2014-08-13  When the Obama Administration sought to shape a status of forces agreement with the Baghdad government it failed to do so.

This meant as well that the Administration left without a plan ever to return to the aide of Iraq.

As Secretary Gates described the situation during his last year as SecDef:

By mid-April, the president asked Austin to explore the feasibility and risks of having 8,000 to 10,000 troops remain in Iraq.

There was some grumbling in Defense over the low number; I thought we could make that work.

But the thumb twiddling continued in both Baghdad and Washington, and in June, as I prepared to leave, the number of troops that might stay on as well as the size of our embassy post-December were totally up in the air.

I don’t know how hard the Obama administration— or the president personally— pushed the Iraqis for an agreement that would have allowed a residual U.S. troop presence.

In the end, the Iraqi leadership did not try to get an agreement through their parliament that would have made possible a continued U.S. military presence after December 31.

Maliki was just too fearful of the political consequences.

Most Iraqis wanted us gone.

It was a regrettable turn of events for our future influence in Iraq and our strategic position in the region. And a win for Iran.[ref]Gates, Robert M (2014-01-14). Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (Kindle Locations 10107-10114). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.[/ref]

One answer to stated intentions but not how hard was provided by the President’s campaign documents:

Barack Obama and Joe Biden will responsibly end the war in Iraq so that we can renew our military strength, dedicate more resources to the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and invest in our economy at home. The Obama-Biden plan will help us succeed in Iraq by transitioning to Iraqi control of their country.

Judgment You Can Trust

In 2002, Obama had the judgment and courage to speak out against going to war, and to warn of “an occupation of undetermined length, with undetermined costs, and undetermined consequences.” He and Joe Biden are fully committed to ending the war in Iraq.

A Responsible, Phased Withdrawal

Barack Obama and Joe Biden believe we must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in. Immediately upon taking office, Obama will give his Secretary of Defense and military commanders a new mission in Iraq: ending the war. The removal of our troops will be responsible and phased, directed by military commanders on the ground and done in consultation with the Iraqi government.

Military experts believe we can safely redeploy combat brigades from Iraq at a pace of 1 to 2 brigades a month — which would remove all of them in 16 months. That would be the summer of 2010 — more than 7 years after the war began.

Under the Obama-Biden plan, a residual force will remain in Iraq and in the region to conduct targeted counter-terrorism missions against al Qaeda in Iraq and protect American diplomatic and civilian personnel. They will not build permanent bases in Iraq, but will continue efforts to train and support the Iraqi security forces as long as Iraqi leaders move toward political reconciliation and away from sectarianism.

No Status of Forces agreement meant that the counter-terrorism mission for residual troops and the training mission went off the table.

Whose fault for failing to do is not really the point:

The question is as follows:

Have conditions changed fundamentally with the Baghdad government to put a fair and equitable bargain on the table for the US to play a role in the future of Iraq that makes any sense?

Even more fundamental a question is the following:

Can the Baghdad government play a serious role in reconciliation or is it simply about maintaining the power of the governing faction?

Without answering this question in the affirmative, it makes little sense for the US to commit financial and military resources to prop up this government and, of course, the Russians have reentered the stage in a potential role to do so as well.

We have yet to see George Washington in Iraq; we have seen on a regular basis Tony Soprano.

Enter 2014: how then would the US be able to work with the same government, but only with a new revolving head?

Or to put even more bluntly: if conditions are virtually the same with working with Baghdad in 2014 as when the President determined that no status of force agreement could be negotiated, why is it different now?

Clearly, an important issue is to determine whether the new Prime Minister is someone we can work with to shape a government of reconciliation. To do so means, you have to trust him with money and arms.

Can we trust Shiite politician, Haider al-Abadi, as the new Prime Minsiter?

In a piece which we published on the Second Line of Defense Forum, by Dr. John Shaw, the answer would be to be clearly note.

http://www.sldforum.com/2014/08/making-haider-al-abadi-new-prime-minister-iraq/

Some excerpts from the article highlight clear concerns over whether or not the past experience will not simply be repeated but no in the middle of a war and not at the conclusion of one.

The appointment of Haider al-Abadi as Iraqi prime minister is the culmination of a decade long political ascent that was unheralded but nonetheless remarkable.

Driven into exile by the murder of his father and two brothers by the Baath party, Abadi spent two decades in England acquiring an advanced degree in electrical engineering and becoming a consulting engineer for building elevators.

At the same time he became an active Dawa party organizer in the expatriate Iraqi community and the protégé of Ibrahim al-Jafari, who became a Dawa leader.

