2014-09-07 In this exclusive interview conducted by our partner India Strategic with Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force, the COS provides an overview on how he sees the evolution of Indian Air Power in the joint context.

By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal (Retired) VK Jimmy Bhatia

Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, took over as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) from Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne on December 31, 2013.

Commissioned into the Flying Branch of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 1974, the CAS has to his credit over 3,400 hors, mostly flown on different types of fighter aircraft. In an exclusive interview with India Strategic (IS) on July 31, 2014, the CAS spoke at length on the IAF’s plans to equip and train itself against the myriad challenges facing the force.

IS: Having completed six months now at the helm of one the largest and battle-tested air forces in the world, what do you reckon are the major challenges facing the Indian Air Force (IAF)? How have you planned to cope with these?

CAS: The application of aerospace power would prove to be the decisive factor in winning the short and intense wars of the future, wherein the response would need to be prompt and precise.

Towards this, IAF envisages a multi-spectrum strategic force capable of addressing the myriad challenges posed by the prevalent security environment.

One of our major challenges is to remain a contemporary aerospace power, which possesses credible capability with a strategic footprint.

The response options so desired would be afforded by our comprehensive transformation plan involving acquisitions, upgrades and efficient management of legacy systems.

Flying training is another focus area where we are systematically building up our capability; both in terms of inducting modern trainers as well as enhancing our overall capacity.

The aircrew need to be capable of handling and operating the modern platforms in multiple roles in a multi-threat environment.

Maximum impetus is also being provided in training and preparing our air-warriors to absorb the intrinsic technologies and maintenance practices therein, in the least possible time.

IS: “The IAF in metamorphic transformation” is an oft-repeated statement, which continues to emanate from different quarters, within and outside the ‘Establishment’.

Do you agree?

If yes, could you elaborate, especially with regard to its concepts and ethos?

Indian Air Force Modernization and Joint Doctrine

CAS: The on-going transformation of the IAF involves a three-pronged approach of ‘Preserve, Upgrade and Acquire.’

All these components are equally important and are included in the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) of the IAF which would be progressed as per the envisaged time lines.

The LTIPP clearly lays down the force accretion plan of the IAF which spans the entire spectrum of IAF’s capability building including fighters, transport ac, helicopters, combat support assets and modernization of air defense network.

Net centricity, cyber security, and ensuring requisite communication bandwidth for seamless operations are also part of this capability.

Space is increasingly being integrated into our day-today operations to give us the winning edge in any contingency.

In order to absorb these new capabilities more efficiently, a time-bound and comprehensive infrastructure upgrade plan has been instituted which focuses on creating modern operational and technical facilities.

It would however, be difficult to give a definitive date or year to say that the ‘IAF has Transformed’.

I am sanguine that the metamorphic transformation process is progressing well and we are already witnessing early results with comprehensive enhancement of our capabilities.

As we build new operational capabilities, our concepts of conducting various types of air campaigns are also evolving.

It is a continuous process and our ethos, professionalism and leadership would be the real catalysts in effectively harnessing the enhanced capabilities.

IS: What are the key ingredients of the IAF’s latest doctrine? Does it mesh well with the joint ‘Sea-Air-Land Doctrine’ of the three services?

Please elucidate.

CAS: Joint operations would be the key to success in any future military operation.

The realms of sea, land, air, space and cyber would need to be exploited seamlessly for effective and efficient operations.

Developing and articulating a doctrine is only the first step towards complete integration. The Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces lays down the fundamental principles by which we employ our joint war-fighting capabilities to conduct successful military operations.

The IAF is completely ‘in-sync’ with the Joint Doctrine. Processes related to procurements and training have already been synergized to a great extent.

Operational Integration is an on-going process and we continue to improve upon it with every exercise especially in operationalizing new weapon systems. Moreover, it is the understanding of each other’s roles, capabilities and core competencies that will enable us to always choose the right option to further our national interest.

As regards the IAF Doctrine; it articulates the Vision, Mission and Core values of the IAF, and puts Indian aerospace power in the right perspective. It highlights the need for all, to understand the roles and responsibilities of the IAF.

The potency and lethality of air power has increased tremendously and it provides a wide spectrum of choices to decision makers in any contingency, both in peace and war.

The Doctrine emphasizes the importance of joint operations and the increasing role of air power as a tool of nation-building.

The stellar role played by IAF in the smooth conduct of recent Lok Sabha elections through extensive airlift of officials, equipment and security personnel as well as record-setting HADR (Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief) operations in Uttarakhand last year are fine examples of IAF’s contribution in nation-building.

The Doctrine is forward looking in its appreciation of the air and space paradigm; and the significance of information warfare in transforming future military operations.

IS: Notwithstanding various alarmist views being aired from time to time in the media, could you give an update on the current status of the IAF’s combat squadrons’ strength?

Would the IAF be in a position to reach the oft-stated strength of 42 jet fighter squadrons by the end of the 13th Plan (2022)?

CAS: The IAF’s present strength of fighter squadrons falls short of the sanctioned strength of combat squadrons. IAF has several legacy squadrons of MiG-21 and MiG-27 which will retire over the next decade.

Therefore, early induction of LCA and MMRCA has been planned for arresting the drawdown in the strength of fighter squadrons. IAF is likely to have its sanctioned strength of combat squadrons operational sooner than later.

The MMRCA Acquisition

IS: What is the latest on the long pending MMRCA deal?

Is there a possibility of the contract being signed in the current financial year? If yes, when would the IAF likely get its first squadron of Rafale jet fighters?

CAS: The MMRCA CNC is presently negotiating various aspects of the contract with the L1 vendor, Dassault Aviation of France. The negotiations are progressing well. The contract for 126 MMRCA is expected to be signed sooner than later in the current FY 2014-15.

IS: In the interim, is there a possibility of the IAF going in for additional Mirage 2000 aircraft as being reported in some sections of the media? Please clarify.

CAS: To make good the existing deficiencies in the Mirage-2000 fleet, a case for procurement of two additional Mirage 2000 aircraft is being initiated by the Air HQ.

IS: Could you give a detailed update on the indigenous LCA (Tejas) program?

When would the aircraft be in a position to achieve full-fledged FOC (Final Operational Clearance)? How will the issue of the first 40 LCAs fitted with the underpowered GE 404 IN engines be sorted out in the long run? Will these be retro modified to Mk II standards or the IAF would remain saddled with Mk Is through their entire service life? Could you also give details of the LCA Mk II aircraft are envisaged for procurement by the IAF?

Other Tactical Aircraft Modernization

CAS: The LCA achieved IOC in December 2013 and this paved the way for induction of the LCA in IOC configuration in IAF. HAL is likely to deliver the first LCA in 2014 and IAF will be in a position to form the first LCA squadron only after receipt of at least four LCA from HAL, which is likely by the third quarter of 2015. The FOC of LCA is scheduled in December 2014.

The first 40 LCA would fly with GE 404 IN engine. The LCA Mk II would be equipped with GE 414 INS6 engine with improved performance. Preliminary Design Review of LCA Mk II was conducted. Four Squadrons of LCA Mk II are envisaged for procurement.

IS: It is believed there is a possibility of the stalled Jaguar re-engining programme being revived. Is it true? If yes, could you give details of the program? How will it affect the overall service life of the aircraft?

CAS: Yes, a case for re-engining of the Jaguar aircraft with F-125 IN engine is being actively pursued. Presently, the case is at Technical Oversight Stage, after which the contract negotiations will commence and we are hopeful of signing the contract in this financial year. Re-engining and concurrent upgrade of the Jaguar fleet will ensure its operational relevance till 2035.

IS: What are your views on the – still on the drawing board – indigenous MCA (Medium Combat Aircraft) program? How does it fit in the already crowded fighter acquisition programs such as the MMRCA, FGFA and of course the LCA too? Also, what time horizons have been fixed for its operational induction into the IAF?

CAS: After having successfully developed the LCA indigenously, the next logical step for DRDO is to design and develop an indigenous medium category fighter aircraft which would replace some of our legacy fleets due to retire in 10-15 years time. Presently MCA is on the drawing board and it is too premature to draw out its induction timelines.

Additional Air Modernization Efforts

IS: The IAF is in the hunt for augmenting its meager resources of force-multiplier aerial platforms such as AWACS, FRAs, etc.

Could you give details of the various programs? Also, how well is the indigenous AEW&C program progressing?

Your comments please.

CAS: To ensure the requisite degree of air surveillance and achieve air dominance in future operations, IAF needs to have adequate on-station capability in its Area of Interest.

Towards this, IAF has already taken the first step of operationalizing three AWACS, procured from abroad. Indigenous development of AEW&C by DRDO is in the developmental flight trials stage. These would be inducted in IAF after the trials are successfully accomplished.

To leverage the experience and expertise gained in the Design & Development of AEW&C, a project for indigenous development of AWACS has been initiated. The project is envisaged in two phases. Phase I involves development of a prototype, followed by a mid-term review by a National Review Committee.

Based on the success of Phase I of the indigenous AWACS, Phase II for production of additional AWACS will be initiated.

IS: Could you give an update on the IAF’s endeavours to improve its ground-based air defence capabilities? How well are the comparatively recently inducted Akash and Spyder SAM systems performing? Also, what is the progress on the India-Israel joint MR-SAM programme? Please elucidate.

CAS: A number of ground based defense capability projects are in progress. These include Akash, Spyder, MRSAM, SRSAM and VSHORAD. A number of Akash squadrons have already been operationalised in the IAF and several more squadrons will be inducted soon.

A few Squadrons of SPYDER LLQRM have also been contracted. Delivery of the SPYDER system is likely to commence shortly. Design, development and production of MRSAM jointly by DRDO and OEM from abroad is progressing well. A case for joint procurement of VSHORAD, for all three services is being processed.

IS: Armed UAVs are increasingly becoming the weapons of choice in the conduct of conventional/sub-conventional wars including the GWOT (Global War on Terrorism).

Does the IAF – which had pioneered the acquisition and operational exploitation of UAVs in the Indian context – have any plans to acquire UCAVs in the near future?

What is the IAF’s long-term vision of acquiring a mix of unmanned/manned combat systems to fight the future wars?

CAS: UAVs offer a cost-effective solution for reconnaissance and surveillance and the developments in sensors and communication technologies are providing immense capabilities to these platforms.

It is natural to extend their utilization for the armed role. UCAV technologies are available only to a few countries and are still in development phase. It will take some time for UCAV technology to mature and harden so that they can be integrated in the battle-space.

A careful cost-benefit analysis is essential before selection of any equipment for induction.

The IAF is studying these systems and is looking at the option of inducting such technology in future.

IS: The recent inductions of C-17 Globemaster III and C-130J transporters have metamorphosed the IAF’s strategic/ tactical and Special Operations capabilities.

Your comments please.

What will be the ultimate size of these fleets once IAF gets to meet all its ongoing and planned acquisition demands?

CAS: The induction of C-17 and C-130J has brought about a paradigm shift in our airlift capabilities.

The exceptional capabilities of the C-17 aircraft have enhanced our strategic footprint, which impacts the concept of Strategic Airlift Operations. Though the process of operationalizing the fleet is still in progress, it has already displayed potential by undertaking operations in support of the UN Mission in Congo and the Government of Tajikistan.

The C-130 has flown with us for three and a half years and has emerged as a significant enabler for Special Operations, besides being extensively deployed for varied tasks.

More importantly, these platforms have significantly enhanced our responsiveness in carrying out HADR operations.

We have inducted five C-17 and C-130J aircraft each and expect to induct more of these platforms as we gain more experience in their utilization and expand upon the roles. Induction of the balance five C-17 will be complete by the year-end while six additional C-130J aircraft are scheduled to be inducted by 2016.

IS: How is the IAF coping up in the aftermath of the stalled/cancelled VVIP helicopter program?

Does the IAF have a ‘Plan B’ to ensure safe and efficient rotary wing capability to meet the VVIP/VIP requirements?

Please explain.

CAS: The IAF has initiated a case in consultation with concerned agencies for modifying a few Mi-17 Series helicopters, for safe and efficient conduct of VVIP operations. However, this is only an interim measure.

IS: The IAF appears to be highly satisfied with the performance of the Pilatus PC-7 Mk II basic trainer aircraft and its availability on the tarmac – implying much better sustained serviceability states – and; would like to acquire more of the same to cater to its ever-increasing requirements of ab-initio flying training, and to ensure standardization.

But HAL is reportedly going ahead with its HTT-40 BTA program. Could you please explain in detail as to how the IAF plans to resolve the emerging conflicting situation and what would be its future plans?

CAS: The performance of PC-7 Mk II as a basic flying trainer has met the long aspired requirements of the IAF. The average serviceability of Pilatus PC-7 Mk II has been exceptional and the OEM is providing proactive product support for maintaining enhanced serviceability of the fleet.

Within a short span of just over a year, IAF has completed the basic flying training of almost 200 pilots utilizing this platform. The fleet has already flown more than 15,000 hours and executed over 25,000 landings.

The total requirement of IAF for the BTA as approved by the Government is 181.

The HTT-40 project does not meet the delivery timeline requirements of IAF. A RFI related to procurement of additional PC-7 through ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ route has been floated to make good the BTA shortfall. The case will be processed thereafter, based on responses to the RFI.

IS: What is the progress on the much delayed IJT program under way at the HAL? It is believed that IJT suffers from serious asymmetric stall problems, which cannot be solved without redesigning the aerodynamic shape of the aircraft. Is it true? Your comments please. In the worst case scenario, if the IJT fails to deliver, what would be the IAF’s fallback position?

Please explain.

CAS: The IJT was sanctioned in 1999 with an aim to achieve IOC by 2004. However, there are certain critical D&D issues, which are being resolved by HAL through consultancy. We are closely monitoring the progress of the IJT project in view of the impending retirement of Kiran aircraft. IAF is hopeful that the IJT will mature before the Kiran fleet starts retiring in very near future.

Indian Armed Forces and Procurement

IS: What are your views on the Naresh Chandra Committee’s recommendation of creating a new post of Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)? It has been often stated the proposal has been hanging fire because of the IAF’s reluctance for its implementation in its present form.

What would happen if the recommendation finds favor with the new political dispensation?

What in your opinion should be done to create the necessary conducive environment for its creation and what should be the overall responsibilities of the new functionary?

CAS: The creation of CDS is an incremental process and therefore, deserves to be supported by the three Services & other agencies. As against the misplaced perception of its reluctance, the proposal to create the appointment of Permanent Chairman COSC by the Naresh Chandra Task Force has been concurred by IAF.

As per its recommendations, the Chairman COSC would be one of the three Service Chiefs appointed by the Government and be the single point contact between the Government and three Services. He would thus be the fourth four star officer who would also be responsible for the various Tri-Service Commands.

The Service Chiefs will continue to exercise operational control and staff functions over their respective Service and have direct access to RM. The proposed set up will allow HQ IDS under Chairman COSC to function as an effective advisory nodal agency to the government on matters of policy, joint acquisitions, joint capability building and training.

A full switch over to CDS concept would be possible, only after assessing the functioning of Permanent Chairman COSC for some time.

IS: There is a view that even after years of revising it, the DPP (Defence Procurement Policy/Procedure) continues to be extremely complicated and needs to be simplified. One good thing which has happened though is the eligibility of ToT (Transfer of Technology) in discharging ‘Offset’ obligations. Has it helped in accelerating the commercial negotiations/processes underway, such as the Rafale deal?

Your comments on both please.

CAS: The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) has not just streamlined the entire Capital Procurement process; it has also catered to the ever-increasing requirement of transparency in the procurement process. At times the procedures appear to delay the procurement timelines rather than reducing them, but the overall effect is that it has led to a better understanding of the processes involved and brought in the much needed standardization amongst the procedures followed by the Services.

The DPP is also evolutionary in nature; feedback from the environment and stakeholders is regularly considered and procedures amended to include suggested improvements. The revised offset guidelines permit greater flexibility for discharge of offset obligations. This will allow offset contracts to progress in a more effective manner.

The MMRCA procurement is being progressed under DPP 2006, under which Transfer of Technology (ToT) is not eligible towards discharge of ‘Offset’ obligations.

IS: The IAF has been one of the foremost proponents of the idea that aerospace industry in India cannot be managed as just a public sector endeavour, but needs to be integrated with private sector in a meaningful way to ultimately achieve the goal of self-reliance. What more does the IAF need to do to realise the stated objective? Has the IAF also put itself in the driving seat to determine what cuttingedge technologies it wants from the concerned sectors to achieve the desired operational capabilities?

Your comments please.

CAS: The Defence Production Policy, which has been put in place by the Government, espouses the cause of the indigenous defense industry, including the private sector, and is one of the major steps towards achieving self-reliance. While initiating the proposals for any new acquisitions, it is ensured that the inherent capability of the Indian defense industry is taken cognizance of, before looking at the external market.

The provisions of Transfer of Technology and Offsets as enshrined in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) also go a long way in ensuring that the indigenous industry (both public as well as private) get the required fillip to compete with the international players thereby leading to self-reliance.

Future Technology Perspective and Capability build up roadmap has been clearly carved out by the IAF.

We regularly interact with the Indian Private and Public industries and apprise them of critical technologies which need to be brought into the country. IAF has forwarded RFI to CII, FICCI, ASSOCHAM to identify private industries capable and interested in IAF’s procurement for Air-to-Air and Air-to-Surface Weapons, SAGW, radars and EW equipment.

In addition, IAF wants rotor blades for Mi-17 helicopters to be produced within the country for which we have recently written to Indian Private Industry Associations. Given the growth of Indian Aviation sector both military and civil, we feel that for holistic and inclusive growth of Defence Industrial Base, Public and Private sectors need to grow together complementing and supplementing each other. We have always been supportive of indigenous development, without sacrificing our combat potential.

Indian Armed Forces Reforms

IS: Advanced armed forces the world over continue to open new operational roles for women, the latest being the induction of women officers in the submarine cadre of the UK’s Royal Navy. What is the likelihood of IAF’s women pilots flying in combat roles in the near future? Also, is there a move to grant permanents commissions to women pilots?

CAS: Presently, women officers of all the three Services are not being deployed on active duty close to the border wherein they are likely to be exposed to direct line of fire of the enemy/ engaged in operations across the border. IAF has opened up all branches for induction of women as SSC officers except for fighter stream of Flying Branch. The probability of women pilots flying in combat roles in the near future is very bright. Permanent Commission has been granted to a large number of SSC women officers in the recent past.

AVSC-II had recommended a larger number of officers in SSC cadre and had limited the number in PC cadre in all three Services; primarily to reduce the stagnation at higher ranks and to improve career prospects. Recommendations of AVSC are being implemented and the IAF has decided to have a balanced mix of PC officers and SSC officers.

IS: Lastly, a standard question: What are the newer technologies being inducted by the IAF to cut down the size of the sensor-shooter loop – a never ending quest for any air force?

CAS: The induction of state-of-art combat platforms like FGFA and MMRCA as well as the ongoing upgradation of existing combat platforms would enable us to keep pace with the newer technologies which include long range multi-function radars, superior man-machine interface, high performance mission computers with data link, state-of-the-art electronic warfare systems, smart weapons and stealth capability.

IAF endeavors to seamlessly integrate maximum number of sensors, platforms and systems in the Integrated Air Command Control System (IACCS) network. Coupled with space assets and RPAs this network would afford us ‘High Situational Awareness’ in a ‘Network Centric’ environment. Enabled by ICT, the network would reduce the sensor to shooter time considerably.

Reprinted with permission of our partner India Strategic:

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3514_Interview_Air_Chief_Marshal_Arup_Raha.htm

And for an earlier piece IAF modernization see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/an-update-on-the-indian-air-force-the-coming-of-rafale/

For a PDF of the original article in India Strategic see the following:

26-33_Interview_Arup_Raha

2014-09-06  The rise of the PRC is certainly an important event and process in the 21^st century.

But it can be forgotten that the PRC has virtually no developed allies, unless one wants to consider Putin capable of such a description.

What this means is that the constant set of assertions about what the PLA can and can not do must always be placed in the evolving strategic context and what powerful states are capable of doing to deal with the challenge.

Already, the PRC has driven the two greatest maritime powers of the 20^th Century into a closer relationship.

And now the PRC is working hard to bring India and Japan into a closer working relationship as well.

The recent visit of the newly elected Prime Minister of India is a case in point.

As an editorial in The Japan Times put it:

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi, on a five-day visit to Japan through Wednesday, reached broad agreements to expand bilateral economic ties and security cooperation.

It is indeed a positive development for Japan to pursue what the leaders termed a “special strategic and global partnership” with the world’s largest democracy, which has a huge market of 1.2 billion people.

Still, Japan and India may find themselves talking at cross purposes if Tokyo is seeking closer ties with New Delhi as a means to counterbalance China’s growing influence and assertiveness in the region.

During their meeting on Monday, Abe and Modi agreed to consider upgrading the framework of their foreign and defense talks and to regularize joint exercises between the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy.

Abe pledged to extend ¥3.5 trillion in Japan’s public and private investment and financing to India, including official development assistance, and double Japanese direct investments in India — both within five years.

Abe and Modi welcomed the accord on a commercial contract for production and supply of Indian rare earths to Japan, a move that would help reduce Japan’s reliance on China for the supply of minerals vital to the production of high-tech products.

They confirmed that the two governments would expedite talks for early conclusion of a bilateral civil nuclear cooperation pact that paves the way for export of Japan’s nuclear technology to India.

On the defense front, the two leaders said they would speed up working-level talks for exporting the MSDF’s US-2 amphibious aircraft to India.

Their joint statement called for maritime security, freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes under international law — an apparent reference to China’s maritime disputes with several countries in the East and South China Sea.

Behind the efforts to step up Japan-India security cooperation is China’s increasing maritime assertiveness and military buildup.

Along with their longtime bilateral border disputes, New Delhi is wary of China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean. Japan’s relations with China remain deeply strained in recent years over the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands as well as other issues related to wartime history.

And in a story published in the same paper, the potential for the working relationship was highlighted:

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his visiting Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, signed a joint declaration to further strengthen their strategic partnership after a summit at the Akasaka State Guest House in Tokyo.

“I have been always saying Japan-India relationship holds the greatest potential,” Abe said at a joint news conference with Modi after signing the declaration. “Hand in hand with Prime Minister Modi, I’d like to elevate our bilateral relationship to a special strategic and global partnership by enhancing relations fundamentally in every field.”

Modi said his visit to Japan this time highlighted a mutual trust and signified deeper relations between Japan and his country. Japan is the first country outside the Indian subcontinent he has visited on a bilateral basis since he took office in May.

“Japan occupies an extremely high position in our foreign policy,” Modi told reporters at the news conference. “The reason is Japan has played a very important role in the development and growth of India.”

Modi also noted his country and Japan as peaceful states and democracies would exert influence in the world and region by cooperating in various fields.

Abe and Modi agreed to work harder to launch a “two-plus-two” security consultative framework involving their foreign and defense ministers.

They also agreed to continue joint maritime exercises in addition to trilateral drills conducted with the United States on a regular basis.

Japan’s sovereignty has been challenged by China over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, a group of uninhabited islets that are controlled by Japan but also claimed by China, which calls them Diaoyu, and by Taiwan, where they are known as Tiaoyutai.

For its part, India is becoming more concerned over China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean, and also ongoing border disputes in the Himalayan region.

And on September 1, 2014, the two governments issued a joint declaration highlighting the way ahead.

The section of the declaration most relevant to defense and security is as follows:

Political, Defence and Security Partnership

6. The two Prime Ministers decided to continue the practice of annual summits and to meet as often as possible on the margins of regional and multilateral meetings.

7. Recognizing the special quality of bilateral engagement between India and Japan imparted by multi-sectoral ministerial and Cabinet-level dialogues, in particular, those between their Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and Ministers dealing with finance, economy, trade and energy, the two Prime Ministers decided to intensify and invigorate such exchanges. In this regard, they welcomed that the next rounds of Foreign Ministers Strategic Dialogue and Defence Ministers dialogue would be held in 2014. They attached importance to the dialogue between their National Security Advisors, launched earlier this year soon after the creation of the National Security Secretariat in Japan, as a key instrument of building deeper mutual understanding and cooperation across the full range of security issues. They underlined the importance of the 2 plus 2 dialogue, involving Foreign and Defence Secretaries, for their growing strategic partnership, and decided to seek ways to intensify this dialogue.

8. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed the importance of defence relations between India and Japan in their strategic partnership and decided to upgrade and strengthen them. They welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defence during the visit. In this context, they attached importance to the regularization of bilateral maritime exercises as well as to Japan’s continued participation in India – US Malabar series of exercises. They also welcomed the existing dialogue mechanism and joint exercises between Indian and Japanese Coast Guards.

9. Prime Minister Modi welcomed the recent developments in Japan’s policy on transfer of defence equipment and technology. The two Prime Ministers expressed the hope that this would usher in a new era of cooperation in defence equipment and technology. They recognized the enormous future potential for transfer and collaborative projects in defence equipment and technology between the two countries. They welcomed progress made in discussions in the Joint Working Group on cooperation in US-2 amphibian aircraft and its technology, and directed their officials to accelerate their discussions. They also directed their officials to launch working-level consultations between the two countries with a view to promoting defence equipment and technology cooperation.

10. The two Prime Ministers recognized their wide-ranging shared interests in security of maritime and cyber domains, and decided to work with each other and with like-minded partners to preserve the integrity and inviolability of these global commons. They affirmed their shared commitment to maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflight, civil aviation safety, unimpeded lawful commerce, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3500_Tokyo_decleration_for_India.htm

When one talks of the US, allies, partners and coalitions and dealing with 21^st century challenges, it is important to remember that it is relationships among allies and partners which will become an increasingly important factor in shaping what the US is able to do in global security and defense as well.

As we wrote in our book on Pacific strategy with regard to the evolution of Japanese defense policy:

The “dynamic defense” phase carries with it the seeds for the next phase— the shaping of a twin-anchor policy of having reach in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean.

Obviously, such reach is beyond the capabilities of the Japanese themselves and requires close integration with the United States and other allies. And such reach requires much greater C2, ISR, and weapons integration across the Japanese and allied force structure.[ref] Laird, Robbin F.; Timperlake, Edward (2013-10-28). Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy: A 21st-Century Strategy (The Changing Face of War) (Kindle Locations 3973-3976). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.[/ref]

The US is important for Japan, but so are Australia and India to whom Prime Minister Abe has clearly reached out to and expanded working relationships as well.

Also see the piece by Harald Malmgren on the dynamics of decision-making in China as well:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/chinas-foreign-policy-and-security-decision-system-shaping-assertive-sovereignty-and-regional-behavior/

2014-09-03 By Julien Canin

Germany has formally announced that they will support the Kurdish fighters, the Peshmergas, against the terrorist organization of Islamic State (ISIS), by sending weapons and providing training as well.

Although the decision was known since the August 20th‘s statement of the German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, the details were clarified on Sunday.

Debate followed on Monday September 1st at the Bundestag during an extraordinary session and was concluded by a symbolic vote in favor of the motion.

“We have seen acts of unbelievable brutality,” said Angela Merkel, describing before the Bundestag, threats, persecutions, tortures and murders committed on Christians, Yazidis and others minorities, by the ISIS terrorists.

According to the German Defense Minister, the shipment will include 16,000 assault rifles (8,000 G36 and the same amount of G3 rifles), 30 Milan anti-tank missile systems equipped with 500 missiles, 8,000 pistols, hand grenades, ammunitions and five Dingo armored vehicles.

Non-lethal equipment will be added (mine-clearing equipment, night-vision goggles, helmets, radio and helmets).

All of these deliveries valued at 70 million euros ($92 million) and aims to equip 4,000 Kurdish soldiers.

These weapons are going to be drawn from existing German army stockpiles and provided in three stages during September in areas not immediately affected by the war.

In addition, the training provided by the country for the use of complex armament will take place in Germany or, if that is not possible, near Erbil or in a third country, according to the defense minister Mrs. von der Leyen.

Germany has already delivered humanitarian aid, defensive equipment and funds to support Kurds and internally displaced persons in northern Iraq – more than 26 million euros and 143 tons of supplies according the website of the Federal Government – and has sent six military to the general consulate in Erbil to coordinate relief effort.

But until now, German has delivered weapons to the Kurds.

This exceptional decision in the German foreign policy, which follows similar moves by several other countries (UK, USA, France and Italy), was preceded by a tortuous and intense week-long discussion in the government.

It is indeed the first time that Germany sends weapons into an ongoing conflict since the end of World War II.

The Germans have begun a process of out of area operations, but it is a difficult history.

The Bundewehr’s very first combat missions occured at the time of war in Kosovo (1999) and then Afghanistan, but to do so almost led Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to lose his position.

But as Chancellor Angela Merkel, on the Central German Broadcasting MDR, that decision is an “exceptional case, of a sort we have not seen to date.”

“When we are asked to supply arms and ammunition on a limited scale, we cannot simply say that it is impossible,” she added.

“Every conflict has its own nature” underscored the Chancellor in her parliament speech on Monday.

Merkel said to parliament:

“The far-reaching destabilization of an entire region affects Germany and Europe… When terrorists take control of a vast territory to give themselves and other fanatics a base for their acts of terror, then the danger rises for us, then our security interests are affected.”

In fact, according German intelligence, at least 400 Germans have joined IS ranks.

In a piece in The Wall Street Journal, the German foreign minister explained the German decision (excerpts below):

This decision has sparked intense debate in Germany. Indeed, some people even see it as a fundamental change in German foreign policy.

I do not share this view. The fact is that Germany is taking on its responsibility in the world—in the fight against IS, but also in the Middle East, in Africa and in Afghanistan. Along with the European Union, we are particularly active in the search for a political solution to the highly dangerous crisis close to home, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Responsibility is always about concrete action. We must calibrate our engagement depending on what is at stake for fundamental principles of a peaceful and just international order, for our own interests and our closest partner countries and allies. Germany’s skepticism about military intervention and its restrictive approach to arms exports are politically well-founded and deeply ingrained in Germans’ collective consciousness. There is no paradigm shift regarding our foreign-policy principles, which include a policy of military restraint. But in the face of a threat like the one posed by IS, we must not hide behind principles. We must take responsible decisions, knowing full well that they involve difficult trade-offs. We take the greatest care in making such decisions, and we do so in close coordination with our European, trans-Atlantic and regional partner countries.

Where there is a threat of mass murder, where the stability and order of countries and entire regions are endangered, and where there is no chance of successful political settlements without military support, we must be willing to honestly weigh up the risks of getting involved against the consequences of doing nothing. This was why Germany decided to take part in international military interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and in Afghanistan in 2001. That is also why we decided that there were good reasons for opposing military action in Iraq in 2003.

Our opposition to the IS terrorists does not start with supplying arms, nor does it end there. IS cannot be stopped by either humanitarian or military means alone. We, the international community, must develop a comprehensive political strategy to counter this terrorist organization systematically.

In my view, four main elements are crucial: We need a new, effective and inclusive Iraqi government in Baghdad to dry up potential support for IS by closing ranks with the Sunni tribes. We need intensive diplomatic efforts to unite the countries in the region to confront the IS threat together. We need the Islamic world’s leaders to clearly distance themselves from IS and to unmask the rank cynicism of the propagandists and ideologists claiming religious legitimacy for terrorist savagery. Finally, we need resolute steps to hamper and prevent the flow of fighters and funds to IS.

It is clear that the ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria have refocused Western attention on the Kurds and I will be looking in coming pieces at the emergence of the Kurdish option for the West and what actions are being taken and ought to be pursued.

Is this an exceptional action by Germany or part of a broader evolution of German global defense and security policy?

The events in Iraq and Syria and Western engagement will provide an answer in part to this question.

At least one German defense industrialist sees the German government’s decision as a very significant step in the right direction.

According to this German defense industrialist:

It is a sea change.

Too many Germans believe we should be like Switzerland, Sweden or Costa Rica.

This will only change when Putin enters Poland or the Baltic states.

But we are already supplying body protection to the forces in the Ukraine. We should do more.

Crimea, East-Ukraine and the destabilizing of Ukraine all sounds like Austria and “Sudetenland” and the Czech Republic of earlier times. The West didn’t want to listen even when the invasion in Poland started.

Is this being repeated now?

I believe six things need to be done now:        

The French Mistrals need to be stopped from exporting, and they should be sold to the EU and deployed to the Baltic Sea under EU or NATO or whatever command;

Germany must step up its budget to the famous 2 percent;

We need to supply weapons to Ukraine;

We need to create a European Energy Union aimed at independence from Russia and others (harbors for ships for liquid gas from Canada, Fracking etc.);

We need to find ways to better inform the Russian public and win the information war;

We need diplomatic efforts to continue to find solutions. Excluding Russia from Swift is a total rubbish, it should be excluded.

It should be noted that the government shift is politically difficult in Germany; three recent opinion polls showing that around thirds of Germans are against the idea of delivering weapons.

http://www.dw.de/germany-to-deliver-weapons-to-iraqi-kurds-battling-is-terrorists/a-17894131

http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2014/09_en/2014-09-01-irak-regierungserklaerung_en.html

http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2014/08_en/2014-08-27-waffenlieferungen-irak_en.html;jsessionid=4CEAB48B82F31D91E4EE0526EFE798CD.s3t2

The Weapons to be Supplied:

First tranche:

4,000 G3 assault rifles; 1 million rounds of ammunition
20 MG3 heavy machine guns; 500,000 rounds of ammunition
4,000 P1 pistols; 500,000 rounds of ammunition
20 MILAN anti-tank weapons; 300 guided rockets
100 shoulder-fired Panzerfaust 3 rocket launchers; 1,250 rockets
20 heavy rocket launchers; 500 rockets
50 flare guns; 2,000 rounds
5,000 hand grenades
20 WOLF jeeps
10 lightly armored WOLF jeeps
20 UNIMOG trucks

Second tranche:
4,000 G3 assault rifles; 1 million rounds of ammunition
20 MG3 heavy machine guns; 500,000 rounds of ammunition
4,000 P1 pistols; 500,000 rounds of ammunition
10 MILAN anti-tank weapons; 200 guided rockets
100 shoulder-fired Panzerfaust 3 rocket launchers; 1,250 rockets
20 heavy rocker launchers; 500 rockets
50 flare guns; 2,000 rounds
5,000 hand grenades
20 WOLF jeeps
10 lightly armored WOLF jeeps
20 UNIMOG trucks

Third tranche:
8,000 G36 assault rifles; 4 million rounds of ammunition
1 tanker truck
5 DINGO-1 armored vehicles

Total weapons, munitions, and vehicles:
8,000 G3 assault rifles; 2 million rounds of ammunition
8,000 G36 assault rifles; 4 million rounds of ammunition
40 MG3 heavy machine guns; 1 million rounds of ammunition
8,000 P1 pistols; 1 million rounds of ammunition
30 MILAN anti-tank weapons; 500 guided rockets
200 shoulder-fired Panzerfaust 3 rocket launchers; 2,500 rockets
40 heavy rocket lauchers; 1,000 rockets
100 flare guns; 4,00 rounds
10,000 hand grenades

http://www.dw.de/german-weapons-deliveries-to-iraqs-kurdish-region/a-17892161

Julien Canin has received a French law degree and a master’s degree from the Universite Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium).

He has worked with both the French Political Party UMP on foreign and defense issues and with the Ministry of Defense recently at the Eurosatory conference.

This is Julien’s first piece for Second Line of Defense but he is following Iraqi developments for us and will provide additional reports in the future.

Also see:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/iraq-2014-is-not-iraq-2003-the-allied-dimension/

2014-09-03 by Ed Timperlake and Robbin Laird

“We will develop what I would call a spearhead within our Response Force — a very high-readiness force able to deploy at very short notice,” Secretary General Rasmussen told reporters at the Residence Palace in Brussels, where NATO is headquartered.

“This spearhead would be provided by Allies in rotation and could include several thousand troops ready to respond where needed with air, sea and Special Forces support.”

The North Atlantic Treaty creating NATO was signed on April 4th 1949. Consequently having stood the test of helping defeat the Soviet Union and that victory was reflected by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991. Since that time, reacting to dynamic world events, NATO military units have had to focus more toward the threats from the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Now sadly the alliance has to once again address a growing threat to Europe from Russia and to forge direct defense in the 21^st century. And make no mistake the 21^st century is different, and world within which rapid insertion forces – air dominant and air-enabled ground forces — able to destroy the forces of an enemy are required along with an ability to be prepared to fight in the second nuclear age.

It is not about shaping a large ground force preparing for an assault from the East; it is about deflecting, shaping and prevailing against the information war, non-kinetic and kinetic attacks from a skillful shaper of 21^st century warfare.

Make no mistake President Putin is as skilled an adversary as the West ever faced during those nasty Cold War days. In fact Putin understands, much better than his predecessors the never ending back and force shift between Information War and Kinetic engagements. He does not have to bang his shoe at the UN to be taken seriously.

He forged his credentials in a key conflict zone of both IW and preparation for kinetic war, namely the Euromissile crisis.

The prelude to the Fall of the Berlin Wall was a massive IW battle over the legitimacy for NATO to deploy weapons in response to the Soviet SS-20s and the significant nuclear arsenal in the Warsaw Pact.

As Russian tanks roll into Ukraine, Crimea falls and an innocent commercial aircraft was shot down NATO is responding now with the creation of Response Force “Spearhead.”

Current reporting states it is the most significant issue to be discussed at the coming 28 nation NATO meeting on 4th and 5th September 2014.

Asked what he meant by saying the force could deploy on very short notice, Rasmussen said such “military technical details would be worked out after the summit.

I can assure you that it will be very, very short notice,” he said.  So we are speaking about a very few days.”

The NATO Secretary General Andre Rasmussen with vision and courage has just committed NATO to a round of Information War against Russian aggression.

The test will first be in the creation and execution of the plan for a rapid reaction “Spearhead. It is a real test in a dangerous and dynamically shifting world.

If after well over six decades of constant military planning and exercises NATO military planners cannot identify the components of the “Spearhead” within days of the agreement to constitute such a force it will be seen as a signal of bureaucratic dithering by a very capable hard eyed opponent.

In fact as Risk Intelligence’s Hans Tino Hansen has underscored:

“This is old wine in new bottles – the old AMF was exactly this type of force and should never have been disbanded!”

For those who may have forgotten, the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) was established in 1960 and “the impetus behind the AMF’s creation in 1960 had been prompted by concerns related to deterrence in ACE’s northern and southern regions, the Berlin crisis of 1961 refocused NATO’s attention on defense of the Central Region.”

It will take time to practice together to forge an effective fighting force –“you fight like you train” but identifying the units committed should be very simple.

If NATO countries and military components get bogged down in a roles and missons fight over the type and nature of the force it will be a significant signal of politics vice combat effectiveness.

Just like no plan ever survives the first round going down range the first stand up of such a Spearhead will have issues and problems. But trying to get it perfect the old Cold War Russian saying comes into play “best is the enemy of the good.”

The good news is that a Dane is in charge with a Norwegian on the way.

Northern Europeans have no illusions about the Russians nor the need to re-shape Baltic defense and to prepare for Arctic defense.

As the head of the  integrated Danish military colleges, Admiral Wang, has put it:

I think that the Ukraine crisis has drawn attention to the fact that the three Baltic states took a very bold decision ten years ago.  They applied for a NATO membership, and NATO accepted them.

That is a commitment that goes both ways, and when you have a scenario like the one that we are experiencing right now with Russia and their intervention in Ukraine, I think it’s very, very important for NATO to send a message that the three Baltic states are NATO members and we are prepared to defend them in a clear manner.

That is why Denmark is deploying F-16s to the Baltic states, and the reason why we can deploy F-16s to the Baltic states without any problem as a routine operation, is basically because we have made it the entire Danish defense force, including our fighter air craft deployable over the last ten, fifteen years.

Having a significant and lethal insertion force ready to deploy at a moments notice is crucial to any credible NATO 21^st century defense capability.

It is not about COIN; it is not about massive territorial defense; it is an ability to insert forces — air dominant and rapidly mobile ground forces — which can rapidly create a positive result.

Whether against Russian forces in Ukraine, Poland, or the Baltics the rapid destruction of Russian forces is required much as with the case of the ISIS forces in Iraq.

NATO’s experience in Afghanistan clearly can be drawn upon which NATO forces have worked together over significant distances and have operated air enabled ground forces for some time, and where innovations such as the ROVER system was introduced.

These battle tested troops remain to be properly organized to let Putin now he does not have a free ride and may well find it together to deal with battle hardened Western troops than invading a country not prepared for war.

But make no mistake, NATO has announced it will do something significant; Putin is not waiting around for NATO to act and is already preparing his response, and if the Euromissile, his training ground, is anything to go by, significant intelligence and IW efforts will be directed to divide and conquer within the alliance.

Putin will count on the self-vetoing qualities of Alliance politics to ensure that he will have a manageable challenge.

2014-08-30 By Ian Armstrong, Department of Political Science at Temple University

Roughly three weeks from now, the Scottish people will decide for themselves whether they wish to end the 307 year union that has bound them to the United Kingdom.

The Union formed in large part due to economic concerns following a failed excursion in colonialism that left Edinburgh bankrupt, and economic issues similarly dominate the contemporary discussion as the small nation edges closer to referendum. Given the immediately-felt economic effects of an independent Scotland, it is understandable that Scots have delegated so much of their attention to these matters.

However, the implications of Scottish independence on security and defense is a largely overlooked facet to be considered as Scotland’s four million registered voters head to the polls this September.

In particular, Scottish independence raises particular questions regarding the United Kingdom’s Trident nuclear program, NATO, and the capability of Britain to remain the greatest ally of the United States.

According to the Scottish Nationalist Party’s (SNP) white paper on independence — a hefty tome describing the Scottish Government’s vision of an independent Scotland — the small nation would function on the international stage in a similar manner to that of nearby Scandinavian countries.

An important aspect of this new philosophy entails a stern policy against nuclear weapons, which Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond has deemed as “an affront to basic decency” and unequivocally “inhumane.”

This, unfortunately for Westminster, poses a great challenge to the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, as it is accompanied by the quick and indefinite removal of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Trident from the Scottish coast.

As it turns out, the core of the United Kingdom’s nuclear force is housed on Scottish shores and in Scottish bases, and the price and time it would take for relocation places a great stress on the U.K. Government.

This has led to the assumption that, should Scotland become an independent state, the United Kingdom — or rather, what remains of the United Kingdom — would be unable to maintain its nuclear arsenal, subsequently terminating it all together.

Should Westminster relinquish its cherished nuclear status, Western security would endure a peculiar strain. The United States, already skeptical of Great Britain’s capability, might opt for another partner to fill the role as “greatest ally.” Tides are already shifting in this nature, with President Obama unable to choose between Paris and London in naming Washington’s closest overseas associate and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates questioning U.K. military capability.

It is accordingly not out of the realm of possibility that a United Kingdom without 58 Trident II D-5 missiles might fall secondary and bring the United States and France closer militarily.

Uncertainty remains as to how much of a tangible impact this would have on greater international security. Still, the United Kingdom’s reliance on the United States for a credible nuclear deterrent suggests that, outside of geo-strategic benefits that the Scotland-based nuclear weapons provide to the Alliance, business would likely continue as usual.

However, while many have argued that a “Yes” vote in September would lead to an end of the U.K. nuclear deterrence, the United Kingdom is likely more reluctant to scrap the Trident than assumed at first glance. As stated in the Scottish white paper, the United Kingdom seeks to project global power by deploying nuclear weapons. Westminster’s current coalition government is headed by a Conservative Party that — despite rejecting the internationally inflammatory U.S.-comradery of former PM Tony Blair’s Liberal Interventionism — is keenly aware of the importance of its nuclear deterrent to both NATO and its “special relationship” with the United States, a relationship closely connected to the maintenance of the British legacy.

Cameron’s conservatives adhere to the modern-day Tory principle of “euroskepticism”, which views the European Union as potentially restrictive of UK interests and inherently brings an emphasis towards the Atlanticist commitments with Washington and NATO, and thus the nuclear deterrent.

For all the talk of a new Conservative idealism in the United Kingdom, Cameron has so far asserted himself as a bastion of the traditional realism of his conservative ancestors, and is unlikely to allow Scottish independence to end the UK nuclear deterrent. This, of course, might change with the coming elections, though a hypothetical Labour government may well maintain the importance of nuclear weapons held by predecessors Blair and Brown.

In addition, the United States is able to exert more influence on London than it would like to admit.

It is undeniably in the United States’ best interest for the United Kingdom to continue reinforcing U.S. and NATO nuclear force.

If Scottish independence becomes a fact rather than a campaign, and if Westminster is seriously mulling the abandonment of its nuclear deterrent, Washington might impose the same kind of pressure that eventually coaxed the United Kingdom into the EU.

For Scotland’s part, the nation will enter into the Alliance as a non-nuclear member if the Scottish will sways towards independence.

The geographic position of Scotland entitles it to an important role in regional security. Still, given its present existence in NATO as a nation within the United Kingdom, an independent Scotland’s admission into the Alliance would have little effect outside of a continuation of the status quo.

However, the SNP has sworn to increase the Scottish contribution to NATO air force capabilities in the event of a “Yes” vote, as well as the creation of a second naval squadron solely for NATO and other excursions in international waters.

As the Scottish Government and First Minister Alex Salmond have indicated, it is certain that when the Scottish people vote for independence this September, they are also voting for the end of the U.K.’s Trident nuclear program as it currently exists.

But that is not to say that the Trident will cease to exist in its entirety.

Rather, an independent Scotland is likely to be trailed by the Trident’s relocation and possibly re-configuration, a prospect which — though costly — is conducive to the continuation of global stability.