SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

Building a High Speed Helicopter

Posted on December 20, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/20/2010

An Interview with Jean-Michel Billig

12/21/2010 – In early October 2010, Second Line of Defense had a chance to talk with Eurocopter about its new high-speed test helicopter, X Cubed. Jean-Michel Billig is Executive Vice President of Eurocopter for Research and Development. The slide show and the accompanying video below show the X3 during the test flight on September 6^th.

The X3 helo demonstration project began its flight tests on September 6 at the Istres test facility in southern France. The helicopter combines conventional rotary blades with forward positioned turbo prop blades. The X3 is a blend of the Dauphin fuselage, the EC155 main rotor, the EC175 gearbox, NH 90 engines, and features a twin fin tail instead of the tail rotor. It also features two forward facing five-bladed props mounted on stub wing sponsors on the upper fuselage, which are driven by shafts from the main gearbox.

The helicopter is designed to provide a low cost high-speed operating form factor while ensuring the versatility and functionalities of an helicopter, such as VTOL, hovering, autorotation. It is aimed at customers who use rotorcraft for various missions where speed or mission duration is of the essence and therefore who could use higher speed to provide better solutions to their core missions.

And it aims at “affordable” high speed, by which Eurocopter sees mission costs reduced by the rotorcraft using both rotor blades and turbo props to gain efficiencies. And by building from a technical architecture extremely simple and close to classic helicopter platforms, Eurocopter is very confident it can provide limited increase of the production costs of the product.

The X3 can change the speed of its main rotor in flight, avoiding drag divergence on the advancing blade and increasing the stall speed of the retreating blade, while also reducing noise. The small stub wings unload the main rotor at speed, thus allowing for the reduced main rotor rpm.

SLD: The hybrid concept of the helicopter is really interesting. How do you put together the rotor blades with the turbo propellers?

Jean-Michel Billig: We have built the test platform around mature and affordable technologies. We have been involved in high-speed research for a long time and have been breaking some high-speed record for some 20 years ago. But we have been searching for high speed within a very simple, mature, architecture.

What do we mean by this? We do not want to offer high speed at any cost; we want affordable solutions. Therefore, we have modified main gearbox, which instead of having one drive shaft, will have two drive shafts, one on each side to the propellers. That means that actually for the dynamic system, it is exactly of the same complexity or maturity as regular helicopters.

SLD: Could you describe how this is done?

Jean-Michel Billig: In hover, we control the rotorcraft like any other helicopter. The main rotor is fully dedicated to lift the helicopter and we control the yaw axis with the two propellers. The differential pitch of the propellers is controlled with the pedals like the pitch of a tail rotor. For the forward flight at high speed, the pitch of the 2 propellers is controlled via a trim on the collective stick while the attitude of the helicopter is kept at zero. So, we have the rotor, which keeps it main functionality to ensure the lift and at high speed we reduce the lift of the rotor by reducing the rotation speed of the rotor, and the wings are taking over up to 40% of the lift and this allows us to go to high speed because, as you know, the limitation for high speed is high rotor rotation with the tip of advancing blade, which shall not be supersonic.

SLD: I think the trick there, as you are describing it, is that you lift with the rotor blades, but then you are going to shift to the propeller blades for your higher speed and lower mission cost.

Jean-Michel Billig: We do not shift; we combine both. We have the main rotor fully dedicated to lift at any time. When we reach high speed in forward flight, we just reduce rotation speed of the main rotor and we take advantage of the lift of the wings.

SLD: Do the rotor blades shift forward, is that what you are saying, or do they stay in the same position?

Jean-Michel Billig: The main rotor stays into the same position. Its architecture is exactly the one from the helicopter. But the hydraulic system has been modified to cope with two propellers.

SLD: Your expectation is that this is a fairly robust solution, then?

Jean-Michel Billig: Technologically speaking, it is extremely robust; it is exactly the principle of a helicopter.

SLD: And you were emphasizing that building an evolutionary approach is at the heart of the objective to provide for cost-effective high-speed solutions?

Jean-Michel Billig: We are not aiming at demonstrating high speed, as such, we are aiming at creating cost effective high speed. We believe that for those missions where speed is important, we want to demonstrate that we can lower the mission costs for those missions. So, this is all about the concept of our X3.

We are not aiming at demonstrating high speed, as such, we are aiming at creating cost effective high speed. We believe that for those missions where speed is important, we want to demonstrate that we can lower the mission costs for those missions. So, this is all about the concept of our X3.

SLD: Your point is that the target here is to be more cost effective than a helicopter, but to add to an increase in factor of time in executing the missions?

Jean-Michel Billig: Yes. I will give you an example. Oil and gas, where the platforms are very far away, we believe that the time to get to the platform is taking longer and longer and it means time and money for the companies. They want to shorten this time. Similarly, for search and rescue missions, where time is of the essence, we believe there is a market. Special Forces applications come to mind as well. We can lower the cost for these missions providing high speed, and our target is to lower the cost of this mission by 10 to 20% compared to the same size helicopter without the high-speed capability of X Cube.

SLD: Two points that derive from this. One is that I note that in the video that I watched that the various systems on the helicopter that were derived or taken, literally, from other Eurocopter systems, so that obviously, you’re not going to have supply chain difficulties with this thing. It’s already embedded in the extant Eurocopter supply chain.

Jean-Michel Billig: Yes, we do not expect challenges in the manufacturing. Of course, every time we have a new development, there are challenges. But having said this, we do not anticipate manufacturing difficulties to reproduce these concepts.

SLD: I’m going back to those mission set issues and I’d like to look at a couple of them. One is this deep-water drilling issue, which was not highlighted by the Gulf crisis. The issue is getting out there quickly to sustain the operations, to get people off the platform, to deal with crisis, to deal with resupply. It is a long way out. So, there’s clearly a need for this kind of helicopter, for that kind of mission.

Jean-Michel Billig: Absolutely, yes. The layout of the final product is under investigation. Today the demonstrator is exclusively to demonstrate the high-speed capabilities. How the final product would look, this is something we are investigating.

SLD: So, your point is that how it gets customized, how it actually gets manufactured, will be linked very much to the missions and the kind of what the customer needs would be?

Jean-Michel Billig: Very much so.

SLD: So, the point is, on the one hand, you’ve got the technology demonstrator; you’re looking at how you could manufacture this capability. On the other hand, you’re looking at the potential form factors within which you can insert this technology, dependent on mission requirements and customer demand. Is that a fair way to summarize it?

Jean-Michel Billig: This is so. On the one hand, we have the demonstrator, and we are validating the cost effective high-speed concepts, and on the other hand, we are capturing the various mission requirements, be they commercial or military, in order to ensure we understand commercial requirements for cost effective high speed.

On the one hand, we have the demonstrator, and we are validating the cost effective high-speed concepts, and on the other hand, we are capturing the various mission requirements, be they commercial or military, in order to ensure we understand commercial requirements for cost effective high speed.

—-

The Afghan Drug Challenge

Posted on December 19, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/19/2010

A Russian Perspective

By Dr. Richard Weitz and Dmitri Titoff, October 21, 2010

12/21/2010 – Translation provided by Dr. Richard Weitz

Q: What accounts for the fact that, since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the flow of narcotics from that country has increased significantly?

Victor P. Ivanov: You know, the Taliban, wishing to obtain international recognition, and receiving warnings from the United Nations – at that time the core anti-drug office was headed by Pino Arlacchi and he personally told me the story – went so far as to eliminate drug production. They started active work in 1998, 1999 and 2000. In 2000, they introduced decisive measures. They proclaimed a fatwa, which introduced the death penalty. As a result, in 2001, narcotics production in the territory controlled by the Taliban had been completely eliminated. Narcotics production has continued in northern Afghanistan, which was under the control of the Northern Alliance and outside Taliban control. But with the beginning of the [NATO] operation [in Afghanistan] narcotics production increased again.

You ask why narcotics production has grown? Our analysis shows that the fundamental factor is that the introduction of the [foreign] forces provoked resistance. In the beginning, the Taliban resisted and armed conflicts emerged. Territory on which armed conflict occurs cannot be used for the production of peaceful crops. The cultivation of useful crops requires a long production cycle – it is necessary to grow, harvest, dry, thresh, market, transport and sell [them]. One can lose crops at each of these stages – or they can be taken away or be burned. Opium poppy does not entail such risks because it requires little maintenance. Second, merchants come to buy it on the spot. The risks of losing the crop are considerably smaller. Accordingly, a decrease in useful agricultural production occurred with an increase in the production of opium poppies. I myself was in Kabul – no Afghan tomatoes or cucumbers are there. And this in a country where there is a favorable climate for beneficial agricultural crops.

Following the introduction of the troops, fighting began. After a while, the Taliban were scattered, but with the long-term presence of military forces in this country, perceptions formed among the local population that these troops were an occupation force. That was not said by me – it was said Zbigniew Brzezinski because a protraсted military campaign in another’s country creates a feeling of occupation. And this, in turn, starts to consolidate the various political movements, parties, and forces that are already beginning to defend their territorial integrity with weapons.

