Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

An Update on the Tiltrotor Enterprise: How to Reduce Osprey Maintenance Cycle Time by 24%

Posted on June 5, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/05/2025

Recently, DVIDS. provided a story which highlights how reworking maintenance regimes can enhance the readiness of the MV-22. Frankly, this is a core theme which needs to be addressed across the ready force: how can we rework organaiatoxal and structural arrangements to enhance the readiness of the “fight tonight” force?

The article was published on May 27, 2025 and was written by Michael A Furlano

That article follows:

Fleet Readiness Center Southwest’s (FRCSW) mission is to maintain the operational readiness of advanced aircraft like the CMV-22 Osprey.

The command provides crucial support to the men and women of the Navy and Marine Corps allowing them to deliver the lethality necessary to defeat any foe.

Recently, the FRCSW Props team achieved a significant milestone by reducing the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) cycle for the CMV-22 from 264 days to under 200 days – a reduction of more than 24%.

The accelerated maintenance timeline directly supports naval aviation readiness goals, ensuring the military have the reliable aircraft they require for success on the battlefield.

The CMV-22 Osprey is a complex tiltrotor aircraft combining the vertical takeoff and landing capabilities of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed wing plane.

Its PMI cycle involves extensive inspection, repair, testing and refurbishment of critical systems including engines, rotors, avionics and airframe components.

The team managers laid out all phases/processes/etc. required and worked directly with the artisans performing the work to develop a new way to sequence events.

Through this workflow analysis and process optimization effort, the FRCSW team identified and eliminated inefficiencies in multiple maintenance phases, setting the stage to achieve this milestone.

The analysis enabled the team to significantly shorten the PMI cycle without sacrificing the high standards required for safety and quality.

A key factor in the accelerated PMI cycle was working with outside entities to ensure any delays outside the commands purview would not prevent the team from reaching their goal.

The FRCSW team worked closely with external partners thus by proactively managing the entire repair cycle and improving communication throughout, the team avoided delays that had previously extended maintenance timelines.

Reducing the CMV-22 PMI cycle from 264 to 200 days translates directly into more aircraft available for training, deployment and operational readiness.

The CMV-22 plays a vital role in carrier onboard delivery and logistics support, making its availability essential for sustained naval operations.

This achievement reflects FRCSW’s commitment to providing the Navy and Marine Corps with the mission capable aircraft they need.

By accelerating maintenance cycles, the team ensures that sailors and marines have reliable, ready-to-fly tools to successfully execute their mission and maintain strategic advantage.

FRCSW will continue to innovate and refine maintenance processes for the CMV-22 and other fleet assets.

The goal remains clear: to sustain and improve aircraft readiness so that naval aviation forces can remain agile, effective and prepared for the challenges of today and tomorrow.

FRCSW employees are the Backbone of Readiness!

A Tiltrotor Enterprise: From Iraq to the Future

Fleet Readiness Center Southwest’s (FRCSW) mission is to maintain the operational readiness of advanced aircraft like the CMV-22 Osprey. The command provides crucial support to the men and women of the Navy and Marine Corps allowing them to deliver the lethality necessary to defeat any foe. Recently, the FRCSW Props team achieved a significant milestone by reducing the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) cycle for the CMV-22 from 264 days to under 200 days - a reduction of more than 24%.

Reactions to President Lula’s Back-to-Back Visits to Moscow and Bejing

Posted on June 4, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/04/2025

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s diplomatic visits to Russia and China in May have sparked intense debate in Brazil, with major newspapers condemning his attendance at Moscow’s Victory Day parade while largely supporting the economic outcomes of his Beijing trip.

The Brazilian leader’s presence at Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations drew particularly sharp criticism from the country’s leading media outlets, making him the only democratic leader among the dozens of heads of state who attended the military parade on Red Square.

Media Backlash Over Moscow Visit

Brazil’s three largest newspapers delivered scathing editorial commentary on Lula’s decision to stand alongside Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping at the 80th anniversary commemoration of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany.

Folha de São Paulo, the country’s most influential daily, described Lula’s Moscow appearance as “not pragmatism, only a diplomatic error,” arguing that by consorting with autocrats, the president was attending “the glorification of another actual conflict condemned by the majority of the democracies of the world, with the exception of Brazil.”

O Globo of Rio de Janeiro was even more direct, running an editorial titled “Lula in Moscow: The wrong side of history.”

The criticism reflects broader concerns about Brazil’s neutral stance on the Ukraine war. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, Lula’s government has abstained from votes to suspend Russia from UN human rights bodies and refused to supply weapons to Ukraine, frustrating Kyiv to the point where Ukraine withdrew its ambassador from Brasília.³

Economic Pragmatism Drives Policy

The Lula administration has defended the visits as essential to Brazil’s economic interests and regional leadership. Russia has become a crucial energy supplier, now providing 65% of Brazil’s diesel imports—up from less than 1% in 2021. Brazil paid Russia nearly $10 billion for diesel in 2024, while Russian fertilizers remain vital for the country’s powerful agribusiness sector.

“Brazil has political, commercial, cultural, scientific, and technological interests with Russia,” Lula told reporters before departing for China. “We believe that, at this historic moment, we can significantly deepen our trade ties.”

Trade between Brazil and Russia reached $12.4 billion in 2024, though the balance heavily favors Russia, leaving Brazil with a $9.5 billion deficit.

China Visit Yields Economic Gains

While the Moscow visit drew criticism, Lula’s subsequent trip to Beijing received more positive domestic coverage, particularly regarding its economic outcomes.

At a business forum in Beijing, Lula celebrated more than $4.5 billion in upcoming Chinese investments across Brazilian sectors ranging from automaking and renewable energy to pharmaceuticals and semiconductors.

“If it’s up to my government, our relationship with China will be indestructible,” Lula told business leaders in Beijing.

Brazil’s trade promotion agency reported attracting approximately 27 billion reais ($4.8 billion) in Chinese investments during the visit. Major deals included a $1 billion investment by China’s Envision Group in Brazilian production of sustainable aviation fuel from sugarcane.

Strategic Nonalignment Policy

Foreign policy experts describe Lula’s approach as “active nonalignment,” reflecting Brazil’s attempt to navigate an increasingly multipolar world while maintaining autonomy from Western pressure.

“The natural path is to look for alternatives. China is one of them,” said a Brazilian diplomat, speaking anonymously about the country’s response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s unpredictable trade policies.

China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009, accounting for 28% of Brazilian exports and 24.2% of imports in 2024. By contrast, the United States ranked second, providing 12% of Brazil’s imports and purchasing 15.5% of its exports.

Opposition and International Concerns

Critics argue there is an inherent contradiction between Brazil’s longstanding foreign policy of upholding national sovereignty and territorial integrity and its acquiescence to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.⁹

International observers have also questioned Brazil’s positioning. In a recent analysis, one critic described Lula’s Russia visit as “hypocritical, undermining everything he allegedly stands for,” noting that Putin has implemented in Russia many of the authoritarian practices Lula historically opposed in Brazil.

Looking Ahead

The visits underscore Brazil’s determination to maintain what Lula calls an independent foreign policy, prioritizing economic relationships over Western calls for diplomatic isolation of Russia.

Brazil will host the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro in July, where Lula will again meet with both Putin and Xi Jinping, further cementing these controversial but economically important relationships.

The challenge for Lula will be balancing Brazil’s economic pragmatism with growing domestic and international pressure over his government’s stance on global democratic norms and the Ukraine conflict.

The featured image was produced by an AI program.

See also the following:

Lula in Moscow and Beijing: Coming to Terms with the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World?

Croix du Sud 25

Posted on June 4, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

U.S. Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 1, Marine Rotational – Force Darwin 25.3 and 22 partner countries participated in Croix-Du-Sud 25 at New Caledonia and Wallis Island, Wallis and Futuna, from April 21 to May 4, 2025.

Croix-du-Sud is a 14-day biennial joint/multilateral field training exercise organized and led by the French Armed Forces New Caledonia, focusing on disaster relief, crisis events, and enhancing partnership and interoperability between the United States and the militaries of the Oceania countries.

