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The US Naval Facilities Engineering Command has contracted B.L. Harbert International to build 65 new housing units worth $18 million at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.
A notice posted on the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) website said the construction works are expected to be complete by May 2016.
“The proposed new construction will contain 65 units, each housing up to four persons, with a total capacity of 260 persons. The building and site design will be austere in design and comply with the most current Camp Lemonnier master plan and installation appearance plan.
“Work will be performed in Djibouti, Africa and is expected to be completed by May 2016. Fiscal 2014 military construction (Navy) contract funds in the amount of $18,387,380 are obligated on this award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year,” the notice reads.
The contract was awarded a few days after the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Europe, Africa and South-West Asia contracted KBR Services Inc of Texas to undertake renovations, repairs, maintenance, replacement, alterations and demolitions to buildings at Camp Lemonier. According to the FBO, works should be completed by September 2019.
“The work to be performed provides for renovations, repairs, maintenance, replacement, alterations, demolition, and NAVFAC Construction Category II, III and IV tasks for Department of Defense activities in the Djibouti, Africa, area.
”The term of the contract is not to exceed 60 months with an expected completion date of September 2019. Fiscal 2014 operations and maintenance (Navy) contract funds in the amount of $50,000 are being obligated on this award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year.”
The US Navy has been steadily expanding its facilities at Camp Lemonnier to house an increasing number of military personnel being deployed to Africa on active special forces duty and partner army training missions in Africa.
Apart from ongoing expansion works on Camp Lemonnier, the US Navy is quietly expanding its smaller naval base at Manda Bay in Kenya. It has also contracted for renovations and expansion of housing and military operational facilities on another naval base in the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.
First Published by our partner defenceWeb on October 21, 2014
And the modernization of Camp Lemonnier is a key aspect of AFRICOM expanded presence in Africa.
Camp Lemonnier is run by CJTF-HOA (Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa) so the renovation is to benefit the CJTF.
In a defenceWeb piece published November 18, 2014, the role of “Fusion Cells” at Camp Lemonnier is highlighted:
Continuity in a command environment is vital to the success of the mission and/or the program an individual is responsible for Staff Sergeant Carlin Leslie of US Africa Command writes on the Command website.
Building an environment where that continuity, leadership and teamwork grows is the vision of the Fusion Action Cell (FAC) and the Threat Security Co-Operation Hive that went fully operational at Camp Lemonnier at the beginning of November.
Training at Camp Lemonnier. Credit: defenceWeb
The Hive is an integral part of the re-organisation of CJTF-HOA (Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa), building and joining together joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental and multi-national teammates from Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda, building leaders and giving them the opportunities to succeed.
“Building the relationships between our African team mates is a must to provide the best Combined Joint Task Force possible. The men and women who work day and night in the Fusion Action Cells are at the forefront of innovation in mission command, joining partner countries together for a greater good and I could not be prouder of their efforts and strides they have made,” said Major General Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., Commander CJTF-HOA.
According to him, the old regional engagement branch consisted of one single desk officer per country. The cells now consist of a country liaison officer and six other officers allowing greater continuity of information sharing.
Using this concept the FAC will no longer rely on only one person’s knowledge and will have resilience–a means of establishing a corporate memory and enable long-term planning.
With each FAC as a force multiplier of its own, the cells are joined in the Threat Security Co-Operation Hive, building on information sharing and using issues and threats from other countries to help plan for future events.
“Perhaps the most important part of the re-organisation is that officers from our African partner nations are now central in the cells and desk teams. Using the unclassified work environment, allowing the liaisons to contribute to everything we do here.” Colonel Timothy Connors, FAC/HIVE director, said.
While the FAC/HIVE mission command is real world and face-to-face, it is supported by the All Partners Access Network (APAN).
This web-based application is a collection of communities developed to foster information and knowledge sharing between the US Department of Defense and non-DOD entities that do not have access to traditional DOD networks.
APAN offers online collaboration tools that can be used alone or in conjunction with other tools to develop unique online community space.
“The FAC is a relationship and team building experience that promotes the fraternity of the profession of arms, while also bringing to life the global coalitional spirit in the fight against global terrorism. Then, using real-time multimedia opportunities offered by APAN is an excellent learning and professionally enriching experience,” said Lieutenant Colonel Okei Rukogota, Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces liaison officer.
According to Rukogota, the FAC has made the country liaison officers critical participants in the formulation, planning and execution of missions, engagements and tasks.
This enables timely and efficient planning of customized partnerships between countries.
The Hive is attached to the Civil Affairs Battalion allocated to CJTF-HOA, allowing it to act on information gleaned and assist their Eastern African teammates in the fight against violent extremist organizations.
The Hive provides a fresh perspective for regionally approached commands and has possible uses in other parts of the world.
21st century warfare technologies concepts of operations and tactics and training are in evolution and revolution.
At the heart of reshaping US and allied approaches to airpower and its evolution is the emergence of the F-35, the significant impact which a global fleet of F-35s will have on US and allied capabilities and the approaches to leveraging other capabilities in the warfighting tool kit.
There is always the reactive enemy, so that the roll out of new approaches shaped by the impact of the F-35 will see reactions from various competitors and responding to these reactions will part of the re-set of evolving US and allied airpower and combat approaches.
The F-35 is at the heart of change for a very simple reason – it is a revolutionary platform, and when considered in terms of its fleet impact even more so.
The F-35, Lightning II, has a revolutionary sensor fusion cockpit that makes it effective in AA, AG and EW.
US and Allied Combat pilots will evolve and share new tactics and training, and over time this will drive changes that leaders must make for effective command and control to fight future battles.
An issue has been that the F-35 has been labeled a “fifth generation” aircraft, a sensible demarcation when the F-22 was being introduced.
But the evolution of the combat systems on the aircraft, the role of the fusion engine, and the impact of a fleet of integrated F-35s operating as a foundational element will make this term obsolete.
The global fleet of F-35s will be the foundation for a fundamental change in the way air power operates and with it overall combats concepts of operations for the US and allied insertion forces.
It is not an in and of itself platform; it is about what an integrated fleet of F-35s can deliver to TRANSFORM operations.
The decade ahead can be very innovative if what the fleet brings to the fight is learned and applied and the combat warriors leverage what they learn and then the application of those lessons to reshaping the force are applied.
As a senior RAF pilot involved with the F-35 program has put it well: “While much of the world still debates the existence of the F-35, we are moving rapidly forward to figure out how to use the aircraft and leverage it.”
At the heart of the transformation is the combination of two powerful trends: the emergence of Tron warfare and the forging of a combat cloud integrating combat capabilities.
The F-35 fleet operates at the cutting edge of both.
The Emergence of Tron Warfare
The F-35 is known as a 5th generation state-of-the-art combat aircraft with stealth for survivability.
The F-35 Lightning II is often discussed in a performance trend clustering over time with the F-22 Raptor, the Russian Sukhoi PAK FA T 50, and various emerging PLAAF aircraft such as Chengdu J-20 and the just announced J-31.
A 5th Gen well designed stealthy aircraft can operate very effectively in both a Fighter (AA) and Attack (AG) role until it can’t.
Yet reducing the F-35 to stealth essentially misses the point of the impact of an F-35 global fleet on reshaping US and allied combat operations.
I highlighted what I think is the key shift in an interview with Wendell Minnick of Defense News in a discussion of the emergence of the J-31:
The physical resemblance between the J-31 and the F-35 — despite the difference in relative size — indicates an effort by China to reproduce the F-35s stealthy external design, Timperlake said.
“If it is a success in being physically stealthy and they build a lot it could be a problem” for our allies in the region, he said.
However, stealth is simply a survivability feature and analysts must learn more about the internal systems. The real combat engagement operational and tactical question is the F-35 fusion cockpit and whether the Chinese actually have anything close to it, Timperlake said.