At the fall of Saddam Hussein he returned to Baghdad and was rewarded for his longtime Dawa support by being appointed Minister of Communications.

The legacy of the Coalition Provisional Authority is one of epic unchecked corruption.

Haider al-Abadi was not appointed as Communications Minister because of any telecommunication expertise, but because he would be decisive in assuring Dawa control of the projected cellular phone contracts for Iraq, and more important, the control of the $3 billion to be awarded with the contracts and the significant ongoing cash flow as Iraq built out a cell phone capability…..

By 2014, after eight years in power, the tides of corruption and dissention rose again to take out Maliki in his turn.

At this stage there appeared to be only two contenders to replace him:

Jafari and Chalabi, the failed candidates of yesteryear, themselves so tarnished that they dissuaded would be kingmakers from returning to them.

What was needed in a new prime minister was sufficient experience to suggest competence, sufficient Dawa credentials to assure core Shia support, and a profile low enough to limit detractors.

His corruption coefficient was sufficiently old that it was forgotten and its magnitude was lost in the shared participation in the telecom billions.

But he was a critical player in one of the biggest rip offs of the entire Iraqi reconstruction debacle, a scam that has been quietly covered up for a decade.

Haider al-Abadi thus became, in Iraqi terms, the new and honest political figure, the new face for the year 2014.

But what we have is only the old wine in a new bottle, the taste has not improved with age.

The French got it right: Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose.

 

2014-08-08 By Ed Timperlake

The Honorable Mike Wynne 21st USAF Secretary expressed what is now known as The Wynne Doctrine—“If you are in a fair fight someone failed in planning.”

Many successful battlefield commanders in history practiced the Wynne Doctrine.

Israel certainly needs too because they can never afford to lose and knows it cold.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) must be vigilant and prepared at all times. In doing so the IDF has invented and perfected one of the most powerful deterrence and warfighting capabilities on the 21st Century battlefield, their Iron Dome.

The Iron Dome is currently defending all under its protection and is proven to be very effective in stopping deadly rockets, mortar and artillery shells.

The current combat proof of concept has important consequences for many countries.

Once such a sensor/shooter system is linked to longer range Air Defense Artillery (ADA) kinetic interceptors such as the IDF Arrow 2 and 3 or if America learns how it works. the US Army can network US THAAD/Patriot batteries in our own version.

In addition to today’s lifesaving combat applications Israeli scientists and engineers can take justified pride that through their direct actions they will be responsible for mitigating threats by nasty deadly countries blustering with their rockets.

As the Iron Dome capability proliferates, the world will actually be a safer place because countries thinking of making a conventional missile attack will have a significant warfighting dilemma as the effectiveness of their weapons getting through will be in question.

North Korea especially along the DMZ, Iran against Israel and China against Japan and Taiwan come to mind as real world examples.

The world will owe Israel a debt of gratitude.

Currently in today’s combat, the Iron Dome is setting a new world standard in defending all non-combatants.

The political and information war considerations of the Iron Dome’s success is yet to be recognized and fully expressed.

The citizens of Gaza are threatened by the actions of Hamas. By using the lives of Gaza citizens as a launch point whereby Hamas fires rockets to draw IDF direct fire, part of the Israel response is to use defensive weapons to deal with the threat.

The Iron Dome is effective in saving ALL lives, not just those in Israel, and provides an opportunity for Gaza citizens to think twice about the goals and intentions of their leaders.

It will dawn on all in Gaza that Hamas is trying intentionally to get them killed.

It is past time for the innocents in Gaza to blame Hamas in public and demand they stop. It is not a war in the conventional sense regardless of the statements that Hamas will resume fighting.

What they are really saying is we know we are ineffective but we will martyr our people regardless because we are winning an information war. 

The Iron Dome is a generation and quantum leap ahead in defending against incoming rockets.

With the proven capability of the Iron Dome along with the IAF and ground troops uncovering deadly tunnels, Israel is inventing a new chapter in modern war.

In essence, the Israelis are shaping a way ahead in defensive offensive air ground warfighting capability.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WHH6MRmw_Jo#t=19

But to be fully effective, the information war aspects need to be addressed as well.

De facto, Hamas by attacking Israel wishes to trigger a massive response and to see more Gaza citizens killed.

With the Iron Dome, Israel can respond effectively, lower the causalities on both sides, and deflect the Hamas goal of seeing more Gaza citizens killed as pawns in their information war.

When discussing innovative technology and warfighting one must also look at the combat rules of engagement (ROE) that stress minimization of harm to innocents.

Linking both technology and ROE is a critical component of 21st Century “Information War;” Israel is doing just that that but not getting appropriate credit.

Just like fighter pilots do not wake up calculating how many innocents can they kill, families in Gaza do not wake up to be sacrificed as information pawns in a calculated ploy by their leaders who now are intentionally trying to get them killed.

The now known success of Iron Dome makes that point.

Tragically unless something changes the piece below is a precursor to what Israel now faces, both in the US but more so in Europe, where her critics will howl for months to come

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/06/on_israel_s_defeat_in_gaza_cease_fire_hamas_public_opinion?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%252ASituation%20Report&utm_campaign=SITREP%20AUG%207%202014

But that does not have to be the case.

It is past time that the innocent families in Gaza recognize that they are being cynically used and they will say enough and finally blame Hamas.

All who are being put in harm’s way by their leaders recognize that instead of blaming Israel should put the blame where it belongs: on Hamas as using them as pawns in a global information war.

Pundits in US and even the Israeli leadership pointing out the truth of the situation is important in Information War but a message finally coming from those in Gaza putting blame on Hamas is the most powerful voice of all.

It is not too late to find and listen to some brave souls in the Gaza “street” telling Hamas to stop launching rockets, stand down and just go away.

It is a hard issue to find anyone with the courage to speak out but honest insights from Gaza citizens, not blaming Israel, would be a powerful insight and save many lives.

Credit Photo:

http://abcnews.go.com/International/israels-iron-dome-works/story?id=24507147

2014-08-10 By Robbin Laird

Vladimir Putin has returned Russia to the world stage in rather dramatic fashion.

The seizure of Crimea from Ukraine is the most obvious statement of Russian power, yet this seizure could obscure the broader strategy and focus of attention.

Putin is really an energy czar, running a country.

The Russian economy and its global significance rest heavily on its energy resources and playing an effective global energy security game.

This means that in addition to the already extensive internal resources, those in the Arctic are crucial to the long-term effort, and engaging in the evolution of the Middle East as an energy ally/competitor is important as well.

The actions in Ukraine have included seizure of territory, the use of special forces, information war, the use of indigenous Russian armed and trained “separatists,” and other techniques well laid out in a thoughtful piece from a Latvian researcher.

In a seminal piece on the Ukrainian crisis by a Latvian researcher, new ground has been laid to shape a clearer understanding of the evolving nature of 21st century military power.

Neither asymmetric nor convention, the Russians are shaping what this researcher calls a strategic communications policy to support strategic objectives and to do so with a tool set of various means, including skill useful of military power as the underwriter of the entire effort.

According to Janis Berzinš, the Russians have unleashed a new generation of warfare in Ukraine. The entire piece needs to be read carefully and its entirety, but the core analytical points about the Russian approach and the shaping a new variant of military operations for the 21st century can be seen from the excerpts taken from the piece below:

The Crimean campaign has been an impressive demonstration of strategic communication, one which shares many similarities with their intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, while at the same time being essentially different, since it reflects the operational realization of the new military guidelines to be implemented by 2020.

Its success can be measured by the fact that in just three weeks, and without a shot being fired, the morale of the Ukrainian military was broken and all of their 190 bases had surrendered. Instead of relying on a mass deployment of tanks and artillery, the Crimean campaign deployed less than 10,000 assault troops – mostly naval infantry, already stationed in Crimea, backed by a few battalions of airborne troops and Spetsnaz commandos – against 16,000 Ukrainian military personnel.

In addition, the heaviest vehicle used was the wheeled BTR-80 armored personal carrier. After blocking Ukrainian troops in their bases, the Russians started the second operational phase, consisting of psychological warfare, intimidation, bribery, and internet/media propaganda to undermine resistance, thus avoiding the use of firepower.

The operation was also characterized by the great discipline of the Russian troops, the display of new personnel equipment, body armor, and light wheeled armored vehicles. The result was a clear military victory on the battlefield by the operationalization of a well-orchestrated campaign of strategic communication, using clear political, psychological, and information strategies and the fully operationalization of what Russian military thinkers call “New Generation Warfare”…..

Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population.

The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their own government and country.

New Generation Warfare

The key is effective intervention, but without over engagement.

Whether this happens depends up Ukraine and the West, but Putin’s approach is about leverage and effect. But the ability to act, indirectly, is a key element of the approach, notably with the inability of Western democracies and their alliances to deal with indirect action.

The West has alliances designed to protect directly threatened states and interests; Putin’s strategy focuses on the seams; the ability to generate indirect actions, leverage and directly act only when necessary.

The Russians really have no allies; but they do not need them to succeed.They have clients.

Client states and actors are key partners for the Russians in protecting their mutual interests, which are not laid out in alliance agreements, but moving arrangements to meet mutual needs.

The ability to build and deliver arms rapidly is certainly a key aspect of shaping the client strategy. It is a strategy of violence but not about Russian troops on the ground, or the operation of a global Russian air force; it is about delivery to the target of need.

With regard to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the Russians are both building out an infrastructure to operate from in the region over the long run, and shaping an effective arms delivery approach fueling the current conflicts.

Earlier, I argued that an aspect of shaping an effective infrastructure for engagement involved shaping a network of naval bases or support facilities in the region.

It is often noted that the current state of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean is not first rate, and is populated with many aging assets. This is largely true, but misses the point that the Russians have set in motion a major naval and air modernization effort, and by laying down a solid geographical infrastructure, when capabilities are added, then they have tools to go with the infrastructure to shape regular influence in the region.

With regard to the Eastern Mediterranean, two key areas are involved: Syria and Egypt.

With regard to the Western Mediterranean, Cyprus is the key target of the Russian effort. 

And correlated with this effort is the ability to provide and deliver rapidly if needed arms to clients. Unlike the United States, which is incapable of delivering arms rapidly to the region (and Europe even more so), the Russians can deliver rapidly.

A recent example was the delivery of Sukhoi jets to Iraq.

According to a BBC story:

Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri Maliki has told the BBC that he hopes jets from Russia and Belarus will turn the tide against rebels in the coming days. “God willing within one week this force will be effective and will destroy the terrorists’ dens,” he said.

He said that the process of buying US jets had been “long-winded” and that the militants’ advance could have been avoided if air cover had been in place. Isis and its Sunni Muslim allies seized large parts of Iraq this month. Mr Maliki was speaking to the BBC’s Arabic service in his first interview for an international broadcaster since Isis – the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – began its major offensive.

“I’ll be frank and say that we were deluded when we signed the contract [with the US],” Mr Maliki said. “We should have sought to buy other jet fighters like British, French and Russian to secure the air cover for our forces; if we had air cover we would have averted what had happened,” he went on.

He said Iraq was acquiring second-hand jet fighters from Russia and Belarus “that should arrive in Iraq in two or three days”.

This has been followed by a much larger arms transfer agreement.

According to a July 30, 2014, Kuwaiti news source:

Iraqi government has recently signed a USD 1 billion-worth deal with Russian government to provide Iraqi army with heavy artillery, ballistic missile systems and ammunition.

The Russian Interfax News Agency reported Wednesday that the deal was signed during a recent visit by Iraqi Defense Minister Saadoun Al-Dulaimi to Moscow.

It added that the deal also includes, among others things, providing Iraqi army with Grad missiles and armored vehicles.

Talks are also underway to sell Iraq ten Su-27 jet fighters, the report disclose.

And one could note that arming the Iranians, the Maliki government and the Syrians has a certain client engagement logic as well.

And in cases like arming Hamas there is clear an interest in testing weapons as well as aiding clients.

The Iron Dome is a threat to Russian offensive weapons, and it is in the Russian interest to seek ways to defeat it, either directly, indirectly, or by information warfare means.

According to a Reuters story published July 24, 2014:

Videos distributed by al-Qassam’s media arm appear to show the strength of the group’s arsenal.

“The demonstrated use of anti-tank guided missiles against small IDF units on foot, rather than against armoured vehicles, shows a clear intent to simply inflict casualties and a recognition of the (Israeli army’s) superior armour defence,” said Charles Lister, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Center in Doha told Reuters.

A senior Israeli intelligence official briefing foreign reporters on Wednesday said “radical axis” countries – Iran, Syria or Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon – had provided Hamas with a new generation of ground weapons.

He cited the Russian-made cornet and the shoulder-fired RPG-29 which is “more of a rocket than a missile. You can use it in an urban area when you have to fight against very close forces. This is something you don’t make by yourself.”

Hamas is a useful client, which can test the waters of an evolving 21^st century conflict situation.

This is itself a key element of gaining advantage in 21^st century global competition.

And of course, energy and arms make a very useful cross cutting capability.

When there was the Soviet Union, the CIA claimed that the Russians were providing arms gratis to allies in the Middle East. But as part of a Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates team in 1983, we were able to prove that the Russians were selling arms to allies and doing so through exchanges in the energy markets.

Clearly, such a possibility is in play once again, although this time Putin does not care so much for allies as for clients. He has little interest in defending clients against direct confrontation with the West, than he is in staying the game and out maneuvering Western states.

This is not the Cold War; this is the engagement of Russia in 21^st century conflict and warfare.