Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

Building a New Class of Conventional Submarines: The Australian Case

Posted on September 5, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

09/05/2016

2016-09-02 By Robbin Laird

After an extensive competition, the Australian government downselected the French firm DCNS to build a new class of advanced-capability conventional (diesel/electric-powered) submarines.

The decision was announced on 26 April 2016, in a press release that stated: “The decision was driven by DCNS’ ability to best meet all of the Australian Government’s requirements.

These included superior sensor performance and stealth characteristics, as well as range and endurance similar to the Collins-class submarine. The Government’s considerations also included cost, schedule, program execution, through-life support and Australian industry involvement.”

Less obvious in the press coverage around the decision was the innovative nature of the program and the significant opportunity to leverage evolving technologies that will be utilized in shaping the largest conventional submarine to date.

In many ways, it is a “hybrid” submarine in the sense that it leverages the innovative technologies of the new nuclear-powered Barracuda SSN being put to sea next year by the French Navy.

Did Australia choose DCNS as a way to keep the SSN option open? According to an article in The Diplomat citing a government Financial Review, “Cabinet ministers and defence officials have already discussed the possibility of switching from diesel engines to nuclear power part-way through the construction contract.” Credit Graphic: DCNS

It also leverages extensive experience that French shipbuilder DCNS has in working with other countries. A good example is the Scorpene-class of conventional attack submarines (SSK). To speed up delivery for the Chilean Navy, initially one boat was built in France by DCNS and a second in Spain by Navantia – these were delivered to Chile in January and December 2006.

The same scenario transpired for the contract for two Malaysian submarines. Orders for India and Brazil are being built at shipyards in those countries with technical assistance and equipment from DCNS and, in Brazil’s case, a joint venture between DCNS and Odebrecht.

The Australian contract takes advantage of the extensive working relationship between DCNS and the French Navy along with the extensive experience between the French, U.S. and UK navies.

Australia’s new conventional boats will, for the first time, include a U.S. combat system, which will be shaped to operate at range, speed and distance in the challenging waters of the Pacific.

The experience DCNS has in working in a variety of infrastructure situations in other countries, means there is a clear capability to leverage the already extensive industrial experience in Australia.

Transformation and upgrade of the Osborne Naval shipyard and maintenance facility at Adelaide is clearly a key part of building a 21st century weapon system.

“DCNS will build a new mega submarine construction facility in Adelaide which will rival any other in the world,” said a document used in the winning bid.

Australia has existing capabilities that can be tapped for the infrastructure upgrades as well as for building the new submarines. New capabilities will clearly be stood up as well, as the program takes shape and construction with life-cycle support is put in place.

With the Royal Australian Navy’s Collins-class boats scheduled to begin leaving service beginning in 2025, a replacement project got underway. Although nuclear propulsion was ruled out due in part to public opposition to nuclear technology, the vessels must be capable of transiting long distances to deployment areas. In April 2016, the Australian government chose the Shortfin Barracuda, a conventionally-powered variant of the Barracuda-class nuclear submarine by French firm DCNS. (RAN PHOTO: LSIS Nina Fogliani)

For example, Thales (a 35% stakeholder of DCNS) has worked closely with France and the UK for many years on common sonar technologies.

In an interview I did in Australia in early 2014, the CEO of Thales Australia, Chris Jenkins, highlighted the sonar business as an example of the Thales approach in Australia. The business started with the transfer of French technology to Australia in the early 1980s.

The technology was used by the Australians to support their submarine program and, as the sonar systems were integrated into Aussie platforms, a team was created to support the technology, which basically meant an ability to upgrade the system and develop new intellectual property along the way to shape the modernization of that capability.

As indigenous capability was forged, the evolving technology was Australian and available for export – resulting in use by the UK Astute submarine program as well as oil and gas platform support systems.

In another example, DCNS recently signed an agreement with Quickstep.

The Australian company typically manufactures advanced composite technologies for the aerospace and automotive industries, but will now collaborate on elements that can be introduced in the production of naval vessel components and assemblies for the future submarines.

Quickstep is a key player in other high technology programs, such as the F-35. During the same visit to Australia, I interviewed its CEO, Philippe Odouard.

In discussing the company’s path towards this innovative approach, he noted that “the Australian government, in its approach to defense products, recognizes that it does might not have a large domestic infrastructure for defense production, and is looking for companies that can position themselves for a global engagement.”

He went on to explain that “the approach is to amortize cost by not simply building up a domestic industry, which needs to be fed by domestic acquisition, but rather one that can work effectively abroad and help the Australian government amortize the cost of its core acquisitions.

“The business model is very different here from what Brazil has done with SAAB. After the Gripen acquisition is over, it is over. You are not going to get exports and your growth abilities are limited. In the F–35 case, our investment allows us to participate in a global supply chain for a global aircraft,” he said.

DCNS will follow a similar approach whereby the Australian program will be able to leverage the global partners and experience for conventional submarines, and the upgrade programs shaped.

The new American combat system, conjoined with the new DCNS submarine, will also provide extensive upgrading capability.

As the transformation of the force is shaped and with regard to submarines, the Australian MoD is very interested in shaping cross-cutting convergence among the services.

There is a clear interest that the submarine can leverage the extensive air modernization strategy being put in place by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

This means that DCNS and the winning American provider for the combat system can partner with the overall transformation of the Australian forces.

The track record and approach of DCNS is a crucial part of why they were selected by the Australian government.

To get a better sense of that track record and approach, I had a chance to discuss leveraging capabilities with Xavier Mesnet, Marketing Director for submarines and surface ships international sales at DCNS.

Mesnet served for 30 years in the French navy, mainly in the operational domain. He has been a commanding officer of nuclear attack submarines Perle and Amethyste, of the nuclear ballistic submarine Le Temeraire, and of the command center of the French nuclear submarine force in Brest.

He spent some time as the Head of Planning for Middle East operations in the Command Center of the French joint forces in Paris, and as vice-director of the Center for Shaping Doctrine for the French joint forces, particularly in charge of evolving new approaches to deal with conflicts.

Mesnet underscored the long-range commitment of the French government and Navy to building both a nuclear and conventional submarine force. This means not simply technology, but a large group of users with many years of operational experience who drive innovations over time.

It also means benefiting from the French upgrade approach and cycle. The 30-year operational cycle of any particular class of submarines is complemented by ongoing efforts to shape the next class of submarines. This is an evolving process whereby long-range submarines are built for the nuclear class, which has its impacts on the evolution of the conventional class.

The French navy has “vast experience in operations, in maintainability and sustainability for the force,” says Mesnet, who notes that “80% of the nuclear and conventional classes have convergent parts and underwater technologies. This means that the new SSN-class Barracuda which goes to sea trials next year is a driver for change for the conventional class as well.”

He discussed at some length their global experience in building conventional submarines.

What was most interesting in the discussion was how each client has different indigenous capabilities and infrastructure, and yet DCNS has been able to shape a customized solution for each of them.

The Franco-Spanish Scorpène diesel-electric AIP attack submarine (SSK) has been chosen by Chile, Brazil, Malaysia (above) and India.

The Scorpène submarine program mentioned earlier is the perfect example. Purchased by Chile, Malaysia, Brazil, and India, the existing workforce, infrastructure and upgrade requirements were different in each case.

Chile had a mature structure, and DCNS worked with them to insert the Scorpene into their extant infrastructure and then build out to support the new vessel. “After 10 years, the Chileans were very independent in terms of sustaining the submarine.”

With Malaysia, they had to standup a completely new capability on a relatively isolated facility on Borneo Island. “They really started from scratch and we stood up the infrastructure with national companies. Nowadays, the Malaysia Navy caught up with the highest standards of the region.”

The contract for India required a standup of new infrastructure, skills and training. The first Indian submarine is now undergoing sea trials. “The first one has been about standing up new capabilities in India, but with the next five their involvement is growing in the build and maintenance processes.”

In Brazil, “we went one step further. We helped them design their new submarine base. We assisted them with the construction of the base; and in process, they have stood up their own design and maintenance capabilities.”

It is obvious that the global domain knowledge base being shaped and developed by DCNS is a key asset.

And also new with the Australian opportunity, there is an opportunity to work with the US Navy in a new and innovative way.

The combat system will be American. “The French Navy has worked extensively with the UK and US Navies, and it will be a major positive milestone and collaborative work to interface with a US combat system onboard a French submarine.”

In short, DCNS has brought a variety of historical experiences, and evolving technological capabilities seen in the new variants of both the nuclear and conventional submarines, which can be leveraged by Australia.

It makes a great deal of sense for Australia to have chosen DCNS and to shape a new conventional submarine capability which will blend new technologies into an advanced submarine able to operate throughout such a challenging ocean as the Pacific.

