The Coming European Elections and European Defence

06/03/2024

By  Pierre Tran

Paris – France and Europe could boost their autonomy by increasing cooperation in the defense technology and industrial base rather than rely on the U.S. military umbrella, with the latter seen as increasingly uncertain, a French parliamentary report said.

The authors, parliamentarians Jean-Charles Larsonneur and Jean-Louis Thiériot, presented their detailed 120-page report, The Defense Industry – Provider of Strategic Autonomy in Europe?” to the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly May 15.

The report closes with no fewer than five pages of policy recommendations, seeking to stimulate public and political debate ahead of the June 9 election for Members of the European Parliament, the elected arm of the European Union (E.U.).

The French parliamentary report was presented as Russian troops seized ground in the Kharkiv region, northern Ukraine, and U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken arrived in Kyiv May 14, seeking to show support for Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy.

The shipment of American-built weapons to Kyiv also resumed that week, after a long awaited congressional approval of a package of arms and ammunition worth $61 billion.

In the first part of the report, the authors reflect on the weight of domestic and international politics on European arms procurement, namely the days of the peace dividend are over. That part includes an established picture of the duplication of arms programs in Europe.

The second part sets out the case on how to spend it – effectively calling for a Buy European Act – rather than simply calling for an increase in military budgets.

“The future of our collective security, the defense of the ‘free world,’ will depend in large part on our capacity to strengthen our defense industry,” the report said.

The report pitched “an action plan to increase the contribution of the defense industry to the strategic autonomy in Europe,” the rapporteurs said. “These proposals have just one aim: that France and Europe remain actors in History and do not become trembling witnesses.

“As long as the European nations supply themselves mainly with equipment from the United States, the European armed forces will remain under the operational tutelage of the United States,” the report said.

Belgium and France Cooperate

Industrial partnership was advancing, the French armed forces ministry said May 21, with Belgium extending its procurement of French weapons to the Serval light armored troop carrier, and Caesar artillery.

That procurement of Serval and Caesar was the second phase of the Belgian Capacité Mobilité (CaMo) land arms program, with the first phase consisting of orders for the Griffon VBMR heavy armored troop carrier and Jaguar combat and reconnaissance vehicle. Those latter two vehicles are part of the French army’s Scorpion program.

John Cockerill Defense, a Belgian company held by a French national, was acquiring Arquus and had given significant commitments on its activities and sites in France, the ministry said.

Volvo, a Swedish truck company, is in exclusive talks on the sale of Arquus, its French unit, with Cockerill. Arquus builds light and medium armored vehicles.

“The merger deal is moving ahead well, and significant commitments have been given on employment,” the ministry said. The two nations will have a high level of supervision after the merger.

A Belgian vehicle assembly line for the CaMo project opened in April.

KNDS, a Franco-German joint venture, would inaugurate next week in Belgium the production line for 155mm artillery shells, the ministry said.

The announcements were made following a meeting, here, between French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, and his Belgian counterpart, Ludivine Dedonder.

FN Herstal, a Belgian company which builds vehicle armed turrets, is seen as a potential partner in the industrial consolidation led by Cockerill.

Cornerstone of U.S. Arms Sales

The parliamentary rapporteurs referred to a point made by Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, a think tank, that 63 percent of E.U. military spending went on U.S. arms.

Those orders for American weapons, notably the F-35 fighter, were the price Europe had to pay for protection under the U.S. umbrella.

“Massive procurement from the United States reflects the attachment of European nations to the maintenance of the American security guarantee, which is the cornerstone of their defence policy,” the report said.

South Korea and Turkey were also significant “third party nations” selling into a fragmented European market for land weapons, adding pressure to consolidate that sector, the report said.

Meanwhile, European defense was seen as “a guarantee of second rank and incomplete.”

For France, the report offered policy guidance to rely less on industrial cooperation with Germany, and seek closer ties with other European nations, notably Poland and Sweden.

The perceived importance of European sovereignty and industrial policy could be seen in remarks by the chief executive of MBDA, Eric Béranger, who pointed up a swift delivery of British-built cruise missiles to arm Ukrainian fighter jets against Russian forces.

“We were able to integrate Storm Shadows on fighters of the Ukrainian air force in a few weeks, and not in several years, because we were the ‘design authorities’ and we did not need to ask for authorization from a third party which could have refused or just made us wait,” he told the rapporteurs.

Foreign sale of the French version of that missile has been a sensitive issue, as deliveries of the Scalp to Egypt and other export clients were previously held up, with the U.S. withholding authorization to ship American components under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Those missiles were eventually shipped.

The chair of the parliamentary committee, Thomas Gassilloud, welcomed the “particularly dense” report, which he noted had been distributed the day before, giving members of parliament time to read and consider the contents before its formal presentation.

Election Time

A campaign leaflet for François-Xavier Bellamy, a candidate of Les Republicans, a conservative party, for the European parliament elections, includes a call for strengthening the defense industry in Europe, to give the services “the means to defend France.”

That center-right candidate is backed by a retired four star general, Christophe Gomart, a former special forces commander and former head of the Direction du Renseignement Militaire (DRM), the military intelligence agency.

The French parliamentary report was presented as Russian troops seized ground in the Kharkiv region, northern Ukraine, and U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken arrived in Kyiv May 14, seeking to show support. The shipment of American-built weapons also resumed that week, after the congressional approval of a $61 billion package of arms and ammunition.

There will also be a U.S. presidential election Nov. 5, with contenders Joe Biden and Donald Trump seeking votes to return to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

The prospect of election of Donald Trump was seen as significant for European allies – “a moment of truth,” the French report said.

“Either it will be an electric shock leading to a European collective awareness to strengthen our strategic autonomy,” an interlocutor told the rapporteurs, “or it leads to yet more procurement of American military equipment to hold on to the American umbrella as part of a favored bilateral tie.”

Cooperation As Tool – And Hindrance

European cooperation was a necessity, in view of the high cost of arms programs, said François Lureau, a consultant and former procurement chief. The Rafale will be the last national fighter program for France, which lacks the means to build a successor on its own.

“It is important to have the tools for cooperation,” he said. The tools would effectively be the organization setting policy aims and managing cross-border cooperative programs.

The European Defense Agency (EDA) looked like the most fitting organization to pursue greater European production of arms as an alternative to dependence on the U.S. and other third party nations, he said.

It was important to have the political weight of the European Council, a policy setting institution, and senior military officers and procurement officials to sit on the cooperative organization, he said.

There was certainly no need to set up more organizations, or to assign the task of program management to the European Commission, he said.

The parliamentary report called for closer ties between Britain and the E.U. in industrial cooperation, and a U.K. membership of the EDA would help that.

Lureau supported that idea, pointing out that non-E.U. members Switzerland and Norway were attached to the EDA, that the best approach was “ad hoc and pragmatic,” and that membership would require London to pay its contribution and not expect to direct the agency.

Competition was essential within the cooperative approach, he said, as the French nuclear deterrence was the only program too sensitive to be opened up for open tender.

There was cooperation at MBDA between Britain and France with their centers of excellence, he said, but there was room for closer work at the European company, which pursued mainly national programs.

The national arms authorities needed to adopt a closer cooperative approach to raise MBDA above 50 percent of collaborative output, he said, but the procurement offices in London and Paris lacked that appetite for common programs.

There was the risk of cooperation being used to promote interests of national companies, relegating the importance of capabilities to a lower rung, said Hélène Masson, senior research fellow at Fondation de Recherche Stratégique, a think tank, the parliamentary report said.

The number of times parts for the Aster crossed the Alps showed the “geographical return” tied to work shared between the French and Italian units of MBDA, business daily La Tribune reported, the rapporteurs said. This form of cooperation partly explained the 42 months needed to build and deliver the surface-to-air missile in 2022, the report said.

Exports To Middle East Seen As Risky

The perceived importance of pursuing Europe as the home market for the defense industrial base could be seen with the weight of sales to the Middle East, notably export deals sealed for the Rafale fighter.

Sale of the Rafale accounted for almost 78 percent of French arms exports in 2022, the report said, and “non-European nations” made 178 orders of the fighter out of the 193 in the period 2019-2023. The latter nations included Egypt, India, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

The UAE order alone accounted for 80 Rafale, the largest foreign deal for the fighter. Yet Abu Dhabi was strengthening ties to China, the report said, such that Washington was concerned.

Those deals amounted to a “dependence on grand export,” the report said, and reflected few sales within Europe, which meant a lack of support for strategic autonomy on the continent.

Middle East nations were moving toward a more “transactional” approach with France in their export deals, the report said, and would not hesitate to switch to new nations such as South Korea, or “strategic competitors,” such as China.

“In this context, it is important to further develop our exports to European nations, all the more so at a time of increased defense spending in Europe,” the report said, citing an official of the directorate general for international and strategic relations (DGRIS), a branch of the armed forces ministry.

The Middle East and India accounted for 65 percent of French arms orders in 2022, and compared to 78 percent in 2015, the report said.

French arms exports into Europe have grown since 2017, the report said, accounting for an average 31 percent of foreign deals between 2018-2022, spiking up to 45 percent in 2019. That compared to an average 7.6 percent between 2013-2017.

Credit Graphic:Photo 38938469 | European Elections © Vepar5 | Dreamstime.com

Wasp Amphibious Ready Group-24th Marine Expeditionary Unit Trains in U.S. 2nd Fleet’s Area of Operation: April 2024

05/29/2024

ATLANTIC OCEAN

April 7, 2024.

Wasp is training and operating in U.S. 2nd Fleet’s area of operation and is the flag ship of the Wasp Amphibious Ready Group-24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Naval integration provides combatant commanders and America’s civilian leaders highly-capable forces.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eric A. Moser)

New Korean Challenges Await Next U.S. Administration

05/28/2024

By Richard Weitz

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs will present major challenges to whoever is elected president this year. Even President Trump would find it difficult to resume his high-level diplomacy with Pyongyang.

Not only has the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) made substantial progress in developing and testing a diverse and growing portfolio of ballistic and cruise missiles, but the international sanctions regime laboriously erected to constrain this threat is disintegrating.

Most recently, Russia, with Beijing’s support, killed the Panel of Experts (PoE) responsible for monitoring UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea.

After North Korea conducted a second nuclear weapons test in May 2009, the UN Security Council (UNSC) enacted Resolution 1874, which established the PoE pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006).

The UNSC members subsequently renewed the panel more than a dozen times, while adopting a comparable number of resolutions condemning and sanctioning North Korea’s missile and nuclear activities.

Twice a year, the panel submitted reports to the UN 1718 Committee on the effectiveness of the sanctions.

At the symbolic level, the PoE represented a public consensus among the great powers that North Korea should not acquire nuclear-armed missiles.

At the operational level, the panel’s regular reports, submitted to the UN committee but accessible to the public, provided insights regarding the effectiveness of measures to constrain the North’s illegal missile and nuclear programs.

Though the PoE lacked enforcement powers, its reports contributed to UNSC compliance actions regarding North Korea.

The panel’s activities made it harder for the DPRK and its potential partners to pursue sanctionable transactions through fear of exposure.

By publicizing recommendations and sharing good practices, moreover, the PoE helped government bodies, private actors, and other entities comply with the sanctions.

However, on March 28, Moscow vetoed the body’s extension.

Russia’s UN Ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya termed the UN sanctions cruel, counterproductive, and unending. He castigated the panel as allegedly biased toward Western views.

The Ambassador said Moscow would propose to restructure the sanctions with mandatory sunset provisions to give Pyongyang a greater incentive to cooperate.

Moscow’s move was not a surprise. In recent years, Russia’s enforcement of sanctions on DPRK activities has waned further.

Russia’s UN delegation has also declined to adopt new or revised sanctions and pushed to curtail the panel’s budget and activities.

Through its veto, Russia pleased the North Korean regime and helped obscure growing Russian-DPRK military cooperation, which has included the North’s transfer of artillery shells, missiles, and other ammunition to the Russian military. UNSC sanctions, enacted earlier with Russian support, ban DPRK weapons sales.

The panel’s last report, released on March 7, provided evidence that Russia had also provided considerably more oil to North Korea than allowed by UNSC Resolution 2397.

Furthermore, there is evidence that Russian as well as Chinese banks are supporting DRPK high-tech purchases, laundering of stolen funds, and other transactions prohibited by Security Council resolutions.

This circumvention has become increasingly serious as the scope of DPRK cyber theft, now focused on cryptocurrency, and covert ship-to-ship transfers have grown to yield Pyongyang billions of dollars annually.

Despite Western concessions designed to appeal to Beijing, the PRC delegate abstained on the UNSC vote to renew the panel. China also backed Russian demands to require regular renewal of the UNSC sanctions on North Korea.

Hwang Joon-kook, the South Korean ambassador to the United Nations, termed Moscow’s killing of the PoE as “almost comparable to destroying a [surveillance camera] to avoid being caught red-handed.”

Though the UN sanctions remain, Moscow and Beijing will likely continue to refuse to update or fully comply with them. Great power rivalries have neutered the UN Security Council’s enforcement capabilities on this and other questions.

Western governments and NGOs should continue to generate open-source information about North Korea’s missile and nuclear-related activities, including sanctions circumvention, to share with the Security Council and other recipients.

The United States can also tighten sanctions compliance with its closest allies, especially with South Korea. G7 members, and other partners confronting DPRK cyber espionage and other sanctions-busting operations.

This month, the United States, Japan and South Korea expanded sanctions on Russian and DPRK entities facilitating Russian-DPRK military cooperation. The upcoming G7 and NATO meetings should take similar actions.

Credit Graphic: Photo 91178429 | North Korea © Maticsandra | Dreamstime.com

Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO) during Exercise Nordic Response 24

05/27/2024

Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO) during Exercise Nordic Response 24 at Oulu, Finland, March 8, 2024. Exercise Nordic Response is an opportunity for the 2nd MAW to refine the DAO warfighting concept, which focuses on generating aviation combat power through the dispersion of aviation squadrons, command-and-control agencies, aviation logistics, and aviation ground-support units across the battlefield while integrating with allies and partners.

Exercise Nordic Response 24 is designed to enhance military capabilities and allied cooperation in high-intensity warfighting scenarios under challenging arctic conditions, while providing U.S. Marines unique opportunities to train alongside NATO allies and partners.

Credit Photos: 2nd MAW

 

2nd MAWT at Arctic Response 24

05/24/2024

U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Scott F. Benedict commanding general of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing and 2nd MAW and allied participants during Exercise Nordic Response 24 in Alta, Norway, March 6, 2024.

Exercise Nordic Response 24 is designed to enhance military capabilities and allied cooperation in high-intensity warfighting scenarios under challenging arctic conditions, while providing U.S. Marines unique opportunities to train alongside NATO allies and partners.

Credit: 2nd MAW

 

MajGen Benedict on His Time as CG of 2nd Marine Air Wing

05/22/2024

By Robbin Laird

On May 14, 2024, I visited 2nd Marine Air Wing to have the opportunity to speak with the Commanding General of the Wing, MajGen Scott Benedict. This was two days before the change of command and his subsequent retirement after a distinguished career in the Marine Corps (bio at the end of the article).

I had last visited 2nd MAW when LtGen Michael Cederholm was 2nd MAW commander and who is now the I MEF Commander.

At that time, I focused on what I saw as an historic opportunity for the fleet in Norfolk and the Marines in North Carolina to work through the process of Nordic integration to create a whole new defense capacity, never seen before in my lifetime.

I had written this at the time after the last visit in 2021:

The North Carolina-based Marines have equipment pre-positioned in Norway and exercise frequently with the Norwegians. And through the Cold War and beyond, those Marines have had the mission to show up to reinforce Norway in a crisis.

But in an era where there is a stated desire to have greater Marine Corps integration with the Navy how might this change?

And in what ways?

The answer in part needs to be generated by the geography, the missions and the allies.

The geography sees the growing role of the High North, and the question of using land space for operations rests on what particular allies will value and permit in a pre-crisis situation up to a full-blown crisis situation.

If one looks at the geography, it is clear the impact which enhanced Nordic integratability can have on rethinking what the Marines might do to reinforce the air-sea battle, which is really where the U.S. Navy is going in its reset to be able to fight and prevail in the 4th Battle of the Atlantic.

Given the priority concern which the Navy has with regard to Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula, those allies best positioned to reinforce U.S. and allied efforts are crucial to the warfighting and deterrence effort.

This means that Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark (Faroe Islands and Greenland), Norway, Sweden and Finland are the anchors for effective deterrence in the region and can clearly shape the outcome with regard to any Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.

What can the Marines bring from North Carolina which would make the most SIGNIFICANT impact?

MajGen Benedict and the 2nd MAW have been deeply involved over the last two years building relationships in Scandinavia culminating in the recent Nordic Response Exercise which saw Sweden and Finland participating as full members of NATO. For the USMC, the entry of Sweden and Finland into the NATO alliance means a substantial change from the primary focus on bolstering Norway in a crisis to being able to work with all the Nordic forces in a crisis; a facet they demonstrated by exercising with all three countries during the event.

This means as well that the USMC can take its Marine Air Ground Task Force integrated capabilities and embed themselves within the network of Nordic defense and support the U.S. fleet as it operates in defense of the region.

In other words, it can operate from the land, within a significant defense belt provided by the Nordics, to support the fleet. The air capabilities of the USMC – Ospreys, F-35s, F-18s, and CH-53Ks – can operate from the land to support the fleet or to operate from the fleet to  support of land-air operations. This capability to do either is truly unique and what the USMC brings to the fight – a significant force operating from the land to the sea and from the sea to the land.

The extensive training and integration with all the Nordic countries is a very significant development and lessons learned by Marines in this key region in the defense of the North Atlantic can be applied to the Pacific as well.

MajGen Benedict provided a wide-ranging picture of Marine Corps activities in shaping this concept of operations and the key role of 2nd MAW working with 2nd and 6th Fleets in the region.

He started by underscoring how he looked at USMC-Naval integration.

“I went to a senior commanders’’ course in Naples where we focused on maritime combined arms operations. It struck me that both the Navy and Marines almost solely focus on Marine capabilities being employed from the sea, but not so much on how we can come from the land to support the naval  campaign.”

“The opportunity to work with the Nordics as they continue to enhance defense integration clearly allows us to demonstrate and take advantage of that opportunity and to shape innovative ways to do so. And we did that in the Nordic Response 2024 exercise as well. There is a lot we can achieve in littoral operations without solely operating from an amphibious ship.”

We then turned to his experience during the exercise working with the air chiefs of the Nordic forces. He underscored that as they were working their way ahead, the Marines and the American forces are working closely on shaping effective C2 across the coalition force to operate as integrated as possible.

One should note that 2nd MAW brought its first squadron of F-35s to the exercise and with the Norwegians already operating F-35s, with Denmark and Finland to follow along with F-35s from the UK coming off of their carrier, which they did in this exercise off of the Prince of Wales. The F-35s are very interoperable with one another and are very capable of operating at a higher level of integration. When one adds German and Polish F-35s to the force, the capability is a substantial one.

The Finns in particular are masters of distributed air operations on their soil and the Marines worked closely with them and will continue to do so. The progress in this domain since I last talked to pilots at 2nd MAW working with Finns is significant. When I spoke to pilots at 2nd MAW in an earlier visit in 2018, they indicated that the Finns were teaching them about DO. Now the Marines are clearly working hard on their own approach to DO and having an ally like Finland who has lived on the shadow of a big power for a long time makes them  a key partner in evolving DO for the F-35 as well.

We then discussed distributed air operations (DO) and how it differed from simply being a Forward Arming and Refueling Point or ‘FARP’. The difference is profound.

While a FARP remains the most visible manifestation of DO, it is the final action and does not by itself reflect significant choices and work necessary to create that capability to re-arm air assets at remote and ever changing locations – allowing the force to disaggregate for protection and then aggregate to mass combat capability, all in a rapid manner to maintain tempo.

As MajGen Benedict put it: “The difference is the backside. Where is the location? Why that location? How do we get the fuel there? How do we get ordinance there? How do we provide force protection? How do we maintain the aircraft and for how long? How long are we going to be there? When do we need to move? All of these things are what I call the backside of distributed operations.”

To deal with this challenge, 2nd MAW has added a functional area inside of its Tactical Air Command Center which is called a Distributed Operations Coordination Cell. According to Benedict: “Here we plan out and initiate coordination and execution of all the aviation ground support necessary to support an ATO in a distributed environment.”

But thinking about the Marines supporting the Navy from the Nordic land mass raises the question of how to craft their way ahead in integration and how to leverage their unique air assets. I have already spoken of the F-35, but obviously the Osprey and its speed and range and its ability to operate across the decks of the fleet – including Military Sealift Command ships – is a key enabler and connector when providing supplies and support from the Nordic region to the fleet. And as the Navy builds up their own Osprey force, this capability will be enhanced as well.

MajGen Benedict then talked about his Osprey experience. This began really when he was an SP-MAGTF commander in Spain. Here the Ospreys worked with KC-130Js and operated throughout the African operational space.

He commented on his subsequent deployment when they operated MV-22s within a MEU, saying “their capability to operate in a distributed manner within a theater is amazing. The ability of the MEU commander to move force from a disaggregated or distributed manner to get the right force in the right force at the right time is a crucial capability for the USMC and the combatant commander, and it is a unique and indispensable capability. Ospreys are the backbone of distributed assault support. There is no doubt about that. It enables us to realize operational maneuver from the sea and from the land to support the naval force.”

We then turned to the new kid on the block for 2nd MAW, namely the CH-53K.

MajGen Benedict underscored that as a Cobra pilot, he did not often go out of his way to praise other helos, but “I have flown the Kilo and it is an amazing helicopter. With its fly by wire capability and its ability to hover over a load, the stability of the helicopter, the reduced workload on the air crew, it is a game changer.”

He highlighted a couple of illustrations of his point. In the recent case where a Kilo lifted a damaged Navy helicopter out of a mountain crevice, the Kilo was required because of its ability to hold a hover for a long time allowing the ground crew to hook the damaged helo to the Kilo for the lift out of the ravine. The ability of the Kilo versus the Echo to hold its location for a relatively long period was crucial to the success of the mission.

The second aspect we discussed was another unique capability of the Kilo which provides a significant contribution to how the Marines are now operating. He noted that the external lift capability of the aircraft is incredible, and it is what many commentators note; however, he believes that the internal load out of the helicopter is really the key force multiplier.

Because the CH-53K can hold a standard USAF pallet internally, it can take cargo from larger transport aircraft such as the C-17 or the C-130 in a ‘tail to tail’ fashion where in the past those pallets would have had to have been broken down at the landing site into smaller loads.  As a result, to support Marines deployed to a remote location, a pallet with the materials they need is cross loaded to the Kilo at a safe location, then it can be transported long range (the aircraft is refuelable in flight) and then land and the pallet removed rapidly allowing the aircraft minimum time on the deck. This reduces significantly the signature of the operations for the Marines, which is a key objective for current USMC thinking about their operational needs.

In short, MajGen Benedict’s time at 2nd MAW has been an historically significant one as the Marines and the Navy work with Nordics as they shape a more integrated capability for North Atlantic defense.

Biography as of May 14, 2024

MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT F. BENEDICT

Major General Benedict is currently serving as the Commanding General of Second Marine Aircraft Wing, headquartered on Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina. He has served as a Marine Corps Officer and Naval Aviator for more than thirty years and has commanded at all levels as a Marine Aviator. His staff appointments have spanned the operational, planning, policy, diplomatic, and acquisition arenas.

All his field grade commands included operational deployments and force employment. From 2013- 2015 he commanded the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) during which time he led two overseas deployments: one while serving simultaneously as the Commanding Officer of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) during its first full rotation supporting the Africa and European Commands areas of responsibility; and the second with the MEU to the Africa, European, and Central Commands. From 2006 to 2008, Major General Benedict served as the Commanding Officer of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 367, including operations in Iraq.

Major General Benedict’s Joint assignments have included service as the Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy (J-5) at U. S. Central Command furthering Combatant Command operations and objectives in the Middle East; as the Director Politico-Military Affairs, Middle East, within the Joint Staff J-5, where he proposed strategies, plans, and policy recommendations on the Middle East to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff to support his provision of military advice to the Secretary of Defense and President; as the Special Assistant to the Assistant Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff where he traveled as part of the Secretary of State’s travel team; and as the Chief of Policy and Assessment Branch, Joint Staff J-5, Joint Operational War Plans Division.

Other senior staff assignments within the Marine Corps include service as the Director of Manpower Plans and Policy, where he was responsible for determining total manpower needs, and preparing plans, policies, programs, and instructions on manpower matters; as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation, where he provided support to assist and advise the Commandant of the Marine Corps on all matters relating to Marine Aviation; as Military Secretary to the Commandant of the Marine Corps where he served as the Director of the Commandant’s personal and extended staff group; as Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Acquisition, and Development, supporting the Department of the Navy’s Acquisition Executive; and as Head, Future Operations Group, Plans, Policies and Operations.

Early tours include Aviation Combat Element Operations Officer for 22d MEU; Squadron Logistics and Operations Officer for HMLA-167; and Operations Officer and Air Officer for 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion.

Major General Benedict has served overseas in support of several combat, contingency, and support operations. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Naval War College, the Marine Corps War College, and the MIT Seminar XXI fellowship program.

Note: Murielle Delaporte interviewed members of SP-MAGTF during her visit to Spain in 2013, and she quoted then Col Benedict with regard to the new force and its operation in Africa as follows:

According to the Commanding Officer of the SP-MAGTF-CR in December 2013, Col. Scott Benedict:

This force provides new capabilities where there has been a gap.

Historically, we would provide this kind of capability of a Marine expeditionary unit [MEU], i.e., the Marine forces that are on ships.

Where there have been some gaps in the coverage of these ships, the Marine Corps created this force and intends to create others like it in order to fill those gaps.

So in that sense, it is a new capability, but the skills that we bring as a SPMAGTF are the same types of skills that Marines have always brought to the fight.

In terms of comparing what we are doing now with what we have been doing in the past, my experience over the years has been that this is more the type of missions that Marines have done historically…..

However, what we have historically done is operate small units like this and provide very flexible and agile capabilities to respond to crisis.

We have done it for years off amphibious shipping, and now we do it with the extended range capability of the V-22 which allows us to provide some very similar capabilities over the vast areas that we are responsible for….

The Marines also are going back to some geographic roots as well, since they have had a long history in West Africa during the Cold War and in the ’90s and early 2000s.

Col Benedict added:

Well before the current ‘post 9/11,’ it has been episodic because we do exercises and theater security cooperation where we partner with nations, so we learn from them and they learn from us, keeping in mind that we might work together in the future for a common goal.

However, we have not based there.

We have been doing these operations for years, and it has paid dividends when we had to do ‘provide support’ for different countries on the continent.

 

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Scott F. Benedict, third from left, commanding general of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, speaks with NATO service members during Exercise Nordic Response 24 in Alta, Norway, March 6, 2024. Exercise Nordic Response 24 is designed to enhance military capabilities and allied cooperation in high-intensity warfighting scenarios under challenging arctic conditions, while providing U.S. Marines unique opportunities to train alongside NATO allies and partners. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Christian Salazar)

Assault Support Tactics 2

The photos are of Marine Corps operations in Assault Support Tactics 2 as part of Weapons and Tactics Instructor course 2-24, at Landing Zone Star, near Chocolate Mountains Aerial Gunnery Range, California, April 11, 2024.

WTI is an advanced graduate-level course that provides advanced tactical training to enhance and employ advanced aviation weapons and tactics.

AST-2 provides prospective WTIs the opportunity to plan, brief, and execute a daytime battalion-sized live-fire air assault mission to multiple objective areas while integrating combined arms and the six functions of Marine Aviation with an expeditionary advanced base operations scenario.

CHOCOLATE MOUNTAINS AERIAL GUNNERY RANGE, CA.

04.10.2024

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1  

A Look at Texelis: French Builder of Mobility Packages for Armored Vehicles

05/20/2024

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Texelis, a builder of mobility packages for armored vehicles, is working on an electric  motorized wheel as an alternative to conventional drivelines, chief executive Jean Vandel told the Association des Journalistes de Defense, a press club.

The company is developing and investing in new technology, including the “hybridization of mobility” for the Serval troop carrier, he told the AJD press club on April 24.

A hybrid vehicle consists of a diesel/electric system, while the present French army Serval troop carrier is powered by a conventional diesel engine and driveline.

The growth in sales and profit from supplying the conventional mobility packages for Serval allows Texelis to fund development of future hybrid diesel/electric systems for army vehicles.

A set of independent electric-powered wheels could deliver 20 to 30 times greater power and boost autonomy by 30 percent on a four-wheel-drive vehicle, Vandel, chief executive of the company’s defense division, said.

Texelis will display mock ups of its work on the electric wheel technology at the upcoming Eurosatory trade show, he said.

The technology concept relates to an “in-wheel electric hub drive,” the company spokesman said. Such an electric hub drive would change the architecture of vehicles, as a power source in each wheel would lead to a smaller diesel engine.

The company is working on maturing the concept, and expects to deliver a technology demonstrator in 2027-2028,  the spokesman said.

Texelis and its U.K. partner Qinetiq said May 18 2021 the two companies had entered a “strategic partnership to deliver in-wheel electric hub technology,” with the British company bringing “electrification technology and expertise.”

While engineers explore the electric hub technology, the company is building and delivering a mobility package for the Serval, which is being shipped to the French army.

Texelis supplies the Serval mobility package, which includes a Cummins engine, Allison gearbox, suspension, and axle. The company is also promoting an export version of that package, dubbed Celeris.

Vandel is chief executive of the defense division of Texelis, a medium-sized company based in Limoges, central France. There is also a chief executive managing the civil division, building equipment for public transport systems.

The Eurosatory trade show for land weapons and air-land systems is due to run June 17 to 21.

Sales and Profit Growth

Texelis profitability is around 10-11 percent of annual sales, Vandel said.

The company has seen rapid growth, reporting 2023 sales of €110 million, an 80-percent rise over four years, the company said.

Military sales accounted for 57 percent, and public transport 43 percent. Vandel forecast the former to account for a larger share in the coming years.

Sales are forecast to rise to around €200 million in 2027.

Service support accounts for 20 percent of sales, and that is also expected to rise. Potential growth is seen with the French army requirement for service of its fleet of BAE Systems Hagglunds VHM high mobility tracked vehicles.

The 2024-2030 military budget law “is very positive” for Texelis, the chief executive said, with “visibility for orders” for almost 10 years.

In addition to the initial batch of Serval models, further requirements are being sought, namely anti-drone and mine countermeasures. There is study for an unmanned vehicle with a robot arm and sensors for an anti-mine capability.

The military orders are seen as offering greater security than civil public transport deals, the chief executive said.

There are expectations of  “clear acceleration” for the Serval in 2026 in the military budget law, after a “stabilization in 2024,” the company said.

Serval Serves as Lever

The Serval is the light version of the véhicule blindé multi-role (VBMR), a troop carrier, a key element in the French army €10 billion ($10.8 billion) Scorpion modernization program.

The Serval can be seen as something of a breakthrough deal for Texelis, lifting the company to the sought after status of joint prime contractor, after winning with KNDS France, formerly Nexter, a competition held by the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office. Texelis was previously a subcontractor, and a supplier of axles and service on the French army VCBI infantry fighting vehicle.

The industrial partners, KNDS France and Texelis, signed the Serval contract in 2018. The  latter receives about a third of the value of the vehicle, with the remaining amount shared equally between the KNDS France – which supplies the armored hull, and Thales – which supplies onboard electronics.

Other companies understood to have bid for the Serval deal included Engie Ineo partnered with an Austrian company, Achleitner; KNDS France; Arquus; Soframe; and Thales.

KNDS France builds the four-wheel-drive aluminium armored Serval at Roanne, central France, where the company assembles the Griffon VBMR heavy armored troop carrier and Jaguar combat and reconnaissance vehicle, other major elements of the Scorpion program. There is also a MEPC mortar version of the Griffon, armed with a Thales 120 mm mortar.

Besides the Serval, Texelis is also supplying a mobility package for the VLTP, a light tactical vehicle, which runs separately from the Scorpion project.

The company expects to build 110 mobility packages this year, comprising the Serval and Celeris export systems.

The serval is a wild cat in sub-Saharan Africa, which kills with a bite to the head or the neck. The French army used that same feline name for its 2013 operation in Mali, a bloody combat intervention which halted Islamist rebel fighters advancing on Bamako.

Celeris for Exports

Texelis has also sold a version of the Serval mobility package under the Celeris brandname to Canada and Indonesia, and is pitching in other export markets. The Indonesian order is for the special forces.

The unit price of the Celeris package is some €240,000-€300,000.

There are also expectations of delivering 350-400 French light armored vehicles to the Belgian army, under the Capacité Motorisée (CaMo) program, perhaps between 2026-2030 or 2031. Those would be on top of the 382 Griffons and 60 Jaguars ordered by Belgium under the CaMo project.

In export markets, Texelis delivered last year its T700 axle for a total 44 four-wheel-drive military vehicles split between the Yugoimport Milosh for the Serbian army and GTP Sisu for the Finnish army.

Also last year, there were shipments of its T900 axle for 18 eight-wheel-drive Yugoimport Lazar 3 armored vehicles.

In 2024, T700 axles are due to be shipped for 60 four-wheel-drive Milosh and Sisu vehicles, and T900 axles for 30 eight-wheel-drive Yugoimport Lazar 3 vehicles.

Unimog is a big competitor in the world market.

Celeris is the name of a four-star constellation, and refers to either the son or brother of Pegasus, the winged horse. Celeris means speed or celerity.

Doing The Numbers

The DGA delivered to the army its 200th Serval on 29 January, the procurement office said in a March 7 statement. That brought to 19 units handed over to the service in 2024 at the date of the DGA statement, out of a total 103 to be shipped this year.

There was an initial order for 364 Servals signed in December 2020, followed by an order for a further 420 units signed in December 2023, the DGA said. The 2024-2030 military budget law sets a target of a total 978 Servals in the Scorpion program, seeking to support the forces in high intensity conflict, the procurement office said.

There will be a further order for 1,060 Servals for the VLTP light tactical vehicle, due to run to 2033, the office said.

That brings the requirement for mobility packages for 2,308 vehicles.

The French army has a requirement for a new armored engineering vehicle, offering further prospects for mobility packages.

There are also potential sales with the French project for the Véhicule Blindé d’Aide à l’Engagement (VBAE), a replacement for the VBL scout car. Belgium has signed up as partner on that planned VBAE procurement.

Arquus and Nexter have signed a two-year contract worth €15 million for a “pre-design” architecture study for the VBAE vehicle, with John Cockerill Defense, a Belgian company, as a major subcontractor.

Arquus has worked on its Scarabée hybrid diesel/electric armored vehicle, seen as a contender for the VBAE requirement. The company presented a new version of its concept vehicle at the 2022 Eurosatory show, with an MBDA Akeron MMP anti-tank missile fitted to the turret.

Soframe, a private company, has worked on its concept, dubbed Mosaic, for the VBAE requirement.

The featured image of Celeris was provided by Texelis. 

Additional photos of the Celeris in the slideshow below are credited to the company as well.

A press release from Texelis in French highlights the launch of the Celeris.

TEXELIS lance CELERIS et change de dimension

A translation by Second Line of Defense  of the first part of the press release follows:

Developing a new 4×4 or 6×6 military vehicle represents a real technical challenge, requiring mastery of numerous technical fields, from mobility to armor and systems integration, not to mention electrical and electronic architecture, support systems and adaptation to capability or doctrinal choices, all in a market that is by nature highly competitive.

Complete high-performance turnkey mobility

There are two possible strategies for developing a new 4×4 vehicle.

The first is to build on the basis of a commercial chassis, thus benefiting from economies of scale and easy access to components and spare parts. However, the use of a commercial chassis does not provide adequate performance, gives no control over components or their parameterization, and guarantees neither access to spare parts nor obsolescence management over the vehicle’s lifetime. In addition, the chassis has to be adapted to military requirements, which calls for a wide range of skills in all the technical fields of mobility, as well as a major effort to identify and qualify suppliers – in other words, a long and complex job, with limited savings, limited performance and a challenge in terms of time and resolving technical problems.

The other strategy is to develop a tailor-made mobility solution. This strategy guarantees the desired level of product performance, component control and definition evolution throughout the life of the vehicle, a comprehensive support system, and a perfect match with the real needs of end-users. However, in-house development is a costly solution that is only suitable for large-scale programs with large production runs.

With CELERIS, Texelis offers the best of both worlds: a complete solution, already developed and qualified, perfectly adapted to military requirements, fully customizable, giving partners their own mobility solution, designed to meet all their needs, with a performance/price ratio unrivalled in this segment.

CELERIS: a modular approach

In its 4×4 configuration, CELERIS comprises 12 basic kits, including axles, powertrain or steering, and over 30 option kits, depending on the desired configuration, or the type of environment in which the vehicle is to operate. A high-performance solution, CELERIS has been developed in compliance with NATO standards.

Thanks to its modularity, CELERIS can accommodate both self-supporting bodies and chassis-mounted architectures, enabling a wide range of architectures and uses. The 4×4 version can accommodate vehicles with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of between 13 and 18 tonnes.

CELERIS 4×4 is built around Texelis T750 axles, with a rear axle available with both trailing arms (maximum load 9.5 tonnes) and double wishbones (maximum load 8.5 tonnes). The powertrain combines a 375 hp Cummins ISL9 Euro 3 diesel engine with an Allison 3200SP two-speed transmission.

Thanks to this modular approach, it is possible to select certain kits and combine them with other components, enabling certain players to create or develop strategic competencies.