2015-01-11  According to a December 20, 2014 story on the Italian Defense website, the Defense Minister’s visit last Fall to Egypt has led to a new Egyptian-Italian agreement on defense cooperation.

Cooperation between Italy and Egypt is stronger. Today, in fact, Minister Pinotti and her Egyptian counterpart, Gen Sobhi, have signed a Joint Declaration on Technical and Military Cooperation, the first step toward an intergovernmental agreement in the Defence sector.In particular, the Declaration  covers the sectors of training, education and border control.

Today’s signature marks the actual starting of cooperation initiatives identified during the November official visit of Minister Pinotti in Egypt.

The discussion, which took place in a cordial atmosphere, focused on regional scenarios and, in particular, Libya and the current level of bilateral cooperation in the defence sector between the two countries.

Talks were also attended by the Chief of Defence Staff, Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli, Defence Secretary General-NAD, Lieutenant General Enzo Stefanini, Chief of Egyptian Navy Staff,   Admiral Osama Rabie and Deputy Minister for International Relations, Major General Mohamed Abd Alfattah Abd Alrahman Alkeshky.

And in a piece published on November 30, 2014, Dr. Theodor Karasik, a Senior Advisor to Risk Insurance Management in Dubai, wrote the following about the evolving relationship between Egypt and Italy:

On the security front, Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi stated strongly that the country is seeking to build a strong defense and military relationship with Egypt because of the threat from Islamic extremists, specifically ISIS and al-Qaeda franchises.

Renzi argued that “Italy is absolutely convinced that the Mediterranean is not the frontier but the heart of Europe, and Egypt must be considered a strategic partner in addressing together the problems of this area. The only way to avoid an escalation of them is through very strong cooperation between Egypt and Europe.”

Let’s be clear that the primary point of impact of the Libyan situation in Europe is Italy.

Italy has borne the brunt of Libyan refugees and the political fallout regarding this refugees is affecting the country’s security.

By uniting together, Italy and Egypt can arrest the problem through coordination of political capital and defense interests that resonate with the GCC.

 

2015-01-08 By Richard Weitz

The new Russian military doctrine adopted shortly before Christmas [available on the Kremlin website makes somewhat clearer Russian leaders’ current threat perceptions and national security priorities.

This iteration, which more accurately reflects Russian government statements, is the fourth since the Russian Federation became an independent country in 1991; the earlier versions date from 1993, 2000 and 2010.

The Russian Security Council, which includes the president and other senior national security officials, directed the writing of an updated military doctrine in July 2013 and established a special working group for that purpose.

In September 2014, Mikhail Popov, the Council’s deputy chairman, said that the doctrine would address new threats that have arisen since 2010, such as “the Arab Spring events, the military conflict in Syria and the situation in Ukraine and around it” as well as NATO’s more hostile stance toward Russia, including its unreliability as a supplier of military equipment.

The Council approved the new text on December 19 and President Vladimir Putin signed it one week later.

In its press release announcing the new doctrine, the Council highlighted these new threats (which cover and sometimes transcend foreign and domestic ones) as well as the challenge presented by the global growth of religious extremism, ethnic violence, state separatism, the decline of patriotism in Russian youth, the “intensification of global competition,” the “rivalry of value orientations and models of development,” and the “indirect action” tactics of “leading states” (i.e., NATO members) – their manipulation of popular protests, extremist organizations, private security companies, and other tools and agents against legitimate independent governments.

In addition to addressing these threats and dangers, the Council press release justified the revisions as needed to take into account Russian defense legislation that had appeared since 2010, recent changes in the structure and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, and the need to guide development and acquisition of a new generation of weapons systems as the existing ones reach the end of their services lives.

The Council insisted on the defensive nature of the doctrine and the government’s intent to apply military power only as a last resort after Russia first uses non-military tools of influence (diplomacy, energy, and other).

As foreshadowed by Popov’s remarks, the latest iteration describes NATO as becoming a more serious threat to Russia due its growing capabilities, both in general and in Russia’s vicinity, its expanding membership, which is encompassing many former Soviet bloc countries, and NATO’s perceived grasp for “global functions” in “violation of international law,” a reference to the alliance’s military interventions in Kosovo and Libya without Moscow’s unreserved approval in the UN Security Council.

Of course, NATO’s stronger policies in Europe result largely from Russian aggression against Ukraine, threats to other countries, and Moscow’s veto of UN mandates authorizing international interventions to protect civilians from state-sponsored mass repression.

From the Kremlin’s vantage point, moreover, NATO, the EU, and the rest of the West are allegedly plotting to overthrow governments friendly to Moscow through “social revolutions” engineered by Western diplomats, intelligence agencies, information campaigns through the Internet and other communications technologies, private military contractors and paramilitary groups, local fascists or terrorists, and other instruments.

In this interpretation, this campaign encompasses the Arab Spring but aims to subvert Moscow’s allies and eventually “the constitutional system of the Russian Federation” itself.

With NATO “puppets” in charge of these countries, Western businesses can more easily exploit their natural resources and undermine Russia’s “sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.”

Of course, Russia has been developing and employing its own panoply of non-military hybrid capabilities to subvert or influence foreign governments, including cyber weapons, mass media tools, foreign intelligence assets, energy dependencies, agents of influence within ethnic Russians or other groups living in foreign countries, and other tools.

Russia is also building alliances with other states (and statelets).

The doctrine actually priorities the latter—Abkhazia and South Ossetia are designated as Moscow’s closest military allies, along with Belarus, due to the integration of their militaries with those of Russia. Below them rank the other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.

The doctrine also says Russia is eager to develop security partnership with international groups that Moscow believes share its perspectives—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which includes China), the BRICS (which besides Russia includes Brazil, India, China and South Africa), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Other than these short references, China is not explicitly mentioned in this version of the doctrine or the previous one, either as a threat or an ally.

The Doctrine’s description of Russia’s more capable nuclear forces, which have been receiving priority funding and attention by the current leadership, does not differ much from previous documents.

Despite some earlier speculation that the Russian government would announce some kind of preemptive strike doctrine, the text states that the Russian President would authorize the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for an attack against Russia and its allies that involved the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) or in the case of an attack with conventional weaponry that “threatens the very existence of the state” (Article 27).

Of course, Russia joins the other nuclear weapons states, with China’s being the sole and unverifiable exception, in refusing to exclude first using these weapons.

In addition, Russian officials, including President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, have been issuing more explicit nuclear threats during the past year, including to affirm that defending Crimea falls under Russia’s nuclear umbrella and even that Moscow can now legally place nuclear weapons on the peninsula.

The caveat about Russia’s willingness to use nuclear weapons to prevent a major conventional defeat would apply most obviously to NATO but also to any Chinese attempt to exploit its local conventional superiority to recover Russian Far Eastern territories lost in previous centuries.

One reason for this abstention may be that the Doctrine more forthrightly acknowledges Russia’s non-nuclear “strategic deterrence measures,” such as better-prepared conventional military forces, improved precision-guided munitions, and other means of combat without using nuclear weapons.

Scholars may debate the importance of the distinction in the distinction between opasnosti (dangers) and ugrozy (threats) facing Russia, but the latter are probably more easily dealt with by non-military means.[ref] See the contributions by Roger McDermott (“Putin Signs New Military Doctrine: Core Elements Unchanged”) and Stephen Blank (“Russia’s Defense Doctrine Reflects Putin’s Paranoia and Siege Mentality”) in Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 2 (January 6, 2015).[/ref]

The Russian command is still studying the issue of how to operationalize an effective “system of non-nuclear deterrence” and the December 2014 Military Doctrine only hints at what might come, but Russia’s conventional forces have certainly improved since the 2008 Georgia War and the Doctrine explicitly pledges to continue the current military reform program.

Yet, the text cites the U.S. development of precisely these systems (without mentioning the United States by name) as a threat, singling out “strategic conventional precision weapons” (the possible placement of conventional warheads on ICBMs to develop “prompt global strike” systems that can hit targets throughout the world in only a few minutes), space-based weapons (possibly anti-satellite weapons but not ballistic missiles, which Russia guards as the jewels in its arsenal), and ballistic missile defenses.

Even some Russian analysts worry that Russian officials are exaggerating U.S. capabilities in these areas, while foreign analysts believe this may be to justify Russia’s own programs and military spending. Like the United States and China, moreover, Russia is also developing hypersonic conventional strike systems, anti-satellite capabilities, and even missile defenses.

Another novelty is the new emphasis on the Russian military’s role in defending Moscow’s interests in the Arctic region.

In recent years, the Russian government, citing alleged NATO threats, has decided to establish a network of military facilities and send more warplanes, warships, and troops to the region. Bolstering Moscow’s hold on the Crimea is naturally another priority. The doctrine is even willing to discuss with NATO, as long as it is “a dialogue of equals,” such issues as regional security, arms control, confidence-building measures, and even joint missile defense.

The Obama administration no doubts welcomes the assertion that Moscow is eager “to maintain equal relations with interested states and international organizations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” (art. 50e). Yet, the duty of the Russian military to help “ensure the protection of its citizens, outside the Russian Federation” (art. 22) is an alarming clause that Moscow could cite to intervene in the Baltic states, Georgia, Ukraine, and other NATO members and partners.

Although the current version more accurately reflects Russian thinking, it is more difficult to accept the Doctrine as a definitive guideline for future Russian strategy and tactics. Doctrine tends to lag behind and mirror rather than lead the development of actual policies, and Russia is undergoing a traumatic economic crisis that could well derail its planned military buildup.

With the collapse of both world oil prices and the value of the ruble on foreign exchange markets, as well as the Western sanctions limiting trade and investment with Russia, the Kremlin will find it difficult to sustain its exceptionally high spending. (Russian government spending for 2015 is scheduled to rise to 35% of the 15.5 trillion ruble budget, or about $100 billion.

The new situation might require the government to roll back its previous goal of modernizing at least 70 percent of its conventional equipment and 85 percent of its strategic nuclear weapons by 2020 in the new state defense program under development for the years 2016-2025, which should appear in public soon. Whatever the Doctrine’s intentions, until Russia’s economy recovers, the Kremlin will struggle to achieve the capabilities designed to implement it.

[The author would like to thank Karolina Lovejoy for her research assistance with this article.]

2015-01-03 As a new member of the Euro, Lithuania becomes the third Baltic state to join the pact.

Clearly, this is about politics as well as economics, and joining is seen as a buffer to the Russians. 

As noted in a Reuters piece published on December 31, 2014:

Lithuania joined the euro zone at the stroke of midnight on Thursday, hoping to anchor itself in Europe as its former master Russia flexes its military muscle in the region.

The first Soviet republic to declare independence, in 1990, Lithuania is the last of the three Baltic states to join the currency union and will be the last country to do so for the foreseeable future, with remaining European Union members at least two years, and probably much more, away.

“Myself, and I think, many of you feel sad that (Lithuania’s currency) the litas, which has served us well for more than two decades, becomes history, but we have to move forward,” Lithuania’s Finance Minister Rimantas Sadzius told the euro launch ceremony.

The common currency remains a divisive issue, with polls showing half the population of 3 million still not convinced dumping the litas is a good idea.

Lithuania’s Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius, who became the first person in the country to withdraw a 10 euro banknote from a cash machine, said the euro would “become a guarantor of both economic and political security.”

At the same time, Russia has launched a new economic organization bringing together several states of the former Soviet Union. 

The newly formed Eurasian Economic Union (EEA) has been launched as an alternative to the European Union.

As The Moscow Times wrote on January 2, 2015 about the new EEA:

Armenia officially joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) on Friday, banding together with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in a Moscow-led project meant to counterbalance the European Union. 

As part of a deal signed last October, Armenia will have limited representation in the organization until the end of 2015. Three Armenian members will share one vote in the union’s governing body, the Eurasian Economic Commission, TASS news agency reported Friday.

Kyrgyzstan is also set to join the union on May 1.

Armenia’s entry into the EEU means it will have to gradually transition to a unified tariff system with the union’s other members, with 2022 set as the deadline for the full transition, TASS reported.

The country will have to negotiate with the World Trade Organization, of which it is a member, on its changing obligations in light of its new membership with the economic bloc of former Soviet republics.

The Armenian government had been set to clinch a free-trade deal with the EU until, following talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in 2013 abruptly decided to switch to the Russian-led Customs Union, a precursor to the EEU.

Trade economist Alexander Knobel told The Moscow Times previously that Armenia turned away from European integration after Russia offered it the budget price of $170 to $180 per 1,000 cubic meters on its all-important natural gas imports.

The Armenian economy is heavily dependent on Russia, the country’s largest foreign investor and trade partner as well as the source of vital remittances sent home to Armenia by migrant workers.

Armenia has also cultivated a close political relationship with Russia in order to secure itself against neighbors Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been entangled in a territorial dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and surrounding districts for decades, with both Turkey and Azerbaijan erecting economic blockades against Armenia in response to its occupation of the area.

And with the new EEA a reality, Russia has started its diplomatic efforts with the European Union, to shape a new phase in Russian-European relationships.

With the Euro expanding Eastward, and the invasion of Ukraine placing pressures on Europe to sort out what to do with Ukraine and Russia, Putin has launched yet another offensive, this time in the political-economic domain.

As Andrew Rettman of the EU Observer wrote on January 2, 2015:

Russia’s EU ambassador has urged Brussels to launch talks with the newly born Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) despite the Ukraine crisis.

Vladimir Chizhov told EUobserver: “Our idea is to start official contacts between the EU and the EAEU as soon as possible. [German] chancellor Angela Merkel talked about this not long ago. The EU sanctions [on Russia] are not a hinder”.

“I think that common sense advises us to explore the possibility of establishing a common economic space in the Eurasian region, including the focus countries of the Eastern Partnership [an EU policy on closer ties with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine]”.

“We might think of a free trade zone encompassing all of the interested parties in Eurasia”.

He described the new Russia-led bloc as a better partner for the EU than the US, with a dig at health standards in the US food industry.

And in the best quote of the day:

“Do you believe it is wise to spend so much political energy on a free trade zone with the USA while you have more natural partners at your side, closer to home?

We don’t even chlorinate our chickens,” the ambassador said.

Rettman provided additional context to the launch of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEA):

Modelled on the EU, it has a Moscow-based executive body, the Eurasian Economic Commission, and a political body, the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, where member states’ leaders take decisions by unanimity.

It has free movement of workers and a single market for construction, retail, and tourism.

Over the next 10 years, it aims to create a court in Minsk, a financial regulator in Astana and, possibly, to open Eurasian Economic Commission offices in Astana, Bishkek, Minsk, and Yerevan.

It also aims to launch free movement of capital, goods, and services, and to extend its single market to 40 other sectors, with pharmaceuticals next in line in 2016.

Ukraine was originally to join, but a popular revolt last year overthrew its Russia-friendly president and its new government signed a free trade treaty with the EU instead.

The developments prompted Russia to invade Ukraine and the EU and US to impose sanctions on Russia.

They also prompted the EU and US to accelerate talks on their own free trade treaty to strengthen Western ties.

Russia’s Chizhov said neither the sanctions nor the slump in oil prices and the resulting crash in the value of the rouble will harm the Eurasian project.

“Russia has been wise enough to build substantial reserves to withstand the external pressure”, he noted.

“The situation with the ruble will be remedied. And we have to see the future of financial and energy markets in the long term. They are of no doubt in favour of Russia and Kazakhstan particularly”.

The political and diplomatic advantages for Moscow of the EEA seem obvious, but what about the economic prospects?

If the goal is to reinforce economic ties among states close to Moscow, the EEA may make economic sense, notably if bartner rather than global currency is the goal.  But otherwise, there is real reason to be skeptical.

Business Insider is skeptical of the success of the EEA.

As Mike Bird wrote on December 31, 2014:

Russia’s economic woes barely need repeating. With oil prices falling, the ruble dropped to record lows dozens of times in recent months, falling to 80 against the dollar in one spectacularly turbulent day. It’s down by more than 40% this year.

Things were actually looking pretty ugly even before a large part of the ruble’s collapse. Western sanctions have hit Moscow and the country’s own finance minister expects a 4% drop in GDP in 2015.

Can the other nations in the EEA help out? The short answer is no. 

Kazakhstan isn’t immune to Russia’s crisis. Its currency is now 50% more expensive in rubles than in the first half of the year. That makes it more difficult for Kazakh firms to export to Russia, though the Moscow Times suggests it may get a bit of a boost from investors who are concerned about Russian sanctions, but still want a presence in the region.

The Kazakh economy is doing well in a lot of ways. That might be why long-term autocrat Nursultan Nazarbayev doesn’t want to tie himself too closely to Moscow. He actually invented the contemporary idea of a Eurasian union, and even he doesn’t seem convinced any more, insisting that the country could leave if it wanted, according to the FT.

What’s more, according to Foreign Policy magazine, studies actually suggest that membership of the Eurasian Customs Union has so far weakened Kazakhstan’s economy. It’s too late to back out now, but it’s no surprise that Astana isn’t rushing into anything more serious.

The economy of Belarus isn’t looking so hot. On 21 December Alexander Lukashenko, who like Nazarbayev has ruled the country for decades, sacked the prime minister and central bank chief. Belarus is extremely dependent on Moscow and exposed perhaps more than any other nation to the collapse of the ruble. As in Russia, there have been queues to exchange currency, and massive interest rate hikes.

Aside from the immediate crisis, it doesn’t look like Lukashenko will be presiding over a dynamic economic any time soon. An apparent obsession with farming led to a plan for the country to return to a sort of serfdom earlier this year.

So of the five countries joining the union in 2015, by far the largest is likely to have a shrinking economy.