As my colleague Ed Timperlake has put it: “Naming the Pacific Ocean as Pacific is one of the great branding mistakes of all time.”

And adding new conventional submarine capabilities to the evolution of the US Navy in the Pacific will enhance coalition capabilities in a challenging strategic environment.

This article first appeared in Front Line Defence Issue 4 (2016) and is republished with their permission.

http://defence.frontline.online/article/2016/4/5205-Australia’s-new-class-of–Conventional-Submarines

Editor’s Note: Recently, a story broke with regard to a data breach affecting DCNS and its submarines.

For a look at this issue, see the following:

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/business/international/france-india-submarine-leak.html?_r=0

“It looks like a case of hacking,” Manohar Parrikar, the Indian defense minister, told reporters outside an event in New Delhi. The report is being investigated by military officials, his ministry said in a statement, adding that the source of the leak appeared to be “from overseas and not in India.”

The Farewell Affair. The French come to the aide of the Americans to deal with significant data breaches.

The impact of the lost data, and particularly whether it would affect the Indian naval fleet’s capabilities, was not immediately clear.

“It’s troubling. It is a challenge, but we don’t have to assume that the adversary has everything,” Robbin F. Laird, a military and security analyst, said.

That the plans date to 2011 meant the data would be of limited use to India’s opponents, he said. “You could have grabbed the answers to the exam for five years ago, but the exam has changed since then.”

The latter point has frequently been made with regard to software enabled programs by Ed Timplerlake and certainly applies to this case.

With regard to France, one should remember the hard line the government takes with those who try to steal its secrets and remember the debt owed by the United States evident during the Farwell Affair, one of the greatest espionage stories of the 20^th century which most Americans seem completely unware of.

With regard to the Farwell Affair, there is a chance to read the best book on the event on Kindle.

https://www.amazon.com/Farewell-Greatest-Story-Twentieth-Century-ebook/dp/B004GKNIWM

Ronald Reagan and François Mitterrand are sworn in as presidents of the Unites States and France, respectively. The tension due to Mitterrand’s French Communist support, however, is immediately defused when he gives Reagan the Farewell Dossier, a file he would later call “one of the greatest spy cases of the twentieth century.”Vladimir Ippolitovitch Vetrov, a promising technical student, joins the KGB to work as a spy. Following a couple of murky incidents, however, Vetrov is removed from the field and placed at a desk as an analyst. Soon, burdened by a troubled marriage and frustrated at a flailing career, Vetrov turns to alcohol. Desperate and needing redemption, he offers his services to the DST. Thus Agent Farewell is born. He uses his post within the KGB to steal and photocopy files of the USSR’s plans for the West—all under Brezhnev’s nose.

The USSR was stealing American’s military technology as fast as the US was building it and all with the complicity of senior US intelligence and industrial officials.

And the Mitterrand Administration helped President Reagan plug the leak and then counter-attack with the launching of Star Wars.

Uzbekistan After Karimov: A Potential Power Vacuum in a Key Region

Posted on September 5, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

2016-09-05 By Richard Weitz

With the death of Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, the country’s political leaders are in the process of deciding who will be Kasimov’s successor.

Predicting the country’s future leadership is difficult given that Karimov has been the country’s only president since Uzbekistan gained independence on August 31, 1991.

A 2015 photo of the recently deceased President of Uzbekistan. Credit: AP

There is great uncertainty over whether, when and how Karimov’s successor might pursue domestic and foreign policies that differ from Karimov.

What is clear is that Uzbekistan’s political transition could have major implications for Eurasian security.

Uzbekistan has the largest population of the five Central Asian countries.

Furthermore, many ethnic Uzbeks reside in neighboring countries, making it likely that any internal instability in Uzbekistan would spill across the national boundaries.

Conversely, Uzbekistan also is the only Central Asian country to border the other four states, which has allowed Uzbekistan to block regional economic and political integration efforts that lack Tashkent’s backing.

Under Karimov, who prioritized Uzbekistan’s national autonomy and regime stability, Tashkent has generally opposed regional integration schemes.

A frustrating early experience trying to promote cooperation within the dysfunctional Commonwealth of Independent States has reinforced Tashkent’s skepticism regarding the likely benefits of regional integration schemes.

Karimov has pursued a strongly autonomous foreign policy grounded in realist principles and a prioritization of national sovereignty.

Uzbek policy makers have thus far relied primarily on their powerful internal security complex to suppress domestic terrorist groups.

Uzbekistan is also reshaping its military into a leaner counterterrorist-focused force in line with the country’s National Security doctrine, which defines the major threats to Uzbekistan’s national security as international terrorism and Islamic extremism.

Meanwhile, Uzbek diplomats insist that the inseparability of Central Asia from Afghanistan require greater international efforts to resolve that country’s internal conflict.

Uzbekistan stands as a “front-line” state regarding the war in Afghanistan. Not only does it have a 137 km-border with Afghanistan, but many ethnic Uzbeks reside in Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan has helped the Afghan government by supplying significant economic assistance, including electricity.

Uzbekistan has also helped construct Afghanistan’s transportation, telecommunications and other national infrastructure, including the country’s first national railway line.

However, Uzbek experts worry that the Afghan government and military lacks the strength to suppress the Taliban insurgency.

They also fear that instability will continue to spill across Afghanistan’s borders—in the form of narcotics and human trafficking as well as transnational terrorists and refugees–given its close ties with its Central Asian neighbors.

Under Karimov, Uzbekistan has pushed for a”6+3 proposal” in which Russia, China, ad NATO would join China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to conduct direct negotiations between the Afghan government and so-called moderate members of the Taliban. The Afghan government and other countries, such as India, has opposed this proposal.

Until the Afghan conflict is resolved, Uzbek leaders would likely continue pursuing a border buffer zone by supporting their allies in the Northern Alliance, whose coalition of non-Pashtun warlords offered the main resistance to the Taliban in the 1990s.

Under Karimov, the country has tried to sustain its national security and autonomy by avoiding close ties with any foreign actor.

In particular, Uzbekistan has refused to permit Russia to have military bases on its territory and has tried to maintain a U.S. and Chinese presence in Central Asia to help balance Moscow’s influence.

Given its large population and pivotal location, Uzbekistan’s refusal to ally with Russia, China, or the United States has prevented any of these countries from dominating Central Asia.

Credit: Geography.com — Credit: geology.com

In contrast with the other Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan does not border Russia or China, which gives Tashkent greater manoeuvring room.

Uzbekistan’s ties with some of its Central Asian neighbors have at times been tense due to disputes over water rights, regional integration proposals, or other issues.

In particular, Uzbekistan objects to Tajikistan’s construction of the Rogun Dam and other major hydroelectric projects.

Whereas Uzbeks use Central Asian water resources for irrigation, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been constructing dams to generate electricity from controlled water flows.

Since Uzbekistan has the largest population in Central Asia, its neighbors have also occasionally feared its aspiration for regional hegemony.

But Uzbekistan’s emphasis on sustaining its national autonomy approach has made Tashkent a major impediment to Moscow’s drive to reassert its control over the region.

Ties with Moscow have also been tense due to Uzbekistan’s refusal to join Russian-led multinational institutions, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Under Karimov, Uzbekistan adopted a Foreign Policy Concept that states Uzbekistan will not join politico-military blocs or host foreign military bases on its territory.

Karimov’s ties with Washington have been tense due to U.S. criticism over Uzbekistan’s human rights abuses and Uzbek criticism that U.S. policy is naïve in presuming that Central Asian countries could become liberal democracies.

For a few years after the U.S. military intervened in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and the United States had a strong military partnership. In particular, Uzbekistan allowed the United States and its NATO allies to use the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) air base and other former Soviet military bases to support limited combat operations in Afghanistan.

But when the Karimov government suppressed anti-regime protests in Andijon in 2005, and U.S. diplomats supported the asylum claims of some protesters who had fled to neighboring countries, Uzbekistan ordered the removal of all U.S. military forces from its territory.

Relations have recovered since then. Uzbekistan has joined other Central Asian governments in allowing the United States and other Western countries to send supplies through Uzbekistan’s territory to the their military forces in Afghanistan through the so-called Northern Distribution Network.

However, in addition to persistent differences over human rights, Uzbek officials have blamed the United States for serving as a weak external balancer against Moscow’s regional ambitions.

More recently, Uzbekistan has sought to improve economic and security ties with Beijing. Thus far, China has focused its cooperation with Uzbekistan on energy and other commercial arrangements, while deferring to Moscow in the expectation that Russia will maintain the stability in Central Asia that Chinese companies need to pursue their economic projects there.

Karimov’s departure now adds another challenge to the region’s security, already threatened by the civil war in Afghanistan, growth of the so-called Islamic State and other transnational terrorist groups that have explicit desires to rule Uzbekistan as a radical Islamic regime, and decreasing U.S. influence in Central Asia.

