Tectonic Junction: The Evolution of French Forward-Based Forces in Djibouti

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/25/2015

2015-04-22 By Murielle Delaporte

*** This article is based in part on interviews conducted last November with French and U.S. military forces based in Djibouti.

Djibouti is uniquely located “near a tectonic triple junction, where three tectonic plates meet: African, Arabian and Somali,” reads its geological description referring to the Red Sea fault, the Gulf of Aden fault and the Somalian Rift[1].

Similarly, French armed forces based on the territory guarding the Bab El Mandel straight are assigned missions on a triple front: African, Arabian and Somali…

The African Mission

The “red line” underlying today’s presence of French armed forces in this part of the world remains the defense of the Djiboutian territorial integrity and population ever since the country became independent in 1977, after almost a century of French rule which started in 1884.

Today, French forces based in Djibouti – or FFDj for Forces françaises stationnées à Djibouti  – are part of the 12,000 French armed forces pre-positioned overseas in order to perform three tasks:

  • Cooperate with local armed forces,
  • Support stability operations,
  • Provide crisis management or the rescue of endangered French citizens abroad (presence and sovereignty forces).

This is the case in the Eastern part of the African continent under the FFDj COMFOR’s area of permanent responsibility (ZRP for “Zone de responsabilité permanente”), which encompasses Yemen, Somalia and Sudan.

But the FFDj can also be sent to other parts of the African continent as reinforcement and support if need b.

The most recent operation was last year in Central African Republic i.e. the Sangaris operation, from which the French military is now starting to disengage as the European Military Advisory Mission – EUMAM CAR – gradually takes over).

The Arabian Mission

The re-balancing of French power projection forces between Africa and the Middle-East under President Sarkozy has led to the departure of the Foreign Legion from Djibouti to the United Arab Emirates in 2011 (i.e. the 1,100 soldiers belonging to the 13e DBLE or Demi Brigade de la Légion étrangère ), while the support of the French forces stationed in the UAE (FFEAU for «Forces françaises stationnées aux Emirats arabes unis ) organically depends in part on Djibouti (infrastructure in particular).

The same principle of reinforcement pool or reserve of forces applies at the East of Djibouti as well, as was the case with the Tamar operation in Jordan in 2012 and 2013[1], or could happen if necessary in the fight against ISIS in Iraq within Operation Chammel, i.e. the French contribution to the multinational operation ‘Inherent Resolve’.

Djibouti had in fact already provided support to the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, which stopped for a few days last February on its way to the Persian Gulf.

The battle group did carry its first Rafale strike on February 25th, officially joining in the 3,200 French forces already engaged since September 2014 on that front against terrorist forces.

The Somalian Mission

Interestingly, Djibouti as a French colony, before briefly being called, in 1967, the Afars and Issas Territory  («Territoire des Afars et des Issas ) carried the name “French Coast of the Somalis” (Côte française des Somalis).

The Somali Battalion was hence composed of soldiers from the region and fought very courageously on the side of French forces during World War I and II.

Today the sole remaining French Army component, i.e. the 5e RIAOM (« Régiment interarmées d’Outre mer »), is the inheritor of the traditions of the Somali Battalion.

Improving the situation in Somalia has been the focus of several broader initiatives, such as the EUTM- Somalia (European Union Training Mission), AMISOM (African Mission In Somalia) supported by the United Nations, and ACOTA (Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance) managed by the US State Department and supported by US AFRICOM.

All were created between the mid-2000’s and 2010 and work in close cooperation. French armed forces have been increasingly involved to train battalions to fight in Somalia through these multilateral missions, as well as via bilateral cooperation agreements with Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti.

French forces stationed in Djibouti are therefore strongly relying on the legacy of decades of presence in the area to tackle new challenges and responsibilities in a unique and rapidly evolving multinational framework.

The FFDj as a Support and Logistics Hub

Initially conceived in 1884 as a supply stop for the French Navy in the context of the Tonkin War, Djibouti’s harbor, which was developed four years later, considerably expanded between the two wars to later become France’s third harbor after Le Havre and Marseille in the 1950’s.

Even though today French investment capital is being increasingly replaced by many other foreign countries’, especially Dubaï and China[2], the need to increase maritime security in this area against piracy, as well as against maritime terrorist risks (illustrated by the 2000 attack against the USS Cole) has meant that the French naval base a key support role for operations.

These operations are not only to the benefit of French ships transiting in the area, but also to the benefit of an increasingly large number of foreign ships from all over the world.

European, American, but also Asian ships stop by, as port infrastructure keeps developing and national and multilateral counter-piracy initiatives have been growing in the area in the past several years.

The European Union NAVFOR-Atalanta and EUCAP Nestor, NATO’s Allied Provider now called Ocean Shield, the U.S. Combined Task Force 151, and individual national deployments from countries such as China, India or South Korea have all played a role.

Even though both Ocean Shield and Atalanta may not be pursued till 2016, as officially planned, since the number of piracy acts has been steadily declining in this part of the world compared to an increase in South East Asia and the Gulf of Guinea[3], Djibouti as a strategic hub has taken a new meaning and has been discovered by new nations.

America which came in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001, now outnumbers France, as former French Camp Lemonnier now hosts 5,000 military personnel and 1,000 contractors, while Japan has established its very first overseas base on Djiboutian territory as well.

The traditional role of France in the defense of Djibouti makes its military infrastructure especially valuable for nations involved in operations, but also for those developing a logistic footprint of their own.

Examples of the support provided on a daily basis by the FFDj to other nations are numerous, such as the hosting of Atalanta’s logistic support Headquarters, i.e. the FHQSA (Force Headquarters Somalia Atalanta) on the French naval base.

Medical support has been provided to foreign armed forces on a regular basis thanks to the military health services and facilities (Role 3 hospital) as well as the necessary air transport capabilities (the French Air Force and Army Aviation indeed also operate Puma SAR helicopters and train on-site dedicated search and rescue diver teams).

Spanish and German military detachments are deployed on the French airbase as well.

As FAF General Philippe Montocchio, COMFOR FFDj, explains about the Spanish and German military:

These countries have neither a base, nor the means to rapidly project one, so they benefit from the infrastructure existing on FAF Base 188 (…), where they have established a small Spanish ‘’corner’’ and a German one.

In addition to the Americans, the Germans, the Spanish, the Japanese, one can also find in Djibouti Italians and a small Swedish detachment. Compared to all these nations present on the Djiboutian territory, France’s posture is a bit different (…).

When the French presence forces are not used in operation, they essentially train to be ready to intervene if need be. Foreign forces stationed in Djibouti, on the other hand, only came here in the framework of an operation (…) and have therefore less time to spend on training. But as soon as a joint training opportunity occurs, we do not hesitate.[4]

Along with other nations, especially the Americans, French naval and air forces also train the Djiboutian Coast guards and ensure with the Djiboutian armed forces the safety of the maritime access to the harbor, but not only the Djiboutians.

The FFDj as a De Facto Center of Excellence for Desert Training

Training the armed forces from Djibouti, Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia bilaterally or multilaterally is being done in the context of the missions relevant to the French AOR.

In addition, the specific characteristics of the environment in Djibouti – extreme temperatures, harsh winds, rough rocky or sandy terrain, very dark nights, etc. – intertwined with fewer urban constraints (electric lines; air traffic; etc.) have traditionally boosted Djibouti as a privileged training site.

This is true as far as Army and Special Forces training is concerned, as the 5e RIAOM manages a dedicated combat and sustainment training center, called the CECAD (“ Centre d’entraînement au combat et d’aguerrissement au desert” or “Ecole du desert” – Desert School), in which bilateral training with the U.S. Marines, the Djiboutian Army and, more recently the Ethiopian Army, routinely takes place.

The French knowledge of how to operate in an environment deprived of everything –- including water (when it should be stressed that a soldier fighting in Africa needs between 6 to 10 liters a day) –- came from Nomadic traditions and has been preserved and updated over the years.

Creating a fire with a phone battery, using a specific desert plant to disinfect a water content, recovering water from condensation and keep it a bit less warm with a wet sock… all these are examples of skills and drills being taught to the thousands of troops passing by Djibouti on their way to deployments to battlefields increasingly demanding high levels of autonomy.

Every single opportunity to train is being seized sometimes via international competition events, such as the International Concentration for Advanced Sniping (ICASD), which was created twelve years ago by the French « Commandos marine », and was held last October with the participation of French, American and Italian Special Forces.

It is the same as far as the third dimension — air operations — is concerned, whether on a joint and multilateral basis or solely among various countries’ air forces.

For the French Army Aviation as well, Djibouti offers a rather exceptional opportunity to provide what is often the very first encounter of ground troops with the third dimension and practice tactics that are not always feasible back home.

As the Commander of the Army Aviation Detachment (DETALAT for “Détachement de l’Aviation légère de l’armée de Terre”), Lieutenant-Colonel Moreau de Bellaing highlights :

Djibouti presents an environment, which is especially privileged to train for the missions for which Army Aviation and our armed forces in general must be prepared.

Whether it is precision airdrop, tactical flight, flying with night vision goggles, fast-roping exercises, ship- or dust-landing, prevailing conditions allow us to constantly improve our techniques with more security than on the mainland and while optimizing all available permanent or temporary means.[5]

Having a sample of the full spectrum of French armed forces at his disposition–with all its components Air, Ground, Sea, Special Forces, but also combatant support (medical, maintenance, food, fuel, etc.), communication and infrastructure–is what French military officers pre-positioned in Djibouti especially value.

With the end of the military conscription in 1998, the structure of the French troops evolved considerably with fewer long-term deployments (usually three years) and an increasingly larger number of short-term missions (four months).

Only a third of the 5e RIAOM is now composed of long-term personnel, but commanders, such as Colonel Jean-Bruno Despouys, Commanding Officer of the 5e RIAOM and commander of the joint tactical group GTIA Scorpion during Sangaris, stress that it is a good balance and enough to maintain the legacy and know-how acquired over more than a century in this part of the world, while benefitting from state-of-the art new tactics brought in by young trainees arriving from the mainland ready to be deployed anywhere in the world from Djibouti[6].

Djibouti has been the chosen ground to train troops prior to their deployment to Afghanistan, and now to Operation Barkhane in the Sahel area.

The FFDj have therefore been constantly adapting to shifting threats by applying lessons learned and training even harder than one fight…

It has proven effective in the past years given the evolution of current conflicts: whether during the Harmattan operation, French participation to the 2011 NATO air strikes over Libya, during which helicopter pilots had to maneuver in the typical African dark moonless nights, or during Serval in Mali which climate and terrain conditions are very similar to Djibouti, or more recently Sangaris in the Central African Republic.

As Lieutenant-Colonel Gabriel Soubrier, in charge of the BOI for Bureau opérations instruction— Operations Instruction Division–for the 5e RIAOM, notes about his regiment, the very last French one prepositioned in the Horn of Africa and the “heir of 123 years of nomadic traditions”:

[It is] strongly anchored in its environment, integrated in Djibouti – which constitutes its starting base -, and oriented towards operations thanks to military tools which are robust, light and able to manoeuver over long distances. We are fully dedicated to projection, which is our “raison d’être” and our calling. »[7]

The vocabulary is being internationalized from “starting base” to FOB, from “projection” back to expeditionary forces, but the concept remains intact: the 5e RIAOM has been deployed from or in Djibouti to participate to 14 operations since 1991.

Even though smaller and smaller in its overall format, presence and economic influence, what is indeed now referred to as France’s “Forward operational base – East Africa” has been constantly adapting to an evolving international environment and appears well suited to face the current tectonic changes of the threat.

The same way the construction of Djibouti’s deep water harbor – and subsequent related prosperity – stemmed from an unfortunate event, i.e. a blaze on the « Messagerie Maritime » steamship Fontainebleau in 1926[8], a new promising era of enhanced joint multilateral cooperation seems to have emerged from the ashes of Terror and Piracy in the region.

[1] A French medical detachment was deployed from Djibouti to Jordania-based Zaatari Camp to support the Syrian refugees fleeing the war (see for instance: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/jordanie-releve-du-mandat-6-de-l-operation-tamour).

[2] Djibouti’s President, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, hosted the Third Islamic Banking Summit Africa early November at the Kempiski Djibouti Palace, the first five star hotel, inaugurated in 2006 by Dubaï’s Nakheel corporation.

On the evolving economic landscape of Djibouti, see:

  • David Styan, Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horns’s Strategic Hub, Chatham House, April 2013.

On Islamic banking, see for instance:

  • http://islamicbankingafrica.megaevents.net/;
  • 3ème Sommet Africain sur la Finance Islamique: le chef de l’Etat appelle de ses vœux une finance islamique « plus offensive et plus compétitive », La Nation, November 5th, 2014, Djibouti, pages 1 and 3.

[3] See ICC International Maritime Bureau statistics: https://icc-ccs.org/news/1040-se-asia-tanker-hijacks-rose-in-2014-despite-global-drop-in-sea-piracy-imb-report-reveals
See also on this issue:

[4] November 12th, 2014 interview, FFDj Base, Djibouti

[5] November 13th, 2014 Interview, BA188, Quartier Massart, Djibouti

[6] November 13th, 2014 interview, 5e RIAOM, Quartier Monclar, Djibouti

[7]November 13th, 2014 interview, 5e RIAOM, Quartier Monclar, Djibouti

[8] The story goes as follows:
« The Fontainebleau, a ‘’Messagerie Maritime” steamship , sailed into Djibouti carrying cotton bound for China. On July 12, a blaze broke out on board. Firefighters flooded the cargo holds trying to put out the conflagration. The ship rolled over on its side in the middle of the harbor, posing a serious threat to navigation. The idea arose of using the Fontainebleau as man-made promontory for a new deep-water port and building a 700-meter-long jetty connecting the ship to the Marabout Plateau. Construction got underway in 1931 ( …). » (Cf: Christian d’Alayer, ibid, pages 48 and 49)

Editor’s Note: The slideshow above highlights some aspects of activity in Djibouti.

Djibouti is uniquely located “near a tectonic triple junction, where three tectonic plates meet: African, Arabian and Somali, reads its geological description referring to the Red Sea fault, the Gulf of Aden fault and the Somalian Rift.

Similarly, French armed forces based on the territory guarding the Bab El Mandel straight are assigned missions on a triple front: African, Arabian and Somali…

French forces stationed in Djibouti are therefore strongly relying on the legacy of decades of presence in the area to tackle new challenges and responsibilities in a unique and rapidly evolving multinational framework.

  • In the first photo, the French amphibious ship, Tonnerre, is seen in the Djibouti harbor.
  • In the second photo, Asian, including Chinese.ships are seen in the harbor.
  • In the third photo, the fault lines of three tectonic plates are pictured.
  • The fourth is a graphic showing the prepositioning of French forces as of January 2015. The remaining photos show French forces, generally, and US Marines, exercising with French forces in Djibouti.

The second, third and tenth photos are credited to Murielle Delaporte.

The other photos are credited to the French Ministry of Defense. 

For the Front Line Defence version of this article see the following:

http://www.frontline-defence.com/index_archives.php?page=2246

 

 

 

An Update on the A400M Training Facility in Seville: A Building Block in Allied Coalition Capabilities

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/24/2015

2015-04-21 By Robbin Laird

On April 8, 2015, I returned to Seville and visited both the Final Assembly Line and the training facility for the A400M.

This was the first time I had visited the training facility but the third time I have seen the FAL.

The program is ramping up and that was evident in terms of the pace of activity within the FAL and on the tarmac outside.

The training facility at Seville has now been joined by training facilities at the UK and French bases with a German training facility in the process of being established.

I visited the Bricy base in France on April 10, 2015 so had the chance to experience the approach being taken in Seville compared to that on the first operational base, a base where six A400Ms operate with a 7th coming later this year to that base.

The A400M is a multinational program delivering a multi-mission aircraft, and its multiple year life will undoubtedly see significant evolutions with regard to how it is used and what it will be used for.

The basic training at facility is for the three-man crew to learn to fly and operate the plane.

The pilot and co-pilots are joined by a single loadmaster, who manages the load and its disposition from a single work station.

The training is with regard to managing a digital cockpit, which is based on the A380 cockpit.

The difference for the French Air Force can be readily seen in comparing the A400M cockpit with the C-130H cockpit in the photos taken below during my visit to Bricy.

The loadmaster operates from a single station, which can be seen both at Bricy and at the simulator in Seville.

The first photo shows the loadmaster station and cargo bay in one of the six A400Ms at Bricy and the third and fourth shows the simulator in Seville.

Quite readily the similarities are evident.

There is a major difference between the training at the base and at Seville.

At Seville, the focus is upon the basics, and upon general training across various national air forces.

At Bricy, the training is focused on operations, tactics and integration with the French Air Force.

The challenge is to keep those aspects of commonality, which enhance interoperability across a multi-national fleet of A400Ms, and to integrate those aircraft within the national doctrines, tactics and approaches of the individual national forces.

At Seville, I was able to discuss the multi-national training approach with Ian Burrett, head of Airbus Defence and Space Military Aircraft Training & Aircrew Operations and with Juan Ignacio Castro Rodríguez, Head of Integrated Training and Ops Support with the A400M program.

I have met previously with Ian Burrett and have discussed the initial standup of the center two years ago when the French were first coming to Seville to prepare for the introduction of the A400M into the French Air Force.

Burrett: A huge amount has happened since you were last here.

When we last spoke, we were still getting the first full-flight simulator ready to enter service. That was achieved in June two years ago and by the way, this week we are in the process of up upgrading its qualification to level D which is equivalent to the civil certification for zero flight time training.

The simulator that you can see today has no substantial differences from the aircraft in terms of its training capability, so that’s the real meaning of level D certification.

Then there is the loadmaster workstation simulator and the cargo hold trainer.

These enable the loadmaster to operate everything both in logistics and in tactical roles. It’s very sophisticated console plus of course a state-of-the-art cargo hold. These devices enable us to train without risking damage to the aircraft.

This also saves one the necessity of using an operational aircraft for training as well, so that enhances the ability to use the operational fleet, for just that, operations.

The A400M training centers. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space
The A400M training centers. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space

Question: This is a software upgradeable aircraft, so you have to upgrade the software in the simulators after you have upgraded the planes, and what about the training for the maintainers via the software systems to train for maintenance?

Burrett: We deliver maintenance training to all of the technicians and engineers who are going to support the aircraft.

An example of the intersection of software and training would be the maintenance training system called CMOS, Cockpit Maintenance Operation System, which we’ve got in a classroom upstairs. It’s a virtual aircraft, in which the students learn how the systems work, where all the components are, how to troubleshoot, and so on.

When it first came into service, it had a limited set of maintenance capabilities. That limited set has been improved five times in the last two years and it will continue to grow in response to modifications to the aircraft or to proposals about how to improve procedures or improve the training.

As far as possible we keep the configuration of the training devices, the software in particular aligned with the operational aircraft.

Question: The training process really is about shaping the human capital to support the A400M operational enterprise.

How do tap into the “graduates” to improve the process and prepare for further evolutions?

Burrett: We have already had many graduates and with regards to maintainers, the numbers are now in the hundreds.

But it is a continuous learning process with regard to shaping the training approach and curriculum, and in part because of the changing software for the operation of the aircraft.

There are two parts to the dynamic.

One is to establish the customer’s capability to operate the aircraft safely and effectively, which is the number one priority.

But the second is for us to improve the training solution. For the latter, we get feedback from every student on every course, which we use in our continuous improvement process.

Question: What is the relationship between the center here in Seville and the national training centers?

Burrett: We’ve set the national training centers up with national people running the training center and as instructors. They have direct military experience in that air force.

But they first are fully integrated into the training center in Seville, into the reference-training center.

We want to make sure that what they’ve taken from Seville is fully transported and used in the national training center so that we’ve got that commonality as far as possible across the platform.

Clearly, each customer does have some differences in the way it operates its aircraft or in the history of its training approaches. So there will be some differences among the national training centers, but as far as possible we have teams going from the reference center to the national training centers to shape as common a solution as possible.

We’re fully connected among the training centers.

We interact on a virtually a daily basis and formally weekly and monthly to make sure we get the feedback from the reference center to the national training centers and vice versa.

Castro: Another aspect, which is important here, are the user groups. We have growing experience with user groups with regard to the tanker and their input on the evolution of that program and we see the same thing happening in the A400M program.

The users explore ways to evolve the aircraft going forward, and we sort out what is common across the program, or what is nationally specific and that will guide the future development approach as well.

So it is training plus user groups, which will provide an important channel for the evolution of the A400M program.

And obviously there are important cost savings going forward from leveraging commonality in training, and operational experience, especially as we look at modernization and software upgrades.

Burrett: There is another advantage to the commonality, which is shaping compliance with EU regulations whereby compliance for one nation is then common for all.

We minimize the need to go through costly national compliance processes to get the plane and training solutions certified for a variety of operating conditions in using European airspace.

This is also true for the simulators, which follow the three musketeer model: one for all and all for one.

Question: What about the possibility of developing over time what might be called “graduate level training,” whereby tactical experiences get shared and operating concepts shaped?

Burrett: We see that as an important step in the future, and the impact of user groups and training inputs will be significant in shaping the process of adapting the aircraft to evolving conditions and technologies.

I think we’re well placed to do that because we have the knowledge and expertise of the aircraft as the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).

And since we’re training and providing ops support across all of the customers, we’re able to see where the best solutions are, where the best opportunities are, and where the best practices are which can be migrated across the fleet’s operation.

We have a really important role to play across this network in helping the nations firstly understand the immense capability of this airplane.

And then to help them actually use all of that capability in operations by using all of the expertise that we’ve developed in the company and are still learning across the national training centers.

I would add as well the impact of learning from the in service support agreements we have in place to work with the individual air forces.

We’re inside, helping the individual air forces to maintain the airplane, to keep their fleet availability levels high, and that also feeds back to how we can improve training and how we can improve the airplane.

For some earlier pieces on the A400M roll out see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-the-a400m-training-facility-in-seville-spain/

https://sldinfo.com/the-a400m-takes-flight-redefining-the-airlift-market/

https://sldinfo.com/the-a400m-in-service-with-the-french-air-force-shaping-a-solid-foundation-for-the-future/

https://sldinfo.com/flying-the-a400m-at-the-airbus-military-trade-media-event/

https://sldinfo.com/the-next-step-in-the-uk-a400m-ioc-delivering-first-operational-payload-to-cyprus/

https://sldinfo.com/a400m-supports-french-middle-east-operations/

https://sldinfo.com/an-evolving-multi-national-training-infrastructure-the-roll-out-of-the-a400m/

https://sldinfo.com/the-french-air-force-conducts-joint-experiments-with-rafale-and-the-a400m/

https://sldinfo.com/the-entry-into-service-of-the-a400m-into-the-french-air-force-rolling-out-its-operational-capabilities/

https://sldinfo.com/the-introduction-of-the-a400m-into-the-french-air-force-a-catalyst-for-change/

https://sldinfo.com/a-step-forward-in-german-defense-the-coming-of-the-a400m/

https://sldinfo.com/onboard-the-a400m-atlas-in-support-of-operations-in-africa/

https://sldinfo.com/uk-pilot-comments-on-flying-the-a400m/

https://sldinfo.com/air-drop-multi-formation-flying-a400m-in-formation-flight/

For an Airbus Defence and Space overview on A400M training presented at the ILA airshow in 2014 see below:

Presentation 12 Airbus DS A400M Training Centres1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Danish Frigate and Flexible Operations: Thinking Through an LCS Alternative

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2015-04-22 By Robbin Laird

The Littoral Combat Ship is being built and deployed.

But it is neither a Frigate nor a Fast Patrol Boat, but really a hybrid that falls between the two.

A concern raised by the Military Sealift Command has been the support concept as well, whereby distance support – namely absence of robust organic support – requires proximity to ports or to MSC ships.

Leaving aside the question of self-defense capabilities, there has been concern as well with building a unique class of mission modules for a unique class of ships. Not only is this challenging, but also clearly with no global market in sight, costs are not to be amortized by global sales.

This is the exact opposite of the modern frigate, for which there are several robust designs in operation with a wide range of suppliers of various systems for the frigates. Rather than having mission modules, today’s frigates have capabilities built in for a variety of combat operations.

They do not have to be refitted for panoply of missions – they have that capability built in because of their larger size.

One clear example of leveraging the frigate to operate in a variety of missions and able to do so organically is the new Danish Iver Huitfelt class of frigates.

Both the Dutch and Danish frigates participated in Bold Alligator 2014, and the Dutch frigate operated as the command ship.

They worked in both ASW and AAW missions in the Exercise, an Exercise, which the lead planner for the exercise called “more a mission rehearsal than an exercise.”

While visiting Copenhagen for the Airpower conference, I had a chance to sit down with Hans Tino Hansen, founder and CEO of Risk Intelligence based in Denmark and Ed Timperlake, Editor of Second Line of Defense Forum, to talk about the Danish Frigate and how to think about that Frigate in relationship to the LCS.

Question: What is the origin of the new Iver Huitfeldt class frigates[1]?

HTH: The ship represents the transition from the Cold War Danish Navy to a post-Cold War navy. Earlier, the Danish navy had small and fast ships along with submarines to operate in the Baltic. After the end of the Cold War, thinking moved to having larger ships able of more a wider-range of operations.

In the Gulf War, we could only send a corvette, which had to be accompanied by a supply ship to get there and to operate. It simply did not have the sustainability built in to do longer range operations.

The last series of smaller vessels, the Flyvefisken-class of multi-purpose ships was built on the StanFlex concept where different modules were designed for different tasks and then put on the ships for the particular mission.

The first larger ships was the Absalon-class that can serve as a command vessel, or using its flex deck as a mine-laying ship with the appropriate module or can be customized as a hospital ship or simply operate as a transport ship with ISO standard containers and can carry helos and fast intervention boats[2].

The new frigate class was based on the same hull as Absalon and designed to provide for a larger ship for multi-mission and to leverage the StanFlex experience as well. The idea was to develop a sound frigate, which could evolve over time.

Ed Timperlake: We have referred to this as pre-planned product improvement. But what you’re also telling me is when you do a modular concept you are doing not with regard to the platform itself, but you can have preplanned product improvement for the modular system?

HTH: That is a good way of putting it.

A good example of the thinking behind the frigate was the desire to put the versatile Mark-41 Vertical Launch System on the frigate.

Not only can the frigate provide the command and control for a variety of missiles, but also it can put in this launch tube anything, which is developed for the community of users of that launch tube.

This means that the ship can become a key node in a future missile defense system for the region or beyond for that matter.

We can buy missiles not even yet developed which use this launch tube, and we can evolve the C2 to use these missiles in a broader engagement as well.

Question: Clearly cost was of concern, and you leveraged your indigenous shipbuilding capability.

Could you describe the approach?

HTH: The ships have been built on a civilian wharf and with civilian technology. It was built to NATO standards but in a civilian yard.

And in building the ship, we leveraged the global market, which enables frigates.

For example, the Thales radar systems were chosen and we will have the opportunity to upgrade with other Thales radar users, the enhanced capability to track missiles including ballistic missiles.

Question: So the ship could become either a sensor or a shooter within a broader missile defense regime?

HTH: It could but most likely it will emphasize its sensor role with the shooters coming from airborne or land based systems.

Ed Timperlake: When the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs was first introduced the two core dynamics were information, and precision weapons with remote sensors.

What is often forgotten is the combination of long range precision-guided weapons WITH remote sensors.

This means that with a state of the art sensor package aboard a ship, it can provide an important contribution to a wider allied force,

HTH: It can. The Danish Air Force has no missile defense capabilities anymore.

This now falls to the frigates, and their role can become significant in a wider context.

Two frigates can more or less cover Danish airspace or we could place the Danish Frigate into the Baltic Sea and provide area coverage for the Baltics.

Question: Crewing is crucial for smaller ships.

The Danish navy has a small crew but with very diverse skill sets on the ship.

Could you describe the approach?

HTH: With the Danish Navy, unlike the US Navy, we require our crews to have a broader skill set for each sailor.

On the Danish ships you have several tasks for a particular officer, which means that the crews are much leaner.

You have just over 100 persons operating the new frigates.

Question: Let us turn to the question of the LCS compared to the Danish Frigate and missions we can envisage.

How do you view the two?

HTH: In Denmark, we have four ocean patrol frigates of about 112 meters, which carry helicopters and weapons and operate in the Arctic mission area.

They have been used as well in other missions, such as anti-piracy in Somalia. They are very good at what they do.

But I do not see the LCS given the sea states they could operate in being able to have this sort of flexibility.

And we have built the larger frigates to operate at sea organically for four weeks and a range of 9000 nautical miles. I do not see them doing that either.

They really fall between the classes of ships we use, and the various sea states in which we have to operate.

I can see perhaps their value in UN missions or very low conflict spectrum settings, but we simply do not have enough ships to build a ship for the lower end of the warfighting spectrum.

Ed Timperlake: The question of support is crucial as well.

The ship simply is not designed for autonomous operations, which means you either have to be part of a task force and then the question is what you contribute to that task force, or be close to ports, and there are many parts of the world where you simply do not want to be dependent upon entering a foreign port for support.

HTH: Those have to be concerns.

And if you bring a replenishment ship along you increase the vulnerability of the whole operation and then you need to protect the replenishment ship as well.

And with regard to ports, you would want to operate them in friendly waters with friendly ports nearby, which defeats the point of having a warship.

The LCS seems more like the corvettes, which the British used, in the last war to provide convoy support. They had limited weapons, primarily for convoy defense and could not hunt submarines.

Question: Clearly another key advantage of the Danish Frigates and the Absalon for that matter is its ability to support very large helos in addition to smaller ones. This is clearly important as rotorcraft technology evolves over time as well.

What can the two ships support?

HTH: The standard frigate helicopter is the Westland Lynx that will soon be replaced by the Seahawk.

The largest helicopter the Danish Airforce operates currently is Merlin[3], which is a large helicopter. The frigate can support one and hanger it and the Absalon two.

Large helicopters are an important part of providing for protection and we can clearly operate those types of helicopters on the two vessel classes.

Ed Timperlake: Historically, the Danish Navy was a very large sea-going navy. Now it is reaching back to some of those roots prior to its Baltic focus in the Cold War.

HTH: You can say that actually it was an anomaly that we only protected the Baltic, our Baltic approaches and our local area.

Those 50 years or 60 years was actually an exception if you look over the last 300 years.

[1] The Iver Huitfeldt class is a three-ship class of frigates that entered service with the Royal Danish Navy in 2012 and 2013

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Absalon-class_support_ship

http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=HDMS-Absalon-L16

[3] http://danishairshow.dk/en/aircrafts/aircraft/danske-flyvevaben1

The photos were taken when visiting the HDMS Niels Juel when it was in Baltimore Harbor after participating in the Bold Alligator 2014 exercise.

Credit Photos: Second Line of Defense

  • The first three photos show the ship pier side in Baltimore, Maryland. The next three show the guns aboard the ship, with the fourth and fifth photos showing the system below deck and the sixth the gun above deck.
  • The seventh and eighth photos show the Sea Sparrow launch tubes and launch area. The ninth shows the Harpoon launcher. The tenth shows one of the two sets of two torpedo launch tubes.
  • The 11th and 12th photos show the SMART-L and APAR radar systems respectively.
  • The 13th photo is a shot of the bridge with 14-16 providing information sheets on the ship’s engines.
  • The 17th through 19th photos are of the missions control areas, where the ASW, anti-air and other missions are conducted. The 20th photo shows the engine control room.
  • The final photo shows the flight deck where the new Danish Seahawks will operate from; the flight deck can take up to a 20 ton flight asset.

And for the visit aboard the HDMS Niels Juel see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/visiting-the-hdms-niels-juel-a-very-flexible-and-capable-frigate/

And for an interview with the CO of HDMS Niels Juel see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/visiting-the-hdms-niels-juel-an-interview-with-commander-lars-holbaek/

 

 

The Danish Way of War After Afghanistan: Will the Activism Continue?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2015-04-24 Dr. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, from the Royal Danish Defence College, provided an overview of the evolution of Danish defense policy to lead off the Symposium on Airpower co-hosted by the Williams Foundation and the Centre for Military Studies of the University of Copenhagen.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-danish-airpower-symposium-laying-a-foundation-for-rethinking-coalition-airpower/

Jakobsen explained that Denmark was a member of NATO from the beginning but circumspect in its operations within NATO.

Indeed, during the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s, Denmark was not an enthusiastic supporter of the deployment of the new missiles.

Paradoxically, with the end of the Cold War, Denmark has become one of the three expeditionary states in Europe, along with Britain and France.

The first panel seen left to right, Dr. Gary Schaub, CMS, Dr. Peter Jackobsen, Royal Danish Defence College, and Col. Anders Rex, Royal Danish Air Force
The first panel seen left to right, Dr. Gary Schaub, CMS, Dr. Peter Jakobsen, Royal Danish Defence College, and Col. Anders Rex, Royal Danish Air Force. Credit Photo: Centre for Militar Studies

As Jakobsen put it:

We started out in the first period from 1864 to the end of the Cold War basically, not having anything to do with war.

And then since then we’ve basically gone to war since the late ’90s and not missed any opportunity to do so.

But something strange happened in the 1990s.

The Danes were the most enthusiastic about the Kosovo air campaign among Europeans, and it was also in Denmark that you found the highest level of support for providing ground troops for an invasion if the air campaign did not succeed.

The Danes have accepted the notion that force is legitimately exercised in defense of their values and interests.

We have some 50,000-60,000 cars in Denmark now with yellow stickers on them saying, “We Support our Troops.”

That’s something you wouldn’t find in Denmark 10, 15 years ago.

We have flag days.

We have homecoming parades.

These are things you traditionally associated with the United States or Britain, but we do them now too.

According to Jakobsen, the Danes have been very supportive of the United States and NATO missions and have been engaged in every NATO mission since the end of the Cold War.

Denmark has generated popular war heroes, such Lars Møller or Anders Storrud.

There has been an avalanche of books, movies and TV series in Denmark which deal with war.

In 1994 the Danes engaged in a tank battle against Bosnian Serb forces (Operation Bøllebank[1]).

They defeated the Serbs handily.

This turned out well for Denmark and Danish politicians could leverage that experience to build a case for its effective engagement in coalition operations.

Dr.Jakobsen addressing the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium. Credit: Second Line of Defense
Dr.Jakobsen addressing the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium. Credit: Second Line of Defense

As Jakobsen highlighted:

And it also meant that we began to get a little praise from our allies in NATO, from the United States, and that’s not something that we had been used to in the previous decade.

And basically we have constructed a new narrative that we’ve been able to explain to the Danish public, why it’s the right thing to sometimes use force and how you can help make the world a better place and Denmark more secure by doing so.

And at the heart of the Danish approach is going to war with coalition partners.

“Usually we go with our key NATO allies in recent years either with the UK or the US and we’ve pretty much tried to do so without any national caveats or restrictions on how we can use our forces.”

Clearly, the approach is not just about the use of force, but force within a broader security context in the region where force is being used.

There are some anomalies, such as not wanting to take prisoners–  and take legal responsibility for them — and here the Danes work with the Brits to sort through that problem in the field.

And the Danes use their own interpreters in the field so they are not held responsible for foreign nationals when the Danish forces leave an engagement.

There is growing opposition to the use of force within Denmark, as there is concern with the results and effectiveness of the interventions over the past few years.

Jakobsen highlighted opponents to the use of force’s position as follows:

“Why don’t we go back to the good old days during the Cold War when we’re arguing peace-keeping and preventing wars and we certainly don’t want to do Iraq or Afghanistan again.

And hey, if we go out there and fight and attack in various places then they’re more likely to launch terrorist attacks against us.”

He concluded:

Who will win the Danish debate?

At the end of the day what will determine it is whether we again will continue to get the phone calls from the DC, from the UN, from NATO, with a UN mandate saying we really need to stop an atrocity or we really need to do something about this crisis and we need your help.

If that happens then I cannot foresee in the foreseeable future any Danish government that would refuse such a request.

So if you keep calling us and provide a UN mandate and a just reason for using force then we’ll come.

He also argued that if this stance prevails, then replacing the current F-16s is a logical thing to do and that given the centrality of the United States to Danish defense and security, procuring an American plane was the most logical thing to do.

Editor’s Note: Below is an article coauthored by Dr. Jakobsen which looks at the Danish way of war:

http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Books2012/YB2012/015.Peter%20Viggo%20Jakobsen%20og%20Karsten%20Jakob%20M%F8ller.pdf

Or can be downloaded here:

Libya and the Danish Way of War

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_B%C3%B8llebank

 

The Danish Airpower Symposium: Laying a Foundation for Rethinking Coalition Airpower

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/23/2015

2015-04-21 By Robbin Laird

There is nothing that focuses one’s thinking about defense more than having an immediate and direct threat that is not going away anytime soon.

With the Russian Ambassador threatening to use nuclear weapons against Denmark if they join the NATO missile defense network, or Russians paratrooping into the Danish zone of responsibility for Arctic search and rescue, or telling the Nordics that banding together threatens Russian security, one can not have an abstract conversation about defense and security in a small country like Denmark.

The Danes clearly know this, and have emphasized in various ways their alliance relationships in order to play a role in their own defense and also play a role in the broader scheme of Alliance security.

The Danes have coalition leadership and cooperation as part of their defense DNA.

Danish Conference

At the symposium, several strands of shaping a way ahead to deal with the threats facing the coalition of democratic states were evident, all converging on the evolving challenge of getting it right to defend against 21st century threats.

One strand was to discuss the Danish approach.

Here three presentations at the Symposium highlighted that approach and characterized the way ahead.

The first presentation along these lines was by the well-known Danish professor, Dr. Peter Viggo Jakobsen.

This presentation provided an overview of why Denmark has been so engaged in alliance expeditionary operations over the past decade, and why that proclivity is likely to continue.

And given the threat overhanging Denmark, clearly the relationship with the United States is a crucial factor in shaping Denmark’s thinking about the way ahead or with regard to the acquisition of fighter aircraft.

Dr. Gary Schaub from the Centre of Military Studies, the co-host of the symposium, then looked back at the F-16 program as a prologue to the next fighter acquisition program.

He highlighted a number of lessons to be learned from those efforts. the most central of them was the collaborative nature of the F-16 program and the contributions made by participating in the consortium of European F-16 states in the operation, maintenance, and modernization of Danish F-16s.

Clearly, airpower is central to Denmark and to its coalition efforts, both for direct defense and for expeditionary operations.

And Col. Anders Rex, Chief of the Expeditionary Air Staff of the Danish Air Force, underscored this theme.

Rex coined a phrase “coalitionability” to express his focus on the core requirement of allied air forces and defense forces shaping ways to work more effectively with one another in dealing with 21st century challenges.

The conference then turned to the question of innovation in airpower and reshaping–or as I call it “renorming airpower”–to deal with the 21st century threat environment.

Two airpowers that are unique in that they are resetting their core air platforms within a relatively short period of time – the Royal Australian Air Force and the USMC – are facing a similar challenge: how best to innovate with the integrated force under the influence of airpower modernization?

For both these forces, the central platform impacting on the transformation is the F-35.

For the RAAF, the Chief has set in motion Plan Jericho which is a fundamental rethink and reworking of the fleet to provide for a more lethal and integrated force designed to enhance its capabilities notably when operating in coalition.

For the USMC, the F-35 is a centerpiece of the next wave of innovation which has been launched under the impact of the Osprey revolution.

In both cases, the central challenge is to reshape the operational mind-sets and approaches able to leverage the fifth generation revolution.

The RAAF perspective was provided by the co-host of the Symposium, John Blackburn; the USMC perspective was provided by Lt. Col. David Berke, a unique pilot with F-22, F-35, F-18, F-16, and JTAC experience.

The presentations dovetailed on the core challenge of resetting capabilities and mindsets to deal with evolving challenges.

Group Captain Paul Godfrey from the Royal Air Force explained the RAF approach to modernization and the impact of the F-35 on that modernization.

As a Harrier, F-16, and Typhoon pilot, Godfrey looked at the role of the F-35 in opening up the aperture for Royal Navy and Royal Air Force modernization which comes together in the form of the new HMS Queen Elizabeth carrier.

Although Godfrey did not say this, the reality is that the HMS Queen Elizabeth could well be a key participant in coalition operations to deter Russia in the Baltics and the Nordic region.

Air Commodore Dré Kraak from the Royal Netherlands Air Force focused on the modernization of the Dutch Air Force and ways to work with allies.

The Dutch are transitioning to an all F-35 fleet, and in so doing are working closely with the Italians, who will build the bulk of the Dutch F-35s.

They are also discussing with the Italians the possibility of developing a common training solution as well.

According to Air Commodore Dré Kraak, “The Italians have made major strides in their capabilities to build aerospace systems.

It is really quite remarkable to look at the progress over the past 20 years.”

Col. “Jeep” Willi from the NATO Joint Airpower Center, highlighted a number of studies that the Center was conducting. These studies emphasized the challenges and opportunities facing coalition airpower. He also took the opportunity to deliver a message from USAFE Commander General Frank Gorenc to the Danish Air Force, inviting them to join the Center and bring the Danish perspective to bear as they develop NATO airpower concepts..

It is clear with the Russian threat to the Baltics that a well thought through coalition approach is crucial so that even smaller allies can contribute capabilities that can fit effectively into a scalable modular force.

This could be an effective way to think about enhancing the defense of the Nordic and Baltic region.

Deterrence is simply not credible if there is a weak or divided or incoherent allied defense force facing an aggressor the size and proclivities of Putin’s Russia.

In my own presentation, I focused on the importance of shaping a 21st century force, and not simply looking backward.

I focused on a way ahead, namely to shape a modular, scalable, and C2 enabled coalition force, in which a regional lead nation could call up and generate forces to deal with adversaries as varied as the probing military powers, like China or Russia, or the pop up threats posed by groups like ISIS.

Ed Timperlake then focused on a number of key technological opportunities facing the allies–as well as strategic challenges that were pressing upon them to actually take advantage of those opportunities.

In the Baltic area right now the Russians were conducting Tron Warfare, and Denmark was on the front lines of this important aspect of 21st century operations, Timperlake noted to the audience.

The symposium was closed by the co-chairs with John Blackburn underscoring that Col. Rex core concept of “coalitionabilty” was at the heart of the RAAF transformation with Plan Jericho.

And Gary Schaub underscored how important airpower really was to effective coalition operations.

Schaub closed with the thought that partnerships are key to enabling a real revolutionary jump in air combat power for joint operations.

Editor: A note about Tron Warfare:

EW is a complex subject with many discreet but also connected elements. Over time all things electronic in the military took on many dimensions. Electronic Counter-measures (ECM) begat Electronic Counter-Counter (ECCM) measures, Command and Control (C&C) has grown to C5ISR. Information war in certain applications created a multi-billion dollar domain called “”cyber.”

Additionally there has to always be considerations of Electro Magnetic Pulse concerns (EMP) and the counter measures of ‘hardening” of electronic components. There are a lot of other EW issues in “tron war,” such as Infer-Red Sensing (IR) and always protecting “signals in space” information being transmitted and trying to jam the bad guys “signals in space.”

Tactically, it has been said on the modern battlefield — air, sea or land — if not done correctly, “you emit and you die.”

EW can include offensive operations to identify an opponent’s emissions in order to and fry spoof or jam their systems.

In successful “tron” war, often-kinetic kill weapons can be fired.  The kinetic kill shot is usually a high-speed missile designed to HOJ (home on jam). There is also the ability to emit electronic “kill” or spoofing signals i.e. to emit miss signals to an enemy’s incoming weapon sensors.

The air engagements between the Russians and the allies in the Nordic and Baltic region include a significant element of Tron Warfare.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reshaping Global Logistics Support for Allied Capabilities: The Fujitsu Approach

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/22/2015

2015-04-14 By Robbin Laird

Logistics is certainly the dark art or science of military capability.

Indeed, one problem facing broader understanding of the centrality of logistics, notably expeditionary logistics in support of joint or coalition operations, is that the crucial role of logistics in operations is not viewed by politicians and politics as a strategic centerpiece of effective capabilities.

It clearly is.

In recognition of this missing piece, Murielle Delaporte, the co-founder of Second Line of Defense, added the key noun Operational to the title of her support and logistics magazine (Soutien, Logistique Défense Sécurité Opérationnels).

http://www.operationnels.com/

With coalition operations becoming so predominant for national militaries, and those operations frequently expeditionary in character, it is essential that more effective logistics approaches be put in place.

And when added to the evolving environment, the operation of those forces with a number of common multi-national systems ranging from C-17s, to F-35s, to Eurofighters, to A400Ms, to KC-30As, it is clear that parts sharing and shared sustainment approaches are very capable of being put in place.

https://sldinfo.com/the-three-%E2%80%9Cm%E2%80%9Ds-for-21st-century-air-capabilities/

https://sldinfo.com/leveraging-new-platforms/

But Rome was not built in a day, and certainly that phrase is truly accurate with regard to the perpetual effort to reform logistics practices.

What is clear, is that a global company with significant local footprints fits the dynamics of change, if MoDs can work through their nationalistic proclivities to leverage global production, operations and sustainment opportunities.

Fujitsu is such a company.

It has presence in several countries, but clearly the very strong base in the UK and Australia coupled with the changing dynamics of Japanese defense, whereby the Japanese government is encouraging and supporting Japanese companies to collaborate worldwide in defense, provides a window of opportunity for Fujitsu in the logistics area.

Fjujitsu global defense logistical support center of activities. Credit: Fujitsu
Fjujitsu global defense logistical support center of activities. Credit: Fujitsu

Another trend line works in favor of such a company, namely the growing role of IT, transparency in parts supply and the need to build in security into IT.

Fujitsu is a global leader in secure cloud computing and its core capabilities in this area can be drawn upon as the company looks to shape global logistics support capabilities.

During my recent visit to the United Kingdom to visit the new large deck carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, I met with Tim Gibson and Eric Bownes of Fujitsu defense, both based in the United Kingdom, and discussed the evolving approach.

In this interview, Tim Gibson described the evolving approach and in the follow up interview with Eric Bownes, the focus was upon implementing the approach as expressed in what Fujitsu calls its Global Defense Initiative.

Tim Gibson is Vice President of Defense and National Security in Fujitsu UK.

According to a biography taken from Tech UK:

Since June 2011, Tim Gibson has managed the Defence & National Security business in the UK&I and leads Fujitsu’s Global Defence Initiative to accelerate the growth and development of Fujitsu’s worldwide Defence and Security Capability.

Tim Gibson started his role in the industry in 1979 and has had extensive roles in ICL and Fujitsu as a Managing Director, sales, sales management and international business across Europe and the Middle East.

Prior to his current role as Executive Director for D&NS he was involved in the management of Fujitsu Group’s global major deals and the development of new and innovative cloud based businesses. Before that he was the Director of Offshore Development for Fujitsu Services, responsible for the development and delivery of the company’s offshore strategy.

Question: What is Fujitsu UK defense logistics focus of attention?

Gibson: We have been around for some time, more than 50 years.

We have long standing relationships with UK MoD and with prime contractors in the UK.

In particular, we have worked in messaging and top secret systems.

And we have migrated similar defense approaches into Australia as well from the UK.

The change in Japan with regard to defense highlights the opportunity to take our work and merge it more generally with the company in shaping a global business.

Tim Gibson and Eric Bowles talking with Air Vice Marshall Graham Howard, thenUK MoD Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics Operations at the DSEI Show in 2013. Credit: Fujitsu
Tim Gibson and Eric Bownes talking with Air Vice Marshall Graham Howard, then UK MoD Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics Operations at the DSEI Show in 2013. Credit: Fujitsu

Fujitsu in Japan has built up a large defense business, and we’ve now seen synergies between all our different elements of our business.

In the 26 countries Fujitsu operates in, we have developed, in three of them, our core defense business.

But these businesses have been built as silos; the challenge is to cross operate and to shape global integrated solutions.

Everyone’s defense budgets are under pressure.

Everybody’s looking at standardizing, and we’re suddenly seeing a market, we think, where the interoperability between countries on common platforms means they will want common support models and common infrastructures and on a global basis.

For us that’s a convenient piece of timing about where we were thinking about how we would try to build a more globalized defense business and take best of breed solutions, whether that’s from Japan, or Australia, or the US or the UK, and apply those business solutions in a consistent way across all the countries we operate in.

We’ve seen that a lot particularly around things like logistics and munitions support where people fundamentally do the same business process, so they need the same sort of supporting technologies.

Question: Fujitsu is a well-known global IT company.

And it has significant global presence in the IT and IT security business, notably as a leading cloud computing company.

Is this a core strength you hope to draw upon in moving forward with your global approach to logistics?

Gibson: It is.

The secure cloud computing capabilities can be leveraged going forward as we provide support to expeditionary forces operating in a coalition setting.

Currently, we do a lot of work in the maritime defense and security space in Australia, Japan and the UK.

We do a lot in things like high-grade military messaging, above top-secret applications in intelligence, munitions support, logistics support space. As well as doing a lot of general infrastructure support.

We support UK MOD wherever they go in the world where they have defense infrastructure. We’re operating always in every operational zone they’re in whether that’s Afghanistan or the Falklands.

It would make sense to leverage the regional cloud computing capabilities, which Fujitsu has in place which provides the foundation for a global approach.

Being truly global is an advantage because Fujitsu operating in a 100 plus companies directly with a fully-fledged Fujitsu business means you got a footprint on the ground to give you that global support model, so we can offer service in a consistent way pretty much anywhere the allied forces go.

And we can mix and match between global and local markets to get the most cost effective solution for the customer.

And with a new program like F-35 which is clearly looking at global support solutions both to save money and to provide more timely support to deployed forces.

Question: There is a clear trend to build a number of core multi-national, multi-mission platforms, wouldn’t make sense to build global support solutions as well?

Gibson: It is crucial to overcome the national stovepipes to unlock value for the defense customer.

All the allied defense ministries or departments and all the platform suppliers are looking at how they can optimize their sustainability route, the repair loop, just the amount of money that’s dead money tied up in the system that none of them can afford anymore.

They do want to have that part available wherever the plane breaks down anywhere in the world pretty much instantly.

But, without all the overheads of every one of them having them sitting in their own warehouses back on their national territory.

Why fly a part from the UK to the Middle East, if that part can be provided locally by cross-supporting supply arrangements?

But this will work only with a very transparent IT supply system with the kind of accurate and timely information, which can be provided to the deployed forces.

This requires edge solutions to sustainment, and we are building up our capabilities in this area, that is one reason we bought GlobeRanger.

Question: It is also a question of the fit between the evolving approach to warfare and the potential for logistics transformation.

How do you see this fit?

Gibson: We are shifting from a concept of expeditionary warfare whereby we take national kit to the fight to coalition warfare where we show up to work with others to engage in the fight.

Pooling resources for combat and support is a core requirement but will not happen without global logistics solutions.

It will be warfare as part of a coalition of nations sharing common platforms, common communications, and trying to optimize their logistics channels.

Everybody is trying to make money going further and be more effective and more efficient.

And, that’s about having the right parts in the right place at the right time, and being able to move things around in a much more flexible way than is currently available with legacy approaches which are still very, very stove-piped.

And there are truly simple solutions, which can provide for significant capability enhancers.

Why fly water into an operational area if you could provide for it locally. But you need pre-arrangements with suppliers in the region of interest and good and reliable information about numbers, stockpiles and delivery routes.

All of that information can be delivered to decision makers by systems we are building now.

Question: And isn’t there is also a security issue?

Gibson: Having a more effective logistics management system at the point of operation is crucial to security of forces going forward.

We don’t want to be Quartermasters for Terrorists.

Editor’s Note: Below is a Case Study of Fujitsu Supporting UK MoD in Germany:

Fujitsu Supports MoD n Germany

The challenge The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) needed to communicate securely between 33 military sites in Germany as well as overseas and within the UK.

The contract in Germany was an addition to the existing Defence Fixed Telecommunications Services (DFTS) in the UK.

This is one of the most successful PFI contracts, covering 230000 phone and data users at 1600 sites in the UK.

DFTS is on course to save more than £700m for the MoD since contract let in 1997.

At the time when this contract work commenced, BT identified Fujitsu as a partner to support its operations in Germany.

A relationship has existed for some time between BT and Fujitsu to maintain DFTS services.

Due to the success of this, BT decided to expand the relationship to include all of the services supported by the DFTS contract in Germany.

The necessary contract was signed between BT and Fujitsu and the operation in Germany was expanded to cover the support and performance requirements.

For a look at the basic Fujitsu approach to defense support see the following:

Fujitsu and Defense

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2d MEB and Evolving C2 for Composite Forces: The Case of Bold Alligator 2014

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2015-04-20 By Robbin Laird

During my visit to 2d MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade), I had the opportunity to interview Major General Richard L. Simcock II, Commanding General, 2d MEB, and Major Marcus Mainz, lead 2d MEB planner for Exercise Bold Alligator 2014, where we had a lengthy discussion regarding the Marine Corps’ innovative approach in addressing Combatant Commanders’ requirements.

During the interviews, I was able to discuss 2d MEB innovations in C2 (command and control) with Mainz.

Although we discussed many aspects of the 2d MEB’s approach to C2 for Marine Corps composited forces, the innovations evident in Bold Alligator provided several concrete examples of how 2d MEB is working through emerging C2 challenges.

Innovations in aviation allow Marines to extend their reach and provide greater flexibility for amphibious operations. The reworking of the amphibious fleet to deliver capabilities to project power from the sea and the ability of the infantry to implement innovations in maneuver warfare and force insertion require creativity in operational design and C2.

The very term command and control can be confusing because it suggests top-down control of detailed operational activities.

However, 2d MEB exercises C2 of scalable and modular forces by delegating it to a level where tactical operations are more effective.

This contradicts a growing trend of micromanagement of an expanding battlespace.

This construct facilitates mastery of the operational environment in a fluid combat situation by keeping focus at the appropriate levels. It gives the MEB CE (command element) the capability to focus on the operational art that bridges the strategic and tactical levels for political objectives.

Execution of the mission, empowerment of subordinate leaders at the appropriate level, and maintaining situational awareness of the overall situation is a key challenge for C2.

The complexity begins with incorporation of joint and coalition forces for CJTF operations.

Given that joint and coalition capabilities enhance response time and effectiveness of global operations, C2 takes on a whole new meaning when shaping the appropriate composite force for missions across the ROMO (Range of Military Operations), which makes it central to effective Marine Corps Operations.

2d MEB is hard at work on meeting this challenge.

MajGen Simcock explained in his interview that the importance of “providing the Combatant Commander with a force capable of plugging into various joint, coalition, and interagency requirements is essential. The realities of the 21st century security environment demand a smart power approach inclusive of all services of the military, our partners and interagencies, which play an integral role in fulfilling National Security Strategy.”

Integration of allied and partner nation operational capabilities and systems with the U.S. amphibious fleet will develop, in effect, a global U.S.-Allied amphibious fleet capability.

General Simcock also discussed emerging demand for partnership with 2d MEB in global security “since the Marine Corps has revitalized the MEB concept capable of world-wide deployment, we have been contacted by many of our coalition partners, allies and other nations interested in training and operating with 2d MEB.”

The way Major Mainz explained it:

Composite forces are created when you take disparate forces, which are underneath different command and control structures, and place them underneath one commander tasked with a specific mission.

The 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade is ‘a receiver of forces.’ We work various compositing options and shape the C2 for those forces coming together to perform the mission.

Major Mainz likened the 2d MEB CE to a Swiss army knife.

We want to be the Swiss Army knife of command and control.

We want to morph or adapt into whatever environment we’re in – coalition or joint.

2d MEB sees itself as a scalable CE capable of C2 for disparate forces, coalition and/or joint, to address the unique requirements of Combatant Commanders in uncertain environment.

The emphasis is upon shaping the force appropriate to the mission much as I discussed earlier the concept of insertion forces.

“We’re not trying to deploy something forward that’s not needed.”

Major Mainz explained the planning approach.

2d MEB needs three things to create a plan – battlespace, mission, and troops available, but given any of the two we develop the third. We offer the Combatant Commander a scalable force capable of operations across the ROMO.

This mental concept allows us to avoid a preconceived notion of what a C2 structure should look like.What makes us so different from any other Command Element is our lack of prearranged subordinate forces along with a training program rehearsing different C2 structures.

We have the mental flexibility to design a plan tailor-made to the unique mission and battlespace of any Combatant Command.

Exercise Bold Alligator 2014 was clearly about C2 and shaping a force that can work with coalition forces operating under a foreign commander.

“The unique term we used during Bold Alligator is we can become a Commander of MAGTFs, not a MAGTF Commander. What that means is we see our Command Element as so flexible we don’t have to go into a normal Marine construct.”

The Marines exercised C2 of multiple U.S. and coalition led MAGTFs while organizing additional structure to support them.

This mix and match approach was a crucial element of what was tested in Bold Alligator 2014.

For example, in Bold Alligator we used the T-AKE (Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship) as a logistics combat element ship.

We had three different MAGTF’s involved but separately we had a logistics combat element operating off a T-AKE, an intermediate staging base and a land base.

We were trying to show the flexibility that we can mix and match whatever the situation actually demands. We don’t need one model or the other, we can create hybrid models.

Major Mainz explained how this approach worked with the Dutch who were in charge of a coalition operation.

When the Dutch did a raid during the operation, Marine Corps’ Aviation supported their raid.

And this required not only flexibility, but clear command and control relationships when those Marine Corps aviation forces were chopped to the Dutch during that mission.

One of the challenges faced in doing coalition C2 is the security restriction on the U.S. side, which is a key part of shaping effective joint C2.

When we provided them an American ship, American helicopters, and some Marines and said you’re in charge of that task force, we spent an enormous amount of time creating what they called command knee boards, to determine what can we ask of the coalition force.

During this intellectual rigor we realized the U.S. had information that was difficult to share in the original construct.

Our challenge was determining how to share relevant information within the constraint of the communications architecture.

We spent an inordinate amount of time getting it to a metric where we could share with the coalition.

Another aspect of the exercise was the USS Kearsarge the installation of CENTRIXS servers to handle coalition communications.

According to Major Mainz, those servers remained on the ship.

“The Kearsarge is now a coalition communications ship.”

In effect, Bold Alligator 2014 was not an exercise; “it was a mission rehearsal.”

A major effort developed from the need to communicate with coalition partners – the need to work on what the Major referred to as building an “information kiosk.”

The challenge was to shape ways to effectively exchange information.

How do we move things from SIPR net to CENTRIXS?

How do we transfer from NIPR net to CENTRIXS?

We dedicated significant manpower and intellectual rigor to these processes?

Major Mainz also discussed the execution of a flexible, scalable and an apportioned HQ for amphibious shipping and/or coalition and joint operations, another important aspect of C2 innovation during Bold Alligator 2014.

One of the things we did during Bold Alligator was to leave the majority of our force at Camp Lejeune as a reachback capability for the command element while we went out on the ships.

On average, MEB amphibious operations necessitate a two hundred man staff. We never put more than seventy people on that ship because we were testing our reachback capabilities.

The general says, ‘Get there the fastest with the mostest.’ Get out there, and get out there fast.

I don’t need to bring everything with me, bring just enough to be capable.

In short, C2 of a composited force is about flexible insertion appropriate to the mission, given its restraints, able to operate from land, air and the sea – not simply park forces on land.

It is about modularity; it is about scalability; and it is about pushing C2 to the appropriate level of decision-making.

And 2d MEB is hard at work on these 21st century innovations.

 

For earlier pieces on C2 and Bold Alligator 2014, see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/re-shaping-coalition-insertion-forces-bold-alligator-2014/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/2d-marine-expeditionary-brigade-shaping-the-scalable-modular-forces-for-21st-century-operations/

And see the following USMC document as well:

EF21_USMC_Capstone_Concept

Expeditionary Force 21, which provides a concept for the Marine Corps (MC) to build, equip and train their forces for 21st century operations.

The MC is enabled by the US Navy (USN) amphibious fleet, which is equipped and trained for the ROMO (Range of Military Operations).

To do so, the Marines are focusing on evolving their capabilities beyond the PHIBRON (Amphibious Squadron) or ARG (Amphibious Ready Group)/MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) level by bringing forces together from across the theater of operations to composite forces.

The goal is to “provide timely and scalable forces for crisis response, allowing commanders to tailor forces to evolving missions and effectively composite modular MAGTFs (Marine Air Ground Task Forces) by combining forward-deployed forces with rapidly deploying forces.”

 

Shaping a Value Proposition in Logistical Support and Training: A Discussion with Lt. General (Retired) Robling About Meeting the Challenge

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/20/2015

2015-04-20 By Robbin Laird

Lt. General Robling recently retired as Commanding General, Marine Corps Forces Pacific (CG MARFORPAC) and is now serving as the CEO of PKL Services, Inc.

(PKL), an aerospace services firm.

PKL is headquartered in Poway, California, and throughout its now ten years of operation, has employed over 500 people and operated throughout the United States and overseas at four international operating sites.

The discussion with LtGen Robling focused on two emerging challenges supporting customers:

(1)the tradeoff of price versus value as core contracting metrics within the US Domestic market space;

and (2) working with international clients as they pursue their own unique value proposition when working with a US-based firm like PKL.

Over the past few years, with the advent of Sequestration and reduced DoD operating budgets, there’s been a growing trend within US procurement and contracting circles to select Lowest Price/Technically Acceptable (LPTA), vice an alternative called Best Value, as the preferred selection criteria for new contracts.

While on the surface LPTA appears to make sense in light of the aforementioned Sequestered budgets, the reality is far more complicated.

U.S. Marine Sgt. Robert W. Walker, center, explains the capabilities of the miniature deployable assistance water purification system to U.S. Marine Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling at a disaster site in Biang, Brunei Darussalam, June 19 as part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX). The disaster site is the location of the field training exercise portion of the multilateral exercise, which provides a platform for regional partner nations to address shared security challenges, strengthen defense cooperation, enhance interoperability and promote stability in the region. Robling is the commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. Walker is an engineer equipment electrical systems technician with 9th Engineer Support Battalion, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force. 6/19/13
U.S. Marine Sgt. Robert W. Walker, center, explains the capabilities of the miniature deployable assistance water purification system to U.S. Marine Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling at a disaster site in Biang, Brunei Darussalam, June 19 as part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX). The disaster site is the location of the field training exercise portion of the multilateral exercise, which provides a platform for regional partner nations to address shared security challenges, strengthen defense cooperation, enhance interoperability and promote stability in the region. Robling is the commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. Walker is an engineer equipment electrical systems technician with 9th Engineer Support Battalion, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force. 6/19/13 

What LtGen Robling and other experienced CEOs are realizing, and forcefully arguing, is there is a deeper and more insidious cost to the customer, in the form of a deferred readiness bill, that will have to be paid later.

When the Government trades a near term imperative (cost) for a long term end state (value), there is almost always a gradual loss in readiness and material condition over time.

LPTA runs counter to the operational logic of defense forces where performance indicators and combat effectiveness, vice cost and efficiency, are crucial to wartime performance.

Getting the best price to achieve the value outcome is the real goal, not simply forcing competition to the bottom of the price barrel without overall performance, endurance, and life cycle considerations.

We have seen this LPTA problem emerge in a number of platform acquisitions but this is clearly not best practice is this shortsighted mindset is affecting the logistics and sustainment field as well.

Question: Looking through PKL’s literature, it seems that your company is providing full spectrum support to your domestic and international clients, to include on- and off-aircraft maintenance support, pilot training, simulator training, maintenance upgrade training, curriculum development, and leadership development.

Is that a correct read?

Robling: It is.

Like most companies, PKL started out with a very discrete core competency and niche, which was US Marine Corps and US Navy aircraft maintenance augmentation.

That competency, tied to PKL’s then 8(a) small business status, expertly positioned the company for the type of aerospace services in high demand as a result of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This initial big bang growth, and the past performance and technical capability associate with this work, solidified PKL as a proven and highly respected company within the aerospace sector.

Building on this initial momentum, PKL was able to then expand into US Air Force contract maintenance support, ground logistics, and most recently, Foreign Military Sales contracts supporting the Republic of Singapore Air Force and the Royal Saudi Air Force.

And most recently, we’ve developed a very unique leadership development program that really rounds out our portfolio of services.

We are particularly proud of, and encouraged by, these FMS contracts with Singapore and Saudi Arabia.

For example, PKL initially won the Singapore contract via open competitive bid; a five year, multi-faceted contract combining F-15 pilot training, simulator training, maintenance, and supervisory oversight based out of Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.

Based on PKL’s performance, the Government of Singapore awarded to PKL, via a sole-source contract award, another 5-year contract.

For Saudi Arabia, we operate in Kingdom providing maintenance upgrade training across all echelons of maintenance, up to level seven training (equivalent to a senior technician in the US Air Force).

We have just entered our third year on this contract, and once again, based on PKL’s superior performance, the contract has expanded in scope and complexity based on our customers high satisfaction with our work.

Though not currently in operation, PKL has in the past supported every helicopter in the US Marine Corps’ inventory, and several of the Corps’ fixed wing aircraft, enabling PKL to claim extensive past performance and technical mastery across a broad array of aircraft types.

Moreover, PKL has gradually made inroads into ground logistics, supply chain management, and material management, supporting Army Tracked Vehicles and USMC ground logistics Depot maintenance.

Based on the above, I’ve asked my staff to base our growth strategy on two core objectives: Exploit those sectors in which PKL already has mastery and experience, and Explore new sectors in which real opportunity is emerging.

An example of the later is FMS—particularly in Asia.

I like to think of this strategy akin to basic portfolio management:

As our US domestic market constrains and tightens (think bonds for example), we are looking to re-weight and re-allocate our investments into International markets where we see growth (think equities).

But let’s be clear; other large US companies see this and are pursuing this same strategy.

Staying competitive with the larger companies has been difficult for smaller companies like ours, principally for the reason I mentioned earlier: LPTA. As U.S. contracting agencies increasingly award contracts based on lowest price, we are seeing across the board the reality that, in actual performance, the contractors cannot deliver a sustainable, high value outcome.

To get to the lowest price on the proposal, the winning contractor has to somewhat gut the workforce, often removing the high priced (but enormously important) supervisory skills.

These LPTA contracts do not necessarily provide the customer with best value, and likewise, the contractors lose as they are forced into what we call a “billet vacancy shell game;” gaping and transferring personnel between and amongst vacant billets as a way to save money and increase profit margins.

This is unquestionably a lose-lose proposition for both parties.

For military customers, whose real metrics are performance and warfighting readiness, not simply lowest cost, we must provide contract criteria allowing us to deliver value, and more so, deliver it over the entire length of the contract, from the first day until the last day.

Based on my recent experience there is a clear need to relook at the LPTA practice, take a more holistic look at value versus cost, and accept the reality that shortsighted tradeoffs we make today.

Although on the surface the Department may be saving a few dollars, it will in the future not only degrade the very readiness we seek to obtain, but cost us twice us much to achieve at a later date when we have to restore and reclaim capability at tomorrow’s inflated dollar.

PKL Services

Question: The pool of qualified labor is pretty small and relatively static, so LPTA practices clearly must have an impact on that pool of labor?

Robling: The pool of available and qualified people, especially in high performance and technically complex aircraft like U.S. military jets and helicopters is finite.

What normally happens when an incumbent loses a fixed-price contract to a lower bidder is this: the low-cost contractor will try to re-hire those technicians at lower wages.

This puts the technician in a dilemma; either he accepts the lower wage offer or he moves on, causing a vacancy in the contract that could take months to fill. For example, if I am paying someone $50 per hour, and lose the contract to a lower bidder, the technician may now be offered $35 per hour. He either takes the lower wage or seeksother employment, which is often the case.

Like I mentioned earlier, this practice creates vacancies in the contracts, which many contractors skillfully manage to make up for the low bids.

The customer is not getting all the people, and more worrisome, loses expertise at the supervisory levels, which are required for the scope of the contract, causing either degraded readiness or delays in producing combat power. Either way the government loses.

Question: It appears International partners have not gone down the LPTA path, at least not as extensively as the US. So it does seem to make sense for PKL to try to expand your global footprint?

Robling: That is our core idea.

Many of our partners in Asia and the Middle East fly very good aircraft but are not necessarily yet achieving their desired levels of readiness, material condition, and organic maintenance mastery.

This is exactly the emerging opportunity we see and intend to explore: They have a real need; PKL has a proven answer. PKL’s value proposition to these international firms is this: Your foe right now is lagging readiness and not yet fully experienced or deep-enough workforces.

PKL can directly attack this foe by sourcing, tailoring, and rapidly employing at your sites the supervisors and skilled artisans to arrest those problems and teach your folks to gain the mastery to become self-sufficient.

That is the key difference between PKL’s value proposition and offers made by other companies.

PKL states to our international clients, up front and before we start work, two core commitments:

First, PKL is not selling you any aftermarket materials to bloat contract expense and drive up your costs; and

second, we seek a long-term and intimate relationship focused on creating organic mastery and capability in your workforce.

PKL works to make you, our customer, independently capable, not dependent on PKL.

Those are not cosmetic commitments; we are telling our international customers that we seek to make them the masters of their destiny, and the highest praise we’ll ever receive from them is for them to see us as a trusted partner, and in the end, that they don’t need our augmentation anymore because we helped them be truly self-sufficient.

It may seem like a counter-intuitive business model, to actually tell a client you don’t desire to develop co-dependency, but I find the opposite to be true.

Give them the assurance up front PKL will deliver the end state that lets them master their own fate.

If we do that job well, we don’t have to sell PKL through cold calls and late night knocks on the door. People who seek value will willingly seek out PKL.

I trust that, and we will anchor our ethos and business ethic on that principle.

We have proven this model works in Singapore and Saudi Arabia; now, we will expand this model throughout those geo-areas based on the same sound principles.

Question: That sounds like a forward-leaning strategy.

Sounds like you are betting on personal relationships, value, and broader end states than just tactical or technical outcomes.

So, how do you get your own people to buy into that strategy?

Robling: Though PKL’s Ethos. We built our company around an ethos we call Row True.

We have a single, powerful image of a manned, oared boat cutting sharply through the water, toward the horizon.

Under that powerful image we have the words Row True.

What this means to all of us, at every level of the company, are these cornerstone principles: First, every one of us has our own hands on an oar, and thus, we must daily be accountable for our attitude, behaviors, and actions.

Personal discipline and personal accountability.

Second, we man the boat together.

We are all rowing together, in unison and coherence, toward a shared vision and towards a distant end state. This is Teamwork. By recruiting and building a talent strategy around our ethos of Row True, we cultivate the leaders who aspire to excellence, meaning, and purpose.

That is how we get our people to look beyond paychecks and near-term gain, and instead invest their energy and creativity towards cultivating trustworthy partnerships like those I mentioned in Asia and the Middle East.

I truly believe this “ethos centering” is what sets PKL apart and is definitely what makes PKL unique.

Let’s face it; lots of people can rightly claim they fix aircraft and train workforces.

That in itself isn’t unique.

But very few companies, very few, can say they deliver, every day and in every clime and place, the tenets of Row True.

We are basing our future on this bet; that by building self-mastery in ourselves first, then reaching out in that spirit to our customers, that we’ll offer a solution that will not only be worth paying for, but more so, will be a service worth coming back to and recommending to others.

That is the art of the long view.

That is PKL’s cornerstone principle.