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2016-09-18 By Gulshan Luthra and Nilova Roy Chaudhury
New Delhi. It was in 2004 that India and the United States had announced The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) with an eye on future cooperation, and a year later, in 2005, Washington formally announced that it recognized India as a regional and global power.
Changes in political leadership in both the countries notwithstanding, the two have moved forward since then. Indian Prime Ministers AB Vajpayee and Dr. Manmohan Singh, and now Mr. Narendra Modi, have responded well, albeit progressively, to the US efforts initiated by Presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama.
Mr. Modi and Mr. Obama have met several times over the past year, including in Vientiane most recently. After his official visit to Washington DC in June 2016, the Indian Prime Minister described the US as “an indispensable partner” and outlined his thoughts for “a new symphony” in bilateral relations. Defence Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the two countries have also met periodically since then. The US declared India a “Major defence Partner” during Mr. Modi’s visit.
Although there is no NSSP 2016, both India and the US talk tough on terror, have raised strategic ties, and Washington has reaffirmed support for India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, after anchoring India’s entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Significantly, while the Indian Defence Minister, Mr. Manohar Parrikar was in Washington end-August, the US Secretary of State, Mr. John Kerry, was in New Delhi at the same time.
The two met their counterparts, Mr. Ashton Carter and Mrs. Sushma Swaraj respectively.
U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter (left) and Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar are seen at a press conference at the Defense Ministry in New Delhi, April 12, 2016. Photo: Getty Images/AFP/PRAKASH SINGH
Washington has been urging India to sign four “foundational” agreements, the second of which, LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) was signed during Mr. Parrikar’s visit. The first one, General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), was signed in 2002.
Mr. Parrikar said that while implementation of the LEMOA will be on a case to case basis, no timelines have been set for signing the other two, the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geospatial Intelligence.
LEMOA will facilitate access to each other’s bases but there is no provision for setting up any military force or base on each other’s territory. Both the countries can now access each other’s bases though.
Defence and Diplomacy go together, and along with them comes trade and commerce. In New Delhi, along with Mr. Kerry, US Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker also held talks with her counterpart, Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman.
The agenda was the same in both the capitals, strategic cooperation in global arena to ensure free and safe passage of shipping through the oceans, deleting terrorism, facilitating each other in logistics, and supplying new defence technology systems to India.
Mr. Parrikar met representatives of several top US defence companies while in Washington and also visited Boeing’s facility manufacturing the Chinook heavy lift helicopters in Philadelphia. The Indian Air Force is buying 15 CH 47 helicopters and 22 Apache AH 64E combat helicopters from the company.
It may be recalled that at the IDEX’05 defence expo in Abu Dhabi in March 2005, shortly before the US announcement supporting India as a major power, US defence companies told us that their wares were open for sale to India. For instance, Boeing offered its F/A 18 Super Hornet and Raytheon put up its famous Patriot anti-missile missile.
AMRAAM, SLAMRAAM and DamnRAAM (the first two really are very sophisticated missiles, the third is whatever else) all seemed to be on the table for New Delhi. The demand for the four foundational agreements came up later.
Understandably, no manufacturer can sell military goods without government clearance, and what is sold, depends on government-to-government negotiations and agreements.
Cooperation under NSSP has resulted in India buying some $ 15 worth of aircraft and weapons so far from the US, with Boeing accounting for around $ 10 billion worth in the last few years. Boeing, and the world’s biggest arms manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, have also offered to set up aircraft factories in India to meet the huge requirements of the Indian Air Force (IAF) for replacing its inventory of 1970s and 1980s generation combat aircraft.
Touch on Terror, and Promising on Trade
During the talks in New Delhi, at the second India-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue which ended August 31, a strong message against terrorism, particularly propagated by and emanating from Pakistan, security threats and “challenges to the rule-based order” combined with a resolve to raise the bilateral trade turnover to 500 billion dollars emerged as key outcomes from the discussions.
The India-U.S. Strategic & Commercial Dialogue (S&CD) is the premier bilateral forum for discussions on trade, economic and defence-related issues. The dialogue is co-chaired by India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Commerce & Industry Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, and US Secretary of State John Kerry and Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker.
The dialogue was held a day after India and the US signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in Washington.
In a joint statement issued at the end of the two-day S&CD, the two countries acknowledged that defence was “the bedrock” of the strategic partnership.
US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter (right) shaking hands with Vice-Admiral Bimal Verma, Chief of Staff of India’s Eastern Naval Command, in front of India’s frigate INS Sahyadri, in Visakhapatnam city on June 2, 2015.– PHOTO: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
“Reiterating that defence ties form the bedrock of the bilateral strategic partnership, the two Sides recognized the importance of the announcement regarding India as a Major Defense Partner of the United States and decided to take further steps expeditiously to enable greater cooperation in the area of co-production and co-development. To this end, the United States committed to elevate defence trade and technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with its closest allies and partners,” the statement said.
The strategic Dialogue was elevated into a Strategic and Commercial Dialogue during President Obama’s visit to India in January 2015.
The first India-US S&CD was held on September 22 last year in Washington.
Secretary Kerry observed, “The security threat is our biggest challenge. We must strike at the root cause of violent extremism,” adding: “It’s clear that Pakistan has work to do in order to push harder against its indigenous groups that are engaged in terrorist activities. We have been urging Pakistan to crack down on terror camps and the sanctuaries in the country.”
“We don’t make distinctions between good and bad terrorists. Terror is terror,” Kerry said, reiterating Washington’s commitment to bring the perpetrators of the 26/11 and the Pathankot attacks to justice.
Speaking at a joint press conference after the S&CD, Mrs. Swaraj said she and Secretary Kerry “agreed that nations must not maintain double standards, such as the categorization of good and bad terrorists, nor must they act as sanctuaries and safe havens for terrorist organizations.” India’s EAM said, mincing no words.
“We reaffirmed the urgent necessity for Pakistan to dismantle safe havens for terrorists and criminal networks, including Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and ‘D Company’.
Secretary Kerry and I also agreed on the need for Pakistan to do more to bring the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai and 2016 Pathankot terrorist attacks to justice quickly,” Swaraj said.
Notably, the US State Department spokesman has thrice, since the Dialogue, urged Pakistan to act against terrorists who “attack neighbors.”
New Delhi and Washington have also, Mrs. Swaraj said, “agreed to strengthen our cooperation in the area of maritime security. In accordance with the roadmap for the Joint Strategic Vision, we have launched a Maritime Security Dialogue.
Our Trilateral with Japan has moved from dialogue into action in key areas of regional connectivity and HA/DR.” (Humanitarian Assistance /Disaster Relief).
Secretary Kerry was also critical of China in comments on its refusal to accept the judgment of the Permanent Council of Arbitration against it.
Making a reference to India accepting the International tribunal judgment on Bangladesh, he said, “We discussed how India’s decision to accept a International tribunal judgment regarding its maritime border with Bangladesh actually stands apart.”
“This is the kind of policy that supports the rule of law that brings us closer and in my judgment reflects a sense of confidence and a sense of responsibility,” Kerry said.
“It is a model of how potentially dangerous disputes can be resolved in a mature and peaceful manner including the South China Sea where the US urges China and the Philippines to respect the judgment of the International tribunal which is final and legally binding on both parties.”
The S&CD also focused on bilateral trade and investment- related issues with Sitharaman and Pritzker discussing the ease of doing business with the bilateral CEOs Forum.
They also prioritized measures to promote ties in innovation and entrepreneurship.
The period ahead could be a very deadly one for the liberal democracies.
Ill-liberal powers whether they be states (Russia, China or Iran) or irredentist movements spouting 12th century values are clearly working to change the global order to their advantage.
Many factors of power are in play, but clearly one of them is military.
And if the liberal powers can learn to not dissipate their military capabilities and investments in nation building and other diversions, the reshaping of insertion forces able to meet threats and to meet clearly established political objectives can be strengthened.
Indeed, the decade ahead can be one of significant transformation for the military forces of the liberal democracies.
Most of the platforms necessary for transformation already exist; what is needed is more investment in standing up the new force and commitment to the culture change which a transformed military can deliver.
Also, crucial is changing the culture of the “high priests of strategy” who can find many places to send the military to serve metaphysically defined rather than Realpolitik objectives.
There needs to be a transformation of the strategic culture to recognize that setting clear and limited objectives and achieving clearly delaminated strategic objectives is necessary prior to sending the military as errand boys for abstract and undefined objectives.
Building the Honeycomb Modular Power Projection Force
Earlier, in our 2013 book on The Remaking of American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy, we argued that a new approach to military transformation and engagement between the U.S. and allies and partners in the Pacific was necessary to protect the interests of the liberal democracies in the Pacific.
The evolution of 21st century weapon technology is breaking down the barriers between offensive and defensive systems. Is missile defense about providing defense or is it about enabling global reach, for offense or defense? Likewise, the new 5th generation aircraft have been largely not understood because they are inherently multi-mission systems, which can be used for forward defense or forward offensive operations.
