SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Gulf Oil Spill Crisis: Meeting the Stewardship Challenge

Posted on August 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

08/08/2010

By Dr. Robbin Laird and Rear Admiral Ed Gilbert, (Retired)

President Obama Addresses the Media at USCG Station, Grand Isle, La.
(Credit Photo: USCG Atlantic Area)

The tragedy of the Gulf oil spill is likely to become a blame game ultimately. This need not be so, and if it is the tragedy will be magnified and an opportunity lost. Crises such as these provide an opportunity to assert leadership to prepare for and to shape effective approaches for the future. The challenge is to provide for a proper government stewardship role for the deepwater drilling enterprise and re-shaping the public-private partnership for such activities. Make no mistake about it; we and other nations will drill in the deepwaters. Simply planning for the green future is an exercise in aspirational politics, rather than realistic government adaptation to meet the near-term future.

To execute a proper stewardship function, the US government team needs to be re-shaped, re-capitalized and strengthened.

First, there is the re-shaping challenge. To date, the USCG has had responsibility above the waters for inspections, and the Minerals Management Service for below the surface. This now needs to be re-shaped with a new inspection sharing of powers to ensure that the entire enterprise can be inspected seamlessly with all the resources necessary for the jobs.

Second, government simply does not have presently the scientific and technological expertise to oversee the deepwater drilling enterprise. Scientific and technological experts need to be hired to provide the proper partners for the USCG and MMS to ensure effective oversight. Creative ways must be found to attract and keep people with these kinds of expertise.

Third, the US government will never own all the expertise to provide for scientific and technological evaluations. This can not be fully insourced, so that an effective scientific and technological partnership with the private sector is essential for success.

USCG Buoy Tenders Are Being Recruited from Virually Every Sector for the Gulf Oil spill leaving their normal area of operations uncovered. (Credit Photo: Fox TV 10, http://www.fox10tv.com/dpp/news/gulf_oil_spill/buoy-tender-responds-to-oil-spill) — USCG Buoy Tenders Are Being Recruited from Virually Every Sector for the Gulf Oil spill leaving their normal area of operations uncovered. (Credit Photo: Fox TV 10)

Fourth, the USCG and the other inspection and oversight agencies need to be fully resourced to meet the challenge. Rather than proceeding with cuts to the USCG, new money should be invested in the USCG role in building proper expertise. The USCG has no tools for situational awareness and management below the waters, for example. Inspectors able to oversee the enterprise need to be hired as well, rather than proceeding with personnel cuts in USCG staff.

Fifth, the USCG needs to have fully funded task forces available for crises like these. Built around additionalresources such as national security cutters. A full team must be available to intervene in crises needs as an above normal operations approach.

Sixth, the USCG has had to move many of its assets to the Gulf to deal with the crisis leaving the country at risk elsewhere. This is unacceptable and can be solved only by increasing the speed of the overall recapitalization of the rapidly depleting USCG core capabilities.

The Administration has spoken of the need to be an effective participate in protecting the global commons. No clearer example of exercising leadership in he the global commons can be made than shaping an effective response to future deepwater drilling. The oil spill is not simply an American affair, in the Gulf of Mexico; with the movement oil by the by currents, it becomes and Atlantic matter as well.

We need hearings on how to properly move forward and to shape a recapitalization and stewardship budgets. Rather than yet another hearing on the failures of the oil industry, it is about time to focus in a no nonsense way on the proper US government role. We and the rest of the world should expect no less.

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***Posted on August 8th, 2010

A Bad Day for Maritime UAVs

Posted on August 8, 2010 | by SysAdmin

Dr. Richard Weitz (Credit Photo: The Hudson Institute)

By Dr. Richard Weitz

A major attraction-getter at the recent Farnborough International Air Show, the biennial aviation event in southern England at which representatives from SLD attended, was a video displaying a laser weapon downing four unmanned aerial vehicles flying over the water. The tests represented the first time that a ship-based solid-state laser has shot down an aircraft mid-flight over water. The Boeing Corporation has already used directed energy weapons deployed on land to shoot down UAVs, but achieving the same success from the deck of a ship—which is moving in multiple directions due to vessel’s motion, the ocean waves and other disturbances—is much more challenging.

This Laser Weapon System (LaWS) was developed by the Raytheon Corporation to take advantage of the sensors on the company’s Phalanx Close-in Weapon System. The LaWS upgrades the traditional ship- and land-based MK 15 Phalanx, a multi-barreled 20mm rapid-fire Gatling gun that is already widely deployed on U.S. Navy ships, by adding a combined-beam fiber laser, rated at 50 kilowatts, to supplement the Phalanx’s traditional kinetic projectiles with non-kinetic laser bursts.

The video depicts events this May. The U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command employed the LaWS-Phalanx combination to destroy four UAVs in over-the-water experiments at the Navy’s test range on San Nicolas Island off the coast of California. Previous Raytheon tests had been against static land targets. The Navy-Raytheon team used the Phalanx’s sensors first to track the targets, which included a drone traveling at about 300mph at a distance of more than two miles. Then the LaWS destroyed the UAVs using six off-the-shelf commercial lasers Raytheon had acquired from the car industry. The Phalanx sophisticated electronics concentrated the six lasers into a single powerful beam that soon set fire to the underside of the drones, causing them to spin out of control and crash.

These directed-energy weapons (DEWs) destroy targets by transferring a concentrated beam of energy to the target. DEWs like lasers have a number of advantages over traditional projectile weapons such as missiles. For instance, since a laser beam travels at the speed of light, there is no need to compensate for target movement. The lack of a kinetic effect also allows for more precise targeting, which can minimize collateral damage as compared with the blast impact of conventional weapons or the radiation and other contaminants that can result from the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The Navy has been experimenting with the LaWS-Phalanx combination and other laser prototypes in recent years in the hopes of deploying them with operational units in the next few years. The LaWS is a solid-state rather than a chemical laser. As a result, it requires less energy to operate and is somewhat safer and smaller. Its weaker beam still proved sufficient to set the underside of the UAVs on fire despite the moist air over the oceans, which can more readily absorb and deflect laser beams. The weapon is also supposedly sufficiently powerful to work even in the rain.

The Navy’s Laser Weapon System (Credit Photo: Defence Talk)

The Navy expects eventually to deploy DEWs on most of its large warships, though as a complement rather than substitute for existing kinetic weapons, which will probably remain more effective at attacking faster manned warplanes as well as ground-based targets. It is perhaps unsurprising that the Navy has taken a lead role in preparing to integrate lasers with its operational units. The Navy sees rapid-fire directed energy weapons such as lasers as especially useful in countering the growing threat of anti-ship missiles, high-speed small boat attacks, and other emerging maritime attack systems that potential adversaries such as Iran and China could use for area-denial operations.

