From Cinematic Battles to Real War: Ukraine’s Journey from Waterloo to Today

08/29/2025

In 1970, the rolling hills and vast plains of Ukraine served as the backdrop for one of cinema’s most ambitious war epics. Sergei Bondarchuk’s “Waterloo” transformed the Soviet republic into 19th-century Belgium, with thousands of Red Army soldiers marching across Ukrainian soil to recreate Napoleon’s final defeat.

More than five decades later, those same landscapes echo with the sounds of real warfare, as Ukraine fights for its independence against Russian invasion. The cruel irony of history has turned a cinematic stage into an actual battlefield.

The 1970 film “Waterloo” represented an unprecedented collaboration between East and West during the Cold War era. Italian producer Dino De Laurentiis partnered with Soviet filmmakers to create what would become one of the most authentic war films ever made. The choice of Ukraine as the filming location was both practical and symbolic. Its terrain closely resembled the Belgian countryside where the actual Battle of Waterloo took place on June 18, 1815.

What made the film extraordinary was not just its $25 million budget (enormous for its time), but the Soviet government’s unprecedented decision to loan the production 15,000 soldiers from the Red Army. These weren’t actors or extras in the traditional sense, but active military personnel who brought genuine martial discipline to their performances. The soldiers were trained for months in 19th-century military tactics, learning to march in formation, handle period weapons, and execute the complex maneuvers that characterized Napoleonic warfare.

The irony was palpable even then: Soviet soldiers, representatives of a communist state that had risen from the ashes of Tsarist Russia, were portraying the armies of Napoleon and Wellington, the very forces that had shaped the Europe their own revolution would later transform. Ukrainian soil, which had witnessed countless real battles throughout history, from Mongol invasions to World War II’s devastating Eastern Front, now hosted a carefully choreographed recreation of someone else’s war.

Ukraine’s selection as the filming location was hardly accidental. The region has long served as a crossroads where empires clash and historical narratives intersect. From the medieval Kyivan Rus to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, from the Ottoman Empire’s northern reaches to the expanding Russian Empire, Ukrainian lands have been contested territory for centuries. The Cossack uprisings, the devastating famines, the Holocaust, and the brutal fighting of World War II, all have left their marks on this soil.

During the Soviet era, Ukraine was both a crucial agricultural heartland and an industrial powerhouse, contributing significantly to the USSR’s military and economic might. The soldiers who marched across Ukrainian fields in 1970, recreating Waterloo’s charges and counter-charges, were part of this Soviet military machine. Many of these soldiers were themselves Ukrainian, their families having survived Stalin’s engineered famines and Hitler’s occupation. They were now playing soldiers from a completely different era and conflict, their own complex history temporarily subsumed into the grand narrative of Napoleon’s downfall.

The film’s production showcased the Soviet Union’s organizational capabilities and Ukraine’s strategic importance within the federation. The logistics required to coordinate 15,000 soldiers, hundreds of horses, authentic costumes, and period weaponry demonstrated the kind of centralized planning and resource mobilization that characterized Soviet governance. Ukrainian infrastructure, from railways to accommodation facilities, supported this massive undertaking.

“Waterloo” achieved an authenticity that modern CGI-heavy productions struggle to match. The cavalry charges were real, with actual horses and riders thundering across Ukrainian steppes. The artillery smoke that rolled across the battlefield came from genuine cannons firing blank charges. The formations of infantry, thousands strong, moved with the precision that only actual military training could provide.

Bondarchuk, himself a veteran of World War II’s Eastern Front, brought a deep understanding of warfare’s chaos and brutality to the production. The Ukrainian locations provided the vast open spaces necessary to stage such massive battle scenes. The rolling terrain allowed cameras to capture the ebb and flow of battle across multiple miles, showing how Napoleon’s forces gradually succumbed to Wellington’s defensive positions and Prussian reinforcements.

The soldiers’ performances carried weight because they understood military discipline in ways that civilian actors never could. Their movements during battle scenes reflected genuine tactical knowledge, their responses to commands showed real military training, and their ability to maintain formation under difficult filming conditions demonstrated the kind of unit cohesion that actual armies require.

Yet there was something surreal about watching Soviet soldiers portray the Grande Armée.

Napoleon’s multinational force that had included Poles, Germans, Italians, and French. Many of the Ukrainian and Russian soldiers participating in the film came from regions that had actually fought against Napoleon during his 1812 invasion of Russia. They were now, in essence, playing their own historical enemies.

The transformation from cinematic battleground to actual war zone began decades after the cameras stopped rolling. Ukraine’s path to independence following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 was initially peaceful, but it set the stage for the conflicts that would later engulf the region. The Orange Revolution of 2004, the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014, and Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine marked Ukraine’s gradual shift from Soviet satellite to contested nation.

The 2022 Russian invasion brought full-scale warfare to Ukrainian soil for the first time since World War II. The same landscapes that had hosted Bondarchuk’s elaborate recreations of 19th-century warfare now witnessed 21st-century combat featuring drones, precision missiles, and tank battles that would have been unimaginable to the filmmakers of 1970.

The parallels are haunting.

Where Soviet soldiers once pretended to charge across fields in formation, Ukrainian defenders now fight for their homeland’s survival. The Ukrainian steppes that provided such magnificent backdrops for cinematic cavalry charges now see the movement of modern armored columns and the flight patterns of military aircraft.

The coordination and logistics that once served a film production now serve a life-and-death struggle for national existence.

The juxtaposition reveals something profound about how we remember and represent conflict.

In 1970, war was something that could be packaged as entertainment, a spectacular historical drama complete with heroic charges and noble defeats. The Battle of Waterloo, safely distant in time, could be transformed into cinematic spectacle. The Soviet soldiers participating were performing someone else’s history, playing roles in a conflict that had ended 155 years before they were born.

Today’s war in Ukraine carries no such distance or abstraction.

Every explosion, every casualty, every displaced family represents immediate human cost. The Ukrainian soldiers defending their country aren’t performing historical roles. They’re writing contemporary history with their blood and sacrifice. The soil that once absorbed fake gunpowder and theatrical casualties now bears witness to genuine loss and heroism.

The film “Waterloo” captured Napoleon’s famous observation that “from the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step.” The current reality in Ukraine suggests a different truth: from the cinematic to the real is also but a step, and that step can be measured in human lives rather than entertainment value.