Indeed, an inherent characteristic of many new systems is that they are really about presence and putting a grid over an operational area, and therefore they can be used to support strike or defense within an integrated approach. In the 20th Century, surge was built upon the notion of signaling. One would put in a particular combat capability – a Carrier Battle Group, Amphibious Ready Group, or Air Expeditionary Wing – to put down your marker and to warn a potential adversary that you were there and ready to be taken seriously. If one needed to, additional forces would be sent in to escalate and build up force.
Leveraging the Honeycomb and Swarming Capabilities Provides a Key Foundation for Modular Power Projection Forces Credit Photo: Bigstock
With the new multi-mission systems – 5th generation aircraft and Aegis for example – the key is presence and integration able to support strike or defense in a single operational presence capability. Now the adversary can not be certain that you are simply putting down a marker.
This is what former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne calls the attack and defense enterprise.
The strategic thrust of integrating modern systems is to create an a grid that can operate in an area as a seamless whole, able to strike or defend simultaneously. This is enabled by the evolution of C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and it is why Wynne has underscored for more than a decade that fifth generation aircraft are not merely replacements for existing tactical systems but a whole new approach to integrating defense and offense.
When one can add the strike and defensive systems of other players, notably missiles and sensors aboard surface ships like Aegis, then one can create the reality of what Ed Timperlake, a former fighter pilot, has described as the F-35 being able to consider Aegis as his wingman.
By shaping a C5ISR system inextricably intertwined with platforms and assets, which can honeycomb an area of operation, an attack and defense enterprise can operate to deter aggressors and adversaries or to conduct successful military operations.
Inherent in such an enterprise is scalability and reach-back. By deploying the C5ISR honeycomb, the shooters in the enterprise can reach back to each other to enable the entire grid of operation, for either defense or offense.
U.S. forces and policies in the region provided a crucial lynchpin providing the reachback and dominance necessary to protect national and allied interests.
The intersection of honeycombed force packages operating as modules and interconnected through networks will allow US and allied forces to shape a distributed force into the area of interest, and to provide strike and defense capabilities throughout a combat or spider’s web of operational capabilities.
An Update from British, Australian and American Forces
Since we published that book in 2013, we have had the chance to talk extensively with British, Australian and American military innovators who are creating the reality, which we projected in our book.
And new combat systems have come into being which are providing key building blocks for the new approach such as the Wedgetail, the A330MRTT, the F-35 and the P-8/Triton combination.
In effect, a new foundation is being laid for the decade ahead in the transformation of the power projection forces and lessons learned by the warriors in combat, exercises and training will shape the way ahead for the decade after next.
Even though some technologies can be identified as important to the next decade, it will be through the shaping of a new paradigm through which new platforms will then be built and along with them incorporated or adjacent technologies.
From the discussions with the US and allied warfighters, a number of key characteristics can be identified with regard to key elements of the new paradigm of the kill web, or the honeycomb operational force.
The decade behind us was one where the platforms became connected and the joint and coalition force learned to leverage the benefits of such a force.
Now that is assumed, and the build forward is now to shape an distributed but integrated force.
First, platforms are expected to be interoperable.
If they are not, then they need to be replaced. The Australian Plan Jericho has been exploring among other things, how to bring those platforms considered important which are not interoperable with the combined force into the picture.
For example, in a Jericho Dawn exercise held last March, the Aussies sought to find ways to take an important Army asset, the Tiger assault helicopter, and to connect it to the RAAF’s air combat force.
According to an Australian Ministry of Defence press release on March 21, 2016, the exercise was described as follows:
Our Army is focussed on two key areas to ensure improved air-land integration. The first is to deliver better communication systems to ensure an agile, efficient and timely response to an intelligent, well-armed and motivated adversary,” said Major General McLachlan.
“The second is to advance how we plan and conduct air-land operations to deliver the right effect, at the right place, at the right time.
“The demonstration highlights how we can better harness the strengths of our team by digitally connecting air and land platforms…..
Capabilities involved include RAAF’s C-17A, AP-3C, KC-30A, E-7A Wedgetail and FA-18 Hornet aircraft, as well as the Army’s air-land enablers from the 16th Air Land Regiment, Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters from 1st Aviation Regiment, and vehicles and equipment from the Combined Arms Training Centre.
Second, platforms are expected to be integratable from the ground up.
As Air Marshal Leo Davis put it:
“It is like a jig saw puzzle.
You have these really nice pieces to the puzzle sitting in the container, but until you begin to look at the picture your trying to create through the overall puzzle, you do not know which bit goes where.”
With regard to F-35 as an example, Davies argued the following:
“I think Joint Strike Fighter on its own, a fifth generation air combat aircraft, could be regarded as just an air combat aircraft.
If you want to shoot the bad guy down, if you want to defend the battle space for a land maneuver or for a maritime strike, that’s fine.
But what we’re beginning to appreciate now is that it’s not just an air combat asset it is also an ISR node.
If you were to then put two more pieces of your puzzle down and go, “Well that’s starting to form a bit of a picture here,” in the center of your puzzle. ”
What else could I do if it was truly an ISR node?
How do I manage that asset differently than if it was just going to shoot down another fighter?”
Although the puzzle analogy suggested an overall approach what he really was focusing on the interaction between the evolving bigger picture, and relooking at what each piece of the puzzle might be able to do in fitting into a new puzzle big picture so to speak.
“How would you operate the air warfare destroyer differently as you add a Wedgetail, a P-8, a Triton or an F-35 to its operational environment?
And conversely, how could the changes in how the destroyer would operate as you evolve systems on it, affect how you operate or modernize the other pieces of the evolving puzzle?”
And to clarify what this means for platform acquisition, Air Marshal Davies discussed the Tiger case.
“I know it’s a little unfair, but we would probably rethink the combat system on Tiger if we were to buy an armed reconnaissance helicopter tomorrow. Having flown the airplane, I don’t have any issue with the airplane that is Tiger. But how do you integrate it? At the moment it is less than ideal in terms of integration.”
He argued that it was crucial to have a realistic and broad view with regard to force design in mind as one thinks about adding platforms, and a large portion of that force design needs to revolve around “integratability.”
Third, systems are expected to be upgradeable from the ground up. A new approach to integratability is associated with what might be called the coming of software upgradeable aircraft, such as the P-8/Triton, F-35 or Wedgetail.
Software upgradeability provides a key opportunity to evolve the capabilities of an air combat platform without having to change the hardware and correlated software configurations through a complicated upgrade process.
And the software will evolve with the evolution of the threat and the coming of additional opportunities to shape a “new” aircraft, which will look the same but not operate the same in the battlespace. That is the point about software upgradeability.
The introduction of software upgradeable systems introduces a new dynamic as well.
Clearly, the manufacturer needs tight configuration control over the core systems software.
That is clear; but the shift is to shape an application layer on top of the core systems software, which can be introduced much more rapidly.
The military is envisaging their own version of the Apple development, modernization and migration model.
In an interview with the RAF ISTAR force commander, the importance of integrated upgradeability was seen as crucial to shaping the evolving force.
As the core platforms are replaced by an all software upgradeable fleet, the possibility could exist to put the platforms in competition with one another for modernization upgrades.
“Which upgrade gets the priority for which platform to make the greatest contribution to the integrated ISTAR capability are the sort of decisions that should lie with the ISTAR Force in the future – it is at Force level, not within individual programmes and projects that the overall capability benefit can be seen and prioritized.”
We then discussed the notion of transformation as a process, not an outcome.
The Air Commodore was very keen to stress again the need for “cultural change, where the aperture is opened for the team and they can embrace greater integration”
“We have the iPhone 6 generation in the Force now, yesterday’s analogue approach to our business is no longer appropriate.
“With the aperture fully open, the individual platforms and capabilities become the apps that enable the integrated Force ‘iPhone’.
“Thinking of it in this way, will allow us to tap this new generation of warriors.”
Fourth, the platforms function in networks but it is not about some giant global network, which can be disrupted; it is about force packages operating as modules working together to achieve objectives and their power extended as they are connected with other force packages.
In effect, the senior commander’s roles, which shift to assembling, deploying, evaluation and augmenting or withdrawing force packages as dynamic tasks, are achieved. It is not about managing the tactical details of forward deployed operations.
For example, work at 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade is focused on shaping such a capability.
2d MEB is clearly focused on working international naval relationships, which played a key role in Bold Alligator 2014 and Exercise African Lion 2014, the largest exercise on the African continent.
In Bold Alligator (2014), the Marines worked an interwoven C2 relationship with the Dutch, who also commanded the USS Arlington, a new US Navy LPD, and worked for and adjacent to the Navy-Marine Corps construct.
Coalition participation required installing CENTRIXS, an allied communication system, on the USS Kearsarge, which improved the forces’ readiness for future crisis and contingency operations.
Throughout the exercise, 2d MEB experimented with various configurations of MAGTF C2 support for operations by leveraging the enhanced US and allied seabase.
In order to facilitate C2 aboard limited amphibious ships, 2d MEB experimented with a robust reachback capability.
Reachback capability allowed 2d MEB to deploy a small part of the staff on ships but employ the whole staff using modern communications technology from a land-based structure given the ships’ space constraints.
2d MEB is a standing operational HQ with no forces assigned.
This provides flexibility to GCCs. Because 2d MEB was designed with its most likely mission in mind – crisis response – the unit needs to be able to deploy and provide C2 within 24 hours after heeding a GCC’s request.