Although lasers were invented shortly after World War II, their primary use in battle thus far has been as a means of targeting, communications, and other non-lethal applications where they have had to rely on kinetic methods for destroying their target. U.S. government funding for research on laser-based weapons rose considerably after 1983, when President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative to develop and deploy a comprehensive anti-missile defense system capable of protecting the United States and its allies from even the mighty Soviet missile arsenal. Unfortunately, at that time, much of DEW research was in its infancy, leading to growing impatience about the absence of operational systems despite the long-term nature and high costs of these research and development program.

The main problems with moving DEWs from the laboratory to operational use have been their enormous energy requirements, the high temperatures they produce, and their delicate construction and maintenance. Modern Navy ships have enormous power-generation capacity, readily available coolant in the form of water, and typically sail with skilled maintenance crews in charge of well-integrated combat, communications, logistics, and other integrated systems. Still, the LaWS can be placed in a mobile trailer to operate at land, and other ship-based DEWS should also be operable from the ground.

One goal of current Navy DEW develop programs is to be able to integrate any ship-born laser into a vessel’s existing weapons systems so that it will not require a separate command and control suites. For example, the LaWS can leverage the Navy’s existing investment in the Phalanx Close-in Weapon system by using the Phalanx’s sensor suite. Such integration will also help contain costs, which could pose a greater barrier than the technical impediments to the widespread use of the lasers on Navy ships in the next few years. Defense experts note that, after buying DEWs, the Navy would need fewer kinetic projectiles. The relative costs to mating newly developed DEWs with already available ships and crews might also be relatively small given the magnitude of the expense of building and maintaining a modern warship. In any case, losing a warship to an adversary due to foregone defensive weapons technologies would entail a multi-billion dollar ship replacement cost, along with the potential loss of priceless military personnel.

In contrast, the Air Force is still willing to work with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and expend large sums of money in the hopes of developing an air-mobile laser sufficiently powerful and accurate to be able to destroy ballistic missiles in flight. Despite continued delays and other problems, the Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) is currently being developed as an advanced platform for the U.S. ballistic missile defense program (see for example SLD’s video on the ALTB or SLD’s interview about the ALTB). The ALTB aims to demonstrate the potential of using directed energy as a viable technology against ballistic missiles. At present, the main test bed carries a High Energy Laser on a significantly modified Boeing 747-400 Freighter. After being assembled in 2000 and arriving in Wichita, Kansas, the ALTB completed its maiden flight on January 22, 2002. The main weapon, a Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL), was first tested on November 12, 2004 at Edwards Air Force Base, when all six modules successfully fired. The ALTB aircraft achieved flight certification in April 2009, meaning that the laser was successfully integrated with the aircraft. The Laser itself uses six infrared sensors to detect the exhaust plume of a boosting missile. Once a target is detected, a solid-state laser tracks the missile and determines a precise aim point. The Beacon Illuminator measures the disturbances in the atmosphere to accurately point and focus the Laser. Then a fire control system focuses the megawatt-class COIL beam onto a pressurized area of the missile, remaining focused on that point until the concentrated energy causes the missile to fail.

The ALTB COIL has achieved some limited successes in testing. On August 10, 2009, the aircraft successfully acquired, tracked, and simulated the low-power direct energy kill sequences against an instrumentally boosting target. On January 10, 2010, the aircraft ALTB successfully engaged an instrumental rocket. Another test was conducted on February 11, 2010, when the ALTB successfully engaged—e.g. detected, tracked, “compensated for atmospheric disturbances” and destroyed—a short-range ballistic missile launched from an at-sea mobile launch platform. The entire engagement occurred within two minutes of the target launch. This was the first directed energy lethal intercept demonstrated against a liquid-fuel boosting ballistic missile target from an airborne platform. On February 3, the ALTB destroyed a solid fuel missile. According to the MDA, the “revolutionary use of directed energy is very attractive for missile defense with the potential to attack multiple targets at the speed of light, at a range of hundreds kilometers, and at a low cost per intercept attempt compared to current technologies.” The Vice Chairman of Boeing’s Missile Defense Systems, Greg Hyslop, boasted that “the government-industry team has produced a breakthrough with incredible potential.”

The Navy's Laser Weapon shoots down drone in test (Credit Photo: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTpP412fM8U&feature=player_embedded) — The Navy's Laser Weapon shoots down drone in test

On June 23, 2010, Boeing announced that it is combining its ALTB and Directed Energy organizations into a single Directed Energy Systems team based in Albuquerque. Boeing’s most active energy program projects are with the three main U.S. Military Services. These are more modest than the company’s high-profile efforts to develop a laser suitable for ballistic missile defense, but more likely to yield concrete results in the short term. The U.S. Army is funding Boeing’s High Laser Technology Demonstrator (HEL TD), a mounted beam control system aimed at countering short-range rocket, artillery, and mortar projectiles. The U.S. Air Force is sponsoring the Tactical Relay Mirror System (TRMS) designed to enhance laser-based systems by extending their range beyond line-of-sight attacks. The U.S. Navy-funded Free Electron Laser (FEL) aims to counter threats from hyper-velocity cruise missiles, such as those under development in China, India, and Russia. Boeing is also using internal funds to support research and development projects the company’s managers believe hold promise for helping the Department of Defense meet core needs. A Humvee-based Laser Avenger system, for example, seeks to destroy improvised explosive devises IEDs), unexploded ordinance, and UAVs. During December 2008 testing, a Laser Avenger engaged and destroyed a small UAV from an operationally relevant range, marking the first time a combat vehicle has used a laser to shoot down a drone. Laser Avenger destroyed another UAV and 50 IEDs in separate 2009 tests.

According to the MDA, there are no present plans to build additional ALTB aircraft. The 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1390) canceled a planned second laser and refocused the Airborne Laser program as a technology research effort. Accordingly, its budget was reduced from $401.2 million to some $186.7 million in 2010. At a press conference in June 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that, “We’re keeping the first one, but the operational concept doesn’t work because to be of any value, for example against Iran, that 747 would have to orbit inside Iran. Don’t think they’re going to allow that. Same way with North Korea. So we want to continue that directed energy research, that’s why we’re keeping the first airborne laser.” In May 2010, at a House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Hearing, Chairman James R. Langevin argued that directed energy research should facilitate the testing and development of technologies that are most likely to yield operational capabilities in the future. According to the GAO 2010 Defense Acquisitions report, none of the ALTB’s critical technologies are fully mature. Some $98.7 million were requested for DEW research for 2011. Systems the Pentagon considered more developed or promising have received proposed finding boosts. These included the midcourse missile defense systems, such as the AEGIS system.

At the present, DEWs hold more promise as systems to in intercept short-range projectiles like rockets, UAVs, and small ships located in their vicinity. There are recurring proposals to deploy a tactical DEW system in Israel to deal with Hamas rocket attacks. A joint U.S.-Israeli effort produced a prototype tactical laser that in tests destroyed 46 rockets, artillery shells and mortar rounds in flight. Tactical DEW could also help protect Kabul, Baghdad, and other urban areas or military bases that come under sustained bombardment from short-range rockets. Tactical DEW systems could also be located at high-profile events, such as G-8/20 summits, to add another layer of security.

