From Reykjavik to Riyadh: Trump’s Strategic Pivot to the Middle East

05/16/2025

President Donald Trump has outlined a dramatic foreign policy shift during his recent address in Saudi Arabia.

The speech signals what appears to be a fundamental realignment of American priorities in the Middle East and potentially reshapes the global balance of power.

A New Vision for the Middle East

Trump’s address presented a markedly different vision for the region than those of previous administrations. “The Middle East should be known for commerce, not chaos. It should be known for technology, not terrorism,” Trump declared in one of the speech’s most memorable lines. This statement encapsulates his administration’s approach: emphasizing economic development and self-determination over Western-imposed democratization efforts.

The president positioned Saudi Arabia as the model for this transformation, praising the kingdom’s efforts to diversify beyond oil and develop what he called “a modern empirical Arabian way.”

Rather than prescribing Western solutions, Trump emphasized that each nation should “be proud of their own legacy,” essentially reinstating power within the nation-state framework.

Strategic Realignment: Saudi Arabia as “Number One Ally”

Perhaps most significantly, Trump explicitly designated Saudi Arabia as America’s “number one ally” in the region—a designation that represents a seismic shift from traditional U.S. foreign policy.

This pivot from established Western alliances to prioritizing Middle Eastern partnerships signals what Murielle Delaporte has described as a move “from Reykjavik to Riyadh.”

The address made clear that the Trump administration sees Saudi Arabia as the cornerstone of regional stability.

Trump highlighted the kingdom’s transformation and urged other nations to follow its example, particularly focusing on economic development and technological advancement rather than ideological battles.

The Iranian Question

Trump drew a sharp distinction between what he characterized as the stabilizing influence of Arab states and the destabilizing role of Iran.

While offering what he called “an olive branch” to Tehran, he simultaneously issued a warning that “repercussions will be real” if Iran continues its current policies.

In one particularly revealing moment, Trump observed:  “I have never believed in having permanent enemies. I am different than a lot of people think. I don’t like permanent enemies, but sometimes you need enemies to do the job and you have to do it right.”

This statement provides insight into Trump’s transactional approach to international relations.

Syria Policy Reversal

In one of the speech’s most concrete policy announcements, Trump declared he would lift sanctions on Syria—a decision he attributed directly to the influence of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

In effect, he indicated that due to the role that Saudi Arabia and Turkey have played, they have changed his mind and that removing sanctions would give Syria “the best chance of success moving forward.”

This decision marks a significant departure from long-standing U.S. policy and signals the growing influence of regional powers in American decision-making regarding the Middle East.

Implications for Europe

The speech carries significant implications for Europe’s role in global affairs.

As the U.S. pivots toward Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern partners, European nations may need to recalibrate their own relationships with both America and the Middle East.

The president’s emphasis on Turkey’s role in regional negotiations suggests he may be attempting to influence European affairs through this NATO member that straddles Europe and Asia.

With Turkey’s complex relationship with the European Union—recently complicated by a EU report questioning Turkey’s prospects for accession—these developments could further reshape transatlantic relationships.

Counter to Chinese and Russian Influence

Trump’s Middle East strategy appears designed, at least in part, to counter growing Chinese and Russian influence in the region.

By offering an alternative partnership model to Gulf Cooperation Council nations, the administration seeks to prevent these countries from being drawn into what might be described as “a multi-polar authoritarian world” led by Beijing and Moscow.

A “Trump Effect” Beyond the Middle East

The president also highlighted diplomatic achievements beyond the Middle East, noting Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s successful brokering of cease-fire between India and Pakistan that helped de-escalate tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbors.

This claim, if accurate, suggests the administration’s influence extends well beyond the immediate focus of the Saudi speech.

Conclusion: A Strategic Rethink

Trump’s address represents what appears to be a fundamental rethinking of America’s strategic approach to the Middle East and global affairs more broadly.

By emphasizing commerce over conflict, nation-state sovereignty over imposed democratization, and pivoting toward Saudi Arabia as America’s primary regional ally, the president has outlined a vision that breaks significantly with decades of U.S. foreign policy orthodoxy.

Whether this approach will succeed in bringing greater stability to the troubled region remains to be seen.

However, the speech clearly signals that the traditional frameworks for understanding U.S. engagement with the Middle East—and indeed, the broader international order—may require substantial revision.

Featured photo: President Donald J. Trump addresses U.S. forces, coalition partners and Qatari citizens at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, May 15, 2025. This marks Trump’s first official visit to the Middle East during his second presidency. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Sean Moriarty).

See also the following:

Trump Outlines Vision for Middle East in Landmark Saudi Arabia Speech

U.S. Elections 2024: The Rise of the “9/11 Generation”

VMM-363 MCCRE

U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 363, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 24, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) perform joint training with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 37 during the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE) at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii, Jan. 21, 2025.

The MCCRE is a formal evaluation of a unit based on approved Marine Corps Training and Readiness tasks, conditions, and standards to ensure standardization and combat readiness.

01.21.2025

Video by Cpl. Anabelle Reedobrien 

1st Marine Aircraft Wing    

The Osprey Evolution: From Assault Aircraft to Multi-Mission Platform

05/15/2025

An interview with Major Sean Timothy Penczak, Operations Officer with VMM-162

By Robbin Laird

The MV-22 Osprey has come a long way since its early days as a novel tiltrotor aircraft. What began as a specialized assault platform has evolved into an incredibly versatile multi-mission aircraft capable of transforming Marine Corps operations. In an interview held in his office at Marine Corps Air Station New River on April 30, 2025, Major Sean Timothy Penczak, Operations Officer with VMM-162, shared his extensive experience with the platform and provided insights into its evolving capabilities.

From Novice to Veteran

Major Penczak joined the Marine Corps in January 2009 and, after working briefly as a Logistics Officer, made his way to flight school. In 2012, he selected the MV-22 at a time when there were reportedly “less than 100 Osprey pilots in the fleet.” His career has included deployments to Afghanistan, Kuwait for Operation Inherent Resolve, Spain with the Special Purpose MAGTF Crisis Response Africa, Hawaii, and Australia.

Afghanistan: Proving the Platform

During his 2014 deployment to Afghanistan, Major Penczak participated in a pilot program called “Enhanced Casevac,” which demonstrated one of the Osprey’s unique advantages. While traditional helicopters were limited to a 40 nautical mile “golden hour” range, the MV-22 could reach that distance and return in just 20 minutes.

“I could get up off deck in less than 15 minutes, out to pick somebody up, and home in about 10 to 15 minutes,” Penczak recalled. “You can max blast out to get to a point of injury.”

This capability proved invaluable for casualty evacuation, allowing injured personnel to be transported to medical facilities within the critical “golden hour” timeframe. The aircraft’s unique combination of helicopter landing capability with fixed-wing speed and range made it ideal for this mission.

Self-Deployment: Beyond Traditional Constraints

One of the Osprey’s most revolutionary capabilities is its self-deployment range. Major Penczak described missions in Spain where the aircraft could “self-deploy to support units located in a lot of different areas,” hopping between islands across the Mediterranean without requiring the extensive logistical support needed by other aircraft.

In Australia, where Penczak participated in two Marine Rotational Force-Darwin deployments, the Osprey demonstrated similar advantages. “We could self-deploy ourselves all over Australia,” he noted, explaining how a journey that would take “multiple hops for our H-1 brethren” could be completed in a single hour-long flight by the MV-22.

The Payload Revolution

As the interview progressed, the discussion turned to the “payload revolution.” The Osprey has evolved from primarily transporting Marines to supporting a much wider range of mission sets through various payloads and configurations.

“What do you want to put on the bird to utilize?” Penczak asked rhetorically. The aircraft can be configured for numerous roles:

  • Casualty evacuation with medical teams and equipment
  • Command and control platform coordinating other aircraft
  • ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) platform
  • Logistics support moving critical supplies
  • Troop transport for rapid insert/extract operations

Major Penczak highlighted a recent exercise in the Bahamas where the Osprey demonstrated its exceptional transport capabilities. The platform efficiently moved an individual who required medical treatment from a remote island to Miami in under 40 minutes – a rapid transit performance that distinguishes the Osprey from other aviation platforms.

Digital Backbone: The Next Evolution

Looking to the future, a significant enhancement which I believe is important for the Osprey is the implementation of a new digital backbone. This upgrade would allow greater flexibility in integrating various payloads without extensive integration with the airplane’s systems, enabling operators to be more responsive to mission needs.

“The less computers, less weight,” Penczak posited, noting how the incorporation of smaller, more advanced systems could further enhance the aircraft’s capabilities while reducing physical constraints, enabling a variety of different payloads for different missions.

Training for Multi-Mission Capability

Operating such a versatile platform presents unique training challenges. Major Penczak explained the deliberate and progressive approach to pilot development, with a minimum of approximately 500 hours of flight time required before pilots can become aircraft commanders.

The training pipeline builds from basic flight skills to advanced tactical employment, including night operations, low-altitude tactics, aerial refueling, and specialized mission sets like hoist operations. Simulation plays a crucial role in this process, allowing pilots to practice complex scenarios before executing them in the aircraft.

Distributed Aviation Operations

The interview concluded with a discussion of how the Osprey supports the concept of Distributed Aviation Operations (DAO), particularly in potential island-chain scenarios. The MV-22’s ability to operate from austere locations without requiring established runways makes it invaluable for this operational concept.

“Marines aren’t going to sit at an airfield. That’s just not what Marines are supposed to do,” Penczak noted. The Osprey can connect these distributed forces, delivering personnel, equipment, and supplies to locations inaccessible to fixed-wing aircraft or surface connectors.

Conclusion

From its early days as a specialized assault platform to its current role as a multi-mission enabler, the MV-22 Osprey has proven itself as a transformative capability for the Marine Corps. As Major Penczak put it, the Osprey represents “the best of both worlds,” combining the vertical landing capability of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft.

As the platform continues to evolve with new technology and tactics, its central role in Marine Corps operations seems assured in the period ahead.

A Paradigm Shift in Maritime Operations: Autonomous Systems and Their Impact

05/14/2025

The paradigm shift in maritime operations involves moving away from concentrating power in capital ships to distributing capabilities across a network of assets.

Distributed Maritime Effects (DME) are the effects created by this distributed force, often independent of or supplemental to traditional capital ship operations which are increasingly focused on distributed maritime operations.

The book highlights the move from traditional capital ship-centric warfare to a distributed, kill web-enabled force. It highlights the importance of integrating autonomous systems and modular capabilities for enhanced combat effectiveness.

Distributed maritime effects will increasingly be created by the use of non-capital ship maritime assets. Air and sea autonomous systems coupled with manned air will generate a core combined capability to deliver the kinds of combat clusters which can create distributed maritime effects supplemental to or independent of the operation of capital ships themselves.

The book explores the potential of maritime autonomous systems (MAS) to deliver distributed maritime operations (DMO) effects. The book also focuses on how the legacy shipbuilding approach contrasts with innovative, modular approaches for rapidly building and deploying naval forces.

The book argues for a rethinking of maritime strategy that embraces autonomous technologies, distributed forces, and innovative acquisition models.

As LtGen (Retired) Steve Rudder notes in the forward to the book:”Dr. Robbin Laird has been leading the reporting on Unmanned Systems and Kill Webs for many years and has been producing forward thinking pieces on the evolution of autonomy. At each achievement, whether it be Ukraine, TF-59 in the Arabian Gulf, or the Australian Defence Force, his articles and books have provided a window into the future dominance of autonomous maritime systems and the journey into the Kill Web.”

“From the technology standpoint, when we talk of autonomous weapons, swarming technology and the associated approvals to employ are governed by the recently updated DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS. 3000.09 requirements established in the Directive include the following: “Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”

“Today’s industry has the technology to field unmanned capabilities today thus we should not celebrate lengthy testing and analysis. We should embrace current technology and field systems today.”

“The possibilities are endless for unmanned surface craft and the teaming with unmanned aircraft. The capability to extend the eyes and ears of the Naval fleets and patrol contested waters requires the fielding and deployment of these vessels inside the current acquisition process.”

“These capabilities are “off the shelf” and, as Robbin appropriately states, are coming WHETHER YOU WANT IT OR NOT.”

For a podcast discussing the book, see the following:

A Paradigm Shift in Maritime Operations: Autonomous Systems and Their Impact

U.S. Marines with VMGR-252 Cold Weather Training

U.S. Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 252 participate in a cold-weather training exercise alongside the Royal Canadian Air Force’s 436 Transport Squadron at 8 Wing/Canadian Forces Base Trenton, Jan. 16-18, 2025.

VMGR-252 and the 436 Transport Squadron participated in this exercise to improve interoperability and increase proficiency and experience maintaining and operating KC-30J aircraft in cold and extreme cold weather conditions.

ONTARIO, CANADA

01.18.2025

Video by Lance Cpl. Mya Seymour 

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing    

Keeping USMC H-1s Ready and Relevant for Today’s Crisis Management Response

05/13/2025

The Marine Corps Aviation Association (MCAA) 2025 Symposium is going on this week from May 12 through the 15h in Dallas Texas.

We are publishing a piece highlighting the role of one of the somewhat undervalued aviation capabilities which the Marine Corps operates today, namely the H-1 helicopters.

By Allen Grinalds

In the opening hours of Operation Iraqi Freedom, one of the first enemy targets was an Iraqi command and control site at Safwan Hill, near the Line of Departure. Armed with unguided rockets, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters closed to within 800 meters.

At 3:00 AM on a moonless night, the operation carried substantial risk of our Cobras taking both hostile and friendly fire—with multiple ground and air units from U.S. and allied forces all maneuvering and shooting at the same time. Despite the considerable hazards, we accomplished the mission unscathed.

Fast forward to today, and the capabilities of those same H-1 rotorcraft—the AH-1Z Viper and the UH-1Y Venom—are continually being transformed to the point that someday soon we will be able to take out a target like the one at Safwan Hill from over 150 miles away with a single precision-guided missile.

That ability to “reach out and touch someone” becomes even more important when considering the vast distances involved in the Indo-Pacific theater. The 2025 Marine Aviation Plan underscores the importance of delivering sustained fires with the extended reach and lethality that Combatant Commanders need on the battlefield today.

An essential contributor to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and its Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is its complement of H-1 helicopters, which perform all six functions of Marine Aviation to include Offensive Air Support (OAS), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Assault Support, Air Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Control of Aircraft and Missiles.

In the early 2000s, investments were made to ensure the H-1s kept pace with the evolving threats on a modern battlefield. Now, over two decades later, we again need to make investments in the Structural Improvement Electrical Power Upgrade (SIEPU) to keep USMC H-1s ready and relevant across the full range of operations for the next decade.

The H-1 Today

The H-1 is fully integrated into the Marine Corps concepts of operation, but like any aircraft, it has limitations that prevent a more lethal pairing with evolving technologies throughout the force.

In some cases, fifth generation fixed-wing aircraft cannot engage certain target types without exposure to the enemy’s radar-guided anti-air assets. Current H-1 aircraft could compensate for this shortfall through exploitation of the low-altitude deficiencies of enemy radar systems. However, today’s H-1 rotorcraft must maneuver dangerously close to enemy forces to be able to do so.

The H-1’s shortfalls in state-of-the-art electronic warfare protection, sensor capabilities, advanced self-defense capabilities, and weapon system integration expose H-1s to both radar-guided and advanced infra-red (IR) surface-to-air missiles; preclude the use of net-enabled weapons; and as a result place H-1s at risk as they must close within enemy weapon engage zones to detect, recognize, and identify enemy targets. These vulnerabilities prevent operational commanders from integrating H-1s into high-threat operations and allow our adversaries additional room to impede the Combatant Commander’s operational plans.

Increased Electrical Power Generation Enhances Survivability and Lethality

The Marine Corps is turning to SIEPU to upgrade Venom and Viper combat performance, address shortfalls in electrical power generation, and make needed structural improvements to the Venom’s cabin. The components of SIEPU include:

  • Improved electronic warfare systems;
  • More capable and reliable communication sharing of information, voice, and data across networks;
  • Integration of advanced weapon systems and data links; and
  • Improved defensive systems.

These SIEPU improvements will directly address many of the H-1’s current limitations by providing advanced protection against both radar-guided and IR-guided missiles, allow H-1s to receive enemy target locations from third-party platforms such as the F-35, and enable the use of precision weapons with ranges up to ten times greater than those currently employed. With SIEPU improvements, H-1s can be safely integrated into high-threat operations with the ability to engage enemy targets from locations undetectable to the enemy.

The SIEPU program will not only increase H-1 lethality and survivability but will also provide a synergistic improvement to U.S. warfighting capabilities by allowing both our Fixed Wing and H-1 assets to operate from tactical sanctuaries where our enemies are either unable to detect, or unable to engage, our aviation strike packages. In essence, the SIEPU program will allow Combatant Commanders to overcome tactical advantages currently enjoyed by our adversaries. To that end, the Marine Corps has incorporated SIEPU into its recently released Aviation Plan, which notes:

“Every investment in H-1s over the next two FYDPs is essential to maintaining a ready crisis response force, pivotal to reduce risk in the development of H-1 Next, and critical to bridge the gap for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as it transforms into a fully modernized fleet.”

SIEPU in Action

Imagine a SIEPU-equipped force scenario: fifth generation fixed-wing assets find, fix, and track enemy weapons systems while remaining outside the range of adversary anti-aircraft weapons systems.

At the same time, SIEPU-equipped AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys take up long-range firing points while remaining undetected, flying under enemy radar resolution cells. Fixed-wing aircraft target the enemy weapon systems and digitally pass the target locations to Venom and Viper helicopters poised to provide fires on unsuspecting enemy forces from an unanticipated vector.

Enabled by the SIEPU program’s upgraded electrical power generation, improved processing capabilities and enhanced weapons carriage, the Vipers and Venoms will be capable of engaging land-based enemy positions from extremely long distances with missiles that can track moving targets and simultaneously engage enemy unmanned aerial systems and other kinetic munitions that threaten U.S. forces with net-enabled air-to-air weapons.

This type of platform pairing will present a thorny problem for the enemy: they can “see” but cannot target fixed-wing aircraft while undetected H-1 aircraft at standoff range launch devastating effects.

H-1 Upgrades Will Maintain Overmatch

The H-1s were outfitted from inception with advanced sensors and weapons, and fully integrated cockpits, but they were not equipped with digital communications or network capabilities to fully realize their capabilities.

SIEPU is not the only upgrade program underway for the H-1. Other initiatives like Digital Interoperability and MAGTF Agile Network Gateway Link integration, combined with the employment of net-enabled precision munitions, will further allow the Marine Corps to fill mission and capability gaps.

These H-1 upgrades provide essential increases in survivability, lethality, and situational awareness. More importantly, they provide Combatant Commanders with an asymmetric advantage that our adversaries can neither duplicate nor counter.

An investment in the SIEPU program will send a clear message to our adversaries that America is serious about preserving our warfighting advantage and remains committed to deterring conflict in a complex global environment. And, if conflict comes, we will prevail.

LtCol Allen Grinalds, USMC (ret.) served as an AH-1 Cobra pilot with tours including MAWTS-1 in Yuma, AZ, H-1 Plans Officer at the Pentagon, commanding officer of HMLA-269 in New River, NC, and combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. Marine Maj. Gen. Glenn M. Walters, commanding general, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, presents a Bronze Star to Lt. Col. Allen D. Grinalds, aviation training standardization officer, Marine Wing Headquarter Squadron 2, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point N.C., August 21, 2012. Grinalds was presented a Bronze Star, the 9th highest military award, for his performance as commanding officer of Marine Light Attack Squadron 269 while in a combat environment. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Yosselyn A. Munnerlyn/Released)

The views expressed in this piece are the sole opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Maritime Strategy or other institutions listed.

First published April 3, 2025 in The MOC, Center for Maritime Strategy

Featured image: U.S. Marine Corps UH-1Y Venoms attached to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 165 (Reinforced), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, fly in formation before embarking the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) in the Pacific Ocean April 1, 2024. Elements of the 15th MEU are currently embarked aboard the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group conducting routine operations in U.S. 3rd Fleet. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Amelia Kang)

This article is republished with the author’s permission.

Earlier, we published a piece highlighting the ahead with the H-1 and its contribution to the evolving kill web capabilities of the USMC as they evolve their concepts of operations within the joint force.

Shaping a Way Ahead for the USMC Light Attack Helicopter

Lula in Moscow and Beijing: Coming to Terms with the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World?

By Kenneth Maxwell

The three major Brazilian newspapers in their editorials had nothing good to say about Lula’s presence in Moscow for the 80th anniversary parade on Red Square celebrating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany in WW2.

The Brazilian President and his wife, Rosângela (Janja) Lula da Silva, joined Vladimir Putin, President Xi Jinping of China, and Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, clad in his army uniform, the 35-year-old victor of a military coup in 2022, among other autocrats on the viewing stand in front of Lenin’s mausoleum.

Vladimir Putin praised his “special military operation,” that is his war against Ukraine. Afterwards at the gala dinner in the Kremlin he praised the role of the BRICS, with Dilma Rousseff, the former (and the impeached ) president of Brazil, in attendance. She is now the head of the BRICS’s development Bank, re-elected with the support of Putin, which is based in Shanghai, China.

The Estado da São Paulo said in an editorial that Lula in Moscow was a “day of infamy”.

The Folha de São Paulo said in its editorial that Lula in Moscow was “not pragmatism, only a diplomatic error .. and that in consorting with autocrats ..  Lula was not only attending the just celebration of the end of the most lethal conflict in the history of humanity, but yes, the glorification of the another actual conflict condemned by the majority of the democracies of their world, with the exception of Brazil. A war of more than three years imposed by a nuclear giant on a ex-soviet republic which has already caused a million deaths according to estimates difficult to verify.”

O Globo of Rio de Janeiro said in its editorial: “Lula in Moscow: The wrong side of history.”

Brazil had indeed participated in WW2,

But not on the eastern Front and not with the Russians. A Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) had fought in Italy, as part of the U.S. military command. Brazil had provided a critical base for the United States in Natal, in the north-east of Brazil, which was absolutely critical to the supply of U.S. armed forces in North Africa, and to the support of the Soviet Union via shipments of war supplies and crated aircraft around the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa and through Iran into the Soviet Union.

This despite the fascist overtones of the Brazilian dictatorial regime of Getulio Vargas and the fact that Brazil had the largest Nazi party outside of Germany, and that the chief of Vargas’s powerful secret police was a fervent German sympathizer.

Lula could well have celebrated Brazil’s participation in WW2 in Rio de Janeiro at the “Monumento aos Pracinhas” which commemorated the Brazilian war dead:  948 men killed in action. 25,900 men, including a full infantry division, liaison flight and fighter squadron was involved.

The FEB saw heavy combat at the arduous Gothic Line and during the final offensive in Europe. By the end of the war, the FEB had taken 20,573 Axis prisoners, including two generals, and almost 900 officers. The FEB served with distinction in several battles including Collecchio, Camaiore, Monte Plano, and Serchio Valley.

It would no doubt have pleased the Brazilian military, and at a time when the Supreme Court in Brasilia is considering the case of the riots in Brasilia on January 8th, 2023, when supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro (who was in Orlando, Florida at the time) had ransacked the Palácio do Planalto, the president of Brazil’s official headquarters, as well as the supreme court building, and the Congress building, in an attempt  to prevent Lula from taking office after his election to a third term, and after Lula’s lengthy imprisonment (April 2018 to November 2019) on changes of money laundering and corruption.

The Brazilian military had after all played a large role during the presidency of his predecessor, former Army captain, Jair Messias Bolsonaro. Army Generals had ruled Brazil for 21 years during the military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985. It could have been symbolic moment of national reconciliation. After all, Celso Furtado, the famous Brazilian exile, economist, and public servant, also fraught in Italy. His participation in the war against fascism was also well worth remembering.

But instead, Lula chose to be in Moscow.

The symbol of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy was a green snake smoking a pipe. Known as the “Smoking Snakes.” It became a symbol of defiance and pride for the Brazilian soldiers who proved their doubters wrong on the battlefield.

Lula received a Doutor Honorius Causa from the State University of Saint Petersburg, Vladimir Putin’s home town It is the University where Vladimir Lenin and Vladimir Putin studied. Lula’s Janja, wife went to Saint Petersburg and gave a speech on “hunger and poverty.” She is 21 years Lula’s junior and was a functionary of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam between 2005 and 2020. She famously told Elon Musk to “f..k” off.”

It is a pity Janja Lula da Silva did not have time in Saint Petersburg to look up the archives of the USSR Academy of Sciences (now the Saint Petersburg Ethnological Museum and the Academy of Sciences of St. Petersburg) which holds the records of  George von Langsdorff (Grigori Ivanovich Langsdorff) and his expeditions in Brazil. Langsdorff was the consul general of the Russian Imperial Court in Rio de Janeiro during the time the Portuguese Court, fleeing Napoleon’s  troops, had removed to Rio de Janeiro, where it remained for almost 21 years after 1808.

Langsdorff  is reported to have 1,500 descendents in Brazil, including Luma de Oliveira, a Carnaval Queen. He was evidently busily impregnating Brazilian women in addition to his duties as the  consul-general of Imperial Russia in Rio. There is a venomous coral snake named in his honor. Lula should have remembered this snake (and the emblem of the FEB) before he embarked on his visit to Putin land.

The Micrurus Langsdorffi is a very nasty reptile.

The Micrurus Langsdorffi; A venomous South American Coral Snake.

President Lula, however, was on his way to Beijing for a four-day state visit to China and to attend the fourth

Forum China-Celac, the meeting between the leaders of several major South American countries (The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States [Celac]) and Chinese representatives.

Lula has eleven ministers, top politicians, and a delegation of 150 business leaders with him in Beijing. He said on arrival that Brazil’s link with China was “indestructible.”

Colombia’s President, Gustavo Petro, said that they were not “only looking one way’ by which meant toward the U.S. Chile’s President Gabriel Boric is also in Beijing. Lula added that he could not accept “that the president of the U.S. tried to impose on the planet earth, from one day to the next.”

While he enjoys the militarily parade in Red Square and the bromides of Xi Jinping on Beijing, Lula should perhaps remember that Brazil is a democracy, and that Russia and China are decidedly not.

The meeting of BRICSs in Rio de Janeiro between 6-7 of July and the COP30 meeting in  Belém,  Pará , between 10th and 21 of November, guarantees that Lula and Brazil are set to remain center stage.

But in Rio and in Belém, Lula should remember, that the Micrurus Langsdorffi lurks in the tropical undergrowth.

The featured image is of President Lula in Moscow listening to Putin and is a screenshot from the official video of the event.

This is the follow up to an earlier article:

Brazil at the Crossroads

Middle Powers in a Changing World: How Australia and Brazil Navigate the China Dynamic

05/12/2025

By Robbin Laird and Kenneth Maxwell

In today’s rapidly evolving global order, middle powers find themselves in an increasingly complex position as they balance economic opportunity against strategic independence. Two nations, Australia and Brazil, offer a fascinating case study in how different countries are responding to China’s rise while pursuing their own national interests.

A Tale of Two Middle Powers

Despite being on opposite sides of the Southern Hemisphere, Australia and Brazil share remarkable similarities. Both are resource-rich middle powers with significant economic ties to China. However, their geographic, political, and historical contexts have led to distinct approaches in managing this crucial relationship.

Brazil is actually slightly larger than Australia in terms of landmass (by about 10%), yet their terrains couldn’t be more different. While Australia is dominated by desert and semi-arid land (approximately 70%), Brazil features nearly 60% rainforest cover. These natural endowments shape not only their resource bases but also their climate vulnerabilities and economic structures.

The China Connection: Trade and Dependence

Australia’s China Relationship

The Australia-China economic relationship is truly massive, with two-way trade reaching $325 billion in 2023-24. Australian exports to China exceeded $212 billion, forming the bedrock of Australia’s global trade. This relationship is dominated by resources, with iron ore alone accounting for over 150% of goods exports to China.

The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), in effect since 2015, has been progressively eliminating tariffs. By 2029, most resources and energy exports will be duty-free, with tariffs already reduced or eliminated on products like barley, beef, wine, and wool.

Beyond commodities, services trade has grown significantly, with tourism and international education seeing a 40% increase in 2023-24. The trade pattern is clear: resources and food flow from Australia to China, while manufactured goods move in the opposite direction.

Brazil’s China Relationship

Brazil’s trade with China is similarly substantial, exceeding $181 billion in 2023. However, Brazil’s export mix is even more concentrated on raw materials than Australia’s, dominated by what analysts call the “soy and steel connection.”

Soybeans represent Brazil’s top agricultural export to China, worth nearly $32 billion in 2022 – more than two-thirds of Brazil’s total soy exports. China sources approximately 60% of its soybean imports from Brazil. Iron ore forms the second pillar, with Brazil sending about $18 billion worth in 2022, roughly 63% of its total iron ore exports. Oil is the third major export, with nearly 40% of Brazil’s oil exports headed to China.

Chinese investment in Brazil is growing beyond resources, particularly in energy (especially renewables), electricity transmission, and increasingly, electric vehicles. Since 2021, all new Chinese automotive investment in Brazil has focused on electric or hybrid vehicles, with companies like BYD and Great Wall Motors establishing operations.

Manufacturing Decline and Economic Transformation

Both countries have experienced significant drops in manufacturing as a share of GDP over recent decades. Australia’s manufacturing peaked in the 1960s and fell below 10% by 2020, while Brazil’s high point came in the mid-1980s before dropping to around 11% recently.

The timing differs notably: Australia’s decline began earlier (1970s-80s), often linked to domestic trade liberalization policies before China became a major global player. Brazil’s more intense deindustrialization period coincides more directly with China’s economic surge in the 2000s.

Australia reportedly lost between 53,000 and 80,000 manufacturing jobs due to Chinese imports between 1991 and 2006. Brazil may have experienced an even more direct impact, as its manufacturers often produced similar goods to Chinese factories, facing tougher competition both domestically and internationally.

This has led to what economists call “primarization” – an increased focus on commodity exports at the expense of manufacturing – which has reportedly affected wages and formal employment in Brazil’s manufacturing sector.

Public Perception and Political Responses

Australia’s Balancing Act

In Australia, the China relationship represents a constant balancing act between enormous economic benefits and legitimate security concerns, particularly regarding China’s military presence in the region.

This tension played out in Australia’s 2025 election, with the Labor government highlighting improved relations and the lifting of some Chinese trade restrictions after 2022. The opposition Coalition employed tougher security rhetoric while simultaneously softening their tone on trade, recognizing the economic importance of the relationship.

The complexity of managing the U.S. alliance alongside the China relationship adds another layer of difficulty, especially with concerns about being caught in potential U.S.-China trade conflicts.

Brazil’s Approach

Brazil’s view of China reflects different dynamics, with clearer divisions based on economic interests. Manufacturing sectors tend to be critical of Chinese competition, while the agricultural sector generally embraces the China connection due to massive purchases of soy and beef.

Political attitudes have varied significantly. Former President Bolsonaro adopted an anti-China stance at times, while current President Lula has prioritized the relationship, visiting China in late 2024 and discussing a “community with a shared future.” Lula views China as a key strategic partner crucial for Brazil’s development and global standing, while still attempting to maintain good relations with the United States – a pragmatic form of non-alignment.

Unlike Australia, Brazil has been more cautious about directly confronting China on sensitive issues, though concerns about economic dependence, deindustrialization, and controversies around Chinese investment persist.

Diversification Strategies

Australia’s Urgent Pivot

Australia’s diversification strategy appears driven by greater urgency, spurred by geopolitical tensions and past trade disputes. Key elements include:

  • Focusing on Asia, particularly India (through the ECTA trade deal, roadmap, and investment funds) and ASEAN countries
  • Expanding globally through trade pacts like CPTPP and negotiations with the EU and UK
  • Developing domestic manufacturing and critical minerals through the Critical Minerals Strategy 2023-2030 and tax incentives
  • Reducing vulnerability in supply chains, often partnering with “like-minded” countries
  • Growing the service sector with more diverse student sources, specialized tourism, and financial hub ambitions

Brazil’s Regional Focus

Brazil’s diversification efforts appear more regionally oriented:

  • Emphasizing Mercosur, the South American trade bloc, especially regarding the potential EU-Mercosur trade deal.
  • Exploring a possible Mercosur-China FTA in the longer term.
  • Boosting manufacturing and innovation through tech parks and the “New Industry Brazil” initiative.
  • Leveraging their clean energy mix for competitive advantage.
  • Using e-commerce to sell directly to Chinese consumers.
  • Attempting to benefit geopolitically from US-China tensions.
  • Focusing on critical materials like lithium and rare earths to build higher-value green tech industries.
  • Using Chinese investment strategically for technology transfer.

Comparative Approaches

While both countries share the common challenge of asymmetrical trade dependence on China, their responses differ significantly.

Australia’s strategy appears more explicitly oriented toward the Indo-Pacific region and traditional Western allies, with a clearer goal of reducing China dependency. The focus on critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and “friend-shoring” supply chains reflects geopolitical calculations.

Brazil’s approach seems more regionally focused and less explicitly concerned with reducing Chinese influence. The emphasis on Mercosur, the potential EU deal, and even exploring a Mercosur-China possibility suggests a strategy of geopolitical balancing rather than decoupling.

Both nations aim to climb the value chain by developing more sophisticated products and capturing more value domestically, though they face different obstacles. Australia contends with the entrenched economic complementarity with China and China’s dominance in mineral processing, while Brazil struggles with innovation coordination, energy costs, political stability, and private R&D investment.

Conclusion: Lessons for a Multipolar World

The contrasting approaches of Australia and Brazil offer valuable insights into how middle powers can navigate the complex challenges of the emerging global order. Their strategies reflect the specific constraints and opportunities they face, suggesting there is no one-size-fits-all solution for balancing economic engagement with China while maintaining strategic independence.

As the global system continues to evolve, other middle powers will likely look to these examples to inform their own approaches. The key question remains: which principles work best for protecting national interests while participating in an increasingly interconnected global economy? The answers may well determine how successfully countries navigate the shifting tides of global power in the coming decades.

Note: in 2026, the authors are publishing their book entitled: The Australian, Brazilian and Chinese Dynamic: An Inquiry into the Evolving Global Order.