WTI-1-23 FINEX

01/15/2024

A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), conducts live hoist exercises with the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Benjamin Bottoms during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 near San Clemente Island, California, Oct. 28, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

10.28.2022

Video by Cpl. Jackson Dukes

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

FINEX Hoist at WTI-1-23

01/12/2024

A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), conducts live hoist exercises with the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Benjamin Bottoms during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 near San Clemente Island, California, Oct. 28, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

10.28.2022

Video by Cpl. Jackson Dukes

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Germany, Eurofighter and Saudi Arabia: January 2024 Update

01/10/2024

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Germany has switched policy tracks with the approval of shipping a batch of Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, in the wake of bitter conflict on the Gaza strip and Riyadh’s interest in the French Rafale fighter.

“We do not see the German government opposing British considerations for more Eurofighters for Saudi Arabia,” the German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, said Jan. 7 while on a visit to Israel, Reuters reported.

Germany blocked the delivery of 48 Eurofighters, reported to be worth £10 billion ($13 billon), in response to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi columnist for the Washington Post, in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018, and Riyadh’s support for a civil war in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia flew its Eurofighters to hit missiles fired by the Houthi force based in Yemen, with the Iranian-backed militants seeking to strike Israel. The Houthi attack, which included action at sea, was in response to the Israel Defense Force sweeping through Gaza to take out Hamas irregular fighters.

“The world, especially here in the Middle East, has become a completely different place since Oct. 7,” Berbock said, with the German chancellor, Olaf  Scholz, endorsing the following day that shift in arms policy on Saudi Arabia.

U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has flown to the Middle East and is holding talks in six nations in a bid to find a settlement. The bloody conflict in Gaza began with the Hamas fighters attacking Israeli settlements, killing some 1,200 civilians and seizing more than 200 hostages on Oct. 7.

It remains to be seen what German approval means for the Saudi interest in the Rafale as an alternative to the Eurofighter.

The executive chairman, Eric Trappier, of the aircraft builder Dassault Aviation told Dec. 5 the Defense Journalists Association, Riyadh had requested information on the Rafale and talks had been held over the last few months.

That Saudi reach out for the Rafale sparked French media reports Riyadh was seeking to put pressure on the German coalition government, already under public criticism from Airbus, one of the leading contractors of the Eurofighter.

The Eurofighter consortium consists of Airbus, BAE Systems, ITP Aero, and Leonardo,  contractors in the four client nations, respectively Germany, the U.K., Spain, and Italy.

There has been concern in London and Paris over Berlin’s ban on fresh weapon shipments to Riyadh, as arms exports are seen as needed to boost the public purse and maintain jobs.

Dassault won its first export order for the Rafale from Egypt in 2015, with Cairo calling Paris in response to Washington suspending in 2013 delivery of a four-strong batch of F-16 fighters, the response of the then Obama administration to a military coup d’état in Cairo.

The Saudi policy has long been to order from a wide base of foreign arms suppliers, with Riyadh keen to join as partner nation to the Global Combat Air System, a future fighter project led by Britain, Italy, and Japan.

The Saudi air force flies the Boeing F-15, and the Tornado and Typhoon, the latter two supplied by Britain.

The Saudi navy sails seven French-built frigates and two fleet auxiliary tankers under the Sawari I and II programs, armed with Crotale surface-to-air missiles. French contractors upgraded the Sawari I ships under the life extension contract in 2013.

There has been something of a drought for France in major arms deals with Saudi Arabia since those naval contracts, and the prospect of a Rafale order may have signalled a break in an extended dry period.

A German green light for despatch of the Eurofighter to the Saudi air force has sparked domestic controversy, with the Green party objecting to breach of a coalition agreement.

“The German government decided in the summer not to comply with any requests for Eurofighters to Saudi Arabia until the end of the legislative period,” said Sara Nanni, parliamentarian and a defense spokesperson for Baerbock’s ecology party, website Politico reported. Nothing much had changed in Saudi Arabia, she said.

The German parliament has extensive supervisory power over arms exports, and the Social Democrats and Greens demand sales be restricted by observation of human rights. The third party in the coalition government is the pro-business Free Democrats.

The risk of a wider regional conflict rose over the weekend, with Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon firing missiles into northern Israel, in response to the killing of a Hamas leader in Beirut.  Israel was suspected to be behind the slaying in Beirut. U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria have been hit by drone and rocket attacks from militants, with the U.S. replying with an air strike against a militia leader in Baghdad.

Trappier has voiced concern over Berlin’s resistance to shipping Eurofighters to Saudi Arabia, as that raised question on whether Germany would authorize foreign sales of a new generation FCAS fighter.

The new fighter is at the heart of a European future combat air system, in which France and Germany are founding partners, with Spain as third partner, and Belgium as observer, looking to join as fourth partner at a later stage.

FINEX for WTI-1-23

A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), conducts live hoist exercises with the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Benjamin Bottoms during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 near San Clemente Island, California, Oct. 28, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

10.28.2022

Video by Cpl. Jackson Dukes

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Shaping a Way Ahead in Australian Defence: The Crucial Significance of Leveraging the Fifth Generation Air Force

01/09/2024

By Robbin Laird

As the Australian government sorts through its way ahead for the defence of Australia, the creation of a fifth-generation air force is a key element providing a foundation for innovations in the decade ahead.

But it can be forgotten too quickly the central role of airpower for a continental nation down under facing an adversary seeking to enhance their ability to pressure choke points and reach deeper into the Pacific.

Integrated air and naval power is at the heart of what needs to be done, but the challenges of sorting out what kind of navy to build, the air element has a much clearer path. Leverage its fifth-generation foundation, build out the weapons enterprise, add autonomous systems and new basing flexibilities.

From this standpoint the future can be seen in the past in terms of how the ADF evolved into a fifth-generation force. During my years of visiting Australia, I had the chance to watch the RAAF bring a new air combat system into service and then maturity, namely, the E-7.

This was a trail blazing effort by the RAAF which has led the way in many respects with regard to a new generation of air battle management C2 aircraft, and one which enters into the world of tron warfare given the software evolution driven by the Commonwealth’s partnership with Northrup Grumman.

And during my time in Australia since 2014, I followed this story closely and visited the Wedgetail base often. But that story starts with recognizing that if you do not use a capability built around software upgradeability, you cannot develop it into what you want that capability to become.

I discussed this approach with Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown in 2015:

‘Testers can only do so much.

‘Once an aircraft is functional you need to get in the hand of the operators, pilots, crews and maintainers. They will determine what they think the real priorities for the evolution of the aircraft, rather than a test engineer or pilot.

‘And you get the benefit of a superior platform from day one.

‘When I became Deputy Chief of Air Force, the Wedgetail was being slowed down by the Kabuki effort to arrange specification lines for the aircraft. There was much hand-wringing amongst the program staff as to how it didn’t meet the specifications that we had put out.

‘I said, “Let’s just give it to the operators.”

‘And the advantage of basically giving the aircraft to the operators was what the test community and the engineers thought were real limitations the operators did not. Sometimes it took the operators two days to figure a work around.

‘And the real advantage of the development was that they would prioritize what was really needed to be fixed from the operational point of view, not the testing point of view.

‘In other words, you can spend a lot of time trying to get back to the original specifications.

‘But when you actually give it to the operators, they actually figure out what’s important or what isn’t important and then use the aircraft in real world operations.’

I then wrote an article later in 2015 which built upon his argument and looked at the projected future for this software defined air battle management system:

“The underlying story of the approach to introduce the Wedgetail and then how the platform is being modernized highlights why the program is trailblazing in many ways. When I visited 2nd Squadron during the first quarter of 2014, I was impressed with the enthusiasm and intelligence of the Squadron and their approach towards innovation.

“But when I got back to Washington DC, the reaction to my experience was met with complete lack of interest or surprise. As the editor of a leading defense magazine put it: “You mean the troubled program; I thought it had been cancelled.”

“With a second trip to Australia under my belt this Summer and a chance to talk with the RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group as well as Air Marshal Davies, Air Vice Marshal MacDonald and the recently retired Air Marshal Brown, I began to understand how the “troubled” program had not only been “salvaged” but how it was “salvaged” put in the trailblazing path.

“The Wedgetail has brought to the fight, unique battle management capabilities. To understand what they mean, one has to look at some of the Wedgetail’s core capabilities.

“Most fundamentally, the Wedgetail does not operate like an AWACs. The AWACs works in tracks directing the air battle but does so with a 360-degree rotating radar. It is the hub of a hub and spoke air combat system.

“With the coming of the fifth-generation aircraft, there is a need for air battle management, but not of the hub and spoke kind. And with the challenge of operating in the expanded battlespace, it is not simply a question of management of air assets, but management of the assets operating in the expanded battlespace, regardless if they are air, naval or ground….

“It is designed with the reach rather than range approach characteristic of fifth generation systems; the MESA radar can be dialed up in terms of energy and focused in terms of direction on priority scan areas.

“As one Northrop Grumman engineer put it: “There is a fundamental shift operationally in terms of how one uses the Wedgetail versus the AWACS. You no longer are limited or defined by a 360-degree rotator.

“You are able to configure how much power you want to put into your radar reach; it is configurable to the mission.  The integrated IFF and radar functionality also allows the system to reach much greater than other systems into the battlespace to shape greater situational awareness in the battlespace. You can put the energy in the mission area where you have the highest priority.”

“This allows much greater reach, and is also part of enhanced survivability as well.

“This means as well that it can act on demands identified by deployed fifth generation and other aircraft with regard to the areas where extended reach and focus for surveillance needs to be directed.”

This is the spirit and the approach that got the RAAF and ADF into a good place; clearly needed in the new rebuild approach is a similar spirit and approach of developing capability by use such as the plus ups to the F-35 fleet, leveraging the new Triton force, initially deploying autonomous systems and employing new weapons in the force.

The RAAF head Air Marshal Chipman underscores such an approach in a recent interview with Brendan Nicholson of ASPI. This is what he underscored about the approach:

“How difficult is it to evolve a capability once it’s operational?

“That’s the new model, says Chipman.

“The RAAF has a steady drumbeat refreshing the capabilities of platforms such as the F-35A Lightning II, the Growler electronic attack aircraft and the Super Hornet by upgrading software, hardware and firmware.

‘That ensures that we’re on the leading edge of technology. We must do that because our potential adversaries are not standing still. They’re delivering new missiles and other capabilities into inventory, new electronic-warfare systems. You’ve got this cat-and-mouse game where we need to continue to make sure our systems can compete and win.’

But the blunt fact is that airpower is the key multi-domain enabler but obviously requiring the further development of integrated offense and defense for the ADF as an operational force in its extended region.

Featured Image: An Air Force E-7A Wedgetail performs a handling display at Nobby’s Beach during the Newcastle Williamtown Air Show 2023.  Credit: Australian Department of Defence

See also the following:

RAAF Chief Air Marshal Chipman Talks About the Wedgetail Approach

An Update on MAWTS-1: 2023

01/08/2024

By Robbin Laird

Ed Timperlake and I are working on book to be published next year on MAWTS-1, the unique USMC training center.

As LtGen (Retired) Rudder has noted: “We need to avoid smoke and mirrors. The talking points from a wargame or ideas from force design planners may sound good, but it has to have an operational look. An A plus for your ideas may equal a D for practical execution.

“If the concept or design does not make it through the physics of operational execution, the idea needs to be rejected or seriously modified.

“Giving problems and operational concepts to MAWTS is crucial to working the physics of combat in testing out new tactical approaches.”

My report focuses on the work of MAWTS-1 in 2023.

I interviewed the CO of MAWTS-1, Col Eric Purcell, in April and then visited the command in November after the second WTI of the year. This provided a chance to discuss how MAWTS-1 had progressed in working enhanced force mobility for the USMC within the broader joint force, a key emphasis of the force design effort.

The challenge is that while the Marines are working FARPs and other means to enhance force mobility, the joint force is in the throes of significant change, whether it be the U.S. Navy working distributed maritime operations or the USAF working agile combat employment.

How does the USMC effort to reorganize and enhance its contribution to the joint force while the joint force is itself in fundamental change with much uncertainty over how to do maritime distributed operations and the agile combat air combat employment?

The Navy and Air Force sides of this transition have been a major part of our work published elsewhere and provide insights with regard to how challenging the overall force transformation is within which the USMC is working to find its proper place. It is not just up to MAWTS-1 to work the training for such an effort, but NAWDC and Nellis are clearly involved as well.

To put it simply: it is a work in progress and the Marines emphasis on a MAGTF organizing principle remains important going forward in spite of the effort to find ways to operate from much smaller organizational formations.

This report includes the interviews conducted in 2023. The date indicates when the interview was published on Second Line of Defense and collectively they provide an overview of how MAWTS-1 is training for the way ahead for the USMC by preparing the force that might have to fight tonite.

As the end of course video for WTI-1-24 starts: “It is not a question of if the Marine Corps will go into combat. It is only a matter of when.

It can be read in either ebook or paperback and can be found here:

 

Defense XXIII: America Faces a Very Different World

On January 5, 2024 the paperback version of Defense XXIII: America Faces a Very Different World was published. And on January 8, 2024 the e-book version of the book was released.

This book looks at the challenge for the liberal democracies competing in a world of multi-polar authoritarian nations and movements. It draws on our analyses in 2023 of global developments, the place of America in a changing world, and the evolution of defense forces to compete in this world.

This is the fourth annual publication we have published at Second Line of Defense and Defense Information. Each of the four publications highlight themes from essays we have published during that year.

We are living in a time of compressed history, and our essays in each volume captures the history emerging in that year. We focus on defense issues, so we have highlighted some of the key developments affecting the evolution of defense and security challenges facing the United States and its key allies in that year, as well as innovations and developments in selected military technologies and concepts of operations.

This year’s volume highlights a number of key developments and dynamics in 2023. This year has been characterized by growing conflict worldwide and further devolution of the global order. We are clearly in a period of history which challenges our fundamental values and challenges us to navigate through a very difficult period of history.

Rather than a world of multi-polarity or great national power competition, a key aspect of the new historical epoch we have entered is multi-polar authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is clearly globally ascendent, but these regimes or groups do not share a common ideology or action program.

They are not in alliance, although they cooperate when convenient for their particular interests. They support splintered globalization which is when global rules exist to some extent to handle globally important exchanges but the authoritarians are not contributing political capital to maintaining the “rules-based order.”

Many of these authoritarian states or groups have roots deeply inside Western democracies and through various means operate within Western societies, rather than simply being an external threat.

These means are diverse: cyber, economic investments, economic partners who advocate their economic interest, or in the case of a number of Middle Eastern states, the impact of a migration which has not been characterized by new arrivals in the West shedding their cultural or political identities from where they came.

At the same time, the liberal democracies or the West as it used to be called, is in the throes of significant self-questioning, internal debates, rejection of capitalism as practiced the last 50 years, and the emergence of disaggregated societies in each of the Western states.

These states work together on common issues, but cooperation is challenged by internal national or regional debates (in the case of Europe.)

This new era is a major challenge to the United States and its governing elites. It no longer commands a Western shaped global order. There is no great crusade as Eisenhower wrote about.

It is about national interests and winnowing commitments to the availability of resources, whether military or financial. The governing elite has not practiced or thought in terms of such discipline and the gap between the evolution of the new era and American leadership is clearly out of phase.

This is our first book published in 2024.

 

Looking Ahead: The Role of Autonomous Systems in Pacific Defense

It is clear that autonomous systems can provide significant enhancements for current operating forces.

As Commodore Darron Kavanagh, Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, has noted: “we have shown through various autonomous warrior exercises, that we can already make important contributions to mission threads which combat commanders need to build out now and even more so going forward.”

Put another way, combatant commanders can conduct mission rehearsals with their forces and can identify gaps to be closed.

But the traditional acquisition approach is not optimized for closing such gaps at speed through the use of disruptive technologies. The deployment and development of autonomous systems are part of the response to the question of how gaps can be closed or narrowed rapidly and without expensive solution sets.

In an interview I did in 2023 with a senior Naval commander, he identified the “gaps” problem. “Rehearsal of operations sheds light on our gaps. if you are rehearsing, you are writing mission orders down to the trigger puller, and the trigger puller will get these orders and go, I don’t know what you want me to do. Where do you want me to be? Who am I supposed to check in with? What do you want me to kill when I get there? What are my left and right limits? Do I have target engagement authority?

“This then allows a better process of writing effective mission orders. so that we’re actually telling the joint force what we want them to do and who’s got the lead at a specific operational point. By such an approach, we are learning. We’re driving requirements from the people who are actually out there trying to execute the mission, as opposed to the war gamers who were sitting on the staff trying to figure out what the trigger pullers should do.”

But how to close the gaps?

One way to do so has been suggested by LtGen (retired) Rudder, the former MARFORPAC commander.

“Current Navy testing has demonstrated USV speed in excess of 100 knots. Also demonstrated is that they can be armed with combat proven loitering munitions.

“This lethal combination of speed and weapons portends the ability to out maneuver surface fleets and strike them at distance. What makes unmanned vessels and munitions lethal is that they can sustain speeds above 100 knots and deliver fires at distance. Like a fighter aircraft, speed is essential for survivability”

One pairing which has been tested and suggest a way ahead to “close a gap” for the operational forces was suggested by Rudder.

“As the Navy continues to experiment with USV technology, the teaming of the MARTAC T38 and the AeroVironment Switchblade series of loitering munitions is proving that speed and lethality for surface vessels cannot be stopped by even the most sophisticated fleet of combatants.

“We should not accept slow moving unmanned systems when technology exists to maneuver beyond the human capability.

“Imagine the ability for commanders to have a number of UAVs and USVs that can maneuver at speed and be integrated into the Carrier Strike Group or Surface Action Group scheme of maneuver. The concept of operations could entail 20-30 loyal wingman USVs sprinting ahead and to the flanks of the Carrier Battle Group.

“With a few simple AI algorithms, they could be directed towards enemy combatants 1000 miles away. Autonomously communicating with each other while closing from multiple directions at 100 knots, they could deliver the combat proven Switchblades and within minutes the swarm could impact key areas of the enemy combatants that includes radars, weapons stations, and the bridge area.

“The results as one would imagine is not the sinking of ship, but the immediate blinding of the fire control system of the ship such as air defense radars for HHQ-9 and launch systems for the YJ-18.

“If we apply the Switchblade capabilities to counter an amphibious landing scenario, small landing craft, air cushioned craft, and amphibious assault vehicles could be individually addressed with the low-cost switchblade at range.

“Think of the thwarted mechanized assault on Kyiv and its application to a slow vulnerable assault in the water. A land-based defense armed with Switchblade combined with armed USVs maneuvering from multiple directions would create a dilemma for landing force that is counting on fire strikes on fixed sites such airfields and ports.

“The land and maritime combination of distributed T38s armed with switchblades could launch from multiple hide sites and maneuver through escort ship defenses and deliver switchblades from front, rear, and the flanks. Assuming some of the landing force makes it ashore, land-based switchblade teams would create additional kill zones.”

These systems are expanding the thought process of future operations with designs that include the boats themselves as weapons armed with an explosive capabilities and further work for larger anti-ship and ASW weapons.

The Navy is at an inflection point with several gap closing technologies ready to be fielded. The unique design of MARTAC fast craft and the combat proven Switchblade are demonstrating that Naval warfare as we know it would change overnight.

“Closing the gaps” needs to become an acquisition capability, not a long-range goal. As Kavanagh underscored: “We need to deliver lethality at the speed of relevance. But if I go after the conventional solution, and I’m just replacing something, that’s actually not a good use of my very finite resources. We need to be answering the operational commanders request to fill a gap in capability, even if it is a 30% solution compared to no solution on offer from the traditional acquisition process.”

These are not technologies looked at in terms of a traditional acquisition process which requires them to go through a long period of development to form a platform which can procured with a long-life use expectancy.

CDRE Kavanagh simply pointed out that maritime autonomous systems are NOT technologies to be understood in this manner.

“We build our platforms in a classical waterfall approach where you design, develop and build a platform over twenty years to make them excellent. But their ability to adapt quickly is very limited. This is where software intensive systems such as maritime autonomous systems are a useful complement to the conventional platforms. Maritime autonomous systems are built around software first approaches and we are able to do rapid readjustments of the code in a combat situation.”

And the legacy acquisition approach is not well aligned with the evolution of warfare.

Not only is the focus changing to what distributed combat clusters can combine to do in terms of combat effects but the payload impacts at a point of relevance is also becoming of increased salience to warfighting approaches.

Featured Image:ARABIAN GULF (Oct. 23, 2023) A Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System launches munitions from a MARTAC T-38 Devil Ray unmanned surface vehicle, attached to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Task Force 59, during Exercise Digital Talon in the Arabian Gulf, Oct. 23. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command recently completed Exercise Digital Talon, demonstrating the ability of unmanned platforms to pair with traditionally crewed ships in “manned-unmanned teaming” to identify and target hostile forces at sea. Then, using munitions launched from another unmanned platform, engaged and destroyed those targets. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Justin Stumberg)