MRF-D is an annual six-month rotational deployment to enhance interoperability with the Australian Defence Force and allies and partners and provide a forward-postured crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific. (U.S. Marine Corps video by Cpl. Anita Ramos)

NOUMEA, NEW CALEDONIA

05.06.2025

Video by Cpl. Anita Ramos

Marine Rotational Force – Darwin

Australian Army’s Strategic Pivot: Adapting for the Indo-Pacific Century

Posted on June 3, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/03/2025

By Robbin Laird

I had the opportunity to meet with Lt. General Simon Stuart, Chief of the Australian Army in. his office on 19 May 2025. We discussed a specific aspect of the way ahead for the Australian Army, namely its role in Australian littoral operations.

In an era where geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific region are significant, the Australian Army is undergoing a fundamental transformation designed to meet the challenges of great power competition. Leading this evolution is a recognition that tomorrow’s conflicts will be won not by the strongest force, but by the most adaptable one.

“War has always been a contest to see who can adapt the fastest,” explains Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, Chief of Army. This philosophy underpins Australia’s shift from traditional change management approaches to a model of continual adaptation.

The stark difference between these paradigms isn’t merely semantic. Stuart points to Ukraine as a real-world laboratory demonstrating how adaptation cycles for technologies like unmanned aerial systems and counter-UAS capabilities are now “measured in days, not weeks, months, and years.”

This represents a clean break from previous military transformation efforts based on civilian change management theories — where organizations moved from one comfortable, well-defined state through a planned period of change to another stable configuration. “That may have been appropriate for the day,” Stuart notes, “but it doesn’t reflect the world we live in today.”

Comprehensive Transformation: The Four Cs

Australia’s approach to Army transformation is comprehensive, built around what Stuart calls “the four Cs”: Concepts, Command and Control, Capabilities, and Culture.

Concepts: Integrated Thinking

The Army has developed new land domain operating concepts aligned with joint force “integrated campaigning.” Stuart highlights four key integrating concepts: integrated air and missile defense, multi-domain strike, special operations, and logistics—with a fifth concept focused on littoral combat currently under development.

“It’s about understanding how you best leverage the terrain, the maritime environment, for positional advantage for the combined and joint force,” Stuart explains.

Command and Control: Restructuring for Joint Operations

The Australian Army has elevated the division to the “unit of action” and aligned divisions and commands with the Chief of Joint Operations’ theater missions. The headquarters structure has been reorganized to function effectively during wartime.

Forces Command has undergone perhaps the most significant transformation, taking on dual responsibilities: managing the Army training enterprise and developing contingency plans for scaling the Army during mobilization.

Stuart emphasizes the importance of this capability: “In a fight, the rest of the Army will be committed to operations. I need some capacity to be able to force-generate out of contact.”

Capabilities: Building the Future Force

The Army’s capability development focuses on several critical programs of record:

The Littoral Maneuver Program, delivering 26 ships (18 medium and 8 heavy landing craft)
Long-range strike capability centered on the newly established 10th Fires Brigade
Combined arms fighting systems
The land C⁴ digital network system connecting all components at machine speed

These capabilities address the functional question Stuart poses: “How do I contribute to my teammates in the air and on the surface and subsurface of the ocean by contributing to or achieving sea denial from the land?”

Culture: Professionalism Under Pressure

The fourth pillar addresses the human dimension. Stuart has commissioned a formal assessment of the Army profession, focusing on jurisdiction, professional knowledge, and self-regulation — ensuring the force has the values, skills, and mindset needed for continual adaptation.

The Littoral Focus: Geography Drives Strategy

The emphasis on littoral operations stems directly from the Indo-Pacific’s geography. The Australian Army aims to “unlock and access the maneuver space in the littorals either side of the beach and the airspace above it” to support joint operations.

“If you look at the map, it’s about understanding where the strategic geography is, where the key terrain is, and which straits are more important than others,” Stuart explains. “What is the contribution of the land force to the joint fight? How do I access and exploit the maneuver space that we haven’t been able to do before?”

Racing Against Time

Stuart doesn’t hide the urgency driving these changes. “Time is not on our side,” he states plainly, identifying a “strategic threat window” between 2025 and 2030.

With 2025 already here, the Army has adopted a “fight tonight” mentality—focusing on maximizing current capabilities while rapidly integrating new technologies. “Do what you can with what you’ve got,” as Stuart puts it.

While awaiting delivery of capabilities from long-term programs of record, the Army is working with allies and partners, including the U.S. Army Pacific and the Australian Navy. Two years ago, they successfully deployed combat forces, including armor, to the Philippines and Indonesia as part of multinational exercises.

