Maritime USVs, UAVs and Reshaping ISR/C2: A Discussion with Lt. General (Retired) Steve Rudder

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Maritime USVs, UAVs and Reshaping ISR/C2: A Discussion with Lt. General (Retired) Steve Rudder
02/22/2023

By Robbin Laird

To deal with the challenges in the Pacific, the United States has and will continue to have a significant shortfall in core platforms to implement a classic warfighting strategy. That is why I wrote a book with my colleagues published in 2013 entitled, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific.  At the heart of our argument was the need to reinvent the way forces were deployed, connected and empowered.

Nothing that has occurred since we wrote that book has changed the essential argument. Only the technology which we highlighted in the book has now arrived in part, and new capabilities are within reach now.

Underlying our argument was our characterization of the new approach as an adaptation of the World War II big blue blanket approach.

As we explained it at the outset of the argument in the book:

“We look at the geographical context, the role of allies, and the need to shape an effective defense approach, which we identify as shaping an attack defense enterprise, or an interactive “big blue blanket” over the Pacific. In World War II, the USN shaped what became called the big blue blanket of ships to cover the Pacific operations. Obviously, this is beyond the ken of current realities, but shaping a connected set of U.S. and allied forces able to work together to shape defense and security in the Pacific is not.”[1]

A technological development which we mention in the book is creating new opportunities for force development, namely, the arrival of unmanned surface systems which can operate as an integratable partner with a new generation of unmanned air vehicles.

Rather than having UAVs as a strategic asset supporting a strategic level directed tactical operation, more transient UAVs operating off USVs or working in tandem with forces at the tactical edge are now possible.

This then enhances significantly the capability of operating task forces with modular flexibility and with enhanced understanding of their battlespace to deliver the desired effects within that battlespace.

Rather than operating with top down ISR, distributed modular task forces can create ISR clusters which can push data back towards higher level command elements, and at the same time operate more effectively in their local operating area.

Recently, I discussed these developments with Lt. General (Retired) Steve Rudder. I last met with him in Honolulu in a visit in 2021 when he was MARFORPAC.

Now recently retired, he continues to focus on the evolution of concepts of operations for the maritime forces.

He started our conversation by highlighting the changing strategic environment, which demands speed in accurate decision-making.

And to do so, raises an inherent challenge of centralized control and decentralized execution.

“As the operational forces have enhanced ISR capabilities at the tactical edge, there is a natural friction point between them and decision making with regard to how much authority is released to those forces to act on their own. In a conflict situation, this becomes an authority’s dilemma for in stride targeting.  The tactical forces are increasingly becoming connected to more capable operational and tactical ISR creating a need for higher-level command authorities to be pushed down.”

Rudder then explained that the evolution of UAVs and USVs and their ability to work within an edge mesh network, gives forces at the tactical edge new capabilities, necessary for them to execute their missions. As he underscored: “Solving the question of how to best use such capabilities should not hinder or delay necessary innovation and implementation. As TF59 proves each day with their unmanned experimentation, the technology is available today.”

With regard to USVs, the U..S Navy faces a major problem of coming to terms with how to use small boats. The shipbuilding plan is not one which highlights the kind of small boats which USVs require, and which operate differently carrying ISR payloads, naturally operating more like wolfpacks than being mere footnotes to a classic naval task force.

The Navy needs such wolfpacks of UAVs and USVs to deal with a number of operational threats and challenges. 

One challenge which Rudder highlighted was the threat from long range low flying cruise missiles. Such wolfpacks can clearly provide timely over the horizon visibility to such a threat. And as technology develops these in no reason payloads could not be placed on UAVs or USVs to defeat such missiles.

The Navy has UAVs and USVs in different stove piped program channels which also makes it difficult to think in wolfpack terms.

How to build in synergy between UAV and USV development?

How to accelerate their contribution to distributed maritime operations?

Another consideration is working with allies.

Shared data is crucial to have common decision making. Exquisite data which is provided by high value strategic assets are shared with very few allies. This is not enough to work with the patchwork of partners in the Pacific which the PLA are contesting with the liberal democracies.

We heed to build shared networks to cover the patchwork of the Pacific in terms of partners.

By creating a network of USVs and UAVs whose function is to generate such data, deterrence is enhanced.

It is about the spectrum of operations not just the question of deployments simply for the highest end of operations. Capabilities already exist to build such a network, which is a low hanging fruit for the build out of UAV-USV collaboration.

And for the United States, such an approach builds a “big blue blanket” with partners which competes with the Chinese version of this already in place. The Chinese fishing fleet empowered by mobile phone technology has built their vision of the network.

As Rudder notes: “There are areas were simply do not have the kind of persistent domain awareness we need. We don’t have the capacity to put capital assets in place to provide for that gap. UAVs and USVs, notably working together, can fill such a gap cost effectively and are available now.”

[1] Laird, Robbin; Timperlake, Edward; Weitz, Richard. Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy (Praeger Security International) (p. 7). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.)

The featured photo: The MATAS Devil Ray UAS making a high speed run. Credit Photo: MARTAC

For a look at the U.S. Navy and the work of Task Force 59, see the following:

Digital Horizon Wraps Up: Task Force 59 Perspective

Unmanned Integration at Sea: A Perspective on Task Force 59

Task Force 59: Another Perspective

Task Force 59 and Unmanned Maritime Assets

 

An Update on French Arms Exports: February 2023

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on An Update on French Arms Exports: February 2023
02/21/2023

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Close U.S. scrutiny of arms exports, Franco-German cooperation, and how the French procurement office is short changed are among areas considered in a report on French foreign sales of weapons by the national audit office.

The head of the independent audit office approved on Jan. 24 publication of the report, Support for Export of Military Matériel.

The big French companies which use U.S. components in foreign arms deals are each thought to apply every year for an estimated 800-1,000 export licenses from the U.S. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), as required by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the report said.

The directorate is part of the State Department.

That reliance on ITAR approval leads to a process which is “long, heavy, constraining, and risky to business confidentiality,” the report said, pointing out that American inspectors go on site to verify companies’ commitments. Once an export licence has been issued, restrictions on use must be observed, and the State Department can make further checks.

The application of ITAR leads to slowness of procedure, higher costs, and can result in withdrawal of technology – leading to lower weapon performance. There may be delays as an alternative solution is sought, in an approach dubbed “ITAR free,” the report said. Or the project is cancelled.

“In every case, the supplier’s reputation is sullied,” the report said.

ITAR, which applies to export of equipment for dual military and civilian use, is very broad, the report said. The authorization applies not just to products, but also technical data, and services such as assistance, training, design, development, production, operational use, maintenance, and repairs.

A component which has been “ITAR-ized” may lead to approval needed for the whole weapon system, the report said. Export of civil equipment may need authorization if they use components which have been ITAR-ized.

The defense trade directorate has power to conduct criminal inquiries, the report said, and can change rules, apply them retroactively, and revoke license.

“The U.S. could decide on its restrictions as much for strategic reasons as for commercial,” the report said.

Companies found guilty of breaking ITAR can be denied the right to apply for future licences and be hit with sanctions, the report said. Penalties include being banned from operating and selling on U.S. soil, hefty fines, and prison sentences of up to 10 years for company directors.

In addition to ITAR, there are checks on dual-use equipment covered by export administration regulations, boosted by the 2018 Export Control Reform Act, the report said. Licences for foreign use of U.S. semiconductors and avionics are under close scrutiny. The Commerce Department oversees those export rules.

France seeks to pursue arms programs which are “ITAR free,” as can be seen in government instruction 1618, drafted by the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) procurement office, the report said.

That Feb. 15 2019 instruction from the ministerial cabinet outlines the protocol for weapons programs.

The European Union should pursue this approach, the report said, urging the EU’s European Defense Fund to avoid supporting European projects for products and components which might fall under the control of ITAR.

Fresh Ties With Berlin

The report considers an updated agreement with Germany on arms exports following “serious difficulties,” which saw French deals stalled in 2014 and 2018.

The fresh accord revised the Debré-Schmidt agreements signed Dec. 7 1971 and Feb. 7 1972, which allowed the export of weapons built in cooperation, without the partner nation blocking the deal.

The projects for a future combat air system, based on a new generation fighter jet, and a main ground combat system, based on a new tank and unmanned vehicles, underscored the need for a new Franco-German pact, the report said.

France and Germany signed Oct. 23 2019 agreement on export controls on weapons, the report said, with both countries were free to sell abroad without authorization from the partner nation when the latter had less than 20 percent of content in the weapon.

That 20 percent – based on the principle of de minimis, when something is so small there is no breach of agreement – excluded service, spares, training, and repairs, the report said. Tucked into the annex of the agreement was a list of weapons excluded from that 20 percent rule.

Apart from the 20 percent ruling, a partner nation could not block exports of weapons designed and developed in cooperation, unless the sale went against the partner nation’s interest or national security, the report said.

It is not clear whether national interest and security were clearly set out.

Some French executives saw that 20 percent threshold as giving Berlin vast sway over French arms exports.

A permanent committee was set up to oversee the smooth running of the agreement, the report said, and it was too early to tell if that was working well. Much will depend on the German parliament, which has oversight over contracts worth more than €25 million.

All nations reserve the right to authorize foreign deals when components come from their country, the report said.

The authors led with the U.S. and Germany. The report also refers to cooperation on missiles between Britain and France.

It’s About Politics

Export arms sales depend on relations between nations, their appreciation of the international situation, balance of power and how they change, the report said.

The foreign arms trade is subject to changes in the political tide, the report said, with deals made more fragile, or suspended, or talks broken off in recent years.

Such vagaries stem from various factors, such as strategic change, shifts in diplomacy, change in the political majority, a determination to show respect to contracts, or the search for independence and alternative suppliers, the report said.

An arms embargo on Russia and the curtailed Mistral deal was the leading example of five recent “emblematic” cases involving breach of a French contract or the foreign pursuit of other suppliers, the report said.

Those cases included Poland’s pick of American kit due to its close ties to Washington and stationing of U.S. troops in the East European nation, the report said, citing the following cases:

– Warsaw picked Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters over the Airbus Caracal in 2016, Patriot missiles over MBDA weapons in 2018, and Lockheed Martin missile launchers in 2019.

– Brazil’s selection in 2019 of four corvettes from German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems over an offer from Naval Group. That reflected weaker ties between Brasilia and Paris after the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018.

– Egypt’s opting in 2020 for two FREMM multimission frigates from Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri over an offer from Naval Group, mainly due to French criticism of Cairo’s lack of respect for human rights.

– A fresh analysis by the Australian and U.S. authorities of the “strategic situation” in the Indo-Pacific region led to Canberra’s 2021 cancellation of Naval Group’s work to build 12 Shortfin Barracuda attack submarines for the Australian navy.

Alternatively, rising tension has led some nations to speed up arms deals, such as Greece ordering Rafale fighter jets and FDI defense and intervention frigates, the report said. Strategic partnership agreements can also help arms deals, if they are watched over with care. A strategic agreement signed with India in 1998 helped lead to Naval Group’s 2005 sale of six  Scorpene attack submarines, and New Delhi’s 2016 order for 36 Rafale fighters.

Companies Owe Money

The DGA – which the audit office says plays a pivotal role in exports – can in theory claim payment of two percent when companies win overseas deals, stemming from paying for studies, research and development, and machine tools for production, the report said. But the reality is quite otherwise, with some companies opting out of payment.

“In fact, problems in calculation, the determination of some companies to exonerate themselves from these payments and the complexity of relations between the DGA and companies” lie behind corporate reluctance to show the money, the report said.

The report pointed up companies failing to inform the DGA when an export deal had been pitched, delaying communication of the estimated payment, and lateness in fixing the final amount due.

There may be a ministerial decision to partially or fully exonerate payment, if the DGA accepts the company’s request, usually based on the corporate effort in the export sale campaign, the report said. That capacity for partial or full exoneration of company payment was not available until written into administrative guidelines revised last year.

The report pointed up lengthy legal disputes and loss of income for the DGA. Some €16 million was due on a contract signed back to 2015, the report said, with the company disputing that as an excessive claim in January 2020. The lawsuit was still pending when the audit office report was being written, the authors said.

The DGA was owed some €154 million in company payments at the end of 2021, the report said, of which €148 million was tied to contracts signed in 2015 and 2016, and these will undoubtedly be contested in the courts. The total amount owed by companies at the end of 2022 was €170 million.

Payments to the procurement office were late, with the payment of one year sometimes including back payments of several years, the report said. The amounts received by the DGA appeared to be “particularly low,” even after  including the contested payments.

The DGA has not made the effort it should have to be fully paid, the report said.

The procurement office said exports were worth more than “the few dozens of millions of payments,” the report said, and greater importance lay in exports supporting the defense industrial and technological base, companies’ economic performance, which cuts costs, helps the defense budget and its effect on jobs and tax revenue.

The audit office called for a tougher approach

“Even if these factors are beyond dispute, they do not justify the lack of tight management of returns the government has the right to expect,” the report said.

The DGA received €26.4 million in payment from companies in 2021, up from €15.3 million in the previous year, a table in the report shows.

“The armed forces ministry should pursue a more aggressive policy on the subject of payments, as it is inadmissible that, after several years of signing a  contract, some companies continue to contest the amounts,” the report said.

DGA and the Services

The procurement office assigned respectively an estimated 231 and 270 staff on support of exports in 2019 and 2020, although that was not a complete tally, as there were some 40 full time equivalent personnel who could be accounted for, the report said.

The DGA technical and operations departments consider they make big contributions to supporting exports, with the appointment of “architects of export programs,” the report said. These officers work closely with teams working on programs and operations, with three program architects assigned to  Rafale contracts.

DGA technical centers are working on flight tests to assess readiness of Rafales for India, Caracal helicopters for Kuwait, and NH90 helicopters for Qatar. There is certification work to ensure standards matches those for use of French forces.

The procurement office recruited 182 staff between 2016 and 2021 to help support exports, assigning around a third to work on the Rafale, 17.5 percent on submarines, 12.6 percent on the CaMo (mobilized capability) program with Belgium on armored vehicles, 11.6 percent on satellites, and 7.7 percent on helicopters, the report said.

In 2016, the then procurement head, Laurent Collet-Billon, said the DGA planned to recruit more than 500 staff to support exports by 2019-2020.

The DGA invoices for payment for supporting exports, with its international development department negotiating directly with client nations on technical services.

A senior DGA official, Thierry Carlier, won promotion last year to five star general and deputy director of the procurement office after heading the international development department for five years. That department leads the French export drive, and foreign arms sales were expected to exceed €30 billion over 2021 and 2022, mostly due to winning pitches of the Rafale abroad.

The joint chief of staff invoices for the services’ support of exports, drawing on the SISTEX computer program for an overall view, the report said. The air force particularly helped in sale of the Rafale overseas. The invoices are sent to the companies or to the forces of the client nation.

The French forces, much like the DGA, prefer billing companies, rather than having to invoice directly the client nation, the report said. The billing of client nations for training pilots proved to be particularly trying.

The armed forces invoice after “tough talks” with companies, the report said, as much on the basic principle of what can be invoiced – such as service support, as the details of each export project. The companies put on pressure in a bid to cut costs “to maintain competitiveness.”

“The aeronautics sector has benefited on several occasions from favorable ministerial decisions in this area,” the report said. “Such was the case in 2017, with aircraft being made available for air shows, without being invoiced.”

China, France, Germany, Russia and the U.S. ranked as the top five arms exporters from 2017 to 2021, the report said, holding between them 78.5 percent of the world market for weapons.

France rose to third from fifth ranking in the world, the report said, doubling its market share to 11 percent, helped by selling €11.7 billion of weapons abroad in 2021.

Featured Graphic Credit: Photo 72117166 © Sjankauskas | Dreamstime.com

JAGM Integration

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on JAGM Integration
02/17/2023

U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169, Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), load and fire an AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) in support of exercise Steel Knight 23 at Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, California, Dec. 13, 2022.

The JAGM is a precision-guided munition for use against high value stationary, moving, and relocatable land and maritime targets.

Exercise Steel Knight 23 provides 3rd MAW an opportunity to refine Wing-level warfighting in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force and fleet maneuver.

12.13.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Daniel Childs

3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

The French Mistral: The Case of the Russian Sale and Its Aftermath

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The French Mistral: The Case of the Russian Sale and Its Aftermath
02/16/2023

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France took a financial hit of €409 million ($440 million) as a result of  its 2015 cancellation of the sale of two helicopter carriers to Russia, the national audit office said in its report on French arms exports.

“In total, taking into account the result of negotiations with Russia, cancellation of payments, payments to Naval Group, modifications and the sale of the ships to Egypt, this transaction cost France €409 million,” the independent office said in its report, Support for Export of Military Matériel.

The report was cleared 24 January 2023  for publication.

The then French president, François Hollande, cancelled in August 2015 a controversial sale of the Mistral class warships, under pressure from the U.S., central European and Baltic nations, after Russia seized in 2014 the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine.

The then U.S. president, Barak Obama, said Paris should “press the pause button,” while the U.K. also called for Hollande to ax the arms deal.

How the audit office arrived at that €409 million was unclear, but one view is that amount includes an estimated €340 million-€350 million paid out by Coface, the export credit agency, to the prime contractor, Naval Group, then known as DCNS, and other contractors including STX and CNIM.

STX built the two Mistrals at Saint-Nazaire shipyard, while CNIM supplied two L-CAT landing catamarans for the warship deal with Moscow.

That overall €409 million might also include €56.8 million spent on training Russian crews and adapting the ships to Russian specifications.

The hangers had been built large for a naval version of the Kamov Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter, and the helicopter deck could be heated, to sail in Arctic waters.

STX, the shipbuilder, received €661 million from Coface, Thales €80 million for supply of electronics, and CNIM €40 million, September 2015 parliamentary reports from the lower house National Assembly and Senate said.

France paid Russia total reimbursement of €949.75 million for cancelling the order for the Mistrals, comprising a core payment of €892.9 million, and a further €56.8 million, the Sept. 15 2015 National Assembly report said.

It is understood the core repayment was based on Russian advance payment for the first ship – Vladivostok – which had been built and was ready for delivery, and partial advance payment on the second vessel – Sevastapol – which had yet to be completed when Hollande called the deal off.

There is a view the costs were covered by insurance claims through Coface, rather than French taxpayers, with export insurance for building the warships, buying them back from Russia, and selling them on to Egypt in 2015.

There is also a view the Mistral sale to Egypt was worth €960 million, although press reports at the time said the Cairo deal was worth €950 million.

Egypt’s purchase of the two Mistrals followed Cairo’s 2015 order for French weapons worth €5.2 billion for 24 Rafale fighter jets, a FREMM multimission frigate, and air-to-air and naval missiles.

The audit office was not available for comment.

Coface consistently made money between 2010-2021, with premiums exceeding claims, the report said, with only 2015 showing a net loss of €82 million due to the claims made on cancellation of the Mistral deal with Russia. The sale to Egypt limited the amount of claim, the report said.

Naval Group, the French shipbuilder, received payment that covered the cost of  production, but it had to forego an estimated profit of €100 million on the Russian deal due to the cancellation.

There was much debate in France at the time, with some calling for delivery to Russia, to bolster a perception of France  as a reliable trading partner.

The previous French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, had approved the Mistral sale to Russia in 2011, for around €1.2 billion, with options for two more.

That deal with Russian president Vladimir Putin drew criticism, with critics pointing to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, and concern rising when Russian troops seized Crimea and Moscow-backed separatists took control of the Donbas region, Eastern Ukraine, in 2014.

The incursion into Georgia would have taken 40 minutes rather than 26 hours if  Russian forces had sailed the Mistral carrier, a Russian general had said.

The then executive chairman of Naval Group, Hervé Guillou, told parliamentarians in September 2015 that lawyers had said the company faced  penalty payments of some €1 billion if the Mistral deal went into a lengthy legal dispute with Russia, on top of repaying almost €1 billion of advance payments.

The then French secretary general for defense and national security, Louis Gautier, negotiated with the then Russian deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, and they agreed on repayment, avoiding a legal wrangle. Hollande and Putin had agreed there should be a negotiated settlement and gave those senior officials mandate to strike a deal.

Those high-level, confidential talks appeared to spark a Russian free and frank expression of views.

Rogozin had not been “very favourable” to the Mistral deal, Gautier told Sept. 8 2015 parliamentarians,  the Sept. 15 parliamentary report said.

The Russian official, in a brusque manner, stated his opposition to cooperation, that Russian yards could have built the helicopter carriers, and that they had not exercised the option for two more Mistrals, which would have been built in Russian yards, the senior French official told the parliamentary committee.

“His point of view was opposition to execution of the contract,” Gautier told parliamentarians.

“Nonetheless, there were representatives of other ministries sitting round the table.”

Also, see the following:

Remember the Russian Mistral Amphibious Ship? Certainly, the Turks Do

Recovering the NASA Artemis I Orion Spacecraft

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Recovering the NASA Artemis I Orion Spacecraft
02/15/2023

Amphibious transport dock USS Portland (LPD27) recovers the NASA Orion spacecraft, Dec. 11, 2022. Portland, along with Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Montgomery (LCS 8), operated in U.S. 3rd Fleet in support of the recovery.

The retrieval operation was part of a Department of Defense effort that integrated combatant command service capabilities to determine best practices for safely retrieving spacecraft capable of carrying humans into space.

The U.S. Navy has many unique capabilities that make it an ideal partner for supporting NASA, including its amphibious and expeditionary capabilities with the ability to embark helicopters, launch and recover small boats, three-dimensional air search radar and advanced medical facilities.

12.11.2022

Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Devin Kates

Expeditionary Strike Group Three

Red Flag-Rescue

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Red Flag-Rescue
02/13/2023

Red Flag-Rescue is a joint exercise that involves other service branches as well as partner nations and is the Department of Defense’s premier combat search and rescue exercise held twice a year, hosted exclusively by Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.

RF-R biannually involves multiple units within the 355th Wing, from pararescuemen to pilots, as well as members from the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force Regiment, other rescue units from Nellis AFB and many other allied nations and joint services, all converging at Playas Training Center in New Mexico.

12.16.2022

Video by Senior Airman Kaitlyn Ergish

355th Wing

The USCG in Pacific Defense: Let Us Support Them This Time

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The USCG in Pacific Defense: Let Us Support Them This Time
02/09/2023

by Robbin Laird

I was fascinated to read an interview with the USCG Pacific Commander which was published by The Wall Street Journal.

In an article by Mike Cherney, we learn that the Biden Administration wants the USCG to expand its footprint amid competition with China.

The only problem with this is that Obama Administration already knew that the USCG could do this (even without competition with China) but simply did not fund the service to do so.

This is yet another example of wasting an opportunity that was obvious in the first decade of the 21st century.

How do we know this?

The USCG leadership tried to fund a fleet to do so in that period of time and simply was ignored.

All you have to do is to compare this interview published in the WSJ with one I did with the same command element in 2011.

According to the article: “The Coast Guard’s mission has traditionally focused on protecting U.S. maritime borders, but its remit has expanded as China’s clout grows. The Coast Guard plans to increase the number of deployments of its 418-foot national-security cutters, its biggest and most capable general-purpose ship, to the western Pacific in the coming year, Vice Adm. Tiongson said.

“Also, the Coast Guard is looking for more locations that can provide “logistics stops,” where its ships can berth, resupply and replenish as they travel around the Pacific, possibly in foreign countries, he said. That would allow its smaller, 154-foot fast-response cutters to spend more time away from their home port and travel farther. Maintenance could be conducted and crews could even be swapped out in those ports, he said.

“The Biden administration, in its Pacific island strategy released last September, called on the Coast Guard to enhance its engagements in the Pacific and expand its presence to support law enforcement. Vice Adm. Tiongson’s comments offer an early look into how the Coast Guard is responding to that directive.”

Now let us go back to the interview I did in 2011 with Vice Admiral Manson Brown.

Admiral Manson Brown: Most people don’t realize that 85 percent of the US exclusive economic zones (EEZs) are in the Pacific, mostly in the Central and Western Pacific.  There are a lot of economies in that region that are driven by the fishing industry.

One of the things that I realized is that even with good enforcement in US EEZ’s, the fish know no boundaries.  So they will shift from our EEZ’s to those of other nations and potentially be overfished there.

We formed partnerships with adjoining countries who are working their EEZs to try to manage the illegal fishing beyond our EEZ. We developed a joint strategy, a ship rider program where essentially we use Coast Guard assets and put enforcement officials from six nations that have signed ship rider agreements.

The Central and Western Pacific is significant distance away from the continental US. Most people don’t know that sovereign American territory is located as well in the Central and Western Pacific.

SLD: How long does it take to go from Alameda, California (the USCG HQ in the Pacific) to these territorial waters?

Admiral Manson Brown: To deploy a Cutter from here to American Samoa requires ten or more days.

SLD: So one way to understand the need for the cutters is their endurance.  If it takes more than a week to go and a week to come back, endurance buys you more time on station.

Admiral Manson Brown: Correct. And the thing you have to realize in the Pacific, you don’t have the infrastructure that you do in the Atlantic.

So in terms of pier space, fuel, engineering support, food and other logistics, you have to take it with you.  When you’re down in a place like American Samoa, you better have most of what you need to operate.

SLD: Endurance from this point is more operational time on station.

Admiral Manson Brown: We also need to be prepared as you alluded to earlier, for the weather conditions in the Pacific, which can be severe, and which can be unpredictable.

And as a former icebreaker sailor, I can tell you that the Pacific storms can whack you pretty heavily. So we need substantial ships to protect our crews, and to promote mission efficiency. And when folks are in Hawaii, they forget that the seas are rough around the islands–this is not the Caribbean.

If you go a mile and a half offshore and to do a SAR case in Hawaii with a 25 foot rigid hull inflatable, you’re doing a SAR case in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.

People think of Hawaii like they think of Florida with the protection of the land mass, but there is no protection out there.  So we need more substantial capability to deal with Mother Nature. You will be operating in seas that will scare you.

SLD: What is the impact of these EEZ’s economically?

Admiral Manson Brown: These areas are some of the richest tuna fisheries on the planet.  Number one, we’ll see a collapse of our fisheries if we don’t protect these regions, which will affect the fishing economies in that region.  Number two, it will affect the fisheries throughout the adjacent regions. There are 22 small nations of Oceania whose economies are driven by fishing licenses, and fish.  If those fisheries collapse, we could potentially see Somalia-like instability conditions closer to our sovereign territory.

SLD: The cutters are crucial to such presence and effectiveness. If you physically are not there, and see one of things I think is also important to understand, the ship is the presence.  You can have all the ISR you want, but that’s not a good deterrent to anybody.  And it doesn’t allow you to prosecute.

Admiral Manson Brown: Yes, indeed. And it’s presence, in a competitive sense, because if we are not there, someone else will be there, whether it’s the illegal fishers or whether it’s Chinese influence in the region.  We need to be very concerned about the balance of power in the neighborhood.

If you take a look at some of the other players that are operating in the neighborhood there is clearly an active power game going on.

SLD: Basically, not being there is its own message, so to speak?

Admiral Manson Brown: That’s exactly right.  When I was in Tonga, I observed large structures built by the Chinese government and am watching others nations expand their influence around the world.

But there is another important reason that we should be there.  It’s another aspect of national security.  If you take a look at the march of terrorism through places such as Indonesia, it’s not too difficult to craft an instability scenario where it could leap to Oceania, allowing our enemy to potentially get closer to reach out and touch us.

I remind people that even though American Samoa is a U.S. territory, once you get to American Samoa, you’re in America. It’s not too difficult to reach out and touch us from there….

SLD: Could you discuss the capabilities, which the USCG brings to a region that is crucial to the security-defense engagement of the United States?

Admiral Manson Brown: There are actually three capabilities that we bring to the table that separate us from DOD.  Number one is the regulatory capability.  The second one is the law enforcement capability, and the third one is the emergency response capability.

And that really gets to our multi-mission nature.  Even though we may out there, we are conducting combined operations with Canada, Korea, Japan, China. We’re also there just in case something goes wrong so that we can intercept the problem and be on scene, and provide the search and rescue capability.

With the vast distances, which we refer to as the tyranny of distance out here,  if you don’t have enduring presence, which cutters bring, then you’re not going to get to where you may be needed in an emergency in time, particularly in a place like the Bering Sea.

SLD: Forward deployed so to speak?

Admiral Manson Brown: Forward deployed. Operations in the Bering Sea allow us to have a positioned emergency response asset, whether it’s search and rescue or pollution response.  There is no significant logistics support up there to enable rapid deployment.  Air only gets you so far.  You need an emergency surface asset to pull it all together.

SLD: So you need to be pre-positioned to be even able to do a number of these missions?

Admiral Manson Brown: That’s correct.  And this is part of our layered strategy.  Many people believe that we need to be a coastal coast guard, focused on the ports, waterways, and coastal environment.

But the reality is that because our national interests extend well beyond our shore, whether it’s our vessels, or our mariners, or our possessions and our territories, we need to have presence well beyond our shores to influence good outcomes.

As the Pacific Area Commander, I’m also the USCG Pacific Fleet Commander.  That’s a powerful synergy.  I’m responsible for the close-in game, and I’m responsible for the away game.  Now the away game has some tangible authorities and capabilities, such as fisheries enforcement and search and rescue presence.

But it’s also got some softer type of capability.  We do a lot of nation building.  We perform a lot of theater security cooperation for PACOM.  We’ll send ships over to Japan.  We’ve got ships going over to China just to exchange ideas, and discuss common objectives and capabilities, and demonstrate American engagement in the region.

As I travel around, I realize that the USCG is respected internationally because of our law enforcement and regulatory capabilities and our history. When people see our response to Katrina, or to Deep Water Horizon, they want a piece of us.

SLD: And because you’re a security and defense entity that allows you to have a larger dialogue than simply a pure military force?

Admiral Manson Brown: It comes down to common interests.  The common interests are those for maritime safety, security, and stewardship.

Other nations understand that we’re also a military service, and we play that security defense interface, but that’s not how the conversation starts.  They’re interested in protecting their shores, protecting their shipping, protecting the ports, and waterways, and protecting the environment.

SLD: The role of the USCG as a Title X or defense agency is crucial to the effectiveness of the USCG role here in the Pacific as well?

Admiral Manson Brown: Part of our framework of respect and credibility is the fact that we wear this uniform. People are intrigued in the international community by us.  Our unique military and law enforcement character, combined with this uniform, makes it work for us.  If I had gone to Beijing in a suit, I would’ve had a very different reaction.

When I was in Iraq in 2004 working for Ambassador Bremer, it was a civilian position. But I took along my Coast Guard uniforms; and it didn’t take too many days for me to figure out that I better wear the uniform because it’s a symbol that commands respect within the international community. That’s something that cannot be lost in the discussion about the future of the USCG and its role in the Pacific.

There is not much different in 2011 than 2023 except perhaps with some policy urgency but we shall see.

The USCG tried to alert the Obama Administration to the national need and had a solution which the Obama Administration chose to slow roll.

To be clear, the USCG was clearly sounding the alarm.

In a 2011 interview I did with the head of USCG Acquisition, Admiral Currier made a clear case for a significant National Security Cutter Fleet.

Admiral Currier: We have a legitimate requirement for persistent presence off the Atlantic Coast, Pacific Coast, Bering Sea, the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean for the interdiction of migrants, narco-terrorism and the insurance of safety and security at sea.

In the past, our formula has been 12 major cutters at 185 days a year away from homeport. And that’s based on over 40 years of operation with the 378-foot high endurance cutter.

Currently, we are looking to replace those twelve antiquated high endurance cutters with a minimum of 8 National Security Cutters.  Given a unique manning concept called crew rotation, we have modeled the ability to do 230 days a year at sea, rather than 185, which we did with the previous class of high endurance cutters. In effect, the days at sea, or the days engaged in mission execution, will be roughly the same between the National Security Cutter with 8 hulls and the Hamilton class with 12 hulls.

But it’s even better because of the enhanced capabilities of the National Security Cutter.  The ship can loiter, sprint, carry aircraft, and deploy small armed interdiction boats. Eventually it will carry unmanned aerial vehicles. Currently, the NSC can process intelligence information operating as a deployed system, not just a hull yielding so many days at sea.

It’s a much more capable platform than anything we’ve had in the past.  Even though our top-line metric is days away from homeport, the effectiveness of the platform in- theater will be an order of magnitude greater.  And that’s been proven in deployment of the first two ships.

When we published our book on rebuilding American military power in the Pacific we started by emphasizing the key role of the USCG.

A role not recognized.

I hope Obama III really seizes the opportunity this time around.

Featured Photo: Vice Admiral Manson Brown during the SLD interview (Credit: SLD)