The lack of force structure outside the CE allows the unit to serve as the Swiss army knife of C2 for the GCC.
2d MEB can deploy the CE and composite joint and international forces already close to the operating area.
The flexibility of the MEB CE also allows the unit to deploy and employ scalable force packages of as little as a few thousand personnel for crisis response and up to 15,000 for its most deadly mission – small-scale conventional warfare.
This is important for warfighting and operating throughout the ROMO the MC engages in.
The leadership of the Australian Navy has highlighted as well the importance of flexible task forces in reshaping combat power.
The foci of both Vice Admiral Barrett, Chief of Navy, and Rear Admiral Mayer, Commander Australian Fleet, at the recent Air-Sea integration conference held by the Williams Foundation is upon re-energizing the task force concept, but in terms of modular force packages which include, Army, Navy and Air Force capabilities configured to achieve the mission with appropriate tool sets.
It is a Swiss army knife concept of operations using modular force packages operating as a honeycomb to achieve the desired combat effect.
Fifth, sustainability has to be built into the force.
Military leaders are looking for the new systems to significantly more maintainable in order to provide for higher reliability and dispatch rates.
This is about designing into systems ways to ensure that the platforms are more sustainable; and because the key foundational platforms are often multi-national systems – such as F-35, P-8, Triton, A330MRTT – the expectation is that they can be globally sustainable.
And this means cross-maintainable with core allies when operating in a common area of interest.
Sixth, the force is expected to be able to contribute and to operate in a secure manner within a distributed battlespace and commanded by a distributed C2 package.
C2 is become an essential element for force structure transformation, rather than focusing excessively on the ISR, or collection of information to inform decisions.
The shift from the kinds of land wars fought in the past decade and a half to operating across the range of military operations to insert force and to prevail in a more rapid tempo conflict than that which characterized counter-insurgency operations carries with it a need to have a very different C2 structure and technologies to support those structures.
The shift to higher tempo operations is being accompanied by platforms which are capable of operating in an extended battlespace and at the edge of the battlespace where hierarchical, detailed control simply does not correlate with the realities of either combat requirements or of technology which is part of a shift to distributed operations.
Distributed operations over an extended battlespace to deal with a range of military operations require distributed C2; not hierarchical detailed micro management.
In effect, the focus is upon shaping the commander’s intent and allowing the combat forces to execute that intent, and to shape evolving missions in the operations, with the higher level commanders working to gain an overview on the operations, rather than micro-management of the operations.
Unfortunately, the relatively slow pace of COIN, and the use of remotes (UAVs or RPAs) in the past decade have led to a growing practice of growing the level of command in order to try to exercise more detailed control. This has led to the current situation in the air operations against ISIS where you have more members of the CAOC than you have actual air strikes!
According to one of the architects of Desert Storm, Lt. General (David) Deptula, the CAOC for Desert Storm was quite lean, and the goal was to get the taskings into the hands of the warfighters to execute, with a later battle damage assessment process then informing decisions on the follow on target list.
It was not about micro managing the combat assets.
And this was with air power multi-mission assets, which went out to execute a command directive in a particular area of the battlespace to deliver a particular type and quantity of ordinance in that area of the battlespace.
With new air technologies, multi-tasking platforms will fly to the fight and execute the initial commander’s intent but will shift to the mission as needs arise during the air combat operation. Fleeting targets are a key reality, which requires an ability for the pilots to prosecute those targets in a timely manner, rather than a deliberate C2 overview manner.
Put in other terms, the command structures will need to “lean out” and to work with warfighting assets where the pilots and operational decision makers are at the point of engagement, not in a building housing a CAOC.
This requires building in a new approach to C2 from the ground up as the new assets are introduced into the force. For example, the introduction of the F-35 should bring with it a fundamental rethink away from hub-and-spoke C2 to distributed C2 and modular force package operating forces.
C2 for fifth generation aircraft is about setting the broader combat tasks and unleashing them to the engagement area, and once there they can evaluate the evolving situation during their engagement time and decide how best to execute the shifting missions within the context of the overall commander’s intent.
Hierarchical command and control of the sort being generated by today’s CAOCs is asymmetrical with the trend of technology associated with fifth generation warfare.
As Robert Evans, a former USAF pilot, and most recently with Northrop Grumman put the change:
Formations of F-35s can work and share together so that they can “audible” the play. They can work together, sensing all that they can sense, fusing information, and overwhelming whatever defense is presented to them in a way that the legacy command and control simply cannot keep up with, nor should keep up with.
That’s what F-35 brings.
If warfighters were to apply the same C2 approach used for traditional airpower to the F-35 they would really be missing the point of what the F-35 fleet can bring to the future fight.
In the future, they might task the F-35 fleet to operate in the battlespace and affect targets that they believe are important to support the commander’s strategy, but while those advanced fighters are out there, they can collaborate with other forces in the battlespace to support broader objectives.
The F-35 pilot could be given much broader authorities and wields much greater capabilities, so the tasks could be less specific and more broadly defined by mission type orders, based on the commander’s intent. He will have the ability to influence the battlespace not just within his specific package, but working with others in the battlespace against broader objectives.
Collaboration is greatly enhanced, and mutual support is driven to entirely new heights.
The F-35 pilot in the future becomes in some ways, an air battle manager who is really participating in a much more advanced offense, if you will, than did the aircrews of the legacy generation.
In fact, the former MARFORPAC, Lt. General Robling, underscored to central importance of distributed C2 for a deterrence in depth strategy in the Pacific.
The Australian military is small in comparison to the US, but it is a lethal and technologically sophisticated force.
In the face of a large-scale threat, they, like the US and others in the region, wouldn’t be able to defend by themselves. They would have to be a part of a larger collective security effort and ally with the US or other likeminded nations in the region in order to get more effective and less costly defense capabilities pushed farther forward.
This is one reason why their buying the JSF and the “Wedgetail” is so important. These two platforms are amazing force multipliers that bring to the region superior Command and Control and networked strike capabilities. These capabilities will be both additive and complementary to the capabilities other nations bring to collective security in the region.
The JSF with its superior networked sensor suite can collect a lot of information from sources at significant distances, and partner with the capabilities of the “Wedgetail” to help disseminate that information to air, sea, and land forces who need the information.
These capabilities and others make perfect sense for Australia and the greater Asia Pacific’s collective security requirements. In addition, other countries like Japan and Singapore can likewise contribute to this collective security because they too are buying the same types or similar military capabilities.
I like the term deterrence in depth because that’s exactly what it is. It’s not always about defense in depth.
It’s about deterring and influencing others behavior so they can contribute to the region’s stability, both economically and militarily, in an environment where everyone conforms to the rule of law and international norms.
The emerging perspective which can be characterized as a kill web, or the “network as a weapon” or a “fifth generation enabled force” can be encapsulated in the graphic above, which reflects the convergent lines of transformation shaping a foundation for the next decade of change.
Building Platforms After Next
The need to operate at greater distance and to deal with a growing diversity of threats has highlighted the importance of ensuring an ongoing modernization effort to enhance that the liberal democracies have the capabilities to fight as a an integrated team in that battlespace.
This requires capable platforms, which can perform their core missions but to do so with greater effect by being more capable through the connectors or enablers for a more integrated force.
Each of the key platforms has a set of core functions, yet their impact is enhanced by inter-connectivity and determining how best to operate those platforms in ways which enhance the overall capabilities of the force.
When approaching the question of the acquisition of new platforms, a key consideration needs to be what does that platform bring to the integrated battlespace?
Posing the question in this way then drives a different way to think about those new platforms which might be added to the force.
How can its organic capabilities enhance the capability of the force to provide for an integrated effect?
How can the platform contribute to the multiplier effect of its operation within the battlespace?
How can the force best survive and prevail and how do new platforms contribute to that effort?
How upgradeable is the platform with regard to the other key capabilities operating in the battlespace?
How can the central role of software upgradeability best be recognized and supported in building out an information secure, decision dominant force?
How to measure cost effectiveness in an integrated battlespace world?
How do new approaches to sustainability built into 21st century systems get recognized as cutting edge ways to have a more effective and sustainable force, rather than being audited to death by 20th century practices and thinking?
The most expensive acquisition could well be one that is the cheapest up front in terms of initial price tag, but is not an effective member of an integrated battlespace.
Such platforms might only contribute to a narrow function without any real capability to evolve with the forces shaping a way ahead to reshape capabilities to achieve key effects in the evolving battlespace and within that battlespace shaping an open-ended force integration process.
In short, the decade of innovation underway can lay the foundation for a new approach to platform acquisition, which can get out of the platform centric ghetto that is so often the only lane in which platforms are discussed, considered and bought.
2016-09-17 Madama is a border settlement on the northeast frontier of Niger. Little more than an army post, the settlement serves as a frontier station controlling travel between Niger and Libya.
It is also the site of a former French colonial fort, built in 1931. The army of Niger maintains a garrison of a hundred soldiers, depending on the 24th Interarmes Battalion from Dirkou.
On Oct 23, 2014, the French government announced plans to base helicopters and 50 French troops here, under the Operation Barkhane.
The French Army has built a forward operating base for operation sin the area, The French military is about 200 to 250 soldiers in January 1, 2015. The operational base of Madama served as a command post for a military operation zone control for the French, Niger and Chad armies from 20 to 27 December 2014.
France is setting up a base in northern Niger as part of an operation aimed at stopping al-Qaida-linked militants from crisscrossing the Sahel-Sahara region between southern Libya and Mauritania, officials said.
Paris, which has led efforts to push back Islamists in the region since intervening in its former colony Mali last year, redeployed troops across West Africa earlier this year to form a counter-terrorism force.
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Under the new plan, about 3,000 French troops are now operating out of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad – countries straddling the vast arid Sahel band – with the aim of stamping out Islamist fighters across the region. Another 1,000 soldiers are providing logistical support in Gabon and Senegal.
“A base is being set up in northern Niger with the throbbing headache of Libya in mind,” a French diplomat said.
Neither France nor Niger has said where the base will be but military sources in Niger said it was likely to be around Madama, a remote desert outpost in the northeast, where Niger already has some troops based.
According to a recent French Air Force article published on September 13, 2016, the A400M flew from August 24-31 to Madama in a series of tests to prepare the way forward.
The tests were conducted under the EMATT and the CEAM which are key French Air Force centers of excellence with regard to aviation.
“The tests are part of the step towards further certification of the aircraft.”
The difficult terrain in the area provides a good test of the capabilities to operate in a challenging operational environment as well.
Currently, the French Air Force has 10 A400Ms based at Orleans.
Recently, the Spanish Air Force’s first A400M made its initial flight.
According to Airbus Defence and Space press release on September 6, 2016:
The first Airbus A400M new generation airlifter ordered by the Spanish Air Force has made its maiden flight, marking a key milestone towards its delivery.
The aircraft, known as MSN44, took off from Seville, Spain where the A400M Final Assembly Line is located at 15:25 local time (GMT+1) on 5 September and landed back on site 3 hours and 45 minutes later.
Test-Pilot Nacho Lombo, who captained the flight, said after landing: “
As always, the aircraft was a pleasure to fly.
I am confident that its unique combination of strategic and tactical capabilities will have a transformational effect on the Spanish Air Force’s air mobility operations as it has done in other countries already.”
The aircraft is scheduled to be delivered in the coming weeks.
For treatment of the subject on the Spanish Air Force website see the following as well:
2016-09-17 According to the Italian Ministry of Defence, Italy is looking to expand European defense efforts in the context of the Brexit dynamic.
Minister Pinotti, during a joint interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Paolo Gentiloni to French magazine “Le Monde”, expressed her hope that “a multinational European force based on a joint mandate, i.e. a body with common command, decision-making and budgetary structures” may be established.
In analysing the current situation she added that: “…if we want to counter the populist drift that is building on anti-European feelings, we must offer effective responses to our citizens’ concerns, starting from security. One of the most appropriate responses can rotate around defence. The U.K. exit from the EU will deprive us of a member-state equipped with significant military capabilities: we must develop new common defence perspectives”.
Both ministers focused on the above-named aspects in their analysis of European defence.
Since then Italy and Germany have joined efforts along the same line.
For example, when Germany’s defense minister visited Lithuania earlier this month she highlighted the core theme as well of greater defense union in the coming of Brexit.
Germany’s defense minister called for a European “defense union” on Thursday during a visit to the Baltic state of Lithuania, where Berlin is preparing to lead a battle group of about 1,000 troops as a deterrence against neighboring Russia.
The European Union has long considered forging closer defense ties while not undermining the U.S.-led NATO alliance, to which many EU member states also belong, especially in the face of a more aggressive Russia and worsening conflicts in the Middle East.
The decision of Britain, a staunch opponent of any EU “army”, to quit the EU has also removed an obstacle to the closer European defense cooperation favored by Germany, France and many eastern European countries.
“It’s time to move forward to a European defense union, which is basically a ‘Schengen of defense’,”, Ursula von der Leyen told reporters in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius.
“That is what the Americans expect us to do.”
Schengen refers to the passport-free zone covering much of Europe, a pillar of the more integrated Europe that Germany strongly supports.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel also recently endorsed the idea of more joint military operations with the three Baltic republics, all NATO and EU members which have felt especially vulnerable following Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula and its support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Germany already has close military ties and joint forces with Poland, the Netherlands and France outside NATO structures, though Berlin and Paris also say they do not envisage establishing a European army.
“When we have threats that are surrounding us, we all know no country by its own will be able to manage that. But we together, we Europeans, we are very strong if we improve our capabilities as Europeans,” von der Leyen said…..
And prior to the most recent EU summit held in Bratislava, the Italian foreign minister amplified on this idea in the following piece published the day before the summit on September 16, 2016.
From Syria to Iraq, from Daesh [Islamic State] to Libya, and the flows of migrants and refugees, the unrest in the Mediterranean represents a geopolitical priority for Italy. Repeated attacks by Islamic terrorists throughout Europe remind us that domestic and international security are different aspects of the same challenge.
We face a threat both inside and outside our societies that generates fear and uncertainty. The EU must find effective answers to our citizens’ security concerns. This will require an integrated approach that includes increased cooperation on intelligence, police and justice, preventive diplomacy, crisis management and — crucially — a leap forward in a common European defense strategy.
We cannot improve the EU’s capacity to project stability in regions crucial to our security if we do not move our cooperation on defense to a new level. In addition to numerous practical benefits, such an effort would have a strong political impact, as it would underscore our readiness to relaunch the process of European integration.
Following the British vote to leave the EU, the debate over the future of European defense has regained momentum. The United Kingdom’s exit will deprive us of a member state with considerable military capabilities. And yet Brexit opens up new possibilities precisely in this sector. The strengthening of European defense is a key element of the Global Strategy for the European Union, unveiled just a few days after the British referendum. And it will be discussed at this week’s summit in Bratislava.
We are all aware that defense lies at the core of national sovereignty. Any step towards a more integrated European defense requires an immense amount of trust, as well as careful attention to different national histories, constitutional systems and security priorities. Close coordination with NATO will be crucial; the transatlantic relationship is and will remain the bedrock of our common security.
This is why a pragmatic strategy and, above all, political will is so necessary. In Italy’s vision, there are three main areas worth exploring in the pursuit of a common European defense.
The first concerns a comprehensive approach to regional crises. We should work to create a more streamlined and integrated civilian-military structure, in order to ensure a more effective response to complex emergencies. The establishment of a permanent civilian-military headquarters — as has also been suggested by France and Germany — would represent an ambitious step forward in the EU’s capacity for crisis management.
The second area regards the development of defense capabilities. Europe has to acquire the defense capabilities needed to be a prominent player on the international scene. This will necessitate common EU efforts to support the Continent’s defense industry and broaden its industrial and technological base.
The third area involves multinational forces: the establishment of a division-level European Multinational Force, able to carry out a set of pre-determined missions and operations. This initiative would differ from the multinational forces already in place, such as the battlegroups, in the size and composition of the military units. It would also possess a unified strategic command, the endowment of permanent forces and a common budget for operations.
These three areas are not entirely new. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that in the past we have found it difficult to make significant progress as 28 member states. Today, at a time when decisive external action is required, we need to move forward rapidly.
Italy proposes that a core group of EU countries accelerate their integration in the area of defense, leaving others the option to join at a later stage through an inclusive exercise. Rather than advancing ready-made solutions, this would be the beginning of a political process.
In theory, the Lisbon Treaty provides for stronger integration among a restricted group of consenting member states, via the so-called “Permanent Structured Cooperation.” Italy will continue to take an active part in the debate on how to best employ these provisions. However, the decision-making system to apply them remains especially complex.
That is why we should consider a different path as well, outside the current treaty framework — a policy scheme that, together with Italian Defense Minister Roberta Pinotti, we have called “Schengen for Defense.”
Under this approach, a group of like-minded countries would begin sharing military capabilities and resources on the basis of an ad hoc agreement. The initiative would then be opened to all interested member states, under procedures similar to those adopted in the original Schengen Agreement.
Italy is ready to discuss these and other proposals for the future of European defense with other EU members. The need for political action following the Brexit vote and in view of the upcoming 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome in March 2017 provides us with a window of opportunity. It is time to move toward a common European defense.
Paolo Gentiloni is Italy’s foreign affairs minister.
Yet the latest European summit highlighted an Italian position which wants a harder line on dealing with the immigrant influx and raises question about the Italian PM’s belief in the ability to move forward on collective defense.
The aim of Friday’s (16 September) Bratislava summit was to reconnect EU leaders with European citizens, and to convince voters that the EU works for them, not against them….
Leaders pledged never to return to “uncontrolled flows” of migrants of last year, but the term “chaos” used often by Tusk was scrapped, as it was deemed too grim by some.
To reach that goal, member states want to ensure full control of external borders and by the end of the year to have the European Border and Coast Guard fully operational.
In December, leaders are to decide new plans on security and defence cooperation, and see how deeply they can proceed on military cooperation within the existing EU treaties.
At the end of the year, the 27 also plan to seal a deal on the doubling of the investment fund, proposed by EU commission president Jean-Claude Juncker. In October, they will assess the bloc’s trade policy to provide more protection for European consumers and businesses.