Innovation in Action: The Tech-Scaled Battle Group

One of the most innovative initiatives is the creation of a “tech-scaled battle group” from the first armored regiment. This unit teams soldiers with industry partners and scientists to rapidly evaluate new equipment, develop tactics, and determine what technologies should be adopted across the force.

“We learn fast,” Stuart says, describing how the battle group helps “operationalize the big idea of continual adaptation.”

Acquisition Challenge Remains

Stuart acknowledges that traditional acquisition processes remain a challenge — a sentiment shared among his counterparts from 27 nations at a recent Land Forces of the Pacific conference. “There is a stunning correlation between the challenge we all have… acquisition systems that have been designed and developed for the last wars and are not yet fit for purpose for the next.”

The Army is experimenting with new program designs that deliver capabilities in incremental “target states” rather than monolithic blocks — particularly important for rapidly evolving software systems.

Looking Ahead

As tensions in the Indo-Pacific continue, Australia’s Army transformation represents a significant shift in military thinking — one that prioritizes adaptability, joint operations, and practical capacity building over traditional force structure planning.

The next few years will test whether this approach can deliver the capabilities needed to address regional challenges. But one thing is clear: the days of comfortable, predictable military transformation are over. In the contest of adaptation that defines modern warfare, Australia is determined not to be left behind.

Featured photo: Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, AO, DSC, talks with Defence Members & Family Support network volunteers at Karrakatta House in Irwin Barracks, Perth. April 16, 2025. Credit: Australian Department of Defence.

Australia’s Littoral Defense Strategy and Regional Security

For my recent book on the ADF found on the Amazon U.S. site see the following:

And in Australia from the Australian Amazon site:

An Update on the Indian-French Relationship: A May 2025 Indian Visit to Paris

Posted on June 2, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/02/2025

By Pierre Tran

Paris – An Indian all-party parliamentary delegation led by Ravi Shankar Prasad, a former law and justice minister, met the French and foreign press May 27, as part of New Delhi’s bid to rally political and media support in a long standing conflict with Pakistan.

Those nine members of the lower and upper houses made up one of the seven delegations taking India’s message around the world, following the April 22 “terror attack” on civilians, the Indian ambassador, Sanjeev Singla, said in opening remarks.

The killing of those civilians “in the name of religion,” signalled “the menace of terrorism that emanates from Pakistan,” the senior diplomat said.

Pakistan has denied any involvement in that April attack, and called for an independent inquiry.

The high-level delegation declined to give a clear denial on whether Pakistan had downed an Indian air force Rafale fighter, while emphasising the safe return of Indian pilots after a May 6/7 night attack, striking military bases in Pakistan.

Reports from Pakistan on downing a Rafale should be taken with “a pinch of salt,” Prasad said.

Pakistan has claimed hitting the fighter built by Dassault Aviation, along with downing Sukhoi and MiG fighters, all flown by the Indian air force on that attack against the bases. Media reports have pointed up Pakistan pilots flew the Chinese-built J-10 fighter and fired a Chinese-built long-range, air-to-air PL-15 missile, while Indian authorities have urged caution on the claims from Islamabad.

“That is operational information that will be shared, however there is an assertion without evidence,” member of parliament Priyanka Chaturvedi said. “What we have categorically said is our mission has been accomplished with regards to operations. Our pilots are back home and they’re safe,” she said.

Prasad said, “All this evidence has come from where? From Pakistan. That is our charge.

“Has any independent, verifiable evidence about the loss of Rafale come? I would urge you to take any evidence coming from Pakistan with a pinch of salt,” he said.

None of the Indian aircraft had entered Pakistan airspace, he said, and no Pakistani missile had crossed the border into India. India had a “very strong air defense system.” he said. India could also block “their air defense system.”

Possible Threats

Pakistan flies the Chinese-built JF-17 alongside the J-10 fighter, armed with the PL-15, a long-range missile.

A French source said Pakistan’s air defense included the HQ-9, a Chinese-built surface-to-air missile based on the Russian S300 weapon.

There was concern of escalation, with “huge tension,” the contact said one day before Islamabad and New Delhi agreed May 10 to a ceasefire. “Things could get worse,” which meant the loss of a Rafale was of lesser importance.

There was in 2019 a “frat kill,” the downing of an Indian air force helicopter, killing six Indian air force personnel and a civilian. An Indian officer fired the missile and shot down an Mi-17 helicopter, which led to a court martial and dismissal of the officer, The Tribune, an Indian daily, reported April 11 2023.

Strong Ties Between France and India

The Rafale was “good gear,” Prasad said. “That’s all we want to tell you.”

India and France has had strong ties since 1998, he said, and there was a strong relationship between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Emmanuel Macron.

The two nations signed in 1998 a strategic partnership agreement, which included cooperation in defense and security, civil nuclear power, and space. That pact has broadened since, to include cybersecurity, maritime security, and counter terrorism.

Asked about media reports India had requested local media to take down stories of the reported loss of the Rafale, Prasad said there were 724 domestic media outlets in English, Hindi, and local languages. That was a sign of Indian democracy, he said.

The reports of government censorship were “unfounded,” he said.

Asked about French media reports India was looking to order a further batch of 114 fighters, Prasad said there was India’s strategic partnership with France, and a “whole big horizon,” with the two nations working as partners not just on “defense gear” but other areas.

“India as a sovereign country is entitled to reinforce its weaponry systems,” he said, adding that India has become the fourth economy in the world, larger than France and England.

“That is what Indian economic might is,” he said.

The Rafale F4 was considered to be the “frontrunner” for India’s competition for 114 fighters under the air force’s multi-role fighter aircraft program, a French website, Avions Legendaires, reported May 24. There were tough negotiations on India’s request for source code to arm the Rafale with Indian-built weapons, including Astra air-to-air and Rudram air-to-ground missiles, and Sudarshan laser-guided bomb.

India has ordered 26 carrier-based Rafale for the navy, which followed a 36-strong order of the fighter for the air force. Those previous orders made the French-built jets the preferred pick, the French website reported.

The other candidates included the Boeing F-15EX Eagle II, Lockheed Martin F-21A Viper, Saab JAS 39E/F Gripen, and Sukhoi Su-57E Felon-B.

India’s No First Strike

Much reporting in those four days in May of combat referred to India and Pakistan as nuclear-capable nations, pointing up the high risk involved.

Parliamentarian MJ Akbar told the French and foreign press he would preempt any question on the use of nuclear weapons, saying India has a very clear doctrine, namely “no first use.”

“Pakistan has no such doctrine,” he said.

India’s no first strike policy carried the implicit sense that if another country did use the nuclear weapon first, “there are no commitments on our response,” he said. “However, we will not use the ultimate weapon of our own volition.”

“In the recent confrontation, we were never close to any nuclear confrontation,” he said.

The rising temperature in New Delhi could be seen with Reuters reporting May 27 India’s defense minister approving the “framework” for building an advanced stealth fighter, with the Aeronautical Development Agency expected to seek initial interest from industry to build a prototype of a twin-engine, fifth-generation fighter.

Pakistan as a Former Client Nation

Pakistan has been a client nation for French weapons, having been an early export customer of the Daphne submarine in the mid-1960s, built by the Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN), since renamed Naval Group.

Pakistan went on to order three Agosta 90B boats, dubbed the Khalid class, in the mid-1990s. A French naval export company, Amaris, pitched in 2008 the Marlin boat in Pakistan’s competition for three diesel-electric submarines. That Marlin was based on the Franco-Spanish Scorpene boat, and included MBDA Exocet SM39 missiles. That deal did not go through.

The Pakistan air force flew French-built Mirage III and V fighters.

Meanwhile, France has sold six Scorpene boats to India, and New Delhi is expected to order three more units. Indian has effectively two air forces, one of Russian-built fighters, the other French-built, reflecting the days of its non-alignment in the Cold War. The French-built fighters include the Mirage 2000 and Rafale, and the air force seeks to replace the Sepecat Jaguar.

Conflict Story

There has been a history of armed conflict between India and Pakistan since the two nations won independence from the British Empire. The neighbouring states fought four wars after the partition of India in 1947, with conflicts in 1948, 1965, 1971 – which saw the creation of Bangladesh – and 1999, with the latter dubbed the Kargil War.

The delegation met French parliamentarians on its visit here. The MPs were due to fly on Rome, Copenhagen, London, Brussels, and Berlin.

Pakistan is mainly a Muslim nation with a government seen as heavily swayed by the military.

India is a secular democracy, which has seen the rise of the BJP party, which promotes a Hindu nationalist approach.

The Indian government presented in April a bill to parliament seeking to change the management of large tracts of land set aside for Muslim use, seen likely to raise tension between the administration and the Muslim minority community, Reuters reported.

Modi’s campaign for election last year drew accusations of anti-Muslim sentiment when he referred to Muslims as “infiltrators,” who have “more children,” the news agency reported.

Islamist militants had been working from what the Indian ambassador said were “terrorist infrastructure” bases in Pakistan.

Those irregular fighters on April 22 killed some 26 tourists, and a local person at Pahalgam, a beauty spot in the Indian part of the Kashmir region in the Himalayas.

India retaliated on the night of May 6/7, launching attacks against some nine sites in Pakistan, leading to renewed conflict between the two states.

Islamabad and New Delhi agreed May 10 to a ceasefire.

Featured image was created by an. AI program.

10th Mountain Division Employs New Technology during Combined Resolve 25-1

Posted on June 2, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 317th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, prepare and launch the Anduril Ghost X and Performance Drone Works C100D systems during exercise Combined Resolve 25-1 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels Training Area, Hohenfels, Germany, Jan. 14, 2025.

Approximately 4,000 military personnel from the U.S. and 15 European countries are participating in Combined Resolve 25-1.

HOHENFELS, BAYERN, GERMANY

01.14.2025

Video by Spc. Jennifer Posy

5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

The Role of Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4

Posted on May 31, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

05/31/2025

By Petty Officer 2nd Class Chelsea Palmer

When you combine mission focus, teamwork, technical expertise, and creativity, the results are remarkable if not predictable. Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4 is no exception.

The 70-person team comprised of four training support vessels operating under the umbrella of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 is one of the most visible and impactful organizations on Atlantic coast. However, very few know the remarkable story or the team of veterans and civilian mariners that bring it to life.

“TSVRON 4 is a tremendous asset for our warfighters,” said Rear Adm. Max “Pepper” McCoy, commander, Carrier Strike Group 4. “These ships provide a wide range of capabilities that enable the right balance of Live-Virtual-Constructive training in a complex, integrated at-sea environment for our naval and joint forces plus partners and allies.”

TSVRON 4’s training mission includes exercise mine-laying and recovery, maritime interdiction operations training, and live-fire event support. They also team with Naval Air Systems Command’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) to deliver targets, and to expand Fleet opportunities for unmanned systems training and Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training.

“Our TSVRON team is comprised of 100 percent civilian personnel who are passionate, mission-focused and dedicated to ensuring our warfighters receive the best training opportunities available. They are our greatest asset,” said Gil Birklund, the executive director of CSG-4 who oversees TSVRON 4 operations and maintenance. “Like many organizations, balancing limited resources and maintenance for ships to meet an ever-increasing demand signal for training is difficult. However, our people are the professional difference makers who work through them to meet training objectives safely every day.”

So how did a single boat from U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Carrier Group 4, a predecessor to Strike Force Training Atlantic now CSG-4, become a multi-platform squadron that provides training opportunities to the Fleet from basic through integrated phase?

Theirs is a story of teamwork and innovation focused on achieving the mission with a steady eye on emerging Fleet training demands. From the delivery of a Mobile Sea Range Program decades before, TSVRON delivers expanded training capability and readiness to the Navy and Marine Corps team today.

Humble Beginnings & Steady Progress

“At that time they [Cmdr. Mike Hull, Fleet Forces N7 staff, and Capt. Mark Noll, CARGRU 4 N7] sat down and said, let’s put this together. So they spoke with Rear Adm. Lindell Rutherford [then-Commander, CARGRU 4] and his successor to help arrange to get the Prevail – a surplus T-AGOS 8 asset that was being made ready for disposal,” said Wayne Gittelman, TSVRON 4 Program Manager.

“They got the Prevail and took it to Colonnas Shipyard under a SUP SHIP [Supervisor of Shipbuilding] contract and decided to build it out with all kinds of electronic components on it to make the range work.”

To make early strides in what became the Mobile Sea Range Program, CARGRU 4 intervened to divert then-CWO3 Gittelman from his orders to CARGRU 8 to bring him onto their team. Since retiring from service in uniform, Gittelman continue to serve as the Mobile Sea Range Program Manager.

After arriving at CARGRU 4, CWO3 Gittelman and team quickly learned that having a boat in the shipyard was vastly different than having personnel with the experience and expertise to fully realize the concept.

In 2005, Fleet Forces Command formally directed Strike Force Training Atlantic (SFTL), the successor to Carrier Group 4, to establish the Mobile Sea Range Program. To do this they brought together all of the training support vessels (TSV) then-operated by Norfolk Naval Shipyard and NAVAIR under one unique team. Beginning with Prevail (TSV 1), the program grew in capacity to four ships – Prevail, Hugo (TSV 2), Hunter (TSV 3), and Narragansett (TSV 4).

TSVs are formidable multi-role, multi-mission platforms. Based on each TSV’s original specifications, they developed unique capabilities used to meet training requirements. Their versatility is what makes them uniquely suited to support training throughout the East Coast’s Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP), from basic phase training through high-end warfighting.

For example, TSVs provide effective support for basic phase training events, Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) live-fire events, HSC Weapons School training, exercises in support of II Marine Expeditionary Force’s Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG), as well as high-end fight training exercises such as Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercises (ARGMEUEX), Group Sails, and Carrier Strike Group Composite Training Unit Exercises (COMPTUEX), the Joint Force’s most complex training event.

“While we are fundamentally part of CSG-4 and support integrated phase training events, the reality is that nearly fifty percent of the work our team does is outside of CSG-4 exercises,” said Gittelman. “The FFAECC [Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center] prioritizes our schedule, and that’s a good thing. We have a significant demand signal for training support that exceeds capacity, and having Fleet prioritization is important.”

In 2015, the Mobile Sea Range Program was renamed to its name today – Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4.

A Winning Team – TSVRON 4 and ATMO

A key element of TSVRON 4’s success and ability to adapt to emerging requirements is its enduring relationship with NAVAIR’s ATMO team. Both bring unique capabilities on the foundation of a mission-focused culture. An outside observer would not be able to point out ATMO or TSV mariners supporting a common mission.

“While it rarely happens within our day-to-day operations, I often have to remind people who aren’t familiar with the history of our work with ATMO that we aren’t in each other’s chain of command,” said Gittelman. “Our relationship is just that – an important, mutually beneficial partnership that supports Fleet training and force generation.”

ATMO supports Fleet training with TSVRON 4 in many ways.

For example, they support each of CSG-4’s Force Protection exercises on the East Coast. In these events, ATMO small boat operations deliver multiple presentations to shipboard teams that drive the ship’s force protection team to practice their pre-planned responses and activate defense countermeasures.

During many of CSG-4’s COMPTUEXs, ATMO provides service from the TSVs, as well as on land-based detachments. Just a few of the events ATMO directly supports in COMPTUEX include strait transits, counter-piracy training, live fire gunnery exercises, and unmanned surface vessel operations.

ATMO also supports multiple helicopter squadron training events from the TSV within exercises including crew-served weapons training, as well as the use of guided and unguided missiles at stationery targets or unmanned high-speed maneuvering surface targets (HSMST) towing a target.

A Steady Eye Toward the Future

In 2024, Vindicator (TSV 5) became the latest addition to the TSVRON 4 team, replacing Hugo (TSV 2).

The addition of Vindicator brought with it enhanced capabilities such as endurance, a larger mission deck to hold more HSMSTs, capability to support Helicopter Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (HVBSS) operations, dynamic positioning capability, portable accommodations for larger detachments, and increased on-station time.

“Our job here at TSVRON 4 isn’t to dictate what the customer wants,” said Gittelman. “Since day one, our job was to take leadership demand signal for Fleet training requirements – the what – and to figure out the how. The amazing part about our team is the number of people we have that can figure just about anything out if they have the time and resources – it’s core to the culture that we’ve built here over time.”

It didn’t take long to take advantage of Vindicator’s new capabilities. She completed support to her first HVBSS training mission during the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) ARGMEU Exercise on May 18, 2025.

“I think the future of the TSVs is with larger vessels like the Vindicator which provide greater capability and capacity,” said Michael Schoeller, master of Vindicator and former master of Narragansett (TSV 4), whose desire to drive ships steered him toward TSVRON 4 in 2018.

Schoeller has a background in oceanography and marine research as a master of vessels from the Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institution and Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences, and before that, he wore a Navy uniform as a Quartermaster, Boatswain’s Mate, and a Signalman.

TSVRON 4 will continue to deliver increased readiness and warfighting capability to the fleet, while rapidly innovating to meet numbered fleet commander requirements. And while TSVRON’s decades of service to the Fleet are often seen and heard if not recognized, many on the team are happy to keep it that way.

“For me it’s all about the people we have within our team. We don’t have PRDs (rotation dates), and our team has a tendency to make a career out of being here. We lose more people from getting older and not being able to get out to sea for stretches of time as much as we do anything else. We’re the unknown asset that everybody knows – and that’s not a bad thing,” said Gittelman.

This article was first published on DVIDS on May 29, 2025.

Featured image: Photo By Sgt. Tanner Bernat | U.S. Marines with Maritime Special Purpose Force, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, board a vessel in rigid-hull inflatable boats while conducting maritime interception operations aboard U.S. Navy training support vessel USNS Vindicator (TSV5) in support of Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercise (ARGMEUEX) while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, May 18, 2025.

During ARGMEUEX, the 22nd MEU, aboard IWO ARG shipping, conducts various mission essential tasks that enhance operational readiness and lethality as a unified IWOARG/22 MEU team. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tanner Bernat)

The images below in the slide show:

TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors.

The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements.

TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chelsea Palmer / released)

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Feb. 24, 2025) - Training Support Vessel (TSV) 4 Narragansett assigned to Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4 sits moored to the pier at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Feb. 24, 2025. TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors. The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements. TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training. (U.S. Navy courtesy photo / released)

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Feb. 24, 2025) - Training Support Vessel (TSV) 5 Vindicator assigned to Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4 sits moored to the pier at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Feb. 24, 2025. TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors. The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements. TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training. (US. Navy courtesy photo / released)

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Feb. 24, 2025) - Vice Adm. John Gumbleton, commander, Task Force 80 and deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, left, shakes hands with Michael Schoeller, right, master of Training Support Vessel (TSV) 5 Vindicator assigned to Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4 at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Feb. 24, 2025. TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors. The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements. TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training. (U.S. Navy courtesy photo / released)

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Feb. 24, 2025) - Vice Adm. John Gumbleton, commander, Task Force 80 and deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, arrives at Training Support Vessel (TSV) 5 Vindicator assigned to Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4 at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Feb. 24, 2025. TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors. The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements. TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chelsea Palmer / released)

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Feb. 24, 2025) – Master of Training Support Vessel (TSV) 5 Vindicator Mike Schoeller, right with hand raised, discusses the ship’s capabilities and TSV operations with Vice Adm. John Gumbleton, commander, Task Force 80 and deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, fourth from left, during a fleet visit to Vindicator (TSV 5), assigned to Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4, at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Feb. 24, 2025. TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors. The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements. TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chelsea Palmer / released)

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Feb. 24, 2025) - Vice Adm. John Gumbleton, commander, Task Force 80 and deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, right, and Master of Training Support Vessel (TSV) 5 Vindicator Michael Schoeller, left, listens to a response during a conversation about Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4 operations after walking the decks of Vindicator at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Feb. 24, 2025. TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors. The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements. TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chelsea Palmer / released)

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Feb. 24, 2025) - Vice Adm. John Gumbleton, commander, Task Force 80 and deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, left, speaks with the ship's crew aboard training support vessel (TSV) 5 Vindicator assigned to Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4 at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Feb. 24, 2025. TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors. The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements. TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chelsea Palmer / released)

I Marine Expeditionary Force

Posted on May 30, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

05/30/2025

U.S. Marines with I Marine Expeditionary Force have conducted a multitude of exercises and operations across the Indo-Pacific throughout 2024. I MEF provides the Marine Corps a globally responsive, expeditionary, and fully scalable Marine Air-Ground Task Force, capable of generating, deploying, and employing ready forces and formations across the Pacific.

CAMP HM SMITH, HAWAI

01.08.2025

Video by Lance Cpl. Blake Gonter

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific