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Soon the USMC Darwin Rotational Force will come to Australia to train with the Australians.
What might not be as obvious as the images of the cross-training is the cross modernization of the two forces.
The Aussies are re-shaping their forces under the influence of new systems; and the Osprey-F-35B-CH-53K and other new systems are leading to the modernization of the USMC.
By using training ranges operating from Australia to the Mariana Islands to Guam, the Marines and the Aussies will shape common approaches built around the new systems.
They will obviously train with other Asian allies and the other US services as well, but shaping expeditionary capabilities through the Marine’s 10 year approach to a distributed laydown in the Pacific dovetails very nicely with the changes which the Aussies themselves are undertaking.
The Aussies are undergoing a significant air combat modernization process.
It began with the C-17, proceed with the acquisition of 5 new Airbus tankers (being joined by 6 being bought by Singapore), 5 new Wedgetail airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) aircraft, and then the F-35. The Wedgetail squadron is doing what no other air squadron has done to date: it is operating and leading the upgrade process of the world’s first software upgradeable aircraft. The F-35 is such an aircraft, and discussions with the squadron made it clear during a recent visit that they understand that they are spearheading a broader modernization process.
The Aussie navy has added new world leading radar systems on their frigates and is adding new amphibious ships as well as Aegis ships. And they are looking to integrate the Wedgetail and their F-35s with the fleet to meet the various challenges and threats in the region.
The four Hornets and the tanker are seen doing a demonstration at the Centenary of Military Aviation Air Show at RAAF Williams – Point Cook, commemorating 100 years of military aviation in Australia. The Air Show (held in early March 2014) commemorates a significant moment in Australias military aviation history when Lieutenant Eric Harrison, an aviation instructor with the Central Flying School, made Australias first military flight taking off from RAAF Williams – Point Cook in a Bristol Boxkite on 1 March 1914. In the future, the Aussie tanker could refuel Ospreys, F-18s and F-35Bs for the USMC. Credit: RAAF
The final major piece to be added is the F-35. The F-35 is viewed by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as disruptive technology, which is embraced as such by the RAAF leadership. It is not just about doing things you can do now with a replacement aircraft; it is about doing things you can not do now with a transformational system.
The Aussie approach was discussed before, during and after a workshop held by The Williams Foundation on behalf of the Australian COS of the RAAF in mid-March at Canberra. The focus of the seminar was on Air Combat Operations: 2025 and Beyond. The core emphasis was on the impact of the F-35 on reshaping the Australian combat approach appropriate to the challenges, which Australia faced in the region and beyond.
The emphasis was on how to leverage fifth generation technology to generate ongoing air combat development in the decades ahead.
The Australian F-35 will enter into an environment of change and the central question addressed by the seminar was how to accelerate the kind of change necessary to deal with the threats and challenges in the neighborhood and beyond in the years ahead.
At the heart of the program were three speakers: SQNLDR Matthew Harper, No. 1 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, Lt. Col. Chip Berke and the VMX-22 Commander Mike Orr. The presence of the Marine aviators was a concrete manifestation of the cross-modernization opportunities.
These three operators addressed the question of what the fifth generation experience was all about and how that experience would affect the evolution of the force in the decade ahead. Having operators address the issue of transformation and transition really focused the audience, which included significant attendance by the next generation RAAF officers.
In an interview with Lt. General Robling, MARFORPAC Commander, he highlighted that the Aussies are a good example of an ally building out its capabilities as the US does so and working out a very interactive and mutually reinforcing defense structure.
He emphasized that the impact of a fleet of F-35s being shaped by Japanese, Singaporean, South Korean and Aussies with those of the USAF, USMC and USN will be a key element of shaping interactive capabilities.
“The two allies see a mutually beneficial relationship.
The intersection of Australian training ranges with those we are modernizing in Guam is a key element of working cross cutting modernizations.
This will allow us to work with a set of allies in the region as well within the Guam context to facilitate mutual modernizations of the allies as well.
We are not just building our bilateral relationships; we are facilitating multi-national collaboration AMONG our allies as well. This is a clear force multiplier.
In other words, the opportunity is not just for training but shaping relevant capabilities for 21st century operations.
2014-04-09 This video provides some shots of various aircraft flying in Red Flag 2014.
At the beginning of the video, one can see a F-15C assigned to the 123rd Fighter Squadron, Portland ANG, Ore., taxiing to the runway for takeoff during Red Flag 14-2 Mar 10, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev.
In the next sequence, F-16s taxi to the end of the runway for takeoff during Red Flag 14-2 Mar 10, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev.
During the third sequence, a Royal Danish Air Force F-16AM taxis to the runway during Red Flag 14-2 Mar 10, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev.
In the fourth sequence, two four-ship F-15Cs assigned to the 123rd Fighter Squadron, Portland ANG, Ore., line up at the end of the runway to be armed prior to takeoff during Red Flag 14-2 Mar 10, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev.
In the fifth sequence, a United States HC-130J assigned to the 79th Rescue Squadron, Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz., takes off during Red Flag 14-2 6 Mar, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev.
In the sixth shot, a Sentry AWACS from Geilenkirchen Air Base, Germany, takes off during Red Flag 14-2 Mar 10, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev.
In the seventh shot, an F-15C assigned to the 65th Aggressor Squadron at Nellis AFB, Nev., takes off during Red Flag 14-2 Mar 10, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev.
In the eighth shot, a B-52 assigned to the 96th Bomb Squadron at Barksdale AFB, La., takes off during Red Flag 14-2 Mar 10, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev
In the final shot, an E-3 Sentry AWACS assigned to the 965th Airborne Air Control Squadron at Tinker AFB, Okla., takes off during Red Flag 14-2 Mar 10, 2014 at Nellis AFB, Nev.
I had a chance to talk with the US Marine Corps, Pacific (MARFORPAC) in late February 2014 about their major project of reshaping and repositioning their forces in the Pacific over the next decade.
It is clear that a distributed laydown is a key element of shaping the deterrence in depth strategy in the Pacific and a fundamental tissue in building out an effective partnership strategy and capability in the region. .
The distributed laydown started as a real estate move FROM Okinawa TO Guam but it clear that under the press of events and with the emergence of partnering opportunities the DL has become something quite different. It is about re-shaping and re-configuring the USMC presence within an overall strategy for the joint force and enabling coalition capabilities as well.
The distributed laydown fits the geography of the Pacific and the evolving partnership dynamics in the region. The Pacific is vast; with many nations and many islands. The expeditionary quality of the USMC – which is evolving under the impact of new aviation and amphibious capabilities – is an excellent fit for the island quality of the region.
The USMC is building out four major areas to operate FROM (Japan, Guam, Hawaii and, on a rotational basis, Australia.) But as one member of the MARFORPAC staff put it: “We go from our basic locations TO a partner or area to train. We are mandated by the Congress to train our forces, and in practical terms in the Pacific, this means we move within the region to do so. And we are not training other nation’s forces; we train WITH other nation’s forces to shape congruent capabilities.”
The basic template around which USMC training activities operate is at the intersection of three key dynamics: the required training for the USMC unit; meeting select PACOM Theater campaign priorities; and the partner nation’s focus or desires for the mutually training exercise or opportunity.
In effect, the training emerges from the sweet spot of the intersection of a Venn diagram of three cross cutting alignment of interests.
The training sweet spot for the Marines in the Pacific. Credit: MARFORPAC
This template remains the same throughout the DL but it is implemented differently as an ability to operate from multiple locations, which allows the Marines to broaden their opportunities and shape more meaningful partnership opportunities.
The training regime is translated into a series of exercises executed throughout the year with partner forces. These exercises are central lynchpins in shaping effective working relationships in the region, which provide the foundation for any deterrence in depth strategy.
Nature abhors a vacuum and if you are not present you are absent. And by building out core working relationships, there is not a significant power void, which could otherwise be filled in by powers trying to reshape the rules of the game, and to perhaps impose a new order in the Pacific.
The USMC is a very cost effective force within the overall defense budget spending over all less than 10% of the defense budget.
2/3 of the USMC force is deployed to the Pacific. And in the Pacific the USMC spends $50 million per year on its exercises and of that 30% of the cost is for lift. It is clear that this touchstone for an ongoing commitment and deepening of partner working relationships needs to be fully supported and enhanced in the years to come and not be part of salami cutting approach to cutting defense expenditures.
Filling power vacuums by ongoing presence is a lot more effective than having to rush in later to deal with a crisis generated by collapse or someone else trying to force their will in the region.
Some of the 2014 MARFORPAC exercise engagements, 2014. Creditt:MARFORPAC
Another way to look at the DL is to compare the before and after of the process.
