doesn’t have the industry base, the massive foundational engineering and technology research infrastructure for production, assembly and quality control to independently build the ballistic missile that was demonstrated on Sunday.

For the North Korea regime’s existence and the Supreme Leader’s prosperity, North Korea is benefiting from someone else’s technology, industry infrastructure, engineering, training, doctrine, resources, and a shared commonality of intent to prevent the reunification of Korea, maintain the armistice, and banish American forces from the Korean Peninsula.

The indications and intent of the quality and quantity of ballistic missile and nuclear testing show it is much more than the limited industry capability and capacity of a poverty stricken North Korea and its Supreme Leader that has been enabled to prove remarkable genius military technical prowess to defeat and deter the most powerful nation in the world and its allies of Japan and South Korea.

There needs to be an end to it and China, not the Supreme Leader of North Korea, is the enabler of a sophisticated nuclear ballistic missile North Korea (Click here to read an article about how the Polaris-1 is similar to China’s JL-1 SLBM). China is the key and needs to be brought in to solve the North Korea dilemma with the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

But there is a core question which Lam has raised: if the PRC has aided the North Koreans in their nuclear program why does one expect them to actually end it?

Perhaps the challenge is to be found elsewhere in history — is the North Korean case the functional equivalent to the Spanish Civil War for the Beijing government?

Credit: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170213000584

Danny Lam has addressed ways to enhance conventional defense against North Korea and the potential Canadian role as well in these pieces:

Can Allies Deter North Korea by 2020? Updating OPLAN 5015

Will Canada Help Deter North Korea?

Editor’s Note 2: We have argued that the US should move the command in South Korea from the Army to the USAF precisely to shape the kind of nuclear tipped conventional force that could deal with the North Korea threat as it is evolving, rather than staying in the past.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-evolution-of-strategy-for-south-korean-defense-shaping-the-us-army-role-in-the-second-nuclear-age/

 

 

2017-02-15 By Kenneth Maxwell

To read today’s press you would think that the coming of Donald Trump is a shock beyond recognition.

Yet conflict and shocks in Washington are clearly nothing new.

We certainly lived through larger social upheavals before, notably the one’s of the 1960s.

It is clear that we are present at the creation of a new historical epoch; yet the pressures to pretend we are not are strong and reactive. Put simply, contestation of Washington is not new in the United States, nor did opponents of Donald Trump invent it.

During the Vietnam War the university campuses were in open revolt against the war and the compulsory draft for military service. Many of my generation were victims of the confrontations of that time of troubles.

Two friends in particular I remember very well had their lives changed and the biases of the left undercutting their careers.

Both were graduate students who worked as I did on 18th century Brazil: David Davidson of Yale University, and William Joel Simon of the City University of New York.   Both were New Yorkers. David was born in the borough of Brooklyn, and Bill Simon in the borough of Queens.

Bill Simon studied the scientific expeditions in the Portuguese overseas territories, or as they were called during the late 18th century, the “philosophic voyages.” He concentrated on the expeditions of Bahia born and university of Coimbra educated, Dr. Alexandre Rodrigues Ferreira, to Amazon and Matto Grosso (1783-1792) and on the contemporaneous scientific expeditions in Angola by Joaquim Jose da Silva (1783-1808), and of Manuel Galvao da Silva in Mozambique (1783-1791).

Both were students of the new faculty of natural sciences at Coimbra University in Portugal established after the root and branch reform and modernization of the curriculum by the Marques de Pombal (1772).

Bill was drafted into the US army and sent to fight in Vietnam.

He wrote to me about his 18th century research from various jungle outposts. He completed his dissertation despite these obstacles.

It was a remarkable work. The more so since many of Rodrigues Ferreira’s prime specimens and manuscripts were stolen and shipped to Paris by Etienne Godfrey Saint-Hilliare during the French invasion of Portugal in 1808 at the time of the Napoleonic wars.

Later many of his illustrations and diaries were shipped to Brazil where they languished and were eventually only partially published. Rodriques Ferreira died in 1815, his health broken, and subject to the bitter jealousies of his fellow naturalists. And many his remaining specimens and illustrations in Portugal were destroyed during a fire at the Museu de Bocage in Lisbon in 1978

Bill Simon’s dissertation was published in English in Lisbon in 1983 by the centro de estudos de cartografia antiga, and it remains the best work on these remarkable explorations.

But on his return to the USA after military service he was never able to get an academic job, largely in my view, because of anti-military prejudice, against those who had been obliged (often against their will) by the military draft to serve in Vietnam.

He worked in the reinsurance business in New York City.  He died at far too young an age, probably I suspect, as a result of the health hazards to which many Vietnam veterans were unknowingly subjected.

David Davidson was a student of the historian Richard Morse. His father ran a nightclub in Miami. He was an unconventional student. He became a protégée of Sergio Buarque de Hollanda, the great Brazilian historian, who was then a visiting professor at Yale, and he became a close friend of Sergio’s family, staying with them in São Paulo, and accompanying Sergio during his research in the archives of Vila Boa de Goiás (today Goiás Velha)

I still have my correspondence with David Davidson from the time of his researches in the far west of Brazil and in the Amazon basin. He wrote to me from Goias, Manaus, and Belem. While in São Paulo, David stayed with Sergio.

In the preface to the second edition of his book “Monções,” (literally “monsoons”, a name taken from the Indian Ocean, but here referring to the seasonal riverborne routes into the Brazilian interior, used by the early explorers and traders), Sergio Buarque de Hollanda called David “his companion researcher during my last visit to Cuiabá, when, as we used to say, we were together in 1967,  on our admirable “entrada” (The term used for the early explorations of the interior.)

David and I had intended in fact to write a history of Pombaline Brazil together.I would cover the south and central Brazil. He would concentrate on the far west and the Amazon basin. His dissertation was on the “rivers and empire” during the Pombaline period.

It was never published. It is still the best-unpublished work on the 18th century Amazon.

But like Bill Simon, David Davidson, was also a victim of the Vietnam War.

He got his first job at Cornell University. Black students, inspired by the “black power movement” took over the Willard Straight Hall on the campus in April 1969 and armed themselves. It was at the height of the Vietnam War, and the violent confrontations of the civil rights movement.

A very dangerous standoff ensued. David helped mediate between the radical black students and the university administration, and helped defuse the confrontation. But this profoundly affected him. In 1973 he gave up his job and dropped out and became a follower of oriental philosophy.

I went up to Cornell to see him, but he had disappeared into the forest. I left a message for him marked out in stones by the roadside. The next day we met. But he was no longer interested in history. He had utterly abandoned his research. He also died far too young in 2010 of pancreatic cancer.

Bill Simon and David Davidson were scholars of a lost generation. Both were members, as Sergio Buarque de Holanda, wrote “of that curious band of enthusiasts who discover the lost world of the ancient dead”.

Both David and BIll could have gone on to make major contributions to Brazilian history.

But in their different ways both were victims of that turbulent epoch.