In an effort to be in compliance with GDPR we are providing you with the latest documentation about how we collect, use, share and secure your information, we want to make you aware of our updated privacy policy here
Enter your name and email address below to receive our newsletter.
In a 20 April 2023,an article by Gregor Ferguson in The Australian provided an overview of the Ghost Shark program.
In that article, the author highlighted the anticipated role of the XL-AUV or extra Large Autonomous Underwater Vehicle. “Make no mistake, (XL-AUVs) will be a game-changer,” said former Royal Australian Navy Head of Navy Capability Rear Admiral Peter Quinn when he officially named the XL-AUV the Ghost Shark last year.
“They will provide militaries with a persistent option for the delivery of underwater effects in high-risk environments, complementing our existing crewed ships and submarines as well as our future uncrewed surface vessels.
“The Ghost Shark program will create uncertainty in the minds of our potential adversaries and will deter both illegal and coercive behaviour,” he added.
“Due to their modular and multi-role nature, our adversaries will need to assume that their every move in the maritime domain is subject to our surveillance, and that every XL-AUV is capable of deploying a wide range of effects, including lethal ones.”
“Exact roles and performance targets are classified, but to achieve these goals, it will be modular, customisable and optimised with different payloads for different missions.”
I met with David Goodrich OAM, Executive Chairman and CEO of Anduril Australia and Asia Pacific at his office in Sydney on April 21 to get an update on the program.
The Ghost Shark program is a jointly funded and managed project with Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Anduril Australia (Anduril). Anduril is contributing $70 million to the project and using technology from its Dive LD capability and Lattice artificial intelligence-powered operating system as starting points.
Anduril brought their Dive LD commercial AUV to Australia as a testbed vehicle to expedite development of the XL-AUV. The Dive-LD is a commercial product used for a variety of offshore missions for companies needing to do littoral and deep-water survey and inspections.
Anduril is developing the XL-AUV platform for both commercial and defence applications, with the Ghost Shark being the defence-specific platform with defence payloads defined by the RAN.
Three prototype XL-AUVs will be delivered to the Royal Australian Navy over three years. Each prototype will be iterative, using agile engineering approaches. As Goodrich describes the approach: “Each prototype will build upon and improve upon the previous one. By the time we have the third prototype in the water, it will be a deployable capability that can be manufactured at scale. This is the Anduril way.”
In fact, the Anduril team is already focusing on what is needed to deliver an at-scale manufacturing program to the Commonwealth. As Goodrich explains: “We are designing the Ghost Shark with the manufacturing process front of mind so that, at the end of the three year program, we can manufacture capability at scale. This is standard practice in the commercial world, but not so much in the traditional defence environment.”
He noted that China has successfully accelerated the build-up of their military by leveraging the commercial sector effectively. Liberal democracies need to shape their own variant of this strategy and embrace the innovation and agility available in the commercial sector. Clearly the Ghost Shark program is cut from this cloth.
The iterative design and upgrade process will be core to the program as it is implemented as well. Anduril is a ‘software first’ defence tech company that believes software-defined hardware-enabled defence capabilities can transform defence and restore competitive advantage. Goodrich underscored: “Because we’re not building crewed platforms, our engineering cycles can be a lot faster and more agile. Our objective is to get a minimum viable product into the hands of the defence customer as quickly as possible and have that customer shape the evolution of the product through actual use over a very short period of time.”
Not only does the defence customer need capabilities delivered more rapidly than through a traditional acquisition process, but rapid upgrades in conflict are key to mission success. As Goodrich warned: “In conflict, as we have seen in Ukraine, you can’t wait months for upgrades at high cost. You need to have a software-centric approach to retain the transient advantage in combat. Upgrades must be provided in days, not months and not at a cost of millions of dollars.
“Using a software first approach, we can push live updates of our software code to respond to adversary countermeasures in real-time. This refreshes our transient advantage on the battlefield. We can move faster than competitors and give our warfighters the capabilities they need to win. They deserve nothing less..”
Featured Photo: From left: Dr Shane Arnott, Anduril Australia’s Senior Vice President of Engineering and, effectively, chief designer of both the XL-AUV and the Boeing MQ-28A Ghost Bat; Rear Admiral Steve Hughes; Chief Defence Scientist Professor Tanya Monro AC; Rear Admiral Peter Quinn (retired); and David Goodrich OAM, Executive Chairman and CEO of Anduril Australia & Asia Pacific; stand in front of the Dive LD autonomous submarine which is much smaller but uses the same Lattice OS as the Ghost Shark and will be used by Defence for technology acceleration, testing and validation as it develops the Ghost Shark.
For an overview of defence autonomous systems and their development, see section five in the following book which we have just published:
A non-flyable F-35C Lightning II airframe is flown as part of a CH-53K King Stallion external load certification lift Dec. 13, 2022, at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md.
The structure is from the first F-35C carrier variant aircraft, CF-1, a former developmental flight test jet from the Patuxent River F-35 Integrated Test Force (ITF). ITF test teams collaborated with Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) and a Marine helicopter support team with Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) 24, Combat Logistics Regiment 2, 2nd Marine Logistics Group to conduct the lift. P
I met with Ross Babbage on 5 April 2023 in Canberra to discuss his new book and his assessment of the way ahead in building credible deterrence of the China of President Xi.