Leaders also decided to send help to Bulgaria to protect its border, and set up an entry-exit system that checks the identity of people before they travel to the EU…..
However, it was Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi who refused to stick to the script.
“I can’t give a joint press conference with Merkel and Hollande. I don’t follow a script to make people believe we all agree,” he told journalists after the summit, according to ANSA news agency.
Renzi said the progress on the migration crisis or rolling back the policy of austerity was not sufficient. “We want to see facts,” he said, adding that the Bratislava summit was a waste of time.
EU officials seemed surprised by Renzi’s belligerent comments, and suggested they were geared towards the Italian electorate, which will vote later this year on a number of crucial reforms on which the Italian PM has bet his political survival.
It is clear that the coming Brexit will have an impact on the defense of Europe; what that will be will be a function of evolving American policies, the British redirection in the context of Brexit and how key members of the Alliance break out on the way ahead for bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements.
2016-09-08 The key to understanding fifth generation combat aviation is sensor fusion and the man-mashine working relationship built into the cockpit. The F-22 started the process; the F-35 continues it.
At the heart of the new capability is moving from being a sequential multi-mission pilot directing the combat capabilities of the aircraft, to becoming a multi-tasking decision maker where the machines are processing data and providing information as the task changes.
As ACC Commander, “Hawk” Carlisle described the maturation of the F-22 seen in the current Middle East operations:
Question: You are describing the kill web.
And as the air combat assets get better at off-boarding information and cross-supporting the strike and defense functions, the air combat force will get better.
We asked you about the F-22 as an air battle manager at the Trilateral Exercise. Could we revisit that dynamic?
General Carlisle: With regard to the F-22, the first strikes were in September 2014.
We have done upgrades as well which allows us to fire SDBs at a greater level of accuracy.
We are also using the sensor fusion on board the aircraft to pass information to the rest of the force, which is bringing their game up as well.
The F-22 functions in this sense as a battle manager because the pilot has the SA inside his cockpit to direct other aircraft on what they do and how they can do it more effectively.
We are better at this now than we were even a year ago.
You create a problem for an adversary when you have multiple places from which you can strike.
You have the SA and the information shared among all three platforms in the case of the trilateral exercise.
You couldn’t defend against all of them.
But how do you train pilots for multi-tasking missions?
This clearly is a work in progress?
What does being a Top Gun F-35 pilot mean and how do you train to the desired multi-tasking level of competence?
In the following piece by Todd Miller, he addresses the question of the making of a 21st century pilot.
The Making of the 21st Century Fighter Pilot
By Todd Miller
With the F-35A program generating an abundance of positive news, it is easy to overlook that the F-22A Raptor remains the USAF platform of choice for the Air Superiority role.
In a recent interview 1st Fighter Wing Commander, Colonel Pete Fesler paraphrased comments made by the Commander of Air Combat Command, General Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle; “The F-35 is the best air to air (A2A) platform in the world, except for the F-22. The F-22 is the best air to ground (A2G) platform in the world, except for the F-35.” Fesler continued,
“So we have two aircraft, one designed primarily for A2G, one primarily for A2A, both with complimentary capabilities to assist each other in either role.
Together they create a team that is optimized to simultaneously go after air and surface threats.”
The F-22 Raptor has a unique combination of stealth, speed, maneuverability, operational altitude and weapons load that make it the “bar” by which A2A fighters are measured. Seen in the context of the current and emerging threat environment, the capabilities the Raptor brings to the fight drive a paradigm shift in the role of the fighter pilot.
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Operating the stealthy F-22 in highly contested space with anti access/area denial (A2/AD) systems AND adversaries with their own advanced stealthy aircraft provides extraordinary challenges.
These current and anticipated air and surface threats drive an aggressive training regime for Raptor pilots.
On a recent visit to Joint Base Langley-Eustis (JBLE) Lt. Colonel Charles “Stab” Hebert, Commander of the 71st FTS (Fighter Training Squadron) and first assignment Adversary Air (ADAIR) pilot call sign “Leeroy” provided insights into the selection and training of Raptor pilots.
The 71st FTS flies the Northrop T-38 Talon as ADAIR support for all F-22 Raptors based at JBLE (27th FS, 94th FS & the 192nd FW).
Raptor Pilot Qualities
During college Leeroy entered the Air Force through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and subsequently took his Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) at Sheppard AFB. As a student graduating from the UPT, Leeroy was assigned to the 71st FTS “Ironmen” where he has honed his piloting skills flying against the Raptor.
After what will be two years of flying as a Raptor adversary (with at least 1 Raptor Kill – more on that later), Leeroy is now uniquely qualified to achieve his goal and become a Raptor pilot. In the short time since graduation Leeroy has become qualified as an instructor in the T-38 ADAIR program.
As Hebert explained, Leeroy is making a little history – being the first, first assignment pilot to become an ADAIR instructor. Leeroy applied himself and broke barriers by achieving something extraordinary in just over 18 months at his first assignment. This is precisely the type of high achievement individuals with excellent flying skills that the Air Force looks to fill Raptor seats.
Hebert speaks insightfully, he was one of those originally tasked to transition the T-38s from training support for the F-117 to the F-22.
Hebert is qualified in the T-38, F-15C, and F-22 – so he knows what’s involved in excelling as an air combat, adversary and F-22 pilot. With that wealth of experience Hebert notes that not every pilot has the aptitude or the skills to fly the F-22 Raptor.
As Hebert says, pilots are graded on many aspects throughout their undergraduate pilot training (UPT) including; instrument, formation, low level, aerobatics, pattern work, academics, physical condition, and professional conduct. By the end of training, it is clear which students are qualified for the F-22.
And as Hebert states emphatically, “it matters, because you have a very expensive single seat platform and one hour of training in the Raptor may involve multiple Raptors, a Tanker, AWACS, and multiple adversaries.
Leadership needs to ensure the student has the right aptitude, the ability to learn from the sortie without multiple do overs, and progress to the next step.”
Existing Air Force pilots that transfer into the Raptor program from another fighter platform must have also demonstrated exceptional piloting skills and aptitude.
Raptor capabilities include sensor fusion that provides the pilot with superior situational awareness vs. Gen 4 fighters.
Coming from the F-15C Eagle, Hebert says, “I used to look at Raptor pilots and think, those guys are so lucky, the jet does everything for you.
Then I flew the Raptor for myself, and yes the jet does a lot for you, but much more is expected of you!
There are fewer aircraft and the Raptor pilot is addressing a larger mission set.
The aircraft has the speed and sensor suite, it can do anything you need a fighter to do and more, however you have to manage your fuel and your weapons.
The role of a Raptor pilot is more like a mission commander (even as a wingman) as opposed to the Eagle.
One Raptor is expected to do the work of multiple Eagles.
It’s not easy to employ the Raptor well, because you have a lot to manage.”
Each step forward in technology drives increased platform capability.
The era of platforms dedicated to a specific role are winding down.
Platforms like the Raptor now include capabilities that may all be utilized on the same mission; A2A, A2G, electronic warfare/electronic attack (EW/EA), and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR).
A familiar way to understand this is to consider the mobile phone from its inception to what we use today.
When first introduced it was “just” a mobile phone, then became a phone with added calculator, notepad, email, and now the mobile phone is a “smart phone” that includes cameras, office assistants and so much more.
The F-22 does more, and that “more” translates into a significant increase in the scope of the mission set.
The F-22 and F-35s advanced sensors ensure both play a critical part in driving the emerging C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) structure. The aircraft form critical nodes in the associated kill web of information driven assets.
They are not replacements for existing Gen 4 aircraft, but provide an entirely new capability, and as such new Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TPPs) must become second nature for the pilot.
While new mission sets are seldom discussed (due to the classified nature of the capabilities), even traditional mission sets have many variables.
The Raptor may be flown in a blended environment with both Gen 4 and coalition (international) jets, or fighting on its own.
In a blended group the Raptor often functions as a battlespace manager for the group providing a “god’s eye view” to all participants – even as it keeps the airspace clear of adversaries, and sends volumes of ISR data back to other platforms.
In some cases, the mission commander will utilize Raptor driven information and designate the missiles of other aircraft to down adversaries, ensuring the Raptor keeps maximum weapons load for use as a last resort (as we have seen in Red Flag exercises).
In another scenario the Raptor may be driven by a time sensitive window to get a bomber on target and aggressively strike deep into contested space with scores of hostile air and ground threats to evade or neutralize.
As Hebert summarized, “the Raptor pilot is called upon to manage each unique environment, and that challenges how you manage your weapons. Do you sling one missile or are you slinging two, ensuring the threat is killed?
“That affects what weapons you have available on board to support the mission on egress. So there is a lot to think about.”
It goes beyond multi-tasking, to multi-tasking in a fluid, dynamic environment with an un-compromised commitment to survival and achievement of mission objectives.
Each circumstance brings a new set of challenges to utilize the available sensor information and deploy the aircraft effectively. Hebert says “the pilot is constantly evaluating out how one change affects everything else and what decision has to be made now.”
Adversary Air
While of 1960s vintage, the sleek, black T-38s are effective adversaries for the Raptors, and train against them daily.