Shaping a Sustainable and Upgradeable Joint Force: The Perspective of Rear Admiral Tony Dalton

Posted on September 2, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

09/02/2016

2016-08-29 By Robbin Laird

Prior to the latest Williams Seminar on shaping a 21^st century joint force, I had a chance to meet and discuss the challenges with Rear Admiral Tony Dalton.

He is the head of the Joint Systems Division of the ADF’s acquisition and sustainment group and has come to that position having managed the acquisition and sustainment of the helicopter force of the ADF from a joint perspective.

The Joint Systems Division contains five branches, two of which the Rear Admiral referred to as the outliers, namely explosive ordnance (including guided weapons) and electronic and associated types of what we call tron warfare.

“From a divisional perspective, these two outliers do largely independent things across all three of our service domains. Guided weapons include everything from fast jet missiles to solider-based GBAD through to submarine torpedoes.

“At the other end, we have all of the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare systems. Rather than being platform-centric, we’ve put them all into one spot so we can leverage the limited number of “pointy heads” that we have in that space. We cover the whole spectrum of electromagnetic warfare.

“Across the middle are three more closely related branches, namely air and space surveillance and control, communications and critical systems. The latter handles all the software applications of the forces we send on operations.”

Having two of the more dynamic areas of warfare as positioned as “outliers” can allow his team to position itself from cross domain innovation as well.

Another opportunity comes from sorting out how equipment acquired from FMS or foreign sources can be reconfigured to operate as integrated assets.

He pointed out that although, for example, the RAAF has bought the latest US Navy systems such as Growler and P-8, they don’t have seamless interconnectivity built in, something which the ADF views as crucial to achieve.

“The data sets are not interchangeable and in fact, in some of them use different tables to look at the same data.

“When we look at, say, local information that we might want to put on a P‑8 and the Romeo (MH-60R – both ASW platforms) in terms of water column data, they actually use different formats.

“We have to now format our data in a number of different ways to put them into a joint mission planning system for each of those platforms.

This is a challenge but one which must be met to shape an integrated force.”

He emphasized the broad strategic change in the operational environment facing the ADF and how that requires a change as well in the operation of the ADF as a joint force.

“We’ve done some really clever things in the Middle East. We certainly have a far better protected ground force, but the ability to operate effectively in the high end warfare scenario is something we need to keep our focus on.

“We need to have more flexible interoperability so that we can have a faster decision cycle. You need to be flexible about how you decide to engage and where you decide to engage.

“These are key drivers for where we want to go into the future.”

Question: Having viewed the Wedgetail over the years, the software upgradeability part of the equation for new platforms, can help with that.

Does that make sense?

Rear Admiral Dalton: “It does. The evolving maturation of the Wedgetail radar is bringing new capabilities to the joint force. And we are looking at other systems, such as the new systems on board our surface fleet, to evolve in a similar manner.

“The locally developed phased array radar onboard our Anzac class frigates is good; but the next generation is on a different planet in terms of capability.

“It’s driving a change in the way we think. It’s not a classic radar at all; it’s a high power, highly sensitive transmitter and receiver array. You can do lots of things with it in the battlespace.

“This is a reforming technology that will reshape the way we think about task groups, how ships communicate, how they operate, where their blind arcs are.

“The next generation of frigates will be electric. The phased array is remarkable technology. It’s game changing technology, especially in the way we think about how we operate at sea.

“We’ll move away from having to worry about the maintenance and the fixed specifications of the radar into a system where you can change the software and change the way the radar behaves.”

Question: And this approach is being taken across the joint force as well, isn’t it?

Rear Admiral Dalton: “It is. For example, with regard to Army, we’re on the cusp of moving to a tactical communications network where the network controller will reside in the radios because the radios are software configurable. That’s the next big leap.

“We’re doing the risk reduction studies right now to move from a tactical communications network that has hardware boxes that do the routing into software enabled radios that can do all that in their own network. Our systems, like our decision management tools, will live like apps on the network.

“When you see kids get into our vehicles today, they see a piece of glass, the first thing they do is touch it and wonder why it hasn’t come on. We’ve got to get to the mindset where when they touch it, they get a menu that says ‘what do you want to do today?’ Here’s your battle management system. Here’s your artillery firing system. Here’s your blue force tracker. They can swipe left and right on that and get the result they want and need.”

Question: And you are going in the same direction with your submarine combat systems as well?

Rear Admiral Dalton: “We have a cooperative development program with the US Navy which leverages a common core combat management system currently used in our Collins class submarines and their attack submarines and will ultimately go onto their boomers as well.

“With regard to the next generation Australian submarines, they will be part of that software revolution as well.”

Question: Prior to this job, you were Mr. Rotorcraft, and managed all of the helos operated by the various services. You also brought a number of new helos into service, such as Tiger.

Where have you ended up with Tiger?

Rear Admiral Dalton: “Bringing Tiger into service has been a real challenge. The bit that’s often lost in the noise is that it’s an incredibly capable platform.

“Kilo for kilo, it’s probably the best attack helicopter in the world. The Spanish and the French are all moving towards a Tiger helicopter that looks pretty much just like our version of the Tiger helicopter. We put hellfire on it, a different gun, and a slightly different mission system.

“Certainly the HAD version of Tiger that the French are now exclusively going to operate is pretty much the Aussie Tiger.

“It’s a very impressive capability. I understand that in the French army the motto is “not without Tiger”. That’s what they’ll tell you quite bluntly.

“They will not deploy without Tiger. It won’t take very long for our army to start saying that very loudly. They will not deploy without Tiger.

“In terms of armed reconnaissance, in terms of understanding where the battle front is and in terms of understanding what’s beyond the next two hills, Tiger is a brilliant little helicopter.

“In fact, when we go on exercise with it, at the end of the first day, they normally have to change the exercise rules because if Tiger’s been involved, it’s destroyed the enemy. They modify the rules so you can’t destroy the enemy that quickly.

“Does it have some issues?

“It still does have some issues. It is still very expensive to operate and availability, while improving, still has a way to come. We also bought Tiger at the end of the 1990s, before we really understood what a digital army would look like, before we had a mature version of the kind of tactical data links that army wants to operate.

“It came with Euro-grid and that tactical data link doesn’t talk to anybody except other Tigers. That’s the biggest issue that we really have with Tiger.

“If we keep Tiger in the future, then absolutely one of the things that we must do is integrate the aircraft into the way we fight in terms of a tactical data link.

“It carries a 30 mm cannon. We’ve got some issues with barrel life, but it is a scary piece of kit. In terms of the ability to deliver 70mm rockets, we now have integrated APKWS, the world’s most awkward acronym, an advanced precision kill weapons system which effectively turns an unguided 70mm rocket into a laser guided rocket.

“While it has a shorter engagement range, we can actually very accurately shoot 70mm rockets now, which are relatively cheap.

“We’ve also got the ability to shoot hellfire and the system is set up in the aircraft to be able to engage very quickly. It is really, really potent.”

Question: What about MRH-90?

Rear Admiral Dalton: “It is early in its operational life, but it is an expensive helicopter to maintain. We’ve got operating limits on the amphibs.

“There are design weaknesses in the platform that will need to be resolved for us to be completely comfortable operating it.

“But our current plan is to operate Tigers and MRH-90s off of our amphibs. The predominant helicopter platform that will be on the LHD is the MRH-90, supported by Tiger.

“And I can certainly see the Romeos sitting on the flight deck of the LHD as well, especially if we’re doing choke point transits and things like that. There’s plenty of options on board those ships.”

Biography Rear Admiral Tony Dalton

Born and educated in Victoria, Rear Admiral Tony Dalton joined the Navy in 1980 as a direct entry aviator, completing his pilot training in 1981.

Over the next 17 years he amassed over 5500 flying hours in Iroquois, Sea King, Gazelle and Seahawk helicopters making him one of the most experienced serving naval aviators. He flew on four Australian Naval Air Squadrons and spent time on exchange as an instructor pilot with the Royal Navy’s 705 Squadron. He commanded 805 Squadron in 2000-01 and the Fleet Air Arm in 2008-09. He has held various staff appointments in Navy Training Command, Navy Systems Command, Fleet Headquarters and the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO).

He is a graduate of the US Naval War College, class of 2003. Dalton was promoted Rear Admiral in 2012 to head the DMO’s Helicopter Systems Division, responsible for the acquisition, sustainment and disposal of all the ADF’s rotary-wing and tactical unmanned aerial system assets. He is currently the head of the Joint Systems Division.

The photos in the slideshow are of Rear Admiral Tony Dalton and show him during his time as head of the helicopter division. The photos are credited to the Australian Ministry of Defence.

In one of the photos, Guard Commander (R) makes his marks of respects to the Reviewing Officer, Rear Admiral Anthony Dalton CSM, RAN, and reports the guard ready for inspection, during HMAS Albatross ceremonial divisions.

More than 700 personnel formed up for inspection by reviewing officer, Rear Admiral Anthony Dalton, and HMAS Albatross Commanding Officer, Captain Gordon Andrew, in the long-standing tradition of Ceremonial Division.

The Royal Australian Navy Band provided musical accompaniment as Albatross personnel paraded before RADM Dalton, CAPT Andrew and key representatives from the Shoalhaven Community and veteran’s associations. A special guest was Lady Nannette Smith – widow of the founding father of the Fleet Air Arm, Admiral Sir Victor Smith.

Editor’s Note: A new helicopter is coming as well to the ADF for training purposes.

And Rear Admiral Dalton flew the first one at the Airbus Helicopter facility.

According to an Airbus Helicopters press release published on July27, 2105:

Boeing Defence Australia as the prime contractor for the new training system for the ADF, joined with representatives of the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Army for a Factory Acceptance ceremony for the “ideal training platform for the next generation of Navy and Army pilots”.

Under the JP 9000 Phase 7 HATS project, a new joint helicopter training system for both Army and Navy aircrew will utilise the EC135 T2+ helicopters, along with flight simulators and a new flight-deck equipped sea-going training vessel.

“Airbus Helicopters is thrilled that Boeing and the Commonwealth of Australia have demonstrated their confidence in our product by accepting this first EC135 T2+, on time and on budget, as part of a world leading high tech helicopter aircrew training system for the ADF”, says Peter Harris, Head of Governmental Sales for Australia Pacific.

“Following contract signature in November of 2014, the first aircraft took to the skies on the 16th of January 2015, and is now accepted by the customer. The next steps involve training of initial Boeing and Commonwealth aircrews and technicians here in Donauwörth, before shipment to Australia in January 2016” said Harris.

Boeing’s HATS Program Manager James Heading said that during 2015 the Boeing team have been conducting engineering evaluations and ground and flight test activities and have been fully satisfied with the results.

“By partnering with Airbus Helicopters on this important program, Boeing Defence Australia is confident of meeting our requirements towards the Commonwealth for providing a mature and cost effective platform that meets training, technical and safety requirements and the future needs of the Australian Defence Force,” said Heading.

The EC135 T2+ is a consummate military training helicopter, offering a glass cockpit with high visibility, a multi-axis auto-pilot, the performance and safety of a twin-engine helicopter replacing current single types, plus other advanced technologies to help instructors perform training missions safely and provide the ADF with the flexibility to undertake additional missions.

The more than 1,200 H135 helicopters now delivered have clocked up over three million flight hours world-wide. The helicopter is part of successful training systems in Germany, Switzerland, Spain and Japan, and is in service in Australia with the Victorian and New South Wales police forces.

The second slideshow above shows the helicopters being built for the ADF at the Airbus plant in Germany and the photos were shot during a visit to Airbus Media Day by Second Line of Defense, June 21, 2016.

Brexit, Europe and Global Markets

Posted on August 31, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

08/31/2016

2016-08-31 By Vitaliy Katsenelson

The Great Recession may be over, but seven years later we can still see the deep scars and unhealed wounds it left on the global economy. In an attempt to prevent an unpleasant revisit to the Stone Age, global governments have bailed out banks and the private sector.

These bailouts and subsequent stimuli swelled global government debt, which jumped 75 percent, from $33 trillion in 2007 to $58 trillion in 2014. (These numbers, from McKinsey & Co., are the latest we have, but we promise you they have not shrunk since.)

A lot of things about today’s environment don’t fit neatly into economic theory. Ballooning government debt should have brought higher — much higher — interest rates. But central banks bought the bonds of their respective governments and corporations, driving interest rates down to the point at which a quarter of global government debt now “pays” negative interest.

The concept of positive interest rates is straightforward. You take your savings, which you amass by forgoing current consumption — not buying a newer car or making fewer trips to fancy restaurants — and lend them to someone. In exchange for your sacrifice, you receive interest payments.

With negative interest rates, something very different happens: You lend $100 to your neighbor. A year later the neighbor knocks on your door and, with a smile on his face, repays that $100 loan by writing you a check for $95. You had to pay him $5 for forgoing your consumption of $100 for a year! Try to explain this logic to your kids. We tried to explain it to ours and failed, miserably.

The key takeaway is this: Negative and near-zero interest rates show central banks’ desperation to avoid deflation. More important, they highlight the bleak state of the global economy.

In theory, low and negative interest rates were supposed to reduce savings, get consumers off their butts and stimulate spending. In practice, the opposite has happened: The savings rate has gone up. As interest rates on their deposits declined, consumers felt that now they had to save more to earn the same income. Go figure.

Some countries resort to negative interest rates because they want to devalue their currencies. This strategy suffers from what economists call the fallacy of composition: the mistaken assumption that what is true of one member of a group is true for the group as a whole. As a country adopts negative interest rates, its currency will decline against others — arguably stimulating its export sector (at the expense of other countries). But there is absolutely nothing proprietary about this strategy: Other governments will do the same, and in the end all will experience lowered consumption and a higher savings rate.

The following point is so important we want to repeat it, in bold: If our global economy were doing great, interest rates would not be where they are today!

As we zoom in, things get worse.

Let’s start with Europe, the world’s second-largest economy.

European political (EU) and monetary (EMU) unions were great experiments that made a lot of sense on paper.

Europe, which had roughly the same-size population and economy as the U.S., was at a competitive disadvantage as dozens of currencies embedded extra transaction costs in cross-border trade, and each currency on its own had little chance of competing with the U.S. dollar for reserve currency status.

There were also important noneconomic considerations. Germans were haunted by their past; they had started two world wars in the 20th century, and a united Europe was their way of lowering the risk of future European wars.

Economic and Monetary Union sounded like a very logical marriage of all the significant powers of post–World War II Europe, but the arrangement was never really a marriage. It was more like a civil union. EMU members combined their currencies into one, the euro. They agreed to use the same central bank and thus implicitly guaranteed one another’s debts.

Though treaties put limits on budget deficits (limits that, ironically, Germany was the first to exceed), each country went on spending its money as it wished. Some were relatively frugal (like Germany); others (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) went on spending binges, like newly hitched college students who had just gotten their first credit card, with an irresistibly low introductory rate and a free T-shirt.

The European Union is a collection of states that are vastly different from one another.

They are separated by culture, language (which impedes labor mobility, resulting in semipermanent labor productivity disparity between countries — think Greece and Germany), economic growth rates, indebtedness and history. Germany, for instance, suffered through hyperinflation in the early 20th century and is thus paranoid about inflation.

Now let’s turn to Brexit, the U.K. referendum on exiting the EU.

Ironically, the U.K. doesn’t have half the problems that most EU nations are going through.

Because it is not part of EMU, it has retained its currency and its central bank.

The U.K.’s main dissatisfaction with EU membership stems from the immigration issue.

Because treaties have turned the EU into a borderless union, when Germany accepted refugees from the Middle East and Northern Africa, it basically made a unilateral decision on behalf of all EU members to accept those refugees to all EU countries. High unemployment, wage stagnation and terrorism are now endemic in the EU, and you can see how the U.K.’s citizenry might have a problem with this.

After the Brexit vote, the financial media lit up with opinions on its consequences for the EU and the global economy. They’ve varied from “Brexit is a nonevent” to “This is a Lehman moment for the global economy,” referring to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy that almost brought the financial system to a halt in 2008. The arguments on both sides are quite convincing.

The argument for Brexit’s being a nonevent is simple and straightforward.

The U.K. maintained its currency, and the pound’s decline in the aftermath of the referendum will help cushion any negative fallout on the British economy. The U.K. and the EU will forge new trade treaties.

There is a fear that the EU may impose trade sanctions on U.K., not so much to punish the U.K. but to threaten other EU members that exit will come at a stiff economic cost (effectively turning this voluntary club into a prison). However, the U.K. is a net importer of goods from the EU; thus any sanctions will hurt remaining EU members more than the U.K.

The Lehman moment argument is less simple, but not unimaginable. Brexit may provide the spark that will ignite already gasoline-soaked ground. Though the EU and EMU were supposed to unite Europeans, they may have had the opposite effect — causing a groundswell of nationalism.

In all honesty, we are concerned more about Italy than the U.K.

Italy is the third-largest economy in the EU, and its debt stands at 132 percent of GDP, second only to Greece (171 percent). Seventeen percent of Italian bank loans are noncurrent. In the depths of the financial crisis, that number was 5 percent in the U.S. Italian lenders account for nearly half of bad debt in the EU (source: WSJ).

If Italy was not part of EMU, it could just print lire and bail out its banks.

