2016-09-08 The key to understanding fifth generation combat aviation is sensor fusion and the man-mashine working relationship built into the cockpit.  The F-22 started the  process; the F-35 continues it.

At the heart of the new capability is moving from being a sequential multi-mission pilot directing the combat capabilities of the aircraft, to becoming a multi-tasking decision maker where the machines are processing data and providing information as the task changes.

As ACC Commander, “Hawk” Carlisle described the maturation of the F-22 seen in the current Middle East operations:

Question: You are describing the kill web.

And as the air combat assets get better at off-boarding information and cross-supporting the strike and defense functions, the air combat force will get better.

We asked you about the F-22 as an air battle manager at the Trilateral Exercise. Could we revisit that dynamic?

General Carlisle: With regard to the F-22, the first strikes were in September 2014.

We have done upgrades as well which allows us to fire SDBs at a greater level of accuracy.

We are also using the sensor fusion on board the aircraft to pass information to the rest of the force, which is bringing their game up as well.

The F-22 functions in this sense as a battle manager because the pilot has the SA inside his cockpit to direct other aircraft on what they do and how they can do it more effectively.

We are better at this now than we were even a year ago.

You create a problem for an adversary when you have multiple places from which you can strike.

You have the SA and the information shared among all three platforms in the case of the trilateral exercise.

You couldn’t defend against all of them.

But how do you train pilots for multi-tasking missions?

This clearly is a work in progress?

What does being a Top Gun F-35 pilot mean and how do you train to the desired multi-tasking level of competence?

In the following piece by Todd Miller, he addresses the question of the making of a 21st century pilot.

The Making of the 21st Century Fighter Pilot

By Todd Miller

With the F-35A program generating an abundance of positive news, it is easy to overlook that the F-22A Raptor remains the USAF platform of choice for the Air Superiority role.

In a recent interview 1st Fighter Wing Commander, Colonel Pete Fesler paraphrased comments made by the Commander of Air Combat Command, General Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle; “The F-35 is the best air to air (A2A) platform in the world, except for the F-22. The F-22 is the best air to ground (A2G) platform in the world, except for the F-35.” Fesler continued,

“So we have two aircraft, one designed primarily for A2G, one primarily for A2A, both with complimentary capabilities to assist each other in either role.

Together they create a team that is optimized to simultaneously go after air and surface threats.”

The  F-22 Raptor has a unique combination of stealth, speed, maneuverability, operational altitude and weapons load that make it the “bar” by which A2A fighters are measured. Seen in the context of the current and emerging threat environment, the capabilities the Raptor brings to the fight drive a paradigm shift in the role of the fighter pilot.

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Operating the stealthy F-22 in highly contested space with anti access/area denial (A2/AD) systems AND adversaries with their own advanced stealthy aircraft provides extraordinary challenges.

These current and anticipated air and surface threats drive an aggressive training regime for Raptor pilots.

On a recent visit to Joint Base Langley-Eustis (JBLE) Lt. Colonel Charles “Stab” Hebert, Commander of the 71st FTS (Fighter Training Squadron) and first assignment Adversary Air (ADAIR) pilot call sign “Leeroy” provided insights into the selection and training of Raptor pilots.

The 71st FTS flies the Northrop T-38 Talon as ADAIR support for all F-22 Raptors based at JBLE (27th FS, 94th FS & the 192nd FW).

Raptor Pilot Qualities

During college Leeroy entered the Air Force through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and subsequently took his Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) at Sheppard AFB. As a student graduating from the UPT, Leeroy was assigned to the 71st FTS “Ironmen” where he has honed his piloting skills flying against the Raptor.

After what will be two years of flying as a Raptor adversary (with at least 1 Raptor Kill – more on that later), Leeroy is now uniquely qualified to achieve his goal and become a Raptor pilot. In the short time since graduation Leeroy has become qualified as an instructor in the T-38 ADAIR program.