A key aspect of understanding the after is that it is a work in progress and is bound to change in the fluid decade ahead as needs become redefined and new partnership opportunities identified.
The Marines have been directed through International Agreements, spanning two different US administrations to execute force-positioning moves. This is political, but it’s not partisan.
The U.S. Secretary of Defense has mandated that at least 22,000 Marines in PACOM remain west of the International dateline in the distributed Marine Air Ground Task Force or MAGTF Laydown and he, congress, and the American people are not interested in a non-functional concept for a USMC force.
And, the Obama White House has directed the USMC to make to shift as well of forces from Okinawa to Guam and to a new working relationship with the Australians.
Beyond what is directed, the Marines need to maintain a ready-force in the face of existing training area encroachments, plus they have the requirement for training areas near the new force laydown locations
Within the distributed laydown, the Marines must retain the ability rapidly to respond to crises across the range of demands, from Major Combat operation in NE Asia to low-end Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) wherever it occurs.
Each location for the Marines is in transition as well. From Okinawa and Iwakuni, the Marines can locally train in Japan, Korea and the Philippines, as well as respond with “Fight Tonight” capabilities if necessary.
From Guam, the Marines can train locally in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) to the north, the Federated States of Micronesia to the south, and Palau and the Philippines to the west. Guam and CNMI provide the Marines something we do not have anywhere else in the Pacific: A location on U.S. soil where they can train unilaterally or with partner nations.
In broad terms, prior to the DL (ca. 2011), the Marines were located in Japan (25,000 in Mainland Japan and Okinawa), Hawaii (approximately 6,000) and on the West Coast (approximately 45,000 in California and Arizona). With the DL (ca. 2025), there will be a projected force distribution as follows: Mainland Japan and Okinawa (15,000), Guam (approximately 4700), Hawaii (approximately 8800), West Coast (approximately 43,000) and a rotational force in Northwest Australia of approximately 2500).
But this is clearly a work in progress.
What it is NOT is simply moving Marines from Okinawa to Guam. There are additive elements as well, mainly from USMC aviation assets as the USMC delivers new capabilities to the Pacific in the decade ahead.
The USMC disposition of forces at the start of the distributed laydown. Credit: MARFORPAC
The USMC disposition of forces at the end of the distributed laydown. Credit: MARFORPAC
The working relationship of the USMC-USN team in the Pacific is operating in a dynamic decade in which various partners are evolving their own amphibious or expeditionary capabilities as well.
The Australians and South Koreans are adding amphibious ships; the Japanese are extending the reach of their forces in the defense of Japan; and Singapore is adding F-35s and new tankers to extend its ability to defend the city-state.
The Marine Corps-USN team is obviously in the sweet spot to work these amphibious and expeditionary evolutions of core partners. There are several other partners working to expand their capacity to do littoral defense of their territory which in turn drive the desire to exercise and train with the USMC-USN team.
The equip side of train and equip forces for the USMC-USN team in the decade ahead during the DL is in flux as well. New capabilities are coming to the region which will are having or will have a significant effect on partnering opportunities and capabilities as well. And some items are under severe demand pressures and may well lead to the need to plus up targeting funding to meet these needs.
With regard to the new capabilities either in the region or coming the list is short but significant: the Osprey, the F-35B, the CH-53K, and the USS America.
The Osprey is rapidly becoming a lynchpin for connecting the forces moving in the DL. It is also an intriguing platform for some players in the region who are thinking about its acquisition as well for it fits the geography and needs in the region so well.
The F-35B is coming first to Japan and will operate throughout the region. The Singhs are buying F-35Bs, the Aussies and Japanese for sure F-35As, with the Japanese interested in Bs as well. The point is simple: The Marines are coming first to the region with the airplane and are the launch point for shaping perceptions and crafting working relationships with partners That are interested in expeditionary and amphibious-like capabilities.
A member of the Royal Australian Air Force refuels a RAAF F/A-18 from a KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport while participating in Cope North 13 near Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, Feb. 13, 2013. In the RAAF’s new KC-30A, the refuel systems are controlled by an air refueling operator in the cockpit, who can view refueling on 2D and 3D screens. Cope North is an annual air combat tactics, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise designed to increase the readiness and interoperability of the U.S. Air Force, Japan Air Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Air Force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Matthew Bruch/Released). 2/13/13
Earlier this year, in a discussion with a USMC leader in the Pacific, the point about the insertion of the F-35 in a dynamic region was put this way:
“Viewed from Washington the US is either leading a process of allied defense or is facing off in a competition with China. Neither is the core dynamic. The reality is that multiple trends were happening at the same time which are creating a “steam roller out here.”
Among the trends cited were the following: South Korea shaping its expanded role in its own defense, the Japanese moving beyond a narrow concept of self defense and with the largest deployment outside of Japan since World War II seen in support of the Philippine relief effort, the Japanese are pushing outwards; the Aussies are shaping several innovations in defense and reaching out into the Pacific; the Filipinos are seeking more US presence within the islands.
While these trends are gaining momentum, the F-35 will be arriving into the region, which will “make it a focus point for discussions and efforts for coalition defense.”
The CH-53K is a less sexy addition to the USN-USMC team but expands significantly the ability to lift items off of ships and move them into play in the region as well as supporting more effectively the insertion of force in a MAGTF maneuver approach.
The coming of the USS America to San Diego and hopefully later to Guam is an important addition as well. It is a large amphibious ship able to support insertion of USMC forces through integration of unique and emerging expeditionary aviation capabilities such as the F-35B, CH-53K and the MV-22 more effectively than any current USN amphibious ship afloat today. The C2 will be better as well which make it a key element for supporting a MAGTF afloat.
And the potential interaction with the dynamic process of partnering going on in the region is significant as well.
During my discussions with the Australian Wedgetail squadron, we discussed the impact of the Wedgetail on their new LHD class and the potential impact which working with the USS America might have as well.
Another participant (in the roundtable with the Wedgetail squadron) noted that “because of the growth potential of the system in response to operational realities, we do not need to waste resources on redesigning the system prior to new capabilities showing up. We are a network management system so a key driver of the evolution will clearly be other assets emerging and then our working out with the new system our next code rewrite.”
A case in point is the coming of Aegis to the destroyer fleet and the new amphibious ships as well with their C2 systems.
And a coalition opportunity could well be the coming of the USS America, a new type of large deck amphib, to the Pacific later this year, which could provide an opportunity for cross learning as well.
With a significant shortfall in amphibious ships, the Marines have demonstrated a capacity to innovate as well.
Training and partnerships matter when engaging in a crisis such as the Typhoon crisis relief effort. This Osprey was part of a training exercise in the Philippines earlier this year. The Osprey prepares for take off for night low-altitude training Jan. 24 on Antonio Bautista Air Base in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Republic of the Philippines. Ospreys conducted day and night low-altitude training Jan. 23-24 2013 in the Republic of the Philippines, marking the Marine Corps’ first Osprey training in the Republic of the Philippines and the first low-altitude training the pilots and crew have conducted since the aircraft’s Oct. 2012 arrival to Okinawa. The Osprey is with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 265, Marine Aircraft Group 36, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, III Marine Expeditionary Force. Credit: 1st MAW.
One example is folding in the Joint High Speed Vessel into their need for movement of assets. As one participant in the MARFORPAC discussions put it: “It is clearly not an amphibious asset and can work in only some sea states. But given those facts, it can be very helpful in supporting assets as we move from our prime locations to exercise in some partner nations, and in supporting training over distance in Hawaii and Guam.”
Another example is how the Marines have leveraged the very capable Military Sealift Command ship the T-AKE. We have highlighted the capabilities of the T-AKE in several pieces on the website, but the Marines have recently demonstrated new ways to use the ship.
In an article in the Marine Corps Gazette, 2dLt Michael Wisotzky described how the Marines worked with the MSC and used the T-AKE as their seabase to support an exercise with a partner nation.
Every day for a week, my team was inserted into various locations by the ship’s organic helicopter detachment.
At the end of the day, the ship’s helicopters picked us up and returned us to the ship for overnight accommodations.
The next day we were off again. My team was fortunate enough to cross train with all of the participating nations, specifically, Brunei, Singapore and China.
Despite innovations, there are clear shortfalls as well, which need to be met however, and one of them is with regard to the KC-130Js.
These tanker-lift assets are in growing demand. The pairing with the Ospreys makes them an ideal presence, engagement and force insertion package. The emergence of a national demand for Special Purpose MAGTFs, which are built around this pairing, is another demand driver.
