By Robbin Laird

As the Nordics work through how to best integrate their forces, a key element to consider is how to shape a basing structure involving the Nordics which will enable an enhanced Northern European and North Atlantic defense.

When I visiting Norway in 2018, I witnessed one of the foundation stones for enhanced Nordic defense, cross-border air operations, something which will now involve the question of the bases involved and their integration with sea basing and land base operations as well in order to shape enhanced capabilities for strike and defense capabilities.

During a visit to Bodø Airbase on April 25, 2018, we discussed the cross-border air training, which Norway is doing with Finland and Sweden with members of the Norwegian Air Force The day we were there, we saw four F-16s take off from Bodø and fly south toward Ørland airbase to participate in an air defense exercise.

The day before this event, the Norwegians contacted the Swedes and invited them to send aircraft to the exercise, and they did so. The day before is really the point. This is a dramatic change from the 1990s, when the Swedes would not allow the Norwegians or Finns to enter their airspace without prior diplomatic approval. Maj. Trond Ertsgaard, Senior Operational Planner and Fighter Pilot from the 132 Air Wing, provided an overview to the standup and the evolution of this significant working relationship.

The core point is that it is being done without a complicated day-to-day diplomatic effort: “In the 1970s, there was limited cooperation. We got to know each other, and our bases, to be able to divert in case of emergency or other contingencies. But there was no operational or tactical cooperation. The focus was on safety; not operational training.”

By the 1990s, there was enhanced cooperation, but it was limited to a small set of flying issues, rather than operational training. As Ertsgaard noted: “But when the Swedes got the Gripen, this opened the aperture, as the plane was designed to be more easily integrated with NATO standards.”

Then in the fall of 2008, there was a meeting of the squadrons and wing commanders from the Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian airbases to discuss ways to develop cooperation among the squadrons operating from national bases. The discussion was rooted in the ability of the national air forces to operate from their own bases and simply cooperating in shared combat airspace.

This would mean that the normal costs of hosting an exercise would not be necessary, as each air force would return to its own operating base at the end of the engagement. The Cross-Border Training (CBT) started between Sweden and Norway in 2009 and then the Finns joined in 2010. By 2011, Ertsgaard highlighted that, “we were operating at a level of an event a week. And by 2012, we engaged in about 90 events at the CBT level.”

That created a template which allowed for cost-effective and regular training and laid the foundation for then hosting a periodic two-week exercise where they could invite nations to participate in air defense exercises in the region. From 2015 on, the three air forces have shaped a regular training approach, which is very flexible and driven at the wing and squadron levels. “We meet each November, and set the schedule for the next year, but in execution it is very, very flexible. It is about a bottom-up approach and initiative to generate the training regime,” Ertsgaard said.

Now with the anticipated inclusion of Finland and Sweden within NATO, the countries can go beyond cross-border training to shaping a basing eco system to provide for distributed integrated operations.

In an article made available to me recently by a Norwegian colleague and published by LUFTEND in December 2022, the focus on a “flexible and resilient Nordic air base concept” was the focus of attention.

The article concludes:

“Finland and Sweden are compatible with USAF’s Agile Combat Employment approach and similar regimes among allied air forces. Norway might reintroduce the principle of protection by dispersal and unpredictability.

“There is a need for regional Cross Border Basing versus national dispersal only. Common Nordic Air C2 is an important enabler for Cross Border Basing of Nordic air forces. In particular it needs to be studied and trained in peacetime with agreed upon frameworks allowing for the usage of spares, munitions and fuel across the different fleets.

“In particular this will provide value to the Finnish and Norwegian F­35 operations, as it allows movement between bases closer to the frontline or using strategic depth to provide flexibility in the air war over the Nordic countries. The implementation of Swedish fighters into the mix is valuable from an operational and tactical point of view, as these offers different capabilities compared to the Finnish and Norwegian fighters, though naturally the deep integration of these in a joint base concept will be more difficult considering that they do not share spares and munitions.

“However, other assets can also benefit from the joint basing, such as the C­130J Super Hercules fleet of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (and where Finland has recently signaled potential interest in acquiring the type).

“It is important to consider that even if Nordic aircraft disperse and rotate to survive in crisis and war, at the same time the main air bases can be congested with allied air force reinforcement units and also APOD related flights. They too will need protection and preferably a GBAD shield. Norway is currently the only Nordic country with GBAD units in the air force structure with a main mission to protect the air bases. A flexible and resilient Nordic air base concept should have a borderless regional approach and include solutions for both Nordic air forces and GBAD units plus all allied reinforcements.”

This is clearly a key way to shape the way ahead for enhanced survivability but enhanced lethality can be provided by integratability of such fixed or mobile land bases with the firepower which sea bases can provide as well.

The entire engagement of allied and Nordic maritime capabilities can provide mobile bases which supplement, compliment, and can be used as part of the protection of such a joint air basing approach.

With an integrated force operating across various air land bases, both fixed and mobile, as well as ground-based missile defense and strike nodes, along with sea bases, common missiles like NSM or JSM can be used as a coalition kill web strike and defense force.

Having distributed strike but focused effects for a distributed force is a key element of shaping a way ahead for Nordic, Northern European and North Atlantic defense.

Author’s Note: The quote with regard to cross-border training was taken from the following book:

The Return of Direct Defense in Europe

For example, see the following:

The Danish Foreign Ministry set up a Security Policy Analysis Group, chaired by Ambassador Michael-Johns, Danish NATO Ambassador (the featured photo), which issued its report on the nature of the evolving strategic environment.

This is how the 16 November 2022 announcement of the public meeting to launch the report read:

“The geopolitical and geoeconomic lines on the world map are being redrawn once again. As the pandemic recedes, the world is faced with an energy crisis, economic shocks, floods and droughts, nation-first populism, and the looming danger of the escalation of the war in Ukraine. This emerging “polycrisis” facing humankind, as the current condition is being described, is creating extreme uncertainties about the shape of the future worlds. Taking Denmark as the locus, we initiate a series of conversations on how to navigate these uncertain worlds and the manifold futures that might lie ahead.

“We will begin with an introduction to the newly released report “Danish Security and Defence towards 2035” by Ambassador Michael Zilmer-Johns, Chairman, The Security Policy Analysis Group, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will be followed by two expert roundtables that will discuss regional perspectives as well as ways forward. The speakers’ panel brings together distinguished scholars and policy experts.”

The first roundtable was entitled “Denmark and the World.”

• Ambassador, Michael Zilmer-Johns, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Chairman of the Security Policy Analysis Group
• Henrik Østergaard Breitenbauch, Dean, Royal Danish Defence College,
• Elena Meyer-Clement, Associate Professor, China Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
• Morten Rievers Heiberg, Professor, Department of English, Germanic and Romance Studies, UCPH.
• Katrine Stevnhøj, PhD Fellow, Russia Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
• Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen, Professor, Middle Eastern Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
• Ravinder Kaur, ADI Chair, Associate Professor, Modern India and South Asia Studies, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.

The second was entitled “The Way Forward.”

• Camilla Mordhorst, Director, The Danish Cultural Institute.
• Charlotte Flindt Pedersen, Director, The Danish Foreign Policy Society.
• Annika Hvithamar, Head of Department, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, UCPH.
• Peter Bøgh Hansen, China Political Director, Confederation of Danish Industry (DI).
• Morten Elkjær, Vice President, Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU).
• John Rand, Professor, Department of Economics, UCPH.

The summary of the report provides the overview of the report.

An entire generation of Danes grew up without fear of war in Europe and in a world that opened up. They could travel freely around the globe and experience how democracy and human rights progressed. They experienced a historic boom in prosperity in Denmark and the rest of the world. The children and young people of today are faced with a bleaker future.

A new iron curtain is descending over Europe since the brutal Russian attack on Ukraine. This is a landmark event in European security. The Russian willingness to use military force to change the European borders and seek to enforce a European order based on spheres of interest and the right of the strong means that the entire Kingdom of Denmark will face significantly intensified threats in the coming years. The network of arms control agreements and confidence-building mechanisms that created stability and predictability on our continent is lying in ruins.

Not only Europe, but the entire international community, is in disarray. The USA has lost its position as the only superpower, and the balance of power between the great powers is shifting rapidly, not least due to the rise of China. Cooperation is being replaced by sharp competition between the great powers while the UN and other global institutions are weakened. The ever-closer integration of the world economy – with complex supply chains across national borders and time zones – has slowed down. Nuclear arsenals are growing and will play a greater role in the global security policy game in the future. We find ourselves on the threshold of a new era in which the rules-based international system based on the unique strength of the United States will be replaced by a new system. At this point, it remains too early to tell how far this development will go towards a more fragmented world order, where power means more than rules and principles. The direction is unfortunately clear, however, and it is certain that the future international system will be very different from what we have known since the end of the Cold War.

The intensified great power competition of the future will take on a different character than was the case during the Cold War. Firstly, the economic integration between China and the West is far deeper than it ever was between the former Eastern Bloc and the West. This means that there will continue to be cooperation in trade, climate, and pandemics in parallel to fierce competition for control of transport routes, supply chains and infrastructure and – not least – for the technologies that can fundamentally change the future military battlefield. Secondly, China and the United States are not as globally dominant as were the USSR and USA. The EU, India, Japan, and a number of medium-sized powers have considerable economic and military capacity and greater freedom of action than was then the case. This will very likely lead to a more fluid international system with changing patterns of cooperation and more proxy wars between the great powers. A sharp division of the world into democracies and autocratic countries could be an alternative but is considered less likely.

China’s ascendance as an ever stronger and more assertive global power will affect European security. The great geographical distance means that China cannot be expected to become a conventional military threat to Europe before 2035. But because the USA is turning its strategic focus towards China, Europe will have to provide a much larger part of the NATO deterrence and defence against Russia as well as the efforts against terrorism and irregular migration from the Middle East and Africa. China will also be more prominent in other aspects of the threat landscape. China’s rapid development and militarisation of new technologies, and its continued efforts to gain and access to European technology through legal and illegal means, will pressure Europe.

In light of the multiple and significantly intensified threats against Denmark, it is more important than at any other time since the end of the Cold War that we are firmly rooted in NATO and the EU and maintain close ties to strong allies in Europe and North America together with partners in Asia. NATO will remain the foundation for Danish security and the world’s strongest military alliance. The intensified Russian threat has strengthened the unity of NATO and triggered a significant strengthening of the collective NATO defence along the eastern flank against Russia. While NATO ensures the military deterrence of Russia, the EU contributes significantly to European and global security in many other ways. With the prompt and harsh sanctions in response to the Ukraine invasion, the EU emerged as a real geopolitical actor. The active involvement of the EU Commission in the European defence dimension is game changer with important ramifications for building an efficient European defence industry.

As a result of the Danish referendum on the lifting of the defence opt-out and the Finnish and Swedish decisions to seek admission to NATO, the Nordic countries will for the first time in history stand together as military allies in NATO and as partners in the EU defence dimension. This opens up entirely new perspectives for Nordic defence cooperation.

The Faroe Islands and Greenland forms part of the Arctic/North Atlantic security policy complex, which has a key role in the mutual nuclear deterrence between the USA and Russia. Greenland lies in the middle of the path of intercontinental missiles between Russia and the USA. As the relations between the two great powers have deteriorated, the relevance of Pituffik (Thule Air Base) has increased. The Faroe Islands and Greenland are important for the strategically important maritime passage in the waters between Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Scotland, which Russian submarines and warships must pass to enter the North Atlantic.

The new security policy situation of the Kingdom of Denmark entails a significant increase in the tasks facing the Danish Armed Forces until 2035. It will be necessary to increase the Danish contribution to the ongoing strengthening of the Western deterrence and defence against the increased military threat from Russia and to the relief of the USA in Europe. The main tasks of Danish Defence are expected to be forward defence in the Baltic Sea region, including more forces on short alert, as well as increased surveillance in the Arctic and the North Atlantic. The Armed Forces has to deliver our NATO capability targets. Future NATO targets for Denmark are likely to become even more demanding and to require much higher preparedness levels. Continued support for Ukraine, including training and weapons, can also require more resources.

Climate change and demographics will intensify the threats and challenges emanating from weak and fragile states. Maritime security will also remain a key priority for Denmark. Furthermore, our allies will likely request Danish military contributions to activities in Asia in line with the increased strategic focus there. The Danish defence should therefore retain capacity to send relevant military contributions to distant international operations. Even with the decision to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP, however, there will be less capacity to participate in such operations in the coming years.

The rapid technological development will require a significant technological boost to the Danish Armed Forces if it is to remain a relevant partner for our strongest allies. This increase will also be required to enable the Armed Forces to handle increasing tasks despite limited prospects for expanding the manpower. The new, bleaker threat assessment also requires a strengthening of the broader societal security. The Kingdom of Denmark must be able to deal with a wide range of growing manmade and natural threats, including cyber-attacks, malign foreign interference in political processes or control of critical infrastructure, shortages of critical supplies, pandemics, and extreme weather.

See, also the following:

The Way Ahead for Northern European Defense: Shaping the Future with Sweden and Finland as NATO Members

Shaping a Way Ahead for Denmark and Nordic Defense: The Impact of the War in Ukraine

The Kingdom of Denmark: Trigger for Change in Nordic Integration?