But it gave up that luxury when it joined the single currency. To make things worse, in 2014 the EU passed a law that prohibits governments from bailing out their banking systems; thus the shareholders, debtholders and depositors may bear the brunt of the eventual bailout.

Unless the EU passes a new law that bends the 2014 law — or the Italian government takes matters into its own hands, violating EU rules — we may see Italian debtholders and depositors hit with the cost of bank bailouts take to the streets and demand “Italexit.”

Nationalism is a highly emotional, zero-sum, us-against-them sort of business.

Add immigration concerns on top of economic ones, and it’s not hard to see how Europe has turned into a highly combustible mixture looking for a match.

And because emotions are often antilogical, future decisions by EU countries may not necessarily be beneficial to the European Continent.

Given that the situation in Europe is so complex and combustible, we don’t know whether Brexit will be just another match that simply burns out or the one that starts the fire.

Will it trigger other exits?

Will it slow down EU growth, thus straining an already leveraged system?

We don’t know, and nobody does.

China is the third-largest economy in the world and is living through the largest debt bubble we’ll probably ever see in our lifetimes.

From 2007 to 2014, the country’s debt quadrupled, from $7 to $28 trillion (according to McKinsey). Over the same time period, its economy tripled, growing from $3.5 trillion to $10.5 trillion.

These numbers are staggering, and they point to one indisputable fact: All Chinese growth since 2007 came from borrowing. There was no miracle in it.

But it gets worse, much worse. The numbers also show that every $1 of new debt brought only pennies of GDP growth. In the absence of skyrocketing debt, the Chinese overcapacity bubble, which was already fully inflated pre-2007, would have burst years ago.

As the government continues to engineer growth by borrowing, every yuan of debt will bring less growth. The laws of economics have not been suspended in China. American economist Herbert Stein’s law states that things that cannot go on forever, won’t.

When its debt bubble bursts, China will turn from being a tailwind for global growth into a headwind.

This brings us to Japan.

It is the most-indebted developed nation in the world, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 230 percent. Japan is the proof of Stein’s law — its economy is still suffering a hangover from what at the time seemed like an endless real estate party (bubble) that lasted from the mid-1980s into the early ’90s.

Japan has been on the quantitative easing and endless stimulus bandwagon longer than anyone else and has nothing (well, except a lot of debt) to show for it.

Japan also has the oldest population in the world — 26 percent of its people are older than 65 (in the U.S. the figure is only 15 percent).

Rising debt and an aging population are a double negative for the economy, as debt per capita is rising at an even faster rate than total debt.

And since the working population is declining at an even faster rate than the population as a whole, debt per working person is growing at an even faster rate.

From what we just told you, you might think Japan is paying the highest interest rates in the world, somewhere in the high teens. Wrong! The Japanese ten-year bond yields negative interest.

We just spilled a lot of digital ink to give you a brief overview of what we see around the world. We did not do it to increase your consumption of alcohol or antianxiety medicine.

We did it for a few reasons.

First, we wanted to show you that stock market performance has not been driven by the improving health of the global economy. Just as negative interest rates are not a positive for the continued health of the economy, current stock market performance does not augur rosy future returns for stocks. In fact, the opposite is true. The bulk of the stock market gains are because of one variable: the expansion of the price-to-earnings ratio. S&P 500 earnings have stagnated since 2014.

Stock prices have gone up because the Federal Reserve and other central banks have squeezed all investors to the right side of the risk curve. Stocks, and especially high-quality ones that pay dividends, are regarded as bond substitutes. Investors now look at the dividends of those stocks and compare those yields to what they can earn in Treasuries. This strategy will end in tears, as these bond-substitute stocks are significantly overvalued (Coke, anyone?).

Secondly, we wanted to show you the headwinds we are facing and what we are doing to avoid having them deflate the sails of your portfolio.

Summarizing, these headwinds are:

The risk of lower or negative global economic growth. If we get higher economic growth, we’ll treat that as a bonus.
Something-flation. Inflation (high interest rates), deflation (low interest rates) or screwflation (higher interest rates and deflation).

We don’t know which of these extremes we’ll see and in which order.

Nobody does.

Despite their eloquence and portrayed confidence, financial commentators arguing one or another extreme point of view on CNBC don’t know either. In fact, the more confident they are, the more dangerous they are. The difference between us and them is that we know we don’t know and are therefore trying to construct an “I don’t know” portfolio that can handle any extremes.

Ultimately, stock valuations will decline.

This is a time for humility and patience. Humility, because saying the words “I don’t know” is difficult for us testosterone-laden alpha male money manager types.

Patience, because most assets today are priced for perfection. They are priced for a confluence of two outcomes: low (or negative) interest rates continuing where they are or declining further, and above-average global economic growth.

Both happening at once in the future is extremely unlikely. Take one of them away (only one!), and stock market indexes are overvalued somewhere between a lot and humongously (we don’t even try to quantify superlatives).

Reprinted by permission of the author.

Vitaliy N. Katsenelson, CFA, is Chief Investment Officer at Investment Management Associates in Denver, Colo. He is the author of Active Value Investing (Wiley) and The Little Book of Sideways Markets (Wiley).

His books were translated into eight languages. Forbes Magazine called him “The new Benjamin Graham”.

To receive Vitaliy’s future articles by email or read his articles click here.

A Day in the Life of the F-35C Aboard the USS George Washington: Viewing a Launch

Posted on August 31, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

2016-08-31 In this video by Todd Miller, a launch of an F-35C aboard the USS George Washington is viewed from the bridge.

Miller was onboard the USS George Washington on August 15, 2016, when 7 F-35Cs were operating onboard the ship as part of pilot certification.

A Day in the Life of the F-35C Aboard the USS George Washington: Viewing a Launch from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

August 15, 2016

Credit: Todd Miller, Second Line of Defense

Visiting Williamtown Airbase: The Wedgetail In Evolution

Posted on August 30, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

08/30/2016

2016-08-22 By Robbin Laird

Recently, I revisited Williamtown airbase, where I earlier visited the Wedgetail Squadron and the F-18 squadrons.

And during the last visit did a site visit and looked at the infrastructure modernization approach being implemented on the base.

This time, I had a chance to talk with Group Captain Stuart Bellingham, the Officer Commanding 42 Wing.

During this visit as well I was able to talk with senior Army and Navy officers involved in the evolution of Wedgetail as well and will discuss their perspectives in forthcoming interviews.

The Wedgetail is often referred to as an Aussie AWACS, but clearly is not.

The AWACs is an AIR battle managements system with the customers being largely the fighter community.

The Wedgetail is evolving towards a ground and naval engagement capability with naval and army officers onboard and with virtual Wedgetail becoming part of the officer training for the Army and Navy this process will deepen in the years ahead.

In many ways, what is being experienced with Wedgetail is what the ADF hopes to bring to the process of overall force design and greater operational integration.

It is also part of the new air combat systems, which are software upgradeable and capable of multi-tasking.

When I interviewed 2^nd Squadron at Williamtown Airbase during my first visit to Williamtown, the squadron operating Wedgetail, the Squadron Commander underscored the challenge of understanding software upgradeability:

“This is a software upgradeable aircraft with a defined launch point (IOC) but no fixed end point (FOC). The system will always be evolving and growing as the software code gets rewritten to reflect events and demands from the squadron.

The squadron works through its experience and shapes change orders, which get sent to the procurement authorities to sort out priorities for the next round of upgrading the aircraft.”

The difference between older and such a new system was outlined by one participant during the visit as follows:

“We have in the same time frame bought a CRC system full up which will look pretty much like it is in 20 years; with Wedgetail it will look nothing like it does now in 20 years.”

This process of upgrading means that the software engineers work closely with the operators in shaping the evolution of the aircraft.

This is a very different approach from legacy systems.

As Paul Kalafos, Vice President of Surveillance Systems at Northrop Grumman has put it:

“We are getting significant feedback from the RAAF on deployment and requests to automate tasks where possible to enhanced the capability of the machine part of the man-machine relationship to shape a way ahead.

“A lot of the input is through the ARCS working group, which is a collaborative study environment involving Boeing, Northrop Grumman, MIT/Lincoln Labs, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), CEA Technologies, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and the Common Wealth of Australia (CoA).

“Operational requirements come out of that process and shape the next increment of software development.

“The ARCS is focused on problems and their resolutions.

“These are software updates.

“We get a software refresh out about once a year.

“Six months are spent doing the study to shape the plausible change; and the next six months are spent doing the integration and then getting it out the door.

“We shed the specs in favor of resolving problems, which the operational community identified.

“They can even write recommended change requests as well which provides part of the demand side process.”

Question: When I last visited Wedgetail you had not operate it in combat. Now you have.

How has it performed?

Group Captain Bellingham: “We flew to the Middle East and almost instantly began operations. Since September last year we haven’t dropped one mission due to systems on the aircraft, and we’re at 99 point something percent success.