Q: But they also need money to buy weapons, and for this they can produce and sell narcotics?

Victor P. Ivanov: Not exactly. It was simply that a situation occurred in which a growing number of political forces entered the arena and military confrontations with the government and foreign troops increased…. If previously it was only the Taliban, now a large number of different movements were engaged in these conflicts, and a larger territory became a field of battle. This deprives farmers of the opportunity to grow useful crops.

Q: In the final analysis, did not the anarchy and chaos lead to the horrific narcotics production in Afghanistan?

Victor P. Ivanov: Of course. When the mass of armed groups are running around the forests, through mountains, through fields, and they are shooting at each other, under such conditions growing wheat is of course impossible. That is, it creates objective conditions that block the possibility of peaceful agricultural production. A poppy, of course, thrives.

Q: How do you assess the cooperation between Russia and NATO in the war on narcotics? In your opinion, in which cases can this collaboration be considered effective and how can it be improved?

Victor P. Ivanov: Our cooperation in training personnel can be considered more or less productive. Within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, we use a training center in Domodedovo (for training the Afghan Counter-narcotics Police). This is a productive direction and I think we should continue this work, and perhaps even expand the scale of the training of the Counter-narcotics police. The more so because we are talking about organizing a process for training the army and police. The more we educate people, the better.

If we talk about cooperation in other areas, for example, regarding the destruction of narcotics laboratories—and this is what has been declared a priority—in March-April, I was in Brussels, and we talked about it. NATO has said that it will not engage in the destruction of narcotics plantations because it is the prerogative of the Afghan government and it is necessary to concentrate on the laboratories. Unfortunately, we have nothing to boast about. The number of laboratories breeds like mushrooms after rain. In addition, working with the US, with Gil Kerlikowske, like two drug lords, we energize the work of our police services. We work closely with the DEA [U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency]. We found several drug laboratories. (Editor’s note: On the 28^th of October 2010 the first ever Russian-American operation on destruction of narcotics labs was conducted with the help from Afghan forces.)

Q: Why do you think this is happening? In addition to the eradication of narcotics crops, which counter-nacotics methods does Russia want NATO and the Afghan government to try to undertake?

Victor P. Ivanov: First, we must realize that the farmers themselves have no economic motive for the cultivation of opium or wheat because they, in essence, perform slave labor, receiving a pittance for it. I already cited the example that a farmer’s family receives $70 a year, so there can be no question of corruption or an economic motive. We can talk about those who are the owners of these narcotics plantations. They are the ones who tell the farmers what to grow. They of course have an economic motive to produce opium because they receive huge windfalls for it. They do not live in Afghanistan; they live abroad – in the United Arab Emirates, in Europe, or in America. They receive huge profits by then laundering them through banks. In our view, it is necessary to expose all these landlords and, as a form of compensation, transfer their land to the Government of Afghanistan so that it took can employ farmers in useful work.

Q: Are the owners of narcotics crops associated in any way with the Taliban?

Victor P. Ivanov: Let’s take Operation Moshtarak, which occurred in Helmand – and in fact Helmand produces 70 percent of all heroin in the world. The land there has long been divided because the richest, most successful farmers have always worked in this province, and there exist very good climatic conditions, hydraulic structures, and irrigation systems. NATO conducted an operation in the province to drive out the Taliban. As Mr. [Anders Fogh] Rasmussen said in April of this year, the operation was very successful. But for some reason narcotics production has remained there as before.

If we talk about the Taliban, that is very interesting material in the [Senate] Foreign Relations Committee. In August of last year, a report entitled, “Drugs, the Rebels and Terrorism”, was presented in which the U.S. Congress estimated the Taliban’s involvement in drug production amounted to 150 million dollars. In this case, narcotics production in Afghanistan itself gives them 65 billion dollars. That is, the Taliban engages in 0.2 percent of the entire narcotics production. This is the data of the U.S. Congress. When NATO says that they will combat only the narcotics production connected with the Taliban, then we must assume that 150,000 soldiers will destroy 0.2 percent of the narcotics production in Afghanistan, while the Government of Afghanistan must destroy 99.8 percent of the narcotics. It seems to me that this is a disproportionate use of force.

Q: How effective do you think are the actions of the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] to combat drug trafficking?

Victor P. Ivanov: You see, both NATO and the CSTO – which is a political instrument with whose help is realized the will of the participating states, and nothing more. The CSTO does not have its own troops, just like NATO, as far as I know, does not have its own troops. It involves the armed forces of its participating states. We took the decision in the CSTO to conduct “Operation Channel.” It is a preventive operation that allows a number of agencies on the territory of the operation to update their activities by enhancing their exchange of information. It involves the customs and border agencies and the police of a number of countries. We are beginning a more rapid exchange of information by having created a so-called national headquarters for conducting the operation. We organize communication channels and a more intensive exchange of data. This allows us to track drug trafficking channels and rapidly apply our capabilities to eliminate them.

Q: Can you say that it is effective?

Victor P. Ivanov: Of course, this is one of the operations that can be carried out. This operation is for the most part preventive because it is an exchange of information, when one state informs another about the availability of data about narcotics flows and so on. This creates a further opportunity for the accumulation of materials and more thorough operations of the police services of the various states. Of course, this operation alone will not change anything – it is quite clear, obvious, and understandable. But this operation attracts attention and increases the activity of the special services.

Q: Americans also participate as observers in this operation…

Victor P. Ivanov: Yes, and China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Baltic States participate. All this contributes to the common cause.

Q: How do you assess the cooperation between Russia and Central Asian countries with China in combating narcotics? In your opinion, what is the potential of the SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organization] regarding the control of narcotics trafficking in Central Asia?

Victor P. Ivanov: With them [the Central Asian countries] we work closely and know each other well. We deal not only with the leaders of agencies, but also with the operational staff at the working level. This allows us to conduct controlled deliveries – this is already specific operational activities – to make test purchases and, in short, to realize the entire arsenal of search operations.

We have reached an agreement with China—with Meng Jianzhu, the Minister of Public Security—to meet annually at the highest level. In addition, at the deputy level we hold meetings on cross-border cooperation because, many synthetic drugs and psychoactive substances go from China to Russia. Here our cooperation is quite specific. In addition, we have intensified our work on information sharing and collaboration in interdicting narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. As you know, separatist movements exist there. There were serious disturbances a year age, during which many people perished. This area borders Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyzstan is part of the CSTO; therefore, the exchange of information is becoming more targeted.

Q: And the SCO?

Victor P. Ivanov: Last year, when Russia was chairing the SCO, we first established a working mechanism for cooperation in the area of narcotics. It consists of three groups, a three-tier mechanism. [The first level is] the so-called leadership meeting, when we meet with the leaders of these countries. Next, we meet at the level of senior officials, at the departmental level. They discuss the issues to present to the leaders. Next, we meet at the expert level, which allows us to formulate the tasks and problems to transfer to a higher level and to plan specific operations. Such a mechanism was created, and within this framework, we exchange information. In addition, this organization has political potential, which allows us to formulate common security levels regarding drug trafficking, narcotics production, and so on. In the framework of the SCO, we can take decisions regarding political and legal assessments of what is happening in Afghanistan.

Q: In your opinion, what steps can the international community take to strengthen counter-narcotics activities in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan?

Victor P. Ivanov: Above all, rendering support to local law enforcement agencies through implementing donor assistance programs, retooling, training and retraining of personnel, and charting out the so-called “supply control model” – in short, the training of forms and procedures.

Q: Do you think that the “6+3” proposal of Uzbekistan for establishing peace in Afghanistan will promote counter-narcotics cooperation? Last week, a delegation from Uzbekistan was in Washington, and they talked about it.

Victor P. Ivanov: You know, a proposal for establishing peace is correct. The question is, how will it be implemented? It is easy to say that we want peace in Afghanistan, but if we do nothing about it, we will not establish peace there. In my opinion, and in the view of the CSTO, there cannot be a military solution to the problems in Afghanistan. Of course, we need a peace process.

Credit: http://www.ips-dc.org

Q: In your opinion, how effectively can the Caspian states combat narcotics smuggling from Afghanistan?

Victor P. Ivanov: On October 13th, I conducted an event at our initiative. There was a meeting of the Caspian Five, the representatives of the competent authorities of the Caspian littoral states. I think that it can be very effective because the Caspian Sea is used to transport drugs to Azerbaijan, Russia and from Iran in various directions. All the more, the Caspian trade relations and merchant marine are actively developing with the usage of “river-sea” type ships, which go by the rivers deep into the Russian Federation. In addition, it is recommended by Article 17 of the 1988 UN Convention on combating drug trafficking at sea. There is international experience. For example, the European Union created the European Monitoring Center for Drugs in Lisbon. In France, there is a marine narcotics monitoring center for the Mediterranean Sea. This practice exists because there are specific conditions: the presence of the sea, major ports, and cargo-intensive commerce. This situation requires the cooperation of the riparian countries.

Q: What is the approximate volume of Afghan narcotics that traverse the Caspian Sea?

Victor P. Ivanov: We believe that approximately 20 percent of Afghan narcotics pass through the territory of the countries neighboring the Caspian basin.

Q: You noted that the suppression of precursors into Afghanistan should reduce the amount of heroin produced in that country. Have you observed any progress in this direction? And if not, why not?

Victor P. Ivanov: You know, judging by the volume of heroin production, it has not diminished. The precursors continue to arrive. In addition, I would not idealize this line of work because there are many ways to produce precursors by using artificial substances that are in legal circulation, including on Afghan territory. Of course, there are cross-border deliveries, but our American partners and we know that primitive methods of production are being used. But work in this direction is necessary. Precursors come from Pakistan, India, China, Germany, Bulgaria, and from Romania. In this regard, of course, there is a serious lobbying by chemical manufacturers – these are powerful institutions that block opportunities for chemical labeling precursors, and so on. They do not want the security services to get deep into the business of the manufacturers.

Q: What will be included in the new UN strategy on combating narcotics declared by Yuri Fedotov, and how will it differ from the former UN activities in this area?

Victor P. Ivanov: I do not yet know what it is. I think that Yuri Fedotov will talk about the main features of the new strategy. We have formulated our own proposals in the “Rainbow-2” plan, which is distinct from “Rainbow” plan. One of his points is to increase the number of provinces that will be the “poppy-free.” I have already cited the example of Badakhshan – the number of laboratories that are located there – and this province is “free” of opium poppies. This is not significant. One province, Helmand, is enough to fill the entire world with poppy, but the figure would be that all provinces except one are free of opium poppies. This criterion is inappropriate; therefore I think that if it will consider and apply normal criteria, the strategy will be good. Any strategy should establish the final criteria and results of an activity. I would include laboratories. To date, in the monitoring conducted by the UN, data on the number of laboratories is absent. The number of families involved in narcotics production is included, as are the acres of the narcotics plantations, but not the number of laboratories. Laboratories are a fundamental point. It is precisely there that the narcotics processing occurs, as well as the processing of raw materials and the direct smuggling of heroin and hashish. And it is already a segment of organized crime. The farmers in the fields are not organized crime, but slaves. But laboratories – this is organized crime. Then there is corruption, and the supply of precursors, and technologically trained specialists, and the connection with drug traffickers. The new strategy must take this into account.

Q: Are there any narcotics laboratories in Central Asia and Russia?

Victor P. Ivanov: You know, there is practically no opium production in Central Asia. There may be laboratories there, but I do not think that there are many. In Afghanistan today so much heroin is produced that it is unprofitable to manufacture it on the territory of Central Asia. Why make it there if a huge amount comes from Afghanistan. One merely needs to take and transport it to the center.

Q: Do you think that the isolation of Iran by Western nations significantly complicates the control over the export of Afghan narcotics? What is the potential for counter-narcotics cooperation between the United States and Iran?

Victor P. Ivanov: I think that in any case to drive the country into a corner is counterproductive because a cornered country begins to reflexively respond. It is necessary to employ the full diplomatic arsenal to work with Iran. With regard to counter-narcotics cooperation with Iran, the U.S. told me they were implementing a Trilateral Initiative with Iran. I think that on November 25 the trilateral initiative will hold a counter-narcotics summit in Islamabad. Yuri Fedotov will be there. The Pakistanis told me about it the week before last in Islamabad.

Q: How do you assess the relationship of Pakistan to the narcotics problem in Afghanistan?

Victor P. Ivanov: Of course, they are very concerned about narcotics production in Afghanistan. First, there are an enormous number of refugees in Pakistan – as many as two million. It’s simply a colossal humanitarian catastrophe. There are refugees today from Afghanistan than from Iraq. On the one hand, these are people who need help. On the other hand, this is a huge army from which traffickers can be recruited. And the Pakistanis are perfectly aware of this. In addition, Pakistan after the flood is experiencing enormous difficulties in connection with its destroyed infrastructure, and an army of refugees of course bring big problems.

Q: In your opinion, what will happen with the narcotics situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO troops?

Ivanov: You see, the issue of the withdrawal of NATO troops –this is a whole chain of interrelated activities, so I do not know according to which scenario all this will develop. I do not see when the withdrawal of NATO forces will be completed.

Q: You do not have a plan “B”? What if the narcotics situation does not improve?

Victor P. Ivanov: This is a rhetorical question. There is a tender announced by the Pentagon to train the Afghan army. It costs 15 billion dollars and covers the period from 2011 through 2015. In 2015, the Afghan army will receive more training. Therefore, it is worthless forecasting the next five years.

“It Takes Time”

Posted on December 19, 2010 | by SysAdmin

An Update on the Osprey From New River (VIII)

[download PDF of full report]

An Interview With Master Sgt. Jeremy Kirk

12/21/2010 – Master Sgt. Jeremy Kirk discussed his experience with maintaining the V-22. As an experience CH-46 maintainer he underscored that the Corps had decades of experience maintaining this rotorcraft. The V-22 is new and has the norm shake down challenges in operational deployments. The maintainers are shaping a regime to understand the new aircraft and how to maintain it in operations. He underscored that there are challenges, but “it takes time to learn how to maintain a new aircraft.”

SLD: Could you give us a sense of your background in maintenance?

Master Sergeant Kirk: I was a FROG guy from the get-go. With the 265, I did the Desert Storm, Desert Shield deployments, and numerous support operations out to Okinawa. I did a little stint in NATO, did the rework thing for a while for four years, and got to 263 in ’02 and did all the same deployments as Major York.

We went to Europe, spent nine months on a boat, quick turnaround, back out with the big Iraq operation. Then in 04 to 05 was in the Fallujah operation and I flew the whole time I was a crew chief originally.

I then did the transition to the V-22. I was with 263, then with the transition and then a month prior to them deploying I hurt my back. I had to have surgery. I went to 204 to do the training for a couple of years rehab, got back out at 264 and then got promoted to a job of the maintenance control chief. I’ve been around maintenance for a little bit.

SLD: What are the differences between maintaining a FROG and a V-22?

Master Sergeant Kirk: There are differences. One of the biggest differences is the lack of experienced maintainers for the V-22. With the FROG being around for so long we have decades of experience with that experience in the minds of the maintainers. We are still learning the V-22. You have younger marines and a new aircraft.

Working on the Aircraft at New River, August 2010 (Credit: SLD)

SLD: The interaction between the novelty of the aircraft, lack of maintenance experience and challenges in the supply chain obviously created a challenge.

Master Sergeant Kirk: Yes one problem was that the expectation of part life was difference from the experience. So we need to close the gap. We are trying to learn the gap. Because parts weren’t lasting as long as they were supposed to last, we were fixing them faster than you anticipated.

SLD: The metrics of performance for the parts were out of whack with the operational experience?

Master Sergeant Kirk: Absolutely. For example, a prop box, a huge transmission inside the nacelle, which is supposed to work for 5800 hours when we get them out of the factory, last considerably less. We’re changing these gearboxes faster than we need to.

One problem was that the expectation of part life was difference from the experience. So we need to close the gap. We are trying to learn the gap. Because parts weren’t lasting as long as they were supposed to last, we were fixing them faster than you anticipated. For example, a prop box, a huge transmission inside the nacelle, which is supposed to work for 5800 hours when we get them out of the factory, last considerably less. We’re changing these gearboxes faster than we need to.

SLD: Another issue we discussed earlier was that improved simplification for access to change parts is underway as well : we discussed challenges in getting the gearbox off for repair.

Working on the Aircraft in the New River Air Station Hanger, August 2010 (Credit: SLD)

Master Sergeant Kirk: Repairing the gearbox entails taking the engine, taking the hub off, taking everything off and then all of skin around it needs to come out also. It’s a pretty maintenance intensive task there.

SLD: What improvements are you seeing in terms of the ability to maintain the aircraft?

Master Sergeant Kirk: Honestly, I like this aircraft. I was a FROG guy for 16 1/2 years but you can definitely see the worth of the V-22. It can do a lot of things. It would make our job a lot easier if things just lasted longer.

I can see significant improvements from ’05 to now from just the experience levels of maintainers learning their tasks and learning the tricks of the trade on the new aircraft. And I think you have seen it on the pilot side also. We just needed to have the aircraft deployed actually to learn how we were going to employ it, and how we’re going to maintain it.

SLD: So your point that you got the aircraft, you got it into service and have four or five years of experience now, maintenance is getting better.

Master Sergeant Kirk: Yes.

SLD: But you are also pointing out that the initial maintenance of the aircraft has required a lot of adjustments, and that’s okay for a while but that obviously is not a prescription for normal operation. Is that a fair observation?

Master Sergeant Kirk: I think it’s a very fair observation. We take parts off the factory to support aircraft. I’m sure that last V-22 that rolls out of the factory is going to be missing quite a few parts just because they’re not available for the rest of them.

SLD: So parts availability is an issue as well as durability of parts.

Working on the Bird With Trained Hands, New River Air Station, August 2010 (Credit: SLD)

Master Sergeant Kirk: Parts availability, and durability. For example, you see the Marines all the time dealing with the oil coolers; we always have hot oil coolers. We’re always cleaning them out. In order for the Marine actually to clean it, he’s got to pull off all those panels and pull it apart to get inside and clean it. If there is a more expeditious way to clean it that would be the way we’d want to go.

SLD: I think part of the problem is nobody has ever operated tiltrotor aircraft.

Master Sergeant Kirk: Absolutely. We’ve come leaps and bounds in the five years that I’ve been involved. But it does take time.

The Future of NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Posted on December 18, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/18/2010

By Dr. Richard Weitz

Preparing for the NATO Summit (Credit: NATO)

12/21/2010 – One of the most important issues that NATO Heads of State addressed at their November 2010 Summit in Lisbon was what to do about the remaining U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) stationed in Europe under the alliance’s “nuclear-sharing” arrangement. In the end, the Lisbon summit essentially confirmed the decision made at the April 22-23, 2010 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn, Estonia, that the alliance would continue stationing about two hundred U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe until a consensus arose among allied governments regarding their final removal.

Supporters of keeping NATO in the nuclear-sharing business focused on the need to provide leverage to induce Russia to negotiate its superior TNW holdings, but there has been no announced NATO initiative to start negotiating with Moscow on this subject.

The April 2010 informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn agreed on some “themes” to guide their approach to the issue:

NATO would maintain nuclear weapons as long as they existed in the world;
Member states will not make “unilateral moves” on nuclear weapons issues;
Members would share the burdens of maintaining a safe and credible nuclear deterrent;
The alliance would balance maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent with the need to contribute to general arms control and disarmament

The foreign ministers did indicate one way in which NATO could reduce its TNWs — if Russia agreed to eliminate some of its much larger stockpile of these weapons, as well as relocate any TNW it does keep away from neighboring NATO countries and make these holdings more transparent.

NATO “nuclear sharing” is a longstanding alliance concept that allows member states not having their own nuclear weapons to participate in the alliance’s planning and possible use of nuclear weapons for NATO’s collective defense if they so choose. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), established in 1966, enables the defense ministers of all countries belonging to NATO’s integrated military commands (though France has declined to participate) to discuss the alliance’s nuclear posture and policies.

Members also have the opportunity to host U.S.-made nuclear weapons in peacetime and, during war, employ them using their own nuclear delivery systems (currently specially equipped combat aircraft that are capable of delivering nuclear as well as conventional weapons). In peacetime, American soldiers stationed at their storage sites — specially constructed vaults on certain airfields — keep them under their control while host-nation pilots train with dummy warheads. In wartime, the American president can authorize their release, as well as the codes for detonating them, to the host-nation’s military command. In turn, the NATO nations hosting U.S. nuclear weapons equip and train their air forces to deliver them.

NATO’s collective defense policy has always preserved the option of employing nuclear weapons, including using them first for purposes of deterrence, defense, and retaliation. During the Cold War, these nuclear forces were seen as essential compensation for the inability of the allies to meet their defense spending and conventional force commitments.

NATO’s Strategic Concept of 1999 stated that, following the end of the Cold War, NATO “has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces” and that “its nuclear forces are no longer targeted against any country” and that “the circumstances in which their use might have to be contemplated are considered to be extremely remote.” Yet, it reaffirmed the alliance’s flexible response strategy of having nuclear options.

In short, “NATO’s nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more fundamentally political… to preserve peace and prevent coercion.”

The American government refuses as a matter of policy to confirm or deny the location of U.S. nuclear weapons, whether based in foreign countries or deployed aboard U.S. planes or ships. That said, analysts consistently report that the number of NATO countries hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as their total number, has been declining over time. All U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from Canada in 1984 and Greece in 2001.

Whereas the United States had thousands of various types of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe during the Cold War, the total TNWs under NATO’s nuclear-sharing agreement is now estimated at under 200 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs stored in 87 specially designed aircraft shelters at six bases in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The tactical variant of the B-61 can be delivered by NATO fighter-bombers, including the Tornado, F-15E, and F-16 C/D warplanes.

Credit: http://www.nti.org

The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in April stated that NATO would collectively review this year whether to change its TNW policies when revising the alliance’s Strategic Concept. Yet, the report confirmed that the administration had embraced the traditional logic for keeping these weapons despite the review’s modification of other U.S. doctrine.

“Although the risk of a large-scale comprehensive nuclear attack against NATO members is at an historic low, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons — combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons – contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats.”

Given that “Russia maintains a much larger force of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a significant number of which are deployed near the territories of several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and are therefore a concern to NATO,” the report argued that “Non-strategic nuclear weapons, together with the non-deployed nuclear weapons of both sides, should be included in any future reduction arrangements between the United States and Russia. The United States will consult with our allies regarding the future basing of nuclear weapons in Europe, and is committed to making consensus decisions through NATO processes.”

The NPR decided that the Air Force would incur the expense of ensuring that, like the F-16, the replacement F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will be dual-capable fighter (having the capability to deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons).

The Review also indicated that, “While security arrangements including NATO will retain a nuclear dimension so long as nuclear threats to the United States and our allies and partners remain, we will continue to seek to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons in the future. In the coming years, as U.S. and allied non-nuclear and counter-WMD capabilities continue to improve and regional security architectures are strengthened, and as we assess progress in restraining other threats, including in particular biological weapons, the United States will consult with allies and partners regarding the conditions under which it would be prudent to shift to a policy under which deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.”

Although the United States had thousands of non-strategic nuclear systems during the Cold War, analysts believe that the U.S. military now only has a few hundred short-range nuclear weapons in the form of gravity bombs for airplanes (some at U.S. air bases in Europe) and nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missiles (deployed at secure land facilities in the United States).

In its latest budget request, the U.S. Department of Energy has requested funding to extend the life of the U.S. arsenal of B-61 nuclear gravity bombs. These include some 400 bombs designed for tactical battlefield use as well as 150 for use on strategic long-range bombers and 200 additional non-strategic bombs held in reserve. Five versions of the B-61 nuclear bomb currently exist. The Mod 7 and Mod 11 are designed for use by long-range strategic bombers, whereas the Mod 3 and 4 are deployed for use by NATO. The more advanced B-61 Mod 10 is also designed for non-strategic use, but is kept in reserve in the United States.

The proposed modernization program would reduce the five existing models into two modern versions suitable for both strategic and non-strategic use. The B-61 Mod 11 would be retained for its earth-penetration capabilities, whereas a new multi-purpose Mod-12 would be equipped with the latest safety and security features.

The new variant, available by 2018, would also be designed for use by the next generation of NATO nuclear-capable fighter jets, such as the new F-35 “Lightning II” Joint Strike Fighter. The proposed Mod-12 is controversial in Congress since critics charge it would violate President Obama’s pledge not to develop a new nuclear weapon.

The U.S. armed forces have been dramatically reducing their holdings of non-strategic weapons because the advent of precision-guided conventional weapons has reduced the number of missions that might require nuclear munitions.

In addition, an important role for theater nuclear weapons — defending NATO allies in Europe from the large conventional militaries of the Soviet block — vanished with the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, many American commanders and civilian strategists doubt that the U.S. President or other senior civilian and military leaders would authorize the use of a nuclear weapon except under the most extreme circumstances.

The U.S. military has preferred to redirect monetary and other resources to researching and developing conventional weapons whose use is more likely.

Russian tactical nuclear warhead in the field during the 1990s (Credit: http://www.energy-dimension.com/soviet-nuclear-weapons/)

It is understandable why both NATO’s Foreign Ministers and the expert group cited Russia’s TNW as the reason to retain the alliance’s nuclear weapons. The main argument for keeping the weapons for the moment is to induce Russia to reduce its own holdings. The Russian government has eliminated many of the tactical nuclear weapons it inherited from the Cold War and removed other TNWs from operational deployment.

Nevertheless, analysts estimate that the Russian military still retains thousands of such weapons, most likely from 2,000 to 4,000, or up to ten times more than the United States likely deploys in Europe. No existing arms control agreement directly applies to them. Despite the urgings of some Republican Senators, the recently concluded START Treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons.

In this context, it is unclear how NATO might best engage in TNW elimination or reduction negotiations with Russia. These could be discussed in bilateral Russia-U.S. talks devoted solely to that issue, though Russia has always resisted that approach and Washington’s NATO allies would not welcome their exclusion, though Washington would presumably solicit NATO and other partner concerns as it did in the INF negotiations during the 1980s.

A variant would be to negotiate TNW limitations as part of follow-on negotiations to the New START Treaty, which would cover other issues set aside in the rush to negotiate the recently signed treaty (non-deployed nuclear warheads, strategic defense systems, and the use of conventional warheads on traditionally strategic delivery vehicles such as long-range ballistic missiles).

Furthermore, they could also be dealt with as part of the NATO-Russia dialogue regarding a new European security architecture, which Moscow would also see draw up a new European Security Treaty along the lines of the draft text proposed by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. These could occur within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC. Finally, they might be considered as part of the discussions aiming to strengthening the NPT against further nuclear proliferation.

The debate over the appropriate negotiating forum also relates to how one defines a tactical nuclear weapon, which is also variously, referred to as “theater,” “sub-strategic,” “short-range,” and “battlefield” nuclear weapons.

The yield of the weapon’s explosive power may not be a good indicator now that many countries are developing low-yield nuclear weapons. Range is therefore more often used as a classifying category, but many nuclear warheads can simply be moved from a short-range launcher to a longer-range one.

Yet, relying on non-physical properties — such the weapons intended use — is difficult when some countries, such as Russia, intend to use TNW for both tactical battlefield purposes and strategic ones.

In any case, the allies would need to assess whether they can accept a persistent imbalance in the number of TNWs in Russia’s favor if Russia declines to go to zero.

This might be acceptable if the reductions resulted in a net decrease in Russia’s aggregate superiority, a more secure and transparent Russian TNW arsenal, and a credible capacity of the allies to employ whatever TNW they did obtain, thereby making threats of TNW retaliation theoretically credible. Even with a TNW imbalance, NATO would enjoy compensating advantages in the conventional and perhaps strategy dimensions of warfare.

Even if the parties are unable to secure the elimination of all NATO and Russian TNW, or if some weapons were exempt from the transparency arrangements to enhance deterrence through the increased uncertainty, limited mutual TNW reductions could provide several advantages, including decreasing the number of possible terrorist targets, saving money spent on having to modernize a larger number of weapons, allowing NATO to remove the TNWs from countries no longer eager to host them, and demonstrating NATO and Russian commitment to making progress toward nuclear non-proliferation.

The Arctic Sea Competition (Part IV)

Posted on December 17, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/17/2010

Lessons from Canada and The Way Ahead

By Caroline Mükusch
German Correspondent, Second Line of Defense

12/21/2010 – In order to meet the Arctic challenges and opportunities of the 21st century Canada formulated a comprehensive Northern Strategy in 2009. Underpinned by science and technology progress the Canadian Northern Strategy pursues a pro-active Arctic policy focusing on four priority areas:

Exercising their Arctic sovereignty.
Protecting their environmental heritage.
Promoting social and economic development.
Improving and devolving northern governance.

Canada’s Northern Strategy reflects Arctic sovereignty and security. Canada’s concept of Arctic sovereignty and security is equivalent to the defense of Canadian Arctic sovereignty for the purpose of protecting the security of its citizens as well as the security of the core values and interests of Canadians. While sovereignty is especially about control, security is about responding to threats.

(Credit image: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703369704575461832760265748.html)

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Canada could no longer assume that the high northern latitudes of Canada would be protected by the U.S. Canada developed a whole-of-government approach addressing all three driving factors of the Arctic: (1) environmental change, (2) resource development, and (3) geopolitical transformation. Canada’s approach acknowledges furthermore the complicating, interacting reality of these factors. Therefore, Canada put a lot of effort into:

Knowing what is happening in the Canadian north;
Enforcing Canadian rules and laws; and
Cooperating with Canada’s circumpolar neighbors.

Since 2009 Canadian Arctic policy also has an international dimension. In 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Second Fleet, and the Royal Danish Navy participated in the Operation Nanook to strengthen the preparedness and inter-operability, exercising a collective response to emerging challenges in the Arctic.

Operation Nanook – an Arctic expedition undertaken first by the U.S. Navy in 1946 – is one of three (since 2007) annually proceeding joint exercises of Canada’s Maritime Command and the Canadian Coast Guard to train for disaster and sovereignty patrols in the Arctic.

(Credit image: http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1008/26radarsat/)

To improve its capabilities to better monitor, protect and patrol in the Arctic land, sea, and sky, Canada provides the Canadian Forces with the Canada First Defense Strategy tools to show increased presence in the Arctic. Beside three armed icebreakers operated by the navy, Canada built six to eight Arctic offshore vessels and a large icebreaker; developed an indigenous surveillance capability (Northern Watch and RadarSat II; Polar Epsilon); expanded the Rangers, creating a Northern Reserve Unit based in the Arctic, developed an army Arctic training base in Resolute; restored berthing and refueling facility in Nanisivik; provided new patrol ships to the Coast Guard; and developed a deepwater resupply port in Nanisivik.

Canada is boosting both defense and science facilities to further promote Canada’s power and influence in the Arctic at a number of different levels. Both, new research infrastructures such as the High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay as well as military training such as the annual northern sovereignty exercises strengthen the Canadian sovereignty strategy. Especially science and technology measures are on the one hand helpful for economic and social development, and on other hand they are fulfilling the function of presence in the area.

The Way Ahead

The operational environment of the Arctic remains challenging: The Arctic is an area of high fuel resource potential, high geologic uncertainty, and sensitive environmental conditions. On the one hand the Arctic is – because of lacking infrastructure – a very expensive region to operate in; on the other hand gathering data, generating information superiority, and enhancing international recognition are the key components establishing the necessary political, economical, and environmental stability in this area.

Although, a direct (military) threat in the Arctic does not exist now, the indicators are becoming more and more worrisome. Lacking a comprehensive European Arctic policy the EU is neither able to secure and protect its strategic interests such as energy security nor able to support both its member states as well as allies in securing their legitimate interests and rights in the Arctic. But, they need to support their member states and allies, to control the region.

Europe must be prepared to deal with challenges of the 21st century Arctic power game, in a concise and effective manner. Otherwise, any conflict over resources or boundaries will probably result in huge environmental damage to the region that affects Europe directly.

Kosovo Lessons Recalled

Posted on December 13, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/13/2010

But Have They Been Learned?

By Dr. Richard Weitz

12/13/2010 – Despite a decade of intense efforts, the December 12, 2010 legislative elections in Kosovo, the first parliamentary ballot in that region since it declared independence from Serbia in 2008, remind us that the international community has yet to cap that longstanding post-conflict stabilization mission with success.

The voters had to choose among 29 political parties, each of which pledged to overcome Kosovo’s enormous problems — widespread criminality and corruption, an unemployment rate estimated at up to 50 percent, restrictions on civil rights, and little prospect of soon joining NATO, the EU, or other international institutions.

Most seriously, many of the 120,000 ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo heeded the call of the Serbian government in Belgrade, which has never reconciled itself to the loss of Kosovo, to boycott the ballot, despite being guaranteed 10 seats in the 120-seat Kosovo parliament. Instead, the 1.5 million ethnic Kosovars decided the results unassisted by their unhappy ethnic Serb compatriots, who live predominately in a ghetto protected by foreign troops in the far north of Kosovo.

The Acting President of Kosovo, Jakup Krasniqi, 
called for December 12th early parliamentary elections
Credit: www.pisqa.com

The post-conflict stabilization operation in Kosovo has involved many of the world’s most important international and regional security institutions: the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Even though the majority ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008 through the local political infrastructure developed by these institutions, most U.N. members have declined to recognize this status. The United Nations, NATO, the OSCE have decreased their presence in Kosovo over time, but they remain heavily involved in the region due to the risk of renewed ethnic violence, Kosovo’s severe economic problems, and continuing disputes among the great powers over how to manage this troubled region.

NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) did ensure that Serbian military and police units withdrew from all Kosovo’s territory within the 11-day timeline that had been established in the Military Technical Agreement. It also succeeded in disarming the fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or incorporated them within the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). These measures prevented further clashes between Kosovo paramilitary units and Serbian regular forces as well as among the Kosovo factions themselves.

Overall, violence has remained at low levels despite a few occasional outbursts in which the peacekeepers have sometimes been faulted for their inability or unwillingness to intervene.

Although the provisional government of Kosovo declared independence without much further violence, the Serbs remain reconciled to the result, raising the specter that this newly frozen conflict will, like the one in Georgia, thaw at any moment.

The United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR were originally insufficiently staffed and resources to prevent ethnic tensions from escalating following the Serbs’ departure.

Yet, the deeper problem was that centuries of ethnic tensions cannot be dissolved overnight by an international force no matter its effectiveness.

It could take generations to overcome the deep ethnic hostility between the ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. The various U.N. missions and other interventions have also failed to overcome the impasse in the diplomatic talks between Belgrade and Pristina, though their actions—such as the European Union’s dangling before the parties the prospects of tighter ties and eventually possible membership—continue to dampen conflict, if indirectly.

KFOR’s decentralized structure proved simultaneously a major strength and a significant weakness for the mission. KFOR divided Kosovo into 5 zones (a new zone was created in June 2006, adding to the original 4), each under the command of separate multinational brigades (MNB) in which five lead nations commanded peacekeeping, police and nation-building operations (a similar division to that which existed in post-WWII Berlin). Effectively, KFOR was directed by the NATO countries with the largest contingent of soldiers in each multinational task force:

Britain (MNB Centre based in Lipijan)
France (MNB North based in Novo Selo)
Italy (MNB West based in Pec)
Germany (MNB South) in Prizren
United States (MNB East based in Urosevac)

In theory, NATO had a single chain of command extending from the individual MNBs, which were formally under the authority of the Commander KFOR, who reported directly to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN). In practice, each of the MNBs enjoyed considerable autonomy and would often receive orders from their national commands, a problem that has affected NATO operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The decentralized implementation structure aimed to encourage the tailoring of policies to the needs of the particular region and to allow KFOR troops to cooperate more effectively (especially in the gathering of intelligence) with the local police and population. But it also detracted from the unity of the mission.

Managing security and reconstruction operations at the local level allowed policymakers to understand and respond better to their constituents’ specific needs. Despite these benefits, however, the dual command structure that each national military contingent operated under worsened the confusion of an already difficult mission.

For instance, each of the five MNBs developed its own information operations strategy rather than followed a single integrated KFOR plan. In addition, military commanders received orders and less formal guidance from both NATO headquarters and their own governments. This dual hierarchy led to contradictory orders and, when followed, occasionally contradictory policies.

When the field commanders followed the demands of their national governments, which was often the case, the ally’s distinct domestic concerns (usually related to shielding their troops from combat) took priority over mission-wide needs. In KFOR, as in Afghanistan, it proved difficult to order soldiers from one MNB assist soldiers in another MNB because of Allies’ reluctance to send their troops outside of their region.

The system of caveats that has so disrupted NATO operations in Afghanistan has also impeded KFOR operations in Kosovo. Both NATO and non-NATO governments often required their military contingents to secure approval from their national capitals before implementing a KFOR directive.

Similarly, governments sometimes withdrew their troops without coordinating force reductions with KFOR. These conditions caused friction and weakened the force’s unity of action. The KFOR commander from October 1999 until April 2000, German General Klaus Reinhardt, later complained that the KFOR commander “has nothing to command” despite his lofty title.

In some cases, NATO allies were often reluctant to cooperate among themselves even in emergency. Much to their chagrin, France discovered this problem early on in their mission when few allies offered troops to assist French forces to quell an uprising that had broken out in the northern city of Mitrovica. Besides helping to overcome these weaknesses, a more centralized command structure would have helped identify best practices and applied them as standard operating procedures throughout the entire mission area.

Compounding the fissiparous effects of KFOR’s decentralized structure was the involvement of so many disparate international institutions (the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, their field missions in Kosovo) and non-governmental organizations in the operation.

Combined with the absence of a dominant command and control center, the presence of so many international institutions — with differing mandates, players, and visions — has made it difficult for policymakers to follow a coherent overall strategy by creating problems of coordination, overlapping jurisdictions among them, and gaps in their authority.

The large number of available international institutions with a Kosovo mandate has also encouraged foreign and domestic actors to go forum shopping. For example, the Russian government used its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to bloc actions by the NATO and European Union, institutions in which Moscow enjoyed little influence. Conversely, on several occasions, the Western governments bypassed the U.N. in order to act unilaterally through NATO and the European Union.

In addition, there was an awkward sharing of responsibilities regarding the construction of the new Kosovo Police Service. The OSCE had the task of recruiting and training, while UNMIK was to mentor, monitor and assist in its development. Since December 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) has assumed UNMIK’s responsibilities for monitoring, mentoring and assisting the Kosovo Police (KP) – however, capacity building programs for the KP have occurred through bilateral arrangements.

Still, a more distinct division of labor among the institutions might have made better use of Europe’s uniquely rich institutional architecture. For example, the Council of Europe has led a useful Reconstruction Implementation Commission that has concentrated on reconstructing the 34 cultural and religious heritage sites that had been damaged during the March 2004 riots against the Serbs. The profusion of European and Eurasian security institutions involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan might also be needlessly complicating the operation there.

In one respect, the complexity issue resembles the centralization issue. In the latter case, the major troops contributors were reluctant to allow foreign commanders to control their forces, so they carved out their own “kingdoms.” The complexity of the international presence in the Kosovo case likewise seems hard to avoid. Neither NATO nor the U.N. would serve under the other’s military command. The architects of the Kosovo mission learned from the problems in Bosnia, where both the EU and the OSCE operated independently, and placed them under loose U.N. oversight.

The United Nations might have assumed these functions directly, but at some probable loss of capacity. In the Kosovo case, the mission planners made a conscious choice to favor broad participation over unity of command. In Afghanistan, they also have prioritized seeking an extensive coalition, with all the national caveats and tensions between institutions, primarily because the United States remains reluctant to wage the protracted conflict only with a few key NATO allies.

Credit: Dreamstime

A lack of effective communication among the parties compounded the complexity and incoherence problems. This insufficient coordination among the military and civilian players was evident even before the mission began. Within KFOR itself, moreover, insufficient communication and coordination occurred between the multinational brigades. The short duration of some troop rotations, such as France’s four-month field deployment policy, limited its troops’ ability to develop ties with the civilian staff working in the region as well as the local population.

Some analysts believe that the rigorous force protection methods practiced by the American and German forces placed a significant barrier between them and the people they were trying to aid. They argue that the British practice of shedding unneeded protective equipment not only instilled a sense of trust between solider and citizen, but dressing with only a sidearm reinforced the belief that combat operations had ended and that the peacekeepers were there to help maintain public order and safety and assist with post-conflict reconstruction and other civic tasks. This British method is also seen as increasing trust between soldiers and citizens and allowing the peacekeepers to collect valuable intelligence about possible threats to their mission and themselves.

The lack of readily available and deployable resources to conduct essential civilian missions such as local governance, street-level policing, and community liaison especially those that could be employed rapidly in the early phase of the operation, disrupted the UNMIK mission. The limited UNMIK capabilities, especially at the beginning of its mission, compelled KFOR to assume civil responsibilities beyond its mandate when UNMIK needed longer than expected to commence functioning civil services. The UNMIK support provided to the field commanders beyond Pristina was often underfunded, understaffed, and lacked the materials and knowledge (i.e., the ability to speak English) necessary to be an effective KFOR partner.

It took the U.N. a year to reach its authorized strength of 5,000 police officers following the end of hostilities. The Security Council had sought to compensate for the U.N.’s limited police surge capacity by authorizing NATO in UNSC 1244 to assume responsibility for public safety until adequate numbers of UN police could be deployed.

Although the mandate for KFOR, unlike for the Stabilization Force in Bosnia, included “law and order,” KFOR was unprepared to assume such extensive civilian policing functions. As a result, law and order deteriorated during the power vacuum that emerged between the withdraw of Serbian military administration and its replacement by KFOR and UNMIK. By June 1999, one account placed the murder rate in Kosovo at some 50 each week, most of which were directed at the Serbian minority.

This rise of ethnic reprisals was especially worrisome given that more than 135,000 Serbs remained in Kosovo following the war, mostly in various enclaves in the north. KFOR and UNMIK would eventually establish order, including by protecting the Serbian minority enclaves. By mid-2000, the murder rate had fallen to around five per week. Nonetheless, the initial wave of violence led many Kosovo Serbs to flee to neighboring Serbia, where most remain.

When the UNMIK police force was finally established, it was beset by the same problems that have hindered past U.N. police missions. The largest troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions come from developing countries, and their police units are often less well-trained in community policing methods, which decreases their ability to train the host nation’s police units. Furthermore, the need to retrain most U.N. officers in law enforcement methods and crowd control, combined with the small stipends offered to them (approximately $71 per day), contributed to the difficulties that UNMIK faced throughout its mission.

Along with a weakened police force, initially UNMIK’s operation was hindered by an inadequate judiciary and the lack of corrections facilities. As a result of Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing and racist policies throughout the 1990s, few Kosovo Albanians were qualified to preside over Kosovo’s courtrooms. The EU eventually had to organize a separate mission, EULEX, to address this deficiency by providing supplementary teaching and training. Even one potentially hopeful sign — that almost all the Kosovo Serb police officers who abandoned their jobs after Kosovo’s independence declaration — have now returned must be discounted since they probably could not find suitable employment elsewhere.

The Mukawama Effect

Posted on December 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

12/09/2010

Israel: « No Second Chance »

An Interview With Amos Harel

Amos Herel (Credit: www.haaretz.com)

12/09/2010 – During the Second Line of Defense Visit to Israel in November 2010, an article was published by Amos Harel of Haaretz, which caught our eye [1]. The article began with a focus on the testimony of outgoing director Military Intelligence Maj. General Amos Yadlin given to the Knessett’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In his testimony, General Yadlin warned that Israel would probably fight in its next major war on two or three fronts simultaneously.

As Amos Harel wrote, the change in the Israeli security situation is due in part to “the shift in the approach of Israel’s adversaries known in Arabic as mukawama (resistance, attrition) rather than an attempt to defeat the Israel Defense forces on the battlefield. Mukawama is grounded in technological developments. For instant, precision munitions are now readily available and relatively inexpensive and there is a better ability to locate and control large-scale missile launches. The threat to Israel’s entire territory has increased significantly in recent years and it’s safe to assume that the accuracy, range and destructive capability of the enemy’s weapons will continue to improve.”

“Mukawama is grounded in technological developments. For instant, precision munitions are now readily available and relatively inexpensive and there is a better ability to locate and control large-scale missile launches. The threat to Israel’s entire territory has increased significantly in recent years and it’s safe to assume that the accuracy, range and destructive capability of the enemy’s weapons will continue to improve.”

One of the suggestions of how to deal with this situation in the piece was a better use of the “maritime domain” to provide greater strategic depth for Israel. Here Amos Harel cited a recent article in the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University’s journal Military and Strategic Affairs. In the article by Commodore First Class Gideon Raz, the author suggests:

“Air power is no longer sufficient in itself. The Israel Navy must transform the sea into part of the country’s strategic depth….Israel’s western flank (the sea) is the only open border, the Achilles’ heel of Israel’s enemies and the IDF’s great opportunity.”

During the visit we sat down to discuss with Amos Harel the article and, more generally, the evolving Israeli defense debate.

Credit: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/semedite.pdf

SLD: Could you talk a little bit about the changing threats that really require a different approach?

Amos Harel: I think it took us some time to understand where we’re heading. We actually realized that after the Lebanon war in 2006. But it’s now very clear to everybody who follows what’s going on that it’s not going to be the same kind of battles anymore. The last real war we were involved in was 1973. You had Syrian tank divisions charging against Israeli tank divisions and the same happened in Sinai between the Egyptians and the Israelis. A conventional warfare is not going to take place in the near future. And I think that in the end, probably, most of our Arab enemies have realized that they’re not going to wipe Israel off the map of the Middle East. What they’re looking for is the idea which is called in Arabic “mukawama”or resistance. But it’s not resistance actually: it’s attrition. The goal is to make the Israelis pay and in the end, after some period of time, pressuring Israelis into any kind of concessions.

SLD: So, it’s a combination of the military technique of attrition, leveraging the fact that Israel is a democracy and will have to deal with the termination of the attrition somehow.

Amos Harel: Exactly. And it has a political goal also, i.e. to lead Israel to unilateral withdrawals, which already happened twice. It happened in southern Lebanon in 2000 and it happened with disengagement in 2005 in the Gaza Strip. Now one could claim, and personally, I feel that these were the right decisions at the time for both cases. But what the other side sees is Israel withdrawing under pressure.

SLD: So the perception of an outcome.

Amos Harel: Yes. Not army against army, but guerilla warfare, terrorist warfare and so on, where the target is Israeli civilian population. And the best way to handle this from their point of view, the easiest way, is rockets and missiles. It’s even better than suicide bombers. It’s true the suicide bombers cause you more pain. One suicide bomber can kill 20-25-30 people on the bus or in a restaurant. The way it happened seven or eight years ago. But it’s more complicated to send him on his way, to have him reach his target without Israeli intelligence, interfering and capturing him on the way or so on.

Now they’re getting better missile rockets. They’re getting missiles from many sources – Iranian made, Chinese made, Syrian made -, some of them pretty accurate. And if you look at the next five or six years, they will have more accurate weapons, more lethal weapons with longer-range missiles. Already now, Hezbollah has (according to the Israeli assessments) 45,000 rockets, and they can hit almost any point in Israel. In a few years time, they’ll probably manage to have GPS capability on their warheads, on rocketsthat will be able to strike at any point in Israel quite accurately.

[The military technique or attrition is] not army against army, but guerilla warfare, terrorist warfare and so on, where the target is Israeli civilian population. And the best way to handle this from their point of view, the easiest way, is rockets and missiles. It’s even better than suicide bombers. It’s true the suicide bombers cause you more pain. One suicide bomber can kill 20-25-30 people on the bus or in a restaurant. (…) Now they’re getting better missile rockets. They’re getting missiles from many sources – Iranian made, Chinese made, Syrian made -, some of them pretty accurate. And if you look at the next five or six years, they will have more accurate weapons, more lethal weapons with longer-range missiles. Already now, Hezbollah has (according to the Israeli assessments) 45,000 rockets, and they can hit almost any point in Israel.

SLD: Let’s just hover for a moment. One of the points that we’ve made on the Chinese challenge is precisely this one. The Chinese are building advanced capabilities in missiles. They will launch a GPS system, they’re putting it together. And this is enough to give them moves on the chessboard in the Middle East, because that is a compelling threat.One has to understand that this missile threat is changing in character, because it’s correlated with this political pressure strategy. Putting those two together, it makes a difference in just exporting missiles. Does that make sense to you?

Amos Harel: Yes it does. So what is our response? Traditionally, it was the Air Force. We strived to have the best Air Force in the Middle East, better-trained pilots, American equipment, American fighter planes and so on. And if you read carefully what Hezbollah thinkers are writing, Iranians and so on, you understand their game plan; it’s not very complicated to grasp it. Apart from hitting Israeli civilians, which is their main target, they will go for Israeli Air Force bases. And it will be very, very difficult for the Air Force to function with such a bombardment. Hezbollah is talking of shooting 1,000 rockets a day. Now, if it was only against the state, it may not be such a big deal, but against airfields that is another question.

"Israeli Air Force Bases will become the main target of the Hezbollah"
Credit photo: Siegi, Israel Air Force, Sikorsky S-70A-50 Yanshuf 830,
Tel Aviv - Sde Dov (SDV / LLSD), Israel
12 May, 2010

SLD: So in part this is the stimulus to thinking about using the sea as a strategic reserve?

Amos Harel: Exactly. It’s more difficult to hit ships, and we could use the ships to target and to attack targets in Lebanon or in Gaza. Now naturally, the Air Force doesn’t like it. And the Air Force traditionally has much more influence over decision makers than anybody else. They think better, they’re more organized, they are more persuasive when they present their argument, and so on. Behind the scenes, there’s now a sort of emerging battle, a bureaucracy battle between the Air Force and others, especially the Navy saying: listen, we have to think of it a bit differently, it’s not only a question of budget, it’s a question of theory- of capability and where you’re going to be able to operate against the threats. And personally, you might think that the F-35 is a good idea. But talking with the ground forces, at least some of the generals felt that this is not where the money should be spent, but they’ve lost this battle completely.

SLD: As we talk about it, I think there’s a potential here for the F-35 to provide synergy. This whole concept of extending this space in maritime terms is probably an excellent idea, and the F-35 could acdtually be a facilitator for this.

Amos Harel: We do not yet have a plan to deal with the new threats. There are ideas, there are changes that have been made; most of them after the war and after the chief of staff resigned, and a new one came in as his successor. What Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi did more than anything else was to go back to the basics. Get back to training, get back to making sure that the soldiers get the right equipment and so on. But thinking ahead is a different issue. And then, at least some of it will have to be left to the next chief of staff, who is going to come into office by February of next year.

[Thinking ahead] will have to be left to the next chief of staff, who is going to come into office by February of next year.

SLD: I’m not sure you can have a single plan, because it depends on whether we’re talking about Lebanon, or whether we’re talking Syria.

Amos Harel: Or Iran or Gaza …

SLD: Or Iran or Iranian held territory in Iraq, which is conceivable. Having maritime capability may be at least part of how you can get that answer, so you can actually go to where the threat is coming from. So that your answer really is: “no matter where you’re going to launch your missiles from, I can reach it”.

Amos Harel: The paradox with Israel is I think that we’re facing a wide spectrum of threats, while in the end, our capabilities are very limited, because of the questions of budget, because there are only 7 million people here, and it’s a tiny country. And you need to make the decisions fast, and there’s no second chance here.

———-

Footnote:

[1] Herel, Amos, By Land, Air and Also by Sea, Haaretz, November 5, 2010

The Key To Survival

Posted on December 9, 2010 | by SysAdmin

Part of the High-High Mix but operational over the spectrum of operations, the combat systems enterprise of the F-35 is a game changer. (Credit: Lockheed Martin Photo)

A Perspective on the Role of Air Power in the Defense of Israel

An Interview with (Retired) General Herzl Bodinger

General Bodinger, SLD, November 2010

12/09/2010 – During a visit to Israel in November 2010, Second Line of Defense had the chance to sit down with the former chief of the Israeli Air Force from January 1992 to July 1996. General Bodinger is a noted air power thinker and during our discussion provided some insights into the evolution of air power and its role in the defense of Israel. He is the incoming President of the Israeli Air Force Association and is President of RADA Electronic Industries. During his 35-year career, General Bodinger accumulated about 6,000 flight hours and conducted 451 aerial sorties.

Israeli F-15I (Credit: USAF)

SLD: What role has airpower played in the defense of Israel?

General Bodinger: From the beginning, airpower has been essential to the survival of Israel. We have developed our Air Force at the maximum size that we can have with our resources. The Air Force needs to cover the whole Middle East, and be able to strike any target that the government of Israel will decide is necessary for the defense of Israel. The goal is to be able to convince adversaries that you cannot stop us, and you cannot retaliate in the same manner. We have had total air superiority for a considerable period of time. But air superiority is not a given. We live in a dangerous neighborhood with new weapons, missiles and capabilities. This provides today’s challenge of air dominance against significant numbers of missiles and defensive systems, primarily not delivered from aircraft. Ensuring air dominance against a polyvalent threat is crucial to the defense of Israel.

From the beginning, airpower has been essential to the survival of Israel. (…) We have had total air superiority for a considerable period of time. But air superiority is not a given. We live in a dangerous neighborhood with new weapons, missiles and capabilities. This provides today’s challenge of air dominance against significant numbers of missiles and defensive systems, primarily not delivered from aircraft. Ensuring air dominance against a polyvalent threat is crucial to the defense of Israel.

SLD: The new approach to take away air dominance is to augment defenses and to proliferate missiles?

General Bodinger: Yes. The effort is to provide new capabilities against our aircraft and to do so by using various means including, ground-to-air missiles of different kinds. And against the ability of Israel to retaliate, and to attack this very small country, a country with no strategic depth. Our adversaries are relying on the proliferation of missiles, both surface-to-air and the ground-to-ground to prevail.

SLD: So how do you respond to this new threat environment?

General Bodinger: You can simply upgrade existing systems to deal with the new threats. There are some gaps that you can’t overcome just by making a small minor change done either by changing the tactics or simply upgrading the aircraft. There comes a time that you have to make a leap forward in combat capability which we plan to do with the F-35.

SLD: Your point is that you need to introduce a different type of combat system to deal with the new threat environment.

General Bodinger: A different kind. Now, you know that we went to robotic systems or UAVs of various kinds. We were the first to use them in numbers in 1982. So this was one solution. And this is also a solution for staying over the battlefield for a long time. I call it a satellite in the atmosphere.

Now, you know that we went to robotic systems or UAVs of various kinds. We were the first to use them in numbers in 1982. So this was one solution. And this is also a solution for staying over the battlefield for a long time. I call it a satellite in the atmosphere.

SLD: It gives you persistence.

General Bodinger: Yes, it stays there for hours, and provides information, and sometimes can attack. But it’s a robot with the limitations of a robot. You need to shape the correct mix between manned and unmanned aircraft, which is an evolutionary process. But you clearly need to deal with the threat from the defensive systems for both the manned and unmanned systems. You need the ability to overcome all these threats, which are being developed against it, like the S-300 and S-400.

SLD: So you need to craft effective capability to deal with the new defensive systems and missile proliferation, which threaten both manned and unmanned systems?

General Bodinger: Correct. So, the correct way to go, which we watched very carefully, was what the F-117 introduced at first. The idea of low observable and low radar cross section, and it really looks a newer way to go. Of course, with all the avionics that come with it, at first all these machines are very expensive. But to keep buying the old aircraft simply creates targets for the new defensive systems and is a much more expensive approach. For us airpower is a spearhead force, which can be used as an icebreaker. It will open the way for the rest of the aircraft to come. For us, this will be the F-35. Because it can lead the way, and it can reach the targets. It can fly over any point over the Middle East, and strike any target. I just want to finish this and say that the surface-to-surface missiles also are a big problem here. Maybe other places less. Because of the range and because of the size of the country. We don’t have strategic depth. So, we have to bear in mind that all our assets are at risks from missiles. Whether it’s the military assets or it’s the civilian assets. From electric power stations, airports, and refineries and factories, and airbases, the entire infrastructure can be held at risk.

SLD: And your point is that offensive and defensive systems need to be available to Israel to deal with the new threat environment?

General Bodinger: Clearly you can take some points of interest, and maybe defend them better. And if worse comes to worse, and there is such a bombardment, so the civilians, you can put to shelters and you can even evacuate for a period of time. We don’t know what our adversaries will do. What we’ve seen from 1991, they bombed two towns, two big cities in Israel. Forty missiles, twenty on each. And about one to two a day. So, it shows the ability to inflict a lot of damage. You are not simply going sit back and take strikes. You have to defend your offensive assets so that you can strike back. We can put aside the defense against surface-to-surface, there are different means and layers, there’s a whole theory here in development of weapons. But we need time to get better results and better integration. And our defense forces always have to think like that. And we have to prepare for the worst; defense spending is like insurance. How much you invest in insurance, is the value of the assets that you want to insure. And the probability they will be damaged. So this time, the asset is a country. So, it’s invaluable. And the probability that it will be damaged is not low enough. So we have to invest wherever we have to invest. Even if at the end at the day, maybe we have seen the dark side of the cloud, and we’re pessimistic, one could say, and nothing happened. No alarm and disagreements, and everything is flourishing; it’s like Europe here. So, we hope for that, but hopes are not a plan of work.

You are not simply going sit back and take strikes. You have to defend your offensive assets so that you can strike back. We can put aside the defense against surface-to-surface, there are different means and layers, there’s a whole theory here in development of weapons. But we need time to get better results and better integration. And our defense forces always have to think like that. And we have to prepare for the worst; defense spending is like insurance. How much you invest in insurance, is the value of the assets that you want to insure. And the probability they will be damaged.

F35 — Israel has agreed in principle to purchase twenty F-35 Lightning II JSF (Credit: http://www.ecnmag.com/Blogs/2010/08/Precision-Guidance/Isr)

SLD: But what we do know on the defense technology side is the defense is getting better; the missile technology is getting better. So all of that could be bundled into different threat environments that could be very, very difficult if you cannot manage the battle space.

General Bodinger: That’s why we need the new aircraft. One would say we need better tanks; we need better everything. But when we talk about the ranges, and the value of air power not as a partner of the ground forces, but as a lead. So, here now we are coming to the F-35. As I look back in the development of the Israeli air force certain aircraft gave us an opportunity to make a leap forward, and the F-35 fits into that tradition. Looking back one quality leap was provided by the Mirage, the other by the F-15.

I remind people that in the late 50’s and the beginning of the 60’s, there were arguments here in the government level and the military, and also in the Air Force whether or not we needed the Mirage. Maybe we can take the aircraft that we have, we had all fresh stuff. We can upgrade them. That was the idea. Really, many officers and pilots in the Air Force supported this. We can do with upgrades, you carry the advanced weapons, and you’re better off. Why do we need to spend a lot of money with something, which could be a little better? But the problem with those who cannot envision the future is that they can not understand the leap which a new platform can provide. It’s another kind of aircraft; another kind of capability.

The Mirage was the first revolution in the early Air Force. The second time such a thing happened, we had Phantoms, we had Sky Hawks, we converted to American machines, it was very good, but the F-15 brought a breath of fresh air. The whole way we started to fight, we got the first aircraft that we received were in 1977, four prototypes of F-15s. We bought them from the test aircraft; they were fit to make some changes to become operational. And we got those. This was a revolution in the Air Force.

The whole way of flying changed after the first four aircrafts came here. Of course, when they were multiplied and then came the F-16, it became the Air Force as it is today. But the first aircraft that arrived already made the change. And we didn’t expect that this would be the change. And so, when you ask me about the F-35, I know the qualities of the aircraft. I know the value of low radar constriction, the fact that you have the communication network, the missiles and weapons that you can hold inside, and whatever you can reach. And I know the qualities of the aircraft, but I am sure that the minute the aircraft will actually be used; again, I know that there will be a big dramatic change.

SLD: No one has ever flown a 360-degree aircraft with combat systems, which allow it to manage that space. We have written on the website about the cultural change associated with the new aircraft. We’ve talked to many test pilots of this aircraft. And the notion of a 360-degree aircraft, with the kind of combat system integration, which the aircraft has, will create pressure for a culture change.

General Bodinger: You can understand it only if you experience it. And it is very difficult to transmit it to somebody who’s never flown the aircraft. And I’m sure that this will not be a small leap, again, it will be a dramatic change.

SLD: Similar to your F-15 kind of experience.

General Bodinger: Yes. I was lucky to put in place the first pilots in the country who flew F-15s. And I’m sure that this will be what will happen. And I know that there will be a big development, but you cannot even imagine what it will be. When it will come, we will know. And it will lift the whole Air Force to another level.

SLD: I think at the heart of the issue from my point of view is sortie generation rate. Your ability to turn an aircraft around quickly to go back into combat.

General Bodinger: Now, you’re coming back to the defense against surface-to-surface missiles. We have to retain our ability to take off. But let me go back to discuss the robots which I consider to be satellites in the atmosphere. I think that wherever you can send a robot, instead of a person, you should prefer a robot. Where can you do it? When the targets are static targets, the headquarters of something, any installation that you wish or asset to bring down is ideal for a robot. That is an important for the war, strategically or tactically. And you know where it is, and it is located there, and this is what you have to do. And all those cases, I think it’s a waste to send a person, because you can do the punch, whatever you wish, it will go and will kill the target and come back. And if it doesn’t come back, you send another one. So this is a robot. All the other cases that you have need to have a human mind on the battlefield to decide, because you don’t want to kill people who are not involved, how the targets have moved to another location, you need to decide on the spot. Or suddenly, you want to make another priority, and you have the authority to do it, because that shift in targets is necessary to success.

SLD: That’s a really crucial issue, reprioritization in a fluid environment.

General Bodinger: So then, you have to have a person on board. Now, it could be, I’m looking at one step forward, we didn’t do it yet. You could do it in an F-35, two or three or four. Lead a herd of those machines — the robots — and give them missions on the spot. Especially when adversaries start to become very accurate because of GPS or any other means via there missiles, we will need dominance in the decision making cycle to prevail. We look to the F-35 to be key to that process. And as we develop the combat capability, we may eliminate many robots; you don’t even need a UAV, why do you need a platform to carry your weapon? Launch the weapon. Like the tomahawk, but this will be different tomahawks.