The 15,000 Soviet soldiers who participated in filming “Waterloo” have long since returned to civilian life or passed away. Many were Ukrainian, and some of their descendants may now be fighting in the current conflict. The transformation from extras in a historical drama to participants in contemporary history represents one of those strange turns that only time can create.

The film itself remains a masterpiece of historical recreation, its battle scenes unmatched in their scope and authenticity. Yet viewing it today, knowing what has transpired in Ukraine, adds layers of meaning that its creators never intended. Every Ukrainian face among the Soviet extras, every piece of Ukrainian terrain captured on film, now carries the weight of current events.

Perhaps this is what makes the comparison so compelling: it reminds us that history is never truly past, that the landscapes we use to remember old wars can quickly become the sites of new ones.

The Ukrainian fields that once echoed with the choreographed sounds of Napoleonic battle now ring with the urgent reality of contemporary conflict. The transition from performance to reality, from recreation to creation of new history, serves as a sobering reminder that peace, like the elaborate staging of old wars, can be more fragile than we imagine.

The story of Ukraine, from Soviet film set to independent nation under siege, encapsulates the unpredictable nature of history itself.

What begins as entertainment can become earnest reality; what seems like distant past can suddenly become urgent present.

In this transformation lies both tragedy and testament to the enduring human capacity for both creation and destruction, for both artistic achievement and actual heroism.

The featured image was generated by an AI program.

Brazil-China Economic Relations: A Critical Assessment of Contemporary Scholarship

08/27/2025

The economic relationship between Brazil and China has emerged as one of the most significant bilateral partnerships in the Global South, fundamentally reshaping both countries’ development trajectories since the early 2000s.

As China became Brazil’s largest trading partner, bilateral trade reached USD 159.6 billion in 2023, with China accounting for nearly a third of Brazil’s exports. However, beneath these impressive headline figures lies a complex web of economic dependencies, structural transformations, and development challenges that have generated intense academic debate.

Recent scholarship, exemplified by Lucas Peixoto Pinheiro da Silva’s analysis of Brazil-China relations, highlights growing concerns about the developmental implications of this deepening partnership. Silva’s work contributes to a rich body of literature that has evolved from initial optimism about South-South cooperation to more nuanced assessments of asymmetric interdependence and its consequences for Brazilian industrialization.

This article examines how contemporary scholarship has analyzed Brazil-China economic relations, positioning Silva’s recent contribution within the broader academic discourse while identifying key themes, debates, and theoretical frameworks that have shaped understanding of this critical relationship.

The Evolution of Academic Perspectives

The initial phase of academic analysis, roughly spanning from 2001 to 2010, was characterized by considerable optimism about the potential for mutually beneficial South-South cooperation.

China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 marked the beginning of robust economic ties with Latin America, with trade growing at an annual rate of 31 percent between 2000 and 2008. Early scholarship emphasized complementarity, viewing China’s demand for raw materials as a natural fit with Latin America’s comparative advantages in agriculture and mining.

This optimistic perspective portrayed the relationship as offering Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, an alternative to traditional dependence on North American and European markets. The narrative of “South-South cooperation” suggested that developing countries could forge more equitable partnerships based on shared historical experiences and mutual respect for sovereignty. (1)

By the mid-2010s, a more critical scholarly consensus began to emerge, fundamentally challenging earlier optimistic assessments. Rhys Jenkins’s seminal 2015 study, “Is Chinese Competition Causing Deindustrialization in Brazil?”, marked a turning point in academic analysis. Jenkins argued that “Brazil has experienced relative deindustrialization in the sense of a declining share of the manufacturing sector in gross domestic product that is mainly attributable to the changes in the country’s trade balance in manufactures,” with Chinese competition playing a significant role in this process. (2)

This shift toward critical analysis coincided with empirical evidence of what scholars termed “reprimarization” or “re-primarization” or the increasing concentration of exports in primary commodities. Research demonstrated that by 2013, approximately 80% of Latin America’s exports to China were concentrated in just five primary products: oil, soybeans, iron ore, copper, and sugar, representing a significant increase from 47% in 2000. (3)

The most recent phase of scholarship, including Silva’s 2025 analysis, has moved beyond binary assessments to examine the specific conditions under which Brazil-China relations either support or undermine Brazilian development objectives. This contemporary literature is characterized by several key features:

  • Territorial and Spatial Analysis: Recent scholarship has increasingly focused on the uneven spatial distribution of benefits from Brazil-China economic integration. Silva’s emphasis on how export-led agricultural growth has been “highly uneven across the country, with certain areas capturing the lion’s share of benefits” reflects a broader academic interest in the territorial dimensions of reprimarization. (4)
  • Institutional and Policy Focus: Contemporary studies examine how domestic institutions and policy frameworks shape the developmental outcomes of China engagement. Research on Brazil’s recent industrial policy initiatives, including the Ecological Transformation Plan (ETP) and technological cooperation agreements with China, represents this institutionally-focused approach. (5)
  • Asymmetric Interdependence: Modern scholarship has adopted more sophisticated theoretical frameworks for understanding Brazil-China relations. Rather than viewing the relationship through simple dependency or mutual benefit lenses, contemporary analysis employs concepts of asymmetric interdependence that recognize both countries’ agency while acknowledging structural power imbalances. (6)

Key Themes in Contemporary Scholarship

Deindustrialization and Structural Transformation

The question of whether China’s rise has contributed to Brazilian deindustrialization remains central to academic debate. Multiple studies have documented Brazil’s declining share of global manufacturing value-added, with research showing an average annual decline of 0.73 percent between 2012 and 2022. However, scholars disagree about the extent to which this deindustrialization should be attributed directly to Chinese competition versus broader structural factors.

Jenkins’s research provides empirical evidence that “Chinese manufacturing exports directly displaced Brazilian exports” in third-country markets, with currency appreciation serving as an important transmission channel. (7) This finding supports arguments that Chinese competition has indeed contributed to Brazil’s industrial decline, though the magnitude and mechanisms of this impact remain subjects of ongoing research.

The Commodity Dependence Debate

Academic analysis of Brazil’s commodity dependence has evolved considerably since the early 2000s. While initial scholarship viewed high commodity prices as unambiguously beneficial for Brazil, more recent analysis has emphasized the structural limitations of commodity-dependent growth models.

Research by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) argues that Brazil’s commodity dependence leads to “low growth, macroeconomic instability, and difficulties in raising productivity and diversifying the composition of the country’s economy.” (8) This perspective aligns with Silva’s argument that Brazil’s reliance on extractive exports may be “accelerating its deindustrialisation, undermining economic diversification and complexity.”

Spatial Inequality and Regional Development

One of Silva’s most significant contributions to the literature is his emphasis on how Brazil-China economic integration affects spatial inequality within Brazil. This territorial dimension has received less attention in earlier scholarship but represents an important avenue for understanding the domestic distributional consequences of international economic integration.

Recent research on “territorial reprimarization” has examined how “the re-specialization in natural resource-intensive primary goods” creates distinct patterns of regional development, with some areas benefiting significantly while others remain excluded from growth processes. (9) This spatial perspective adds important nuance to aggregate assessments of Brazil-China economic relations.

Theoretical Frameworks and Analytical Approaches

Dependency Theory Revival

Contemporary scholarship on Brazil-China relations has witnessed a notable revival of dependency theory concepts, though applied in more sophisticated ways than earlier dependency analyses. Rather than viewing dependency as a static condition, recent studies examine how different forms of economic integration can either reinforce or challenge dependent relationships.

Silva’s analysis exemplifies this neo-dependency approach, arguing that Brazil risks “becoming locked into a peripheral role in the global economy” without strategic policy interventions. This perspective recognizes agency and policy choice while maintaining attention to structural constraints imposed by global economic hierarchies.

Asymmetric Interdependence Theory

Recent scholarship has increasingly employed asymmetric interdependence theory to understand Brazil-China relations. This framework, developed in international relations literature, recognizes that while both countries benefit from economic integration, the distribution of benefits and costs may be highly uneven.

Research applying this framework to Brazil-China relations emphasizes that “an asymmetric relationship does not imply that the larger side can unilaterally dictate the terms of the relationship,” while acknowledging that Brazil faces greater vulnerabilities due to its smaller economic size and higher dependence on the bilateral relationship. (10)

Global Value Chain Analysis

Contemporary scholarship has also employed global value chain (GVC) analysis to understand Brazil’s position in China-centered production networks. This approach examines how Brazil’s integration into Chinese-led value chains affects its opportunities for industrial upgrading and technological development.

Research in this tradition has identified specific sectors and companies, such as BYD’s electric bus manufacturing operations in Brazil, where bilateral cooperation has facilitated technology transfer and industrial development. (11) However, these success stories remain exceptions within a broader pattern of commoditized trade relations.

Policy Implications and Future Research Directions

Contemporary scholarship has increasingly focused on identifying policy frameworks that could enable Brazil to derive greater developmental benefits from its relationship with China. Silva’s call for “deliberate efforts to diversify its export base, strengthen regional linkages, and promote sectors with higher economic complexity” reflects broader academic consensus about the need for proactive industrial policy.

Recent research has examined Brazil’s attempts to implement such policies, including analysis of the country’s National Investment Bank (NIB) and various industrial policy initiatives designed to promote technological upgrading and export diversification. (12)

An emerging theme in contemporary scholarship concerns the environmental implications of Brazil-China economic integration. Research has examined how Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities affects deforestation patterns, carbon emissions, and biodiversity conservation.

This environmental dimension adds additional complexity to assessments of Brazil-China relations, as scholars grapple with tensions between short-term economic benefits and long-term sustainability objectives. (13)

Conclusion

The academic literature on Brazil-China economic relations has evolved significantly since the early 2000s, moving from initial optimism about South-South cooperation to more nuanced assessments of asymmetric interdependence and its developmental implications.

Silva’s recent contribution exemplifies the current state of scholarship: analytically sophisticated, empirically grounded, and focused on identifying specific conditions under which Brazil-China integration can support rather than undermine Brazilian development objectives.

Contemporary scholarship has made several important contributions to understanding this relationship.

First, it has documented the extent and mechanisms through which Chinese engagement has contributed to Brazilian deindustrialization and export reprimarization.

Second, it has highlighted the spatial and distributional consequences of economic integration, showing how benefits and costs are unevenly distributed across Brazilian territory and social groups.

Third, it has identified specific policy frameworks and institutional arrangements that might enable Brazil to capture greater developmental benefits from its relationship with China.

As Brazil and China continue to deepen their economic relationship, academic scholarship could play a crucial role in informing policy debates and development strategies.

The featured image highlights our forthcoming book to be published in 2026.

Footnotes

1. Javier A. Vadell, Giuseppe Lo Brutto, and Marília Silva de Oliveira Leite, “Dragon in the ‘backyard’: China’s investment and trade in Latin America in the context of crisis,” Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 40, no. 4 (2020): 580-601.

2 Rhys Jenkins, “Is Chinese Competition Causing Deindustrialization in Brazil?,” Latin American Perspectives 42, no. 6 (2015): 42-63.

3 ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), “Latin America and the Caribbean and China: Towards a New Phase in Economic and Trade Relations,” 2015.

4  Lucas Peixoto Pinheiro da Silva, “Brazil, China, and the New Geography of Development,” University of São Paulo and King’s College London, June 12, 2025.

5 Phenomenal World, “State and Development,” February 17, 2025, https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/state-and-development/.

6 Thiago P. B. Bessimo and Octavio Amorim Neto, “The Brazilian Extreme-Right and China,” International Politics 61 (2024): 542-565.

7 Rhys Jenkins, “Exports of manufactured goods and structural change: Brazil in the face of Chinese competition,” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 63 (2022): 473-486.

8 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Why Brazil Sought Chinese Investments to Diversify Its Manufacturing Economy,” October 18, 2022.

9 Regional Studies Association, “Territorial reprimarization: Questions regarding regional development and urbanization in Brazil,” October 22, 2024.

10 Bessimo and Amorim Neto, “The Brazilian Extreme-Right and China.” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1866802X241263362

11 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Why Brazil Sought Chinese Investments to Diversify Its Manufacturing Economy.”

12 Phenomenal World, “State and Development.”

13 Cambridge Core, “Re-Primarization All Over Again? Extraction and Resistance in Twenty-First-Century Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 59, no. 3 (2024): 690-696.

REFORPAC 2025

Two U.S. Air Force F-35 Lightning II’s fly side by side during exercise Resolute Force Pacific (REFORPAC) 2025 at Misawa Air Base, Japan, July 15, 2025.

REFORPAC spans multiple locations across the Pacific, sharpening the USAF’s ability to rapidly deploy, sustain operations and project airpower in contested environments.

MISAWA AIR BASE, AOMORI, JAPAN

07.15.2025

Photo by Senior Airman Brittany Russell 

35th Fighter Wing

Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Competition: From Science Project to Operational Reality

This report examines the evolution of U.S. hypersonic weapons development from the Bush administration through 2025, tracing how technological promise repeatedly encountered bureaucratic obstacles and shifting strategic priorities.

The report argues that after decades of delays caused by focus on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, American hypersonic programs have finally reached operational readiness, with Air Force systems ARRW and HACM approaching deployment.

The integration of hypersonic weapons into U.S. military strategy represents both an opportunity and a challenge that extends far beyond impressive technical capabilities. While these weapons offer significant advantages in terms of speed, range, and precision, they also create fundamental challenges for command-and-control structures and nuclear risk management that require immediate attention.

The temporal compression that hypersonic weapons create forces a reconsideration of traditional command relationships and decision-making processes. Military institutions must adapt to operating environments where critical decisions must be made at machine speed while maintaining strategic coherence and appropriate political oversight.

The nuclear threshold implications of hypersonic deployment require equally serious attention to crisis management protocols and strategic communication frameworks. While these weapons offer conventional alternatives to nuclear escalation, their speed and precision capabilities might paradoxically increase nuclear risks if not properly managed through enhanced command and control arrangements.

Success requires what might be called a “systems approach” to hypersonic integration, one that considers not only the technical capabilities of the weapons themselves but also the command-and-control adaptations, strategic communication requirements, and nuclear risk management protocols necessary for their effective employment.

This integration cannot wait for perfect solutions or comprehensive studies. As strategic competition intensifies and adversaries deploy their own hypersonic capabilities, the United States must move beyond treating these weapons as science projects and begin addressing the command-and-control challenges their deployment creates.

The technology is ready. The targeting enterprise exists. The strategic requirement is urgent. What remains is the institutional will to move from development to deployment, from science project to operational capability. The window for establishing credible deterrence in the Pacific is measured in years, not decades. The choice facing military planners and policymakers is clear: adapt command and control structures to hypersonic realities or risk deploying weapons whose speed advantages are negated by institutional limitations and escalation risks.

The transformation demanded by hypersonic weapons represents more than technological adaptation. It requires a fundamental evolution in how military forces are commanded, controlled, and employed in strategic competition. The nations that successfully navigate this transformation while managing its associated risks will hold decisive advantages in conflicts that may define the next generation of global security. Those that fail to adapt risk finding their most advanced weapons neutralized by their own institutional limitations.

For a podcast which discusses the report, see the following:

Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Competition: From Science Project to Operational Reality

For a video discussing the report, see the following:

The Coming of Hypersonic Weapons to the U.S. Operational Force

Britain and the IMF Bailout Debate: Economic Crisis or Political Theatre?

08/26/2025

Nearly five decades after Britain’s humiliating dash to the International Monetary Fund for a bailout, warnings of history repeating itself are echoing through Westminster and the City of London.

A growing chorus of economists, politicians, and financial commentators are drawing stark parallels between today’s economic challenges and the crisis that forced Denis Healey to famously turn around at Heathrow Airport in 1976 to negotiate Britain’s financial survival.

The alarm bells began ringing most prominently when Professor Jagjit Chadha, the former head of the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, warned that Britain’s economy was “on the brink of collapse.” Speaking to The Times, Chadha invoked Ernest Hemingway’s famous observation about bankruptcy: “First gradually and then suddenly.”

The comparison to 1976, when James Callaghan’s Labour government requested what was then the largest loan in IMF history, £3.2 billion under stringent conditions, has become a rallying cry for critics of the current government’s fiscal approach.

The 1976 Crisis: A Historical Context

To understand the current debate, it’s essential to revisit what actually happened in 1976.

Britain had become the “sick man of Europe” as inflation soared above 16 percent and the pound reached record lows against the dollar.³ The combination of an oil crisis and double-digit inflation made government debt deeply unattractive to international investors.

When Chancellor Denis Healey was forced to abandon his journey to a finance ministers’ meeting in Hong Kong to return home and negotiate an IMF bailout, it marked one of the most dramatic moments in British economic history.

The £3.2 billion loan came with stringent conditions: higher taxes, elevated interest rates, and what were then the deepest cuts in government spending on record. Britain was forced to accept external oversight of its economic policy, a humiliation that scarred a generation of politicians and civil servants. However, as critics of the current bailout warnings point out, Britain only needed the loan for six months and repaid it when the immediate crisis passed.

Today’s Warning Signals

The economists raising alarms today point to several concerning parallels. While inflation in 1976 was running at more than 16 percent compared to today’s 3.8 percent, they argue that Britain faces similar structural vulnerabilities through what they term the “twin deficits.”

The first is the budget deficit, the government is spending £60 billion ($125 billion) more than it raises annually. The second is the current account deficit, meaning Britain imports more than it exports to the rest of the world. This combination leaves the UK particularly dependent on what Mark Carney, the former Bank of England governor, memorably described during the Brexit referendum as the “kindness” of foreign investors.

Andrew Sentance, a former member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, has been particularly vocal in his warnings. “Rachel Reeves is on course to deliver a Healey 1976-style crisis in late 2025 or 26,” he declared, noting that she has “massively boosted public spending, borrowing and taxes — fuelling both demand-pull and cost-push inflation.” Sentance pointedly observed that Britain’s borrowing costs are now higher than Greece’s, which he described as “an indictment of where the UK is.”

Willem Buiter, another former Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee member, issued an even starker warning, suggesting that Chancellor Rachel Reeves would face market scrutiny that “will be at least as effective as the pressure from the IMF was in the 1970s” unless she changes course.

Market Signals and Political Rhetoric

The concerns aren’t limited to academic economists. Market indicators are showing signs of stress, with the cost of government borrowing, particularly 30-year gilts, steadily rising which is a clear signal of increasing nervousness among investors. The government’s retreat from planned welfare cuts has added to mounting evidence of market concerns, critics argue.

Political figures have seized on these economic warnings to attack the Labour government’s fiscal policies. Nigel Farage, the Reform UK leader, told The Telegraph that the situation felt like “the 1970s all over again,” but warned that Britain’s position was even worse now because the country is “bitterly divided” compared to the relative social unity of the 1970s. Conservative Party leader Kemi Badenoch described the surging cost of government borrowing as “the price” of Labour’s “economic mismanagement.”

The warnings have gained additional urgency with concerns about the autumn budget. Chancellor Reeves faces filling a deficit of as much as £40 billion in the public finances, and there are fears that without spending cuts, there could be another bond and currency market panic similar to the “Truss tantrum” that followed Liz Truss’s disastrous mini-budget.

Mark Dowding, the chief investment officer at RBC BlueBay Asset Management, captured market sentiment by warning that the pound was vulnerable to another market revolt if Reeves cannot bring down “runaway welfare spending.” He noted, “There is a sense that the market’s trust in the government’s policy stance is starting to evaporate.”

The Scale of Current Challenges

Recent data suggests the fiscal challenges are substantial. Public debt has reached 96.4% of GDP with a deficit of 5.1%—figures that are significantly higher than the 61.2% debt-to-GDP ratio recorded in 1976 when Britain required IMF support. Some analysts describe Britain as facing a £50 billion “black hole” in public finances, with surging borrowing costs and stagnant growth fueling fears of prolonged stagflation.

Professor Chadha has been uncompromising in his assessment of the risks. “By failing to address this critical issue we leave ourselves vulnerable to a random shock or something from overseas,” he warned. “We haven’t got a robust platform. Unless we sound alarm bells and get some action — preferably a fiscal consolidation plan — that’s the level of seriousness we are facing.”

The economist painted a dire picture of what an IMF bailout scenario might look like: “We will not be able to roll over debt, we will not be able to meet pensions payments, benefits will be hard to pay out.” Such warnings carry particular weight given Chadha’s previous role leading one of Britain’s most respected economic research institutes.

The Counter-Argument

However, not all economists share these apocalyptic warnings. Richard Murphy, a prominent tax economist, has mounted a systematic challenge to the bailout narrative, arguing that comparisons to 1976 are fundamentally flawed.

Murphy contends that the 1976 bailout was essentially unnecessary, pointing out that only half of the IMF loan was actually drawn and it was repaid in full within 18 months. He argues that the crisis was primarily one of understanding rather than genuine financial distress, rooted in Britain’s failed attempt to maintain Sterling’s reserve currency status in an era of global dollar shortage.

“Britain had balance of payments and current account deficits, but it wasn’t, and could never be ‘bankrupt,'” Murphy argues. He emphasizes that modern Britain, unlike in 1976, has full control over its currency and monetary policy. The Bank of England can create money as needed, a capability that was effectively demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic when the government simply “created more money” to address economic challenges.

Murphy is particularly critical of economists raising bailout warnings, suggesting they have “remarkably little understanding of money” and are akin to “maybe 90+% of all macroeconomists and nearly 100% of microeconomists” who fail to grasp modern monetary theory. He argues that countries like Britain, which issue their own currencies, face fundamentally different constraints than they did under the Bretton Woods system that was collapsing in the 1970s.

The IMF’s Official Position

Perhaps most tellingly, the institution that would actually provide any potential bailout—the IMF itself—has recently offered a starkly different assessment of Britain’s economic prospects. In its 2025 Article IV consultation, the IMF actually endorsed the UK government’s fiscal strategy, stating that it “strikes a good balance between supporting growth and safeguarding fiscal sustainability.”

The Fund upgraded Britain’s growth forecast to 1.2% for 2025, describing the UK’s economic recovery as “underway” and projecting momentum to build through 2026. Crucially, the IMF characterized the government’s spending plans as “credible and growth-friendly,” noting that “they are expected to provide an economic boost over the medium term that outweighs the impact of higher taxation.”

The IMF’s assessment directly contradicts the bailout warnings, with the Fund stating that “as revenue is projected to increase, deficits are set to decline and stabilize net debt.” The organization also praised the government’s Growth Mission, stating it “focuses on the right areas to lift productivity.”

This official endorsement prompted a robust response from the Treasury, with a spokesperson calling warnings of a 1976-style crisis “unfounded” and emphasizing that the government’s fiscal strategy had been explicitly “endorsed by the IMF.”

Market Dynamics and Historical Context

The current market turbulence, while concerning, may not necessarily presage an IMF bailout scenario. Martin Weale, a former Bank of England rate-setter, noted that while “the markets are looking less favourably on us than they are any other major economy,” he hadn’t heard “anyone saying we’re at a point where we can’t access the debt markets.”

Paul Johnson, the former head of the Institute for Fiscal Studies, struck a similarly measured tone despite acknowledging challenges. “There clearly are issues because we are paying more interest on our debt than anyone else,” he observed, “but I don’t think there’s any indication that people are going to stop lending to us.”

This perspective suggests that while Britain faces genuine fiscal pressures, the situation may not be as dire as the most alarmist warnings suggest. The bond market’s willingness to continue lending to the UK government, albeit at higher rates, indicates that investors still view British government debt as fundamentally sound.

Alternative Crisis Responses

Even economists who acknowledge serious fiscal risks don’t necessarily see an IMF bailout as the most likely outcome. Some argue that if a fresh crisis emerges, the Bank of England would more likely slash interest rates while the government implemented an emergency austerity budget to restore market confidence, rather than seeking external assistance.

This reflects the reality that Britain retains significant policy tools that weren’t available or weren’t understood in 1976. The flexible exchange rate system, independent monetary policy, and modern understanding of sovereign debt dynamics provide options that simply didn’t exist during the Bretton Woods era.

The bailout debate reveals deeper tensions about Britain’s economic model and fiscal priorities. Critics of the current approach argue that years of avoiding difficult fiscal choices have left Britain particularly vulnerable to external shocks. As Professor Chadha noted, successive governments have “regularly withdrawn from any plan to reduce expenditure” while binding themselves by ruling out increases to major taxes.

This political dynamic where spending cuts are politically toxic but tax increases are ruled out creates what some economists see as an unsustainable fiscal trap. The government faces pressure to maintain or expand public services while operating within self-imposed fiscal constraints that may prove unrealistic in the face of demographic pressures and economic headwinds.