“It’s able to deliver everything plus more to the coalition forces.There’s a lot of potential in in the Wedgetail system.

“You’ve got a twin engine jet, it takes a lot less fuel to keep it over the battle space. We’ve got 13 crewmembers on board rather than 20 plus crewmembers on board (on an AWACS) who need food and shelter and clothing and sustainment. The footprint comes down.

“And it is very reliable. It’s a relatively new jet, so our reliability is high in terms of the green aircraft systems. That may change as it gets older, but right now you turn it on and it works.

“From my perspective, I think not just the US but other nations are looking at E7 going, “You know what? That’s working.” Whereas where we were four or five years ago it was, “Seems like we’ve got a bit of work to do.”

Question: It is clearly a system in progress with the capability to evolve into what the US CNO calls a key capability to operate in the electromagnetic battlespace, and to do so for the joint force.

Could you talk about the joint evolution?

Group Captain Bellingham: “Army and navy officers are part of the Wedgetail crew. . We are not just extension of what the air defense ground environment or the control reporting units do from the ground. We take our platform airborne and we do air battle space management.

“Recently, in the Army led Hamel exercise, we pushed the link piecutre down to the ground force headquarters. Their situational awareness became significant, compared to what they have had before.

“And since the Williams seminar on Air-Land integration, several senior Army officers have been to Williamtown to take onboard what we can do and potential evolution of the systems onboard the aircraft.

“We are seeing similar developments on the Navy side. A key example is working with the LHD. My opinion is that the Wedgetail will be critical to making all the bits of an amphibious task group come together. And not just that but as the P-8 joins the force, we can broaden the support to Navy as well. And the new air warfare destroyer will use its systems as well to pass the data around to everyone, and making sure everyone’s connected.

“The E-7 is a critical node in working force integration and making sure we’re all seeing the same thing at the same time, and not running into each other, and getting each other space. We’re not on a ten second scan. We are bringing the information to the war fighter or to whoever needs it right then.”

Question: During the visit, we have been in the squadron building, the hangar and in the System Program Office collocated with the squadron.

What advantages does that bring?

Group Captain Bellingham: “It facilitates a close working relationship between the combat force and the system developers.

“We can share our combat experiences with the RAAF-industry team in the SPO and to shape a concrete way ahead in terms of development.

“The team is very proactive in working collaboratively to get to the outcome we’re looking for.”

Question: In the SPO facility, you have a Virtual Wedgetail, which is the currently configured Wedgetail systems but located on the ground.

How as that worked for you?

Group Captain Bellingham: “It is crucial for reaching out to the warfighting community. We have plugged into both Army and Navy officer training courses.

“We are using it to work closely with the Army and Navy getting ready for our Fall exercise with the LHD to shape a task force concept of the amphibious ships.

It provides a realistic way for Army and Navy officers to see what we contribute to their warfighting tasks.

“We need a crew in the Virtual Wedgetail to make it work because they have to have the right experience and background to provide that level of reality to the force which then the warfighters can experience what we can bring right now to the fight.

“We are also working with 7^th Fleet. We work with the PACAF as well. We sent two planes to Pitch Black 2016 and are participating as well in the current Red Flag Alaska. This allows for Australia and the United States to shape synergies in the force.

“We put three layers of officers into the AOC that was running the Pacific Thunder exercise to ensure the success from our perspective and get people to understand it.

“We’ve definitely been invited back so we’ll be there again beginning of next year doing it again which will be great.”

Question: The software upgradeability aspect of the plane means that you have to inform the broader warfighting community of what the evolving aircraft is now capable of. We saw those concerns when we visited Jax Navy and talked with the P-8 and Trion squadrons.

How are dealing with this challenge?

Group Captain Bellingham: “Until we stop flying the E7, it will keep getting better. The challenge is as you fairly eloquently stated it is making sure people understand the capability as we’re progressing.

“It’s not just one community, the fighter force, with whom we need to communicate.

“We need to work with and communicate effectively with the joint force.

“Which affects our training as we move ahead as well.

“We must make sure that our communication is effective within the joint force.”

Question: Where is the future evolution of the system likely to go?

Group Captain Bellingham: “One aspect is the people aspect, namely that Army and Navy officers are not simply replicating what they have done in legacy systems. Once they become that mission commander they are that all-seeing, all-knowing, joint integrator who is a vastly different person to what they were in the ground system and they know an awful lot about joint integration and how to make that work.

“Another aspect is the evolving technology of the systems, which are clearly moving down the path of providing significant electronic-magnetic warfare capabilities as well.

“We are not just a classic flying radar.

“When we’re looking forward ten years from now, that’s where we’re looking.”

Question: The P-8/Triton dyad is coming to the force.

How will that affect Wedgetail?

Group Captain Bellingham: “Significantly.

“One aspect is that we will be operating a larger 737 fleet with six Wedgetails and 15 P-8s. We can’t afford not to look for opportunities in this space.”

https://www.airforce.gov.au/Technology/Future-Acquisitions/Boeing-P8-A-Poseidon/?RAAF-Z4PUOpGXH/eLtWmc6qxYl9xYycb+rKng

The first slideshow highlights Wedgetail in the recently completed Pitch Black 2016 exercise and the photos are credited to the Australian Ministry of Defense.

The second slideshow shows Group Captain Bellingham and the Wedgetail being worked in the hangar for deployment later this year and the photos are credited to Second Line of Defense.

For earlier overview pieces on Wedgetail, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/from-troubled-to-trailblazing-program-the-wedgetail-and-21st-century-combat-innovation/

https://sldinfo.com/recrafting-the-surveillance-response-group-for-the-extended-battlespace-an-interview-with-air-commodore-heap-commander-of-the-srg/

And for our special report on the P-8/Triton dyad, see the following:

The Arrival of a Maritime-Domain Awareness Strike Capability: The Impact of the P-8/Triton Dyad

Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead Focuses on the Way Ahead for the Royal Australian Navy

Posted on August 30, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

2016-08-30 By Robbin Laird

Prior to attending the Williams Foundation Seminar on air-sea integration, I had the opportunity to sit down with Rear Admiral Johnathan Mead in his office in Canberra to discuss his perspective, on the way ahead with regard to the Navy within the evolution of the ADF.

Rear Admiral Mead is the Navy’s joint capability manager and is clearly focused on the cross-cutting dynamics of maritime modernization within the context of the overall evolution of the ADF.

Although the Head of Navy Capability since 2015, Rear Admiral Mead is part of the transition set in motion since April 1, 2016 to shaping a new approach to shaping joint force capability. As he put it:

“The way the department was structured previously was capability development was centralized in a group led by joint three-star.

“One of the recommendations of The First Principles report was to bring those accountabilities from the center back out to Navy, Army, Air Force.

“Whereas previously the services had de facto a third party working it for them, now as of the first of April, it’s all come back directly to the services.

“The Chief of Navy is accountable for all naval capability across the board from building to life cycle support to disposal of assets.

“We’re only about five months in that transition.

“The services led by the Vice Chief, is now accountable for the investment program and also for the force design and bringing the alignment capabilities of the three services together into a joint force.

“That’s where we are today.”

With the launching of the White Paper, a significant modernization of the ADF was put in motion with a major build for the Australian Navy, including new submarines, air warfare destroyers and frigates.

This build will unfold within the evolving context of the overall transformation of the Australian Defence Force, which highlights shaping an integrated force able to operate in the extended battlespace.

Question: A key element of the rethink clearly is with regard to how you are thinking about the new assets in terms of task force operations.

Could you discuss the new amphibious ships from this perspective?

Rear Admiral Mead: “The ship itself provides the government an enormous array of options and flexibility, but we have no intention of deploying the ship by itself. Our philosophy is to deploy in task groups, but in a flexible manner.

“The amphibious ships are clearly going to anchor any amphibious task force, but those task forces will employ a mix and match capability of air, land and sea assets.

“And we are looking beyond a classic understanding of an amphibious task force role for these ships, for they could operate as C2 ships in an ASW effort with embarked helos on board, and integrated with the P-8s, Tritons and other assets as well.

A United States Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey aircraft lands on board HMAS Canberra off the north east coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2016.

“And that will be true of how we will use the new air warfare destroyers as well, providing C2 and support capabilities for integrated air-land-sea missile defense or be the lead in such an effort.”

Question: As you build the new submarine and its combat system, clearly there is an interest for that submarine to tap into the information network which the ASW force can provide for it, such as the P-8/Triton dyad might provide.

How do you view that process?

Rear Admiral Mead: “Obviously, the silent service wishes to operate in such a manner that two-way communication does not compromise its operations.

“But equally obvious, is that the new submarines will operate in such a manner that they can tap into the evolving ASW network and have its combat systems benefit from that data input to maximize its mission success.

“The new submarines and their combat systems will clearly be designed effectively.to tap into the maritime warfare network.

“The task will be moving that information around so it won’t duplicate and so there’s no gaps in the coverage.”

Question: How do you bring coherency to the diverse programs you are managing?

Rear Admiral Mead: “It is clearly a challenge.

“In my front hallway, there is a large diagram — it’s about three meters in length and about one half meters wide — and it articulates all the major capability programs we’ve got on the way now and how they’re connected.

“My job is to try and bring a sense of coherency to that program. I do drill down to individual projects and some have very short timelines.

“But in the main, we are adopting a programmatic approach to navy capability.

“We are looking to maximize efficiencies and to work effectively in partnership with industry to do so. It is a challenge.”

Question: When I visited Williamtown, I was impressed to see the System Program Office located next to the squadron so that that software developers could work directly with the squadron on shaping a way ahead.

I understand the Navy has something similar in mind.

Could you talk to that approach?

Rear Admiral Mead: “We do and we call it the “Ship Zero” approach.

“As we build our new ships, we are going to do so around a common structure, which brings together the sustainment, the training, command and management, land-based test bed, simulation the software development and importantly industry, into a common facility in order to provide the horsepower and genius necessary to support the capability at sea..

“We are trying to bring all the key elements into a building wherein that building is located close to where the platforms we’ll be operating from.

“This is a new concept for us.

“It’s about shaping an approach to proper asset management, maximizing the capability the ships can get through 30 to 40 year life.”

Biography of Rear Admiral Mead

Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead, AM, RAN joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1984 and proceeded to sea in 1986. He specialised in Mine Clearance Diving and Explosive Ordnance Disposal and after serving as Executive Officer of Clearance Diving Team One he undertook Principal Warfare Officer (ASW) training. A succession of warfare postings then followed, including: Anti Submarine Warfare Officer in HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Arunta, Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer and Executive Officer of HMAS Arunta.

In 2005, he commanded HMAS Parramatta and saw active service in the North Arabian Gulf as part of Operation CATALYST; for this his ship was awarded a Meritorious Unit Citation and he was appointed a Member of the Order of Australia.

He undertook studies at the Indian National Defence College in 2007 after which he assumed the appointment as Australia’s Defence Adviser to India.

Promoted to Commodore in July 2011, Commodore Mead deployed to the Middle East where he commanded Combined Task Force 150, responsible for maritime counter terrorism. Upon his return to Fleet Headquarters in 2012, he served as Commander Surface Force. In January 2015, he was promoted to Rear Admiral and assumed the position as Head Navy Capability.

Rear Admiral Mead holds a Masters Degree in International Relations, a Master’s Degree in Management and a PhD in International Relations. He has published a book on Indian national security.

The slideshow above shows Rear Admiral Mead earlier in his career.

These photos highlight a visit by General Zhao Keshi, Chief of Central Military Commission of People’s Republic of China, Chief of the General Logistics Department, People’s Liberation Army on HMAS Tobruk at Sydney’s Garden Island naval base when then Commodore Jonathan Mead was the Commander Surface Force.

Also shown is then Commander Jonathan Mead when he was captain of HMAS Parramatta on the bridge of the frigate with the Maritime Commander Australia, Rear Admiral Davyd Thomas, in the Persian Gulf

What exactly does the 2016 White Paper say with regard to Government commitments to new maritime capabilties?

The following is taken from the 2016 Defence White Paper with regard to the general discussion on the way ahead with regard to maritime capabilities:

Highly capable and versatile naval and maritime forces are vital to our defence strategy.

Australia’s naval and maritime forces must be able to undertake a wide range of activities in support of the Strategic Defence Objectives and operate across huge distances.

The area of Australia’s maritime zones, including our Exclusive Economic Zone, is one of the largest in the world, with a total marine area of around 10 million square kilometres.

Australia is also responsible for covering one of the largest search and rescue areas in the world, some 53 million square kilometres of the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans.

Our naval and maritime forces deploy around the world for training, exercises and to participate in coalition operations to support the rules-based global order.

Modernising our maritime capabilities will be a key focus for Defence over the next 20 to 30 years.

Our maritime forces will become more potent through the acquisition of more capable submarines, ships and aircraft and better integration of combat and supporting systems across Defence. These forces will help to protect our maritime borders, secure our immediate northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication and enable us to project force in the maritime environment Increasingly, these capabilities will provide an ability to undertake anti-submarine warfare throughout the maritime environment.

Defence’s ability to contribute to border protection will be enhanced with the introduction of larger, more capable offshore patrol vessels with greater range, endurance and improved carrying capacity and a new large-hulled multi-purpose patrol vessel, the Australian Defence Vessel Ocean Protector.

The Government will invest in enhancements to multiple layers of the maritime surveillance system including new manned and unmanned aircraft.

Submarines

Submarines are an essential part of Australia’s naval capability, providing a strategic advantage in terms of surveillance and protection of our maritime approaches.

The Government has determined that regionally superior submarines with a high degree of interoperability with the United States are required to provide Australia with an effective deterrent, including by making a meaningful contribution to anti-submarine warfare operations in our region.

The key capabilities of the future submarine  will include: anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and support to special operations.

The Government will increase the size of the submarine force from six to 12 boats. The doubling in size of the submarine fleet recognisesthat Australia will face a more challenging maritime environment in the decades ahead.

By 2035, around half of the world’s submarines will be operating in the Indo-Pacific region where Australia’s interests are most engaged. Australia has one of the largest maritime domains in the world and we need the capacity to defend and further our interests from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans and from the areas to our north to the Southern Ocean. Submarines are a powerful instrument for deterring conflict and a potent weapon should conflict occur.

Australia’s new submarines will be supported by upgrades to enablers and facilities such as wharves and port facilities, as well as simulators, training and submarine rescue systems. The key strategic requirements for the future submarines include a range and endurance similar to the Collins Class submarine, sensor performance and stealth characteristics which are superior to the Collins Class, and upgraded versions of the AN/BYG-1 combat system and Mark 48 MOD 7 heavyweight torpedo jointly developed between the United States and Australia as the preferred combat system and main armament. The new submarines will have advanced communications systems to link with other Navy ships and aircraft to conduct anti-submarine warfare operations.

The acquisition of the 12 future submarines will commence in 2016 with the first submarines likely to begin entering service in the early 2030s. Construction of the 12 new submarines will extend into the late 2040s to 2050 timeframe. The length of the construction process will mean that Australia will need to be planning the follow-on submarine well before the last new submarine enters service.

To ensure no capability gap and the ability to progress development of a replacement submarine in the 2050s, the Government has decided to implement a rolling acquisition program for Australia’s submarine fleet. A rolling acquisition program will ensure that Australia is able to maintain a fleet of 12 regionally superior submarines as submarine and anti-submarine technologies develop over the coming decades.

During the long life of the new submarines, the rapid rate of technological change and ongoing evolution of Australia’s strategic circumstances will continue. As part of the rolling acquisition program, a review based on strategic circumstances at the time, and developments in submarine technology, will be conducted in the late 2020s to consider whether the configuration of the submarines remains suitable or whether consideration of other specifications should commence.

The future submarine program is the largest defence procurement program in Australia’s history. The Government has already committed to maximising Australian industry involvemen in the submarine program, without compromising cost, capability, schedule or risk. The Government will announce the results of a Competitive Evaluation Process in 2016

The Government will also continue to make appropriate investments in the existing Collins Class fleet, including priority capability enhancements, obsolescence management and fleet sustainment, to ensure Australia’s potent and agile submarine capability is maintained until the introduction of the future submarine fleet. This will include upgrades to the Collins Class communications and sensor capabilities.

This investment will build on recent improvements to Collins Class availability In 2011–12, Collins Class availability was about half that of the international benchmark and in the past there had been up to three submarines undergoing long-term maintenance. Following the 2012 Coles Review and implementation of a comprehensive and innovative transformation plan, there has been a major improvement in the availability of the Collins Class, and Defence is on track to reach the international benchmark for submarine availability by mid-2016.

By mid-2016, the submarine HMAS Farncomb will have completed the first two-year full cycle docking in Adelaide – a maintenance activity that formerly took over three years to complete. From then onwards only one Collins Class submarine will be in Adelaide for full cycle docking Defence will continue to work closely with industry to implement reforms to optimise Collins Class availability, reliability and capability.

Surface Vessels

Surface vessels will continue to play a critical role in protecting our sovereignty, maintaining presence and projecting force into the region and beyond. They are an important component of our joint force and will operate as a highly integrated part of our force with enhanced situational awareness, communications and data sharing between maritime, air and land-based systems.

Our surface vessels must be capable of independent Australian operations, as well as operating in coalition taskforces They must also contribute to a wide range of whole-of-government priorities, including border security, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Key elements of new naval capability will include 12 major surface vessels. The three Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers to enter into service in the early 2020s will provide Australian or coalition maritime task groups with defence against air and missile attack. The Hobart Class will be equipped with new advanced surface to air missiles to enter service by the middle of the next decade. Nine new future frigates optimised for anti-submarine warfare will be introduced into service from the late 2020s to replace the existing fleet of eight Anzac Class frigates, with construction to start in 2020.

The Government will acquire 12 new offshore patrol vessels that will provide greater reach and endurance than the existing Armidale Class patrol boat fleet. The new vessels will be capable of undertaking several different roles including enhanced border protection and patrol missions over greater distances than is currently possible with the existing patrol boat fleet, with construction to start in 2018. All 12 offshore patrol vessels will be delivered by 2030 The Armidale Class will be supplemented by additional patrol craft as required until they are replaced by the offshore patrol vessels, to ensure there is no gap in Navy’s border protection capability.

The mine countermeasures and military hydrography capability will be updated to support the future force. The life of four of the current Huon Class mine hunters will be extended while new technologies are developed to counter the threat of maritime mines Defence will seek to replace the hydrographic capability with an efficient combination of military and commercial hydrographic and oceanographic survey capabilities.

Capability priorities

Eight P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and response aircraft will be introduced in the early 2020s, with seven additional aircraft to be acquired in two tranches to bring the total to 15 aircraft by the late 2020s. These aircraft have a range of over 7,500 kilometres, and can be refuelled in the air by Australia’s KC-30A air-to-air refuelling aircraft, extending their range even further In addition to being able to undertake sophisticated surveillance operations at great distances, the P-8A can undertake offensive operations against submarines and ships, as well as supporting search and rescue operations.

To complement the surveillance capabilities of the Poseidon, the Government will acquire seven high altitude MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft from the early 2020s as part of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability stream. The Triton is an unarmed, long-range, remotely piloted aircraft that will operate in our maritime environment, providing a persistent maritime patrol capability and undertaking other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks Short-range maritime tactical unmanned aircraft will be acquired to improve the situational awareness of our ships on operations.

Currently entering into service, 24 MH-60R Seahawk naval combat helicopters will enhance the anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare operations undertaken by our destroyers and frigates Navy will also employ MRH-90 utility helicopters, and will work closely with Army for amphibious operations.

Rear Admiral Manazir in Australia: Allied Convergence on the Kill Web

Posted on August 29, 2016 | by Robbin Laird

08/29/2016

2016-08-29 By Robbin Laird

The lead off speaker at the Williams Foundation seminar on air-land integration was Rear Admiral Manazir.

Rear Admiral Manazir currently serves as the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems (OPNAV N9) on the staff of the chief of naval operations. In this capacity, he is responsible for the integration of manpower, training, sustainment, modernization and procurement of the Navy’s warfare systems.

His presentation focused on the strategic context for the U.S. and allied maritime forces and shaping a convergent way ahead.

His presentation highlighted both the significance of the maritime domain for commercial operations and the emergence of peer competitors within that domain.

The U.S. and its allies are clearly concerned that the freedom of the seas, and rule of law be exercised by the global maritime nations.

Equally obvious is the concern that rival maritime powers are committed to their own interpretation of the rules of the road and are building capabilities to seek to implement their will in the maritime domain.

The question is how can the allies shape convergent capabilities to ensure that the global commons remain open, and not controlled by powers seeking to enforce their will against the allied powers?

Rear Admiral Manazir highlighted the kill web approach as a way to shape more effective integration of force and convergence of efforts.

The kill chain is a linear concept which is about connecting assets to deliver fire power; the kill web is about distributed operations and the ability of force packages or task forces to deliver force dominance in an area of interest.

It is about building in integration from the ground up so that forces can work seamlessly together through multiple networks, rather than relying on a single point of failure large network.

Later in the seminar, both the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Barrett, and Rear Admiral Mayer, Commander Australian Fleet, underscored similar approaches to the one introduced by Rear Admiral Manazir.

In his presentation at the conference, Vice Admiral Barrett underscored that “we are not building an interoperable navy; we are building an integrated force for the Australian Defence Force.”

He drove home the point that ADF integration was crucial in order for the ADF to support government objectives in the region and beyond and to provide for a force capable of decisive lethality.

By so doing, Australia would have a force equally useful in coalition operations in which distributed lethality was the operational objective.

Vice Admiral Barrett noted that it is not about massing force in a classic sense; it is about shaping a force, which can maximize the adversary’s vulnerabilities while reducing our own.

Rear Admiral Mayer focused specifically on the networking aspect of the kill web and how to make it work.

He highlighted that the Navy was returning to a task force concept but one which was 21^st century in character, whereby Navy was tapping into ground and air assets as “part” of the task force, rather than simply focusing on Navy operated assets.

This evolution of the task force, clearly in the mode of what the US Navy is referring to as the “kill web,” will require the evolution of capabilities, both in terms of connectivity, and training. During the seminar he characterized as the network as a weapon system with “no single master.”

It was important to shape a way ahead for the joint force to work within the evolving networks in order to effectively operate in a distributed task force sense.

“Each service is underpinning its platforms with elements of a common network.

“There is increased overlap thereby for the air and sea forces. How should we best develop our joint concepts of operations and joint capability?”

And later in the seminar the perspective of the Royal Navy was provided by Captain Nick Walker, Royal Navy, with regard to the coming impact of the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers.

His presentation highlighted that the impact of the new carriers was joint through and through and was about empowering the British defense force to operate throughout the spectrum of conflict.

It was about not simply adding a new ship, but shaping a networked enabled capability able to operate to serve national interests or to support coalition operations.

Captain Walker quoted the most recent Strategic Defence Review with regard to the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers as follows:

Captain Walker highlighted as well the Royal Navy’s own approach to the kill web concept in terms such as the Type 45 destroyer could operate as the wingman of an F-35B coming off the Queen Elizabeth carrier.

In short, Rear Admiral Manazir was part of an Australian and Allied re-think about the way ahead.

When asked after the seminar about his reactions to the seminar and his meetings in Australia, he underscored that he found a significant among of innovative thinking going on generated by the Williams seminar.

“The Williams Foundation is coalescing around a lot of the issues that we’re trying to solve.

Most often the public discussions are mostly about resources.

That conversation is important but the discussion, which Williams set in motion, is about how to develop a different kind of navy.

The conversation has got to be along the lines of what we had today if we are going to get it right. For this, I thank the Williams Foundation.”

When asked what he thought about the presentations of his Australian peers, Rear Admiral Manazir had this to say:

“I thought the Fleet Commander was very, very good. He understands his trade and he speaks comfortably about his trade. And he understands where the Navy needs to go. What I took from Vice Admiral Barrett was his vision and his passion about that vision. He’s obviously a bold leader.

I see great examples in the Australian Navy of the kind of bold and competent leadership necessary for us collectively succeed.”

When asked about the UK presentation and perspective, Rear Admiral Manazir underscored that what impressed him most was the emphasis on the strategic role which Air and Naval modernization was being accorded by the UK government.

“The new carrier is being viewed as a government strategic asset, not simply a new platform, in and of itself. The British government is clearly investing in the Queen Elizabeth class of aircraft carriers.

And I’m so very happy that we still are committed to an aircraft carrier force; that we don’t have to go back and reaffirm our commitment to that force but can move ahead with re-shaping its role and capabilities in the period ahead, in the period of building the kill web.”

Finally, he highlighted what he sees as a key leadership role exercised by the Royal Australian Air Force and its Plan Jericho approach and mentality.

“Let me add my admiration of the approach that the RAAF has taken over the last 7-10 years.

“They have bought their platforms with an eye to interoperability inside the ADF, and with coalition partners, with key regard to the United States as well.

“RAAF leaders, energized by Geoff Brown’s forward-thinking approach, have already moved past the platform replacement approach and are focusing on capabilities delivered by networked combat power.”

The slideshow above highlights the uniformed presenters at the seminar as well as the leadership of the Williams Foundation.

For our earlier interviews with Rear Admiral Manazir and related materials, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/the-sea-services-prepare-to-prevail-in-the-extended-battlespace-an-interview-with-rear-admiral-manazir/

https://sldinfo.com/admiral-manazir-on-the-impact-of-global-partnerships-for-deterrence-in-depth/

https://sldinfo.com/focuspublications/reach-and-punch-the-sea-services-prepare-to-prevail-in-the-extended-battlespace/

https://sldinfo.com/the-sea-services-transform-their-reach-punch-and-impact-in-the-extended-battlespace/

https://sldinfo.com/the-uss-america-cvn-78-and-hms-queen-elizabeth-crafting-capabilities-for-21st-century-operations/