Not to be confused with dogfighting within visual range (WVR) (generally suicidal for a T-38 vs an F-22), the primary training involves taking on multiple bogeys beyond visual range (BVR) that attack in a wide variety of formations.
In the past F-22 pilots used to slip in and out of the T-38s to try their hand against their own aircraft, but that is generally not the case today. Each pilot is focused on their specific craft. Leeroy brings a fresh but disciplined approach to flying as an F-22 adversary.
As he explained, he flies the mission while maintaining a series of priorities revolving around the mission and safety; maintaining fuel; staying within the designated airspace; keeping a safe distance from other participants.
“The formation (to include my wingman and myself) must be executed correctly, the tactic we have been tasked to reflect must be executed correctly. Not merely flying a profile, ADAIR must replicate a tactic and in some cases an aircraft type. It is the responsibility of ADAIR to drive specific learning objectives for the Raptors.”
For the T-38 pilot, communication is typically verbal (from an AWACS or Ground Controller), and situational awareness is the 3D picture the pilot paints in their own mind. In this respect, there is no help from the aircraft! With aircraft often converging at well over 1000 mph – things are happening fast, leaving lots to think about and little time for decisions and actions.
Hebert comments, “I like Leeroy’s response because it illustrates the difference between what’s happening with the Raptor versus Leeroy. Leeroy is flying in a fast jet, he’s really got a lot of variables; he’s thinking about communication; he is literally building a picture in his mind so that he knows what he’s doing next, where his threats are or how he can affect a mission. That is hard. But his effectiveness is small compared to the Raptor.
“A Raptor pilot benefits from tremendous systems that give him a lot of situational awareness, they’re not having to do as much mentally, however they’re wildly outnumbered.
“There’s a lot more aircraft out there trying to kill those two or four jets and so they have to figure out how they’re going to complete their mission, preserve their fuel, preserve their weapons and realize it’s not just an air to air threat, they are also dealing with air to ground threats. The Raptor pilot must stay true to their own limitations associated with that mission set. Our training is very challenging on both sides.”
It is clear – Raptor pilots are pressed through a crucible.
As has been noted in the USAF Red Flag exercises and USAF Weapons School at Nellis AFB – the objective is to train pilots in environments designed to be equal too, or more difficult than what is expected in combat.
While virtual training is utilized, Hebert notes that there is nothing that can train like being in the air. The physical exertion, the actual reality of managing fuel, weapons, the mission set – all escalate dramatically in the air.
Fights On
The typical training sortie take one of three forms, involving 2 – 6 or more T-38s vs 2 – 4 F-22s;
Short Range, Low Awareness: This scenario typically involves two to four T-38s vs two F-22s with the focus on ACM (air combat maneuvering). The Talons approach the Raptors quickly from behind. The Raptors turn around with low awareness and attempt to quickly kill all threats. Just like an old western shootout, except the Raptor pilot has to contend with three or four gunslingers at once!
Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Defensive Counter Air (DCA): In these sorties ADAIR flies as a hostile nation in a scenario that is drawn up by mission planners. ADAIR represents a specific type of aircraft and a particular threat country. A designated “territory” is defended, or attacked. Engagements that end in kills to ADAIR send the T-38s back to a specific location to regenerate and reenter the battle. Given the regeneration those 6 – 8 T-38s might represent a total of 20 – 30 bandits for the F-22s to address during the sortie.
Both OCA and DCA are “missionized scenarios” so the regeneration threat airfields are identified and coordinated with intelligence. The Raptors must typically honor a surface to air threat and they will be penalized if they violate. The surface threats are critical to reflect the A2/AD environment that the Raptor will be expected to fight and prevail in.
The problem sets created for Raptor pilots are difficult, and represent a significant step up in sophistication and difficulty from Gen 4 air to air training exercises (that have primarily focused on ACM or specific mission set served by a given platform).
Hebert addresses the question many are asking, “How is that that a 1960s aircraft challenges a Raptor? By volume, size, and speed. It’s the fact that Leeroy is well versed in Raptor tactics. We know how to work the Raptor to the best of our ability, add intelligence and the difficulties associated with their mission sets (such as their escorting someone you know they have to protect at all costs) -and it gets hard, quick.”
Pride must be taken in the execution of the mission, because it must get old always getting killed! Has Leeroy ever “killed a Raptor?”
A brief moment of hesitation indicates a reluctance to share, “Yes, I have – it happens from time to time.”
Now before readers and armchair fighter pilots lose their minds, there are a number of reasons why a 1960s T-38 may get a Raptor kill, and none of them include the Raptor being out flown by a T-38 in a WVR engagement.
As Hebert explains, it was likely a very hard kill.
While it could have been a mistake (an overlook) by a Raptor pilot, more likely the Raptor was being tasked to do something very aggressive. We may ask them to achieve the impossible.
We have to push them beyond their limits to effect valid training, to hammer home hard lessons. It is a natural, if not critical part of the training.
With Leeroy soon to be flying Raptors he reflects on the most impressive things he’s seen from both the perspective of the F-22 and the T-38.
“With the Raptor – you constantly die without ever seeing it – that’s very impressive” he both smiles and frowns. “On the other hand, if you do get close, right on the Raptors six and you think you are going to get a kill, you quickly learn that the maneuverability of the F-22 is incredible.”
The F-22 turns on a dime, and you are another F-22 statistic. And the most impressive thing about the T-38 Talon? Sounding much like I might expect a B-52 pilot would, Leeroy answers, “to fly a 1960s jet in 2016!”
The situation is ripe with paradox.
An 1960s jet flown by a young, very capable pilot is making an invaluable contribution to the creation of pilots for the most lethal air superiority platform of today and tomorrow.
What could be more exciting? I looked at Leeroy and he could not wipe the smile off his face, he’s enrolled in the Raptor-B-course this coming January.
Now that is exciting!
Article and photos by Todd Miller, Second Line of Defense.
All rights reserved; for use please contact Second Line of Defense.
The Second Line of Defense would like to thank Lt. Col Charles “Stab” Hebert, Commander of the 71st FTS “Ironmen”; “Leeroy,” T-38 Instructor and soon to be F-22 Raptor pilot; Jeffrey Hood, Media Operations Section Chief, JBLE; and TSgt Katie Ward of the 633 ABW PAO.
Editor’s Note: One impact of the F-35 is a dramatic increase in fifth generation pilots; there are few F-22 pilots and few F-22s; in fact, already Lockheed has or will seen have produced more F-35s than F-22s!
The F-35 has been operational with the USMC for more than a year, and this summer with the USAF. The US Navy is getting ready for the introduction of the F-35 and already sees it as a key element of and trigger fro what Navy leadership calls the kill web. This means that the F-35 is see both as a new capability but part of a much broader transformation of the power projection force.
In this report, we look at perspectives of the US services and the allies on the impact of fifth generation enabled combat capabilities and ways to think about the patterns of transformation of the power projection forces.
Interviews have been conducted at the major bases and warfighting centers in the United States as well as interviews in the UK and Australia as well. There is a convergence of thinking about the broad strategic direction of the reshaping of power projection forces but a diversity of innovative approaches with regard to how best to achieve change.
21st century warfare concepts of operations, technology, tactics and training are in evolution and revolution. The F-35 is at the heart of this change for a very simple reason – it is a revolutionary platform, and when considered in terms of its fleet impact even more so. The F-35, Lightning II, will make combat aviation history with the first of kind sensor fusion cockpit. The F-35 is essentially an F/A/E-35 that makes it effective in AA, AG and EW combined missions. Allied and U.S. combat pilots will evolve and share new tactics and training, and over time this will drive changes that leaders must make for effective command and control to fight future battles.
An issue has been that the F-35 has been labeled a “fifth generation” aircraft, a sensible demarcation when the F-22 was being introduced. But the evolution of the combat systems on the aircraft, the role of the fusion engine, and the impact of a fleet of integrated F-35s operating as a foundational element will make the current term “5th Gen” obsolete. The F-35 is the first of a new generation of design features and airborne capabilities that will change everything. It is a first generation information and decision making superiority “flying combat system.”
The global fleet of F-35s will be the first generation for building a foundation for a fundamental change in the way air power operates in overall combat concepts of operations. It is not in and of itself a single aircraft platform; it is about what an integrated fleet of F-35s can deliver to TRANSFORM everything. The decade ahead will be very innovative. Combat warriors, at all ranks, can leverage what they learn and then apply those lessons to reshaping the force over and over.
The impact of an integrated fleet of F-35s with fused internal pilot combat data and also distributed information out, will allow the US and its allies to rethink how to do 21st century air-enabled operations. Each F-35 will be able to network and direct engagements in 360-degrees of 3-dimensional space by offloading tracks to other air/land/sea platforms including UAVs and robots.
The current head of the ACC when he was PACAF looked forward to the time when allies and the US forces had substantial numbers of F-35s flying in the Pacific area of operations and highlighted how dramatic he saw the coming changes to be.
“General Carlisle was asked what would be the impact of a fleet of F-35s (allied and US) upon a Commander of PACAF a decade out. It will be significant. Instead of thinking of an AOC, I can begin to think of an American and allied CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center). By sharing a common operating picture, we can become more effective tactically and strategically throughout the area of operations.”