Ross Babbage in his new book, The Next Major War: Can the U.S. and its Allies Win Against China? takes the wider view of the Chinese military challenge.
Rather than limiting himself to a force-on-force analysis, he looks at the broader nature of the war the Chinese have prepared themselves to fight and examines the situation which the liberal democracies have put themselves into with decades of globalization and accepting Chinese intrusions into their domestic economies and politics.
This is an important book and reflects the serious thinking and work which Babbage has devoted himself to over the past few years. One of the remedies which Babbage believes necessary to get the West into “fighting shape” is for the strategic leaderships in the West to discuss frankly with their publics all of the dimensions of the strategic challenge we now face. Babbage himself very much contributes to such leadership.
In our recent Williams Foundation seminar, we focused on the re-orientation of Australian defence in shaping and contributing to a wider national and alliance deterrent strategy. In my discussion with Babbage, we focused on what he considers the three key elements to being able to shape broader defence capability.
For Babbage, shaping a broader defence capability is not just about the ADF and its own operational capability. “If you’re looking at it from Beijing’s point of view, they’d have to think very carefully about messing with us for we do have a very capable although small military and we have even more powerful friends.”
But the ADF lacks strategic depth and sustainability. As Babbage noted: “We are in danger of being a one-month operational military in case of conflict due to the lack of economic and industrial depth, such as the provision of fuels and key munitions and spare parts.”
The second aspect for Australia is its alliance structure.
As Babbage underscored, Australia has focused upon ramping up its alliance working relationships to the point where its own forces can more effectively integrate with the Americans and are working towards greater cooperation with other allies as well, notably the Japanese.
The result is clear: “The sum of alliance efforts is greater than any of the parts. This is a consideration which Beijing has to realize is not working to its advantage. The Chinese threat has drawn many nations in the Pacific closer together to resist authoritarian interference.”
And it is not just Pacific allies: a number of European states have woken up to the realization that China directly threatens their interests, and they have to find ways to contribute to the deterrence of China as well. Babbage noted: “We will cooperate with a range of others, including a number of relatively powerful and capable Europeans with whom we have long-standing partnerships.”
And that led to the discussion of the third element in Australian deterrence, developing more effective regional partnerships. Here he discussed evolving relationships with India, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian and South Pacific countries. Australia is working hard to develop closer military, security, economic, technological and diplomatic relationships that can strengthen regional cooperation and deterrence.
Working with its neighborhood much more directly and effectively is a key part of shaping the way ahead for Australia’s deterrence strategy.
But beyond these three key elements for shaping the way ahead for Australian deterrence, an important broader question is the need for a national and alliance-wide efforts to strengthen strategic sustainability and endurance. We did not discuss this at length in this meeting, but it is the core of the analysis in his new book.
The challenge is to move from the near and mid-term efforts at enhanced national military capability and allied interoperability to a stronger capability for resilient societies that empower enduring forces, not just one-month militaries. The close allies need to review and restructure their strategic supply chains as a matter of urgency to reinforce each others’ economic and industrial strengths and cover their respective weaknesses.
New levels of allied cooperation are required along with new planning and management mechanisms. These initiatives are needed urgently if the allies are to have a credible deterrent going forward and if they are going to be able to endure and sustain themselves in the event of major conflict.
National Defence: Defence Strategic Review was released to the public on 24 April 2023, to a defence ‘community’ only too eager to scrutinise the document for its consequences on the ADF’s capability mix.
The paper, of course, covers a swathe of topics and concepts. It describes the reasons that a change to Defence’s pattern of business is necessary while doing, as reviews must do, extolling that Australia’s circumstances have changed.
Unfortunately, and because there is only so much material that can be covered in a single document, National Defence’s readers might be left uncertain as to what the topics and concepts of the document mean, and what must be done by Defence accordingly.
There is an important emphasis on the ADF’s logistics capabilities, functions and concepts in National Defence – more than usual when compared to other Government policy documents of recent years.
Moreover, the traditional focus on logistics through the lens of capability acquisition and sustainment has – perhaps – transitioned a more helpful narrative concerning the role of logistics and national-level preparedness.
However, and because so the overall conversation about logistics is so muted, with so little written, and it being a topic people tend to think is quite technical and conceptually uninfluential, it’s easy for those conversing about National Defence to fail to engage with the logistics implications of the paper.
Logistics and Force Posture
National Defence requires the ADF to develop a northern Australia network of bases ‘to provide a platform for logistics support, denial and deterrence’ (p19). This requirement centres on the mechanics of basing by focussing on air bases, shipyards and barracks – all of which must be dispersed and part of a resilient network with in-built redundancy to enable integrated defence. Fuel and ammunition feed into the discussion of force posture, and the importance of exercises to build ‘preparedness including minimum viable improvements in key areas’ is also clear (pp 78-80).
Logistics is the connective tissue of force posture, ensuring the viability of forces by the timely (and time-dependant) provision of personnel, materiel, stores and supplies.
Force posture is underpinned by supply chains, distribution and the technical systems – military and civilian – that ensure that the right ‘stuff’ gets to the right location. It is underpinned by stockholding concepts that ensure sufficient resources are kept, transport management plans and policies and concepts for working with national partners when needed.
Force posture without the logistics arrangements to allow such connections to be made is little more than window-dressing with respect to strategic threats. In other words, it is imprudent to rush forward to force posture outcomes if the logistics arrangements required cannot be produced.
It will also be critical for the ADF to consider concepts relating to force projection: from receiving forces at particular locations, equipping and preparing them for deployment or movement, to consolidating forces at forward locations relative to threats, and the command and control measures required to ensure this happens in a well-coordinated and efficient manner.
Points and ‘mounting’ locations should be chosen to act as places where logistics control can be exerted at a time of crisis; where headquarters can manage the influx of civilian and military resources necessary to support subsequent military operations.
The Relationship between Logistics and Preparedness
National Defence offers a clear signpost that there is a need for Defence, if not the Nation, to reconsider how it views preparedness and its relationship with logistics (p81). The idea of accelerated preparedness speaks to concepts such as mobilisation, force scaling and force expansion. These are ideas that are fundamentally logistics-related in their nature and is counter to the tendency to assume that having forces available at the outset of a conflict is a realistic measure of overall preparedness.
The rotational models of force preparedness used to sustain operations in the Middle-east over the last two decades have tended to obscure the logistics problems which must be resolved by the Government, and ADF, in the years ahead. That there should be a ‘reshaping and growth of the national and Defence logistics and health workforce … to improve national resilience’ is recognition of stranglehold of logistics on what the ADF can and cannot do at a time of need (p81).
Importantly, the idea of Accelerated Preparedness, recognises the essentiality of the national support base, and national resilience, to military performance. Guided-weapons and fuel enterprises are the tip of a proverbial iceberg with respect to the type of national support arrangements needed to insure logistics sovereignty.
However, and in my view more importantly, Accelerated Preparedness requires an investment in the ability of the ADF to enunciate the circumstances under which engagement on strategic logistics issues should be managed, and relationships developed.
The idea of national support should not surprise readers of Logistics in War, it being a topic of frequent discussion topic on this site and raised in a submission to the Defence Strategic Review. National support speaks to a consolidated, preparedness-centric, approach to strategic logistics in the ADF, but also presents a substantial opportunity for the ADF to reinforce its strategic logistics ‘muscles’ by better integrating what it does in the context of whole-of-nation logistics capability and capacity.
Although National Defence recommends – in principle – the creation of a National Support Division, what will be most important in the immediate future is how responsibilities and accountabilities within the ADF – for national support is an ADF responsibility as it deals with its preparedness requirements – help the ADF logistical prepare.
Theatre Logistics System
A section on ‘theatre logistics’ in National Defence is arguably more practically relevant to ADF in the short term, though to resolve capability gaps in ADF logistics capability and capacity will require a long-term program. The recognition that Government, and Defence, must reinvest in Defence logistics and health capacity is instructive to a more serious view of preparedness than in the past – as alluded to above.
Theatre-level logistics is described in terms of the military supply-chain, with important national support overtones; it will be important that strategic and theatre logistics approaches are developed in a unified fashion. This is, of course, a normal goal for logistics planners to have.
One of the habitual challenges to the reform of logistics relates to how it is managed, let alone funded, in military organisations. As prospective logistics systems are complex and complicated, with multiple owners who have different resourcing and management priorities, it can be difficult for militaries to coherent approach the redevelopment of their logistics processes. It is possible that the emphasis given to guided weapons and fuel creates another wedge between organisations, and a potential source of friction to be managed in a crisis.
However, that National Defence identifies two Commanders – Joint Logistics and Joint Health – as requiring ‘adequate resourcing’ can only be seen as an important reinforcement of their role in the context of ADF preparedness.
Conclusion
There is much to infer from National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, and important pieces of context missed in the public version of the document. However, at face value, the direction given to Defence clearly associates logistics with Defence preparedness and even national resilience. This is extremely positive, especially in comparison to other policy statements issued over the last two decades. Naturally, there is a way to go to realise the intention of the document as many sceptical commentators point out. From the perspective of a logistician, however, it’s safe to say they’re at an important interlude.
A change in the way Defence preparedness and logistics is being considered in reviews is underway. Richard Betts, in Military readiness: concepts, choices and consequences describes preparedness as coming from a choice about the balance between ‘investment’ and ‘consumption’ (Betts, R., Military readiness: concepts, choices and consequences, The Brookings Institution, USA, 1995, p. 45)
National Defence, in many ways, is recognising that Defence must rebalance its approach to preparedness to the latter from the former. Ideas such as ‘minimum viable capability’ based on capability delivery in the ‘shortest possible time’ are incredibly significant for planners and logisticians in Defence to grasp (p 20).
It is unlikely that a transfer of funds and interest from acquisition to methods to scale and improve sustainability will be all that is needed; there is a cultural and change management aspect to the reform of Defence logistics that will be required to fully leverage the time available.
As we conceptualise how Defence works to better prepare itself for the threats considered in National Defence, it is worth remembering the idea of logistics preparedness.
Anything that is developed must be done so with the appropriate plans and policies in mind, the organisation structured appropriately and resourced needed, with logistics capabilities well resourced and integrated, and with a regime of exercising and assessments conducted to ensure that the ADF is responsive, and its operations are sustainable. This must be achieved while Defence reforms in the wake of National Defence, and in a state of heightened preparedness.
There is nothing in National Defence that will be easy to implement, or in its implementation be free of angst. Nonetheless, the document does present an opportunity to achieve important – vital – outcomes for Defence that must be taken.
The success of ADF operations in the future may depend on it.
U.S. Marines have left a mark on the U.S. territory of Guam since the beginning of the 20th century, contributing to regional stability by serving as an enduring symbol of the continued partnership between the Marine Corps and the government of Guam.
When Marines first landed on the Pacific island of Guam during the Spanish-American War and established Marine Barracks Guam in the village of Sumay, we began a century-long relationship that ultimately led to the administrative activation of Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz on Oct. 1, 2020.
MCBCB is named in honor of the late Brig. Gen. Vicente “Ben” Thomas Garrido Blaz, the first CHamorro Marine to attain the rank of general officer.
The MCBCB Reactivation and Naming Ceremony is scheduled for Jan. 26, 2023 to officially recognize the activation and naming of Naval Support Activity, Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz after Marine Barracks Guam was deactivated on Nov. 10, 1992.
GUAM
01.24.2023
Video by Cpl. Alex Fairchild, Staff Sgt. Laiqa Hitt, Lance Cpl. Martha Linares and Cpl. Jessica Massi
During my visit to Honolulu during the last week of April 2023, I had a chance to meet with Rear Admiral Jeffrey Jablon, the Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC) commander. We disscused the evolving role of the submarine fleet in the challenging environment of the Pacific.
In Europe, Russia faces three Western nuclear powers. In the Pacific, the U.S. and its allies and partners face three nuclear powers: China, Russia and North Korea. Any consideration of the nature of warfighting in the Pacific has to be considered in the context of the threat of nuclear weapons use, with three adversaries who do not have the same doctrine.
SSBNs are a key part of any nuclear deterrent equation in addition to the key role which SSNs play in the broader conventional deterrence equation. We did not focus specifically on the nuclear dimension, but it can never be forgotten in the Pacific context.
As I wrote comncering the impact of the war in Ukraine to date on nuclear deterrence: “But the core question is simply put: does the possession of nuclear weapons effectively create sanctuaries in your territory in case of conflict?
“Does this work with regard to extended deterrence as well by the United States with its allies? Would this apply to the defense of Australia as it expands its basing support for the United States? Does this work as well in the Pacific with China, Russia, North Korea and the mainland of the United States effectively sanctuaries? How does the question affect warfighting strategies, muti-domain or otherwise?”
Let me start by clarifying what the role of Rear Admiral Jablon and his command is within the overall submarine contribution to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. As the submarine type commander in the Pacific, he is charged with the task of manning, training and equipping the submarines in the theater. He is also the operational commander of Task Force 34, where he reports to the U.S. 3rd Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Boyle (whom I meet with in January in San Diego) who has responsibility for naval operations east of the international dateline. The U.S. 7th Fleet Commander owns all operations west of the international dateline.
In his role with regard to training and equipping the submarine force, Jablon is responsible for ensuring that the subs are combat ready: able to conduct any mission, and ready to deploy. Warfighting is his top priority.
The SSNs operate on a Fleet Response Training Plan cycle. The subs go on a 6-month deployment. They then come back for 12 months of training, modernization, and maintenance and then go back on deployment.
The stealth quality of the nuclear submarine and its speed are key elements of its ability to be first to the fight. But as described by Rear Admiral Jablon, the submarine being able to be first to the fight is in the context of moving the joint force into a better position to prosecute the fight. As he put it: “I would no longer characterize ourselves as a silent service. Deterrence is a major mission for the submarine force. You can’t have a credible deterrent without communicating your capabilities; if the adversary doesn’t know anything about that specific deterrent, it’s not a deterrent.”
Part of this deterrent emphasis is upon a more public display of the submarines we have and the capability they can demonstrate. Frankly, what the SSGNs have demonstrated over the years is the versatility of the submarine to contribute range, speed and stealth and then deliver firepower including the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and special operations forces.
Now submarines are becoming part of deterrent signaling and operating in new ways to enhance their overall deterrent impact.
For example, earlier in April 2023, the ballistic missile submarine USS Maine (SSBN 741) publicly visited Guam for a logistics visit. During that visit, submarine commanders from Japan and the Republic of Korea embarked the Maine. The Navy stated that “The embark was an example of how U.S. forces are advancing the U.S-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship that is forward-leaning, reflective of shared values, and resolute against threats that challenge regional stability.”
APRA HARBOR, Guam (April 18, 2023) The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Maine (SSBN 741) arrives at Naval Base Guam for a logistics stop, April 18. Maine is homeported at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, Washington. It is a launch platform for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, providing the United States with its most survivable leg of the nuclear Triad. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Gregory A. Pickett II)
And recently, the White House announced that an SSBN would make a port visit to South Korea. As a Reuters story published on 27 April 2023 noted: “For the first time since the 1980s a U.S. Navy nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will visit South Korea to help demonstrate Washington’s resolve to protect the country from a North Korean attack. The visit was announced in a joint declaration during a summit between South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington on Wednesday….
“The United States has pledged to deploy more so-called “strategic assets” such as aircraft carriers, submarines, and long-range bombers to South Korea to deter North Korea, which has developed increasingly powerful missiles that can hit targets from South Korea to the mainland United States.”
Also, the Navy is stepping up its cooperation with allied submarine forces, as illustrated in Rear Admiral Jablon recently hosting the Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference: a core meeting with other submarine commanders from Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. As he underscored: “During the conference, the submarine force commanders discussed the coalition approach to interoperability, which is a key part of deterrence.”
In an 18 April 2023 story published by the U.S. Navy, this conference was highlighted as follows: “Commander, Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet hosted the 2023 Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference (SWCC) at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, April 12-14, 2023.
“The purpose of SWCC, which was first held in 2018, is to strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific region through expanded cooperation between submarine force commanders of allies and partners.
“When we hold the SWCC each year and come together with our allied and partner submarine force commanders, we demonstrate the strength of our relationships,” said Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, commander, Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet. “Now more than ever, these strong relationships give us an asymmetric advantage as we work together in this incredibly dynamic region to maintain the international rules-based order.”
“Submarine commanders from the Royal Australian Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, French Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Republic of Korea Navy, Royal Navy, and Republic of Singapore Navy met with U.S. Pacific Fleet commanders on the historic submarine base at Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam, Hawaii.
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM (April 13, 2023) Attendees of the Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference (SWCC) pose for a group photo on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, April 13, 2023. The purpose of SWCC, which was first held in 2018, is to strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific region through expanded cooperation between submarine force commanders of allies and partners. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Scott Barnes)
“The U.S. Submarine Force is an indispensable combat capability in our Joint and Combined Force to ensure freedom of the seas in support of defending the security, freedom and wellbeing of our nation and allies and partners through deterrence and upholding the international rules based order,” said Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. “Our undersea warfare is made up of advanced technology, quality of training and exceptional personnel, but the solidarity of our alliances and partnerships is our asymmetric advantage.”
“The multi-day event included briefings from each submarine force commander and discussions which focused on the theme of this year’s conference, “Improve Multinational Maritime Domain Awareness and Theater ASW Capability in the Indo-Pacific Theater”. SWCC provided an opportunity for commanders to exchange perspectives through an open dialogue and encouraged allied and partner countries to continue to find ways to work together through collaboration and innovation.
“The conversations we had during this conference will collectively strengthen our team, and will maintain our overmatch in the undersea domain,” said Jablon. “I look forward to more opportunities for us to work together as a combined force in exercises and real-world operations.”
The role of the submarine in the joint and coalition force is being expanded. The submarine force is part of the joint fires solution. The submarine force can operate independently or work with the joint or coalition force in providing joint or coalition force combined effects.
As the joint force works enhanced kill web capabilities, combat clusters can operate together to deliver joint fires solutions. As Ed Timperlake and I have argued in our book on the evolution of the maritime kill web: “Force packages or combat clusters are deployed under mission command with enough organic C2 and ISR to monitor their situations and integrate the platforms that are part of that combat cluster and to operate effectively at a point of interest. Within that combat cluster, the C2 and ISR systems allow for reachback to non-organic combat assets which are then conjoined operational for a period of time to that combat cluster and becomes part of an expanded modular task force.
“With the right kind of security arrangement, and C2 and ISR capabilities, the presence force, now an expanded modular task force, need not be American to expand the reach and effectiveness of the operational force in the extended battlespace. Such an approach and capabilities are the essence of what a kill-web enabled force is and how such integratability can close the geographical and combat seams which 21st century authoritarian powers are focused on generating.
“This allows for the kind of escalation management and control crucial for the competition with the 21st Century authoritarian powers. It is not about getting to World War III as rapidly as possible or generating nuclear exchanges early in a widening conflict. It is about escalation control and management, and an ability to close seams which adversaries seek to open to gain significant escalation dominance as they expand the reach and range of those 21st century authoritarian powers.”[1]
Rear Admiral Jablon underscored the nature of the shift as follows: “The submarine force is now becoming part of the ‘combat clusters’ that you’re talking about instead of an independent operator. In the Cold War, we operated independently, alone, and unafraid. During the land wars, we started becoming part of the joint force as we provided land fires via the TLAM. Now, we are fully integrated with the joint force in terms of targeting and communications. But, of course, we can also conduct independent operations as the ‘silent service’ when directed.”
The broadening of the submarine’s role within joint warfighting is being expanded by the arrival and then growth in capability of autonomous systems. In my own view, rather than seeing autonomous systems in the short- or medium-term creating ghost fleets, their role will be to expand the range, capability, and lethality of capital assets. Rather than looking simply at the organic capability on a specific platform, we will consider surface ships using such capabilities as becoming mother ships and submarines will share in this development as well.
Rear Admiral Jablon specifically mentioned two types of autonomous developments of note for the submarine fleet. One is the ability to operate a UUV out of a torpedo tube, with the UUV coming back after its mission to offload data specifically onboard the submarine.
In article published by USNI News on 2 November 2022, this development was described as follows: “In the near future, the U.S. nuclear attack submarine fleet will be able to launch and recover an underwater robot from a torpedo tube, Navy officials said this week. The torpedo-sized Razorback — designed to extend the awareness of a submarine— has been in testing on the Navy’s attack boats for more than a year but requires a dry deck shelter and divers to recover the 600-pound UUV. The current procedure has blunted the utility of the system, Submarine Force commander Vice Adm. Bill Houston said on Tuesday at the Naval Submarine League’s annual symposium.
“The Medium UUV can go on any one of our submarines. That is a priority for us. We have no problem launching UUVs. That’s easy. The recovery part has been the critical aspect,” Houston said at the Naval Submarine League’s annual symposium. The Navy tested a system earlier this year to recover the Medium UUV via torpedo tube and is close to deploying the system in the “very near future,” said Rear. Adm. Doug Perry, the director of submarine warfare for the Office of Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N97).”
Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron One is under Rear Admiral Jablon’s command and is where UUV solution sets are being worked for deployment. And in February of this year, he visited Keyport, Washington where the squadron is based.
NAVAL BASE KITSAP – KEYPORT, Wash. (Feb. 16, 2023) Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, meets with Capt. Jason Weed, commodore of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron One to discuss the latest developments in unmanned undersea technology. The Pacific Submarine Force provides strategic deterrence, anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning; and special warfare capabilities around the globe. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Corey T. Jones)
The second autonomous development is the ability to launch a UAV while submerged to enable joint fires.[2] Rear Admiral Jablon said that they had specifically worked this with the USMC as the force develops its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) solution set.
Finally, the joint force, including the submarine force, are working new ways to do expeditionary logistics to enable resupply of the force when operating in a contested environment.
“NAVAL BASE KITSAP – BANGOR, Wash. — Two Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines demonstrated their ability to replenish while operating at sea during a series of vertical replenishment (VERTREP) exercises off the coast of California July through August, 2022.
“During the exercise, the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines USS Nevada (SSBN 733) and USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730) operated jointly with U.S. Navy MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, U.S. Marine Corps CMV-22 Ospreys, and U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster IIIs.
“Recently the Pacific SSBN submarine force exercised a vertical replenishment capability for at-sea SSBNs to prove our resiliency for worldwide operations and to replenish our ships with materials, food and operational gear,” said Capt. Kelly L. Laing, director of maritime operations for Commander, Task Group 114.3. “This allows us to maintain an unpredictable forward presence and continued demonstration of the unmatched strength of our strategic forces.”
“The event showcased the submarines’ ability to remain on mission and at sea while performing essential replenishment operations.
“Our fundamental mission is to deter a strategic attack, which is an existential threat to the United States and our allies.” said Rear Adm. Mark Behning, commander of both Submarine Group 9 and Task Group 114.3. “Testing our readiness ensures we maintain a safe, secure and reliable strategic deterrent force.”
“The event was part of a U.S. Strategic Command exercise which highlights the interoperability of multiple U.S. military platforms in order to implement the strategic deterrence mission.
“Exercising these VERTREPs was a joint operation involving Marine and Air Force assets,” Laing said. “This shows our commitment to joint operations worldwide and between combatant commanders. This is important so that we don’t stovepipe ourselves under one community or brand. We are committed to operating together as a global force.”
“This event is the latest in a series of efforts by the United States submarine force to look at alternative operations that previously required a submarine to be pierside to accomplish. For example, in May, the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Alabama (SSBN 731) conducted an at-sea crew exchange, swapping out the blue and gold crews. This demonstrated the submarine’s ability to continuously operate and stay on mission for longer periods of time while sustaining quality of life for the crews and their families.
“What this shows to our allies and adversaries is that we have the ability to keep our boats at sea,” Laing said. “This shows them that we are ready.”
“Nevada and Henry M. Jackson are two of eight Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines homeported at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor. The Ohio-class ballistic missile platform provides the United States with its most survivable leg of its strategic deterrent forces.”
While a variety of systems could be used to replenish food onboard the submarine, if a critical part is required, the speed, range and variable path of operations of the Osprey would make this the preferred partner. As the Navy is adding CMV-22bs to its fleet, this is yet another role it could play for fleet distributed operations.
For rearmament, the submarine tenders have been developing various locations from which to re-arm submarines. Obviously, the command element would work submarine operations in such a way that a cascading approach to weapons resupply would be worked in times of conflict.
But the navy has only two submarine tenders, and both are to be replaced by new versions in the mid-term. But the Navy is working various ways to get best value out of their sub tenders, but as the Navy adds UAVs to the fleet, the demand signal goes up on the Military Sealift Command and upon its sub tenders as well.
We concluded by my asking Rear Admiral Jablon what investments in the mid-term would make a significant contribution to his operational force.
“Having a robust maintenance infrastructure is crucial for us, and the Navy is allocating more resources to this through the SIOP program. When we can get submarines through maintenance periods on time or ahead of time, that translates into more time I can operate these submarines at sea, which increases our presence, and increases deterrence.”
[1] Laird, Robbin F. and Timperlake, Edward. A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (pp. 41-42). Kindle Edition.
NAVAL BASE GUAM (Dec. 2, 2022) Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, middle, receives a tour the Los Angeles class fast-attack submarine USS Asheville (SSN 758) at Naval Base Guam by Cmdr. Thomas Dixon, commanding officer, USS Asheville (SSN 758), right, during a routine visit to Guam, Dec. 2. Asheville is one of five submarines assigned to Commander, Submarine Squadron (SUBRON) 15. SUBRON 15 is responsible for providing training, material, and personnel readiness support to five forward-deployed Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarines and is located at Polaris Point, Naval Base Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Victoria Kinney)
YOKOSUKA, Japan (Sept. 12, 2022) — (From left to right) Rear Adm. Rick Seif, Commander, Submarine Group (CSG) 7, Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Vice Adm. TAWARA Tateki, Commander, Fleet Submarine Force, and Cmdr. TSUCHIYA Toru, commanding officer of the Taigei-class submarine JS Taigei (SS 513) pose for a photo at Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Sept. 12, 2022. CSG-7 directs forward-deployed, combat capable forces across the full spectrum of undersea warfare throughout the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Travis Baley)
(Feb. 16, 2023) Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, meets with Capt. Jason Weed, commodore of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron One to discuss the latest developments in unmanned undersea technology. The Pacific Submarine Force provides strategic deterrence, anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning; and special warfare capabilities around the globe. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Corey T. Jones)
U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Colton Davis, a crew chief with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 165, Marine Aircraft Group 16, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, resupplies a U.S. Navy submarine near the coast of California, July 26, 2022. The U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey increases the survivability, range and lethality of a forward deployed naval vessel by conducting resupply missions. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Daniel Childs)
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM (April 12, 2023) Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, addresses attendees of the Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference (SWCC) on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, April 12, 2023. The purpose of SWCC, which was first held in 2018, is to strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific region through expanded cooperation between submarine force commanders of allies and partners. The Pacific Submarine Force provides strategic deterrence; anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning; and special warfare capabilities around the globe. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Scott Barnes)
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM (April 12, 2023) Adm. Samuel Paparo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, addresses attendees of the Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference (SWCC) on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, April 12, 2023. The purpose of SWCC, which was first held in 2018, is to strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific region through expanded cooperation between submarine force commanders of allies and partners. U.S. Pacific Fleet builds and persistently employs dynamic naval combat power, supported by the Joint Force in the maritime domain, in order to defend U.S. interests throughout the lndo-Pacific Region and the homeland, demonstrate advantage in the maritime domain, and enhance U.S. alliances and partnerships. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Scott Barnes)
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM (April 13, 2023) Attendees of the Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference (SWCC) pose for a group photo on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, April 13, 2023. The purpose of SWCC, which was first held in 2018, is to strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific region through expanded cooperation between submarine force commanders of allies and partners. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Scott Barnes)
NAVAL BASE KITSAP – KEYPORT, Wash. (Feb. 16, 2023) Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, meets with Capt. Jason Weed, commodore of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron One to discuss the latest developments in unmanned undersea technology. The Pacific Submarine Force provides strategic deterrence, anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning; and special warfare capabilities around the globe. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Corey T. Jones)
NAVAL BASE KITSAP – KEYPORT, Wash. (Feb. 16, 2023) Rear Adm. Jeff Jablon, commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, meets with Capt. Jason Weed, commodore of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles Squadron One to discuss the latest developments in unmanned undersea technology. The Pacific Submarine Force provides strategic deterrence, anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning; and special warfare capabilities around the globe. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Corey T. Jones)
During my March-April 2023 visit to Australia. I had a chance to meet with Air Vice-Marshal Michael Kitcher, Deputy Chief Joint Operations (DCJOPS) and to talk with him about the Joint Operations Focus on regional defence after a long period in the Middle East. AVM Kitcher is responsible for assisting Chief Joint Operations (CJOPS) with the command of ADF joint operations, directing command units and assigned forces in the planning and conduct of campaigns, operations, joint exercises, and other activities.
I last met with him during a 2018 visit to Williamtown Airbase with Murielle Delaporte. He was then the Air Combat Group Commander as Air Commodore Kitcher. During that visit we focused on the transition from legacy aircraft to a fifth-generation force.
We started the April 2023 discussion by focusing on the shift of the Joint Operations Command from the shaping of a joint force for operations in the Middle East to a refocusing on joint operations in the region with core allies to shape more effective coordinated allied operations. Kitcher pointed out that the command had been established in 2007 to plan, execute and optimise the conduct of ADF joint operations.
I noted that during the ADF’s participation in the Middle East Wars, the RAAF for the first time deployed an integrated air task force which included air battle management aircraft, lifters, tankers, and fighters and that this experience laid a foundation for bringing back into the Indo-Pacific region an ADF force that had exercised really for the first time this level of air tasking integration.
But as Kitcher underscored: “The focus in this period, up to say 2017, for CJOPS was on operations in the Middle East whilst managing operations in our region. We clearly have leveraged the earlier experiences in our renewed focus on the conduct of Operations, Actions and Activites, OAA, in the Indo Pacific. We are focused on developing a theatre campaign plan to translate strategic guidance into the OAA we execute in our region to achieve our desired objectives.
“We are focused on ways we can operate as a joint force to optimise our regional OAA to have the maximum positive effect in supporting our theater campaign plan. You don’t get the maximum benefits from a joint force unless firstly the services provide you with trained personnel capable of executing joint missions and then HQJOC, through focused joint planning, maximises the potential of the individual components. We have made good progress along this path but still have a way to go.”
Air Vice-Marshal Kitcher highlighted that we are “now squarely focused on managing operations in a coordinated fashion in our region.” And this means both how to get the best joint force effect but also how to coordinate the ADF effort with core allies in also getting the best proper coalition effect.
Obviously in working with coalition partners, national sovereignty has to be respected but at the same time for effectiveness in operations coalition forces need to operate in an integrated manner. This is a key tension which needs to be managed, notably in crises where the government of the day will make decisions about the allowable operations of their national forces, these individual decisions may challenge the effectiveness of a coalition force.
This is challenge which CJOPS has to be prepared to deal with in both exercises and real world operations. Kitcher underscored: “Planning and exercises prepare the way for joint and coalition capabilities but executing them in an actual operational situation requires agility and flexibility of command by CJOPS and his staff, and our parallel staff in the various coalition headquarters.”
Air Vice-Marshal Kitcher emphasized that working with partners to deal with challenges in the region has clearly grown in importance for both deterrent and operational impacts. The relationship with U.S. forces has certainly become closer. He mentioned an upcoming CPX exercise with the U.S. Indo-PACOM command in which the ADF and the U.S. will run a detailed CPX on a regional scenario together. The cooperation with both Japan and India is also growing.
And with Australia’s regional defence emphasis, joint operations will need to focus on regional partners in the Australian neighborhood. This will see more emphasis on building regional expertise and continued engagement with regional countries through relationship building, languages, cultural awareness and local knowledge. This can provide an important aspect of Australian leadership in a regional military coalition but dependent on the crisis, a differentiator for Australian involvement as well.
As Air Vice-Marshal Kitcher summarized their job: “We’ve got a responsibility to make sure that we optimize how well the joint force works together for the greatest positive effect and present the best possible options to government on how that force might be employed. We’ve also got a remit to ensure that we can work as closely and as efficiently and effectively as possible with our regional partners in both peacetime HADR situations and potential crisis situations.
“We’ve got a responsibility to be as efficient and as effective together among like-minded nations militaries. If we are not careful, uncoordinated actions in our region will overwhelm smaller countries and not have a positive effect. Planning and conducting OAA together ensures we present a much more credible regional security capability than we do as individual nations. The militaries have a large part of the responsibility to generate how we can do so. And then it’s up to individual governments to determine how those forces will be employed at any one time or in any one set of security circumstances.”
We closed the discussion by focusing on a question I asked him with regard to how does Australia best leverage its geography in shaping its defence and deterrent structure?
He answered that is a core challenge and question. He noted: “The really good thing about Australia is the size of Australia and the amount of nothing that is in Australia. The really bad thing about Australia is the size of Australia and the amount of nothing that is in Australia.”
Australia’s population and economic base is in the South and East of the country; the core defence locations for projecting force into the region are in the North, North East and North West of Australia. Northern Australia (especially the North and North West) is lightly populated without significant infrastructure and major industrial base. How does Australia have capabilities which can be used to project force into the region from Northern Australia but the majority of the population and industrial base remains well in the south?
For example, the RAAF has a number of bare bases in northern Australia in addition to their main operating bases. But how can those bases really be used for operations in a crisis, and flexibly use all of the basing options available? How to support all these locations? How to move fuel and weapons? How to ensure the necessary level of resilience and that combat support, logistics and health elements are available? There are no easy or cheap solutions to achieve a viable outcome.
Air Vice-Marshal Kitcher concluded: “The challenge of how we optimize the Australian geography for defence is real and is quite significant. As is how we use Australian geography for the best effect of allies and partners that we might invite to deploy here. This is an ongoing process and a real challenge.”
Featured Photo: (R-L) Air Vice-Marshal Michael Kitcher, Deputy Chief Joint Operations talks with HMAS Hobart’s Weapons Electrical Engineering Officer Lieutenant Commander Monica Tabulo during a visit to the ship in Manila, Philippines as a part of a Regional Presence Deployment.
Credit: Australian Department of Defence, October 22, 2022.
U.S. Army Soldiers with 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), improve their skills on the newly updated unmanned aerial vehicle, RQ-11B or “The Raven”, in Smardan, Romania, 16 Jan. 2023.
The Raven’s purpose is to be used for reconnaissance missions, call-for-fire missions and to enhance the Soldiers’ capabilities leading to lower risk on the Soldiers for fewer U.S. casualties and more successful missions.
