2015-06-19 By Robbin Laird (with Murielle Delaporte)

During May 2015, I had a chance to return to VMU-2 and to continue the discussion of the USMC approach to the evolution of unmanned aerial systems within the expeditionary force.

In that interview, the importance of shaping a more flexible UAS for USMC operations was highlighted,

With regard to the RQ-21A, the squadron was working with industry to shape ways to enhance capability.

We are looking at size, weight, power tradeoffs to enhance overall platform capability. 

Currently, we are at 135 pounds with the platform and we could go as high as 165 which would give us more payload to carry onboard.

Lt. Col. Faught emphasized throughout the discussion the need to evolve the payloads along with other key aviation capabilities being shaped for the MAGTF.  He especially felt that EW payloads will be increasingly of interest going forward.

And he felt as the F-35B joins the force along with the Ospreys, the opportunity to rework evolving UAVs to operate with these more expensive combat systems would be significant.

During this visit, which was with Murielle Delaporte, we discussed the way ahead with Captain Guy Nelson, the Operations Officer, Captain Johnathan Putney, the Assistant Operations Officer, and Captain Justin Pvlischek, the Intel Officer.

The members of the squadron provided a very clear perspective on the challenges and potential ways ahead.

It is clear that the use of UASs in Afghanistan was an important phase in the evolution of UAS use within the US forces.

But this really is a phase and one which needs to be put into its historical place with a clear need to move on.

UASs were used in a land operation with many years of infrastructure put into place, and this infrastructure – wide ranging, expensive and significant – is hardly going to be waiting for an expeditionary insertion force.

And the con-ops learned in Afghanistan clearly are a problem as well.

As one squadron member put it:

“The UAS controllers were more part of the intelligence system in Afghanistan than of the Marine Corps.

They were an asset which plugged into the intelligence gathering system, and did not operate as we do more generally with air assets in the USMC.

Normally, the airborne assets work with the ground element and share the intelligence picture in an operational context.

This was the norm in Afghanistan: an external asset managed by the intelligence system rather than organic integration with the MAGTF.

As the operations officer put it bluntly: “We are trying to burn down the whole UAV structure which the Marine Corps created in Afghanistan and shaping a new approach, one in which it is integrated within MAGTF operations.”

According to the Marines interviewed, the intelligence community views UAVs as “their assets” because that is how the system evolved in Afghanistan.

“UAV operations personnel would basically check in with the air officer who would then pass them over to intel and they would then work together.”

Rather than having UAVs as part of the fire support system, they became assets which were part of observation and evaluation and the authorization of fires was handled separately.

“This became a loop rather than a straight line which is where we would like it be when we operate as a MAGTF.”

The separation of Marine Corps UAV assets was the norm rather than the exception.

“When I would fly in Afghanistan, I might look down and see a Shadow or Scan Eagle below me, but I never once coordinated with these assts.

I had no idea what they were looking at.

I just knew that they were below me,” noted the Operations Officer.

Lt General David A. Deptula, who in his last active duty position oversaw the planning, policy, and development of Air Force UAVs, and grew that force by over 500 percent in the Air Force, agreed with the Marine officers interviewed about the need for integration.

“One of the biggest advantages of remotely piloted aircraft is that they allow for the condensation of the ‘find, fix, and finish’ kill chain onto one platform.

To capitalize on this capability these aircraft need to be integrated into the entire combat enterprise, not just one piece of it.”

That is exactly what the next phase of UAVs involve in the Marine Corps—the integration of these systems within the Air Combat Element (ACE) of the MAGTF.

“The GCE should be requesting the capability, not the asset.

If you need persistent IS with full motion video, that will probably fall to UAS.”

The UAS operator is a key part of the equation and when it works properly, the operator can work with the GCE and work with the sensor onto the target by shared situational awareness.

The challenge is shaping ways to parse the information to the appropriate element within the MAGTF to empower the GCE or ACE to become more effective.

A problem facing the USMC is the relatively limited capabilities of the UASs which they currently operate whether the Shadow or the RQ-21A.

Their range is limited, and their footprint is not agile.

The Marines are bringing the RQ-21A aboard amphibious ships but its limited range – 50 nautical miles – and its footprint limit its utility. 

And it takes up precious ship space as well.

“4 Shadows take about 50-55 Marines to operate with only one airborne at any one time.

With the RQ-21A we will take 22 marines with us onto the ship with the MEU but with our equipment size, we are already taking up about 12-15% of the space on the ship.”

These limitations also can frustrate the training and career processes.

Marines are trained at Air Force UAV schools and the Air Force personnel go on to operate Predators, and the Marines operate a much more limited asset.

Another clear requirement is to build swappable packages for the evolving USMC UAS birds as well, for missions can highlight C2, ISR or EW needs.

And the sweet spot for the USMC would be to have UASs, which could work with Ospreys and F-35s to provide persistent capability complementing the insertion force.

The RQ-21A has too small of payload to be able to provide for this kind of operational flexibility being limited to the 20 pound or less category.

But there is a clear need, one driven by USMC innovation overall.

“When we looked at an after action report for a SP-MAGTF mission, there was a desire to have communications reachback, the ability to have armed escort and persistence surveillance, all capabilities which the proper UAS can provide.

Why would put in anything else but a UAS to provide for those capabilities?”

And a core challenge facing UASs clearly is not just bandwidth but jamming.

“Our current platforms actually operate at bandwidths that are commercially available. Our Shadow operates at the same bandwidth as your WiFi does.”

Beyond the question of evolving a new generation of UASs more appropriate for the USMC expeditionary approach and Osprey and F-35 enabled and capable of collaborative engagement, there is an opportunity in the short term.

The USAF has Predators going to the Air National Guard and as Afghanistan winds down Predators could be made available to the Marines.

For the Africa and Middle East missions, Marine Corps Predators could be operated on French bases in West Africa and Djibouti in East Africa (where the Italians recently operated Predators for several months) with the ground stations able to support USN-USMC ARG-MEUs operating on either side of Africa.

The Marines did not suggest this option, but they did focus on how longer-range land based assets could support an expeditionary force.

“The Reaper is the best thing out there, whether you look at speed, range or endurance.

And you can have the ground control station anywhere you want within the broad operational area.”

In the slideshow above, two key UAVs that the squadron operates are seen as the squadron works with them in their hanger area. 

The first photos show the Shadow and its supporting elements. 

The final photos show the RQ-21A which will be deployed aboard ship soon by the Marines.

Credit Photos: Second Line of Defense

2015-06-17 By Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte

The Marines are in the throes of transformation.

The Osprey has been a major factor, as well as introducing new C2 approaches and technologies.

A core competence of the Marines is to put infantry into an objective area and to provide force protection and support for an expeditionary force.

A key contributor to this role is the Low Altitude Air Defense battalion in supporting the infantry.

As threats evolve, and Marine Corps Aviation introduces new technologies, the LAAD Marines are in the throes of change as well.

The role of LAAD and the dynamics of change were discussed with the CO of 2nd LAAD at Cherry Point during a visit on May 18, 2015.

We met with Lieutenant Colonel Raymond J. Placiente to discuss the command and the way ahead.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond J. Placiente enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1988 and was commissioned in 1992.  His command assignments include:  Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Detachment Fort Bliss, TX; Detachment Commander for the Marine Air Control Group (MACG) 28 Detachment with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Landing Force 6th Fleet 3-00); H&S Battery Commander at 2d Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalion; and HAWK Platoon Commander with 2d/1st Light Antiaircraft Missile  (LAAM) Battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel Placiente is a graduate of the Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, Amphibious Warfare School, Defense Acquisition University, and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.  He was awarded a Bachelors of Science in Computer Science from the University of Maryland Baltimore County and a Masters of Science in Computer Information Systems from Boston University.

Lt. Col. Placiente put it succinctly: “We need to shape a 21^st century employment approach but we are fielding in the case of air defense a 20^th century capability.

The stinger missile was designed to deal with the Mig-21 and Mig-29 and it does that well.

The threat is now less that kind of aircraft and now it is cruise missiles or swarming UAVs.

Even with upgrade Stinger missiles, it will be challenging to deal with the new threats.”

The Marines are in the throes of shaping a 21^st century system to build out its defensive capabilities.

And at the heart of this effort is the Ground-Based Air Defense and Ground/Air Task Oriented Rader or G/ATOR.

The G/ATOR is an expeditionary multisession radar and is intended to replace five older radar systems.

As Lt. Col. Placiente put it: “The Marines are looking at much richer sensor-enabled defensive capability to provide the infrastructure for force protection.

We need to marry the sensor rich G/ATOR radar with effective 21^st century weapons.”

Clearly, these weapons can be air, sea or ground delivered as means to attack the adversary’s offensive threats to the insertion force.

In this regard, directed energy weapons are a key element of the coming capabilities for the USMC, and the ability of the power system to power both G/ATOR and directed energy weapons would significantly enhance the capabilities of the expeditionary force.

“We are looking at directed energy and high energy lasers as a key component of ground-based air defense.

It is just part of the future of ground-based air defense because the Marine Corps vision is a mix of both kinetic and non-kinetic means. “

It should be noted that ground based lasers have considerable potential against UAVs, a fact already demonstrated by the laser operating aboard the USS Ponce today.

An important aspect of change will be to shape the right approach to training the Marines operating the defensive systems as well.

According to Lt. Col. Placiente:

“We operate two-man LAAD teams today and the team is lead by a Sergeant or more often than not, a lance corporal.

They receive a digital air picture through Link 16 to their laptop and are able to act on that information.

For us, digital interoperability is that young corporal with his two-man team being able to receive a data link and to us that data to be able to engage aircraft with the stinger missile.

At the short ranges that we’re engaging aircraft we can’t afford to wait for engagement command.

We have to engage.”

LAAD Doctrine is to engage based upon air defense warning conditions, weapons control status, ROE, and positive ID. 

LAAD Gunners do not have to wait for an engagement command from higher provided the target falls within the engagement criteria.

Future capabilities that improve combat ID and recognition will only improve reaction time.

G/ATOR will provide a powerful sensor set for the 360-degree Marine Corps Combat force, the three dimensional warrior, but sorting out the shooter side of the equation will be crucial as well.

And this is a work in progress.

Lt. Col. Placiente highlighted the role of directed energy weapons as part of the solution set.

“As directed energy technology matures and the ranges of the laser get better that coupled with the situational awareness and the cueing you can get from the G/ATOR radar is going to be the most effective weapon system we have against cruise missiles, UAVs and related threats.

But that depends on the amount of power you can put out from the directed energy system.”

And as these changes occur, the configuration of the LAAD battalion will shift as well.

“We are going to see a significant paradigm shift in how we do business.

The LAAD organization and structure of today may have to be adjusted to better exploit new capabilities and address new threats.

Lt. Col. Placiente underscored that the nature of the approach changes as sensors become enhanced, dispersed and command systems are not linked directly to a particular sensor system.

“We could move to a system whereby the warfighter is building the air situation based on multiple sensors that are all integrated and correlated.

And I don’t necessarily have one guy who is sitting there and directing the fire, but maybe I have one guy who is managing the fires of multiple different strike assets.

By making use of the G/ATOR sensors and a better command and control system, we need to have the person with their finger on the trigger to be certain they are engaging a hostile and not a friendly target.

When you start about swarming threats, you are going to want to push down the engagement authority to the most relevant shooter.”

As we came to the end of the interview, the Lt. Col. sounded quite a bit like the Army General who was in charge of Army Missile Defense in the Pacific when he was interviewed last year – it is not just about defense, it is about effective offense.

https://sldinfo.com/a-key-army-contribution-to-pacific-defense-the-evolving-missile-defense-mission/

“The best air defense is to destroy the adversary on the ground before he can attack you.

We want to shape the battlefield where we can destroy the runways or their control stations or the equipment via kinetic or non-kinetic means.”

And the evolution of EW or tron warfare means is crucial as well.

“We could well build an anti-RF bubble around the MAGTF which prevent any UAVs from being effective.

For this to work, we would need to mitigate the effects on ourselves.”

The Marine CO added: “The MAGTF commander will prioritize what he wants defended and that is where we will put the majority of our effort.

And that is how I am going to orient and employ my capability.”

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Joshua C. Price, a gunner with Alpha battery, 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense (2D LAAD) Battalion, fires a Stinger Weapon System during a live-fire exercise at Onslow Beach, Camp Lejeune, N.C., March 19, 2014. 2D

LAAD conducted the exercise to familiarize Marines with the missile weapon system. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Austin A. Lewis/Released

A Remote Piloted Vehicle Target launches off a base during a live-fire exercise at Onslow Beach, Camp Lejeune, N.C., March 19, 2014

In the third photo, U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Andrew R. Chabak, left, a team leader with 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense (2D LAAD) Battalion, carries a Stinger Weapon System at Onslow Beach, Camp Lejeune, N.C .

In the final photo, U.S. Marines with 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense (2D LAAD) Battalion, fire a Stinger Missile Weapon System during live-fire exercise at Onslow Beach, Camp Lejeune, N.C., March 19, 2014.

Credit:2nd Marine Aircraft Wing Combat Camera:3/19/14

For articles on G/ATOR see the following:

GATOR_090412

gator_seapower

2015-06-20 By Scott C. Truver

When naval mine warfare is discussed, the focus usually is on the technologies, systems, platforms and people needed to counter our adversaries’ use of naval mines.[1]

Indeed, when Commander Peter Bergen Henegouwen, HNLN, Commander, Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1, outlined for Second Line of Defense the “challenges of mine warfare,” he really meant “mine countermeasures”––MCM––i.e., mine-hunting and -sweeping.

Although mine-hunting/sweeping and offensive/defensive mine-laying are two sides of the same naval warfare “coin,” they are indeed very different functions, with very different prospects for success.

The seemingly enduring offense/defense imbalance in this warfare area, an imbalance that so heavily favors the mine, should stimulate U.S. Navy investment in the “winning” side: offensive mining as a means to carry out anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations against our adversaries. 

While there are indications that Navy “weapons that wait” are receiving greater attention among the operating forces and Navy leaders, particularly as a result of the “Pacific pivot” and the need to address potential adversaries’ capabilities, since the mid-1980s Navy mines and mining have represented an even more dismal story than MCM in the U.S. Navy––at best a “backwater” naval warfare area.[2]

During the Cold War, the Navy maintained a large stock of mines for both offense and defense.

Several types of bottom and moored antisubmarine mines (MK52/55/56/57) deployed by submarines and aircraft entered service in the 1950s and 1960s, and in 1980 these were joined by the MK60 deepwater encapsulated torpedo CAPTOR ASW moored mines armed with a MK37 lightweight torpedo.

The MK67 submarine-launched shallow-water mobile mine (SLMM), a modified MK37 torpedo, entered service in 1983.

Mine inventories also included general-purpose bombs fitted with multiple-influence mine target detection devices (TDDs), the shallow-water Destructors, which saw widespread employment at sea and on land during the Vietnam War.

But with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s mine capabilities began to atrophy.

In mid-2015, no conventional mines remain, CAPTORs have been retired, and at one point the Navy had programmed the remaining obsolescent MK67 SLMMs to be phased out in 2012. Had that been carried out, U.S. attack submarines would have had no mining capability at all; only direct intercession by the CNO, Admiral Greenert, saved a handful of SLMMs.

The only other mines in service are the Quickstrike series of aircraft-deployed weapons (essentially upgrades of the 1960s Destructor mines):  the dedicated, thin-wall MK65 2,300-pound bottom mine (in service since 1983); and the MK62 500-pound and MK63 1,000-pound bottom mines (1980). Like the Destructor series, these last two are general-purpose, shallow-water bomb-conversion weapons, using screw-in multiple-influence (magnetic and seismic sensors) TDDs in place of the bombs’ conventional fuses.

There are no surface mine-laying capabilities in the U.S. Navy.

While packages for mission sets beyond the baseline of MCM, surface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) have been suggested for the littoral combat ship (LCS), there is no apparent interest in configuring LCS variants as minelayers.

Likewise, in mid-2015 there is little indication that the results of the 2014 Small Surface Combatant Task Force will include mine-laying for a next-generation, “frigate-like,” small warship.

That said, any ship could be a minelayer, often more than once. During the late summer 1984, Libya used the commercial ferry Ghat to deploy at least 19 weapons––Soviet/East German “export” mines of a type never seen before in the West––in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez. Reports indicate that the North Korean navy would deploy some of its 50,000 mines from thousands of fishing boats and junks.

With the eventual demise of the MK67 SLMM, the nation’s sole mine-laying capabilities will reside in naval aviation and the U.S. Air Force.

The Navy’s P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet can drop Quick strike mines, but the P-3Cs are leaving service. They are being replaced by the P-8 Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, which will also have a mining capability, but its ability to do so in meaningful numbers is years away.

The Air Force B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2A Spirit strategic bombers constitute the nation’s only high-volume mining capability.

B-1s can carry more Quickstrike mines than the seemingly ageless B-52s (expected to remain active through 2040, the first B-52H having entered service in 1961), and B-52s and B-1s (but not B-2s) regularly train for and practice this mission.

For example, the multi-national Baltic Operations 2015 (BALTOPS15) exercise included dummy mines deployed from B-52s along the southern coast of Sweden, a defensive minefield to halt an aggressor’s amphibious assault.[3]

The 77 active B-52Hs can each carry about 45 MK62 Quickstrike or 18 MK63 mines or ten MK65s. The 66 B-1s can carry 84 MK62, or 24 MK63 (although the MK63s are not yet certified), or eight MK65 mines. And the 20 B-2s could carry 80 Mark 62s each. However, the availability of bombers, airborne tankers, and defensive escorts for mining campaigns is uncertain. There will certainly be intense competition for these scarce resources in future crises and conflicts.

In short, in 2015 the United States lacks modern mines and the means to deliver them.

The Navy has no surface-deployed mines.

A handful of obsolescent SLMMs––with perhaps less than optimum reliability, accuracy, and standoff characteristics––constitute the Navy’s only clandestine mining capability. The air-launched Quickstrikes have less-than-optimal accuracy and are best deployed in less-than-contested environments.

Indeed, the 1991 Gulf War was the last time that the Navy deployed mines in combat.

On that occasion, four A-6 Intruder bombers planted a tactical minefield of Quickstrikes at the mouth of the Kwahr az-Zubayr River to deny Iraqi access to the northern Gulf; one aircraft was lost to ground fire. Although there was little evidence that the minefield was successful, the Navy used the Quickstrikes also against bridges and airport runways, to better effect.

Thus the nation’s only offensive mining capability is resident in a small number of SLMMs and our only defensive mines are the shallow-water Quickstrikes.

Of greater long-term concern, there are only a few uniformed and civilian mine specialists, and a dwindling mine technological/industrial base has already presented challenges.

For example, the U.S. Navy has been developing the next-generation, multiple-influence, programmable Mark 71 Quickstrike TDD since mid-1980s.

Building Mines for B52 Launch from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

Three decades later, only since 2012 has the system been acquired, and work is already under way to develop “smarter” algorithms for a broader target set.

Also, the Navy’s mines/mining community has long wanted the ability to command and control deployed mines remotely but has not received the R&D funding to support it.

There were several, albeit half-hearted, efforts after the Cold War ended in 1991 to develop new mines for wide-coverage, intermediate- and deepwater mines.

A joint-Australia/U.S. program for an improved submarine-launched mobile mine, based on the Mk48 torpedo, was proposed, but the proposal died in 2002 largely due to a short age of Mk48 weapons and increasing cost.

There was also the “2010 Mine” to complement the Quickstrike mines in deeper water. That mine program was to provide the U.S. Fleet with modern air-dropped mines by 2010.

But that, too, was canceled, as was another offensive, networked mine concept—the Sea Predator 2020 Mine.  Lack of funding and “protection” resulted in nothing being fielded, at all.

At the direction of Admiral Greenert, in 2012 the Navy conducted an “analysis of alternatives” (AoA) for near- and far-term mining capabilities that would address shortfalls and gaps.

This included assessments of foreign mines, as well as American weapons.

As of mid-2015, the AoA has yet to be released, and its potential impact on the mine warfare program of record is unclear.

Nevertheless, low-level research and development for “advanced undersea weapon systems” has continued at the Office of Naval Research and the Naval Surface Warfare Command, in Panama City, Florida.[4]

With today’s unmanned-precision-vehicle and underwater communication technologies, the mining vision has significantly been expanded to make it more tactically responsive to changing situations, to provide much greater reach and utility in all phases of operations, including A2/AD missions.

And there are near-term proposals, for example, a Quickstrike mine fitted with wings and a Joint Direct Attack Munition kit.

“On 23 September 2014, a B-52H bomber at high altitude north of Guam accomplished an aviation first,” Colonel Michael W. Pietrucha wrote, “the release of a winged precision aerial mine….

The inert, orange and white GBU-62B(v-1)/B Quickstrike-ER (extended range) separated cleanly from the B-52, rolled, and three seconds after release, the BSU-104 wings deployed, transforming a free-fall munition into a medium-range weapon. Under command from the attached Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) tail kit, the weapon flew around 40 nautical miles (nm) and impacted the water.

Had the weapon been a live system dropped in shallow water, it would have settled to the bottom to lie in wait for a target.

This effort marked the first advance in aerial mine-delivery techniques since 1943 and demonstrated a capability that substantially changes the potential of aerial mining in a threat environment.[5]

The great irony and paradox for the Navy lie in the fact that mines do work and that mines/mining will almost certainly be needed in a future crisis or conflict, perhaps as elements of the U.S. Department of Defense third offset strategy.[6]

The post–World War II operational history underscores the value of naval mines.

Of the 20 U.S. Navy ships that have been severely damaged or sunk by adversary action since September 1945, 15 were mine victims.

When the Navy employed mines in Haiphong in 1972, they were effective operationally and politically.

More to the point of mines and mining in Navy strategies and operations is that in various fleet exercises during the past decade, senior flag officers have been increasingly concerned that they could not carry out operation plans because of a lack of modern mines and platforms.

Thus the question remains:  How much longer must the U.S. Navy’s “weapons that wait” continue to wait?

Dr. Truver is director of Gryphon Technologies’ TeamBlue National Security Programs. 

He is the co-author of the U.S. Naval Institute Press Weapons that Wait:  Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (1991), and since 1991 has supported the U.S. Navy’s mine warfare planning and advocacy efforts.

[1] This commentary is based on the author’s “WANTED:  U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Champion,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2015,  http://go.usa.gov/3quAm.

[2] Scott D. Burleson, David E. Everheart, Ronald E. Swart, and Scott C. Truver, “The Advanced Undersea Weapon System: On the Cusp of a Naval Warfare Transformation,” Naval Engineers Journal (March 2012), pp. 59–60; Joshua J. Edwards and Dennis M. Gallagher, “Mine and Undersea Warfare for the Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (August 2014), pp. 72–73.

[3] Magnus Nordenman, “Analysis: BALTOPS 2015 Highlights New Friction Between West, Russia,” USNI News, 11 June 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/06/11/analysis-baltops-2015-highlights-new-friction-between-west-russia?utm_source=USNI+News&utm_campaign=b3de45cedd-USNI_NEWS_DAILY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_0dd4a1450b-b3de45cedd-230475369&mc_cid=b3de45cedd&mc_eid=d9c10b9b63

[4] Burleson, Everheart, Swart, and Truver, “Advanced Undersea Weapon System.”

[5] Col Michael W. Pietrucha, “Twenty-First Century Aerial Mining,” Air & Space Power Journal, March-April 2015, p. 129.

[6] “Weapons Technology:  Who’s Afraid of America?” The Economist, 13 June 2015, p. 57, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21654066-military-playing-field-more-even-it-has-been-many-years-big.

Editor’s Note: No platform fights alone.  This is clearly true of mine warfare which is an integral part of maritime operations and the capability to insert force from the sea.

And such capabilities are crucial in shaping an effective Baltic defense approach where and sea operations, notably to insert force from the sea is a crucial and even defining capability for NATO to defend the Baltics against potential Russian aggression.

How can NATO best shape a credible defense strategy which meets the realistic performance of the key stakeholders in defense and security in Northern Europe?

…..Naval forces are crucial as well, not only to deal with Russian naval forces, but to support the Baltic operation as well. Modern amphibious forces are among the most useful assets to provide engagement capabilities, ranging from resupply, to air operations, to insertion forces at key choke points.

By not being based on Baltic territory, these forces are part of the overall defensive defense approach, and not credibly part of a forward deployed dagger at the heart of Russia argument that the Russian leadership will try to use if significant NATO forces were to be forward deployed upon Baltic territory itself.

Shaping an effective defensive template, leveraging collaborative Baltic efforts, with enhanced integrated air and naval forces will only get better as Western naval and air transformation occurs in the period ahead.

The relaunching of Baltic-focused counter mine activities described by Murielle Delaporte in the latest issue of OPERATIONELS based on her time embedded with the mine warfare task force is a key element of this effort.

The USN-USAF training for laying mines in BALTOPS 2015 is another.

The videos included in this article highlight their effort.

In the video at the top of the article, U.S. Navy and Air Force personnel build inert Mark-62 Quick Strike Navy mines in support of a BALTOPS 15 mission.

The video includes interviews from Staff Sgt. Ryan Cassady (Munitions Systems technician; 5 MUNS) and Petty Officer 1st Class David Toyloy (mineman; Navy Munitions Command, Unit Charleston)

2nd Bomb Wing Public Affairs, 6/10/15.

In the next video, weapon loaders from 5 AMXS, Minot load inert Navy Mark-62 Quick Strike mines to a B-52 Stratofortress in support of an ALTOPS 15 mission.

Included is an interview from SrA Peter Discipio; Weapons Loader, 5 AMXS.

2nd Bomb Wing Public Affairs, 6/11/15.