The Raytheon LaWS is a good example of continuing American strengths in this area, but the British and Indian governments have recently announced their own DEW R&D efforts. Given the limited nature of UK defense resources, a constraint highlighted by British officials at the Farnborough Air Show, perhaps a NATO-wide research, development, and deployment program would be appropriate for some DEW systems. After all, the Phalanx is deployed on many British and other NATO warships in addition to its widespread presence in the U.S. fleet.

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*** Posted On August 8th, 2010

TRANSCOM on Meeting the Challenge in Afghanistan

Posted on July 15, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

07/15/2010

During our visit to Transcom in March 2010, General McNabb provided a detailed overview on the challenges in supporting the deployed warfighter in Afghanistan, including supporting the surge ordered by the President. Although the General did not put it this way, it was apparent that the con-ops approach of Transcom is providing a very good fit with the nature of the Afghan challenge. The multi-modal approach of Transcom provides an appropriate match to the Afghan support challenge.

On the one hand, the multi-modal approach is built around using diverse delivery means calibrated against the required speed of delivery to the warfighter. And within this context seeking as cost effective approach as possible. The command is clearly seeking to shape more effective data measures and decision-making tools to assist in managing trade-offs among alternative delivery means.

On the other hand, Afghanistan as a land-locked country can be supported for military operations only through air and ground transport systems. Sea-delivery can provide a significant bulk of supplies but these need to be moved the last miles by air and ground systems. Also, important is diversifying the axis of supplies to manage the risk factor of disruption of supply through any one means. And the diversification requirement fits hand in glove with the multi-modal approach.

The General discussed several axis points into Afghanistan being used by Transcom.

The first route is the “Pakistan ground lines of communication. These routes have zero % military C2, are 100% commercial, involve all host nation trucking and are projected to carry 54,000 containers per year.”

The second route is the so-called Northern Distribution Network. “This year we have had 8327 containers on the ND with 5172 coming via the Russian route and 3155 via the Caucasus Route.”

The third route moves cargo from Iraq to Afghanistan via Turkey or the NDN and “is moving 300-400 containers per month”.

The fourth route is the Trans-Siberian variant of the NDN route. This route opens the “US West Coast and Pacific for shipment with a refrigerated cargo capability and a potential for 400-500 TEUs per month.”

A fifth route is the use of a polar route, which “allows us to move troops to fly non-stop and saves 2-8 hours of flight time per mission. The use of this fully is pending Kazakhstan approval of new routings.”

A major element of delivery of goods is via airdrops directly to deployed forces. “Although costly, this mode is essential for a deployed and distributed force. There is a significant increase in millions of pounds of delivered goods via this route from 16 million in 2008 to 29 million in 2009.”

The air delivered element is significant given the nature of the theater of operation. Normally, 90% of military requirements are shipped by sea and 10% by air; in Afghanistan the balance is different with 80% by sea and 20% by land.

And several innovations have been demonstrated within Afghanistan in performing airdrops. The airdrop approach allows the deployed forces to move directly on their operations without carrying a deployed warehouse; “they can have valet delivery in route which facilitates operational tempo and enhanced security for the deployed forces.”

The main tools facilitating airdrops in Afghanistan are as follows: Joint Precision Air Drop System, GPS rigged JPADS bundle, Improved Container Delivery System (ICDS-HV) dropped above threat envelope, improved container delivery systems, and disposable chutes providing slow descent at low altitude.

A key aspect of managing the Afghan supply effort has been the improved data available through the Defense Transportation System. General McNabb underscored that the “enhanced transparency of data allows us to have much better knowledge of where the choke points are in the system and allows us to seek improvements and identify work arounds.”)

Another aspect of improved ability to track flows of goods and to identify anomalies, which might in reality be significant pilfering in the system has been the use of satellite tracking systems. Satellite ITV on the PAKGLOC allows reporting at less than 20-minute intervals with no gaps in satellite coverage. There is automatic connectivity to the government database. All of this allows Transcom with greater ability to measure carrier performance and has led to “less than 1% of the containers in shipment being pilfered or damaged.”

General McNabb underscored that a key to success in Afghanistan clearly is to be able to provide an effective system of supply. “This is central to our ability to succeed in both military and security operations. And is clearly a capability, which differentiates us from earlier efforts to operate within Afghanistan. Logistics is the core for sustained operations; and the diversified approach we are taking to supply is central to success in this effort.”

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***Posted On July 15th, 2010

Re-visiting the USAF Tanker Impact on Con-ops

Posted on July 15, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Air Force Association White Paper Excerpts

As the support functions ramp up, the USAF has relied more on the KC-10s to provide for the tanker gap. And as the Administration moves forward to make a tanker decision, it is important to re-visit why tankers are so important to the US and coalition concepts of operations. As USTRANSCOM Commander General McNabb underscores, tankers and lift are key elements in supporting the operations in Afghanistan. Given the geography, air dropping and air support is central to operations, and this requires a tanker infrastructure.

In excerpts from the Air Force Association White Paper first published in September 2009, the Impact of the USAF tanker on US global concepts of operations is discussed. The excerpts are published with the approval of the Air Force Association.

***

[slidepress gallery=’re-visiting-the-usaf-tanker-impact-on-con-ops’]

This slide show pictures different operations of USAF tankers in the spring of 2010 [1].
All the photos are courtesy of the 380^th Air Expeditionary Wing.

The US Air Force enhances airpower by providing air-refueling (A/R) aircraft at nearly every location around the world where our own services and coalition partners position forces. According to the 2008 AMC Air Mobility Master Plan (AMMP), “air refueling provides the flexible ‘air bridge’ concept, substantially enhancing our nation’s force projection capability. It functions as a ‘force multiplier’ by accelerating the deployment cycle and reducing dependency on forward staging bases and host-nation support.”

On a typical day, tankers provide refueling capability, cargo hauling support, aeromedical evacuation support, and various other taskings worldwide. For example, on a recent day the KC-10 flew 21 sorties offloading over 2 million pounds of fuel, supporting almost 130 receiver aircraft and augmenting the cargo and passenger system with its airlift capability. On the same day, KC-135’s flew 113 sorties directed by the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) offloading nearly 3 million pounds of fuel to over 325 receivers.

Obviously, the impact of both the KC-10 and KC-135 is astonishing. The combined tanker fleets flew almost 135 sorties offloading over 5 million pounds of fuel, the equivalent of 16 Olympic-sized swimming pools, to 455 receivers on this particular day.

This joint combat capability cannot be duplicated by any alternative means. Without our tanker capability, these missions would not have occurred or would have had severely degraded consequences. Worldwide fighter movements would require multiple en route stops, and some would be almost impossible (e.g., Pacific Ocean transits). Theater combat sorties become short, limited-duration missions with very little loiter time to provide air superiority or close air support to troops in trouble on the ground.

In many cases, the mission would be impossible to execute without air refueling. Contingency mobility missions would require multiple en route stops at locations around the globe, overtaxing the already busy airfields. Air-refueling training sorties, necessary for the proficiency of both tanker and receiver aircrews, would stop, degrading the skills needed for operational missions. Finally, aeromedical evacuation missions scheduled on KC-135’s would have to quickly find alternate means of transportation for the injured with critical medical needs. The phenomenal combat survival rates we have seen in recent years have been, in part, due to the speed with which we have been able to get our injured service members returned to CONUS through the Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) System. The loss of an air-refueling capability would negatively impact casualty transit times and would add to the physiologic stress of our injured service members as they endured multiple aircraft refueling stops and transloads during their trip back to CONUS.

Impact of Grounded Tankers

With the loss of KC-135’s and KC-10’s across the globe, the many missions our tankers support would be significantly hindered. Considering that global air power incorporates the tanker into almost every battle and/or military movement plan, the consequences of the lost tanker capability need to be highlighted. There have been times when catastrophic tanker accidents temporarily put limitations on the use of our tankers and demonstrated the vulnerability of the tanker fleet. Three specific examples – including the 1989 Loring AFB fuel tank explosion, the 1993 Milwaukee Air National Guard KC-135 ground explosion, and the 1999 Geilenkirchen AB, Germany stabilizer trim malfunction crash – illustrate how quickly an unknown, inherent flaw in an aircraft structure could instantly affect the operations of all tankers worldwide.

The following are the major areas where the tankers are utilized every day. If lost, our global power, presence, and flexibility would be seriously degraded.

Deployment Air Refueling (CORONET)

In the early days of any conflict, one of the most critical functions of the tanker is delivering fighter units to the area of responsibility. Tankers accompany formations of fighters across the ocean or over long stretches of land, re-fueling the aircrafts multiple times along the way. Frequently, the tankers also carry cargo and personnel to support the fighter units at the forward location. The capability of air assets to fly nonstop to a theater may eliminate the need to obtain landing or overflight rights from foreign countries who may want to remain neutral in a given operation or conflict.

Without air-refueling capability, the task of delivering fighters to global positions would be severely eroded and in many cases impossible due to limited range of fighters and the distances needed to travel without suitable landing sites.

For example, consider the need to fly a set of fighters to Southwest Asia from the CONUS. Without being able to re-fuel planes mid-flight, multiple ground stops for aircraft and crew support would be necessary, re-routing the flight path to northern Canada, Iceland, and then hopping across the European continent. Short-notice diplomatic clearances complicate this flight plan as many of these clearances are difficult to obtain, require long lead times, and are time-limited.

In addition, during periods of force deployment or rotation, many bases’ need for ground refueling and turnaround are already full with a maximum-on-the ground (MOG). It is apparent that only a few, if any, long-range fighter movements would happen in this scenario. For example, the movement of 10 F-16C’s from Tulsa, Oklahoma to Iraq was conducted from 16-18 September 2008. This movement utilized two KC-10s and five KC-135s transiting through Moron AB, Spain as the only en route stop. Losing these tankers, the fighters (which unrefueled have only about two-hour legs) would have to hopscotch their way to the AOR, requiring at least an additional two days transit time.

A notional non-A/R fighter movement scenario begins with F-16’s at Langley AFB deploying to Kuwait. The first leg spans from Langley to a stop at Goose Bay, Canada. After a two-hour fuel and crew rest stop, the mission continues to Sondestrom, Greenland, requiring another two-hour refuel stop. The fighters move on to Keflavik AB, Iceland, where they stop and rest for 13 hours. The next day the fighters takeoff for RAF Lakenheath, England, where they regenerate their aircraft again and fly to Aviano AB, Italy for fuel and food. From there they proceed to Incirlik AB, Turkey for another full stop crew rest. The mission flies out of Incirlik with the last leg through Iraq to Kuwait. Total duration en route is more than three days.

This scenario does not take into account maintenance problems that usually accompany

multiple stops (seven) of multiple airplanes versus only two stops with refueling. In addition, the crew is required to fly over 12 hours more. This routing is also dramatically affected by weather (winds, seasons, etc.) and, as previously described, the capability of en route base support.

Finally, diplomatic clearances are needed for the countries of France, Greece, and Turkey. At present, such clearances are not difficult to obtain from friendly countries; however internal politics and difficulties in obtaining clearance approval from non-allied nations could delay the movement by several days.

Air Bridge Air Refueling

The ability to extend the legs of many cargo aircraft (C-5 and C-17) over long distances is a crucial function of our air mobility planning. For example, a fully loaded C-5 needs a large in-flight re-fuel over the Black Sea to make it from its departure in Spain to its cargo offload destination in Afghanistan. This prevents the otherwise necessary drop-in to an otherwise already overextended base such as Souda Bay, Greece or Incirlik AB, Turkey.

Additionally, legs from the CONUS to Europe or to the Far East for these large cargo haulers are greatly enhanced via en route air refueling (A/R) to avoid stops at already overused and full bases like RAF Mildenhall, England or Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. In this scenario, the Air Bridge is no longer possible requiring all cargo planes to stop en route for fuel and service as in the Deployment A/R scenario. Planes of all varieties will begin to saturate available ramp space along the flight route, taxing all ground support capabilities and causing many bases to refuse further arrivals due to inadequate capacity. As the scenario progresses, fewer and fewer bases become available and aircraft are no longer able to fly their planned missions simply because there are no longer any viable bases en route.

Our Operational Plans (OPLANs) are critically tied to tanker utilization, especially in the beginning stages. Without the use of tankers, the OPLANs (and our whole U.S. strategy in major wars) would not be executable. This would have dire consequences for the U.S. and the world. Instead of a rapid response to influence an opponent’s calculus, we would be forced toward a timeline that allows others to solidify their positions. With delay, the costs in time, treasure and lives escalate.

Global Strike Air Refueling

Fundamental to our nation’s military credibility is the ability to strike anywhere on the globe. With the loss of the tanker fleet, we lose the possibility of rapidly delivering our strategic bombing force to any destination. As with the previous situations, our strategic strike aircraft would have to hop-scotch their way to targets or sacrifice days to forward deploy to perimeter locations. Air refueling provides strike platforms the ability to reach any target globally without relying on intermediate basing locations or international diplomatic support. Our fighters would be unable to swiftly and directly strike targets in distant locations and safely return to non-hostile areas, especially for missions originating and terminating in the U.S.

Without tanker support, global strike assets would require time to deploy, diplomatic clearance for overflight, and basing. In addition, they would need forward maintenance and operational support as these plans might call for action with little or no warning.

The premise of global strike is a rapid response in a crisis situation. Without the tanker fleet, a response, if possible, would not be rapid. Decision-makers do not have the luxury of waiting to initiate a military movement. As with the example of fighter aircraft, multiple stops also elevate the risk of maintenance problems, which would require additional spare aircraft to be placed at bases in advance. However, this forward-deployment strategy takes extensive planning and immediate action is necessary because crises may occur at any time.

Let’s take a look at a B-2 attempting to move to the forward theater area without tanker assistance. With stop times and re-fueling, the non-A/R B-2 would arrive at the Forward Operating Base (FOB) at the earliest on Day 3. The Strike missions, however, would not be able to be executed until at least Day 4. This must be tempered, of course, with the staging of multiple aircrews, maintenance support, and the possibility of broken airplanes at en route locations. Once at the FOB, the B-2 must accomplish stage operations from there to the FOA until the theater combat operation is complete. With refueling, the B-2 is able to put bombs on target in less than 1 day and return to its home base after a day and a half. Plainly, the strategic expediency of the B-2, one of its core functions, is lost without tanker support.

Theater Support to Combat Air Forces (CAF)

Tankers play an essential role in the employment of combat aircraft within the theater AOR. This tanker support is essential not only to the U.S. Air Force aircraft, but also to those of the U.S. Navy and coalition partners. Intra-theater air refueling enables combat and combat support aircraft to increase their range, endurance, persistence, and flexibility. In-flight refueling allows them to carry a larger payload on initial takeoff by decreasing the amount of initial fuel required, thereby multiplying their combat force and combat efficiency. This capability is essential to carrier-based aircraft. Theater-based air-refueling assets also enhance the security of combat and combat-support air assets by allowing them to be based beyond the range of adversary threats.

Air Superiority with A/R vs Without A/R

Day-to-day operations in a combat area provide an outstanding example of the critical nature of refueling support. Tankers are a major influence within a typical AOR.

For example, the depictions in the accompanying figure show fighters flying Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and Close Air Support (CAS) in the AOR with and without A/R capability. In the CAP scenario, 12 F-22s are required to fly 24 A/R sorties (in a 24-hour period) with four hours of loiter time, then return back to FOB. Each loiter block provides the flexibility to reach out within a 500 NM threat zone and accomplish its mission. Without A/R capability, the U.S. must field 96 F-22s to fly 192 sorties (and must include quick turn arounds at the FOB) with loiter time shrinking down to 30 minutes on station. This requirement almost negates the F-22s effectiveness against enemy aircraft. The F-22 could possibly accomplish a very limited counterattack capability in the 30 minutes of loiter time (equating to slightly less than 240NM of threat zone range). However, after this time, it must tag-team with its replacement F-22 entering into the loiter area to accomplish sustained presence or military capability.

In the CAS scenario, 48 F-35s are required to fly 88 A/R sorties allowing two 45-minute loiters (within orbit area) and/or strike time (kill box area) with an A/R in between. Take away the A/R, and the U.S. will need to field 56 F-35s to maintain the required 88 sorties. This will only enable the F-35 to achieve 5 minutes of loiter time and not enough time to proceed to the kill area and accomplish its objectives. The F-35 will not be able to accomplish its mission of reaching the kill box and successfully return to base. Thus, in either case, without A/R, the mission will fail to accomplish its objectives. The additional force requires additional aircrew, ground personnel, basing infrastructure, and funding to support.

Theater Support to Mobility Air Forces (MAF)

Air refueling within the theater area of responsibility greatly extends the C-17 and C-5 ranges, giving these mobility assets much greater flexibility, capability, and range to deliver their needed cargo. By providing in-flight fuel, these giant cargo haulers no longer need to stop at mid-range locations. Depending on the needs of the Combatant Commander, these assets can adjust their destination or divert locations, accelerating the delivery of time-critical people and cargo. Mid-mission stops for fueling require three to four hours apiece. Each en route air refueling accelerates delivery by that same amount.

Without the tanker fleet, there needs to be more airlifters in the system to accomplish the same velocity and capacity of cargo delivery. With the burgeoning global air traffic, the increases are not easy to accommodate in the increasingly crowded international airspace.

KC-135’s play an important role in the aeromedical evacuation (AE) mission across the globe. In previous conflicts, dedicated aircraft provided aeromedical evacuation. The trip from the combat zone was a time consuming series of hops and stops resulting in repeated pressurization cycles, which were difficult for critical patients to endure. In contrast, current operations have abandoned dedicated aircraft in favor of rapidly transforming any airlifter or tanker into an AE platform. The range and receiver capabilities of these platforms make a direct delivery to the CONUS from the combat front possible. This direct delivery not only speeds care, but it also minimizes the footprint of the medical force required to deploy forward.

The aeromedical evacuation mission has shown an extensive improvement not only in patient transport time from the theater to CONUS, but how integrated the aeromedical evacuation has become within the mobility airlift system…. Today, with the increased medical capability aboard AE aircraft (Critical Care Air Transport Teams), the improvement in AE support equipment, and the increased patient turnover capability resulting from both regularly scheduled and In-System-Select designated AE aircraft. All of these factors work well together due to the availability to refuel MAF in-flight. Today, AMC-wide crews are trained in the aeromedical evacuation mission, as opposed to the limited aircraft and aircrews devoted to the mission in the past. We now have greater flexibility and ability to accomplish the mission resulting in more lives saved.

The tanker is an integral piece in this lifesaving system in its own right, complementing the C-17s and C-130s, sometimes comprising up to 30 percent or more of the aircraft dedicated to total AE airframe utilization. The increased flexibility tankers provide MAF aircraft, greatly increases our nation’s ability to provide timely, lifesaving aeromedical evacuation.

Strategic Nuclear Mission

The object of the strategic nuclear mission is to deter adversaries who have the ability to use weapons of mass destruction against us and to respond as necessary to their aggression. The tanker’s role is to refuel the bombers that are tasked against strategic targets to fulfill this mission. This mission, as part of our nuclear triad, has a very important role in our nation’s defense posture and is the original reason for developing A/R capability. Without tankers, this mission would be so severely degraded that our nuclear deterrence posture would not be as credible. The strategic aircraft flying these nuclear missions are heavily dependent on tanker support to accomplish their objectives. Work-arounds are basically non-existent and extensive re-planning with no tanker support may only accomplish limited objectives. We would reduce our deterrent and our strike capability.

Homeland Defense

Our nation demands the capability to defend itself and support government and civilian agencies in the event of a national emergency or disaster. This mission requires the ability to enforce our air sovereignty with airborne radar and interceptors and the ability to rapidly deliver cargo and passengers to and from the troubled locations. Tankers refuel air defense aircraft, thereby extending their on-station times and allowing larger cargo loads for CONUS-operating airlift aircraft. These are regional CONUS support missions with some tankers in a supporting role and additional tankers on alpha alert in preparation for a quick-response launch for the air defense of the United States.

Without tankers, homeland defense missions will be severely degraded as fighter and Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (C2ISR) aircraft will no longer be afforded extended loiter time in their respective orbit areas. For example, 1 November 2008 was a typical day in the homeland defense mission. There were 21 air sovereignty fighters flying combat air patrol, 10 tankers refueling those fighters, and one tanker on alert ready to launch in an emergency. In an increased security situation, the lack of in-flight refueling resources will cripple the very critical homeland defense mission as fighter and C2ISR aircraft have to continuously land and refuel their aircraft leaving large vulnerabilities in the assigned areas.

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Footnotes

[1] Slideshow’s captions:

In the first photo, a maintenance Airman from the 380th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron’s Extender aircraft maintenance unit provides direction to the flight crew of the KC-10 Extender from the 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron during flightline operations for the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing at a non-disclosed base in Southwest Asia June 7, 2010.

In the second photo, a KC-135R Stratotanker deployed from Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D., and a KC-10 Extender deployed from Travis AFB, Calif., are seen on the flightline operations area for the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing at a non-disclosed base in Southwest Asia on June 2. Both airframes support deployed air refueling efforts through the 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron. The 908th EARS, as part of the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing, supports operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. The 908th EARS is a sub-unit of the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing.

In the third photo, a flight crew from the 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron guides a KC-10 Extender, also from the 908th EARS, to a parking area at a non-disclosed base in Southwest Asia on June 2. According to statistics from Yancy Mailes, 380th AEW historian, KC-10’s assigned to the 908th EARS and the Airmen who support and fly them flew more than 230 missions off-loading nearly 35 million pounds of fuel to more than 2,100 aircraft from January through April 2010.

In the fourth photo, a KC-10 Extender from the 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron is silouetted as the sun sets during operations for the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing on the flightline May 6, at a non-disclosed base in Southwest Asia.

In the fifth photo, a KC-10 Extender from the 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron takes off for an air refueling mission from a non-disclosed base in Southwest Asia in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility during operations for the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing on April 27. For the first three months of 2010, KC-10’s and the Airmen who support and maintain them supported more than 1,000 sorties refueling more than 6,600 aircraft and off-loading more than 108 million pounds of fuel to those aircraft supoorting combat operations.

In the sixth photo, a U.S. Navy F-18 is refueled by a KC-10 Extender from the 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron during an air refueling mission in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility on April 24.

In the final photo, a U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon is about to be refueled by a KC-10 Extender from the 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron during an air refueling mission in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, April 24.

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*** Posted on July 15th, 2010

This Year’s 14th of July On The Champs-Elysées: “Brothers In Arms” With Africa

Posted on July 15, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Celebrating “Blood Ties”

By Murielle Delaporte
[email protected]

The SLD team was there early to capture the moments before the parade officially started: this video gives a sense of the ambiance surrounding the last preparation before marching from the Arc de Triomphe towards the Concorde. Elements of the joint forces in charge of the 2010 Earthquake Operation in Haiti were represented, as well as Detachment Epidote (dedicated to Afghanistan National Army training) and Task Force Vulcain (Bataillon de Commandement et Soutien) both deployed in Afghanistan (the latter in charge of support within the TF Lafayette was just replaced last April by TF Osterode). Among some of the equipment displayed, the American Buffalo, now used by French forces against IEDs in Afghanistan, with the Aravis armoured vehicles, as well as STDI UAVs, also used in Afghanistan, were taking part of Bastille Day for the first time. A total of 4,400 men (including the dropping of eight paratroopers on Concorde Square), 269 vehicles, 241 horses, 82 motocycles, 79 planes (including the French Fleet air arm celebrating its 100th anniversary this year) and 38 helicopters were all present to celebrate the French national holiday.

This Year’s Theme
Celebrating fifty years of independence this year from France, thirteen African nations were invited to open the traditional military parade on the Champs-Elysées: African troops from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Centrafrique, Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tchad and Togo, legacy of the former French “troops of Africa” (Troupes d’Afrique), participated to the 14th of July as “brothers in arms” at the invitation of President Sarkozy, who wanted to honor the African troops role and sacrifice during World War I and World War II and their contribution in the liberation of France (“les liens du sang” or “blood ties” in English). After years of benign neglect, the French government has decided to grant African veterans who fought for France the same retirement pension that the French veterans currently receive.

This initiative has raised some polemic among various opinion-makers (Human rights groups protesting against some African governments; French politicians criticizing a return to the “Françafrique” traditional policy of influence on the continent; some Africans considering it as a symbol of domination; etc), but one shall remember the solemnity and symbolism of these soldiers pacing the pavement in unison and paving the way for better tomorrows under a quasi-tropical rain in Paris during the day of celebration.

[slidepress gallery=’14-juillet-defile-africain’]

Credit photos: Brothers In arms, SLD, Paris, July 14th, 2010

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*** Posted on July 14th, 2010

Crafting a New Paradigm for Manned-Unmanned Systems: Lieutenant-General Deptula Reflects on the MQ-X

Posted on July 14, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

07/14/2010

In late May 2010, SLD sat down to continue the conversation begun earlier in the year with the Lieutenant-General Deptula with regard to the impact of remotely piloted aircraft on the shifting paradigms for air operations.

SLD: You have talked about a shift in paradigms for air operations associated with remotely piloted aircraft. Could you clarify your thinking about the shift?

Lieutenant-General Deptula: We are moving into an era that is much different than the one we just left. Now, that might seem obvious; but moving from the 20th to the 21st century was not just a convenient break point, but it is moving away from the industrial age of conducting warfare into an information age to a degree that is only going to accelerate.

There are people that have grown up their entire careers used to the employment of weapon systems in a linear fashion to execute warfare. Today we are faced with a different set of security conditions. Accordingly, we have to change our conceptions for how to effectively accomplish our security objectives, to adapt them to the flatness of the way information is collected, analyzed and distributed.

We can either capitalize on the technologies that the F-22s, F-35s and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs) bring to the table or not. We can move further into the information age or we can apply old concepts of operation to new equipment. Such a failure to adapt will prohibit us from exploiting the potential of the manned-remotely piloted aircraft interface.

SLD: So you are talking about the possibility of a paradigm shift in air operations, as shift facilitated by the technology but can only be realized by a shift in con-ops as well?

Lieutenant-General Deptula: That gets us into the issue of how are we’re using remotely piloted aircraft, and how they may be used in the future.

Currently, we are using or applying remotely piloted aircraft today in a fashion that resemble the use of segregated ISR platforms in the past. The RPAs have an advantage of providing persistence in this role, even if segregated in con-ops.

97-percent of the remotely piloted aircraft today are used to acquire intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The MQ-1 and the MQ-9 do have force application capability and when their capability is used it dramatically shrinks the ISR strike equation to a matter of single-digit minutes.

Their predominate use today is to acquire information. So while that information is used in conjunction with other force operations, whether they be surface-based or air-based, we still have a long way to go to really achieve seamless integration between remotely piloted and manned vehicles.

SLD: But to achieve the breakthroughs you are discussing, there will have to be as much boldness in re-designing con-ops as developing technology. And we have to move beyond simply relying on iterative technological development.

Lieutenant- General Deputla: I would tell you in the past we let imagination drive technology. Where we are today, is technology is driving our imagination. Where we need to get to is back to where our imagination drives the technology and permits con-ops breakthroughs.

We need to have imagination driving technology instead of just taking technologies that are handed to us and applying them in old ways. That’s letting technology drive us. And that’s kind of where we are with remotely piloted aircraft today. We’re trying to figure out how we can plug them into conventional concepts of operation. We are today with remotely piloted aircraft about where we were in 1918-1920 with manned aircraft. Who was the first organizational crowd that bought in the airplane? It was the signal corps. The U.S. Army Signal Corps. They applied it in a fashion that matched what they were used to doing.

SLD: Instead of balloons.

Lieutenant-General Deptula: They wanted to see over there, they wanted to see further, they wanted to be able to communicate. Well, that’s great,but they’re not the ones that came up with the construct of strategic application of force to directly achieve security objectives. The other question is, is what are the forces for change? What will allow this new paradigm to be built? And I go back to it is a combination of imagination that we ought to use to lead technology.

In the instance of remotely piloted aircraft, where are we going? What I’m trying to drive is a concept for MQ-X that is not just a better version of the MQ-9. The MQ-9 is a better version of the MQ-1. It flies twice as high; twice as fast, carries six times as much payload and son and so forth. There are some people out there who just want to build a bigger, better, higher, faster, greater payload capacity remotely piloted aircraft.

However, what we really need to do, and what I’ve tried to accomplish in building this remotely piloted aircraft flight plan, is not simply build a remotely piloted aircraft because it’s remotely piloted aircraft, but address how we can take new technologies that enable remote operations and apply them to our entire set of Air Force core function areas. Where can that technology be best applied across the core function areas to increase effectiveness for air operations? And then you look at the kind of design that you might want to pursue.

SLD: You talked earlier about modularity; how might that drive a new paradigm?

Lieutenant-General Deptula: Resource constraints are driving us to fewer and fewer aircraft types, which then drives the idea of something we haven’t done in the aviation arena yet. The whole notion of modularity suggests that you can accomplish different mission sets by changing the configuration of the aircraft itself.

This may require an approach different from conventional aircraft design. Imagine a common fuselage, but the wing structure can be changed based on how fast or how survivable or how low observable the overall aircraft needs to be for a particular threatenvironment—or maybe change the empennage. Or we change out the payload structure. We need to build the next generation RPA to perform more than just one function.

That’s one of the key drivers of MQ-X as we design it—modularly. Survivability is also absolutely key as we look to the future. We do not need any more aircraft that can only operate in uncontested airspace. We have plenty of those. This is going to be a challenge.

SLD: And presumably you are focusing on the con-ops as well as the technology.

Lieutenant-General Deptula: We tend to channelize ourselves into stealth, which is good, but it’s also expensive, so we want to be able to produce sufficient numbers of these things, although technology’s helping us with the expense thing. This is what I talked with you about earlier—the notion of a fractionated set of systems. You have sufficient quantity of systems that if you lose some you can still achieve your overall degree of effectiveness by those that are remaining.

The other part of the equation from a RPA perspective is moving toward greater degrees of autonomous operation to avoid the vulnerabilities associated with current command and control arrangements. A greater degree of autonomy brings with it a completely different set of concepts where you can use remotely piloted aircraft to enhance or extend the influence that is brought to the fight by an F35 or an F22.

What you and I are talking about in terms of being able to pair up remotely piloted aircraft with manned aircraft envisions a seamlessness of operations between the two that we have yet to achieve. It is something that I believe we should aspire to so that we can leverage manned aircraft to a degree we have yet to achieve because we have not had the RPA capabilities to match up with them before. However, that’s the direction we need to move, and that’s the kind of leverage or potential that F35 and F22 bring to the equation. We need to apply this kind of conceptual planning for the integration of RPAs with our next generation, long-range ISR strike aircraft as well.

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*** Posted On July 14th 2010

Iraq 2012: An Update in Perspective

Posted on July 7, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

07/07/2010

By Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary of the United States Air Force

The United States has made a commitment to depart Iraq by the end of the year 2011, and planning is in full swing around the country to ‘Make it Happen.’ Bringing some perspective to this Strategic Withdrawal is required so that the next baseline can be established. The target is all forces, less trainers, to be replaced by Iraqi Army and Police across the country. General Odierno calls it ‘Responsible Withdrawal’.

Without a doubt, there are studies being performed in all of the neighboring countries to determine what the region will look like in 2012. There are as many doubters as proponents, but the nature of the two cultures between America and the Arabic almost guarantee that there will be no change in direction between now and the end of 2011.

Already, the Army has taken the actions to withdraw almost all, if not all track vehicles from Iraq, and is queuing them up for refurbishment. They are not being redeployed into Afghanistan, and so have made major moves first to Kuwait, and then back to CONUS. Post Desert Storm, and prior to March 2003 becomes a reset point as in Kuwait, at Camp Arafjon, there is a relatively large logistics and maintenance camp, which also is a de facto force staging center for ground units.

Kuwait and the Emirates have historically been a Port of Call for the Navy; and in some parts of the Emirates there are residual Air Bases, welcomed by the Country Leaders as counterbalances to other regional power centers. Kuwait, historically not a friend of Iraq; and most recently subjugated by Iraqis is now beginning to operate in their interest; which with a weakened Iraq gives them strength. So they are raising Port Fees and demanding more for each service provided; such that one interesting result of both saving their nation in 1991, and then eliminating their threat in 2003 will be the de facto expulsion of US Forces from their now protected Nation.

As well, while we used to have bases in Saudi Arabia, one of the residual victories by the Al Qaeda movement was and is the removal from Saudi Arabia of American bases. This will restore the US to more historical roots in the Emirates, which have always seen the advantage of having strong friends.

In a television interview this spring on This Week in Defense, Vago Muradian asked some pointed questions about maintenance of complex equipment by the Iraqi’s in the 2012 time frame. General Pillsbury was open and thorough in response and said there were no plans for a regional or national maintenance center in the plan. This has a deeper meaning, as historically, none of the neighbors shared maintenance facilities; and each had to have there own capabilities to bring their forces to a high state of readiness.

Clearly, it will depend on the sophistication of the military kit we plan on leaving, as well as what other international or commercial style maintenance might become available to support the Iraqi Police and Military. What we can see from other releases is a move toward Russian Made Helicopters; and C-130 aircraft; as well as light Russian Aircraft. It was thought at one time that the Liberty Fleet might be left, but with announcements for US Basing, that may not have been accurate. Discussions surrounding a counter-insurgent aircraft drew on historic footnotes wherein US Pilots trained their counterparts in the COIN Aircraft and left them. This time; the degree of sophistication might inhibit that activity.

So what may be needed is a forward look at the Table of Organization and Equipment or TOE that will remain for the Iraqi Armed Forces and Police—what lies beyond rifles, trucks, and body armor. Training for such activities is what we have been exposed to by the media; but there is much more that is needed, notably with regard to air and naval forces.

(Figure 2 Rear Adm. Jeffery "Scott" Jones, director, Coalition Naval Advisory Transition Team Mission (left) and Commodore Muneer Saddam from the Iraqi navy, walk alongside the 35-meter patrol boat that Iraqi sailors are being trained to operate and maintain. The Iraqi navy will take possession of the boat in late summer 2010. The training is being coordinated through Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity, Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, Naval Sea Systems Command, and Swiftships Shipbuilding. Credit Photo: Naval Education and Training Command, 6/16/10) — Rear Admiral Jeffery "Scott" Jones, director, Coalition Naval Advisory Transition Team Mission (left) and Commodore Muneer Saddam from the Iraqi navy, walk alongside the 35-meter patrol boat that Iraqi sailors are being trained to operate and maintain. The Iraqi navy will take possession of the boat in late summer 2010. The training is being coordinated through Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity, Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division, Naval Sea Systems Command, and Swiftships Shipbuilding (Credit Photo: Naval Education and Training Command, 6/16/10)

From a perspective of the Iraqi military; it is not clear that the standards that the US initially set for Police and Armed Forces will be met, and there might be a need to be adjusted downward. It is not in the Arabic culture to worry about western standards; and there is no indication that the US will be convincing if they are not paying the salaries for the trainees. The clock is ticking very loudly.

The opposing view, of course, is a ballooning of the Trainers into a very large and complex contingent. But since 2011 approaches a contested election year; there will be no enthusiasm to exceed pre-agreed targets; and very likely, there will be a plan for reducing forces as well in Afghanistan. During a period of drawdown, it is easy to forget about the support to the force given by service corporations such as KBR and many others that provide base support, maintenance;, and operate airfields across Iraq. But they will be the backbone of the withdrawal as well.

Recently, there has been a closing of some of the permanent fixtures like American Style restaurants, moving backwards to temporary outposts. Clearly the Major bases will be watched closely, as the end of 2010 approaches and 2011 ticks down.

Concentration on maintaining the export of Oil from Iraq should continue to be a focus area; and could end up as a trip wire to conflict. The off shore loading platforms were and likely are a continuing target for opponents of stability; and they have been ably defended by the US Navy and Coast Guard elements; this will have to be turned over to Iraqi forces. Iraq’s not so small navy with its small boats and patrol craft that protect its oil infrastructure will need similar training; as their skills requirement will be complex.

Iraq 2012 will be a tense place.

General Colin Powell’s famous quote, ‘If you break a nation, you own it’ might still apply, but pressing sentiment of a recession weary America is turning away.

Already, the thinking part of Iraq is asking the US: ‘Don’t put Iraq in the rear view mirror’. Since they really mean watch over us, as we have in the past, this has implications to our aging and shrinking Air and Naval deterrent capability. With our seeming blindness to deterrent capability while we pursue ‘balance and the current war we are in’ could prove costly in the multi-polar era we are entering. One continues to hope for ‘Peace in our time’, but what we have seen work for the past peaceful period, is ‘Speak softly; but carry a Big Stick’.

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*** Posted on July 7th, 2010

The Projected Impact of F-35B on USMC Operational Costs

Posted on July 7, 2010 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

By Lieutenant General George J. Trautman, III, Deputy Commandant for USMC Aviation

Affordability is the balance of cost and capabilities required to accomplish assigned missions. For over a decade the Marine Corps has avoided the cost of new procurement during a time when the service life of our legacy aircraft were sufficient to meet the missions assigned. However, in the near future, our investment in the capabilities of the F-35B will outweigh the unavoidable legacy aircraft operations and sustainment (O&S) cost increases we will incur with the F/A-18, AV-8B, and EA-6B.

Figure 1 General Trautman in Afghanistan, November 2009 (Credit Photo: USMC) — General Trautman in Afghanistan (Credit Photo: USMC, November 2009)

The O&S costs of legacy aircraft across DoD have been increasing at an average rate of 7.8% per year since 2000. The operational lifetimes of legacy aircraft are being extended well beyond their original design limits. As a result, we have been continually engaged in a struggle to maintain operational readiness of our legacy aircraft due largely to the increasing age of the aircraft fleet. Early in an aircraft’s life cycle, the principal challenge is primarily attributed to the aging proprietary avionics systems upon which the the user depends for warfighting relevance; later it is maintenance of the airframe and hardware components that are become the O&S cost drivers.

The Marine Corps strategy for the last eleven years has been to forego the procurement new variants of legacy aircraft and continuing a process of trying to sustain old designs that inherit the obsolescence and fatigue life issues of their predecessors. Instead, we opted to transition to a new 5th generation aircraft that takes advantage of technology improvements which generate substantial savings in ownership cost. The capabilities of the F-35B enable the Marine Corps to replace three legacy aircraft types and retain the capability of executing all our missions. This results in tangible O&S cost savings.

A common platform produces a common support and sustainment base. By necking down to one type of aircraft we eliminate a threefold redundancy in manpower, operating materiel, support services, training, maintenance competencies, technical systems management, tools, and aircraft upgrades. For example:

Direct military manpower will be reduced by 30%; approximately 340 officers and 2600 enlisted.
Within the Naval Aviation Enterprise we will reduce the technical management requirements the systems requiring support by 60%.
Peculiar Support Equipment will be reduced by 60%; down from 1,400 to 400 line items.
Simulators and training support systems will be reduced by 80%; five different training systems will neck down to one.
Electronic Attack WRA’s will be reduced by 40% and replaced with easier to support state of the art digital electronics.
The Performance Based Logistics construct will nearly eliminate macro and micro avionics repair, and intermediate propulsion support functions.
Airborne Armament Equipment (AAE) will be reduced by over 80% with the incorporation of a multi-use bomb rack.
Compared to historical parametrics we expect our overall O&S costs to decrease by 30%.

The key to enabling these reductions is to evolve our supportability concepts, processes and procedures instead of shackling ourselves to a support infrastructure built for legacy aircraft. We need to be innovative and ensure our sustainment posture keeps pace with technology advancements and global partnering synergies. Working together with industry, the Marine Corps is intently focused on the future as we seek innovative cost effective sustainment strategies that match the game changing operational capabilities resident in the F-35 Litening II.

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***Posted on July 7th, 2010