The Productivity Puzzle

Underlying many of these fiscal challenges is Britain’s persistent productivity problem. The IMF noted that “persistently weak productivity remains the UK’s primary obstacle to lifting growth and living standards,” with the UK experiencing “a decline in trend productivity growth since the Global Financial Crisis.” This productivity stagnation makes it harder to grow out of fiscal challenges and places greater pressure on the government to find alternative solutions.

The productivity challenge has multiple causes, including “chronic under-investment, low private R&D, limited access to finance for businesses to scale up, skill gaps, and a deterioration in health outcomes.” Addressing these structural issues requires long-term investment and reform—precisely the kind of policy initiatives that may conflict with short-term fiscal consolidation pressures.

Conclusion: Crisis or Confusion?

The debate over Britain’s potential need for an IMF bailout reflects genuine economic challenges but may also represent a fundamental misunderstanding of how modern monetary systems operate. While the fiscal pressures are real, high debt, persistent deficits, and market concerns about sustainability, the institutional framework within which these challenges occur has changed dramatically since 1976.

The most telling aspect of this debate may be the contrast between the dire warnings from former Bank of England officials and other economists, and the IMF’s own relatively sanguine assessment of Britain’s fiscal situation. If the institution that would provide any bailout sees the current fiscal strategy as sustainable and growth-friendly, it raises questions about whether the crisis rhetoric reflects genuine economic analysis or political positioning.

That said, the warnings serve an important function in highlighting the fiscal challenges Britain faces and the need for sustainable long-term policies. Whether these challenges require the kind of dramatic intervention seen in 1976, or can be managed through conventional monetary and fiscal policy tools, remains to be seen. What seems clear is that the debate itself reflects deeper uncertainties about Britain’s economic future and the difficult trade-offs between immediate political pressures and long-term fiscal sustainability.

The coming months, particularly the autumn budget and market reaction to it, may provide clearer evidence of whether Britain is indeed facing a 1976-style crisis or whether the warnings represent a more manageable set of fiscal challenges that can be addressed through conventional policy tools.

In the meantime, the ghost of 1976 continues to haunt British economic policy debates, serving as both a warning and a reminder of how dramatically the global monetary system has evolved over the past half-century.

This essay is published in memory of our colleague Harald Malmgren who certainly have written a piece on this issue for us.

Assessing Global Change: Strategic Perspectives of Dr. Harald Malmgren

Cross-service Maintenance: US and ROK Forces

08/25/2025

The U.S. Air Force and Republic of Korea Air Force participate in an F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft cross-servicing effort at Daegu Air Base, Republic of Korea, June 11, 2025.

The intent of this cross-servicing event was to develop and mature the capabilities of the two allies to recover, service and launch each other’s aircraft in support of combat air operations.

DAEGU, SOUTH KOREA

06.11.2025

8th Fighter Wing

The CH-53K in Action: Bridging the Gap Between Technology and New Operational Possibilities

By Robbin Laird

The U.S. Marine Corps’ latest heavy-lift helicopter, the CH-53K King Stallion, represents far more than an evolutionary step from its predecessor. In an interview on July 22, 2025, Col Kate Fleeger, Program Manager, H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopters Program at NAVAIR, underscored that the CH-53K embodies a fundamental shift in how Marines approach heavy-lift operations, mission planning, and force sustainment.

According to Col Fleeger, the aircraft’s debut at major exercises is revealing capabilities that extend well beyond its impressive lift specifications, challenging traditional acquisition and support paradigms while unlocking new operational possibilities.

At the heart of Col Fleeger’s leadership priorities lies a conceptual paradox: how to introduce a cutting-edge capability without having it mentally reduced to merely the “next version” of the past. She explains that part of this stems from deliberate choices in the helicopter’s designation and outward appearance.

“What contributes to that challenge is the fact that we called it the CH-53K instead of going with something wholly different, the fact that we made it look a lot like a 53 Echo. I think it actually encourages, unfortunately, people to view the platform as a replacement platform instead of a revolutionary, key element of a really forward-thinking concept of operations.”

This insight highlights the inertia that can affect even the most innovative military programs. Marines, maintainers, and planners have long relied on the CH-53E Super Stallion as the backbone of heavy-lift operations. The King Stallion’s larger engines, advanced avionics, and greater payload unleash new capabilities and new possibilities for operational innovation.

The CH-53K should not be seen as a modest improvement, but as a transformative enabler for a new era of expeditionary operations. Its ultimate effectiveness will depend on whether users — operators, planners, commanders — embrace the change which the CH-53K enables.

Col Fleeger noted that the best antidote to old mindsets is realistic, challenging operational experience. The Service Level Training Exercise (SLTE) at 29 Palms, California in January 2025, provided exactly that opportunity, where HMH-461 deployed six CH-53K aircraft in a proving ground for both the machine and the Marines.

“This is a large-scale exercise at 29 Palms, California, Marine Corps-wide, and it is really designed to kind of put the entire [MAGTF] through its paces. They’re not only practicing and implementing, kind of our standard CONOPS and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) with the equipment that we’ve had all along,” said Col. Fleeger. “But then they’re also integrating newer capabilities and kind of executing variations on the existing TTPs, and coming up with wholly new TTPs as well, and trying those out in an operationally realistic environment.”

The exercise wasn’t simply a demonstration of lift capacity. It was an exploration of what becomes possible when technological limitations disappear. Where the CH-53E required extensive preparation and carried significant risk when lifting 20,000-pound loads, the CH-53K handles such operations routinely. This transformation from complex undertaking to routine operation fundamentally changes how ground commanders plan missions.

The exercise’s most striking demonstration was a full company insert conducted entirely with CH-53K aircraft. This capability dramatically reduces both the operational signature and timing required for major troop movements. As such, this operational capability delivers critical advantages in contested environments where speed and smaller numbers of lift elements determine mission success.

Key aspects of the exercise included:

  • Testing the CH-53K’s increased lift and range in situations simulating contested logistics, distributed sustainment, and rapid troop movements.
  • Enabling Marines to experiment with, adapt, and iterate on established and entirely new TTPs, not just for the CH-53K, but in the context of evolving Marine Corps operational doctrine.
  • Demonstrating how developing confidence in the platform is as much about human adaptation as machine performance.

Perhaps the most significant but least visible advancement lies in the CH-53K’s integrated mission planning ecosystem. Col Fleeger emphasized that this system encompasses both cockpit technologies and ground-based planning stations, creating seamless integration throughout the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

“Planning is as important as execution,” Col Fleeger noted, describing how the CH-53K’s systems integrate into rapid response planning processes across the entire MAGTF structure. This represents a paradigm shift from aircraft-centric planning to truly integrated operational design, asking planners to start with the problem, not with the platform, and to imagine what missions are now possible.

It’s easy to focus on mindset, but the CH-53K’s technical attributes are undeniable. Designed with the demands of distributed maritime operations in mind, the aircraft is a force multiplier for both traditional and emerging missions: These differences aren’t just statistics; they enable new concepts in contested logistics, distributed basing, and support for high-end maneuver warfare

The CH-53K’s digital architecture generates unprecedented amounts of operational data, but Col Fleeger identified a critical challenge: transforming data into actionable information and knowledge for sustainment operations. The aircraft continuously collects information that could revolutionize supply chain management, but only if organizational systems evolve to process and act on these insights.

“Data is no good to anybody if you can’t move that data throughout the ecosystem and analyze it in such a way that you turn it into actionable information,” she explained. The goal is creating a seamless flow from aircraft-generated data to demand signals that inform industrial partners about parts requirements for production in advance.

This represents a fundamental shift from reactive maintenance to predictive sustainment. This capability is essential for maintaining readiness in distributed operations where traditional logistics pipelines may be disrupted.

Col Fleeger provided an overview on the progress of the program and significant milestones ahead:

  • August 2025: The 20th aircraft will deliver directly from factory to VMX-1 at Yuma, Arizona.
  • Training Infrastructure: HMHT-302 at New River has received aircraft and is transitioning to become the formal CH-53K training squadron.
  • Long-term Commitment: Multi-year contracts for lots 9-13 will be awarded by September 2025, securing production through fiscal year 2029.

She argued that the expansion to HMHT-302 represents a crucial transition from limited operational testing to institutional training capability which is a necessary step for broader fleet integration.

The CH-53K can “unlock” capability that enables new operational concepts across the Marine aviation portfolio. The combination of F-35 sensing capabilities, Osprey versatility, and CH-53K heavy-lift capacity creates operational possibilities that extend far beyond the sum of individual platform capabilities.

With the payload revolution, when looking to deploy a Marine Corps force, there is flexibility in using the totality of Marine Corps air to deliver various payloads across the force to enable the Ground Combat Element’s mission success. In this context, Col Fleeger advocates for developing standardized “roll-on, roll-off” payload systems for the King Stallion. These would establish common size, weight, and power parameters that allow rapid integration of new capabilities without lengthy acquisition processes.

“Give the fleet operators a box, and whatever you can fit in this box with this weight and power, will allow for rapid innovation in operational approaches,” she explained. Such systems could revolutionize how Marines employ maritime autonomous systems, advanced sensors, or other emerging technologies by providing a standardized integration pathway that bypasses traditional acquisition timelines.

Fielding a new helicopter is only half the battle; the challenge is integrating it operationally, conceptually, and culturally. This means feeding real-world feedback from exercises like the SLTE directly back into maintenance procedures, training pipelines, and doctrine development processes.

Her comments show a resolve to push the enterprise to move beyond incrementalism, ensuring doctrine and aviation planning evolve alongside the machine. Success requires not just new tools, but new mindsets about how digital systems can enhance rather than complicate operational effectiveness.

Although the current focus is on Marine Corps adoption, there are broader joint and allied dimensions. The technological gains embodied in the CH-53K are being closely watched by U.S. military leadership and international partners, especially as global threats demand both interoperability and operational unpredictability.

The CH-53K represents a microcosm of broader military transformation challenges. Like the F-35’s evolution from traditional fighter to information node, the CH-53K’s journey from helicopter to integrated system demonstrates how platform-centric thinking must evolve toward capability-based approaches.

As it is successfully integrated into the force, the CH-53K will make a significant impact not just in amphibious operations, but in humanitarian assistance, partner capacity building, and rapid response missions worldwide.

The CH-53K’s story is ultimately about transformation of platforms, processes, and possibilities. Its legacy will be written not just by its impressive specifications, but by how daringly it shapes what is possible for generations of Marines to come, realizing the promise of digital aviation in an era of major power competition and global disorder.

This is a more comprehensive version of the Breaking Defense version of the article published on August 21, 2025.

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/how-the-ch-53k-king-stallion-can-transform-marine-heavy-lift-operations/

For a video overview of several of the key elements of this interview and article, see the following:

For a podcast discussing this article, see the following:

CH-53K King Stallion: Reshaping Marine Corps Heavy Lift Operations

What if it was called the CH-55? Transformation in the Vertical Heavy Lift Fleet

The Heavy Lift Helicopter and Its Role in Supporting Diverse USMC Operations

The Coming of the CH-53K : A New Capability for the Distributed Force

 

Australia–South Korea Space Cooperation: Diversifying Relationships Among Middle Powers

08/24/2025

In recent years, space has become a primary frontier for geopolitical strategy, defense partnerships, and technological innovation. Both Australia and South Korea have accelerated their national ambitions in the space sector, moving from tentative bilateral exchanges to robust, multi-layered cooperation.

This evolving relationship now spans satellite manufacturing, launch services, positioning systems, and joint defense initiatives. Growing strategic alignment not only reflects the changed security calculus in the Indo-Pacific but recognizes the need to develop resilient sovereign capabilities in a contested domain.

This article explores the drivers, dynamics, and future prospects of Australia–South Korea cooperation in space, grounded in recent government agreements, defense industry partnerships, and expert analysis, while showcasing how this relationship exemplifies next-generation space strategy for allied nations.

Strategic Rationale for Bilateral Space Cooperation

The Indo-Pacific faces mounting threats: North Korean missile provocations, growing Chinese space and missile capabilities, and the potential for crisis escalation. For Seoul, rapid deployment and renewal of surveillance assets especially in wartime is imperative. Australia, meanwhile, seeks to augment sovereignty in space surveillance, intelligence gathering, and secure communications as it modernizes its defense sector and responds to threats in its vast maritime approaches.

Both nations are classified as “new space powers.” Australia’s push for independent launch capacity and South Korea’s expansion in small satellite programs and orbital services form natural complements. Joint projects allow for rapid innovation cycles, skill building, and sovereign manufacturing capability thereby reducing dependence on third-country providers in an era of supply-chain insecurity and dual-use technology competition.

Australia’s geographic position close to the equator offers optimal launch conditions for orbital vehicles, lowering costs per kilogram and enabling eastward launches with greater efficiency. Its sparse population means launches are safer, compared to crowded Asian territories. For South Korea, whose territory is surrounded by geopolitical rivals, launching from Australia is a strategic imperative.

Expanding Defense and Commercial Partnerships

In September 2024, Hanwha Defence Australia, Hanwha Aerospace (South Korea), and Gilmour Space Technologies (Australia) signed a major Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to foster innovation and expand cooperation in aerospace and defense. This partnership leverages Hanwha’s expertise in space and defense programs and Gilmour’s sovereign launch vehicle (Eris rocket), Queensland-based orbital launch facilities, and advanced satellite structures.

Immediate goals include joint research, development, and manufacturing across the two countries, co-development of integrated launch technologies, and collaborative launches of South Korean payloads from Australian territory. The agreement also aims to address regulatory, legal, and export challenges, positioning the parties as leaders in Indo-Pacific space services.

South Korean firm INNOSPACE signed a multi-year contract with Australia’s Equatorial Launch Australia for orbital launches from the Arnhem Space Centre, with inaugural launches scheduled for early 2025. This cements Australia’s place as a regional launch provider and signals Korean industry’s intent to use Australian territory for commercial and defense-related satellite deployments.

Beyond individual companies, there is a clear trajectory toward government-to-government agreements and broader commercial synergies. The Australian Space Agency and South Korea’s Ministry of Science and ICT signed an MoU in December 2021 covering Earth observation, robotics, and space manufacturing—laying the groundwork for current cooperation. Dialogue forums, such as the inaugural Space Policy Dialogue in July 2022, are facilitating policy alignment and industry connection.

Joint R&D: Small Satellites and Technological Innovation

A central pillar of cooperation is in small satellite development. According to analysis from ASPI and South Korea’s Defence Acquisition Projects Administration (DAPA), joint research and manufacturing can build foundational skills and infrastructure in a sector critical for resilience against counterspace threats and robust civil and defense use cases. Small satellites under 100kg are easier to deploy in constellations, harder for adversaries to neutralize, and allow for rapid replacement if lost.

South Korea’s focus is on surveillance of North Korean activity, while Australia needs robust Earth observation assets to support environmental monitoring, disaster response, and military ISR. Joint Australian–Korean satellite constellations would allow data sharing, capacity building, and mutual deterrence and resilience, supporting both countries’ sovereign ambitions.

A second priority is alignment in Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) infrastructure. South Korea’s planned Korean Position System (KPS) and Augmentation Satellite System (KASS) can be supported by ground stations in Australia—similar to existing hosting arrangements for Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System. This collaborative arrangement would:

  • Enhance accuracy and reliability of navigation services.
  • Diversify and harden regional PNT infrastructure against interference.
  • Complement Australia’s Southern Positioning Augmentation Network (SouthPAN), used by both Australia and New Zealand.

Streamlining Launch Capabilities and Regulatory Frameworks

Australia’s emergence as a regional launch provider is underlined by new sites in the Northern Territory, Queensland (Bowen and Cape York), South Australia (Woomera), and potential expansion to other strategic locations. These are attractive for South Korean launches for reasons of proximity, safety, and technical efficiency. Regulatory authorities in both countries are working to streamline launch permits, export licenses, and payment processes to accelerate collaborative launches.

The next logical step, as suggested by ASPI and Korean analysts, is negotiation of an agreement for a permanent Korean-operated launch site in Australia. Not only would this support commercial and defense launches, but it would also benefit local economies, create jobs, and drive the emergence of an Indo-Pacific launch hub for allied nations.

Space Situational Awareness and Traffic Management

Bilateral cooperation is also expanding into space situational awareness (SSA) and traffic management which are increasingly essential as space becomes an increasingly contested and congested domain. Collaborating on SSA will improve:

  • Monitoring and collision avoidance for satellite assets.
  • Detection and attribution of hostile space activities.
  • Strategic deterrence and resilience through real-time data sharing.

Such cooperation is a direct response to the growing threat landscape, where counterspace operations and physical or cyber risks to satellites are now an operational reality for space-faring defense partners.

Strategic Implications

Australia and South Korea are now positioned as proactive “middle powers,” demonstrating that a flexible, agile alliance can shape regional security environments and technological innovation.

The Australia–South Korea partnership is a template for how Indo-Pacific allies can develop dual-use capabilities, enhance deterrence, and drive economic growth via space cooperation. It also reflects a broader trend in multipolar competition, where regional resilience is built not only through hard power but through control of critical infrastructure, supply chains, and data both on Earth and in orbit.

Australia–South Korea space cooperation stands at a pivotal juncture, propelled by defense needs, technological synergy, and shared economic interests. The recent wave of government agreements, commercial MoUs, and expert-driven recommendations highlight a deepening strategic partnership. With clear progress on joint launches, satellite development, PNT infrastructure, and space awareness, the two countries are well placed to shape the Indo-Pacific space domain for decades to come.

As new projects for scientific, defense, and commercial purposes continue to emerge, the partnership will not only serve immediate national interests but reinforce long-term stability, technological sovereignty, and innovation in the broader region.

Sources Consulted for this Article:

Malcolm Davis, “Strengthening Australia’s space cooperation with South Korea,” The ASPI Strategist, April 16, 2025.

Max Blenken, “South Korea seeks closer ties,” Australian Defence Magazine, August 20, 2025.

Hanbyeol Sohn,A Strategic Turning Point for Australia-South Korea Defense Cooperation,” The Diplomat, August 19, 2025.

MoU between Australia and the Republic of Korea – Australian Space Agency

https://www.space.gov.au/mou-between-australia-and-the-republic-of-korea

“Australia and South Korea Enhance Space Cooperation,” Confer.com.au, April 16, 2025.

Hanwha Defence Australia, Hanwha Aerospace and Gilmour Space sign MOU

https://www.hanwha-defence.com.au/news/hanwha-defence-australia-hanwha-aerospace-and-gilmour-space-sign-mou-at-land-forces-2024