“Fusion will make all the difference in looking at the J-31 as a real competitor or just a linear generational development aircraft with perhaps enhanced survivability that will still need a hub spoke battle management [concept of operations] — [airborne warning and control system] or [ground-controlled interception] being essential for them,” he said.
The US and Allied fleet of F-35s will also add an “electronic” or “tron” warfare component to the fight, an “E” for electronic.
It is not necessary to designate the F-35 as the F/A/E-35 but that would be more accurate.
Adding the “E” is both an active and passive capability and will changing the entire design dynamic of combat aviation.
Electronic Warfare (EW) was designed inherently into the F-35 airframe and Fusion Cockpit. The revolutionary design of a Fusion Cockpit will as time goes by give the air battle commanders of the US and allies an emerging new strategic command and control way to fight and win.
EW is a complex subject with many discreet but also connected elements. Over time all things electronic in the military took on many dimensions. Electronic Counter-measures (ECM) begat Electronic Counter-Counter (ECCM) measures, Command and Control (C&C) has grown to C5ISR. Information war in certain applications created a multi-billion dollar domain called “”cyber.”
Additionally there has to always be considerations of Electro Magnetic Pulse concerns (EMP) and the counter measures of ‘hardening” of electronic components. There are a lot of other EW issues in “tron war,” such as Infer-Red Sensing (IR) and always protecting “signals in space” information being transmitted and trying to jam the bad guys “signals in space.”
Tactically, it has been said on the modern battlefield — air, sea or land — if not done correctly, “you emit and you die.”
EW can include offensive operations to identify an opponent’s emissions in order to and fry spoof or jam their systems.
In successful “tron” war, often-kinetic kill weapons can be fired. The kinetic kill shot is usually a high-speed missile designed to HOJ (home on jam). There is also the ability to emit electronic “kill” or spoofing signals i.e. to emit miss signals to an enemy’s incoming weapon sensors.
But what is necessary to succeed in evolving capabilities to fight in the age of “Tron” Warfare?
In taking a lesson from history, pre-WWII AA&T long lines research found that in order to build and keep operational a U.S. phone system, the AT&T visionaries found that the key to success was the need for “robust and redundant” systems.
That lesson of always focusing on robust and redundant systems in combat is extremely critical in the electrical element or “tron” component of the modern way of war.
With a solid interactive structure, the 5th generation aircraft can function as a honeycomb which allows them to follow a distributed air con-ops. This allows them to become a lead element for enabling the entire air combat force to be able to operate in three-dimensional space. (Credit: Bigstock)
Over two human Generations from WW II the F-35, was designed as being both inherently robust and redundant with many sensors and systems built into the airframe structure from the initial airframe stealth design forward. All F-35 systems designed and developed sent “trons” into the aircraft cockpit “Fusion Engine.”
Trusted fusion information generated by inherent aircraft systems queued up electronically by threat will send to the cockpit displays, and the pilot’s helmet, battle ready instantaneous Situational Awareness.
A combat certainty is that “electronic warfare” or as referred to in this Special Report as “tron” warfare will grow in importance and will evolve as a critical component of future combat engagements.
As very briefly described above the issue of all things “EW” or “tron” war is extremely complex because electrical components engage in empowering a nation’s ability to fight and win and covers so many facets of combat.
Because of the growing role of shared situational awareness and shaping of what some are calling the combat cloud, tron warfare is part and parcel of the transition in air warfare. Tron warfare is about protecting you ability to operate in shared communication space and to deny your adversary the ability to do so.
As Secretary Wynne has noted: “Whether we call it the combat cloud or the ability to share targets and situation awareness; the bulk of our and allied air fleets will be fourth gen for a long time. Getting max use from this mixed fleet will be the Hallmark of the next few decades. ‘Tron’ warfare should therefore be a prelude to Maximizing Probability of Kill; while minimizing the probability of being killed.”
The specific focus of this Special Report is the F-35 F/A/E and what it means for shaping a new foundation for the way ahead in air combat.
To put it another way, the F-35 fleet allows the air services to shape a new foundation for engaging in Tron Warfare, but because “no platform” fights alone, it is a foundation from which other elements of the airpower and combat capabilities picture are woven in for 21st century operations.
F-22 Raptors from the 94th Fighter Squadron, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, and F-35A Lightning IIs from the 58th Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, fly in formation after completing an integration training mission over the Eglin Training Range, Florida, Nov. 5, 2014. The purpose of the training was to improve integrated employment of fifth-generation assets and tactics. The F-35s and F-22s flew offensive counter air, defensive counter air and interdiction missions, maximizing effects by employing fifth-generation capabilities together. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo)
(Please see bibliography at end of the Special Report for most current articles of discussing the many different aspects of electronic warfare.)
One additional notation in this research is that there is an emerging focus on the concept of “Combat Cloud” computing for military operations. It is a debate going in many different directions much like in US “Information War” as initially proposed in “The Revolution of Military Affairs.”
Information War (IW) proposed as part of RMA eventually migrated especially in US forces to a very significant focus on “cyber” or computer empowered systems. The word “cyber” is now covering a multitude of capabilities issues and technological progress.
So perhaps a good place to start to understand the newest item of analysis “cloud computing” could begin by studying both the F-35 individual cockpit inward and the ability of each aircraft to be connect to a network of additional F-35s and other weapon systems.
The “E” in F-35 will eventually change strategic battle management Command & Control (C&C), especially using the military concept of no platform fights alone.
Consequently, the F-35 is an example of both a ‘Cloud” enabled aircraft cockpit looking inward to enhance pilot information and outward by projecting 360 long range collected information into a fleet of similar F-35 T/M/S.
The F-35A is land based belonging to USAF and some allied nations; the F-35B is V/Stol belonging to USMC, Royal Navy, Italian Navy and others in the coming years, and the F-35C is a large deck USN model
So the F-35 could be a starting point for the never ending process of understanding the next generation of “Cloud” information flowing to all levels of the battle space.
And the “combat cloud” operating within a Tron warfare fleet is a very powerful re-definer of combat capabilities for reshaping 21st century concepts of operations.
Combat Tactics and Combat Learning: A Key Dimension of Prevailing in Conflict
Technological development is a key part of being on the winning edge of combat. Yet the ability to produce the technology in numbers and to train to use it effectively is crucial to success.
During our recent visit to Fallon Naval Air Station, a Top Gun instructor underscored the importance of training:
I would argue that training is the essential piece, which is necessary to drive combat competence and the ability to get full value out of our platforms.
I’m not a famous admiral in the Pacific, but if you want the Chunk sound bite, I’ll tell you that it is a waste of taxpayer money if you buy a capability that has not been trained to by its aircrew, it’s a waste of tax payers money.
And going back into history, lessons can be learned from looking at the US-USSR air power rivalry.
The lesson for the air power rivalry between the US and USSR is rather straightforward: the technology had to be available but it also had to be successful understood and employed.
An historical take away from the cold/hot war air battles is that in the air-to-air mission, a country that equips its fighters with airborne radar and sensors allows more autonomous action and actually favors tactical simplicity and operational autonomy—even though the equipment becomes more complex.
In air-to-ground, airborne simplicity indicators are usually smaller formations and allowance to maneuver independently into weapon launch envelopes primarily in a weapons-free environment. Embedding technology into the weapon itself –bombs and rocket-fired weapons– has also made a revolutionary difference.
A key conclusion is always to assume a reactive enemy can develop the necessary technology to try and mitigate any advantages. With the worldwide proliferation of weapons even a second or third world nation might have state-of-the art systems. The air war over the skies of Vietnam was between two peer competitors because of USSR support and constraints by the US national command authority on how the US would fight an air campaign.
F-4D Phantom II marked as 555th TFS 66-7463, flown by Ritchie and DeBellevue for their first of 4 kills together and Ritchie’s 5th kill which was DeBellevue’s 4th killAn F-4D owned by the Collings Foundation taxis at Selfridge ANGB, Michigan in May 2005. The plane has the markings of the Steve Ritchie / Chuck DeBellevue fighter from the Vietnam War.Credit: Wikepedia
The peer fight in the air abruptly ended when President Nixon unleashed the full power of US air in the famous Christmas bombing of 1972. The war ended quickly after that. When the North invaded the South in 1975 US air power was not used like the first invasion in1972, which was a dismal failure for the North Vietnamese.
The lesson on the US-USSR rivalry is that air combat leaders must be able to adjust during the course of an air battle or war by changing strategy and tactics, to achieve exploitation of the enemy’s mistakes or weakness.
Aircrews must be adaptable enough to follow changing commands from leadership and also, on their own initiative, to change tactics to achieve local surprise and exploitation. Like the quote in Animal House: “knowledge is good.” In the cockpit it can be a lifesaver and aid in mission accomplished.
An air-to-air engagement totally slaved to a ground controlled radar attack, the USSR model was a colossal failure and deadly to a lot of pilots locked into such a system. A bottom-up approach with evolving aircraft system capabilities in a competitive airframe makes for adaptive, creative aircrews that will have a large repertoire of tactical moves and a better chance of getting inside an opponent’s OODA loop.
This is true for both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat missions.
As the history of war in the air shows it was a constantly evolving process of human factors integrated into technology. The Cold War ended well for humanity and a lot of courageous pilots, bold leaders, and smart technologists deserve a lot of credit for this success.
The great strength of the American way to fight in the air is combat learning and sharing between the USAF, USN and USMC; all can come together to fight learn, train and win.
One very powerful example of US combat learning was cited in an interview with the leading Ace of the Vietnam War, Col. Chuck Debelleue USAF (ret).
(I was told that): You’re going to the Navy Fighter Symposium at Miramar.
I get to go with my roommate from Southeast Asia. He had three kills and spent 23 days on the ground Hanoi when they got shot down. He was in the class ahead of me.
He flew us out and back in a 237 to Miramar also with his instructor. We got the instructors into all the briefings, which were classified. Bear Lasseter was there (USMC Mig Killer) – Cunningham (USN ACE) was there – Steve and I were there – all talking about our engagements. That’s November of ’72.
Question: That is ’72 – just before the Christmas bombing? They called you guys together to really, really learn from your experiences?
Answer: Right – just before the Christmas one. Cunningham was back in the States – Driscoll (USN RIO ACE) were back in the States and so were we. This was a weapons symposium to discuss tactics it was pretty interesting.
After Vietnam, in 1986, the USAF made an historic raid on Libya, called “El Dorado Canyon.”
The Navy attacked from the sea along with the USAF 12 plane F-111 strike force from a base in England. The entire mission was flown “EMCON.” Electronic emission controlled, and it was reported that there was one “mike” click over the entire route of flight. Libyan defenders knew they were under attack as bombs were falling. Tragically one F-111 was lost.
The importance of both the joint learning seen by the F-4 community and the importance of being able to strike with EMCON capabilities are two important lessons going forward as the US and its allies shape 21st century concepts of operations to take advantage of the 5th generation aircraft and the associated new tools for combat.
(For a Special Report on the lessons learned from the US versus USSR tac air rivalry see the following:
These lessons and concepts can now be extended to our allies and coalition partners in unique ways.
The extent of integrated exercises and training provides clear evidence that next generation allied force wants to come up the learning curve towards more effective 21st century air combat approaches and concepts of operations.
(For a look at the role of exercises in Pacific training see the following:
In mid-October 2014, we had a chance to discuss with Dr. Amatzia Baram, a leading Israeli expert on Iraq about how the ISIL crisis was much broader than simply being an Iraq crisis.
With several years of dynamic change in the region, and the failure to create a stable Iraq during the period after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, ISIL is like throwing a match into a gas can.
And the tensions in the divisions within the Middle East itself come into play and are augmented and aggravated by both responses to ISIL and the impact of success or failure in containing the impact of the ISIL movement.
Question: What’s your sense of how we should place the ISIS crisis in a broader regional context?
Baram: I see essentially two main very negative developments.
One is that Iraq will never be Iraq again, and I cannot see Syria becoming Syria again.
If you have this terrible instability, it’s a very, very hard on the other Middle East states.
They see this huge problem, and this is a spoiler of any hope for any stability.
I would still think the American administration has the right approach to see what they can do to try and put Humpty Dumpty back, when it comes to Iraq.
So my main concern would be how to bring stability back to this area by keeping Iraq as Iraq, and Syria as Syria, and saying that, which may be the case we should know within a few months.
The idea is to try and help a new architecture emerge that will enhance stability rather chaos.
That’s number one issue.
Number two, not less importantly, is that ISIS cannot be allowed more success.
They already had great success, but they have to at least be stopped.
I can see already all over the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Africa, the intellectual pull from ISIS as a radicalization virus spreading around much of the Islamic world.
In other words, if they are more successful, even though it may not create a total chaos where they are already, just the fact that they are so successful means that others will follow their example in the broader region.
Question: In other words, the impact of the ISIL brand has a demonstration effect in the Middle East and in Africa?
Baram: It is clearly the demonstration effect, which in turn impacts on the perceptions of GCC states as well.
The GCC states are of a kind of split personality with regard to ISIS.
If the ISIS were to conquer Baghdad, the GCC states can see a significant defeat for Iran and the Shias in Iraq.
With these two rivals being clobbered on the head, the GCC states come out ahead.
How bad can it be that Iran gets more than a bloody nose?
Yet an Isis seizure of Baghdad could well provide a significant demonstration effect in accelerating the kind of Islamic radicalism, which can destabilize the GCC states as well.
Clearly clobbering the Shias on the head is a good thing; yet by so doing it uncovers the hidden energies that can be mobilized by revolutionary Islam.
Question: America failed to put together a government in Iraq that was perceived to be anything other than one dominated by Shias.
The Maliki government was really nothing other than a Shia government leveraging the Iraqi assets to their benefit.
What then can be done in the face of the mobilization of Sunnis and Baathists currently being done by ISIL leadership?
Baram: In the current situation, one way out is to re-enter the reshaping of Iraqi politics, which can only be done by allowing the regions significant autonomy, and to broker their ability to provide for their own defense.
Euronews image from battle for Iraq’ largest oil refinery. 11/6/14
Then a confederation or a federated Iraq in effect could emerge.
If successful, this reshaped “unified Iraq” will serve as a stabilizing buffer in the region.
Given that the West will not deploy ground troops, certainly not in the numbers to allow for the kind of “brokering from above” which such capability could permit, the only force available currently to play a role and to shape a Western alliance with those with whom we might be able to work, are the Kurds.
The Turks have no intention of sending ground troops, for the current Turkish Administration is an ally of ISIL.
The Turks are brokering ISIL oil and selling it into the global market among other ways in which they are working with ISIL.
When it comes to the Iraqi forces, the military is not very effective.
They still have 14 divisions but only about four can more or less fight.
But they are certainly not willing to take big risks for Mosul.
Still, one reason why I do not think that Baghdad will fall to ISIL is that the Shia will fight for Baghdad, both in terms of the regular military and the militias.
Yet there is a serious problem of ISIL getting close enough for artillery barrages into Baghdad and for supporting terrorism in the city and putting pressure on the city in those ways.
The Kurds will fight and engage to push ISIL out of the Kurdish areas.
The Kurds will be very happy to help you on the ground if they are well armed, well directed, well tutored provided with air support from the U.S., or Europe, whatever.
So the Kurds can then take back the Kurdish areas if you support them.
With American support they have already pushed ISIL out of the Mosul Dam, north of the city.
But what to do about support for the Syrian Kurds?
Here Turkey comes into play; the support of the current Turkish Administration of ISIL is making the US Administration absolutely furious but not furious enough to provide weapons and other supplies to the Syrian Kurds.
And as far as the Turkish reluctance to allow the use of their airbase, it may come to choosing sides between ISIL and NATO.
This crisis is that serious.
The US could begin to build a new airbase in north-eastern Jordan (or expand the existing one there) to prepare to remove its reliance on the Turkish base, a position which might well prove necessary in the evolving politics in the region.
Fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) celebrate on vehicles taken from Iraqi security forces, at a street in city of Mosul, June 12, 2014. REUTERS/Stringer
The Kurds have a clear agenda, but so do the Sunnis.
They do not want to be dominated by a Baghdad Shia government.
A way to turn them against ISIL is to provide for their ability to defend themselves against other forces within Iraq and outside of it.
Which means that first and foremost, they want a defense force that will protect them against anybody and everybody: of course, ISIL, but also the Iraqi National Army.
If you approach the Sunnis, all the Sunnis, with the idea of a “new” Iraq, there is a chance that you really can move them to your side.
But you see, right now they are in a bind because if they join you, and you don’t give them any guarantees for the future, why not just leverage the ISIL destabilization?
And if the Iraq Army occupies Mosul it will be viewed precisely as that by the Sunnis with the Shia seen to be occupying Mosul.
And the U.S. and allied role as an honest broker would simply not be possible.
Question: We have discussed Iran in passing with regard to the GCC states, but obviously Iran has a big stake in the crisis as well.
Baram: They do.
And one of the ironies of the current situation is that American policy against ISIL actually helps Iran.
Baghdad is now mostly an Iranian issue, more so than an American one.
You have to be aware of what America is doing.
America is getting Iran out of trouble by helping the government of Baghdad to push the ISIS back.
You are serving Iranian interests, not just yours.
So I’m not against it, as long as you understand what you are doing.
Iran will allow you to save it from ISIS, and in return they want you to allow them to continue to develop nuclear weapons.
Question: The ISIL crisis and its ongoing consequences will affect the great powers outside of the region as well; how do you see the stance of the major players?
Baram: With regard to Russia, they have little concern about Iran having nuclear weapons.
The Russians see this from the perspective of their conviction that they can unilaterally counter an Iranian nuclear threat effectively.
But what they have not calculated well is what others are going to do.
After Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and very likely also Turkey will acquire nukes.
A multi-player nuclear crisis is extremely difficult to control.
Isis leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi preaching during Friday prayer at a mosque in Mosul, as seen in a video released in July. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Even a nuclear war between Iran and Israel alone is dangerous for neighboring Russia, and one should bear in mind that unlike the Cuban missile crisis, there is no direct communication between Teheran and Jerusalemto provide key elements for negotiation as a crisis unfolds.
What does deterrence mean to Tehran as opposed to an old nuclear power like the United States or Russia?
How would a crisis management emerge that could manage these two very different poles?
And if Iran were to have access to nuclear weapons, notably with the onslaught of ISIL,or another similar anti-Shi`i movement, the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out, and all this in close proximity to Russia.
Question: To put it mildly, this is a very volatile period of history, in which the calculations of key states in the region, all of whom have money, weapons, and power, could lead to a ratcheting up with the conflict here reasonably rapidly.
Is that a fair assessment of the challenge?
Baram: It is and this is why I focused on trying to keep Iraq Iraq and Syria Syria.
Even though far from perfect, this is a far better approach than simply allowing the crisis to spin out of control with unpredictable interactive consequences.
Prof. Dr. Amatzia Baram is a professor of Middle East History and Director of the Center for Iraq Studies at the University of Haifa.
Professor Baram was born in Kibbutz Kfar Menachem in southern Israel and raised and educated there.
He served as an officer and commanded tank units in the Armoured Corps during his regular military service from 1956 to 1960 and while in the reserves.
He was ‘on loan’ to the Iraqi desk at Military Intelligence as an analyst when soon after the Iraq-Iran War began in 1980.
After release from regular military service he worked on the kibbutz farm, before graduating in biology and teaching sciences at the kibbutz high school.
He decided on a career change following the Six Day War in 1967 and started his education as an historian of the modern Middle East and Islam in 1971
His latest book Saddam Husayn and Islam, 1968-2003: Ba’thi Iraq from Secularism to Faith came out in November 2014 by the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Johns Hopkins University Press.
The maps have been taken from the article “27 Maps that explain the crisis in Iraq,” and the article can be found here:
The first map shows Iraq’s three-way demographic divide didn’t cause the current crisis, but it’s a huge part of it.
You can see there are three main groups. The most important are Iraq’s Shia Arabs (Shiiism is a major branch of Islam), who are the country’s majority and live mostly in the south.
In the north and west are Sunni Arabs. Baghdad is mixed Sunni and Shia.
And in the far north are ethnic Kurds, who are religiously Sunni, but their ethnicity divides them from Arab Sunnis.
Iraq’s government is dominated by the Shia majority and has underserved Sunni Arabs; the extremist group that has taken over much of the country, ISIS, is Sunni Arab. Meanwhile, the Kurds, who suffered horrifically under Saddam Hussein, have exploited the recent crisis to grant themselves greater autonomy.
The second map shows the Kurds — who are long-oppressed minorities in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran — have been fighting for their own country for more than a century.
They’ve come closest in Iraq, where, since the 2003 war, the international community has pushed to give them an unprecedented degree of autonomy.
Since the recent crisis began, they’ve taken even more de facto autonomy for themselves, and recently seized control of the oil-rich area around Kirkuk, which is part Arab and part Kurd.
The big problem for Kurds is that all of Iraq’s neighbors want to prevent an independent Iraqi Kurdish state, because they fear their own Kurdish populations will then fight to break off and join them.
The third map shows the rise and fall of the Sunni insurgency, 2006-2008.
ISIS was formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
At its peak level of influence in 2006, AQI controlled significant chunks of Sunni Iraq, and even set up a quasi-government along harsh Islamic lines in some of the land it controlled.
However, the Sunni population turned on AQI — partly out of anger with AQI’s brutal rule and partly out of political interest.
This Anbar Awakening, named after the province in which it began, resulted in former Sunni insurgents partnering with the American and Iraqi militaries to uproot AQI.
AQI was roundly defeated, and lost effective control over almost all of its previous domain.
The fall of AQI illustrates just how much ISIS depends on support from Sunni Iraqis.
If it angers the population, they can provide critical intelligence and cooperation that would allow the Iraqi military to crush them.
The fourth map shows the Sunni protest movement of 2013.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki did a lot to assist in ISIS’s rise.
Since becoming Prime Minister in 2006, he has centralized a great deal of power in his office, and run the Iraqi government along Shia sectarian lines.
Naturally, this infuriated Sunnis, who organized a series of protests around the country in 2012.
These continued into 2013, and the Maliki government began to see them as a serious problem.
Unable or unwilling to resolve the protests politically, the Maliki government turned to force. His security forces killed 56 people at protest in the northern town Hawija alone in April 2013.
The forcible breakup of the protest movement convinced some Sunnis that their only solution was military, helping militant groups like ISIS and the more secular Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN) recruit from and curry favor with the Sunni minority.
The fifth map shows a hypothetical re-drawing of Iraq and Syria.
This is an old idea that gets new attention every few years, when violence between Sunnis and Shias reignites: should the arbitrary borders imposed by European powers be replaced with new borders along the region’s ever-fractious religious divide? The idea is unworkable in reality and would probably just create new problems.
But, in a sense, this is already what the region looks like.
The Iraqi government controls the country’s Shia-majority east, but Sunni Islamist extremists have seized much of western Iraq and eastern Syria.
The Shia-dominated Syrian government, meanwhile, mostly only controls the country’s Shia- and Christian-heavy west. The Kurds, meanwhile, are legally autonomous in Iraq and functionally so in Syria.
This map, then, is not so much just idle speculation anymore; it’s something that Iraqis and Syrians are creating themselves.
One of the major questions facing Iraq, perhaps even bigger than the question of whether it can put down ISIS, is whether the government can overcome these sectarian divisions and make Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds feel that they are part of the same Iraqi state.
Until Iraqis believe in that project of a diverse, inclusive nation, and until the Iraqi government is able and willing to see it through, conflict is likely to continue.
Editor’s Note: For earlier articles on the evolving situation with regard to ISIL see the following:
AUGUST AND September had been rather busy for the Indian foreign policy establishment, with a large number of high profile visits taking place to and from the country.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan and the US, President Parnab Mukherjee’s tour of Vietnam and Australian Prime Minister’s visit followed by the Chinese presidential visit to India were noteworthy besides a host of others undertaken by Mr Modi and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.
One clear message that comes across is that Indian foreign policy is no longer suffering from the stasis and drift witnessed during the UPA-II regime. The tentativeness of that period has been happily replaced by a more focused and goal oriented approach to regional and global issues.
The perception of our neighbors and others, that India is poised to play a more active role with a stable Government firmly in control at the Centre, is gradually gaining ground.
There is no denying the fact that with the dramatic rise of China, the global focus has shifted to the Asia Pacific region.
As China flexes its economic and military muscle, reverberations are being felt both at the regional and global levels. Even though there has been a marginal decline in the Chinese rate of growth, its military spending has continued to increase. Proclamations by China of a peaceful rise notwithstanding, apprehensions among its neighbors about its real intentions are gradually increasing.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, right, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Xi’s wife Peng Liyuan, left wave to the media after Modi received them upon arrival at a hotel in Ahmadabad, India, Wednesday, Sept. 17, 2014. Credit Photo: AFP
Astute observers have also noted China no longer follows Deng Xiao Ping’s maxim of ‘hiding intentions and biding time’. With continuous high rate of growth leading to increased clout, it is breaking out of the mold of feeling apologetic about its rise. In fact, its strategic doctrines and concepts display an evolving trend to suit its national interest and growth as a global power.
As the Chinese power grows both economically and militarily, there is a clear evidence of greater assertiveness in its territorial disputes with its neighbors whether in the South China Sea, East China Sea or in the Himalayas. Specifically when the cloak of a ‘peaceful rise’ would be totally shed, depends on how soon it perceives itself capable of handling its consequences.
India has a unique role to play as the Asia Pacific region emerges as the global center of gravity.
Its geographic location, size, economy, markets and population make it an attractive partner for potential adversaries. India’s accelerated rate of growth in the past decade has projected it as a rising power in regional and global affairs. Though there has been a relative decline in its growth in the last couple of years, it has the potential to reverse that trend and regain its standing in the coming years.
The US and its allies view India, the largest democracy, as a natural partner against communist Chinese expansionism. They expect India to take the lead in checking aggressive Chinese moves and posturing in South China Sea as well along its land borders.
Chinese efforts, on the other hand, have focused on keeping India away from being part of an anti China alliance by enhancing economic cooperation on one hand and stressing on historical and traditional linkages on the other.
India has a dilemma of its own. Since independence it has maintained a non-aligned stance, has never been part of any grouping and has retained its autonomy in decision making in global affairs. This militates against joining a Western led alliance.
The Chinese, on the other hand, seek to improve Sino-Indian relations by enhanced economic cooperation between the two.
However, with threat to Indian territorial integrity looming large due to non settlement of the boundary dispute with China for half a century now, the possibility of economic cooperation being successful as a tool for improving long term relations between the two seems to have limited chances of success.
Chinese President Mr Xi Jinping’s India visit has to be viewed in the context of a desire by both nations to improve relations. From the Chinese perspective, with the possible exception of Pakistan, there is a degree of apprehension and unease among its neighbors despite massive doses of economic aid to a number of them, as to the real Chinese intentions.
India, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines and Japan have unresolved boundary issues in view of the Chinese claims both on land as well as South and East China Sea Islands. Even where such territorial disputes are nonexistent, the fear of Chinese expansionism and eventual domination is a major concern with neighbors like Myanmar, Mongolia, Nepal, Thailand and South Korea.
The presence of large Chinese Diasporas in most South East Asian countries further fuels these apprehensions. Chinese attempts to reach out to a number of these countries through economic packages have not succeeded due to their security concerns.
From an Indian perspective, it makes logical sense to enhance economic relations with a rising global powerhouse like China since it would assist in improving Indian growth and development in the long run.
Chinese investments in the infrastructure, power, communications and other sectors would open avenues for Indian industrial growth besides providing employment and self -sufficiency in crucial areas.
Secondly, better economic relations may lead to softening of attitudes and final resolution of boundary issues between the two.
Thirdly, the strong nexus between China and Pakistan vis-a-vis India, which has been existent for almost half a century now would, it is hoped, stand diluted with the development of better relations between India and China.
A major problem with economic cooperation has been the massive Indian trade deficit which is gradually increasing to India’s disadvantage. Raw materials exported from India at low prices and expensive finished goods imported into the country from China increase the trade deficit besides closing avenues for domestic manufacturing sector. Unless a solution is found to this vexatious issue, economic cooperation between the two is likely to become increasingly one sided.
A second aspect, which is of concern, is that both China and India are emerging economies, and at times would be competing for the same markets globally. The possibility of this healthy competition turning into confrontation at some stage cannot be ruled out.
Post Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan, where agreements worth approximately $35 billion Japanese investment into India were signed, the Indian media speculated on the possibility of China outdoing Japan and investing up to $100 billion in India in the next five years.
These expectations were, however, belied with China pledging a disappointingly low figure of just $20 billion investments in the next five years.
On the security front, results of the Xi visit have been more dismal.
Chinese incursions into Chumar and Demchok sectors of the Ladakh region took place just a few days before President Jinping was to arrive in Delhi. Indian Army reacted firmly to these transgressions resulting in a serious face off with both sides sticking to their positions. Surprisingly, the standoff continued even while the presidential visit was in progress, leaving a distinct impression that the Chinese transgressions had the approval of the country’s highest political levels.
The resultant hype in the Indian media undermined the significance of the visit and left a question mark over Chinese intentions.
The Chinese intent to convey that economic cooperation and strategic issues are at two different and separate levels seem to have missed the point that an overall improvement in relations is only possible when all aspects are taken care of.
There is a basic trust deficit between India and China. If one of the aims of the Chinese President’s visit was to reduce that trust deficit, it stands negated due to events on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
Secondly, the non-resolution of the boundary issue weighs heavily on the Indian mind. This appears to have been conveyed by Mr. Modi emphatically during their interaction.
Till it gets resolved to mutual satisfaction, improvement in Sino-Indian relations cannot go beyond a certain level. Even economic cooperation would be constrained by this limitation. The joint communiqué, issued at the end of President Xi’s visit underlined the need to settle strategic issues, thereby signaling China’s acceptance of this stance. The camaraderie and bonhomie displayed by both the leaders during the visit will have to be matched by concrete actions by both sides to indicate the contours of future relationship between the two.
While China and India share similar views on a host of global issues like climate change, global commons, terrorism, drug trafficking, trade barriers etc., there are major differences on a number of strategic issues. The impression that India is a second rung state vis-a-vis China tends to be subtly conveyed by the Chinese leadership in all interactions. President Xi Jinping’s visit was no exception in this regard.
Clandestine Chinese attempts to undermine India at various international forums continue unabated from time to time, leading to an increase of trust deficit.
If China is sincere in maintaining good relations with India and ensuring India’s neutral stance in the Asia Pacific region, its actions must aim at eliminating the trust deficit altogether. From the Indian viewpoint, resolution of strategic issues with China will enable it to concentrate on its internal growth and development in a focused manner
General Deepak Kapoor PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM, ADC (b. 1948) was the 23rd Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, appointed on 30 September 2007 and Chairman, Chiefs of Staffs Committee(COSC) appointed on 31 August 2009.[2]
He retired on 31 March 2010 and was succeeded by General V K Singh, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, ADC.
The burgeoning crisis at the state-controlled Brazilian oil giant Petrobras, the arrest of leading construction company executives, allegations of embezzlement for personal gain, kickbacks paid for over-invoiced contracts, and the accusation that this involved payoffs to leading Brazilian politicians, including members of congress, governors, ministers, as well as political parties, strikes at the heart of the nexus of Brazilian corruption.
It is a scandal staggering in its implications, and it presents the greatest challenges to the Brazilian political and economic and judicial elite since the end of military rule in the mid-1980’s.
Petrobras is a semi-public Brazilian multinational corporation with its Headquarters in Rio de Janeiro founded by President Getulio Vargas in 1953. It is the largest company by market capitalization and revenues in South America, and the Brazilian government controls directly or indirectly 64% of the company’s common shares.
It controls oil and energy assets in Brazil and in 18 countries in Africa, North America, South America, Europe, and in Asia.
It has been the most reliable blue chip on the Sao Paulo stock exchange (Bovesp).
It owns oil and gas production facilities and refineries, oil tankers, and is a major distributor of oil products.
Following the euphoria after major off shore oil discoveries Petrobras in 2010 conducted the largest share sale in history (US$ 72.8 billion).
Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff reacts during a news conference at the Alvorada Palace in Brasilia September 8, 2014. REUTERS/Ueslei Marcelino
Paulo Roberto Costa, who headed the refining division of Petrobras between 2004 and 2012, has accused over 40 politicians of involvement in a vast kickback scheme involving a 3% surcharge on the value of contracts (he has apparently named government ministers, three state governors, six senators, and dozens of members of congress). Together with convicted black-market money dealer Alberto Youssef, who “laundered” hundreds of millions of dollars, he is understood to have plea bargained with federal prosecutors in return for leniency.
Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff said in Australia, where she was attending the G-20 summit meeting, that “this may change the country for ever.”
She added it will “end impunity.” President Dilma Rousseff was recently re-elected in the tightest, most divisive, and most contentious Brazilian presidential contest in recent history.
She will be inaugurated for a second term on January 1st.
But from 2003 until 2010 she was the chairwoman of the board of directors of Petrobras.
She was also the former minister of energy (2002-2005). She was chief of staff for former president Lula da Silva. She is famous (notorious might be a better description) as a “micromanager.”
The CEO of Petrobras is Maria das Gracas Foster who worked with Dilma Rousseff at the ministry of energy. Joao Augusto Nardes, the president of the Brazilian Court of Accounts (TCU) has said that US$1.3 billion was skimmed of contracts.
It appears that major Brazilian contractors entered into a cartel (which including Brazilian multinationals, Odebrecht SA, Camargo Correia SA, Constructora OAS SA) with Petrobras employees, in order to drive up the price of the bids. 24 executives have been arrested as part of “Operation Car Wash” by the Brazilian Federal Police.
Maria das Gracas Forster has belatedly announced that Petrobras will establish a “compliance department” in order to “improve corporate governance,” and has contracted two law firms (one American and one Brazilian) to investigate the allegations of widespread embezzlement.
If this was just a Brazilian question the scandal might be contained. But it is not.
Petrobras is an international company responsible for a quarter of Brazil’s annual dollar-denominated bonds and also has American depository-receipts traded on the New York Stock Exchange. It is already being investigated by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the US Department of Justice (DoJ). The US Export-Import Bank in 2009 provided Petrobras with US$2 billion in loans and loan guarantees.
Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff reacts during a meeting with leaders of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) at the Planalto Palace in Brasilia November 5, 2014. REUTERS/Ueslei Marcelino
Among the many revelations made by former National Security Agency contractor, Edward Snowdon, was the fact that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was spying on Petrobras.
One of the most egregious cases of Petrobras overpaying was for the Pasadena Refinery in Texas. Already the Netherland’s based SBM, the world’s largest leaser of off-shore oil-production vessels, has settled a bribery case involving Brazil, Angola, and Equatorial Africa, with Dutch prosecutors for $240 million.
It is my great regret that I never met Paulo Francis, the New York based Brazilian journalist. The columnist Elio Gaspari was hoping to arrange a lunch for us to meet at Bravo Gianni, his favourite East Side Manhattan Italian restaurant (now sadly closed). But we never managed it.
Paulo Francis was pilloried for “speaking truth to power” on the television program “Manhattan Connection” when he claimed that “all the directors of Petrobras have accounts in Switzerland.”
The well-paid agents of Petrobras pursued Francis in a million dollar judicial action for his comments until his early death by heart attack in 1997.
Paulo Francis would undoubtedly have gained a quite satisfaction had he lived to see the denunciation by Paulo Roberto Costa.
But be in no doubt
The protective forces around Petrobras, the construction companies, and the politicians, are no less formidable today than they were in 1997.
Petrobras is a pillar of the Brazilian economy: nationalistic pride; cultural and academic sponsorships; 67,000 employees; billions of dollars in investment are involved; as well as the reputations of many members of the Brazilian elite.
It will take more than the courageous action of few Federal prosecutors to unravel this tangled web.
2014-11-21 Although the F-22 and F-35 have flown together previously, now training to bring together the core competencies of the two systems into a coherent combat force has begun.
As the former head of the Air Combat Command put it in an interview with Second Line of Defense:
People focus on stealth as the determining factor or delineator of the fifth generation, it isn’t, it’s fusion. Fusion is what makes that platform so fundamentally different than anything else. And that’s why if anybody tries to tell you hey, I got a 4.5 airplane, a 4.8 airplane, don’t believe them. All that they’re talking about is RCS (Radar Cross Section).
And you’re not going to put fusion into a fourth gen airplane because their avionic suites are not set up to be a fused platform. And fusion changes how you use the platform.
F-22 Raptors from the 94th Fighter Squadron, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, and F-35A Lightning IIs from the 58th Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, fly in formation after completing an integration training mission over the Eglin Training Range, Florida, Nov. 5, 2014. The purpose of the training was to improve integrated employment of fifth-generation assets and tactics. The F-35s and F-22s flew offensive counter air, defensive counter air and interdiction missions, maximizing effects by employing fifth-generation capabilities together. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo)
What I figured out is I would tell my Raptors, I don’t want a single airplane firing a single piece of ordinance until every other fourth gen airplane is Winchester. Because the SA right now that the fifth gen has is such a leveraging capability that I want my tactics set up to where my fourth gen expend their ordinance using the SA that the fifth gen provides, the fifth gen could then mop up, and then protect everybody coming in the next wave.
It’s radically changing how we fight on the battlefield.….
Question: One of the concepts we’ve played with was what we called the S Cubed, which is the tradeoffs between sensors, stealth, and speed. And how you played them off against one another. Does that make sense?
General Hostage: It does. I think an excellent portrayal of the value of looking at the interaction of those parameters is to examine Raptor versus the Lightning. A Raptor at 50-plus thousand feet at Mach 2 with its RCS has a different level of invulnerability than a Lightning at 35,000 at Mach .9 and it’s RCS.
The altitude, speed, and stealth combined in the two platforms, they give the airplanes two completely different levels of capability. The plan is to normalize the Lightning’s capability relative to the Raptor by marrying it up with six, or seven, or eight other Lightnings.
The advanced fusion of the F-35 versus the F-22 means those airplanes have an equal level or better level of invulnerability than the Raptors have, but it takes multiple airplanes to do it because of the synergistic fused attacks of their weapon systems.
And that’s the magic of the fifth gen F-35, but it takes numbers of F-35s to get that effect, that’s why I’ve been so strident on getting the full buy. Because if they whittle it down to a little tiny fleet like the Raptor, it’s not going to be compelling…..
The Raptor brings a significant force protection capability to an overall air combat force, as seen in the operations over Syria and Iraq. And the Raptor has trained with legacy aircraft like the Eurofighter and with the SA which the Raptor brings to the fight, according to an RAF pilot involved in Typhoon-Raptor exercises, “the F-22 enhances the lethality and surviability of Typhoon.”
Now two SA platforms are being brought together and in the case of the F-35 the fusion systems are even more advanced than the Raptor.
As Ed Timperlake argues in a forthcoming Special Report on the F-35 and Tron Warfare:
21st century warfare technologies concepts of operations and tactics and training are in evolution and revolution. At the heart of reshaping US and allied approaches to airpower and its evolution is the emergence of the F-35, the significant impact which a global fleet of F-35s will have on US and allied capabilities and the approaches to leveraging other capabilities in the warfighting tool kit.
There is always the reactive enemy, so that the roll out of new approaches shaped by the impact of the F-35 will see reactions from various competitors and responding to these reactions will part of the re-set of evolving US and allied airpower and combat approaches.
The F-35 is at the heart of change for a very simple reason – it is a revolutionary platform, and when considered in terms of its fleet impact even more so. The F-35, Lightning II, has a revolutionary sensor fusion cockpit that makes it effective in AA, AG and EW. US and Allied Combat pilots will evolve and share new tactics and training, and over time this will drive changes that leaders must make for effective command and control to fight future battles.
According to a Press Release published by the 33rd Fighter Wing on 11/18/14 which highlights the joint training event:
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Fla. — The U.S. Air Force deployed four F-22 Raptors from Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, to Eglin Air Force Base, earlier this month for the unit’s first operational integration training mission with the F-35A Lightning II assigned to the 33rd Fighter Wing here.
The purpose of the training was to improve integrated employment of fifth-generation assets and tactics. The training allowed both units to gain operational familiarization and capture lessons learned to improve future exercises.
“When the F-22 and F-35 come together, it brings out the strength of both airplanes,” said Lt. Col. Matt Renbarger, F-35 pilot and 58th Fighter Squadron commander. “The F-22 was built to be an air-to-air superiority fighter and the F-35 was built to be a strike fighter. These airplanes complement each other and we’re trying to learn how to take that from a design perspective into a tactical arena and be the most effective combat team we can be working with the F-22s.”
The F-35s and F-22s flew offensive counter air, defensive counter air and interdiction missions together, exploring ways to maximize their fifth-generation capabilities.
“The missions started with basic air-to-air and surface attacks,” said Maj. Steven Frodsham, F-22 pilot and 149th Fighter Squadron, Virginia Air National Guard, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia. “As the training progressed, the missions developed into more advanced escort and defensive counter air fifth-generation integration missions.”
The Air Force recently employed fifth-generation combat airpower for the first time against the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant during the most recent joint coalition campaign. The ground strike was the F-22 Raptor’s combat debut, demonstrating the decisive impact fifth-generation capabilities bring to real-world scenarios.
Like the F-35, the F-22 brings an unrivaled stealth capability to the fight. However, as seen in the recent employment in Syria, it’s the aircraft’s ability to provide heightened situational awareness to other aircraft through the platform’s integrated avionics and fused sensors – often referred to as “fusion” – that makes all the aircraft in the strike package more lethal and survivable, maximizing the full capabilities of airpower.
“Fusion and stealth – those are the two things that fifth-generation aircraft bring to the fight,” said Renbarger. “It’s all of those sensors coming in to give me that fused battle picture that I have displayed in my cockpit along with fifth-generation stealth that enables me to go undetected into the battlefield with that high situational awareness to do what I need to do for the fight.”
The F-22 sparked the Air Force’s fourth-to-fifth generation integration efforts. Now that the F-35 program is moving closer to its initial operational capability, it too can begin to integrate with the fourth-generation systems as well as its fifth-generation F-22 counterpart.
“The F-22 and F-35 squadrons integrated very well,” said Frodsham. “The lessons learned and tactics developed from this training opportunity will help to form the foundation for future growth in our combined fifth-generation fighter tactics.
Oh by the way — the F-35s which will work with F-22s in future combat operations can come from either the seabase or from landbases enhancing the flexibility of the imapct of the F-22 itself, whether the ship is a large deck carrier, a UK carrier, an Italian, Australian or USN amphibious ship.
The F-22 will not care as the data and support comes its way and it can, in turn lend support, to the F35-enabled sea base force.
Editor’s Note: For our interview withLt. Col. Matt Renbarger see the following:
2014-11-16 Visiting the HDMS Niels Juel: An Interview with Commander Lars Holbaek
Second Line of Defense visited the new Danish frigate, the HDMS Niels Juel, which had just participated in Bold Alligator 2014, and which constituted its first overseas engagement.
We interviewed Commander Lars Holbaek about his ship, its capabilities, the way ahead and his involvement in Bold Alligator 2014.
Commander Senior Grade Lars Holbaek was born in Copenhagen, Denmark, January 11, 1966.
He began his military career in 1988. After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1993,
Lars Holbaek served in various positions on board vessels of the Royal Danish Navy as well as being an instructor.
From 2000-2003, he took command of HDMS RAVNENE (Flyvefisken-class patrol vessel) until joining the Joint Senior Staff Officers Course at the Royal Danish Defence College, and then moving on the Danish Defence Command as a staff officer in Force Structure Branch (Planning Department).
Since then, Holbaek has served as Military Advisor to the Danish Chief of Defence, preparing briefings, decision presentations and planning and executing of the Generals visits to the Danish Forces in international operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.
The HDMS Niels Juel pier side in Baltimore, November 13, 2014. Credit: Second Line of Defense
He also served as head of Structure and Organization Branch at Admiral Danish Fleet in Aarhus, then moving on to become Head of Personnel Strategy Branch in the Danish Defence Staff.
In 2013, Holback assumed command of HDMS Iver Huitfeldt and then switched to HDMS Niels Juel in 2014 in order to prepare the second frigate in Division 21 to action state. The ship is the second frigate in a new class of three frigates
The frigate is an impressive ship, which is designed to perform multiple missions, including anti-submarine and air defense missions, and practiced both missions with the USN and coalition partners in Bold Alligator 2014.
That indeed, was why the ship was in the United States, and the visit constituted the new frigate’s first overseas deployment.
The baseline cost of the ship is just over $300 million with the full up capability of a fully enabled frigate around $900 million. It has a speed of 29 plus knots and endurance of more than 9000 nautical miles at 18 knots and a crew size of 116
The combat system C2 system can be adjusted to the mission sets to allow for greater capabilities for the particular mission sets as well.
The ship is based on the flex concept in all Danish naval ships built in this century whereby design elements among different ship classes are reused throughout the fleet. The same Combat Management System is common throughout the larger ships and standard racks are used for all weapon, sensors, communication and IT systems in all larger ships.
It leverages coalition technologies, from Germany, and the Netherlands and uses common technologies for its torpedo and radar systems.
It also leverages US technology like the MK-41 launcher tube, and can accommodate SM-2s if desired. Because it is a frigate, the ship can draw upon the global market for enabling frigates, a robust and evolving set of capabilities by allies in Europe and beyond.
The deck can hold a single helicopter of up to 20 tons, and the Danes are buying new Seahawk helos which will operate off of the ship.
A briefing by Cdr. S.g. Per Hesselberg, Project Manager of the Danish Frigate Program, explaining the approach which was given to the USN in May 2014 can be seen below:
Commander Holbaek: “This is our first overseas deployment and first overseas exercise.
We are here to participate in Bold Alligator 2014.
We operated in the exercise to protect the amphibious task force in both Air Defense and an ASW role.
We were under the command of the Dutch command ship and worked with USN destroyers for both Air Defense and ASW operations.”
Question: The ship is very flexible. When I was Denmark, there was discussion of fitting the ship with SM-2 missiles but the point really is that the ship is able to evolve with mission sets required for the strategic environment?
Commander Holbaek: That is true.
The CEC system is very flexible for you can shift roles and the network can support different uses.
You can plug into the network with the consoles and use them for the desired role.
The missile containers are also quite flexible. For example, the MK-41 system is inherently a flexible launch system.
The flight deck can hold a medium sized helo, up to 20 tons. The largest would be the UK Merlin helicopter. We are switching from the old Lynx to the Sea Hawk. The Danish Air Force is buying nine of them.
This was one of the benefits from the exercise as well was to work with the USN with regard to the Sea Hawk. We have not bought the ASW capability with the helo but the other capabilities will come with the new helo.
Question: What is your background and its relevance to this ship?
Commander Holbaek: I have significant experience in the Baltic sea and as a Navy we have a lot of experience in littoral operations.
It is not just about the technology, but the tactics, training and operational experience to really understand how to operate effectively in close in waters, and this frigate will be an important capability to do so.
Question: What role do you see this ship playing in Baltic defense?
Commander Holbaek: It is a natural with the anti-air and anti-submarine capability.
We have the capability to use our radars for missile defense and can tap into the SM-class of missiles as well.
And we are designed to work well with our Flex ships which have good capability to work with the frigates as an integrated package as well.
Question: What was your experience at Bold Alligator, which is an exercise, trying to sort out new ways to innovate in littoral operations?
Commander Holbaek: We are used to operating in shallow waters.
Canadian soldiers stand force protection watch during Coral Strait passage aboard the Royal Netherlands Navy landing platform dock ship HNLMS Johan de Witt (L801) as the Danish frigate HDMS Niels Juel (F363) transits alongside for air threat protection during Bold Aligator 2014.(U.S. Navy photo courtesy of the Royal Netherlands Navy by SMJR Gerben van Es/Released)
Danes are very used to operate in confined or closer in waters.
We can be a considered a very good partner in doing amphibious operations of the sort being tested in Bold Alligator.
Operating with asymmetric threat like small boats is an area in which we work regularly. If you are dealing with an asymmetric threat in confined waters, you need to know what you are doing.
It takes a lot of training and having the right tactics.
A main issue remains working connectivity among the allied forces.
Even with the NATO procedures, we need to work harder on getting common C2 procedures and technologies.
Otherwise one is reduced to the mission your ship will do rather than how you contribute to the overall operation in an integrated manner.
We need to re-shape the planning function as well.
Rather than using new technologies to make planning more detailed and complicated, we need to enhance the flexibility of key assets to execute an overall plan, rather than providing detailed tasking’s to each platform.
For our look at the evolving Danish defense challenge see the following:
Yesterday I had the privilege to visit the European Air Group based at High Wycombe.
The EAG flies below the radar but is a key asset for the Air Chiefs of 7 major European Air Forces in shape ways to work more effectively together and to get the best value they have from legacy and new assets at the disposal of those forces.
They clearly have grasped the point of the Ben Franklin moment: We all hang together or we hang separately!
We need to learn to work more effectively together to ensure even that our individual national air capabilities are maximized in their effectiveness.
Outside the HQ of the EAG from left to right are Col. Hagemeijer, COS of the EAG, Robbin Laird, BG De Ponti, Deputy Director of the EAG. November 19, 2014.
For an airpower aficionado, it is always a pleasure to visit High Wycombe, the home of “Bomber” Harris and the Mighty 8th.
In fact, when one has lunch at the Officer’s Club one quite literally comes face to face with “Bomber” Harris, or at least a sculpture of the famed air chief.
Last year, I visited a small village in France where the remains of one of these B-17s sent to make an impact on the war had found its final resting spot.
It flew from a British base to drive home to the Nazis that the “War of the Atlantic” was not going to be one by sea power alone but by a combined arms effort.
Unfortunately for the crew of this particular B-17, the war was over on July 4, 1943 with all of the crew captured and sent to various points in the Third Reich to spend the rest of the war until their liberation.
Much as the leadership of the bomber force at High Wycombe found innovative ways to shape victory in Europe, the European Air Group is supporting their Air Chiefs to figure out how to prevail in 21st century conflicts.
What is most striking about the EAG is the well thought out organizational structure designed to support the Chiefs and to find ways ahead without the need to have a heavy structure.
It is clearly designed to be agile and to problem solve for how to shape the templates for airpower going ahead, and not simply plodding along in the present.
The head of the EAG is rotational among the Air Chiefs, with the current COS of the RAF now the head of EAG. The Chiefs meet once a year to shape an agenda and to determine the way ahead based on the work performed by the EAG or being shaped for the EAG.
There is a small permanent staff, headed by a Deputy Director and a Chief of Staff for the EAG. I had a chance to interview BG Giacomo De Ponti, from the Italian Air Force, who is the Deputy Director, and Col. Ron Hagemeijer, RNLAF, who is the Chief of Staff. That interview will be published soon and provides a good overview on the working process, accomplishments to date and the way ahead.
The command brief for the EAG can be viewed below and provides a very good overview on its structure, achievements and approach.
The seven European Air Forces involved in the EAG are the following: The UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Germany.
Two notable achievements of the EAG are working through the terms of reference and the approach to establishing the European Air Transport Command and to the standing up soon in Italy of a European Personnel Recovery Centre.
In my interview with the Italian Chief of Staff, General Preziosa highlighted the EAG role.
Preziosa highlighted two other important sharing efforts in Europe, which are designed to enhance capability. “The point of sharing is not simply to share; it is to shape a greater capability to act and with greater and more effective means.”
The first is Italian participation in the European Air Group, located at High Wycombe in the United Kingdom.
Here Italian Air Force aircraft – such as the Tornados and Eurofighters – work to be more effectively integrate in coalition operations, as happened with the UK and Italy operating from an Italian base during operations during what the US called Odyssey Dawn.
The second is Italy entering into the European Air Transport Command (EATC) and committed to EPRC (European Personnel Recovery Centre).
“We are contributing our transport aircrafts and new tankers to the EATC”.
Besides Italy is engaged with EAG nations to establish a Personnel Recovery (PR) Centre, based in Italy, in 2015.
This centre is addressing a very important operational function (PR), in order to foster joint-combined interoperability through common approaches and common procedures, under a lead service approach.
I believe those are simple and tangible examples of what is commonly known as pooling & sharing initiatives.”
Now the EAG is looking at the impact of the F-35 upon the evolution of European airpower.
Notably, they are looking at the integration of 4th and 5th generation aircraft in those air forces.
My presentation was an input to their initial seminar to think about the way ahead and to shape practical steps to think through and shape the impact of F-35 on European airpower.
I concluded by posing these key questions as being highlighted by the 4th-5th generation interactions in the renorming of airpower:
How can coalition partners work more effectively together?
How might coalition partners realistically attenuate the key barriers to more effective operations?
In the course of modernization, what are the most promising opportunities to shape more effective coalition operations?
And suggested that some of the key themes moving forward are as follows:
The Challenge of Cultural Change
Working the Machine to Machine Relationships
Reshaping C2
Shaping a Combat Cloud
Fostering a Weapons Revolution
Collaborative Long and Short Range Strike
Tron Warfare
Robotics and Its Impacts
Managing ROEs and Strategic Surprises
Managing Three Dimensional Battlespace
In short, the significant role of airpower played today will be enhanced as concepts of operations are reshaped by consideration for how to operate in an extended 360-degree battlespace.
For me, it is about expanding the battlespace and training with regard to how to do this.
We are developing the means to push out the battle space and our ability to find, fix, track, target and engage the threat.
The F-35 will bring enormous capability in this area.
Clearly, the EAG gets this.
It is not simply about adding a new platform; it is about redesigning the concepts of operations to get the full collaborative capabilities out of European forces operating and leveraging fifth generation to enhance overall combat capabilities.
It is not about a new platform; it is about a new way of conducting operations.
High Wycombe led the way in understanding the impact of bombers and fighter escorts in reshaping warfare; now the EAG at High Wycombe is doing something similar with regard to reshaping 21st century airpower.
Editor’s Note: For a look at the B-17 lessons learned for today’s uphill struggle to innovate with regard to airpower see the following:
