C3 and the Way Ahead for the USMC: The Perspective from the C3 Department Head at MAWTS-1

12/04/2023

By Robbin Laird

C3 is the key tissue allowing for the shaping of a distributed force which can be integrated to create the desired combat effect. During my November 2023 visit to MAWTS-1, I discussed the way ahead in this crucial area with Major Christopher Werner, the C3Department Head.

Werner is a DASC marine, as is the current XO of MAWTs.

These are Marines who focus on providing the direction for air operations supporting the ground forces, and hence are key players in shaping an integrated ground maneuver force.

Major Werner began by describing their key role, notably working with the USAF, in providing fire support for the ground forces in Afghanistan. He noted that they were able to operate within a MAGTF construct to provide significant support for the ground forces in counter-insurgency operations.

But with the shift to preparing for combat operations against peer competitors, the focus has shifted both for the air element and the focus of C3 Marines on force integration. The air element is now returning to air-to-air combat as well as air defense as key missions, both of which were not the focus of attention in the counter-insurgency wars.

And now the C3 effort for the USMC needs to shift from a primary focus on integration within the MAGTF to working with the joint force and using C3 to integrate relevant joint force elements to create the desired effect.

Werner noted that their cooperation with the USAF evident in Afghanistan was going forward, but there was a renewed emphasis on working with the Navy on new ways to do force integration, to which C3 needed to provide the integrating tissue.

But this was a work in progress.

Major Werner noted that officers of the same rank of his in the Navy are pushing for more effective C3 between the services, but major problems remain in terms of working with the C3 systems of the carrier task forces.

He underscored: “That is something we need to work out if we can operate as an inside force with the carrier strike groups.”

C3 for the joint force as seen with the Navy MISR officers is essentially sensor-shooter integration over a kill web.

As Major Werner put it: “What we teach in our courses is the importance of being able to take data from whatever joint or coalition forces sensors are relevant to us and blending them into data enabling shooters and fires control decision makers. I think that makes our community such an interesting one to work within today, notably as the joint services pursue ways to do joint command and control to create desired combat effects at the tactical edge.”

From my own point of view, an important focus which would enable the Marines is building on the ARG-MEU and its amphibious ships. Ed Timperlake and I in our book on the maritime kill web, we underscored how we envisaged a very dynamic future for such a force.

As we argued: “There is no area where better value could be leveraged than making dramatically better use of the amphibious fleet for extended battlespace operations. This requires a re-imaging of what that fleet can deliver to sea control and sea denial as well as Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) offense and defense.

“Fortunately for the sea services, such a re-imaging and reinvention is clearly possible, and future acquisitions which drive new connectors, new support elements, and enhanced connectivity could drive significant change in the value and utility of the amphibious fleet as well. In addition, as the fleet is modernized new platform designs can be added to the force as well. And as we will address later in the book, this entails shaping variant payloads as well to be delivered from a distributed integrated amphibious fleet.

“As building out the evolving fleet, larger capital ships will be supplemented and completed with a variety of smaller hull forms, both manned and autonomous, but the logistics side of enabling the fleet will grow in importance and enhance the challenges for a sustainable distributed fleet. That is certainly why the larger capital ships – enabled by directed energy weapons as well – will see an enhanced role as mother ships to a larger lego-like cluster of smaller hull forms as well.”

And as maritime autonomous systems come on line, amphibious ships are well positioned for mother ship functionality in terms of launching and leveraging air and sea autonomous systems.

Note: The quote is taken from: Robbin F, Laird, and Edward Timperlake. A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (pp. 109-110). Kindle Edition.

Featured Photo: U.S. Marines with Command, Control and Communication, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), board an MV-22B Osprey aircraft during an offensive air support exercise, part of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) 2-23, at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, April 4, 2023.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Ruben Padilla.

Heavy Lift Helo Support in WTI-1-24

U.S. Marine CH-53E Super Stallion and a CH-53K King Stallion helicopters assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, perform external lifts during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-24 at Yuma Auxiliary Army Airfield 2, Arizona, Oct. 3, 2023.

WTI is an advanced, graduate-level course for selected pilots and enlisted aircrew providing standardized advanced tactical training and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

10.03.2023

Video by Lance Cpl. Emily Hazelbaker

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

The Technology is Important: But the Con-ops Against a Reactive Enemy is Determinate

12/03/2023

By Robbin Laird

With the coming of maritime autonomous systems, we are reminded once again about the importance of understanding what a technology does and does not do for an organization. If you keep the structure of the organization the same, you simply wait for the technology to be useful to that legacy organization. Your focus is not upon – how can I use that technology now because it is important I do so?

How do I change the way I operate so I can use it NOW?

There is no better case in point than the conventional thinking about the U.S. Navy and maritime autonomous systems.

To be clear, there are those in the U.S. Navy who get it, such as Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. Task Force 59 within 5th Fleet has provided practical leadership for the way ahead in using (not endlessly developing) maritime autonomous systems.

A good illustration of the challenge was highlighted in a recent USNI piece published on 30 November 2023.

In this piece, the author indicated that the unmanned future of the U.S. Navy is “murky.”

I would have used the term “confused” instead.

And the difference gets to a key point about how these systems can be used now and not after China has seized Taiwan.

The story highlights the deployment of four autonomous ships which was a months long deployment at the behest of the PACFLEET commander. The goal of the deployment was to demonstrate utility of such ships to the fleet, and the commander involved was quoted as saying: “The long-term goal … is to find ways to integrate these unmanned systems across the continuum – subsurface, surface and air – while having the ability to close kill-chains faster, keep them closed longer and be able to operate in a contested environment.”

But this a variant of the vision of a so-called ghost fleet which mimics what a legacy fleet does, only doing so with “unmanned vessels” and doing what is referred to as “manned-unmanned” teaming.

And these larger vessels will cost serious money to build and will almost certainly follow traditional production methodologies.

That is not going to get the Navy where it needs to go and will not keep it ahead of strategic competitors.

A different understanding is required.

First, the new generation autonomous UAVs or the new smaller maritime autonomous systems do not have to be designed to be integrated with the combat systems of the extant manned fleet. That misses the point.

As Commodore Kavanagh of the Royal Australian Navy has put it: “They don’t replace platforms; they complement the integrated force. They are complimentary to that force in that they interface rather than being fully integrated with the current force elements.”

Second, they are part of a kill web, not an integrated kill chain. They can create a combat cluster rather than part of an integrated task force. You give them specific missions and they perform what that limited mission might be. Their job is fully focused on a specific mission thread not replacing a multi-mission manned system.

Put another way, you change the con-ops of the fleet from a task force manned scoped fleet designed for multi-mission operations to one in which manned fleet assets have at their disposal clusters of autonomous systems to which one can delegate a specific mission which the manned assets does now not have to perform.

This is not manned-unmanned teaming – this is delegation of a mission to a wolfpack of smaller autonomous vessels.

Third, the battlespace is conceived as a chessboard. There are significant gaps on that chessboard which the legacy force can not address.

Autonomous systems – the next generation air or maritime autonomous systems can fill those gaps – in addition to providing complementary ISR, C2, logistics or strike capabilities.

The article mentions one desired effect from PACFLEET which is to create “hellscape” for an adversary looking to occupy terrain in the Pacific.

The article notes: “To keep sailors and Marines out of the deadliest of the Pacific crucibles, they want to overwhelm the invasion force with lethal drones to create what PACFLEET calls “hellscape.” The plan calls for thousands of lethal drones on, above and under the sea, creating chaos for the invaders.

“[Enemy] ships are getting damaged, slowing down, big timings are getting thrown off, some are getting lost, some ships are probably going to get sunk,” Clark told USNI News last week.

“This hellscape, this churn you cause in the invasion lets you mobilize, get your act together and start delivering the long-range fires that are going to actually take out the larger amphibious ships and surface ships,” he added.

“The concept has been taken up by the Pentagon and folded into the overarching Replicator initiative.”

To do this in the near term is possible but not by focusing on long-terms LUSV builds.

To do so requires building kamikaze boats with ordinance aboard which can attack the adversaries’ assets.

One company, MARTAC, has recently created such a kamikaze boat (the M-18) in five weeks, and could be available in the short term.

There are other ways to use smaller boats to enable a Hellscape con-ops but the point is that the con-ops change to drive the technology you tap.

And associated with that is creating a manufacturing model which could build smaller boats to scale, and such a model has virtually nothing in common with legacy shipbuilding models but can be done through the leveraging of smaller more agile companies that can activate a supplier chain more rapidly than the legacy prime contractors.

And to be blunt, whether you are a legacy prime or a smaller company it is all about the supply chain, and that will not exist at the scale needed without significant demand.

By focusing on a con-ops at hand – a maritime kill web force – one can find the place for maritime autonomous systems ready now for identifiable mission threads – rather than waiting for a ghost fleet that mimics the legacy fleet.

After all you want our sailors not to become ghosts while waiting for that futuristic ghost fleet.

Featured Photo: The MARTAC M-18 on the water. Credit: MARTAC

The USMC Ground Combat Element and Shaping a Way Forward: Challenges to be Met

11/30/2023

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to MAWTS-1 in November 2023, I had a chance to talk with Maj Scott Mahaffey, the Department Head for the Ground Combat Department.

Maj Mahaffey has been at MAWTS for three years but prior to that has had a number of deployments, including Afghanistan, with an SP-MAGTF, which involved operations in Africa, and participation in a number of exercises such as Trident Juncture in Norway in 2018, the first exercise with the Indians, in the Tiger Triumph Exercise, and exercises in the Philippines.

His background provided a very good preparation for taking on the demanding task of working the training of the GCE as it works its transition from more traditional ground operations associated with the land wars to a wider range of force insertion missions.

According to Mahaffey: “Predominantly our portion of WTI we call our Air Assault and Fires Integration course. It is a heavy flavor from a ground and ACE perspective of how to execute air assaults from battalion sized raid to a platoon-sized lift. The fires integration piece at least from our student’s perspective is focused on fires integration with air-delivered weapons and how they can mesh and integrate with ground fires not necessarily in the close in battlespace but in the deep enclosed battlespace.

“Our students are typically captains at the company level, some senior enlisted, gunnies or master sergeants, with a sprinkling of lieutenants. They have focused on how to accomplish a company objective with close in fires, and we focus on training to give them knowledge of fires support at higher echelon support. We are focused on training which enhances their knowledge of the broader battlespace and how F-35 or HIMARS fires provide support for a broader engagement in the battlespace.”

U.S. Marine Corps Capt. Scott Mahaffey plans the day’s movements with Indian Army Soldiers during exercise Tiger TRIUMPH in Kakinada, India, on Nov. 19, 2019. Tiger TRIUMPH improves U.S.-Indian partnership, readiness and interoperability. It gives the U.S. Marine Corps and Indian forces the opportunity to work together, exchange knowledge and learn from each other on a range of military operations such as humanitarian assistance disaster relief and amphibious operations. Mahaffey is the commanding officer of Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, on a Unit Deployment Program to 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division and is a native of Orlando, Fl. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jacob Hancock).

When I was last at MAWTS in 2020, there was significant concern with deploying Marines to remote locations, even if new longer-range weapons will come on line in the next few years, with the question of fires authorities. In the MAGTF construct, the question of who gives fires authority is clear; in the new direction to have smaller groups of Marines deployed throughout the battlespace, that question is not yet resolved.

The other issue is that GCE is training in the absence of the longer-range weapons which are not yet in place. They are using data from weapons development efforts, a step up from briefing slides, to work with notional weapons, NEMESIS being a case in point.

The challenge facing the GCE is seen in this USMC 2021 description of NEMESIS.

The Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System successfully hit its target in support of Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, during Large Scale Exercise 21 Aug. 15, 2021. The exercise showcased the U.S. maritime forces’ ability to deliver lethal, integrated all-domain naval power.

LSE 21 was a live, virtual and constructive scenario-driven, globally-integrated exercise with activities spanning 17 time zones. LSE 21 applied and assessed developmental warfighting concepts that will define how the future Navy and Marine Corps compete, respond to crises, fight and win in conflict.

The Marine Corps’ NMESIS will provide the Marine Littoral Regiment with ground based anti-ship capability to facilitate sea denial and control while persisting within the enemy’s weapons engagement-zone, and LSE 21 provided a venue for the program team to validate some of those concepts.

“This scenario is representative of the real-world challenges and missions the Navy and Marine Corps will be facing together in the future,” said Brig. Gen. A.J. Pasagian, commander of Marine Corps Systems Command. “This exercise also provided an opportunity for us to work alongside our service partners to refine Force Design 2030 modernization concepts.”

 SINKEX, the exercise scenario involving NMESIS, provided a testing environment for new and developing technologies to connect, locate, identify, target and destroy adversary threats in all domains, culminating in the live-fire demonstration of the naval strike missile against a sea-based target. During the exercise, forward-deployed forces on expeditionary advanced bases detected and, after joint command and control collaboration with other U.S. forces, responded to a ship-based adversary. Simultaneous impacts from multiple, dispersed weapons systems and platforms across different U.S. services—including NMESIS—engaged the threat.

NMESIS integrates established, proven sub-systems, such as the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle Chassis, the Naval Strike Missile and the Fire Control System used by the Navy for NSM.

“From an acquisition perspective, NMESIS started a little over two years ago,” said Joe McPherson, long range fires program manager at MCSC. “We’ve been able to rapidly move [on developing and fielding this system] because we’re leveraging existing NSM and JLTV subsystems.”

Because NMESIS is not yet a fielded capability, engineers from MCSC managed the fire control piece of the system during the exercise. Marines, however, were able to practice maneuvering the system and validating the system’s interoperability with their Naval and Air Force partners.

The basic focus of the Ground Combat Department at MAWTS-1 is upon company training and awareness of higher echelon support, both actual and projected such as the case with NEMESIS.

Maj Mahaffey indicated that simulators are a key part of the training regime, which allows for lessons learned to be taken away and reflected in the simulators which are located at the Marine Corps bases as well. This allows for working the standardization aspect of the training development process.

But they don’t have a simulator for a new system such as NEMESIS and are working with a notional projected system as part of their training regime. They are training in terms of working the timelines to execute a strike with the notional system to support an external fires authority.

The reality for the GCE is that currently have organic fires which allow them to operate in the close in fight. Longer range fires are in development, with HIMARS at an outer range of 300Kms being the exception.

But by and large the GCE projected in remote locations is largely capable of providing defensive capability, protecting logistical locations, or radars or items of interest, not being part of an offensive punch for the joint force.

It is a work in progress.

Featured Photo: U.S. Marines assigned to 1st Battalion 4th Marines post security during assault support tactics three during Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course 2-18 in Yuma, Ariz., on April. 20, 2018. WTI is a seven week training event hosted by Marine Aviation and Weapons Tactics Squadron One cadre which emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of Marine Corps aviation in support of a Marine Air Ground Task Force. MAWTS-1 provides standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation Training and Readiness and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Joel Soriano)

Osprey and KC-130J Training in WTI-1-24

11/29/2023

U.S. Marine MV-22B Osprey and KC-130J Hercules aircrafts, assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, participate in Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-24, at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, Oct. 11, 2023.

WTI is an advanced, graduate-level course for selected pilots and enlisted aircrew providing standardized advanced tactical training and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

10.11.2023

Video by Lance Cpl. Emily Hazelbaker Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

French Air Force Takes Up NATO Air Police Mission on the “Eastern Flank”

By Pierre Tran

Paris –  The French air force will fly Nov. 28 four Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets to Lithuania in a Nato air police mission in the skies of the allied Baltic nations, amidst Ukraine’s concerns on waning Western support for its fight back against Russian forces.

The despatch of Mirage fighters was part of an “air defense on the eastern flank,” the French armed forces ministry said in a Nov. 23 statement, pointing up the Baltic Air Policing mission sought to maintain sovereignty of airspace over the three Nato partners – Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.

The French fighters will take up the Baltic air operation for four months, taking over from  Eurofighter jets deployed by Italy and Spain in a rotating collective security measure aimed at warning off Russian president Vladimir Putin on any move against members of the alliance.

The Mirage jets will take off from the Luxeuil 116 airbase, eastern France, and will be based at Siauliai air base, northern Lithuania, the French ministry said, with some 100 French air personnel supporting Lithuanian forces.

“By committing high level assets and maintaining a regular operational presence in the region,” the ministry said, “France shows it is committed to strengthening Nato’s deterrence and defensive posture, and acts in a concrete manner to contribute measures of reassurance on the eastern flank of Europe.”

The air force invited the press to the Luxeuil air base and attend the despatch of Mirages, which form part of a high-priority mission of air police of the French national airspace.

Meanwhile, Kyiv came Nov. 25 under a six-hour sustained attack by Russian kamikaze drones, raising concern Moscow had replenished its stocks of weapons and was intent on smashing resolve in Ukraine.

Although Ukraine said its air defense had downed 74 of the 75 Russian drones, falling parts of the weapons, reported to be based on the Iranian Shahed drone, wounded five people and  hit buildings in the capital.

The concern in Kyiv was that U.S. political and military attention had turned to the war in Gaza, with Washington switching ammunition supplies to support the Israel Defense Forces, and the White House acting as mediator between Jerusalem and the Hamas irregular force.

The Hamas group agreed to extend by two more days a four-day ceasefire, just hours before the pause in fighting had been due to end on Nov. 27, allowing further release of hostages seized in its deadly Oct. 7 assault on Israeli communities on the border with Gaza.

The Ukraine stock of 155 mm shells was reported to be running low, and the fear was the U.S. has redirected shipments to Israel, now seen as the higher military priority.

There was something of “Ukraine fatigue,” with support withering among Republicans in the U.S. Congress, and a general election looming in the U.K. , David Manning, a former British ambassador to Washington, Nato, and Israel, said Nov. 26 on BBC Radio 4.

It was likely Moscow “welcomed” the election result in the Netherlands, and the debates going in the U.S., he said.

“This is a real issue,” he said, and Western leaders needed to address the Ukraine crisis, which could not be solved by “easy solutions” proposed by populist leaders, and that “Putin can be appeased in some way.”

Last week saw the populist, far-right PVV Freedom party led by Geert Wilders win the largest share of votes in the Netherlands general election, allowing him to form a coalition government, ringing alarm bells across Europe.

Western officials such as U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin,  U.S. secretary of state Anthony Blinken, and British foreign secretary David Cameron, have at various times flown to Kyiv to show support for Ukraine and president Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is reported to be under German and U.S. pressure to negotiate a settlement with Putin. But the Ukrainian leader has refused to accept Russia hold on to territories seized by military means.

“The stakes are huge,” George Robertson, a former Nato secretary general and ex-U.K. defense secretary, said Nov. 26  on Radio 4.

Cameron’s visit was all very nice, he said, but there was nothing in the U.K. government’s recent autumn financial statement – effectively the national budget – that would replenish U.K. military stocks  sent to Kyiv, or send more kit to the Ukrainian forces, which needed longer range missiles, large quantities of ammunition, and more equipment.

“Your visit is not enough,” he said, “rhetoric is not enough.”

Ukraine was losing kit due to a war of attrition, and British factories needed to be working 24 hours a day, he said. Ukraine was being starved of resources, while the Russian military industry was working at full rate.

If Putin won in Ukraine, the world order would be transformed, he said, with the new rules  written by China, Russia, and Iran.

Putin had already failed in his expectation of winning Ukraine in a three-day campaign, he said, and the West needed to “turn the narrative round.”

The three Baltic nations joined the transatlantic alliance in 2004,  following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the wake of the Nov. 9 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall.

Nato allies adopted  the enhanced Air Policing (eAP) operation in 2014, in response to Moscow’s seizing the Crimean peninsula and taking control of the eastern region of Ukraine.

The French air force has flown 10 times in the Baltic Air Police mission, and has deployed seven times in Lithuania, the ministry said.

The U.S. congress, backed by the senate, has approved the 2024 budget, but the last minute vote left out any fresh financial support for Ukraine, leaving the prospect of Kyiv running out of funds for ordering further arms and ammunition.

Germany has pledged €5.4 billion ($5.9 billion) for its 2023 security capacity building initiative, up from €2 billion last year, with further commitment of a total €10.5 billion in following years, the government said on its military support for Ukraine.

Military assistance to Ukraine mainly accounts for those funds, as well as restocking German inventories for equipment sent to Kyiv.

Among the weapons sent to Ukraine, there were a further 20 Marder infantry fighting vehicles on top of the 60 units already announced, as well as 30 Leopard 1 A5 heavy tanks long sought by the Ukrainian army.

A further 105 Leopard 1 A5 tanks were being prepared to be shipped to Ukraine, in a project jointly financed with Denmark.

Germany will also send over 21,910 rounds of  the Nato standard 155 mm artillery shells, up from the 19,530 previously pledged.

Featured photo: A U.S. KC-130J Super Hercules assigned to the Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron-352, refuels a French Dassault Mirage 2000 fighter jet near Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Feb. 8, 2022. U.S. and French forces regularly exchange expertise, ideas and tactics to become a more integrated combined force with the ability to respond to crises or threats in East Africa. The refueling unit is deployed from Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, and supports the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa by providing aerial refueling, airdrop and rescue capabilities to the area of operations. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Blake Wiles)

ISR, Mission Planning and Enabling a Distributed Force: An Ongoing Challenge

11/28/2023

By Robbin Laird

I spent parts of March and April this year in Australia and then flew to Hawaii where I visited PACFLEET and PACAF.

The Australians and the American commands are both working to build a path to enhance deterrence of China and then augment capabilities which work to reinforce that path. Force distribution, greater allied interoperability, significant C2 and ISR capabilities enabling the distributed force to operate as a kill web with enhanced capabilities to confuse adversary targeting are the key elements for reshaping the current force. Based on this effort, acquisition choices will either help or hinder augmentation of core capabilities to further realize this approach.

A key challenge in mission success is working effective ways for higher level commanders to work effectively with forces at the tactical edge which increasingly have ISR capabilities better than the commanders have with regard to that particular operational area.

How to proceed? As one Navy officer put it: “Higher headquarters must be able to see, understand, monitor, and adjust tactical headquarters that own battlespace and missions throughout the theater. Higher headquarters must have the ability to see, understand and occasionally direct. But those headquarters must have borders so the tactical commanders can exercise their own creativity to deliver the fires and effects where they are operating.

“The higher headquarters may have access to better information and when it does it needs to have the ability to reach out to the tactical level to tell them to do or not do something associated with the larger political and strategic picture.”

He felt that they were making significant progress in commanding a distributed force, which is a core element of shaping a force capable of deterrence in the Pacific. “We are capable of commanding from various locations and can be able to see and understand how to command in the battlespace dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, thousands of personnel.

“We are capable of seeing, understanding, and deciding what is going on in the battlespace, and tracking the enemy force using exquisite means way beyond a grease pencil and a radio call. We can and do so through links and sensor from the sea floor to the heavens.”

During my visit to MAWTS-1 in November 2023, I had a chance to talk about how the intelligence aspect of working in mission command and the evolving ISR environment was being experienced by a USMC intelligence officer. I met with Capt Liggett, a MAGTF Intelligence Officer, a U.S. Naval Academy graduate whose generation will experience very significant dynamic decades of change of both ISR and counter-ISR dynamics.

Prior to coming to MAWTS-1, her experience has been in supporting fixed wing aircraft and their mission planning. She has worked with VMFA-211 and served on the Queen Elizabeth during the Marines operating their F-35Bs from that ship. This is a very unique experience for the British carrier was built especially to operate the F-35s and has information warfare and intelligence facilities built on the ship especially for F-35 capabilities. When I visited the ship when it was being built in Scotland, I saw those facilities being built and their functionality was explained to me at the time.

Capt Liggett on-baord HMS Queen Elizabeth.

Capt Liggett indicated that coming to MAWTS-1 has broadened her experience and allowed her to work the intelligence function for the mission planning of the entire air capability of the USMC, including rotorcraft and the new addition to the force, the Reaper.

I highlighted that with the kind of ISR at the tactical edge which forces have this changes the dynamic between intelligence that comes from other sources and the dialogue that goes on between operators and the intelligence function.

Capt Liggett discussed that dynamic in the following terms: “We need to communicate back and forth to ensure that we have most updated information to pass on. We are active participants in this process and working to ensure that from a collection point of view we are looking in the right locations and refining information with regard to the operational area. The challenge is to pass data effectively to the right people at the right time and make sure we have access to resources that enables us to do that. We are also informing our pilots of what we can know and what we can’t from the particular resources available to us at a particular time.”

She indicated that “we are generally cueing the intelligence data  and the operators at the tactical edge are then taking that with what they see in real time to prosecute targets.”

In my view, with the growing capability of ISR inherent in the force at the tactical edge – with F-35s and other local intelligence capabilities – the dialogue with the intelligence analysts and sources beyond the tactical edge with those at the tactical edge is a key part of shaping operations going forward.

Featured Image: F-35B Lightning II with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron VMFA-211 and the United Kingdom’s 617 Squadron, both Carrier Strike Group 21, are secured to the flight deck aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth at sea on May 06, 2021. VMFA-211 and 617 Squadron will form of the largest 5th-generation carrier air group in the world. This deployment highlights the global reach of the U.S. and UK armed forces and their interoperability, and enhances the deterrence and defense capabilities of combined force.

“Our excellence is a key part of deterrence.”

11/27/2023

By Robbin Laird

During my November 2023 visit to MAWTS-1, I had a chance to talk with Major Kyle “Elton” McHugh, tactical air department head at MAWTS-1. McHugh was originally a Harrier pilot who transitioned to the F-35B and served for three years with the first forward deployed F-35B squadron, VMFA-121.

The F-35 is a key part of answering the question of the how the USMC integrates with the joint force and supports the maritime fight. The Marine Corps F-35Bs in Japan provide fifth-generation aircraft to the Marine Corps and Joint Force in the first island chain, operating off a variety of basing options, and work closely with the USAF, USN, and allied Pacific Air Forces.

The aircraft shares common sensors, decision making systems, weapons and so on with a common U.S and allied combat fleet. In discussing the way ahead for USMC integration with the joint force, both the F-35 and the Osprey are often overlooked as key stakeholders in both current capabilities and the future force.

I asked him about his time in Japan and his perspective on working with the Japanese. He commented: “I think our enemies fear our excellence and that is a key part of deterrence. Working with the Japanese as they stood up their own F-35s, we shared a common mission and a common passion to defend our nations and our way of life. Our adversaries cannot ignore that commitment and the quality we bring to the fight.”

Throughout our discussion, Major McHugh emphasized how the Marines have worked with the joint and coalition force on integratability of the F-35, enabling a more lethal and capable F-35 enterprise. He noted that “there has been a concerted effort by MAWTS-1 to work with the Navy and Air Force weapon schools on F-35 integration. All the weapon school instructors meet in person twice a year. The goal is to standardize and shape a tri-service TTP manual, including Australian and British partners as well.”

We also discussed the coming of the Reaper and he emphasized how its inclusion is helping to learn about and shape operations in the challenging maritime environment. He noted that many of the students who come to WTI do not have deep knowledge of the maritime environment and Reaper data is helping in that learning process.

He noted the last Harrier class came to this year’s WTI and the Hornets are soon to follow. The all F-35 Marine Corps TACAIR element will be a key part of the joint and allied integration efforts as evidenced by the work on a common training manual by the weapon school instructors.

Major McHugh concluded: “At MAWTS-1 we are focused on tactical excellence. That level of competence is critical to deterrence. The events we do at MAWTS-1, both live and simulated, are executed with distributed joint partners, empowering mission commanders to compete against the evolving threat.”

Featured Photo: U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Kyle McHugh, a pilot assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121, currently attached to Marine Medium Tilt-Rotor Squadron 265 Reinforced, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), departs the flight deck of amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6), in the East China Sea, June 24, 2021. The F-35B is launched in support of the 31st MEU’s unit level training to maintain proficiency in air-to-surface attacks, tactical intercepts, and other critical skills. The 31st MEU is operating aboard ships of the America Amphibious Ready Group in the 7th fleet area of operation to enhance interoperability with allies and partners and serve as a ready response force to defend peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. John Tetrault.

The following story published on 1 April 2014 highlights the coalition aspect of McHugh’s career but as a Harrier pilot.

U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier pilots with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), conducted a bilateral aviation exercise with French air force fighter pilots in Djibouti, Africa, March 26 to April 2, 2014.

The weeklong exercise was intended to maintain proficiency and learn new tactics while building lasting relationships between allied nations.

“This has been a great experience for us,” said U.S. Marine Corps Capt. Kyle McHugh, VMM-263 (Rein.) Harrier pilot and native of Aberdeen, Md.

The MEU’s pilots flew air-to-air missions, dogfighting French Mirage 2000 pilots; as close air support, striking and bombing ground targets; combat search and rescue; tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel; and strike coordination/armed reconnaissance.

A French air force Mirage 2000 fighter jet with Fighter Squadron 03/011 Corsica taxis to a runway at French Airbase 188 during an air-to-air combat exercise with AV-8B Harriers from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The 22nd MEU is deployed with the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group as a theater reserve and crisis response force throughout U.S. Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Austin Hazard/Released)

“Within the large air war, we flew those different roles and got to be a piece of the puzzle and see how the whole picture worked in actual execution,” explained McHugh, who also serves as the squadron’s assistant logistics officer. “It’s the most challenging environment we’ve had a chance to train in.”

The MEU’s pilots flew approximately 35 sorties and accumulated approximately 40 flight hours, flying missions with and against the Mirage pilots. The Mirage pilots were assigned to local French air force Fighter Squadron 03/011 Corsica, as well as visiting French air force Fighter Squadron 02/005 Ile de France.

“The missions we do here are very complex with very little time to prepare and coordinate,” said French air force Capt. Joan Dussourd, Fighter Squadron 02/005 Mirage 2000 fighter pilot. “It forces us to be very efficient.”

Each mission included several aircraft with different tasks, such as Harriers flying close air support while Mirages provide fighter support and dogfight against role player enemy Mirages. Throughout the week, there were as many as 12 aircraft participating at any given moment.

“They’re very tactically proficient in air-to-air and we consider ourselves to be very tactically proficient in an air-to-surface environment,” noted McHugh. “The ability to learn from one another in a combined forces environment, we’d be very lucky to ever have this experience again.”

In the end, the exercise helped both forces learn the other’s mindset, said Dussourd.

“I think when you fly the same missions with someone, you learn about them,” added Dussourd. “We’ve gotten to know the Marines and learned their mindset, which is very flexible. Ours is also, so we work well together.”

The squadrons and individual pilots established good working relationships throughout the exercise and built a strong foundation for other U.S. military squadrons to train or work with the French squadrons in the future.

“I’ve already seen how well trained and skilled they are in air-to-surface missions, but I was not in the air when they fought air-to-air, so I’m very interested to see how they did,” said Dussourd, who had never flown with Harriers before this exercise. “It’s important that we have chances like this in the future, to mix our knowledge. We appreciate the way the Harrier pilots work: very professional and skilled.”

The 22nd MEU is deployed with the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group as a theater reserve and crisis response force throughout U.S. Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility.