By Robbin Laird and Kenneth Maxwell

The discourse surrounding contemporary international relations has become dominated by the phrase “great power competition,” yet this framing may fundamentally mischaracterize the nature of today’s global order.

While policymakers and analysts frequently invoke this term to describe the strategic rivalry between the United States and China, the concept of “great power competition” actually originates from an entirely different historical era that of the 18th century world of colonial empires.

More importantly, the globalized, interconnected nature of today’s economy has created a fundamentally different dynamic where major powers are more enmeshed within global networks than they are controllers of them.

This transformation has opened unprecedented space for middle powers to shape how competition among major players unfolds.

The original great power competition emerged during the Age of Discovery and colonial expansion, beginning around 1500 when European maritime powers, Spain, Portugal, Britain, the Netherlands, and France, competed to establish global empires. These powers sought to control territories, resources, and trade routes through direct colonial administration, with the mother country exercising comprehensive control over its colonies. Over 450 years from 1500 to 1945, these major European powers competed with one another over colonies, with no established global rules until the 20th century.

Each colonial empire operated as a relatively self-contained system. The British Empire, at its peak, covered a quarter of the world and was so vast that “the sun never set” on it, with Britain’s most important colony, India, accounting for half of the British Empire’s gross domestic product in 1870. The East India Company’s policies effectively amounted to a massive wealth transfer over hundreds of years, with one study estimating that by 1938 the British Empire had extracted $45 trillion from colonial India.

The key characteristic of this historical great power competition was hierarchical control: colonial powers could dictate terms to their territories, extract resources unilaterally, and operate largely independent economic systems. Each empire had distinct approaches but shared the fundamental ability to shape global affairs through territorial control and resource extraction from subordinate colonies.

Contemporary “great power competition” as an organizing principle for American foreign policy has proved remarkably shallow and short-lived, never describing a coherent strategy but rather representing a narrative of world politics that provides insight into how U.S. policymakers saw themselves and the world around them.

The “return of great power competition” is essentially an easier way of admitting that the United States is in relative decline, as the unipolar moment or the three-decade period of U.S. global predominance that started with the collapse of the Soviet Union is ending.

However, the fundamental structure of power in today’s world differs dramatically from the 18th century.

The U.S. and China were perhaps the two greatest beneficiaries of the phase of globalization that dated from roughly the mid-1970s to the 2008–9 global financial crisis.

Rather than operating as self-contained imperial systems, both powers are deeply embedded within global networks of production, finance, and trade.

After thirty years of intensive globalization, the world’s major powers find themselves more enmeshed in global networks than in control of them.

Global supply chains have become so integrated that China has gained global export and manufacturing share across multiple sectors, but this expansion has made Chinese firms dependent on global networks for components, markets, and technology. The value of U.S. goods imports from China rose from about $100 billion in 2001 to more than $400 billion in 2023, with Chinese factories assembling products for export to the United States using components from all over the world.

This interdependence creates mutual vulnerabilities that did not exist in the era of colonial empires.

The realities of complex interdependence could moderate confrontational strategies on both sides, as geopolitical rivalry between America and China need not make mutually profitable economic exchange impossible. Even so, the rhetoric around decoupling presently outpaces the reality; the U.S. and China will likely find it far more challenging to unwind their interdependence than they would like.

Opening economies to freer trade and capital movement tends to boost purchasing power and economic growth, but geopolitical considerations are increasingly causing some countries to pursue policies that create retrenchment in globalization, including Brexit, U.S. tariffs, and the U.S.-China trade war.

Yet the technology that makes supply chain integration easy has not changed, and economies will still need to interact, creating tension between geopolitics moving toward greater fracturing and technology producing integrating forces.

In this context of interdependence and constrained great power autonomy, middle powers have gained unprecedented agency.

Middle powers are states that commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace, helping to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and “go-betweens.”

Unlike the colonial era, when territories were either colonizers or colonized, today’s non-European middle powers, Australia, South Korea, Japan, India, and Brazil, operate as actors with significant influence.

One of the leading trends in world politics which in the long run, are just as important as intensifying major -power rivalries is the growing desire of these countries for more control over the shape of the global order and greater influence over specific outcomes.

Many middle powers are diversifying their partnerships and clearly not wanting to align fully with either side and know that their ability to overhaul the any bifurcating global order is limited.

Middle powers have developed sophisticated strategies that would have been impossible in the colonial era. With the ongoing major power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, middle powers attempt to rearrange their security strategies and alignment behaviors by adopting hedging strategy to avoid taking sides by engaging all sides simultaneously.

The hedging strategy allows secondary states to maximize benefits from all competing powers while simultaneously adopting insurance policies to minimize risks and preserve their strategic autonomy.

Unlike the Cold War’s nonaligned movement, many “Global South” countries are not rejecting alignment but pursuing multi-alignment on specific issues, based on their calculus of their own interests, colonial legacies, and a sense of inequality on economic or strategic issues.

Perhaps the single geopolitical stance most characteristic of middle powers is an allergy to being recruited into a bipolar stand-off between major powers.

Asia-Pacific Middle Powers

In the context of U.S.–China rivalry, Australia, South Korea, and Indonesia have developed distinct strategies for the Indo-Pacific, with Australia pursuing a more committed alignment with Washington while maintaining significant economic ties with China, and South Korea maintaining a careful balance between the two powers.

The rise of China and Beijing’s aggressiveness have alarmed countries across Asia, representing an opportunity for the United States to solidify partnerships, but these nations also provide basing and access for U.S. forces while maintaining their own strategic autonomy.

Australia and Japan are pursuing a multiple track approach in trade, participating in both the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreements, realizing that smaller trade agreements can be useful tools while the WTO needs reform.

“Global South” Middle Powers

Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa are “swing states” that are capable of creating new power dynamics due to their nonalignment with great powers. These countries have no ideological affinities with each other, and their lack of ideological orientation reinforces the transactional impulse that conditions their policies.

Middle powers have considerable and growing agency to operate their policies of multi-alignment and are not merely pawns in major power contests, with technology competition potentially transforming these nations from peripheral actors to critical nodes in global innovation networks.

The Constraining Effect on Major Powers

The agency of middle powers fundamentally constrains the actions of major powers in ways that colonial subjects never could.

Even Japan, arguably the country in Asia most concerned about China’s growing power, is deeply dependent on China’s economy for its own prosperity, and the same goes for countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, all of which have deep and growing economic links with China.

In addition to its own interdependencies with China, the United States will be influenced and constrained in how far it can push against China by the interdependencies of its coalition partners, as most countries in the region harbor deep concerns about China’s ambitions but none are willing to explicitly align against it.

China’s strategic positioning in multilateral bodies has allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the UN system, but this influence must be exercised within institutional frameworks where middle powers retain significant voice and voting power.

The rise of middle power agency suggests that the future global order will be characterized not by major power dominance alone but by complex multi-polar arrangements where middle powers play decisive roles.

The international system is undergoing a dramatic shift from an American-dominated rules-based order to a more intricate and sophisticated multipolar order, with middle powers holding a special place due to their proactive diplomacy, strong economies, and moderate influence.

But the rise of a multi-polar authoritarian world does limit the flexibility of these non-European middle powers, as all are democracies.

And being democracies they are directly threatened by the political culture and broader strategic objectives of these authoritarian powers.

The United States is the key democratic power, but there is little desire by the middle powers to reduce the global competition to a bi-polar global competition.

The partial unraveling of globalization raises questions about the direction of global order, but mobilizing like-minded coalitions of mostly democracies on certain issues makes sense, even though excluding China and other major powers from all arrangements is problematic.

The United States has an advantage in building regional arrangements with trusted partners, given its shared values and extensive web of alliances, but must operate in regional groupings and partnerships rather than through unilateral dominance.

In short, the contemporary international system represents a fundamental departure from the great power competition of the 18th century.

Rather than hierarchical imperial systems where great powers controlled subordinate territories, today’s world features complex networks of interdependence where even major powers are constrained by their integration into global systems.

This transformation has created unprecedented space for middle powers to shape international outcomes.

Australia, South Korea, Japan, India, Brazil, and other middle powers are not the colonies of earlier eras but autonomous actors with significant agency.

They can pursue hedging strategies, multi-alignment policies, and coalition-building approaches that would have been impossible under colonial domination.

Their choices about how to balance relationships with major powers, which multilateral institutions to support, and what global norms to promote will be crucial in determining how competition between the United States and China unfolds.

Understanding this dynamic is essential for both policymakers and analysts.

The future of international relations will not be determined solely by major power competition but by how middle powers navigate, shape, and constrain that competition.

In a world where major powers are more enmeshed in global networks than controllers of them, middle powers have become the decisive swing actors in shaping the 21st century global order.

The implications are profound: Rather than preparing for a return to 18th century-style great power competition, we should focus on understanding how middle powers are reshaping the very nature of international competition itself.

Their rise represents not just a shift in the distribution of power, but a fundamental transformation in how power operates in an interconnected world where there are significant authoritarian powers challenging the values of the democratic world.

Note: Next year we are publishing our book entitled, The Australian, Brazilian and Chinese Dynamic: An Inquiry into the Evolving Global Order which focuses on the question of the role of middle powers in the evolving global system.

The book provides a detailed analysis of the evolving economic and strategic relationships between China and two significant middle powers, Australia and Brazil.

We explore how both countries, despite being resource-rich and heavily reliant on trade with China, are navigating their positions in a changing global order marked by increasing multipolarity and strategic competition, particularly between the U.S. and China.

We highlight the contrasting approaches Australia and Brazil are taking to address the challenges and opportunities presented by China’s growing global influence.

While Australia is more focused on bolstering security alliances and diversifying markets in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, Brazil is pursuing regional economic integration and leveraging its position within the BRICS group to seek re-industrialization in its partnership with China.

Both Australia and Brazil, as middle powers, are navigating a shifting global landscape where China’s economic power presents both significant opportunities and challenges.

Their distinct approaches to balancing economic benefits with security concerns (Australia) or maintaining strategic autonomy and focusing on regional integration (Brazil) highlight the varied ways middle powers are adapting to a more multipolar world.

The analysis underscores the risks of economic over-dependence and the importance of diversification strategies, while also revealing the growing influence of China through its economic leverage and the concept of an “informal empire.”

The continued development of these relationships will be crucial in shaping the future global order.

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Britain and France were seen as reviving close ties between their services and arms industries, following President Emmanuel Macron meeting British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at Downing Street on July 9, the start of a three-day state visit to the U.K.

Britain and France signed in 1904 the Entente Cordiale, a bilateral treaty for cooperation, “after 100 years of rivalry,” Olivia Penichou, spokeswoman for the armed forces ministry, said July 17 at the weekly press conference at Balard, the defense headquarters.

The 37th summit in London was a “demonstration of solidarity and the importance of their defense ties,” she said. The summit was an “opportunity to modernize and consolidate” an alliance, which included the 2010 Lancaster House treaty.

Macron’s high-profile visit to London included a plan to work more closely on the separate British and French nuclear deterrence, a strategic partnership included in the Lancaster House agreement, which spanned nuclear and conventional warfare.

That French state visit was seen as Britain reaching out to France to repair cross-Channel relations in the wake of Brexit weakening the U.K. There was also a policy drive to strengthen European capability in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and concern over U.S. relations with Europe, with Washington slapping trade tariffs on the European Union, and perceived uncertainty over U.S. commitment to Nato.

The Macron visit came ahead of U.S. President Donald Trump’s unprecedented planned second state visit to the U.K., due in September.

The timing of that U.S. visit, which included a royal welcome, was reported to be driven by the British parliament going into official recess that month. That dodged a perceived bullet of Trump giving a speech to parliamentarians, some of whom object to his views.

Britain and France may be medium powers hampered by ailing economies, but they are seen to be world class players when it comes to holding official events of pomp and circumstance, serving up rich cultural references.

Macron’s visit included a state banquet with King Charles at Windsor castle, with the guest list including Mick Jagger and Elton John, rock stars who are also knights of the realm.  Taittinger, a French Champagne house, provided an English sparkling wine for the formal toast, while etiquette and protocol required the menu to be written in French.

Chancellor Merz Visits

The German Chancellor followed in the strategy-rich steps of Macron, going to the U.K. for a one-day official visit. Friedrich Merz and Starmer signed July 17 the Kensington treaty, dubbed a “friendship treaty,” seeking to deepen military and bilateral economic links.

The search for closer ties for the U.K. with the Continental powers included a pledge of mutual assistance, an unprecedented almost-alliance between Berlin and London, prompted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Starmer’s meetings with Macron and Merz in the U.K. were seen as London’s bid to boost European military capability, and forge tighter political links with Berlin and Paris.

“These back-to-back visits symbolize and reinforce a return of the E3 group – France, Germany and the U.K. – as the driving force of European security,” Nicolai von Ondarza, associate fellow of Chatham House, a London-based think tank, said in a July 18 note.

“Despite Brexit, this configuration has the potential to tie the complex European security architecture together.”

That Anglo-German pact included a push for export sales of the Eurofighter Typhoon jet and Boxer armored vehicle. The two political leaders also discussed development of a deep-strike missile with a range of more than 2,000 km, Merz said on the BBC Radio 4 Today program.

That project for a European long-range missile follows the Ukrainian use of U.S.-built high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), reported to have a range of some 400 km, and the capability to hit targets inside Russia.

Merz and Starmer visited an Airbus factory at Stevenage, southeast England, which is also where European missile company MBDA has a significant British plant.

Those visits by Macron and Merz were a British effort to “reset” relations, but the long-term solution was for the U.K. to rejoin the E.U., a July 19 op ed in the daily Guardian said.

France, U.K. Deepen Nuclear Ties

The perceived importance of Macron’s visit to the U.K. could be seen with a senior officer, French air force general Bruno Cunat from the direction générale des relations internationales et de la stratégie (DGRIS), speaking about the summit at the weekly press conference.

The summit extended beyond “refreshing” the defense ties of the Lancaster House treaty, and also addressed economics, migration, emerging technology, and European security with the U.K., he said. The DGRIS focuses on international relations for the armed forces ministry.

Britain and France, as European nuclear powers, had a responsibility to demonstrate a “strategic solidarity” for European security and “modernize” their cooperation, he said.

There were two Lancaster House treaties – one for nuclear cooperation, the other for conventional warfare – he said. One of the stand-out points of the summit was the creation of an Anglo-French “oversight committee” to coordinate nuclear capabilities.

That stronger cooperation was in response to Moscow’s use of nuclear threats after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Those Russian threats made it necessary for Britain and France to talk closely to each other,  and manage Moscow’s “vertical escalation” of nuclear threat, he said.

The two allied nations had signed the Northwood Declaration, seeking for the first time to coordinate “our independent nuclear deterrents,” Starmer said July 10. “From today, our adversaries will know that any extreme threat to this continent would prompt a response from our two nations.”

Starmer was speaking with Macron beside him at Northwood military headquarters, northwest London.

All Out War

There would be a modernization of the combined joint European force (CJEF), which was renamed combined joint force (CJF), Cunat said. The CJEF had been planned as an expeditionary force, but the threat was now seen as high intensity war on the European continent, as could be seen with Russia.

The modernization sought to make the Anglo-French force more robust, faster to respond, and open to friendly forces, drawing on the lines of the coalition of the willing, he said.

The CJF would be 10 times larger – 50,000 troops strong – and capable of responding in every domain, Starmer said at Northwood.

Regarding MBDA, the partner nations were entering a “phase of development,” Cunat said, in response to the lack of new joint missile programs since the 2010 Lancaster House treaty, and the production of joint weapons below half the company’s activity.

Budget Increase

Macron’s hop across the Channel opened high level communication on military and security policy from the French spy chief and the joint chief of staff, preparing  the way to the president’s  call for higher military spending.

Macron added €3.5 billion ($4.1 billion) to the draft 2026 defense budget, and a further €3 billion in the 2027 budget, setting the aims in his key note speech on the eve of the July 14 Bastille day parade on the Champs Elysées.

Those increases would hit in 2027 the spending target previously set for 2030, with a total budget of €64 billion brought forward, the commander in chief said.

This was a “national responsibility,” he said, pointing up the 2027 amount would double the €32 billion defense budget for 2017.

Macron ruled out the use of national debt to fund that budgetary boost for the services, which he said would be financed by greater economic activity and higher production.

“Our military independence is tied to our financial independence,” he said. “If our freedom carries a price, here it is.”

The president pointed up the French production of weapons, which offered “European solutions” for rearming Europe. Macron referred to the French new generation, surface-to-air SAMP/T missile system, a wide range of missiles, Rafale fighters, the first constellation of low-orbit satellites, artificial intelligence, radar, and anti-drone systems.

“Let us buy European in volume,” he said, adding that European power was the best shield in the face of uncertainty over the U.S.,  China, and the Russian threat.

Macron left it up to Prime Minister François Bayrou to find funds for that spending increase. Bayrou said July 15 the administration would slash €43.8 billion in government spending in 2026, with measures including cutting tax breaks for pensions, freezing civil service pay, and  boosting productivity by cancelling two public holidays. The latter measure, axing Easter Monday and May 8, which marks the 1945 victory in Europe, sparked particular political ire.

France is under E.U. pressure to bring its national deficit to 3 pct of gross domestic product in 2029 from forecast deficit of 4.6 pct in 2026.

Spy Chief On The TV

A French spy chief helped prepare the ground for a spending boost for the armed forces.

Nicolas Lerner, the head of direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE), the foreign intelligence service, appeared July 9 on the television for the first time.

“Russia poses an existential threat in the medium to long term to Europe, democracy, and our values,” the spy chief told the LCI news channel, which was invited to DGSE headquarters.

It was clear Putin and those close to him were preparing the “ideological groundwork” for one day taking “military action,” Lerner said. That made it important for France and Nato allies “seriously to prepare for that.”

The spy chief said the first he heard about the U.S. air strike against nuclear targets in Iran last month was with a phone call to one of his mobile phones by his bedside just before 2 am.  France, along with allies, gathered intelligence on friendly nations, he said, commenting on  the rooftop of the U.S. embassy, which appeared to carry prominent listening devices.

“At the Place de la Concorde there is an installation which poses questions…” he said, in response to remarks by the TV reporter.

France To Be Feared

The media campaign continued with the joint chief of staff, army general Thierry Burkhard  giving July 11 a rare news conference, which was unusually televised on a social platform.

Macron had asked Burkhard – a former army chief press officer – to speak to the press ahead of the commander in chief’s speech before the Bastille day parade.

Again, the Russian existential risk made its way to the television.

“The war in Ukraine is existential for Russia and it absolutely wants to reach what it has set as its target, or what Putin has set as target,” he said. “Weaken Europe and dismantle Nato – that is Russia’s objective.”

Russia was taking a heavy hit in Ukraine, but the nation would rearm and would pose a “real threat” on the eastern flank of Europe by 2030, the chief of staff said.

An update on the French national strategic review was also published July 13, and was available in French, English, and German.

For Macron, there was a call for France to arm up.

“In the end, let us be clear: to be free in the world, one must be feared. To be feared, one must be powerful,” he said in his key note speech in the gardens of Brienne House.

By Robbin Laird

Alan Dupont’s recent analysis published in The Australian presents a clear warning about Australia’s foreign policy trajectory. In his view, Australia is dangerously drifting toward China while simultaneously weakening its foundational alliance with the United States. This drift, he argues, threatens to leave Australia in a “national security no-man’s land” where is not fully committed to its democratic allies nor able to rely on an increasingly authoritarian China that shares few of Australia’s core values.

Dupont identifies four key factors driving this concerning trend. First, he points to the influence of “pragmatic realists” who assume China’s regional dominance is inevitable and that Australia must accommodate this reality. Second, he highlights Australia’s economic dependence on China, with trade ties seemingly trumping security considerations. Third, he notes the political calculations within the Labor Party, which has successfully courted Chinese-Australian voters while breaking traditional foreign policy bipartisanship. Finally, he identifies a strain of anti-Americanism within Labor’s left wing that views the U.S. as morally equivalent to China in its pursuit of global influence.

The consequences of this drift, according to Dupont, are already visible: Australia’s reluctance to publicly criticize China’s cyberattacks and interference operations, insufficient defense spending despite warnings about an increasingly dangerous strategic environment and a failure to recognize China’s systematic efforts to undermine democratic institutions globally while reducing its own economic vulnerabilities.

Dupont’s analysis captures several uncomfortable truths about Australia’s current strategic position. The optics he describes, namely, Prime Minister Albanese’s warm engagement with President Xi Jinping contrasted with a more cautious approach to the Trump administration, do suggest a concerning imbalance in Australia’s major power relationships.

The economic argument deserves particular scrutiny. While China is indeed Australia’s largest trading partner, accounting for approximately 25% of Australia’s trade, Dupont correctly notes that this figure obscures important nuances. U.S. investment in Australia dwarfs Chinese investment by a factor of more than ten to one. Moreover, China’s coercive trade measures during 2020-2021, which cost Australia an estimated $20 billion in lost exports, demonstrated the vulnerability inherent in economic dependence on an authoritarian state willing to weaponize commerce for political ends.

The security dimension is equally compelling. China’s military buildup in the South China Sea, its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan all point to a state whose interests fundamentally conflict with Australia’s vision of a stable, rules-based international order. The presence of Chinese naval vessels monitoring Australian military exercises, as Dupont notes, symbolizes this strategic competition playing out in Australia’s immediate neighborhood.

It should be noted that the Albanese government has maintained Australia’s core alliance commitments, including the AUKUS partnership and continued military cooperation with the United States. The challenge lies not in abandoning these relationships but in managing the inherent tensions between security imperatives and economic interests.

Dupont’s suggestion that Australia should emulate Europe’s approach to China offers a promising framework for moving forward. European nations, particularly Germany, have undergone a significant strategic recalibration following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The shift from viewing China as primarily an economic partner to recognizing it as a “systemic rival.” the words of German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, demonstrates how democracies can maintain economic relationships while clearly articulating their strategic concerns.

This European model suggests several principles for Australian policy:

• Strategic Clarity: Australia should be more explicit about the fundamental differences between its partnership with the United States and its economic relationship with China. These are not equivalent relationships and treating them as such creates dangerous ambiguity about Australia’s strategic orientation.
• Diversification Imperative: Just as China is actively working to reduce its dependence on Australian commodities through investments in African mining projects, Australia should systematically diversify its economic relationships to reduce vulnerability to coercion.
• Values-Based Engagement: Australia should follow Europe’s example of combining economic engagement with clear public criticism of China’s human rights abuses, military aggression, and interference in democratic processes.

What would then be the implications of the approach suggested by Dupont?

Australia would craft a comprehensive strategy that would rest on several pillars:

Military Preparedness: Australia would increase defense spending beyond the current target of 2.4% of GDP by 2033. The Trump administration’s demands for burden-sharing, while sometimes expressed crudely, reflect a legitimate expectation that allies contribute meaningfully to collective defense. A target of 3-3.5% of GDP would demonstrate serious commitment while providing Australia with greater strategic autonomy. And especially the government would commit significantly greater resources to its “fight tonight force” which is suffering as investments shift to the 2035 or 2040 force,

Economic Resilience: Australia would accelerate efforts to diversify its export markets, particularly in critical minerals and agricultural products. The recent success in developing alternative markets for products previously blocked by China during the trade war demonstrates this is achievable. Investment in value-added processing of raw materials could reduce dependence on any single market.

Technological Security: Australia would be more selective about Chinese investment in critical infrastructure and emerging technologies. The decision to cancel the Port of Darwin lease, while economically costly, sends an important signal about Australia’s commitment to protecting strategic assets.

Alliance Reinforcement: Australia would deepen its integration with democratic allies beyond the United States. The Quad partnership with India, Japan, and the U.S., along with strengthened ties with European democracies, can provide alternatives to excessive dependence on either great power.

Diplomatic Engagement: Australia can maintain diplomatic and economic relationships with China while being clear about fundamental disagreements. This requires abandoning the current approach of avoiding public criticism in favor of a more mature relationship that acknowledges areas of both cooperation and competition.

Dupont’s central insight can be put simply: Australia’s attempt to sit on the fence between the US and China is no longer sustainable. The strategic environment has fundamentally changed and Australia’s policy framework must evolve accordingly.

This does not mean abandoning economic relationships with China or adopting a confrontational posture. Rather, it requires strategic clarity about Australia’s fundamental orientation toward democratic values and institutions. As Dupont notes, quoting Thucydides: “Weak states do what they must, and strong states do as they please.” Australia’s choice is whether to build strength through alliance with like-minded democracies or to accept the constraints that come with dependence on an authoritarian great power.

Alan Dupont, “In a tougher, more dangerous world, the U.S. remains our best option.” The Australian (July 18, 2024).

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/in-a-tougher-more-dangerous-world-the-us-remains-our-best-option/news-story/596f55c1f6a7f92d692f3b7095635535