As Hebert explained, Leeroy is making a little history – being the first, first assignment pilot to become an ADAIR instructor. Leeroy applied himself and broke barriers by achieving something extraordinary in just over 18 months at his first assignment. This is precisely the type of high achievement individuals with excellent flying skills that the Air Force looks to fill Raptor seats.

Hebert speaks insightfully, he was one of those originally tasked to transition the T-38s from training support for the F-117 to the F-22.

Hebert is qualified in the T-38, F-15C, and F-22 – so he knows what’s involved in excelling as an air combat, adversary and F-22 pilot. With that wealth of experience Hebert notes that not every pilot has the aptitude or the skills to fly the F-22 Raptor.

As Hebert says, pilots are graded on many aspects throughout their undergraduate pilot training (UPT) including; instrument, formation, low level, aerobatics, pattern work, academics, physical condition, and professional conduct. By the end of training, it is clear which students are qualified for the F-22.

And as Hebert states emphatically, “it matters, because you have a very expensive single seat platform and one hour of training in the Raptor may involve multiple Raptors, a Tanker, AWACS, and multiple adversaries.

Leadership needs to ensure the student has the right aptitude, the ability to learn from the sortie without multiple do overs, and progress to the next step.”

Existing Air Force pilots that transfer into the Raptor program from another fighter platform must have also demonstrated exceptional piloting skills and aptitude.

Raptor capabilities include sensor fusion that provides the pilot with superior situational awareness vs. Gen 4 fighters.

Coming from the F-15C Eagle, Hebert says, “I used to look at Raptor pilots and think, those guys are so lucky, the jet does everything for you.

Then I flew the Raptor for myself, and yes the jet does a lot for you, but much more is expected of you!

There are fewer aircraft and the Raptor pilot is addressing a larger mission set.

The aircraft has the speed and sensor suite, it can do anything you need a fighter to do and more, however you have to manage your fuel and your weapons.

The role of a Raptor pilot is more like a mission commander (even as a wingman) as opposed to the Eagle.

One Raptor is expected to do the work of multiple Eagles.

It’s not easy to employ the Raptor well, because you have a lot to manage.”

Each step forward in technology drives increased platform capability.

The era of platforms dedicated to a specific role are winding down.

Platforms like the Raptor now include capabilities that may all be utilized on the same mission; A2A, A2G, electronic warfare/electronic attack (EW/EA), and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR).

A familiar way to understand this is to consider the mobile phone from its inception to what we use today.

When first introduced it was “just” a mobile phone, then became a phone with added calculator, notepad, email, and now the mobile phone is a “smart phone” that includes cameras, office assistants and so much more.

The F-22 does more, and that “more” translates into a significant increase in the scope of the mission set.

The F-22 and F-35s advanced sensors ensure both play a critical part in driving the emerging C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) structure. The aircraft form critical nodes in the associated kill web of information driven assets.

They are not replacements for existing Gen 4 aircraft, but provide an entirely new capability, and as such new Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TPPs) must become second nature for the pilot.

While new mission sets are seldom discussed (due to the classified nature of the capabilities), even traditional mission sets have many variables.

The Raptor may be flown in a blended environment with both Gen 4 and coalition (international) jets, or fighting on its own.

In a blended group the Raptor often functions as a battlespace manager for the group providing a “god’s eye view” to all participants – even as it keeps the airspace clear of adversaries, and sends volumes of ISR data back to other platforms.

In some cases, the mission commander will utilize Raptor driven information and designate the missiles of other aircraft to down adversaries, ensuring the Raptor keeps maximum weapons load for use as a last resort (as we have seen in Red Flag exercises).

In another scenario the Raptor may be driven by a time sensitive window to get a bomber on target and aggressively strike deep into contested space with scores of hostile air and ground threats to evade or neutralize.

As Hebert summarized, “the Raptor pilot is called upon to manage each unique environment, and that challenges how you manage your weapons. Do you sling one missile or are you slinging two, ensuring the threat is killed?

“That affects what weapons you have available on board to support the mission on egress. So there is a lot to think about.”

It goes beyond multi-tasking, to multi-tasking in a fluid, dynamic environment with an un-compromised commitment to survival and achievement of mission objectives.

Each circumstance brings a new set of challenges to utilize the available sensor information and deploy the aircraft effectively. Hebert says “the pilot is constantly evaluating out how one change affects everything else and what decision has to be made now.”

Adversary Air

While of 1960s vintage, the sleek, black T-38s are effective adversaries for the Raptors, and train against them daily.

Not to be confused with dogfighting within visual range (WVR) (generally suicidal for a T-38 vs an F-22), the primary training involves taking on multiple bogeys beyond visual range (BVR) that attack in a wide variety of formations.

In the past F-22 pilots used to slip in and out of the T-38s to try their hand against their own aircraft, but that is generally not the case today. Each pilot is focused on their specific craft. Leeroy brings a fresh but disciplined approach to flying as an F-22 adversary.

As he explained, he flies the mission while maintaining a series of priorities revolving around the mission and safety; maintaining fuel; staying within the designated airspace; keeping a safe distance from other participants.

“The formation (to include my wingman and myself) must be executed correctly, the tactic we have been tasked to reflect must be executed correctly. Not merely flying a profile, ADAIR must replicate a tactic and in some cases an aircraft type. It is the responsibility of ADAIR to drive specific learning objectives for the Raptors.”

For the T-38 pilot, communication is typically verbal (from an AWACS or Ground Controller), and situational awareness is the 3D picture the pilot paints in their own mind. In this respect, there is no help from the aircraft! With aircraft often converging at well over 1000 mph – things are happening fast, leaving lots to think about and little time for decisions and actions.

Hebert comments, “I like Leeroy’s response because it illustrates the difference between what’s happening with the Raptor versus Leeroy. Leeroy is flying in a fast jet, he’s really got a lot of variables; he’s thinking about communication; he is literally building a picture in his mind so that he knows what he’s doing next, where his threats are or how he can affect a mission. That is hard. But his effectiveness is small compared to the Raptor.

“A Raptor pilot benefits from tremendous systems that give him a lot of situational awareness, they’re not having to do as much mentally, however they’re wildly outnumbered.

“There’s a lot more aircraft out there trying to kill those two or four jets and so they have to figure out how they’re going to complete their mission, preserve their fuel, preserve their weapons and realize it’s not just an air to air threat, they are also dealing with air to ground threats. The Raptor pilot must stay true to their own limitations associated with that mission set. Our training is very challenging on both sides.”

It is clear – Raptor pilots are pressed through a crucible.

As has been noted in the USAF Red Flag exercises and USAF Weapons School at Nellis AFB – the objective is to train pilots in environments designed to be equal too, or more difficult than what is expected in combat.

While virtual training is utilized, Hebert notes that there is nothing that can train like being in the air. The physical exertion, the actual reality of managing fuel, weapons, the mission set – all escalate dramatically in the air.

Fights On

The typical training sortie take one of three forms, involving 2 – 6 or more T-38s vs 2 – 4 F-22s;

Short Range, Low Awareness: This scenario typically involves two to four T-38s vs two F-22s with the focus on ACM (air combat maneuvering). The Talons approach the Raptors quickly from behind. The Raptors turn around with low awareness and attempt to quickly kill all threats. Just like an old western shootout, except the Raptor pilot has to contend with three or four gunslingers at once!

Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Defensive Counter Air (DCA): In these sorties ADAIR flies as a hostile nation in a scenario that is drawn up by mission planners. ADAIR represents a specific type of aircraft and a particular threat country. A designated “territory” is defended, or attacked. Engagements that end in kills to ADAIR send the T-38s back to a specific location to regenerate and reenter the battle. Given the regeneration those 6 – 8 T-38s might represent a total of 20 – 30 bandits for the F-22s to address during the sortie.

Both OCA and DCA are “missionized scenarios” so the regeneration threat airfields are identified and coordinated with intelligence. The Raptors must typically honor a surface to air threat and they will be penalized if they violate. The surface threats are critical to reflect the A2/AD environment that the Raptor will be expected to fight and prevail in.

The problem sets created for Raptor pilots are difficult, and represent a significant step up in sophistication and difficulty from Gen 4 air to air training exercises (that have primarily focused on ACM or specific mission set served by a given platform).

Hebert addresses the question many are asking, “How is that that a 1960s aircraft challenges a Raptor? By volume, size, and speed. It’s the fact that Leeroy is well versed in Raptor tactics. We know how to work the Raptor to the best of our ability, add intelligence and the difficulties associated with their mission sets (such as their escorting someone you know they have to protect at all costs) -and it gets hard, quick.”

Pride must be taken in the execution of the mission, because it must get old always getting killed! Has Leeroy ever “killed a Raptor?”

A brief moment of hesitation indicates a reluctance to share, “Yes, I have – it happens from time to time.”

Now before readers and armchair fighter pilots lose their minds, there are a number of reasons why a 1960s T-38 may get a Raptor kill, and none of them include the Raptor being out flown by a T-38 in a WVR engagement.

As Hebert explains, it was likely a very hard kill.

While it could have been a mistake (an overlook) by a Raptor pilot, more likely the Raptor was being tasked to do something very aggressive. We may ask them to achieve the impossible.

We have to push them beyond their limits to effect valid training, to hammer home hard lessons. It is a natural, if not critical part of the training.

With Leeroy soon to be flying Raptors he reflects on the most impressive things he’s seen from both the perspective of the F-22 and the T-38.

“With the Raptor – you constantly die without ever seeing it – that’s very impressive” he both smiles and frowns. “On the other hand, if you do get close, right on the Raptors six and you think you are going to get a kill, you quickly learn that the maneuverability of the F-22 is incredible.”

The F-22 turns on a dime, and you are another F-22 statistic. And the most impressive thing about the T-38 Talon? Sounding much like I might expect a B-52 pilot would, Leeroy answers, “to fly a 1960s jet in 2016!”

The situation is ripe with paradox.

An 1960s jet flown by a young, very capable pilot is making an invaluable contribution to the creation of pilots for the most lethal air superiority platform of today and tomorrow.

What could be more exciting? I looked at Leeroy and he could not wipe the smile off his face, he’s enrolled in the Raptor-B-course this coming January.

Now that is exciting!

Article and photos by Todd Miller, Second Line of Defense.

All rights reserved; for use please contact Second Line of Defense.

The Second Line of Defense would like to thank Lt. Col Charles “Stab” Hebert, Commander of the 71st FTS “Ironmen”; “Leeroy,” T-38 Instructor and soon to be F-22 Raptor pilot; Jeffrey Hood, Media Operations Section Chief, JBLE; and TSgt Katie Ward of the 633 ABW PAO.

Editor’s Note: One impact of the F-35 is a dramatic increase in fifth generation pilots; there are few F-22 pilots and few F-22s; in fact, already Lockheed has or will seen have produced more F-35s than F-22s!

2016-09-04 By Robbin Laird

Prior to the Williams Foundation seminar on air-sea integration, I had a chance to sit down with Air Commodore Kitcher and to discuss the way ahead for the RAAF in the joint combat space.

He is the Director General of Capability Planning in the RAAF.

Air Commodore Kitcher provided an understanding of how the RAAF was integrating its new platforms into the force, and how opening the aperture from the outset on joint capability was affecting that roll out as well.

Question: It is often noted in the USAF that 80% of the platforms which will make up the 2025 force are already here.

What is the RAAF’s perspective?

Air Commodore Kitcher: “It is somewhat different from the USAF.  And our challenge is also somewhat different. By 2025  our oldest platform will be a C130J, which remains the most modern C130 available.

“In 2025, we’re not going to be operating a platform in the air combat space that’s 20 years old. In Australia, we don’t have to integrate an F35 with an F16, or an F35 with the classic Hornet.

“We will be operating some of the latest  and most capable platforms across the air lift, control  of the air, strike and ISR roles and our challenge is to get best combat value out of an integrated Australian and coalition force using these cutting edge capabilities.

“We’ll retire classic Hornet, and introduce the F35-A which is much more than a replacement for the Classic. Our other air combat asset are our Super Hornets, which are only 5 years old, and both will be supported (amongst many other things) by Growlers, which will arrive in Australia next year.

“If we look at the maritime space, P3s are retiring, P8s and Triton are being introduced. Our first P8 turns up in November this year. If we look in the airlift space, C130Js will be our oldest platform, but they remain contemporary.

“The KC-30 Multi Role Tanker Transport is 4 or 5 years old with both the hose and drogue and boom air to air refueling capabilities being fully realised and  another 2 effectively new KC-30 aircraft  will arrive before the end of 2019. We also  picked up C-17 aircraft #7 and 8 last year. C-27J is being introduced right now and we expect it to reach IOC before the end of this year.

“In the surveillance  and control area , the E-7 Wedgetail  AEWAC airframe might be 10 or 15 years old. However, the Wedgetail capability is equal to or better than any similar capability in the world.

“You’d have to say Wedgetail is a cutting edge AEWAC capability. There would be some capabilities that Wedgetail has that the new USAF Block 40/45 E-3G AWACS doesn’t have, and vice versa, of course.”

Question: So your challenge is ensuring that your force which is a young force in terms of new capabilities can work effectively together; and for this, you are also working with core allies such as the US, but need to shape a core Australian way ahead.

 How would you describe the challenge?

Air Commodore Kitcher: “How do I make my US Air Force ‘like’ F35A work closely with my US Navy ‘like’ Growler and Super Hornet to achieve a mission?

“Similarly, how do I ensure  these aircraft, plus the Australian bespoke Wedgetail can work effectrvely with the RAN LHD and  Air Warfare Destroyer to achieve a Maritime support or strike mission?

“It’s a good problem to have to ensure that we get the maximum collective capability out of our individual platforms in the Australian context, which means we’ve got to make them work with each other.

“Larger forces, like the US, may not have that same requirement, because they’ve got other assets that can do various specialized missions.

“And we face a major challenge to ensure that our new air platforms work in an integrated manner with evolving Navy and Army capabilities.

“We must  shape solutions which support our Australian Concept of Operations.

“Our force also obviously needs to be “integratable” and/or interoperable with the US and other allies, but we won’t get there fully by simply buying US C2 and ISR systems.

“Not only do we need to make a particular platform or system work for Australia within our ADF capability context, but we need to ensure that it’s  truly interoperable in a coalition as well.

“This is a real challenge, because there are security issues, restictions and requirements that exist that musr be overcome to realize true high-level interoperability.

“However, solving these problems is far better than trying to keep something that’s 30-year-old flying and make it work with the new equipment coming on line.

“To solve these challenges, we are focused on prioritising and integrating only the things that you ‘should’ to make a more lethal and effective force.

“There is no need for all our capabilities to be fully connected to each other, there are levels of connectivity that will suffice. especially initially We must prioritise and identify what we ‘should’ do, and to what level, vice embark on a program of doing what we ‘can’ do.

“A component of the RAAF Project Jericho involves this kind of thinking and is looking at our Air, Maritime and land capabilities, determining the art of the possible with respect to connectivity, and then suggesting levels and priorities that should be pursued.

“This also includes components in the virtual and constructive areas such that we can also train more effectively in the joint arena.

“Improving our training capacity by complementing live training with virtual and constructive is vital, especially where availability of the scarce live resources necessary to generate a complex training scenario are limited, and security restrictions could inhibit operating live at appropriate levels.”

Question: You have done a lot of worked to shape a fifth-generation enabled force, prior to the F-35 showing up.

 How will the F-35 fit into that evolving effort?

Air Commodore Kitcher: “The F35 introduction’s is catalyst for significant change.

“Although the jets don’t arrive in Australia until the end of 2018, and IOC is not until the end of 2020, believe me, we are right in the middle of introducing the F-35A into service.

“In addition to personnel we have embedded in the overall F-35 program in the US, we have two RAAF aircraft and four instructors at Luke AFB. Our first cadre of dedicated F-35 maintainers and engineers departs for the US in Jan 17, and will be gaining the necessary experience so we can operate the F-35 in Australia from the end of 2018.

“Operating the F-35 will be one thing, but we also need to be able to sustain it, and the methods of sustaining the F-35 are also different to older platforms.

“We have been planning for a while now, and these plans will continue to evolve, but I’m not sure our system fully understands that this significant transition is well and truly underway.

“You can keep flying legacy aircraft forever if you want to spend enough money on them, but they all reach a point where they will become capability irrelevant.

“Our Classsic Hornets are doing a great job in the Middle East right now, and due to the raft of Hornet upgrades we have completed, remain amongst the most capable Classic  Hornets anywhere.

“However, they will reach a point in the near future, especially in the higher end fight, where their utility  will be significantly diminished.

“The F-35 brings 5th generation qualities which will allow for a significant expansion across a raft of ADF capabilities. Air Maritime, Land and most importantly joint.

“We’ve chosen, and we have structured it such that the Classic Hornet will run out of effective hours and fatigue life at the point not too far after when the F35 is being introduced. There is  contingency of course but not a lot.  We don’t have the luxury simply to reflect abstractly on this problem anymore, we’re in the middle of solving it.

“That gives us a very aggressive F35 introduction schedule.

“For example, we’re planning to change out a classic Hornet to F35 squadron over 12 months. A squadron will stop flying the classic Hornet at the end of December one year, and by the end of December next year they are fully up and running and operational on the F-35. That is a very tight schedule. We’ve got a plan to execute but as you would expect, it’s not without risk.

“However, being a little bit smaller than what other forces might be, we tend to also be more agile.

“And that agility will see us deal with any risks that might materialize, or the other inevitable pop up issues.

“Due to this aggressive schedule, our ability right now to deal with many other things  triggered by the F-35 is somewhat limited, we are rightly focused on introduction.

“Fortunately, most of these associated issues, such as the Mission Data Environment, have already been the subject of extensive work. We have been positioning our joint force to both provide the necessary level and type of data to maximize new capabilities such as Growler, Triton and F-35A, and process the vast amounts of data these capabilities will collect.

“There are definitely remaining challenges in this space, we’ve observed them here in Australia and also with our key coalition partners, but there is good work underway in parallel with the platform introductions.

“I’m sure after we introduce the F-35 aircraft we’ll still have a lot of work to do to get us to the point where we maximize the F35 capability across the Australian defense force, and interoperability with the other F-35 forces, but this is natural and will be dealt with in due course.

“There is certainly a lot happening at once.”

Question: But clearly, you are bringing in the F-35 with the mindset that it is not simply replacing the Hornet?

Air Commodore Kitcher: “I absolutely agree we are not just replacing the classic Hornet with another fighter.

“And we are looking from the ground up at complementary F-35 capabilities to maximize the F-35 effect across the joint space, such as the missiles we wish to see onboard our F-35.

“For example, we are looking at the Kongsberg JSM, we think that presents a logical option to consider far more seriously for our JSF maritime strike capability, and we’re looking at that right now, as was  announced at the 2015 Avalon Air Show.

“Our requirement for a quality maritime strike missile internally carried on the F35 might also be ahead timewise of what the US and other coalition partners might  have. It might also be ahead of what the US has programmed. We’re certainly working on the F-35 MARSTK capability and are also developing  options, with Australian Industry,  that might lead to a dual mode seeker in the JSM.

“But it is clear that just like in the case of Wedgetail and KC-30A, we want to put the F-35 into the hands of the warfighters as rapidly as possible.

“They will make it work.

“I know that despite all our best efforts and intent, we won’t be able to plan the F-35 introduction perfectly from Canberra. We are doing our best job to make sure we deliver the capability to the men and women in the field, as efficiently and positively as possible.

“When we throw the F-35 at them, they’re going to do all sorts of stuff with it that we will not have even thought of.

“I look forward to letting our smart young man and women, who have grown up in a different environment to those of us here in Canberra, get their hands on the F-35 and do some amazing things with it. I’m also quite looking forward to getting back out there myself, and see this first hand.

“Our job is to set up the program and set in motion the framework for that kind of tactical innovation to happen, to position them  for success.

“We should not get in their way with excessive top down guidance and legacy thinking.”

2016-09-06 By Robbin Laird

Recently, the Williams Foundation held their latest seminar on 5th generation enabled combat. This one focused on new approaches to air-sea integration, and featured two key foreign military perspectives.

https://sldinfo.com/the-williams-foundation-seminar-on-air-sea-integration-shaping-sea-air-land-forces-for-deterrence-in-depth/

The first was provided by Rear Admiral Manazir, who currently serves as the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems (OPNAV N9) on the staff of the chief of naval operations. In this capacity, he is responsible for the integration of manpower, training, sustainment, modernization and procurement of the Navy’s warfare systems.

His presentation focused on the strategic context for the U.S. and allied maritime forces and shaping a convergent way ahead. How can the allies shape convergent capabilities to ensure that the global commons remain open, and not controlled by powers seeking to enforce their will against the allied powers?

Rear Admiral Manazir highlighted the kill web approach as a way to shape more effective integration of force and convergence of efforts.

The kill chain is a linear concept, which is about connecting assets to deliver fire power; the kill web is about distributed operations and the ability of force packages or task forces to deliver force dominance in an area of interest.

It is about building in integration from the ground up so that forces can work seamlessly together through multiple networks, rather than relying on a single point of failure large network.

https://sldinfo.com/rear-admiral-manazir-in-australia-allied-convergence-on-the-kill-web/

The second major presentation by a foreign military leader was by Captain Nick Walker of the Royal Navy, who is on the Naval Staff. Earlier, we interviewed Captain Walker as part of a RN and RAF team discussing the carrier and strike aviation during an interview conducted at Whitehall in the first quarter of 2014.

He was then Commander Nick Walker and serving as the Chief of Staff Carrier Strike in the Carrier Strike and Aviation Division within Navy Command Headquarters in Portsmouth.

https://sldinfo.com/the-new-uk-aircraft-carrier-reshaping-the-royal-navy-and-the-royal-air-force/

During that interview, Captain Walker underscored a key point about the new capability for the national decision makers:

Question: How does this evolving capability affect a possible rethink about the way ahead for the forces?

Walker: This evolving capability will give the decision maker a lot of flexible tools to respond or prepare for crises.

The Maritime Task Force can be well integrated with land based air but does not need a lot of forward ground presence to generate combat effects.

This can give decision makers significant flexibility with regard to a crisis or to have the ability to move to crises rather than having to generate force build up in a particular place in order to intervene.

Captain Walker certainly picked up on that theme and wove the carrier discussion within a broader emphasis on how it both triggered and reflected the transformation process for the UK power projection forces.

He underscored that both the F-35 and the carrier are being brought into service together, and together they are key definers of the new power projection approach for an information age.

The carrier is being introduced from the ground up as a joint asset; not simply a maritime asset.

“The carrier strike journey is driving significant cultural change in the forces as well.”

He started by focusing on the core point that the carrier is coming into service as part of the overall transformation of UK power projection capabilities. Indeed, the CEPP or Carrier Enabled Power Projection statement of intent highlights the way ahead:

“An integrated and sustainable joint capability, interoperable with NATO, that enables the projection of UK Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre power as well as delivering humanitarian assistance and defence diplomacy, enabling joint effect across the maritime, land and air environments at a time and place of political choosing.”

He noted that the role of Special Forces has been highlighted since this original statement and will be folded into the revised statement of intent with regard to the role of the carrier within the UK forces.

CEPP has been maintained within the Ministry of Defence. This is in distinction to most other capabilities, which have been given to the front line commands. This allows joint forces command and the services to focus on CEPP as a joint capability.

The deck of the Queen Elizabeth carrier is 85% of the size (i.e. area) of a Nimitz class carrier; which can carry up to 36 F-35Bs along with a Merlin Crowsnests and a Merlin Mk2 ASW helo. Alternatively, the ship can be used in the projection of land forces from the sea in terms of Marines and helo insertion capabilities as well.

But it is the carrier strike focus which is definitional for the new carrier.

The ship has been designed from the ground up to support F-35B, in terms of weapons, C2, and ISR integration.

“We have also built from the ground up interoperability, and have worked closely with the USN and USMC with regard to this capability. And we are working on a broader approach to NATO interoperability as well.”

He provided an overview of the timing of the build out of the ship and the process of marrying it with the movement of the UK F-35Bs being prepared and trained in the United States to its permanent location in the UK at RAF Marham.

The initial carrier IOC is projected to be December 2020 with the fully integrated F-35 and carrier having full operational capability by 2025.

Much like the leadership of the Royal Australian Navy focused on in their presentations at the seminar, Walker emphasized new approaches to task forces as key part of their transformation approach.

Clearly, the UK is looking at the evolving impact of introducing carrier strike upon the overall change in the RAF and Royal Navy as well. And a key aspect of this transformation is working the evolving integration of fifth gen upon legacy capabilities.

Captain Walker highlighted the shift from a legacy mindset, which focused on thinking of maritime versus air environments to an integrated information dominance environment.

“A key cultural change is that we are looking at air and maritime as an integrated domain; and we are looking at the interaction among the environmental seams of our forces driven by a kill web approach and capability.”

A clear challenge is reworking C2.

“We need to shape a more mission order vice a directive Air Tasking Order approach to the use of an integrated air-maritime force.”

Putting the new carriers in play completely integrated with the F-35 will provide the foundation for shaping the way ahead for the UK power projection forces.

Put bluntly, shaping the way ahead will be defined by the operational experiences entailed in operating and deploying the new carrier strike force and leveraging that capability will be crucial in thinking through future procurement decisions as well.

“We are focused on being more platform agnostic; and ironically, the F-35 can be looked at as a new platform an keep in the old platform-centric approach but we are looking at it as lever of change for next generation thinking and capabilities.

“We are taking the kill web concept very seriously, and examining how best to shape the desired outcome from nodes in the operational force, rather than focusing on specialized platforms.

“How do we generate operational tasks to be delivered from the integrated force?”

“How do we bring the Typhoon which is a key air asset into the kill web?

“Rapid reprogramming of platforms is a crucial way ahead for sure.

“The ability to exploit the intrinsic ISR capability of the force, rather than simply relying on specialized ISR platforms is a key way ahead as well.

“The ability to deliver effect throughout the force with data-link capabilities such as in the future the wingman of an F-35 could well be the Type 45 destroyer”

In short, Captain Walker saw significant commonality in terms of the Australian rethink about the way ahead for their navy and how the UK was thinking about the transformation of its power projection capabilities.