The most neglected aspect of the roll out of the F-35 is its global nature. It is not just about the three US services, it is about partners and allies concurrently rolling out their F-35s and sorting out how their new air systems transform their forces. The F-35 is not an airplane; it is a global air combat system.
Although the F-35 is a U.S. aircraft, it has significant foreign content provided by an integrated global network of suppliers. With the introduction of F-35s globally, comes the nascent global sustainment enterprise. The forces are working out ways to leverage the commonality in the plane and the support structure to sustain those planes in combat.
It is a nascent effort, but is already laying down building blocks such as sustainment enterprise in Europe and Asia to support the partners, and the operation of U.S. forces from regional support centers, such as being built by the Italians, the Dutch or the Australians. The roll out of the aircraft is built upon a common logistics enterprise shaping a global sustainment effort similar to that of the successful the C-17 global enterprise.
Global defense industry, not just the U.S. defense industry, is significant to building AND sustaining the F-35. About 30% of the F-35 fleet will be built with foreign content, and the maintainability will rest on best practices from global suppliers. The F-35 logistics enterprise will not simply be forced to rely on sole source suppliers for any number of key parts produced globally. And with the system to identify parts, the performance of those parts will be put to the test and the better performing parts suppliers determined by performance in combat and in operations, not simply determined in a procurement bureaucracy.
Besides the US, the F-35’s nine partner countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey. And they’re a number of other countries buying the aircraft via a more traditional FMS acquisition route, including; Japan, South Korea, Israel and possibly Singapore. Each of these countries is buying the F-35 as part of their overall efforts to shape 21st century defense forces.
The global nature of the fleet – is a trigger for change and key allies are looking at F-35 enabled defense transformation. The coming of the F-35 triggers key aspects of shaping 21st century concepts of operations, we will focus on an examples of how concepts of operations can be reshaped, namely the evolution of “tron warfare” under the impact of the F-35 global fleet.
Leveraging the F-35 triggered transformation, rather than pursuing a stove-piped platform modernization and upgrade strategy, will be the essential catalysis to shape new platform acquisitions. The decade ahead will be one of significant innovation which will in turn build a technology, training and tactics foundation for what new systems will be important to develop in the decade after next.
Prior to the Williams Foundation seminar on air-sea integration, I had a chance to sit down with Air Commodore Kitcher and to discuss the way ahead for the RAAF in the joint combat space.
He is the Director General of Capability Planning in the RAAF.
Air Commodore Kitcher provided an understanding of how the RAAF was integrating its new platforms into the force, and how opening the aperture from the outset on joint capability was affecting that roll out as well.
Question: It is often noted in the USAF that 80% of the platforms which will make up the 2025 force are already here.
What is the RAAF’s perspective?
Air Commodore Kitcher: “It is somewhat different from the USAF. And our challenge is also somewhat different. By 2025 our oldest platform will be a C130J, which remains the most modern C130 available.
“In 2025, we’re not going to be operating a platform in the air combat space that’s 20 years old. In Australia, we don’t have to integrate an F35 with an F16, or an F35 with the classic Hornet.
“We will be operating some of the latest and most capable platforms across the air lift, control of the air, strike and ISR roles and our challenge is to get best combat value out of an integrated Australian and coalition force using these cutting edge capabilities.
P-8 crew flying the Wedgetail simulator in Australia for refueling operations.
“We’ll retire classic Hornet, and introduce the F35-A which is much more than a replacement for the Classic. Our other air combat asset are our Super Hornets, which are only 5 years old, and both will be supported (amongst many other things) by Growlers, which will arrive in Australia next year.
“If we look at the maritime space, P3s are retiring, P8s and Triton are being introduced. Our first P8 turns up in November this year. If we look in the airlift space, C130Js will be our oldest platform, but they remain contemporary.
KC-30A MRTT and E-7A Wedgetail conduct Air to Air refuelling testing in the airspace near RAAF Williamtown. June 2015. Credit: Australian MoD
“The KC-30 Multi Role Tanker Transport is 4 or 5 years old with both the hose and drogue and boom air to air refueling capabilities being fully realised and another 2 effectively new KC-30 aircraft will arrive before the end of 2019. We also picked up C-17 aircraft #7 and 8 last year. C-27J is being introduced right now and we expect it to reach IOC before the end of this year.
“In the surveillance and control area , the E-7 Wedgetail AEWAC airframe might be 10 or 15 years old. However, the Wedgetail capability is equal to or better than any similar capability in the world.
“You’d have to say Wedgetail is a cutting edge AEWAC capability. There would be some capabilities that Wedgetail has that the new USAF Block 40/45 E-3G AWACS doesn’t have, and vice versa, of course.”
Question: So your challenge is ensuring that your force which is a young force in terms of new capabilities can work effectively together; and for this, you are also working with core allies such as the US, but need to shape a core Australian way ahead.
How would you describe the challenge?
Air Commodore Kitcher: “How do I make my US Air Force ‘like’ F35A work closely with my US Navy ‘like’ Growler and Super Hornet to achieve a mission?
“Similarly, how do I ensure these aircraft, plus the Australian bespoke Wedgetail can work effectrvely with the RAN LHD and Air Warfare Destroyer to achieve a Maritime support or strike mission?
“It’s a good problem to have to ensure that we get the maximum collective capability out of our individual platforms in the Australian context, which means we’ve got to make them work with each other.
“Larger forces, like the US, may not have that same requirement, because they’ve got other assets that can do various specialized missions.
“And we face a major challenge to ensure that our new air platforms work in an integrated manner with evolving Navy and Army capabilities.
“We must shape solutions which support our Australian Concept of Operations.
The Joint Standing Committee visit RAAF Base Amberley; (from the left) Sue Joyce, Nathan Fewkes, Group Captain Carl Newman, Mrs Jane Prentice MP, Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Senator David Fawcett, Air Commodore Michael Kitcher, Mr Alan Griffin MP, Mr Jerome Brown, Senator Linda Reynolds, Wing Commander Jo Elkington, Mr Josh Leslie, Warrant Officer Tony Hall, Flight Lieutenant Jack Appleton, Sergeant Robert Lee and Flight Lieutenant Melissa Picton.
“Our force also obviously needs to be “integratable” and/or interoperable with the US and other allies, but we won’t get there fully by simply buying US C2 and ISR systems.
“Not only do we need to make a particular platform or system work for Australia within our ADF capability context, but we need to ensure that it’s truly interoperable in a coalition as well.
“This is a real challenge, because there are security issues, restictions and requirements that exist that musr be overcome to realize true high-level interoperability.
“However, solving these problems is far better than trying to keep something that’s 30-year-old flying and make it work with the new equipment coming on line.
“To solve these challenges, we are focused on prioritising and integrating only the things that you ‘should’ to make a more lethal and effective force.
“There is no need for all our capabilities to be fully connected to each other, there are levels of connectivity that will suffice. especially initially We must prioritise and identify what we ‘should’ do, and to what level, vice embark on a program of doing what we ‘can’ do.
“A component of the RAAF Project Jericho involves this kind of thinking and is looking at our Air, Maritime and land capabilities, determining the art of the possible with respect to connectivity, and then suggesting levels and priorities that should be pursued.
“This also includes components in the virtual and constructive areas such that we can also train more effectively in the joint arena.
“Improving our training capacity by complementing live training with virtual and constructive is vital, especially where availability of the scarce live resources necessary to generate a complex training scenario are limited, and security restrictions could inhibit operating live at appropriate levels.”
Question: You have done a lot of worked to shape a fifth-generation enabled force, prior to the F-35 showing up.
How will the F-35 fit into that evolving effort?
Air Commodore Kitcher: “The F35 introduction’s is catalyst for significant change.
“Although the jets don’t arrive in Australia until the end of 2018, and IOC is not until the end of 2020, believe me, we are right in the middle of introducing the F-35A into service.
“In addition to personnel we have embedded in the overall F-35 program in the US, we have two RAAF aircraft and four instructors at Luke AFB. Our first cadre of dedicated F-35 maintainers and engineers departs for the US in Jan 17, and will be gaining the necessary experience so we can operate the F-35 in Australia from the end of 2018.
F-35 Aircraft AF-4 Australian KC-30 Tanker Test. First fuel transfer.
“Operating the F-35 will be one thing, but we also need to be able to sustain it, and the methods of sustaining the F-35 are also different to older platforms.
“We have been planning for a while now, and these plans will continue to evolve, but I’m not sure our system fully understands that this significant transition is well and truly underway.
“You can keep flying legacy aircraft forever if you want to spend enough money on them, but they all reach a point where they will become capability irrelevant.
“Our Classsic Hornets are doing a great job in the Middle East right now, and due to the raft of Hornet upgrades we have completed, remain amongst the most capable Classic Hornets anywhere.
“However, they will reach a point in the near future, especially in the higher end fight, where their utility will be significantly diminished.
“The F-35 brings 5th generation qualities which will allow for a significant expansion across a raft of ADF capabilities. Air Maritime, Land and most importantly joint.
Nextgen Cyber Innovation and Technology Centre (NCITC) Operations Manager, Mr Merv Wills (right), talks to Program Manager – Joint Strike Fighter, Air Vice-Marshal Chris Deeble, AM, CSC (centre) and Director General Capability Planning, Air Commodore Mike Kitcher, OAM (left) about the NCITC at Lockheed Martin.
“We’ve chosen, and we have structured it such that the Classic Hornet will run out of effective hours and fatigue life at the point not too far after when the F35 is being introduced. There is contingency of course but not a lot. We don’t have the luxury simply to reflect abstractly on this problem anymore, we’re in the middle of solving it.
“That gives us a very aggressive F35 introduction schedule.
“For example, we’re planning to change out a classic Hornet to F35 squadron over 12 months. A squadron will stop flying the classic Hornet at the end of December one year, and by the end of December next year they are fully up and running and operational on the F-35. That is a very tight schedule. We’ve got a plan to execute but as you would expect, it’s not without risk.
“However, being a little bit smaller than what other forces might be, we tend to also be more agile.
“And that agility will see us deal with any risks that might materialize, or the other inevitable pop up issues.
“Due to this aggressive schedule, our ability right now to deal with many other things triggered by the F-35 is somewhat limited, we are rightly focused on introduction.
“Fortunately, most of these associated issues, such as the Mission Data Environment, have already been the subject of extensive work. We have been positioning our joint force to both provide the necessary level and type of data to maximize new capabilities such as Growler, Triton and F-35A, and process the vast amounts of data these capabilities will collect.
“There are definitely remaining challenges in this space, we’ve observed them here in Australia and also with our key coalition partners, but there is good work underway in parallel with the platform introductions.
“I’m sure after we introduce the F-35 aircraft we’ll still have a lot of work to do to get us to the point where we maximize the F35 capability across the Australian defense force, and interoperability with the other F-35 forces, but this is natural and will be dealt with in due course.
“There is certainly a lot happening at once.”
Question: But clearly, you are bringing in the F-35 with the mindset that it is not simply replacing the Hornet?
Air Commodore Kitcher: “I absolutely agree we are not just replacing the classic Hornet with another fighter.
“And we are looking from the ground up at complementary F-35 capabilities to maximize the F-35 effect across the joint space, such as the missiles we wish to see onboard our F-35.
“For example, we are looking at the Kongsberg JSM, we think that presents a logical option to consider far more seriously for our JSF maritime strike capability, and we’re looking at that right now, as was announced at the 2015 Avalon Air Show.
Australian F-35 at Luke AFB. Credit: Luke AFB
“Our requirement for a quality maritime strike missile internally carried on the F35 might also be ahead timewise of what the US and other coalition partners might have. It might also be ahead of what the US has programmed. We’re certainly working on the F-35 MARSTK capability and are also developing options, with Australian Industry, that might lead to a dual mode seeker in the JSM.
“But it is clear that just like in the case of Wedgetail and KC-30A, we want to put the F-35 into the hands of the warfighters as rapidly as possible.
“They will make it work.
“I know that despite all our best efforts and intent, we won’t be able to plan the F-35 introduction perfectly from Canberra. We are doing our best job to make sure we deliver the capability to the men and women in the field, as efficiently and positively as possible.
“When we throw the F-35 at them, they’re going to do all sorts of stuff with it that we will not have even thought of.
“I look forward to letting our smart young man and women, who have grown up in a different environment to those of us here in Canberra, get their hands on the F-35 and do some amazing things with it. I’m also quite looking forward to getting back out there myself, and see this first hand.
“Our job is to set up the program and set in motion the framework for that kind of tactical innovation to happen, to position them for success.
“We should not get in their way with excessive top down guidance and legacy thinking.”
During the Williams Foundation seminar on evolving approaches to air-sea integration, Rear Admiral Mayer, the Commander of the Australian Fleet, focused on the concrete and specific challenges facing the evolution of the Royal Australian Navy as a key element of the joint force.
He argued that the Army, Navy and Air forces were evolving in the context of tapping shared networks to empower their platforms to form an extended battlespace.
But the challenge, he observed, was to work through how to most effectively shape, coordinate and execute effects from the networked force while retaining decision authorities at the lowest practical level to achieve speed of decision.
Rear Admiral Stuart Mayer, Commander Fleet Australia, speaking at the Williams Seminar on Air-Sea Integration, August 10, 2016, Canberra, Australia.
He highlighted that the Navy was returning to a task force concept but one, which was 21st century in character, whereby Navy was tapping into ground and air assets as “part” of the task force, rather than simply focusing on Navy operated assets.
This evolution of the task force effect and the networked approach, clearly in the mode of what the US Navy is referring to as the “kill web,” will require the evolution of capabilities, both in terms of connectivity, and training.
During the seminar he characterized the network as a weapon system with “no single master” and that one of the ADFs challenges was to shape the evolving network in order to effectively operate in a distributed multi domain task force.
“Each service is designing its platforms and enabling their potential through the elements of a common network.
“There is increased overlap thereby for the air and sea forces, at the very least through the access and synergy provided in the network.
“A fundamental question presents itself; how should we best develop, certify and deploy our joint network that must be cross domain in nature?”
He argued that the Australian Defence Force was on a good track but needed to enhance its capability to work in a joint domain that recognized tactical effects were generated by Services, but operational outcomes were inherently Joint.
In effect, the Services provided the muscle behind the Joint intent.
If the ADF were to achieve its potential it would need to design forces from the ground up that were interconnected to a single reference standard, rather than simply connecting assets after the fact.
But to do so required an open architecture approach to building a joint network that recognized the different needs of the participants.
The role of the network as a weapon system required that it had to be designed, deployed and certified like any other weapon system.
I had a chance to sit down with Rear Admiral Mayer and discuss further some of his thinking about the way ahead.
“We are joint by necessity.
“Unlike the US Navy, we do not have our own air force or our own army. Joint is not a theological choice, it’s an operational necessity.”
It was clear both from his presentation and our discussion during the interview that Rear Admiral Mayer was focused on how the build out of the Navy in the period ahead would be highly correlated with the evolution of the joint network.
“The network is a weapons system.
“Lethality and survivability have to be realized through a networked effect.”
Rear Admiral Manazir at the seminar focused on the kill web as a weapon system; it was very clear that Rear Admiral Mayer had in mind a similar thought when he discussed the network as a weapon system.
A key element of change for the Australian Navy was evolving a 21st century concept of task force operations.
He noted that the development of the new amphibious ships had come within a decade of work on shaping an amphibious warfare system.
The importance of the LHDs was not just the capability they offered, but the elevation in thinking they drove in Navy over the decade, thinking that moved operational concepts from the platform to the Task Group and affected all of Navy’s force elements.
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He emphasized throughout the interview that not enough work has yet been done to prioritize the evolving C2 and network systems empowering the platforms in the force, including but not limited to the amphibious force.
He sees this area of development as a crucial one in creating a more interactive joint force able to deliver lethal effect.
“The potential of each of the individual platforms in a network is such that we’ve actually got to preset the limits of the fight before we get to it.
“The decisions on what we’ll do, how much we’ll share, and what sovereign rights we will retain have to be preset into each one of the combat systems before you switch it on and join a network.
“There is no point designing a combat system capable of defeating supersonic threats and throttling it with a slow network or cumbersome C2 decision architecture.
“Achieving an effective network topology is so much more complex in a coalition context in which the potential for divergence is higher.
“The paradox is that a coalition network is much more likely a requirement than a national network, and yet what investment we do make is based on national systems first.
“If we don’t achieve the open architecture design that enables the synergy of a networked coalition force, then the effectiveness of the coalition itself will be put at risk.
“The moment we insert excess command and hierarchical decision authority into the loop we will slow down the lethality of the platforms in the network.
“Before we even get in the battlespace we have to agree the decision rights and pre set these decisions into the combat system and network design; the fight for a lethal effect starts at the policy level before we even engage in combat operations.
“The network and C2 rather than the platforms can become the critical vulnerability.”
“This is why the decision making process needs to be designed as much as the network or the platforms.
“If the C2 matrix slows the network, it will dumb down the platform and the capability of the system to deliver a full effect.”
“The nature of the force we are shaping is analogous to a biological system in which the elements flourish based on their natural relationship within the environment.
“We have an opportunity to shape both the platforms and the network, but we will only achieve the flourishing eco system we seek if each harmonise with the other, and the overall effectiveness is considered on the health of the ecosystem overall.
“For example, an ASW network will leverage the potential of the individual constituent platforms and that in turn will determine the lethality of the system.
“A discordant network connection will, at least, limit the overall Force level effect of the network and at worst break the network down to discordant elements.”
Clearly, a key part of the evolution is about shaping a weapons revolution whereby weapons can operate throughout the battlespace hosted by platforms that are empowered by networks tailored to the battlespace.
And that revolution will have its proper impact only if the network and C2 dynamics discussed by Rear Admiral Mayer unfold in the national and coalition forces.
“The limiting factor now is not our platforms; it’s the networks and C2 that hold the potential of those platforms down.
“When the individual platforms actually go into a fight they’re part of an interdependent system, the thing that will dumb down the system will be a network that is not tailored to leverage the potential of the elements, or a network that holds decision authority at a level that is a constraint on timely decision making.
“The network will determine the lethality of our combined system.”