Marines and Sailors Battalion Landing Team 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit along with soldiers with 1st Company, 51st Infantry Regiment, 15th Brigade, Japanese Ground Self Defense Force dismount from combat rubber raiding craft during a boat raid here, September 22. The JGSDF are integrated into BLT 2/1 during the MEU’s Fall Patrol deployment, where they conduct bilateral exercises to help strengthen military ties between Japan and the US. The 31st MEU is the only continuously forward-deployed MEU and is the Marine Corps’ force in readiness in the Asia-Pacific region.
And the support for a widening circle of partner engagements is yet another. And the USAF with its own focus on supporting a dispersed force of USAF fighters is placing increasing reliance on using its C-17s in this key role as well. Which means that C-17s are not in surplus to meet USMC lift needs.
Another key aspect of the DL is shaping new capabilities for training. Training ranges are in short supply in the Pacific. The USMC is looking to modernize and expand their possibilities for training in Hawaii, Guam and the Marianas. Part of the need is driven by the longer-range operations facilitated by the Osprey and the coming of the F-35B. Changing con-ops to fit the 21st century is to support this century’s Marine Corps not the last.
And the evolving relationship with Australia offers possibilities as well.
Any critics of the USMC coming engagement in Australia have largely missed the point of the benefit to Australian forces of working with the USMC.This benefit can be seen on two levels.
First, the Guam and Marianas Joint Training facilities offer unique opportunities for the training of Aussie forces in the period ahead, and for the Marines training in Australia as well.
Second is that USMC-USN modernization hits a sweet spot with Aussie modernization in several spots, including F-35s, LHDs, Aegis, digital integration and interoperability, etc.
A measure of hitting the sweet spot is that two senior USMC operators participated in a seminar on the 5th generation opportunity at a leading Australian defense foundation.
In and of itself, this event is a recognition of the opportunities inherent in the cross fertilization from USMC and Aussie defense innovations.
In short, the distributed laydown over the decade ahead is a foundational element in shaping a more effective deterrence in depth approach.
And one, which is inextricably intertwined in reshaping with US allies an effective Pacific, defense approach for the 21st century.
For additional articles on the subject of the USMC shift, exercises in the region, Aussie modernization and cross-cutting modernizations see the following:
Editor’s Note: The information and inputs from the MARFORPAC staff and Lt. General Robling provided a significant update on the section on the USMC strategy in the Pacific to be found in our latest article published in Joint Forces Quarterly:
“Forging a 21st Century Military Strategy: Leveraging Challenges”
2014-04-08 The impact of the speed and range of the Osprey is driving an opportunity to add speed and effectiveness for situational decision makers in the ground combat element flying aboard the Osprey as well.
As Col. Mike Orr, the CO of VMX-22, explained in an earlier interview:
It is not just about adding new platforms and doing older tasks better.
It is about rethinking how we do operations in 21st century conditions.
We are working on the creation of aviation enabled networks provided by a group of platforms able to perform a wide range of missions and to be provide the situational awareness to allow the MAGTF to function more effectively and efficiently into the 21st century.
The approach is to work the relationships among the new aviation platforms to deliver capabilities to the MAGTF to, as Orr put it, “build the operations space for the commander.”
A key driver for change has clearly been the Osprey, which has forced the USMC to think beyond the horizon of classic helicopter operations. Helos are slower moving, not capable of great range of operations and require an infrastructure of support on the ground to execute many of their missions.
With the Osprey’s greater range and speed and ability to be refueled in flight, the ground combat element can operate over much greater distances.
160 Marines and Sailors from the Special Force Marine Air Ground Task Force Crisis Response could be flown by 2 KC-130s Hercules and 4 MV-22B Ospreys from Spain where they are temporarily based to Djibouti and then Uganda.
With 3,400 nautical miles (a distance equivalent from Anchorage to Miami), this was the longest range insert ever performed by this force thanks to its self-deployable capability.
Students from the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va., completed a “Proof-of-Concept” 1,100 mile, long-range operation from Twentynine Palms, Calif., to Fort Hood, Texas, via MV-22 Ospreys, on Dec. 15, 2013. The Marines fast-roped into a mock city to secure the embassy and rescue key U.S. personnel. Credit: USMC, 1/2/14
Thinking outside of the helo defined operational box is a key game changer in thinking about the future of the MAGTF.
During the earlier interview, Orr discussed the recent experiments in C2 support for a long-range raid, in UAV developments, and shaping a new working relationship between electronic warfare and cyber approaches.
The long-range raid in December 2013, the Marines worked on mission planning on the fly.
Although the Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft, its heart and sole is in supporting the Ground Combat Element (GCE) differently than any airborne capability seen before.
The Marines work the relationship between the GCE and the Air Combat Element (ACE) to shape a capability, which is expeditionary, flexible, and with the Osprey more rapid with greater range for force insertion than before.
But to get to the next phase requires further innovation, this time in terms of how the MAGTF (GCE and ACE) can better use the new emerging capabilities, specifically C3I and fires, to execute its mission more effectively.
The Osprey and KC130J pairing provides an ability to operate at distance and to rethink various missions such as force insertion, extraction of embassy personnel, TRAP and others, to include limited objective MAGTF strike operations.
By not being a relatively slow-moving helicopter that typically requires forward operating bases to conduct long-range operations, the Osprey allows the USMC (and the USAF) to think about how to use the speed and range of the Osprey when paired with organic tanking capabilities to operate fundamentally different from past approaches.
Over the past year, during three separate, long-range, Marine Air-Ground exercises, the Marine Infantry Officer Course (IOC) has worked closely with multiple aviation units to attack this required culture change.
During these experiments, the combined air-ground team has sought different approaches to achieve more effective outcomes, and have used these exercises as means to shape future technological adaptations.
A recent example of this approach was seen in a long-range Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) that IOC, serving as a simulated Company Landing Team(CLT), executed into a semi-permissive environment from 29Palms to Fort Hood Texas.
The exercise was called TALON REACH and was the culminating event for IOC Class 1-14. This event was conducted under one period of darkness between 29 Palms California and Ft Hood Texas.
According to Orr, VMX-22 provided two Ospreys, which provided the airborne C2 network to enable a new approach to planning aboard the aircraft for the GCE.
He emphasized: “we currently have C2 links to support the MAGTF at the Combined Operations Center. What we’re doing with new technologies is to push C2 to the lowest appropriate tactical level to enable the CLT commanders to be able to have the situational awareness and intelligence to make better and more effective combat decisions.”
During the exercise, the Harriers provided through their FLIR systems the video, which flowed into the back of the Ospreys and appeared on the tablets used by the assault force commanders.
“We can use either manned or unmanned systems for this role, but the core point is flowing the information to the embarked commander.”
In effect, a key aspect of the change with the new technologies, which will be accelerated with the arrival of the F-35B, is the key role of situational decision making at the appropriate level and not just situational awareness sent BACK to a central command.
It is about empowering new concepts of distributed operations based on new approaches to connectivity.
2014-04-07 Clearly, Putin made his move in Crimea due to circumstances in Ukraine as a whole. The upheaval in Ukraine provided an opportunity to ensure that the Russian base in Ukraine could be secured within Russian national territory.
And with a play in Cyprus and Syria consolidating their position in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea port can be a springboard to broader influence and capabilities in the region.
And naval modernization is a key part of the Russian upgrade for their military. Last year, the Russians announced their intention to modernize the fleet, but the Ukraine was hovering over its legal right to veto or attenuate the modernization.
According to a Novosti piece published on February 23, 2013:
Russia has announced plans to rearm its Black Sea Fleet and has asked Ukraine to settle the issues regarding the planned deliveries of new weapons to the naval force, Ukraine’s defense minister said on Saturday.
“Russia’s desire is understandable – technology is moving ahead, and the desire to rearm its fleet is fair. That is why it is necessary to solve all the issues at the legislative level, taking the interests of Ukraine as a non-aligned country into account,” Pavlo Lebedev was quoted by the ministry’s press service as saying.
However, Lebedev said customs formalities are not within his ministry’s jurisdiction and therefore the documents concerning the planned arms deliveries will be sent to the Tax and Income Ministry and the Finance Ministry.
The bulk of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is stationed at the port of Sevastopol in Crimea under a lease agreement with Ukraine. Moscow and Kiev signed the so-called Kharkiv Agreements on April 21, 2010, extending the fleet’s lease on the base for another 25 years after the current lease expires in 2017.
The sides have yet to agree on the fleet rearmament, taxable supply and the usage of Sevastopol’s docks.
Now there are not two sides; but it is up to Russia with regard to modernization of their own fleet in their own port on their own territory.
Afghan Withdrawal Routes. Credit: Russia Direct
This is an important launch point into the Mediterranean and as such modernization of the fleet will be part of the dynamics of change in the region.
Another consideration is the possible counter-reaction of the Russians to Western sanctions.
As Alexey Feneko commented in a recent Russia Directpiece, the Russians clearly have options to respond, and to do so with an impact.
None more so than directly impacting on the US Administration’s planned exit strategy from Afghanistan. With the Afghan government in the throes of pressuring the US out, the challenge will be get the vast amount of military equipment OUT of Afghanistan.
If the Russians wish to put the hammer down, this could become more difficult, more costly, and has the potential to see a stockpile of US war materiel to remain behind in Afghanistan.
According to Feneko:
The first victim of serious Russian sanctions will be the transit of NATO supplies to Afghanistan — not only by land, but by air, too.
The Russian route is extremely important for the alliance as an alternative to the vulnerable Pakistani corridor.
The northern transit route is becoming increasingly critical ahead of the forthcoming withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan this year.
Russia may denounce the 2008-09 agreements with NATO, closing off its air and land space to Brussels.
In addition, Moscow may begin to exert stronger influence over the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which, in addition to Russia, includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus, encouraging them to reduce cooperation with NATO on Afghanistan.
The problem facing the US is well laid out in the map which was included in the article as well.
This is not the Cold War, but clearly part of a 21st century process of redefining the global power balance.
At the Williams Foundation seminar entitle Air Combat Operations: 2025 and Beyond, Air Marshall Geoff Brown, the Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Air Force provided a sober and challenging perspective on the way ahead. He warned that preparing for future threats and challenges was always challenging and certainly applied to the decade ahead.
Although proud of the efforts being made on behalf of investments in the re-set of the RAAF, he underscored throughout that the challenge of shaping effective concepts of operations and training, training, and training were crucial to any success in real operations.
He noted at the outset, that the struggle to develop bombers in the 1930s was a difficult one, but that when the new bombers were actually used in World War II, they were not used as envisaged when they were built.
I would like to inject a word of caution here at the beginning of this seminar. The caution comes from the eminent RAF historian of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany in World War II, Sir Noble Franklin. In a conference at the USAF Academy in 1968 he reviewed the development of the four engine bomber force – the standout examples being the American B-17 and the British Lancaster.
He noted that only the Americans and the British had persisted through the 1930s with the effort of thinking about and developing these aircraft along with their bombing doctrines over the long capability development process. He noted that the way these platforms were eventually employed, bore little resemblance to the concepts created during the development process. He said;
If there is a moral in all this, it is surely that strategic thought and strategic planning in peacetime are necessary and productive processes, provided the realization is ever present that peacetime plans especially for the employment of new weapons will not, in war, work out in accordance with expectation.
(For our look at the 1930s analogy see our Special Report on the B-17:
The Air Marshal then turned in his remarks to the question of the coming of the F-35 and what it meant for the RAAF.
Why is Australia acquiring the F-35?
With so much capability inherent in generation 4.5 fighters, it has been often asked why do we need 5th generation?
The answer to this is simple: we need to ensure we conduct tomorrow’s air combat operations with tomorrow’s capabilities.
Historical examples highlight loud and clear that today’s technology won’t be suitable in 2025, and certainly not in 2035.
In his presentation to The Williams Foundation seminar on air combat in 2025 and beyond, the Chief of Staff or the RAAF focused on the F-35. He highlighted the centrality of the decision superiority inherent in the systems of the aircraft. But underscored that training and effective concepts of operations were necessary to achieve a latent advantage.Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
And his discussion of the F-35 focused on a key element which will become evident as the F-35s in the Pacific becomes a fleet of enablers for deterrence in the depth: decision making superiority.
To achieve decision superiority in 2025 and beyond, Air Combat Operators will need to be able to see who and what is in the area of operations, with very few limits to arcs of coverage.
The fusing of multi-spectral sensors and electronic support must enable targets to be detected without the knowledge they are being tracked.
The cueing of capabilities must not be limited to on-board sensors; they must be available from multiple off-platform sources.
The networking capabilities of these future air combat assets must be a force multiplier.
They must be able to feed, and be fed from, multiple sources.
The end result is that the pilot must be able to focus solely on the fight, not allocating time and effort to managing data that supports the fight.
As the F-35 systems become realities, concepts of operations will change significantly and here the Air Marshall sounded a bit like Admiral Halsey who focused constantly on the importance of what he called, “training, training, and training.”
New capabilities breed new methods, and how a 5th generation fighter undertakes these missions in 2025 and beyond are unlikely to resemble yesterday’s air combat operations. In future, as it is now, the ability to integrate all the fundamental inputs to capability will still be what determines relative combat effectiveness.
The ability to fly an aircraft does not mean you have the ability to fight the aircraft.
This is never more so than in 5th generation fighters.
This is where training will be so important to our success in future air combat operations.
(On the centrality of training for the decade ahead see the following:
He underscored that a shift from 4th to 5th generation fighters was not simply a transition in technologies but a “generational shift for everybody involved.” And clearly a key reason to acquire the F-35 is to get on the right side of generational change.
History tells us some things with relative certainty about air combat operations in 2025 and beyond.
Importantly, it tells us that technologies will have evolved markedly by 2025, making it essential to acquire capabilities with future growth. 5th generation capabilities, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, offer a quantum leap in air power capabilities over their compatriots,
The missions they will undertake may not be new, but the capabilities 5th generations fighters bring will vastly change the character and effectiveness of how the missions are undertaken.
The complete presentation of the Air Marshal can be found on The Williams Foundation website at the following location:
2014-04-11 In our new special report, Second Line of Defense looks at Australian defense modernization, notably in the air systems areas.
The report is informed by a number of interviews conducted in Australia in March 2014. It is informed as well by interviews with USN, USMC, and USAF staff and commanders.
The report highlights the importance of cross cutting modernizations among allies in the region, which can be crafted into a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional deterrence in depth strategy for the US, and its allies.
After taking an overview on Australian developments (with a look at Japan as well), the report examines the following four topics: the key building blocks of Australian defense modernization; the impact of the coming of the F-35 on that modernization; the evolution of Australian defense industry associated with the modernization process; and finally the perspectives of MARFORPAC and PACAF on those modernizations and the challenge and opportunities inherent in cross-cutting modernization.
We conclude by highlighting the central significance of joint and coalition training for shaping an effective Pacific defense capability and strategy.
Covering a territory which covers so much of the earth’s surface and with thousands of islands present a tapestry of operational complexity. This is no place for amateurs.
As Admiral Nimitz confronted the last century’s challenges he concluded a core lesson for this century’s Pacific warriors: “Having confronted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s skill, energy, persistence, and courage, Nimitz identified the key to victory: ‘training, TRAINING and M-O-R-E T-R-A-I-N-I-N-G.”
The US and its core allies are shaping new capabilities to deal with the various threats and challenges in the Pacific in the time of the Asian century. Flexibility in operations and agility in inserting force with a proper calibration of effect will be enhanced as new systems come on line in the years ahead but joint and coalition training become more essential as new approaches and capabilities are forged.
To obtain a copy of the Special Report free of charge please go to the following link:
In this special report, Second Line of Defense looks at Australian defense modernization, notably in the air systems areas. The report is informed by a number of interviews conducted in Australia in March 2014. It is informed as well by interviews with USN, USMC, and USAF staff and commanders.
The report highlights the importance of cross cutting modernizations among allies in the region, which can be crafted into a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional deterrence in depth strategy for the US, and its allies.
After taking an overview on Australian developments (with a look at Japan as well), the report examines the following four topics: the key building blocks of Australian defense modernization; the impact of the coming of the F-35 on that modernization; the evolution of Australian defense industry associated with the modernization process; and finally the perspectives of MARFORPAC and PACAF on those modernizations and the challenge and opportunities inherent in cross-cutting modernization.
We conclude by highlighting the central significance of joint and coalition training for shaping an effective Pacific defense capability and strategy.
Covering a territory which covers so much of the earth’s surface and with thousands of islands present a tapestry of operational complexity. This is no place for amateurs.
As Admiral Nimitz confronted the last century’s challenges he concluded a core lesson for this century’s Pacific warriors: “Having confronted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s skill, energy, persistence, and courage, Nimitz identified the key to victory: ‘training, TRAINING and M-O-R-E T-R-A-I-N-I-N-G.”
The US and its core allies are shaping new capabilities to deal with the various threats and challenges in the Pacific in the time of the Asian century. Flexibility in operations and agility in inserting force with a proper calibration of effect will be enhanced as new systems come on line in the years ahead but joint and coalition training become more essential as new approaches and capabilities are forged.
