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ISIS-Supported terrorism in Paris and ballooning refugee flight from violence in and around Syria has combined to generate heightened apprehensions and political discord among Europeans. Political discord has increased not only between EU governments but also within individual EU nations on how to deal with these two interrelated threats.
As refugee problems spread out to touch daily European life, a new source of trauma appeared in the form of ISIS-sponsored multiple terrorist killings in the heart of Paris.
French President Hollande found himself in an existential predicament.
Political polls already showed a big voter sentiment swing to the nationalist, anti EU ideas of the Front National (FN). Local French elections coming soon, the Syrian refugee crisis was already boosting FN support to potential national majority levels. The terrorist events seemed to guarantee FN domination of local elections. Hollande had no choice but to show bold leadership in response to the terrorism.
Hollande called urgent meetings of his cabinet and a political decision was made to retaliate with military force. President Hollande declared a state of war with ISIS, and deliberately chose to invoke Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, but not Article V of the NATO treaty.Article 42.7 is the “solidarity clause” that states if a member of the European Union is the victim of “armed aggression on its territory,” other EU member states have an “obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power.”
In reaching his decision, Hollande had to consider several hard choices.
First, he could not enlist Chancellor Merkel as her government had become internally divided, rendering her unable to play a lead or co-lead role.
Second, if Hollande invoked NATO’s Art.5, further French action would be under overall supervision of NATO, and implicitly oversight of Washington.
Successful military action in Syria also would require Russian cooperation because of the already existing heavy military action by Russian air forces against all Assad opposition groups. Russia appeared to be determined to defend Assad’s leadership of Syria. Washington, on the other hand, had demanded that Assad agree to step down before the US would coordinate military action with Russia.
Hollande’s cabinet calculation was simple. Within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, EU members could coordinate with Russia and persuade Russia to apply more direct force on ISIL and avoid US/NATO objections.
Behind this decision there had been a lengthy history of disagreements from the French side to Obama Administration Middle East policies. French Foreign Minister Fabius saw major changes in geostrategic forces taking place when the U.S. President backed off his Syria Red Line, and then pushed relentlessly his own personal objectives with Iran while dismissing French, Israeli, and Gulf Arab reservations to the U.S.-Iran accord.
Fabius also pointed out that the Russian decision to establish a new military land base inside Syria was likely a game changer, as it became clear Russia intended to stay there permanently.
This French perception was, of course, correct. The Russian decision to accept Assad’s invitation to intervene militarily in Syria, and enlarge its military base presence there laid down an historic marker for a significant reconfiguration of power, not only in the Gulf, but also the entire Eastern Mediterranean region.
The French cabinet also took into account that Putin had invited several other governments and representatives of governments to Moscow to discuss joint action in Syria. Putin had even offered to send Prime Minister Medvedev to Washington to discuss coordination of efforts, but President Obama had publicly refused such a meeting.
Note was taken that General Sulemeini, of the Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) had months before been invited to Moscow to coordinate Iran’s military and quasi-military actions in Iraq and Syria (including IRGC’s oversight of Hezbollah forces in the region).
Prime Minister Netanyahu had been to Moscow, ostensibly to negotiate “deconfliction” arrangements to avoid accidental Israeli and Russian military clashes. Senior Israeli military and intelligence decision makers accompanied Netanyahu. The French believed that Russians and Israelis had already agreed on sharing of information on missions, objectives, and targets. The King of Jordan had undertaken a similar trip with military aides, and made it clear Jordan wished to join in anti-ISIS actions. Saudis and other GCC nations had also made similar trips to Moscow.
It was also apparent that, practically speaking, Russia had already assumed the lead role in the multinational talks on Syria that were ongoing in Vienna.
For the French, the way forward seemed self-evident. Russia already had working arrangements with several other anti-ISIS forces, so the French joining would maximize French impact on events. Hollande’s visit to Washington was to request U.S. help for France’s response to ISIS.
Washington’s cautious response left the path open for overt coordination of the French with the Russian military.
As it later became evident when Turkish military attacked and destroyed a Russian air force plane, widespread information sharing had been going on bilaterally and through the Baghdad intelligence-sharing center well before the French joining in.
The Turks knew well the flight paths of the Russian aircraft as well as those of the US and other neighbors. The result has been yet another shock inflicted by Turkey.
In response, Putin has not only instituted economic sanctions on Turkey, but started releasing information on Turkey’s key role in transmission of Syrian refugees, ISIS oil, and supply of armaments to a wide array of militants operating in Syria.
All of these developments are likely uncomfortable for the present U.S. Administration, particularly the French-led European linkage to Russian plans for ending the Syrian conflict on Putin’s terms.
It might be concluded that Washington’s preoccupation with domestic policy disputes and upcoming US elections had diverted the nation’s leadership attention from Syriaq (Syria and Iraq) to President Obama’s priorities of completing a domestic legacy of his term of office.
The Royal Navy (RN) is returning the large deck carrier business after many years absence.
This means that the RN while shaping the concepts of operations for it new carrier and the RAF for the new carrier air wing, the two services are not constrained by the immediate past.
They are reinventing their approach to carrier airpower; not reshaping its carriers to deal simply with the addition of new aircraft to the carrier air deck, as is the US Navy.
Secretary Wynne once noted that a good way to rethink the role of the large deck carrier would be to clear the deck of its legacy airwing and imagine what a fifth generation enabled carrier might look like.
The RN and the RAF as the closest proximity of any country going to do that.
But this will not be easy, for the RN and the RAF will have to rethink their legacy approaches, and shape ways to work more effectively together as an embarked force.
For the latest update on the progress in building the new UK carriers, see the following newsletter from the Carrier Alliance published in November 2015:
This will involve significant cultural change as well, with the RN having operated largely as a “frigate navy for the past few years,” according to a senior RN official.
And for the RAF moving from a land-based mentality and the use of legacy aircraft will require a leap into operating a “fifth generation enabled carrier” and finding ways to integrate that capability within the overall air combat profile of the RAF.
In other words, it is not just about adding a ship or adding an aircraft.
It is about significant cultural change and the overall transformation of UK forces to a 21st Century paradigm of operations.
Much of this was evident from a visit to the ship and discussions aboard the ship. But in an interview conducted at the Ministry of Defence Main Building in Whitehall the day after the visit, a discussion with the RN and RAF provided significant detail and perspectives on the paradigm shift.
Squadron Leader Nichol at Beaufort MCAS standing in front of an RAF F-35 jet which is part of the training effort. Credit: Second Line of Defense
The discussion at MoD was with two Royal Navy personnel and one RAF officer.
Chris Alcock Programme Manager Queen Elizabeth Carriers at Royal Navy was joined by Commander Nick Walker and RAF Group Captain Paul Godfrey in the interview.
Captain Chris Alcock is Head of the Carrier Strike Division in Navy Command Headquarters. He is Programme Manager for the QEC Carriers and also responsible for capability Integration of the Carrier Air Wing into the platform, specifically LII F35B, Merlin Mk2 and Crows nest.
Commander Nick Walker is currently serving as the Chief of Staff Carrier Strike in the Carrier Strike and Aviation Division within Navy Command Headquarters in Portsmouth. The role involves coordinating and brigading the activities of the Carrier Strike Team as they interact with a plethora of organizations in Defence and industry to manage the Queen Elizabeth Class project and bring the aircraft carriers into service.
Group Captain Paul Godfrey is a key RAF officer involved with F 35 Lightning II Entry into Service. He has extensive flight experience with Harrier, Typhoon and F-16. After his current assignment, he will be given command of a Typhoon Main Operating Base which position him well to support the land and sea based air integration efforts of the RAF.
Question: How demanding a shift in RN thinking is the introduction of this ship?
Alcock: It is an important shift.
There are a lot of people that have never been on a carrier before, and the Royal Navy has been very much, since the demise of the carriers, has been a very much a frigate Navy.
We are generating a new Maritime Task Force concept (MTF) to shape the concept of operations going forward.
This clearly draws on elements of the past, but requires a fresh think as well.
People say it’s not all about the carrier, but it is all about the carrier, because that will be the center of gravity around which we will provide all the other enablers for the other elements of the task group.
The constitution of the task group is critical to depending on what we do with the carrier but the carrier and its air wing are the centerpiece enabling the entire task force.
We have worked closely with the USN and the USMC in the regeneration of Carrier Strike and the close working relationship has been hugely appreciated and also the work they have done for us and with us in support of this aim.
Question: The RN and the RAF have been visiting places like Nellis, Fallon and Yuma and I would assume that your are looking at cross learning and cross transformation processes?
Godfrey: Very much so.
And we are training with the Marines and the other air services as we prepare to embark our F-35s aboard the carrier in three years time.
And we are very much using this time to think through the marriage between the carrier and the airwing and are looking closely at what the Marines and the US Navy are doing as well.
In this three year period that we’ve got before we’re bringing our F-35B’s back to the U.K, in the four year period we’ve got before we declare a carrier strike capability 2020, we can have a really good look at how do we want to do this?
And we are looking at a revolutionary way of doing it, rather than an evolutionary way of doing it.
Alcock: And we are looking at significant innovations different from the US as well.
We will not generate the sortie rate of as many aircraft as a large deck USN carrier, but we will generate significant combat effects.
Our carrier is designed to operate 24/7 and will not operate with catapults and traps.
We are looking to use the F-35B and its unique operational capabilities to give us a significant combat effect.
I think we will just do things differently and we have been studying the USN model as to how they operate their CVN from Japan.
Also maintenance is key and this will be an important factor for the platforms – serviceability and availability gives the UK greater flexibility.
In addition we have been working closely with USMC and gaining insight into SGR’s and deck cycles.
Question: We argue that no platform fights alone; this is obviously true in terms of the carrier, which is both and enabled and enabling platform, notably with regard to its carrier air wing.
What is some of the thinking in the RN about the potential evolutions?
Alcock: As I said earlier, we have not been defined by the carrier in our Navy and some of the newer assets will be rethought with the introduction of the carrier.
With the advent of the carrier we will need to re think doctrine, tactics and training.
There will be much work between elements of the CAG specifically interaction with Merlin Crows Nest and F35B but also our T45 destroyers will work extremely closely with F35B and be a great enabler in tactical development.
We need to explore the boundaries of what we can do as we leverage the carrier with regard to our other force assets, Navy, Army and Air Force.
The good thing is that a lot of people involved in the process have open minds about thinking through the process of change.
Question: And presumably the new destroyer program designed to replace Type 45 can be defined in such a way as to leverage the carrier and to be built into the carrier enabling capabilities as well?
Alcock: That is a good point.
New platforms will need to embrace the new warfare disciplines associated with the Carrier and the lessons learnt will need to be embedded in the design and operability of any replacement Platforms.
Question: How does this evolving capability affect a possible rethink about the way ahead for the forces?
Walker: This evolving capability will give the decision maker a lot of flexible tools to respond or prepare for crises.
The Maritime Task Force can be well integrated with land based air but does not need a lot of forward ground presence to generate combat effects.
This can give decision makers significant flexibility with regard to a crisis or to have the ability to move to crises rather than having to generate force build up in a particular place in order to intervene.
Question: A key aspect to thinking about the flexibility engendered by the carrier led Maritime Task Force can come from shaping effective C2 for an intervention force.
What is your thinking and approach with regard to the C2- enabled carrier maritime task force?
Alcock: We have spent a great deal of time thinking through C2 over the past few months, and C2 in terms of operating from benign to high combat environments.
The inbuilt working relationship between the RN and the RAF engendered by the carrier is an important forge point to get the two services to think through 21st century technologies and approaches to C2.
And given the carrier and the MTG will be used not just as national assets but as coalition ones, then working the coalition piece of this is crucial as well.
Lt. Cdr. Kitchen during the panel discussion aboard the USS WASP. Credit: SLD
Question: Could we return to the challenge of adaptation posed by the carrier to the RN.
How do you view this challenge?
Alcock: In part it is about the carrier; and in part is about the F-35. A core challenge is to get the RN understand what fifth generation is all about.
Do we understand what 5th gen means?
Do we understand what the carrier can do? Do we understand how type 45 or new type 26 will integrate into the MTG and what we can then bring to other coalition partners?
That is where the hard work is going to come and actually getting that out to people to incorporate in their operations and train and exercise the capability.
We clearly face a challenge in bringing the various strands of innovation and transformation together into the operational crescendo necessary to make the MTF fully effective.
Question: A number of British allies are in throes of change as well, ranging from the Aussies to Italians.
Clearly, you are bringing a powerful evolving template to the process of shaping 21st century combat approaches.
You’re part of the club trying to figure out how to do combat differently moving forward in the 21st century.
Does that make sense?
Walker: It does.
That is one of the strengths which comes from the various working groups we have within MoD and with core allies.
We can both learn and contribute to the overall learning process for coalition partners.
HMS Queen Elizabeth in all her glory: An artists impression reveals the decks of new 65,000-ton Royal Navy warship that will be able to carry 2,300 crew and enough space to transport 36 F-35 Lightning fighter jetsRead more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2972278/Britain-s-new-aircraft-carrier-HMS-Queen-Elizabeth-sighted-River-Forth-6billion-fitting-Royal-Navy-s-biggest-ship-continues.html#ixzz3TEfX1nJu
The two graphics below are credited to the same source above.
At the end of March 2015, Second Line of Defense visited HMS Queen Elizabeth in Scotland.
These photos were shot during the visit by the RN/RAF team and are credited to them.
The first photo shows the ski jump on the flight deck for the F-35B. The second photo is of the ski jump and a shot of the Hood Dock from which HMS Hood left to go after Bismarck and to which HMS Prince of Wales returned after the Bismarck was sunk.
The third photo is shot from the ski jump and looks down at the entire flight deck.
The fourth photo shows Robbin Laird with one of the HMS Queen Elizabeth team at the end of the flight deck.
The fifth photo shows several members of the team who provided the tour of the ship.
The sixth, seventh and eighth photos show the islands aboard the flight deck.
The ninth photo provides another shot of the flight deck; the tenth photo is a shot of the reconfigurable C2 spaces aboard the ship;; the eleventh photo shows the massive crane used in the course of construction.
And the final photo shows those who provided the tour for whom more than thanks are due for providing insights into a key element of evolving air and sea power.
The British are working closely with the USN-USMC team.
Their pilots and maintainers are at MCAS Beaufort and at Edwards AFB as part of the ongoing multiple year modernization process entailed with a software upgradeable aircraft
They were closely involved with the recent USS WASP operational trials as well.
But it is a real testimony to the capabilities of the maintainers of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and the USMC to adapt to the new technological challenges.
Their knowledge of aircraft systems is now being applied to a new air system and taking steps forward into the unknown.
It is a testament to the professionalism of these maintainers that they are just getting on with the job of making this aircraft work.
Every single person involved in this detachment are passionate about this aircraft and not just because it is a sexy looking aircraft but want to see it working in every operational environment.
The E-7A Wedgetail provides Australia with one of the most advanced air battlespace management capabilities in the world.
The E-7A Wedgetail is based on a Boeing 737-700, with the addition of an advanced Multi-Role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar and 10 mission crew consoles, to create one of the most advanced pieces of technology for the Australian Defence Force.
Based at RAAF Base Williamtown, the six E-7A Wedgetails are capable of communicating with other aircraft and providing air control from the sky. They can cover four million square kilometres during a single 10 hour mission.
The E-7A Wedgetail represents an entirely new capability for the Australian Defence Force, providing an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platform that can gather information from a wide variety of sources, analyse it and distribute it to other air and surface assets.
The E-7A Wedgetail can control the tactical battle space, providing direction for fighter aircraft, surface combatants and land based elements, as well as supporting aircraft such as tankers and intelligence platforms.
Based on the 737-700 commercial airliner airframe, the E-7A Wedgetail features advanced multi role electronically scanned radar and 10 state-of-the-art mission crew consoles that are able to track airborne and maritime targets simultaneously.
The E-7A Wedgetail significantly multiplies the effectiveness of our existing Navy, Army and Air Force, and will help Australia maintain a capability edge well into the future.
The E-7A Wedgetail has participated in Exercise Bersama Lima, Exercise Cope North, Exercise Red Flag, Exercise Pitch Black and is currently deployed on Operation OKRA.
Although a good description of the platform, the underlying story of the approach to introduce the Wedgetail and then how the platform is being modernized highlights why the program is trailblazing in many ways.
When I visited 2nd Squadron during the first quarter of 2014, I was impressed with the enthusiasm and intelligence of the Squadron and their approach towards innovation.
But when I got back to Washington DC, the reaction to my experience was met with complete lack of interest or surprise.
As the editor of a leading defense magazine put it: “You mean the troubled program; I thought it had been cancelled.”
With a second trip to Australia under my belt this Summer and a chance to talk with the RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group as well as Air Marshal Davies, Air Vice Marshal MacDonald and the recently retired Air Marshal Brown, I began to understand how the “troubled” program had not only been “salvaged” but how it was “salvaged” put in the trailblazing path.
The Wedgetail has brought to the fight, unique battle management capabilities.
The Wedgetail is operated by South Korea and Turkey as well, although the Aussies have developed the most advanced version, but the South Koreans refer to it as their first “fifth generation” platform.
To understand what they mean, one has to look at some of the Wedgetail’s core capabilities.
Most fundamentally, the Wedgetail does not operate like an AWACs.
The AWACs works in tracks directing the air battle but does so with a 360 degree rotating radar.
It is the hub of a hub and spoke air combat system.
With the coming of the fifth generation aircraft, there is a need for air battle management, but not of the hub and spoke kind.
And with the challenge of operating in the expanded battlespace, it is not simply a question of management of air assets, but management of the assets operating in the expanded battlespace, regardless if they are air, naval or ground.
The Wedgetail is a key step forward in shaping a 21st century or to use the South Korean characterization “a fifth generation” approach to battle management for evolving combat demands.
The Wedgetail provides for the key function of air traffic control; which will remain important in the 21st century battlespace.
But it is designed with the reach rather than range approach characteristic of fifth generation systems; the MESA radar can be dialed up in terms of energy and focused in terms of direction on priority scan areas.
As one Northrop Grumman engineer put it:
“There is a fundamental shift operationally in terms of how one uses the Wedgetail versus the AWACS.
You no longer are limited or defined by a 360 degree rotator.
You are able to configure how much power you want to put into your radar reach; it is configurable to the mission.
The integrated IFF and radar functionality also allows the system to reach much greater than other systems into the battlespace to shape greater situational awareness in the battlespace.
You can put the energy in the mission area where you have the highest priority.”
This allows much greater reach, and is also part of enhanced survivability as well.
This means as well that it can act on demands identified by deployed fifth generation and other aircraft with regard to the areas where extended reach and focus for surveillance needs to be directed.
With the first combat operations initiated in the Middle East, the Wedgetail squadron and the RAAF are evolving not only lessons learned, but shaping demands for the evolution of the software systems within the Wedgetail.
The Wedgetail is one of the first or the first software upgradeable aircraft and built so from the ground up.
Rather than requirements set by testers and acquisition officials, the warfighting community can shape a demand side driven set of desired changes, which is then worked out with the engineering side of the house, which includes a key partnership with Boeing and Northrop Grumman in shaping the doability of meeting the demands.
And as one Northrop Grumman engineer put it: “Working closely with the RAAF we can identify and develop a software response or upgrade and have it operational within six to twelve months thereafter.”
The Wedgetail program went from “troubled” to trailblazing by starting with a significant and decisive decision.
Instead of a long list of requirements which had to be met in order for the aircraft to be declared operational, a baseline was established after which the plane was put in the hands of the warfighters for training and preparing for operations.
Put bluntly, getting the platform into the hands of the warfighters early and then leveraging software upgradeability to shape a demand driven modernization strategy was the key foundation for moving ahead with a new 21st century capability.
This was not business as usual; but a whole new approach.
And in that sense it clearly is trailblazing, and has been a key part of inspiring the Plan Jericho approach to shaping a more innovative and integrated combat force moving ahead.
About five years ago, the baseline was frozen and the operational community brought into the process.
Question: As Chief you decided to push your new aircraft – Wedgetail and the KC-30A – out to the force rather than waiting for the long list of tests to be complete.
Why?
Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: Testers can only do so much.
Once an aircraft is functional you need to get in the hand of the operators, pilots, crews and maintainers. They will determine what they think the real priorities for the evolution of the aircraft, rather than a test engineer or pilot.
And you get the benefit of a superior platform from day one.
When I became Deputy Chief of Air Force, the Wedgetail was being slowed down by the Kabuki effort to arrange specification lines for the aircraft. There was much hand-wringing amongst the program staff as to how it didn’t meet the specifications that we had put out.
I said, “Let’s just give it to the operators.”
And the advantage of basically giving the aircraft to the operators was what the test community and the engineers thought were real limitations the operators did not. Sometimes it took the operators two days to figure a work around.
And the real advantage of the development was that they would prioritize what was really needed to be fixed from the operational point of view, not the testing point of view.
In other words, you can spend a lot of time trying to get back to the original specifications.
But when you actually give it to the operators they actually figure out what’s important or what isn’t important and then use the aircraft in real world operations.
The current Chief of Staff of the RAAF, Air Marshal Davies provided a very clear emphasis on the importance of demand driven modernization, rather than acquisitions driven by vast bureaucracies of requirements generators:
Question: And this would not have happened if the RAAF leadership had not decided to put the assets in the hands of the warfighter rather than waiting for some procurement official to declare IOC?
Air Marshal Davies: That is exactly right. We put these assets in the hands of the warfighter to use and to determine what systems needed to be further developed in order to achieve the operational readiness, which the warfighters actually sought.
Both platforms took time to evolve to the point where we could effectively use them; but we put them into the hands of the warfighters more rapidly than traditional procurements approaches would allow.
This is certainly part of what we mean by Plan Jericho – let the warfighters have a decisive say on what is needed from an operational standpoint, in terms of what the fleet can deliver rather than simply upgrading individual platforms organically.
And getting into operations is crucial in terms of operator confidence and coalition capabilities.
With the Wedgetail deployed, allies got use to it and considered it a very reliable asset and the radar performance to be extraordinary.
Without that operational confidence, the asset will not be used as often or as effectively.
We see this as part of the Plan Jericho approach – get into the hands of the operators to determine what capabilities are best next and from which platform?
What does a .02DB Delta on a radar range mean for an operator?
I don’t know.
Let’s give it to the operators and find out.
And that’s what we’ve done.
Establishing a baseline and then putting into the hands of the operators was crucial to getting the Wedgetail into combat; the modernization path is also trailblazing in that it relies on demand driven software modifications worked in close interaction with the industry team.
The software upgradeable side of the equation was highlighted during my visit to 2nd squadron.
This is a software upgradeable aircraft with a defined launch point (IOC) but no fixed end point (FOC). The system will always be evolving and growing as the software code gets rewritten to reflect events and demands from the squadron.
The squadron works through its experience and shapes change orders which get sent to the procurement authorities to sort out priorities for the next round of upgrading the aircraft.
The difference between older and such a new system was outlined by one participant in the roundtable as follows:
“We have in the same time frame bought a CRC system full up which will look pretty much like it is in 20 years; with Wedgetail it will look nothing like it does now in 20 years.”
A recent visit to Baltimore, Maryland with the Northrop Grumman team working on Wedgetail provided important information with regard to the way ahead with regard to working closely with the RAAF as well as working in support of the kind of integration the RAAF envisages as its brings its P-8 and new Triton RPA on line in the Australian Defence Force.
In discussions with Paul Kalafos, Vice President of Surveillance Systems at Northrop Grumman, and his Wedgetail team, the Wedgetail experience and working with the RAAF on shaping an integrated surveillance and C2 decision set was the focus of attention.
Northrop Grumman is teamed with Boeing as the prime contractor for Wedgetail.
The specially configured 737 has been acquired by the South Koreans (Project Peace Eye) and by Turkey (Project Peace Eagle).
The three nations have a similarly configured aircraft from a hardware point of view, but the software is configured differently for each.
“The Australians are the leading nation in terms of software; they have been investing in the software development with the industrial team and lead the way. They have been funding a number of updates.”
The RAAF is working closely with the industrial team in shaping upgrades, and this involves co-investment as well in the evolving capabilities.
The AEW&C Radar Capabilities Study (ARCS) is the model for shaping the evolutionary path forward, driven by operational experiences of the RAAF.
“We are getting significant feedback from the RAAF on deployment and requests to automate tasks where possible to enhanced the capability of the machine part of the man-machine relationship to shape a way ahead.
A lot of the input is through the ARCS working group, which is a collaborative study environment involving Boeing, Northrop Grumman, MIT/Lincoln Labs, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), CEA Technologies, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and the Common Wealth of Australia (CoA). Operational requirements come out of that process and shape the next increment of software development.”
“The ARCS is focused on problems and their resolutions. These are software updates. We get a software refresh out about once a year. Six months are spent doing the study to shape the plausible change; and the next six months are spent doing the integration and then getting it out the door. We shed the specs in favor of resolving problems, which the operational community identified. They can even write recommended change requests as well which provides part of the demand side process.”
An important upgrade for the Wedgetail was made in late 2014 prior to the deployment to the Middle East.
Prior to the initial deployment the E-7A was fitted with an IP chat capability, providing text rather than voice connectivity with the Combined Air Operations Centre in theater.
“The introduction of the IP chat capability into the aircraft was a real success story for us,” said Paul Carpenter, who was the commanding officer of the Wedgetail squadron and the detachment commander of the first rotation of Wedgetail personnel who returned to Australia in January (2015).
“That project looked like being many years in the future, but when we got notice of our Operation Okra deployment, our engineering department team got together with the wing, AEW&C System Project Office and Boeing Defence Australia and came up with a solution in a matter of weeks.”
And this is not simply about the Wedgetail as a platform; it is about shaping a more integrated force going forward.
Notably, the Aussies are acquiring the P-8 and the Triton RPA and the expectation – as expressed by the senior RAAF leaders, notably with the Surveillance Response Group – is that these capabilities will provide integration solutions.
And this means that software evolution on any one platform will be informed by developments on the others.
It is about cross-cutting or interactive modernization, not simply stovepiped upgrades of single platforms, or upgrades designed to make the platform more effective in doing its initial task, but rather upgrades informed by what the operational force most needs from a particular platform.
And when the bell first rung in combat, the Wedgetail and its combat team was ready.
As a piece by Brian Hartigan put it with regard to the telling moment:
010411ZOCT14 was the exact moment that the ‘shit got real’ for callsign Magpie 01 – Australia’s E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft – as it crossed the official line that separates the air war against ISIS from the rest of the world.
010411ZOCT14 …that’s 1 October 2014 at 4.11am UTC for those who need translation from the military date/time group – or 7.11am local.
That first mission was supposed to be a fairly easy-paced shadowing of an American E-3 Sentry on station over the northern-Iraqi Battle Management Area (BMA), to allow the mission crew (using their own onboard callsign “Outback”) to observe how the job was done in real time before taking on any live tasking.
But when the ageing E-3 developed technical problems early in its mission, the Aussies stepped up and took over – throwing themselves and Australia’s newest and most advanced warplane headlong into the fight.
Back at Air Task Group Headquarters, RAAF Squadron Leader Glenn ‘Fish’ Salmon heard the call, “All stations, g’day. Outback has the BMA” – and callsign Outback began to prove itself to its coalition partners.
So successful has Australia’s Wedgetail now become that stories of American strike squadrons delaying or planning missions to coincide with Wedgetail flight times have filtered back to a proud Aussie hierarchy.
This is what shaping a baseline and getting the aircraft into the hands of the warfighters can deliver.
And a demand driven software development process, rather than hundreds of testers and bureaucratic overseers, can lead to the right kind of change in the rapid manner required for 21st century combat operations and experience.
There is a core lesson to be learned from the RAAF and the Aussies for those in Washington who love bureaucracy and oversight more than effective results.
The photos in the slideshow provide various shots of the Wedgetail.
The first photo shows he view from the cockpit of a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft as it approaches a RAAF KC-30 Multirole Tanker Transport aircraft in the sky over northern Iraq. Clearly visible is the extended probe of the tanker’s refueling boom, which features the latest technology available for this difficult operation.
10/26/15
The second and third photos show 2 Squadron Wedgetail, Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft , AIR – AIR of first to arrive in Australia. Flying along coast of New South Wales from Williamtown Air Force Base then over Sydney Harbour.
9/15/15
The fourth and fifth photos show KC-30A MRTT and E-7A Wedgetail conducting Air to Air refueling testing in the airspace near RAAF Williamtown.
6/10/2015
The sixth photo shows the Minister for Defence, The Hon Kevin Andrews MP (bottom of the stairs), and the Deputy Chief of Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal Gavin ‘Leo’ Davies, AO, CSC exit a No 2 Squadron E-7A Wedgetail aircraft after being shown the onboard Mission System.
The seventh photo shows Squadron Leader Andrew Boeree (foreground) shows the Minister for Defence, The Hon Kevin Andrews MP; the Member for Solomon, Mrs Natasha Griggs MP; and the Deputy Chief of Air Force, Air Vice-Marshal Gavin ‘Leo’ Davies, AO, CSC the onboard Mission System on the situational display in a No 2 Squadron E-7A Wedgetail aircraft.
5/26/15
The final photo shows two F/A-18A Hornets and a E-7A Wedgetail aircraft fly over the Anzac Day 2015 National Ceremony at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
2015-11-28 The Luftwaffe operates the Heron 1 in Afghanistan with support from Airbus Defence and Space.
The German Air Force focuses on utilization of the aircraft and Airbus and Defence and Space is responsible for operating the systems and guarantees the operational readiness of Heron 1 in Afghanistan.
This services business model expands the capability of the German forces and enables Airbus and Defence to focus on operations and modernization,
According to an Airbus Defence and Space press release published on November 27, 2015:
Following this year’s 410th flight on 16 November 2015, the Heron Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), which is jointly operated by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) and Airbus Defence and Space, successfully landed in Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan, bringing the total number of flight hours it has completed in the country up to 25,000. The occasion was celebrated at Camp Mazar-e-Sharif together with the Luftwaffe.
The Heron UAS delivers valuable intelligence and surveillance data round-the-clock to the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) for its ‘Resolute Support’ mission in Afghanistan.
The UAS’s satellite data link makes it possible to monitor the entire northern half of the country – which, at over 300,000 square kilometers, is almost the size of the Federal Republic of Germany. The UAS thus makes a meanwhile invaluable contribution to protecting soldiers and the civilian population in Afghanistan.
Ralf Hastedt, Head of Sales at Airbus DS Airborne Solutions, underlines:
“With this system the Luftwaffe is performing leading services in comparison to other nations. A great number of operators and maintenance personnel both from the Luftwaffe and industry have now been trained to use this UAS, and the experience we have gained on a national scale will certainly prove useful for other mission and when using future MALE UAS.”
Heron 1 in Afghanistan. Credit Photo: Airbus Defence and Space
The UAS’s availability for carrying out long-term surveillance and reconnaissance operations from the air via real-time video is an essential criterion for all operations in the region.
The high degree of acceptance is not least thanks to the hard work of the on-site maintenance team, which ensures the operational readiness of the aircraft and ground stations 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
The press release adds details with regard to how the working relationship between the German military and Airbus works in Afghanistan.
Manufactured by the Israeli company IAI, Heron 1 is a medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAS for the respective theatre of operations. The aircraft has a wingspan of 17 meters and a typical mission endurance of over 24 hours.
The Heron 1’s military tasks include detecting booby traps from the air, accompanying convoys and patrols, assisting forces in combat situations, reconnaissance and surveilling routes, establishing movement profiles, long-term monitoring, supporting situational assessments, and protecting property and military camps. The UAS is also used to support humanitarian missions as well as to safeguard the national security of countries.
Airbus Defence and Space is responsible for operating the systems and guarantees the operational readiness of Heron 1 in Afghanistan as agreed on the basis of an operator model.
To this end, the company has stationed some 40 engineers, pilots and UAS specialists in the region to maintain the system and conduct test flights.
This ensures that the Bundeswehr can call on an airborne intelligence capability at all times.
It also frees it from non-core tasks so that it can concentrate fully on completing its mission.
According to reliable sources, the vital first test in ejecting a missile from its onboard silos was conducted November 25.
Proverbially, adding a feather to the cap of the Indian Navy and scientists from DRDO and BARC, the firing was done remotely from a far away location by the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), India’s nuclear command authority which is tasked with creating nuclear deterrence.
Primarily, the test was to check system alignments for smooth and safe ejection and the requirements were met.
To mention more achievements, the indigenous submarine has also successfully completed the critical diving tests, and significantly, met nearly all its design and designated parameters just about 100 per cent, including the maximum possible power option tests.
It is actually good news all over, but the last one final step before the submarine is inducted as INS Arihant formally in the Indian Navy will be the firing of proper missiles albeit with unarmed warheads.
Details are unavailable but this should happen soon enough as there are indications of the submarine taking part in the International Fleet Review (IFR) being held by the Navy in February.
The boat should be operational by then, sources told India Strategic.
The missile fired was a dummy version of DRDO’s B 5, which approximately has a range of 1000 km. Later, missiles with a reach of 3500 to 4000 km, are likely to be inducted onboard.
India plans to build some half a dozen Arihant class, in line with the country’s nuclear doctrine which calls for No First Use but Massive Retaliation if attacked.
Arihant is built with Russian designs, but this will be the country’s first nuclear powered nuclear attack submarine, classified in international naval lingo as SSBN.
India has one more nuclear powered submarine, INS Chakra, leased from Russia, but that cannot fire nuclear missiles. The classification for such boats is SSN.
Like any submarine, both INS Arihant and INS Chakra are pearl shaped to accommodate the vertically launched missiles, and designed to move faster underwater than on the surface.
They can stay deep in the darkness of the oceans for months, the only restrictions being the limits on human tolerance and availability of nuclear fuel.
It may be recalled that the project for nuclear submarines was sanctioned soon after the 1974 nuclear test by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi but it suffered when Morarji Desai and VP Singh took over as Prime Ministers in the coming years.
In 1983, Mrs Gandhi pushed the project once again with required funds, but it was in 1998, when India conducted the second round of nuclear tests, that Prime Minister AB Vajpayee sanctioned the project afresh, and a decision was also taken to involve the private sector.
Larsen & Toubro, India’s premier engineering construction company, was involved right from then onwards.
L&T, as it is known, has done commendable work in gradually and systematically building a horizontal supply-chain base and meeting the DRDO and naval specifications.
DRDO, or Defence Research and Development Organisation, has been in-charge of the India’s missile systems programs throughout, which it has delivered with distinction.
Nuclear propulsion systems have been installed and managed by experts from BARC, or Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.
Indications of Arihant’s journey have been coming out for some time, and recently, Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Robin Dhowan mentioned the possibility of its inclusion in the IFR in rather positive terms although he did not understandably commit.
The tests are done one by one, and for a nuclear boat, every single check is critical. Deployment has to be thoughtfully and carefully, even if it takes time as safety and success are both paramount.
Notably, in IFR, only operational ships and submarines can and will take part.
2015-11-27 Readers of Second Line of Defense were not surprised by the Turkish shootdown of the Russian aircraft.
Hardly, an unpredictable event, the shootdown is a function of the evolving situation and Turkish objectives.
With regard to context, Professor Amatzia Baram highlighted two important data points going into this phase of developments in the region.
First, the Israelis and Jordanians recognized the obvious threat of airspace intrusions and set up a hotline with Moscow and discussed the situation with the Russians.
There is a key danger however.
Our pilots know every tree and every trench between Israel and Turkey.
The Russian pilots do not and there is a clear danger that they will show up in key conflict areas unintended with perhaps negative consequences.
That is why deconfliction hot lines are important as well.
In Syria, the U.S. and the allies have vast areas to adjust; in between Israel, Lebanon, and Damascus, and the Alawite mountain and shore line, we are talking only a few kilometers.
We already know from interviewing European pilots involved in the Baltic air patrol that the Russian pilots are young and there have been incidents in which it is not clear that the older established rules of the game are known or executed.
Professor Baram added an additional aspect which plays in the current event as well.
Question: Will the Russians expand their influence in Iraq as well due to their expanded Syrian presence?
Amatzia Baram: We shall see what they do, but they clearly are gaining traction in Iraq with their actions.
For example, the NATO radars in Northern Iraq are feeding information into the joint intelligence center in Iraq.
The Iraqi government is sharing information with the Iranians and now with the Russians.
Putin could well use information gained from this source to dispute Turkish claims that the Russian planes were shot down in Turkish airspace.
And what makes the Turkish claims murky at best is the position of the current Turkish Administration, which has de facto aided Isis, certainly the ISIS oil traffic, as well as being more interested in killing Kurds than ISIS.
Clearly, the Turkish Administration has used the US desire to use Turkish air bases – something which they did not allow when the U.S. needed it in the Iraq wars – to gain de facto support for the Turkish Administration objectives.
Professor Baram in an interview in 2014 highlighted the Turkish dynamic.
So the Kurds can then take back the Kurdish areas if you support them.
With American support they have already pushed ISIL out of the Mosul Dam, north of the city.
But what to do about support for the Syrian Kurds?
Here Turkey comes into play; the support of the current Turkish Administration of ISIL is making the US Administration absolutely furious but not furious enough to provide weapons and other supplies to the Syrian Kurds.
Russia is a key player in the way ahead against ISIS.
The French recognize this and have shaped an approach with Russia to expand capabilities to go after ISIS as well.
These actions are driven by fundamental interests and are unlikely to be slowed down by third party “warnings”
Now the Russians are moving in significant air defense assets which changes the game in terms of the use of airspace not just in Syria but more broadly given that borders are difficult to determine in many situations.
There is little reason not to work with Russia in sorting out a way ahead, which is not the same as acquiescing in Putin’s view of the world or his broader global ambitions.
Russia has accused Turkey of ‘planned provocation’ and supporting ISIS in selling human organs after one of Moscow’s fighter jets was shot down by the Turkish army
The situation can easily spin out of control.
As a Daily Mail piece published on November 26, 2015 highlighted:
Russian president Vladimir Putin has accused the U.S. of being complicit in the destruction of its military jet three days ago – suggesting the Americans knew exactly when and where it was travelling.
In a press conference at the Kremlin yesterday, Putin said the Russians had given prior information to the U.S. of the flight path of the plane – but the U.S. had ‘leaked’ the information to Turkey.
In other developments, Putin’s dreaded S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems – mobilized in the wake of the jet’s destruction – were photographed being unloaded from military transports in Syria.
He also vowed to join France in coordinating bombing campaigns against ISIS forces and agreed to share intelligence information.
Given the point made by Professor Baram about the northern Iraq radars and feeding of information, Putin’s accusation certainly gains in credibility.
Rather than abstract debates about the future of the world, and climate change conferences in Paris, it might make sense to sort out how to work with Russia and key allies in the destruction of the ISIS infrastructure.
Editor’s Note: This story from the CNN interview with the President of Turkey highlights the dispute between Turkey and Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin told reporters in Moscow on Thursday that the strike was unexpected.
“It did not even come into our mind that we could be struck by a party that we considered to be our ally,” he said. “We considered Turkey to be a friendly country.”
Putin also noted that Russia had informed the United States, Turkey’s ally, of its flight path, and said it was “not possible” the Turkish air force didn’t recognize the Russian aircraft.
“Turkey is a member of this (U.S.-led) coalition and must know that Russians are working there,” he said.
But to this the Turkish President had a different version.
“I think if there is a party that needs to apologize, it is not us,” he said from the Turkish capital. “Those who violated our airspace are the ones who need to apologize. Our pilots and our armed forces, they simply fulfilled their duties, which consisted of responding to … violations of the rules of engagement. I think this is the essence.”
And diverting attention from the Turkish role in the war against ISIS, the Presdient added:
“If Mr. Putin is saying that we are cooperating with Daesh, that we are accomplices, I think that would be a huge mistake, because we are doing the exact opposite,” he told CNN, using another name for ISIS. “Yesterday there was a declaration which was very unacceptable. Some people claimed that we were buying oil from Daesh — and the fact that people in positions of authority in Russia said this is very, very unacceptable.”
What is the difference between the “good” Islamic fighter vs the “bad” Islamic fighter is not very clear in this situation.
With pride the video embedded in the story shows the Turkoman rebel ally (“the good guys”) bragging about shooting the Russian pilot under parachute and killing him while the crowd screams “Allahu Akbar“ in the background.
Same in the funker video after they TOW the rescue helo.
No matter the former act is illegal under the Geneva Conventions.
Construction of the first lot of six VH 92 Super Hawk helicopters for the U.S. President has made its beginnings in India.
The new generation presidential helicopter is based on the Sikorsky S-92 model, whose cabin, some other parts and wire harnesses are made only in India in collaboration with Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) at Hyderabad.
Work on the cabins, the initial building blocks for the VVIP helicopters, began recently at this facility, sources told India Strategic.
The VH variant is a much advanced version of the civilian S 92 rotorcraft or its military version H 92 with more powerful twin engines, fly by wire systems, and highly advanced Communication and Electronic Warfare (EW) protection suites.
The US President is the most protected person in the world, and appropriately, the Tata-made aluminum and metal cabin may be reinforced with Kevlar and strong composite materials.
Precise details are nearly impossible to get, and even timelines for the presidential aircraft are never disclosed. But development means many tests and many trial flights, particularly if the US President has to fly in these helicopters.
In any case, the manufacturers in India will get no idea which of their cabins have finally been selected for the White House machines.
It is possible that some flight testing may already have begun.
In any case, all the fittings are to be done in the U.S. itself, and what is delivered when and where is also determined there. In a couple of years though, after harsh tests and trials, the next U.S. President may take off from the White House in one of these India-made cabins.
TASL makes 48 cabins a year, and which six of these cabins are selected for the VVIP helicopters, will be decided by experts from the US Secret Sevice, Marines and Lockheed Martin in the US itself.
The Presidential helicopter fleet is maintained by the US Marine Corps, and any machine that the head of the state boards, gets the call sign Marine One.
At least five of these aircraft travel with the President wherever he goes, even when abroad. He stays connected with his office through satellites or connectivity by other systems irrespective of wherever he is.
Sikorsky had won the $1.24 billion deal in May 2014 to develop and build six new generation VVIP configuration machines, with the number going up gradually to 23 over the next few years and their value going up to an estimated $3 billion.
The project then envisaged cooperation with Lockheed Martin (LM) for onboard protection and communication suites. Its financial component is to be additional for all the space-age gizmos and tech suites that it will put on board those machines. Details are not available.
Significantly, Lockheed is now also in command and control of all of Sikorsky’s famed flying machines as only recently, it acquired the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation from United Technologies Corporation (UTC).
Lockheed Martin is the world’s biggest military systems giant, and the TASL project is now part of its own very impressive portfolio.
Notably, when Sikorsky won the deal for the VH 92, it was described as the world’s most advanced executive transport helicopter by Sikorsky President Mick Maurer.
Sikorsky has been flying the US Presidents since 1957, beginning with Dwight D Eisenhower. The current versions that the President flies in are designated VH 3D and VH 69, based on the older generation of Sikorsky machines.
It may be recalled that the Tata-Sikorsky (76:24) venture had rolled out is first cabin in 2010, about a year after the assembly line was shifted from Japan to India. Reliable sources told India Strategic that by now, tens of these cabins have been exported to the US for completion and deployment globally as required.
The construction of the VIP configuration variant incidentally is an example of how UTC initiated a venture in India with an eye on the future for the company and a vision for the growing US – India Strategic relations. This in fact has often been emphasized by Sikorsky’s India and South Asia Managing Director Air Vice Marshal AJS Walia (Retd).
The spacious S 92 is already being used for VIP travel in some countries, and is also on offer to India for both government and civilian roles.
Reprinted with permission of our strategic partner, India Strategic.
Background: In 2014, Sikorsky Aircraft was awarded the contract to replace the Marine One helicopter fleet used to transport the President.
The initial US$1.24 billion contract is for six S-92 helicopters and two trainer simulators for the US Marine Corps iss part of a development and conversion program that will see a fleet of 21 aircraft built for presidential use by 2023.
2015-11-25 Europe is in the throes of fundamental transformation.
Certainly, this is not the top down transformation experienced in the 1990s.
This is crisis engendered transformation, where what is not done is as important as what is done in the reshaping of Europe.
The Eurozone crisis raises fundamental questions about the way ahead on core financial issues, not just with regard to the single currency.
The continuing economic crisis does not provide significant room for maneuver to deal with the broader Euro management set of challenges.
Then the outpouring of refuges from the Eastern Mediterranean into Europe, placing sever strain on social, economic and political systems already struggling with broader identity issues.
Then the power projection of ISIS into the heart of France has raised fundamental questions about security in the Euro-Med zone and with it questions of the broader European security and defense issues.
Expulsion of Greece from Schengen to safeguard freedom of movement in Europe? (Photo: wfbakker2)
An activist Russia, engaged on virtual every European borderland, and forging innovative ways to engage to get its interests met, is a key force reshaping the strategic landscape.
And with a U.S. preoccupied with domestic issues and a cautious President whose approach to become President is being overcome by the events of his Administration, pressure is on for key European states to shape national perspectives to protect interests and at the same time restructure significantly what European institutions are all about, other than collecting a common tax for the benefit of Brussels bureaucrats.
Today the EUObserver published an op ed by Angelos Chryssogelos which highlights the EU’s crisis within the crisis.
Excerpts from the article follow but the full article can be found and read here:
With Europe currently absorbed by the refugee crisis and, after the Paris attacks, its security implications, the Eurozone crisis, once considered an ‘existential threat’ to the EU, suddenly feels remote.
The EU’s capacity to respond effectively to the migration emergency in the coming months, however, is heavily conditioned by the legacy of the Eurozone crisis.
There are three parallels between the Eurozone and the migration crises: the hybrid nature of European governance structures that are little prepared to face up to major external challenges; the preeminence of Germany as a key player; and the important role of a peripheral country – Greece – as a conduit for an external challenge that is becoming an internal crisis.
These issues will determine whether and how the EU will overcome the refugee crisis.
They are also, all the same, the areas in which the EU’s capacities have been most stretched by the Eurozone crisis.
First, much as the Eurozone, Schengen reflects the willingness of EU member-states to cooperate in an area that touches upon the core of national sovereignty (border control), but without fully delegating decision-making and legislative and regulatory initiatives to a supranational agency (like the Commission in ‘first pillar’ policies).
While the involvement of the Commission can be significant, political impetus requires intergovernmental agreement while effective implementation relies on national policies, in border control as much as macroeconomic policy.
This makes both structures slow in responding to external challenges….
The Greek Epicenter
Since 2010, Greece had largely been the epicenter of attention.
While the EU was focusing on the Greek economy, however, the groundwork for the refugee crisis was being laid.
The new radical leftist Syriza government allowed free passage for refugees and migrants through Greek soil, as they moved from Turkey to Europe in the first half of 2015.
Much as in financial matters, Greece was the crack in the edifice that allowed an external crisis to flood the EU.
Just like in Eurozone politics, the long-term viability and attractiveness of the European project will be under stress in the following months as the capacity of the EU to keep its zone of free internal movement and common protection of external borders intact is tested.
Again, Greece may be the crucial test of Europe’s credibility. Ironically, the radical leftist ideology of Tsipras and his government makes them an amenable partner to moderates like Merkel and the Commission in the refugee issue.
Tsipras has been willing to collaborate with the EU on this issue, probably expecting rewards in the question of the Greek debt. This expectation presupposes that the tone in the EU will continue to be given by the moderates.
Schengen zone
This, however, is doubtful after the Paris attacks. At the same time, with the EU’s refugee relocation scheme ineffectual and the states of the Western Balkans erecting fences along their borders, the capacity of the EU to offer relief is rapidly lagging behind the still huge daily inflows of refugees to Greek islands.
Greece may soon realise that, instead of contemplating relaxing its economic terms in exchange for Greece’s cooperation in the refugee question, the EU (or at least some European politicians) will begin contemplating an expulsion of Greece from Schengen as the most effective (and cheaper) way to safeguard freedom of movement in Europe.
The governance deficits of the Greek polity and the imperfect integration in the area of border protection may very soon make the discussion about the EU’s territorial integrity and the irreversibility of European integration flare up again.
The above does not mean that the EU will necessarily fail to survive the refugee crisis.
As with the Eurozone, a combination of skillful diplomacy, purposeful leadership (particularly by Germany) and a sense of urgency may yet allow collaborative solutions to emerge.
Yet there is no reason to expect this to be a smooth process.
Instead, much will depend on the political capital that national governments across Europe still have at their disposal in order to push through compromises with their respective publics.
The long shadow of five years of painstaking Eurozone crisis management will make this a tougher challenge than any the EU has ever faced.
Angelos Chryssogelos is a research fellow at the Hellenic Observatory of the LSE and an Academy associate fellow at the Europe Programme of Chatham House.
